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Title: The Public Orations of Demosthenes, volume 1
Author: Demosthenes
Translator: Sir Arthur Wallace Pickard-Cambridge
Release date: October 1, 2005 [eBook #9060]
Most recently updated: October 13, 2014
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Anne Soulard, Jon Ingram and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES, VOLUME 1 ***
Produced by Anne Soulard, Jon Ingram and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team.
THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL I
TRANSLATED BY
ARTHUR WALLACE PICKARD
PREFACE
The translations included in this volume were written at various times
during the last ten years for use in connexion with College Lectures,
and a long holiday, for which I have to thank the Trustees of the
Balliol College Endowment Fund, as well as the Master and Fellows of
Balliol College, has enabled me to revise them and to furnish them with
brief introductions and notes. Only those speeches are included which
are generally admitted to be the work of Demosthenes, and the spurious
documents contained in the MSS. of the Speech on the Crown are omitted.
The speeches are arranged in chronological order, and the several
introductions to them are intended to supply an outline of the history
of the period, sufficient to provide a proper setting for the speeches,
but not more detailed than was necessary for this purpose. No
discussion of conflicting evidence has been introduced, and the views
which are expressed on the character and work of Demosthenes must
necessarily seem somewhat dogmatic, when given without the reasons for
them. I hope, however, before long to treat the life of Demosthenes
more fully in another form. The estimate here given of his character as
a politician falls midway between the extreme views of Grote and
Schäfer on the one hand, and Beloch and Holm on the other.
I have tried to render the speeches into such English as a political
orator of the present day might use, without attempting to impart to
them any antique colouring, such as the best-known English translations
either had from the first or have acquired by lapse of time. It is of
the essence of political oratory that it is addressed to
contemporaries, and the translation of it should therefore be into
contemporary English; though the necessity of retaining some of the
modes of expression which are peculiar to Greek oratory and political
life makes it impossible to produce completely the appearance of an
English orator's work. The qualities of Demosthenes' eloquence
sometimes suggest rather the oratory of the pulpit than that of the
hustings or that of Parliament and of the law-courts. I cannot hope to
have wholly succeeded in my task; but it seemed to be worth
undertaking, and I hope that the work will not prove to have been
altogether useless.
I have made very little use of other translations; but I must
acknowledge a debt to Lord Brougham's version of the Speeches on the
Chersonese and on the Crown, which, though often defective from the
point of view of scholarship and based on faulty texts, are (together
with his notes) very inspiring. I have also, at one time or another,
consulted most of the standard German, French, and English editions of
Demosthenes. I cannot now distinguish how much I owe to each; but I am
conscious of a special debt to the editions of the late Professor Henri
Weil, and of Sir J.E. Sandys, and (in the Speech on the Crown) to that
of Professor W.W. Goodwin. I also owe a few phrases in the earliest
speeches to Professor W.R. Hardie, whose lectures on Demosthenes I
attended twenty years ago. My special thanks are due to my friend Mr.
P.E. Matheson of New College, for his kindness in reading the
proof-sheets, and making a number of suggestions, which have been of
great assistance to me.
The text employed has been throughout that of the late Mr. S.H. Butcher
in the _Bibliotheca Classica Oxoniensis_. Any deviations from this are
noted in their place.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION i. 7
LIST OF SPEECHES TRANSLATED
Traditional Order In this Edition
ORATION I. OLYNTHIAC I i. 87
II. OLYNTHIAC II i. 99
III. OLYNTHIAC III i. 109
IV. PHILIPPIC I i. 68
V. ON THE PEACE i. 120
VI. PHILIPPIC II i. 133
VIII. ON THE CHERSONESE ii. 3
IX. PHILIPPIC III ii. 26
XIV. ON THE NAVAL BOARDS i. 31
XV. FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS i. 56
XVI. FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS i. 45
XVIII. ON THE CROWN ii. 47
XIX. ON THE EMBASSY i. 144
NOTES ii. 149
INTRODUCTION
Demosthenes, the son of Demosthenes of Paeania in Attica, a rich and
highly respected factory-owner, was born in or about the year 384 B.C.
He was early left an orphan; his guardians mismanaged his property for
their own advantage; and although, soon after coming of age in 366, he
took proceedings against them and was victorious in the law-courts, he
appears to have recovered comparatively little from them. In preparing
for these proceedings he had the assistance of Isaeus, a teacher and
writer of speeches who was remarkable for his knowledge of law, his
complete mastery of all the aspects of any case with which he had to
do, and his skill in dealing with questions of ownership and
inheritance. Demosthenes' speeches against his guardians show plainly
the influence of Isaeus, and the teacher may have developed in his
pupil the thoroughness and the ingenuity in handling legal arguments
which afterwards became characteristic of his work.
Apart from this litigation with his guardians, we know little of
Demosthenes' youth and early manhood. Various stories have come down to
us (for the most part not on the best authority), of his having been
inspired to aim at an orator's career by the eloquence and fame of
Callistratus; of his having overcome serious physical defects by
assiduous practice; of his having failed, nevertheless, owing to
imperfections of delivery, in his early appearances before the people,
and having been enabled to remedy these by the instruction of the
celebrated actor Satyrus; and of his close study of the _History_ of
Thucydides. Upon the latter point the evidence of his early style
leaves no room for doubt, and the same studies may have contributed to
the skill and impressiveness with which, in nearly every oration, he
appeals to the events of the past, and sums up the lessons of history.
Whether he came personally under the influence either of Plato, the
philosopher, or of Isocrates, the greatest rhetorical teacher of his
time, and a political pamphleteer of high principles but little
practical insight, is much more doubtful. The two men were almost as
different in temperament and aims as it was possible to be, but
Demosthenes' familiarity with the published speeches of Isocrates, and
with the rhetorical principles which Isocrates taught and followed, can
scarcely be questioned.
In the early years of his manhood, Demosthenes undertook the
composition of speeches for others who were engaged in litigation. This
task required not only a very thorough knowledge of law, but the power
of assuming, as it were, the character of each separate client, and
writing in a tone appropriate to it; and, not less, the ability to
interest and to rouse the active sympathy of juries, with whom feeling
was perhaps as influential as legal justification. This part, however,
of Demosthenes' career only concerns us here in so far as it was an
admirable training for his later work in the larger sphere of politics,
in which the same qualities of adaptability and of power both to argue
cogently and to appeal to the emotions effectively were required in an
even higher degree.
At the time when Demosthenes' interest in public affairs was beginning
to take an active form, Athens was suffering from the recent loss of
some of her most powerful allies. In the year 358 B.C. she had counted
within the sphere of her influence not only the islands of Lemnos,
Imbros, and Scyros (which had been guaranteed to her by the Peace of
Antalcidas in 387), but also the chief cities of Euboea, the islands of
Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Samos, Mytilene in Lesbos, the towns of the
Chersonese, Byzantium (a city of the greatest commercial importance),
and a number of stations on the south coast of Thrace, as well as
Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, and the greater part of the country bordering
upon the Thermaic Gulf. But her failure to observe the terms of
alliance, laid down when the new league was founded in 378, had led to
a revolt, which ended in 355 or 354 in the loss to her of Chios, Cos,
Rhodes, and Byzantium, and of some of the ablest of her own commanders,
and left her treasury almost empty. About the same time Mytilene and
Corcyra also took the opportunity to break with her. Moreover, her
position in the Thermaic region was threatened first by Olynthus, at
the head of the Chalcidic League, which included over thirty towns; and
secondly by Philip, the newly-established King of Macedonia, who seemed
likely to displace both Olynthus and Athens from their positions of
commanding influence.[1]
Nevertheless, Athens, though unable to face a strong combination, was
probably the most powerful single state in Greece. In her equipment and
capacity for naval warfare she had no rival, and certainly no other
state could vie with her in commercial activity and prosperity. The
power of Sparta in the Peloponnese had declined greatly. The
establishment of Megalopolis as the centre of a confederacy of Arcadian
tribes, and of Messene as an independent city commanding a region once
entirely subject to Sparta, had seriously weakened her position; while
at the same time her ambition to recover her supremacy kept alive a
feeling of unrest throughout the Peloponnese. Of the other states of
South Greece, Argos was hostile to Sparta, Elis to the Arcadians;
Corinth and other less important cities were not definitely attached to
any alliance, but were not powerful enough to carry out any serious
movement alone. In North Greece, Thebes, though she lacked great
leaders, was still a great power, whose authority throughout Boeotia
had been strengthened by the complete or partial annihilation of
Platacae, Thespiae, Orchomenus,[2] and Coroneia. In Athens the ill
feeling against Thebes was strong, owing to the occupation by the
Thebans of Oropus,[2] a frontier town which Athens claimed, and their
treatment of the towns just mentioned, towards which the Athenians were
kindly disposed. The Phocians, who had until recently been unwilling
allies of Thebes, were now hostile and not insignificant neighbours,
and about this time entered into relations with both Sparta and Athens.
The subject of contention was the possession or control of the Temple
of Apollo at Delphi, which the Phocians had recently taken by force
from the Delphians, who were supported by Thebes; and in the 'Sacred
War' to which this act (which was considered to be sacrilege) gave rise
in 355 B.C., the Thebans and Locrians fought against the Phocians in
the name of the Amphictyonic Council, a body (composed of
representatives of tribes and states of very unequal importance[3]) to
which the control of the temple traditionally belonged. Thessaly
appears to have been at this time more or less under Theban influence,
but was immediately dominated by the tyrants of Pherae, though the
several cities seem each to have possessed a nominally independent
government. The Greek peoples were disunited in fact and unfitted for
union by temperament. The twofold desire, felt by almost all the more
advanced Greek peoples, for independence on the one hand, and for
'hegemony' or leadership among other peoples, on the other, rendered
any effective combination impossible, and made the relations of states
to one another uncertain and inconstant. While each people paid respect
to the spirit of autonomy, when their own autonomy was in question,
they were ready to violate it without scruple when they saw their way
to securing a predominant position among their neighbours; and although
the ideal of Panhellenic unity had been put before Greece by Gorgias
and Isocrates, its realization did not go further than the formation of
leagues of an unstable character, each subject, as a rule, to the more
or less tyrannical domination of some one member.
Probably the power which was most generally feared in the Greek world
was that of the King of Persia. Several times in recent years (and
particularly in 387 and 367) he had been requested to make and enforce
a general settlement of Hellenic affairs. The settlement of 387 (called
the King's Peace, or the Peace of Antalcidas, after the Spartan officer
who negotiated it) had ordained the independence of the Greek cities,
small and great, with the exception of those in Asia Minor, which were
to form part of the Persian Empire, and of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros,
which were to belong to Athens as before. The attempt to give effect to
the arrangement negotiated in 367 failed, and the terms of the Peace of
Antalcidas, though it was still appealed to, when convenient, as a
charter of liberty, also came to be disregarded. But there was always a
sense of the possibility or the danger of provoking the great king to
exert his strength, or at least to use his wealth, to the detriment of
some or all of the Greek states; though at the moment of which we are
speaking (about 355) the Persian Empire itself was suffering from
recent disorders and revolutions, and the king had little leisure for
interfering in the affairs of Greece.
It was to the department of foreign and inter-Hellenic affairs that
Demosthenes principally devoted himself. His earliest political
speeches, however, were composed and delivered in furtherance of
prosecutions for the crime of proposing illegal legislation. These were
the speeches against Androtion (spoken by Diodorus in 355) and against
Leptines (in 354). Both these were written to denounce measures which
Demosthenes regarded as dishonest or unworthy of Athenian traditions.
In the former he displays that desire for clean-handed administration
which is so prominent in some of his later speeches; and in the
prosecution of Leptines he shows his anxiety that Athens should retain
her reputation for good faith. Both speeches, like those of the year
352 against Timocrates (spoken by Diodorus), and against Aristocrates
(spoken by Euthycles), are remarkable for thoroughness of argument and
for the skill which is displayed in handling legal and political
questions, though, like almost all Athenian forensic orations, they are
sometimes sophistical in argument.
The first speech which is directly devoted to questions of external
policy is that on the Naval Boards in 354; and this is followed within
the next two years by speeches delivered in support of appeals made to
Athens by the people of Megalopolis and by the exiled democratic party
of Rhodes. From these speeches it appears that the general lines of
Demosthenes' policy were already determined. He was in opposition to
Eubulus, who, after the disastrous termination of the war with the
allies, had become the leading statesman in Athens. The strength of
Eubulus lay in his freedom from all illusion as to the position in
which Athens stood, in his ability as a financier, and in his readiness
to take any measures which would enable him to carry out his policy. He
saw that the prime necessity of the moment was to recruit the financial
and material strength of the city; that until this should be effected,
she was quite incapable of carrying on war with any other power; and
that she could only recover her strength through peace. In this policy
he had the support of the well-to-do classes, who suffered heavily in
time of war from taxation and the disturbance of trade. On the other
hand, the sentiments of the masses were imperialistic and militant. We
gather that there were plenty of orators who made a practice of
appealing to the glorious traditions of the past and the claim always
made by Athens to leadership among the Greek states. To buy off the
opposition which his policy might be expected to encounter, Eubulus
distributed funds freely to the people, in the shape of
'Festival-money', adopting the methods employed before him by
demagogues, very different from himself, in order that he might
override the real sentiments of the democracy; and in spite of the
large amounts thus spent he did in fact succeed, in the course of a few
years, in collecting a considerable sum without resorting to
extraordinary taxation, in greatly increasing the navy and in enlarging
the dockyards. For the success of this policy it was absolutely
necessary to avoid all entanglement in war, except under the strongest
compulsion. The appeals of the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians, to
yield to which would probably have meant war with Sparta and with
Persia, must be rejected. Even in dealing with Philip, who was making
himself master of the Athenian allies on the Thermaic coast, the fact
of the weakness of Athens must be recognized, and all idea of a great
expedition against Philip must be abandoned for the present. At the
same time, some necessary measures of precaution were not neglected. It
was essential to secure the route to the Euxine, over which the
Athenian corn-trade passed, if corn was not to be sold at famine
prices. For this purpose, therefore, alliance was made with the
Thracian prince, Cersobleptes; and when Philip threatened Heraeon
Teichos on the Propontis, an expedition was prepared, and was only
abandoned because Philip himself was forced to desist from his attempt
by illness. Similarly, when Philip appeared likely to cross the Pass of
Thermopylae in 352, an Athenian force was sent (on the proposal of
Diophantus, a supporter of Eubulus) to prevent him. The failure of
Eubulus and his party to give effective aid to Olynthus against Philip
was due to the more pressing necessity of attempting to recover control
of Euboea: it had clearly been their intention to save Olynthus, if
possible. But when this had proved impossible, and the attempt to form
a Hellenic league against Philip had also failed, facts had once more
to be recognized; and, since Athens was now virtually isolated, peace
must be made with Philip on the only terms which he would accept--that
each side should keep what it _de facto_ possessed at the time.
Demosthenes was generally in opposition to Eubulus and his party, of
which Aeschines (once an actor and afterwards a clerk, but a man of
education and great natural gifts) was one of the ablest members.
Demosthenes was inspired by the traditions of the past, but had a much
less vague conception of the moral to be drawn from them than had the
multitude. Athens, for him as for them, was to be the first state in
Hellas; she was above all to be the protectress of democracy
everywhere, against both absolutism and oligarchy, and the leader of
the Hellenes in resistance to foreign aggression. But, unlike the
multitude, Demosthenes saw that this policy required the greatest
personal effort and readiness for sacrifice on the part of every
individual; and he devotes his utmost energies to the task of arousing
his countrymen to the necessary pitch of enthusiasm, and of effecting
such reforms in administration and finance as, in his opinion, would
make the realization of his ideal for Athens possible. In the speeches
for the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians, the nature of this ideal is
already becoming clear both in its Athenian and in its Panhellenic
aspects. But so soon as it appeared that Philip, at the head of the
half-barbarian Macedonians, and not Athens, was likely to become the
predominant power in the Hellenic world, it was against Philip that all
his efforts were directed; and although in 346 he is practically at one
with the party of Eubulus in his recognition of the necessity of peace,
he is eager, when the opportunity seems once more to offer itself, to
resume the conflict, and, when it is resumed, to carry it through to
the end.
We have then before us the sharp antagonism of two types of
statesmanship. The strength of the one lies in the recognition of
actual facts, and the avoidance of all projects which seem likely,
under existing circumstances, to fail. The other is of a more sanguine
type, and believes in the power of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice to
transform the existing facts into something better, and to win success
against all odds. Statesmen of the former type are always attacked as
unpatriotic and mean-spirited; those of the latter, as unpractical and
reckless. There is truth and falsehood in both accusations: but since
no statesman has ever combined all the elements of statesmanship in a
perfect and just proportion, and since neither prudence and
clear-sightedness, nor enthusiastic and generous sentiment, can ever be
dispensed with in the conduct of affairs without loss, a larger view
will attach little discredit to either type. While, therefore, we may
view with regret some of the methods which both Demosthenes and
Aeschines at times condescended to use in their conflicts with one
another, and with no less regret the disastrous result of the policy
which ultimately carried the day, we need not hesitate to give their
due to both of the contending parties: nor, while we recognize that
Eubulus and Phocion (his sturdiest supporter in the field and in
counsel) took the truer view of the situation, and of the character of
the Athenians as they were, need we (as it is now fashionable to do)
denounce the orator who strove with unstinting personal effort and
self-sacrifice to rouse the Athenians into a mood in which they could
and would realize the ideal to which they, no less than he, professed
their devotion.
But the difficulties in the way of such a realization were wellnigh
insuperable. Neither the political nor the military system of Athens
was adapted to such a policy. The Sovereign Assembly, though capable of
sensible and energetic action at moments of special danger, was more
likely to be moved by feeling and prejudice than by businesslike
argument, particularly at a time when the tendency of the best educated
and most intelligent men was to withdraw from participation in public
life; and meeting, as the Assembly did (unless specially summoned),
only at stated intervals, it was incapable of taking such rapid,
well-timed, and decisive action as Philip could take, simply because he
was a single man, sole master of his own policy, and personally in
command of his own forces. The publicity which necessarily attached to
the discussions of the Assembly was a disadvantage at a time when many
plans would better have been kept secret; and rapid modifications of
policy, to suit sudden changes in the situation, were almost
impossible. Again, while no subjects are so unsuited under any
circumstances for popular discussion as foreign and military affairs,
the absence in Athens of a responsible ministry greatly increased the
difficulties of her position. It is true that the Controller of the
Festival Fund (whose office gradually became more and more important)
was now appointed for four years at a time, while all other offices
were annual; and that he and his friends, and their regular opponents,
were generally ready to take the lead in making proposals to the
Council or the Assembly. But if they chose to remain silent, they could
do so;[4] no one was bound to make any proposal at all; and, on the
other hand, any one might do so. With such a want of system, far too
much was left to chance or to the designs of interested persons.
Moreover, the Assembly felt itself under no obligation to follow for
any length of time any lead which might be given to it, or to maintain
any continuity or consistency between its own decrees. In modern times,
a minister, brought into power by the will of the majority of the
people, can reckon for a considerable period upon the more or less
loyal support of the majority for himself and his official colleagues.
In Athens the leader of the moment had to be perpetually adapting
himself afresh to the mood of the Assembly, and even to deceive it, in
order that he might lead at all, or carry out the policy which, in his
opinion, his country's need required. It is therefore a remarkable
thing that both Eubulus and Demosthenes succeeded for many years in
maintaining a line of action as consistent as that taken by practical
men can ever be.
The fact that the Council of Five Hundred, which acted as a standing
committee of the people, and prepared business for the Assembly and was
responsible for the details of measures passed by the Assembly in
general form, was chosen by lot and changed annually, as did
practically all the civil and the military officials (though the latter
might be re-elected), was all against efficiency and continuity of
policy.[5] After the system of election by lot, the most characteristic
feature of the Athenian democracy was the responsibility of statesmen
and generals to the law-courts.[6] Any citizen might accuse them upon
charges nominally limited in scope, but often serving in reality to
bring their whole career into question. Had it been certain that the
courts would only punish incompetence or misconduct, and not failure as
such, little harm would have resulted. But although there were very
many acquittals in political trials, the uncertainty of the issue was
so great, and the sentences inflicted upon the condemned so severe
(commonly involving banishment at least), that the liability to trial
as a criminal must often have deterred the statesman and the general
from taking the most necessary risks; while the condemnation of the
accused had usually the result of driving a really able man out of the
country, and depriving his fellow countrymen of services which might be
urgently required when they were no longer available.
The financial system was also ill adapted for the purposes of a people
constantly liable to war. The funds required for the bare needs of a
time of peace seem indeed to have been sufficiently provided from
permanent sources of income (such as the silver mines, the rent of
public lands, court fees and fines, and various indirect taxes): but
those needed for war had to be met by a direct tax upon property,
levied _ad hoc_ whenever the necessity arose, and not collected without
delays and difficulties. And although the equipment of ships for
service was systematically managed under the trierarchic laws,[7] it
was still subject to delays no less serious. There was no regular
system of contribution to State funds, and no systematic accumulation
of a reserve to meet military needs. The raising of money by means of
loans at interest to the State was only adopted in Greece in a few
isolated instances:[8] and the practice of annually distributing
surplus funds to the people,[9] however necessary or excusable under
the circumstances, was wholly contrary to sound finance.
An even greater evil was the dependence of the city upon mercenary
forces and generals, whose allegiance was often at the call of the
highest bidder, and in consequence was seldom reliable. There is no
demand which Demosthenes makes with greater insistence, than the demand
that the citizens themselves shall serve with the army. At a moment of
supreme danger, they might do so. But in fact Athens had become more
and more an industrial state, and men were not willing to leave their
business to take care of itself for considerable periods, in order to
go out and fight, unless the danger was very urgent, or the interests
at stake of vital importance; particularly now that the length of
campaigns had become greater and the seasons exempted from military
operations shorter. In many minds the spread of culture, and of the
ideal of self-culture, had produced a type of individualism indifferent
to public concerns, and contemptuous of political and military
ambitions. Moreover, the methods of warfare had undergone great
improvement; in most branches of the army the trained skill of the
professional soldier was really necessary; and it was not possible to
leave the olive-yard or the counting-house and become an efficient
fighter without more ado. But the expensiveness of the mercenary
forces; the violent methods by which they obtained supplies from
friends and neutrals, as well as foes, if, as often happened, their pay
was in arrear; and the dependence of the city upon the goodwill of
generals and soldiers who could without much difficulty find employment
under other masters, were evils which were bound to hamper any attempt
to give effect to a well-planned and far-sighted scheme of action.
It also resulted from the Athenian system of government that the
general, while obviously better informed of the facts of the military
situation than any one else could be, and at the same time always
liable to be brought to trial in case of failure, had little influence
upon policy, unless he could find an effective speaker to represent
him. In the Assembly and in the law-courts (where the juries were large
enough to be treated in the same manner as the Assembly itself) the
orator who could win the people's ear was all powerful, and expert
knowledge could only make itself felt through the medium of oratory.
A constitution which gave so much power to the orator had grave
disadvantages. The temptation to work upon the feelings rather than to
appeal to the reason of the audience was very strong, and no charge is
more commonly made by one orator against another than that of deceiving
or attempting to deceive the people. It is, indeed, very difficult to
judge how far an Athenian Assembly was really taken in by sophistical
or dishonest arguments: but it is quite certain that such arguments
were continually addressed to it; and the main body of the citizens can
scarcely have had that first-hand knowledge of facts, which would
enable them to criticize the orator's statements. Again, the oration
appealed to the people as a performance, no less than as a piece of
reasoning. Ancient political oratory resembled the oratory of the
pulpit at the present day, not only because it appealed perpetually to
the moral sense, and was in fact a kind of preaching; but also because
the main difficulty of the ancient orator and the modern preacher was
the same: for the Athenians liked being preached at, as the modern
congregation 'enjoys' a good sermon, and were, therefore, almost
equally immune against conversion. The conflicts of rival orators were
regarded mainly as an entertainment. The speaker who was most likely to
carry the voting (except when a great crisis had roused the Assembly to
seriousness) was the one who found specious and apparently moral
reasons for doing what would give the audience least trouble; and
consequently one who, like Demosthenes, desired to stir them up to
action and personal sacrifices, had always an uphill fight: and if he
also at times 'deceived the people' or employed sophistical arguments
in order to secure results which he believed to be for their good, we
must remember the difficulty (which, in spite of the wide circulation
of authentic information, is at least equally great at the present day)
of putting the true reasons for or against a policy, before those who,
whether from want of education or from lack of training in the
subordination of feeling to thought, are not likely to understand or to
listen to them. Nor, if we grant the genuineness of Demosthenes'
conviction as to the desirability of the end for which he contended,
can many statesmen be pointed out, who have not been at least as guilty
as he in their choice of means. That he did not solve the problem, how
to lead a democracy by wholly honest means, is the less to his
discredit, in that the problem still remains unsolved.
It should be added that with an audience like the Athenian, whose
aesthetic sensitiveness was doubtless far greater than that of any
modern assembly, delivery counted for much. Aeschines' fine voice was a
real danger to Demosthenes, and Demosthenes himself spoke of delivery,
or the skilled acting of his part, as the all-important condition of an
orator's success. But it is clear that this can have been no advantage
from the standpoint of the public interest.
In the law-courts the drawbacks to which the commanding influence of
oratory was liable were intensified. In the Assembly a certain amount
of reticence and self-restraint was imposed by custom: an opponent
could not be attacked by name or on purely personal grounds; and an
appearance of impartiality was commonly assumed. But in the courts much
greater play was allowed to feeling; and the arguments were often much
more disingenuous, not only because the personal interests at stake
made the speaker more unscrupulous, but also, perhaps, because the
juries ordinarily included a larger proportion of the poorer, the
idler, and the less-educated citizens than the Assembly. The legal
question was often that to which the jury were encouraged to pay least
attention, and the condemnation or acquittal of the accused was
demanded upon grounds quite extraneous to the indictment. (The two
court-speeches contained in these volumes afford abundant illustrations
of this.) Personalities were freely admitted, of a kind which it is
difficult to excuse and impossible to justify. To attempt to blacken
the personal character of an opponent by false stories about his
parentage and his youth, and by the ascription to him and his relations
of nameless immoralities, is a very different thing from the assignment
of wrong motives for his political actions, though even in purely
political controversy the ancients far exceeded the utmost limits of
modern invective. And this both Demosthenes and Aeschines do freely.
There is also reason to suspect that some of the tales which each tells
of the other's conduct, both while serving as ambassadors and on other
occasions, may be fabrications. The descriptive passages for which such
falsehoods gave an opening had doubtless their dramatic value in the
oratorical performance: possibly they were even expected by the
listeners; but their presence in the speeches does not increase our
admiration either for the speaker or for his audience.
All the force of Demosthenes' oratory was unable to defeat the great
antagonist of his country. To Philip of Macedon failure was an
inconceivable idea. Resident during three impressionable years of his
youth at Thebes, he had there learned, from the example of Epaminondas,
what a single man could do: and he proceeded to each of the three great
tasks of his life--the welding of the rough Macedonians into one great
engine of war, the unification of Greece under his own leadership, and
the preparation for the conquest of the East by a united Greece and
Macedonia--without either faltering in face of difficulties, or
hesitating, out of any scrupulosity, to use the most effective means
towards the end which he wished at the moment to achieve; though in
fact the charges of bad faith made against him by Demosthenes are found
to be exaggerated, when they are impartially examined. Philip intended
to become master of Greece: Demosthenes realized this early, and, with
all the Hellenic detestation of a master, resolved to oppose him to the
end. Philip was, indeed, in spite of the barbarous traits which
revealed themselves in him at times, not only gracious and courteous by
nature, but a sincere admirer of Hellenic--in other words, of
Athenian--culture; the relations between his house and the people of
Athens had generally been friendly; and there was little reason to
suppose that, if he conquered Athens, he would treat her less
handsomely than in fact he did. Yet this could not justify one who
regarded freedom as Demosthenes regarded it, in making any concession
not extorted by the necessities of the situation: his duty and his
country's duty, as he conceived it, was to defeat the enemy of Hellenic
independence or to fall in the attempt. Nor was it for him to consider
(as Isocrates might) whether or no Philip's plans had now developed
into, or could be transformed into, a beneficent scheme for the
conquest of the barbarian world by a united Hellas, if the union was to
be achieved at the price of Athenian liberty. It is because, in spite
of errors and of the questionable methods to which he sometimes
stooped, Demosthenes devoted himself unflinchingly to the cause of
freedom, for Athens and for the Hellenes as a whole, that he is
entitled, not merely as an orator but as a politician, to the
admiration which posterity has generally accorded him. It is, above
all, by the second part of his career, when his policy of antagonism to
Philip had been accepted by the people, and he was no longer in
opposition but, as it were, in office, that Demosthenes himself claims
to be justified; and Aeschines' attempt to invalidate the claim is for
the most part unconvincing.
It is not easy to describe in a few paragraphs the characteristics of
Demosthenes as an orator. That he stands on the highest eminence that
an orator has ever reached is generally admitted. But this is not to
say that he was wholly free from faults. His contemporaries, as well as
later Greek critics, were conscious of a certain artificiality in his
eloquence. It was, indeed, the general custom of Athenian orators to
prepare their speeches with great care: the speakers who, like
Aeschines and Demades, were able to produce a great effect without
preparation, and the rhetoricians who, like Alcidamas, thought of the
studied oration as but a poor imitation of true eloquence, were only a
small minority; and in general, not only was the arrangement of topics
carefully planned, but the greatest attention was paid to the sound and
rhythm of the sentences, and to the appropriateness and order of the
words. The orator had also his collections of passages on themes which
were likely to recur constantly, and of arguments on either side of
many questions; and from these he selected such passages as he
required, and adapted them to his particular purpose. The rhetorical
teachers appear to have supplied their pupils with such collections; we
find a number of instances of the repetition of the same passage in
different speeches, and an abundance of arguments formed exactly on the
model of the precepts contained in rhetorical handbooks.[10] Yet with
all this art nothing was more necessary than that a speech should
appear to be spontaneous and innocent of guile. There was a general
mistrust of the 'clever speaker', who by study or rhetorical training
had learned the art of arguing to any point, and making the worse cause
appear the better. To have studied his part too carefully--even to have
worked up illustrations from history and poetry--might expose the
orator to suspicion.[11] Demosthenes, in spite of his frequent attempts
to deprecate such suspicion, did not succeed wholly in keeping on the
safe side. Aeschines describes him as a wizard and a sophist, who
enjoyed deceiving the people or the jury. Another of his opponents
levelled at him the taunt that his speeches 'smelt of the lamp'.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, one of the best of the ancient critics,
says that the artificiality of Demosthenes and his master Isaeus was
apt to excite suspicion, even when they had a good case. Nor can a
modern reader altogether escape the same impression. Sometimes,
especially in the earlier speeches to the Assembly, the argument seems
unreal, the joints between the previously prepared commonplaces or
illustrations and their application to the matter in hand are too
visible, the language is artificially phrased, and wanting in
spontaneity and ease. There are also parts of the court speeches in
which the orator seems to have calculated out all the possible methods
of meeting a particular case, and to be applying them in turn with more
ingenuity than convincingness. An appearance of unreality also arises
at times (again principally in the earlier speeches) from a certain
want of imagination. He attributes feelings and motives to others,
which they were really most unlikely to have entertained, and argues
from them. Some of the sentiments which he expects Artaxerxes or
Artemisia to feel (in the Speeches on the Naval Boards and for the
Rhodians) were certainly not to be looked for in them. Similar
misconceptions of the actual or possible sentiments of the Spartans
appear in the Speech for the Megalopolitans, and of those of the
Thebans in the Third Olynthiac (§ 15). The early orations against
Philip also show some misunderstanding of his character. And if, in
fact, Demosthenes lived his early years largely in solitary
studiousness and was unsociable by disposition, this lack of a quick
grasp of human nature and motives is quite intelligible. But this
defect grew less conspicuous as his experience increased; and though
even to the end there remained something of the sophist about him, as
about all the disciples of the ancient rhetoric, the greatness of his
best work is not seriously affected by this. For, in his greatest
speeches, and in the greatest parts of nearly all his speeches, the
orator is white-hot with genuine passion and earnestness; and all his
study and preparation resulted, for the most part, not in an artificial
product, but in the most convincing expression of his real feeling and
belief; so that it was the man himself, and not the rhetorical
practitioner that spoke.
The lighter virtues of the orator are not to be sought for in him. In
gracefulness and humour he is deficient: his humour, indeed, generally
takes the grim forms of irony and satire, or verges on personality and
bad taste. Few of his sentences can be imagined to have been delivered
with a smile; and something like ferocity is generally not far below
the surface. Pathos is seldom in him unmixed with sterner qualities,
and is usually lost in indignation. But of almost every other variety
of tone he has a complete command. The essential parts of his reasoning
(even when it is logically or morally defective) are couched, as a
rule, in a forcible and cogent form;[12] and he has a striking power of
close, sustained, and at the same time lucid argumentation. His matter
is commonly disposed with such skill that each topic occurs where it
will tell most powerfully; and while one portion of a speech affords
relief to another (where relief is needed, and particularly in the
longer orations) all alike bear on the main issue or strengthen the
orator's position with his audience. Historical allusions are not (as
they often are by Aeschines and Isocrates) enlarged out of proportion
to their importance, but are limited to what is necessary, in order to
illustrate the orator's point or drive his lesson home. Add to these
qualities his combination of political idealism with absolute mastery
of minute detail; the intensity of his appeal to the moral sense and
patriotism of his hearers; the impressiveness of his denunciation of
political wrong; the vividness of his narrative, the rapid succession
of his impassioned phrases, and some part of the secret of his power
will be explained. For the rest, while there is in his writing every
degree of fullness or brevity, there is no waste of words, no 'fine
language' out of place. His language, indeed, is ordinarily
simple--sometimes even colloquial; though in the arrangement of his
words in their most telling order he shows consummate art, and his
metaphors are often bold and sometimes even violent. In the use of the
'figures of speech' he excels; above all, in the use of antitheses
(whether for the purpose of vivid contrast or of precise logical
expression), and of the rhetorical question, used now in indignation,
now in irony, now in triumphant conclusion of an argument: and at times
there are master-strokes of genius, which defy all analysis, such as
the great appeal to the men of Marathon in the Speech on the Crown.[13]
He does not as a rule (and this is particularly true of the Speech on
the Crown) cover the whole of the ground with the same adequacy; but so
concentrates all his forces upon certain points as to be irresistible,
and thus 'with thunder and lightning confounds'[14] the orators who
oppose him. It is no wonder that some of the greatest of English
orators, and notably of those of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, borrow from him not only words and phrases, but inspiration
and confidence in their cause, and look upon him as a model whom they
may emulate, but cannot excel.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Introduction to First Philippic.
[2] See notes on Speech for the Megalopolitans.
[3] See note on Speech on the Crown, § 140.
[4] See Speech on the Crown, §§ 170 ff.
[5] See Zimmern, _The Greek Commonwealth_, pp. 159 ff., for an
excellent short account of the constitution and functions of the
Council. That the councillors themselves sat (for administrative
purposes) in relays, changing ten times a year, was also against
continuity.
[6] See Speech on Embassy, § 2 n.
[7] See Introduction to Speech on Naval Boards, and Philippic I, §§ 36,
37.
[8] See Zimmern, _The Greek Commonwealth_, p. 205.
[9] See Zimmern, _The Greek Commonwealth_, p. 205.
[10] The 'Art' of Anaximenes is an interesting extant example of a
fourth-century handbook for practical orators. The Rhetoric of
Aristotle stands on a higher plane, but probably follows the lines laid
down by custom in the rhetorical schools.
[11] See Speech on Embassy, § 246, and note.
[12] He is especially fond of the dilemma, which is not indeed cogent
in strict logic, but is peculiarly telling and effective in producing
conviction in large audiences.
[13] See [Longinus] 'On the Sublime', especially chap, xvi-xviii
(English translation by A. O. Prickard in this series). This treatise
should be read by all students of Demosthenes, especially chap. xii,
xvi-xviii, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxix.
[14] 'On the Sublime', chap. xxxiv.
[TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: The text for all notes marked [n] will be found at
the end of the second volume.]
ON THE NAVAL BOARDS (OR. XIV)
[_Introduction_. The speech was delivered in 354 B.C. News had been
brought to Athens that the Persian King Artaxerxes Ochus was making
great military and naval preparations, and though these were, in fact,
directed against his own rebellious subjects in Egypt, Phoenicia, and
Cyprus, the Athenians had some ground for alarm: for, two years before
this, Chares, in command of an Athenian fleet, had given assistance to
Artabazus, Satrap of Ionia, who was in revolt against the king. The
king had made a protest, and (late in 355) Athens had ordered Chares to
withdraw his aid from Artabazus. A party in Athens now wished to
declare war on Persia, and appealed strongly to Athenian traditions in
favour of the proposal. Demosthenes opposes them, on the ground that it
was not certain that the king was aiming at Athens at all, and that the
disunion of the Hellenic peoples would render any such action unsafe:
Athens had more dangerous enemies nearer home, and her finances were
not in a condition for such a campaign. But he takes advantage of the
interest aroused, to propose a reform of the trierarchic system,
designed to secure a more efficient navy, and to remedy certain abuses
in the existing method of equipping vessels for service.
In earlier times, the duty of equipping and commanding each trireme was
laid upon single citizens of means, the hull and certain fittings being
found by the state. When, early in the fourth century, the number of
wealthy men had diminished, each ship might be shared by two citizens,
who commanded in turn. In 357 a law was passed, on the proposal of
Periander, transferring the responsibility from individuals to
'Symmories' or Boards. (The system had been instituted in a slightly
different form for the collection of the war-tax in the archonship of
Nausinicus, 378-7 B.C.) The collection of the sums required became the
work of twenty Boards, formed by the subdivision of the 1,200 richest
citizens: each contributor, whatever his property, paid the same share.
The richer men thus got off with the loss of a very small proportion of
their income, as compared with the poorer members of the Boards,[1] and
in managing the business of the Boards they sometimes contrived to
exact the whole sum from their colleagues, and to escape payment
themselves. At the same time the duties of the several Boards and their
members were not allocated with sufficient precision to enable the
responsibility to be brought home in case of default; and the nominal
Twelve Hundred had fallen to a much smaller number, on whom the burden
accordingly fell with undue weight. Demosthenes' proposal provided for
the distribution of the responsibility of equipping the vessels and
providing the funds, in the most detailed manner, with a view to
preventing all evasion; but it was not carried. In fact, it was not
until 340 that he succeeded in reforming the trierarchy, and he then
made the burden vary strictly with property. The proposal, however, to
declare war upon Persia went no further.
While, in this speech, Demosthenes is in accord with the policy of
Eubulus, so far as concerns the avoidance of war with Persia, his
proposals of financial reform would not be viewed with favour by the
wealthy men who were Eubulus' firm supporters. Some of the themes which
recur continually in later speeches are prominent in this--the futility
of rhetorical appeals to past glories, without readiness for personal
service, and the need of a thorough organization of the forces. While
the speech shows rather too strongly the marks of careful preparation,
and seldom rises to eloquence--the style, indeed, is often rather
cramped and stiff, and the sentiments, especially at the beginning,
artificially phrased--it is moderate and practical in tone, and shows a
characteristic mastery of minute detail.]
{1} Those who praise your forefathers,[n] men of Athens, desire, no
doubt, to gratify you by their speeches; and yet I do not think that
they are acting in the interests of those whom they praise. For the
subject on which they attempt to speak is one to which no words can do
justice; and so, although they thus win for themselves the reputation
of capable speakers, the impression which they convey to their hearers
of the merit of our forefathers is not adequate to our conception of
it. For my part I believe that their highest praise is constituted by
Time: for the time that has passed has been long, and still no
generation has arisen, whose achievements could be compared with
advantage to theirs. {2} As for myself, I shall attempt to point out
the way in which, in my opinion, you can best make your preparations.
For the truth is, that if all of us who propose to address you were to
succeed in proving to you our rhetorical skill, there would not be the
slightest improvement in your condition--I am sure of it; but if a
single speaker were to come forward, whoever he might be, who could
instruct and convince you as to the nature of the preparations which
would meet the city's need, as to their extent, and the resources upon
which we can draw for them, your present fears would instantly be
dissolved. This I will attempt to do--if indeed it is in my power. But
first I must briefly express my views as to our relations with the king.
{3} I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Hellenes; and yet
I should not on that account urge you, alone and unsupported, to raise
war against him. For I observe that there is no common or mutual
friendship even among the Hellenes themselves: some have more faith in
the king than in some other Hellenes. When such are the conditions,
your interest requires you, I believe, to see to it that you only begin
war from a fair and just cause, and to make all proper preparations:
this should be the basis of your policy. {4} For I believe, men of
Athens, that if it were made plain to the eyes and understandings of
the Hellenes, that the king was making an attempt upon them, they would
both fight in alliance with those who undertook the defence for them
and with them, and would feel very grateful to them. But if we quarrel
with him prematurely, while his intentions are still uncertain, I am
afraid, men of Athens, that we may be forced to fight not only against
the king, but also against those for whose benefit we are exercising
such forethought. {5} For he will pause in the execution of his
project, if indeed he has really resolved to attack the Hellenes, and
will bribe some of them with money and offers of friendship; while
they, desirous of bringing their private wars to a successful end, and
animated only by such a spirit, will disregard the common safety of
all. I urge you then, not to hurl the city needlessly into the midst of
any such chaos of selfish passions. {6} Moreover, I see that the
question of the policy to be adopted towards the king does not even
stand on the same footing for the other Hellenes as for you. It is
open, I think, to many of them to manage certain of their own interests
as they please, and to disregard the rest of the Hellenes. But for you
it is not honourable, even if you are the injured party, and are
dealing with those who have injured you, to punish them so severely as
to leave some of them to fall under the domination of the foreigner:
{7} and this being so, we must take care, first, that we do not find
ourselves involved in an unequal war, and secondly, that he, whom we
believe to be plotting against the Hellenes, does not gain credit from
the supposition that he is their friend. How then can this be achieved?
It will be achieved if it is manifest to all that the forces of Athens
have been overhauled and put in readiness, and if her intentions in
regard to their use are plainly righteous. {8} But to those who take a
bold line, and urge you, without any hesitation whatever, to go to war,
my reply is this--that it is not difficult to win a reputation for
bravery, when the occasion calls for deliberation; nor to prove
yourself an accomplished orator, when danger is at the door: but to
display your courage in the hour of danger, and, in debate, to have
wiser advice to offer than others--that is the hard thing, and that is
what is required of you. {9} For my part, men of Athens, I consider
that the proposed war with the king would be a difficult undertaking
for the city; while the decisive conflict in which the war would result
would be an easier matter, and for this reason. Every war, I suppose,
necessarily requires ships and money and the command of positions. All
such advantages the king, I find, possesses more abundantly than we.
But a conflict of forces requires nothing so much as brave men; and of
these, I believe, the larger number is with us, and with those who
share our danger. {10} For this reason I exhort you not to be the
first, in any way whatever, to take up the war; but for the decisive
struggle I think you ought to be ready and your preparations made. And
further, if the forces[n] with which foreigners and Hellenes could
respectively be repelled were really different in kind, the fact that
we were arraying our forces against the king would naturally, it may
be, admit of no concealment. {11} But since all military preparations
are of the same character, and the main points of a force must always
be the same--the means to repel enemies, to help allies, and to retain
existing advantages--why, when we have our acknowledged foes,[n] do we
seek to procure others? Let us rather prepare ourselves to meet the
enemies whom we have, and we shall then repel the king also, if he
takes the aggressive against us. {12} Suppose that you yourselves
summon the Hellenes to your side now. If, when the attitude of some of
them towards you is so disagreeable, you do not fulfil their demands,
how can you expect that any one will listen to you? 'Why,' you say, 'we
shall tell them that the king is plotting against them.' Good Heavens!
Do you imagine that they do not foresee this themselves? Of course they
do. But their fear of this does not yet outweigh the quarrels which
some of them have against you and against each other. And so the tour
of your envoys will end in nothing but their own rhapsodies.[n] {13}
But if you wait, then, if the design which we now suspect is really on
foot, there is not one of the Hellenes who stands so much upon his
dignity that he will not come and beg for your aid, when he sees that
you have a thousand cavalry, and infantry as many as any one can
desire, and three hundred ships: for he will know that in these lies
his surest hope of deliverance. Appeal to them now, and we shall be
suppliants, and, if unsuccessful, rejected suppliants. Make your own
preparations and wait, and then they will be the suppliants and we
their deliverers; and we may rest assured that they will all come to us
for help.
{14} In thinking out these points and others like them, men of Athens,
my object was not to devise a bold speech,[n] prolonged to no purpose:
but I took the greatest pains to discover the means by which our
preparations could be most effectively and quickly made; and therefore,
if my proposal meets with your approval, when you have heard it, you
ought, I think, to pass it. Now the first element in our preparation,
men of Athens (and it is the most important), must be this: your minds
must be so disposed, that every one of you will perform willingly and
heartily any service that is required of him. {15} For you see, men of
Athens, that whenever you have unanimously desired any object, and the
desire has been followed by a feeling on the part of every individual,
that the practical steps towards it were for himself to take, the
object has never yet slipped from your grasp: but whenever the wish has
had no further result than that each man has looked to his neighbour,
expecting his neighbour to act while he himself does nothing, the
object has never yet been attained. {16} But supposing you to be filled
with the keenness that I have described, I am of opinion that we should
make up the Twelve Hundred to their full number, and increase it to
2,000, by the addition of 800. For if you can display this total, then,
when you have allowed for the unmarried heiresses and orphans,[n] for
property outside Attica,[n] or held in partnership, and for any persons
who may be unable to contribute,[n] you will, I believe, actually have
the full 1,200 persons available. {17} These you must divide into
twenty boards, as at present, with sixty persons to each board; and
each of these boards you must divide into five sections of twelve
persons each, taking care in every case to associate with the richest
man the poorest men,[n] to maintain the balance. Such is the
arrangement of persons which I recommend, and my reason you will know
when you have heard the nature of the entire system. {18} I pass to the
distribution of the ships. You must provide a total complement of 300
ships, forming twenty divisions of fifteen ships apiece, and including
in each division five of the first hundred vessels,[n] five of the
second hundred, and five of the third hundred. Next, you must assign by
lot[n] to each board of persons its fifteen ships, and each board must
assign three ships to each of its sections. {19} This done, in order
that you may have the payments also systematically arranged, you must
divide the 6,000 talents (for that is the taxable capital[n] of the
country) into 100 parts of sixty talents each. Five of each of these
parts you must allot to each of the larger boards--the twenty--and each
board must assign one of these sums of sixty talents to each of its
sections; {20} in order that, if you need 100 ships,[n] there may be
sixty talents to be taxed for the expense of each ship, and twelve
persons responsible for it; if 200, thirty talents will be taxed to
make up the cost, and six persons will be responsible; if 300, then
twenty talents must be taxed to defray the expense, and four persons
will be responsible. {21} In the same way, men of Athens, I bid you
make a valuation according to the register of all those fittings of the
ships which are in arrear,[n] divide them into twenty parts, and allot
to each of the large boards one-twentieth of the debtors: these must
then be assigned by each board in equal numbers to each of its
sections, and the twelve persons composing each section must call up
their share of the arrears, and provide, ready-equipped, the ships
which fall to them. {22} Such is the plan by which, in my opinion, the
expense, the ships, the trierarchs, and the recovery of the fittings
could best be provided for and put into working order. I proceed to
describe a simple and easy scheme for the manning of the vessels. I
recommend that the generals should divide the whole space of the
dockyards into ten, taking care to have in each space thirty slips for
single vessels close together. This done they should apportion to each
space two of the boards and thirty ships; and should then assign a
tribe to each space by lot. {23} Each captain should divide into three
parts the space which falls to his tribe, with the corresponding ships,
and should allot these among the three wards[n] of each tribe, in such
a way that if each tribe has one division of the entire docks, each
ward will have a third of one of these divisions; and you will know, in
case of need, first the position assigned to the tribe; next, that of
the ward; and then the names of the trierarchs and their ships; each
tribe will be answerable for thirty, and each ward for ten ships. If
this system is put in train, circumstances as they arise will provide
for anything that I may have overlooked to-day (for perhaps it is
difficult to think of everything), and there will be a single
organization for the whole fleet and every part of it.
{24} But what of funds? What resources have we immediately at our
command? The statement which I am about to make on this subject will no
doubt be astonishing; but I will make it nevertheless; for I am
convinced that upon a correct view of the facts, this statement alone
will be proved true, and will be justified by the event. I say then,
that this is not the time to discuss the financial question. We have
large resources upon which, in case of necessity, we may honourably and
rightly draw: but if we inquire for them now, we shall not believe that
we can rely upon them even against the hour of need; so far shall we be
from supplying them now. 'What then,' you will ask me, 'are these
resources, which are non-existent now, but will be ours then? This is
really like a riddle.' I will tell you. {25} Men of Athens, you see all
this great city.[n] In this city there is wealth which will compare, I
had almost said, with the united wealth of all other cities. But such
is the disposition of those who own it, that if all your orators were
to raise the alarm that the king was coming--that he was at the
doors--that there was no possible escape; and if with the orators an
equal number of prophets foretold the same thing; even then, far from
contributing funds, they would show no sign[2] [and make no
acknowledgement] of their possession of them. {26} If, however, they
were to see in course of actual realization all the terrors with which
at present we are only threatened in speeches, not one of them is so
blind that he would not both offer his contribution, and be among the
first to pay the tax. For who will prefer to lose his life and
property, rather than contribute a part of his substance to save
himself and the remainder of it? Funds, then, we can command, I am
certain, if there is a genuine need of them, and not before; and
accordingly I urge you not even to look for them now. For all that you
would provide now, if you decided upon a levy, would be more ludicrous
than nothing at all. {27} Suppose that we are told to pay 1 per cent.
now; that gives you sixty talents. Two per cent. then--double the
amount; that makes 120 talents. And what is that to the 1,200 camels
which (as these gentlemen tell us) are bringing the king's money for
him? Or would you have me assume a payment of one-twelfth, 500 talents?
Why, you would never submit to this; and if you paid the money down, it
would not be adequate to the war. {28} You must, therefore, make all
your other preparations, but allow your funds to remain for the present
in the hands of their owners--they could nowhere be more safely kept
for the use of the State; and then, if ever the threatened crisis
arises, you will receive them as the voluntary gift of their
possessors. This, men of Athens, is not only a possible course of
action, but a dignified and a politic one. It is a course of action
which is worthy to be reported to the ears of the king, and which would
inspire him with no slight apprehension. {29} For he well knows that by
two hundred ships, of which one hundred were Athenian,[n] his ancestors
were deprived of one thousand; and he will hear that Athens alone has
now equipped three hundred; so that, however great his infatuation, he
could certainly not imagine it a light thing to make this country his
foe. But if it is his wealth that suggests proud thoughts to his mind,
he will find that in this respect too his resources are weaker than
ours. {30} It is true that he is said to be bringing a great quantity
of gold with him. But if he distributes this, he must look for more:
for just so it is the way of springs and wells to give out, if large
quantities are drawn from them all at once; whereas we possess, as he
will hear, in the taxable capital of the country, resources which we
defend against attack in a way of which those ancestors of his who
sleep at Marathon can best tell him: and so long as we are masters of
the country there is no risk of our resources being exhausted.
{31} Nor again can I see any grounds for the fear, which some feel,
lest his wealth should enable him to collect a large mercenary force.
It may be that many of the Hellenes would be glad to serve under him
against Egypt,[n] against Orontas,[n] or against certain other foreign
powers--not from a wish that the king should conquer any such enemies,
but because each desires individually to obtain some private means to
relieve his present poverty. But I cannot believe that any Hellene
would march against Hellas. Whither will he turn afterwards? Will he go
to Phrygia and be a slave? {32} For the war with the foreigner is a war
for no other stake than our country, our life, our habits, our freedom,
and all that we value. Where is the wretch who would sacrifice self,
parents, sepulchres, fatherland, for the sake of some short-lived gain?
I do not believe that he exists. And indeed it is not even to the
king's own interest to conquer the Hellenes with a mercenary force; for
an army which has conquered us is, even more certainly,[n] stronger
than he; and his intention is not to destroy us only that he may fall
into the power of others: he wishes to rule, if it may be, over all the
world; but if not, at least over those who are already his slaves.
{33} It may be supposed that the Thebans will be on the king's side.
Now this subject is one upon which it is hard to address you. For such
is your hatred of them, that you cannot hear a good word about them,
however true, without displeasure. And yet those who have grave
questions to consider must not on any pretext pass over any profitable
line of argument. {34} I believe, then, that so far are the Thebans
from being likely ever to march with him against the Hellenes, that
they would give a great deal, if they had it to give, for an
opportunity of cancelling their former sins against Hellas.[n] But if
any one does believe that the Thebans are so unhappily constituted, at
least you are all aware, I presume, that if the Thebans take the part
of the king, their enemies must necessarily take the part of the
Hellenes.
{35} My own belief is that our cause, the cause of justice, and its
supporters, will prove stronger in every emergency than the traitor and
the foreigner. And therefore I say that we need feel no excessive
apprehension, and that we must not be led on into taking the first step
towards war. Indeed, I cannot even see that any of the other Hellenes
has reason to dread this war. {36} Are they not all aware, that so long
as they thought of the king as their common foe, and were at unity with
one another, they were secure in their prosperity; but that ever since
they imagined that they could count upon the king as their friend, and
fell to quarrelling over their private interests, they have suffered
such evils as no malediction could have devised for them? Must we then
dread a man whose friendship, thanks to Fortune and Heaven, has proved
so unprofitable, and his enmity so advantageous? By no means! Let us
not, however, commit any aggression, in view of our own interests, and
of the disturbed and mistrustful spirit which prevails among the rest
of the Hellenes. {37} Were it possible, indeed, to join forces with
them all, and with one accord to attack the king in his isolation, I
should have counted it no wrong even were we to take the aggressive.
But since this is impossible, we must be careful to give the king no
pretext for trying to enforce the claims of the other Hellenes against
us. If you keep the peace, any such step on his part would arouse
suspicion; but if you are the first to begin war, his hostility to you
would make his desire to befriend your rivals appear natural enough.
{38} Do not then lay bare the evil condition of Hellas, by calling the
powers together when they will not obey, or undertaking a war which you
will be unable to carry on. Keep the peace; take courage, and make your
preparations. Resolve that the news which the king hears of you shall
certainly not be that all Hellas, and Athens with it, in distress or
panic or confusion. Far from it! {39} Let him rather know that if
falsehood and perjury were not as disgraceful in Hellenic eyes as they
are honourable in his, you would long ago have been on the march
against him: and that though, as it is, your regard for yourselves
forbids you to act thus, you are praying to all the gods that the same
madness may seize him as once seized his ancestors. And if it occurs to
him to reflect upon this, he will find that your deliberations are not
conducted in any careless spirit. {40} He at least shares the knowledge
that it was your wars with his own ancestors that raised Athens to the
summit of prosperity and greatness; while the peaceful policy which she
previously pursued never gave her such a superiority as she now enjoys
over any single state in Hellas. Aye, and he sees that the Hellenes are
in need of one who, whether intentionally or not, will reconcile them
one to another; and he knows that if he were to stir up war, he himself
would assume that character in relation to them; so that the news which
he will hear of you will be intelligible and credible to him.
{41} But I do not wish to trouble you, men of Athens, by unduly
prolonging my speech. I will therefore recapitulate my advice and
retire. I bid you prepare your forces with a view to the enemies whom
you have. If the king or any other power attempts to do you injury, you
must defend yourselves with these same forces. But you must not take
the aggressive by word or deed; and you must take care that it is your
deeds, and not your platform speeches, that are worthy of your
forefathers. If you act thus, you will be consulting both your own
interests and those of the speakers who are opposing me; since you will
have no cause to be angry with them afterwards, because you have
decided wrongly to-day.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Speech on Crown, §§ 102 ff. and notes.
[2] See Speech on Crown, §§ 102 ff. and notes.
FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS (OR. XVI)
[_Introduction_. In 371 B.C. the Thebans under Epaminondas defeated the
Spartans at Leuctra, and, assisted by Thebes, the Arcadians and
Messenians threw off the Spartan yoke. The former founded Megalopolis
as their common centre, the latter Messene. But after the death of
Epaminondas in 362, Thebes was left without a leader; and when, in 355,
she became involved in the 'Sacred War' with the Phocians, the new
Peloponnesian states turned towards Athens, and Messene received a
solemn promise of Athenian assistance, if ever she was attacked by
Sparta. In 353 Thebes was suffering considerably from the Sacred War,
and the Spartans made an ingenious attempt to recover their power, in
the form of a proposal for the restoration of territory to its original
owners. This meant that Athens would recover Oropus, which had been in
the hands of Thebes since 366, and had previously been the subject of a
long-standing dispute; that Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Plataeae, which
had all been overthrown by Thebes, would be restored; and that Elis and
Phlius would also recover certain lost possessions. All these states
would then be morally bound (so the Spartans thought) to help Sparta to
reconquer Arcadia and Messenia.
On the occasion of this speech (delivered in 353) the Megalopolitans
had appealed to Athens, and an Arcadian and a Spartan embassy had each
had an audience of the Assembly, and had each received strong support
from Athenian speakers. The principal motives of the supporters of
Sparta were their hostility to Thebes, and their desire not to break
with the Spartans, whom Athens had assisted at Mantineia in 362 against
the Thebans and Megalopolitans. Demosthenes supports the Arcadians, and
lays great stress on the desirability of maintaining a balance of power
between Sparta and Thebes, so that neither might become too strong. To
allow Sparta to reconquer Arcadia, and, as the next step, Messenia,
would be to render her too formidable; and to reject the proposal of
Sparta would not preclude Athens from recovering Oropus and demanding
the restoration of the Boeotian towns. But the promise of assistance to
the Arcadians should be accompanied by a request for the termination of
their alliance with Thebes.
Demosthenes' advice was not followed. In fact Athens was hardly in a
position to risk becoming entangled in a war with Sparta, particularly
in view of the danger to her northern possessions from Philip. She
therefore remained neutral, while the Thebans, relieved from the
pressure of the Sacred War owing to the defeat of the Phocian leader
Onomarchus by Philip, were able to send aid to Megalopolis. A truce
between Sparta and Megalopolis was made about 350. It was, however, a
result of the neutrality of Athens, that she was unable, a few years
later, to secure the support of the Arcadians against Philip, whose
allies they subsequently became.
Lord Brougham describes the oration as 'one of extraordinary subtlety
and address in handling delicate topics'; and, after quoting the
passage in which Demosthenes urges the necessity of maintaining a
balance of power between rival states, adds that 'this is precisely the
language of modern policy'. At the same time, the speech has in places
a somewhat academic and theoretical air: it is much occupied with the
weighing of hypothetical considerations and obligations against one
another: and though it enunciates some plain and reasonable political
principles, and makes an honest attempt to satisfy those who wished to
help the Arcadians, but at the same time desired to regain ground
against Thebes, it is not always convincing, and the tone is more
frankly opportunist than is usually the case with Demosthenes.]
{1} I think, men of Athens, that those who have spoken on the Arcadian side and
those who have spoken on the Spartan, are alike making a mistake. For
their mutual accusations and their attacks upon one another would
suggest that they are not, like yourselves, Athenians, receiving the
two embassies, but actually delegates of the two states. Such attacks
it was for the two deputations to make. The duty of those who claim to
advise you here was to discuss the situation impartially, and to
inquire, in an uncontentious spirit, what course is best in your
interests. {2} As it is, if one could alter the fact that they are
known to us, and that they speak the dialect of Attica, I believe that
many would imagine that those on the one side actually were Arcadians,
and those on the other, Spartans. For my part, I see plainly enough the
difficulty of offering the best advice. For you, like them, are
deluded, in your desire for one extreme or the other: and one who
endeavours to propose an intermediate course, which you will not have
the patience to understand, will satisfy neither side and will forfeit
the confidence of both. {3} But in spite of this, I shall prefer, for
my own part, to risk being regarded as an idle chatterer (if such is
really to be my lot), rather than to abandon my conviction as to what
is best for Athens, and leave you to the mercy of those who would
deceive you. And while I shall deal with all other points later, by
your leave, I shall take for my starting-point, in explaining the
course which I believe to be best, those principles which are admitted
by all.
{4} There can be no possible question that it is to the interest of the
city that both the Spartans and these Thebans should be weak; and the
present situation, if one may judge at all from what has constantly
been asserted in your presence, is such, that if Orchomenus, Thespiae,
and Plataeae[n] are re-established, Thebes becomes weak; and that if
the Spartans can reduce Arcadia to subjection and destroy Megalopolis,
Sparta will recover her former strength. {5} We must, therefore, take
care not to allow the Spartans to attain a formidable degree of
strength, before the Thebans have become insignificant, lest there
should take place, unobserved by us, such an increase in the power of
Sparta as would be out of proportion to the decrease in the power of
Thebes which our interests demand. For it is, of course, out of the
question that we should desire merely to substitute the rivalry of
Sparta for that of Thebes: that is not the object upon which we are
bent. Our object is rather that neither people shall be capable of
doing us any injury. That is what will best enable us to live in
security.
{6} But, granted that this is what ought to be, still, we are told, it
is a scandalous thing to choose for our allies the men against whom we
were arrayed at Mantineia, and further, to help them against those
whose perils we shared that day. I agree; but I think that we need to
insert the condition, 'provided that the two parties are willing to act
rightly.' {7} For if all alike prove willing to keep the peace, we
shall not go to the aid of the Megalopolitans, since there will be no
need to do so; and so there will be no hostility whatever on our part
towards our former comrades in battle. They are already our allies, as
they tell us; and now the Arcadians will become our allies as well.
What more could we desire? {8} But suppose they act wrongfully and
think fit to make war. In that case, if the question before us is
whether we are to abandon Megalopolis to Sparta or not, then I say
that, wrong though it is, I will acquiesce in our permitting this, and
declining to oppose our former companions in danger. But if you all
know that, after capturing Megalopolis, they will march against
Messene, let me ask any of those who are now so harshly disposed
towards Megalopolis to say what action he will _then_ advise. No answer
will be given. {9} In fact you all know that, whether they advise it or
not, we _must_ then go to the rescue, both because of the oath which we
have sworn to the Messenians, and because our interests demand the
continued existence of that city. Ask yourselves, then, on which
occasion you can most honourably and generously interpose to check the
aggressions of Sparta--in defence of Megalopolis, or in defence of
Messene? {10} On the present occasion it will be understood that you
are succouring the Arcadians, and are anxious that the Peace, which you
fought for and risked your lives to win, may be secure. But if you
wait, all the world will see plainly that it is not in the name of
right that you desire the existence of Messene, but because you are
afraid of Sparta. And while we should always seek and do the right, we
should at the same time take good care that what is right shall also be
advantageous.
{11} Now an argument is used by speakers on the other side to the
effect that we ought to attempt to recover Oropus,[n] and that if we
make enemies of those who might come to our assistance against it we
shall have no allies. I too say that we should try to recover Oropus.
But the argument that the Spartans will be our enemies now, if we make
alliance with those Arcadians who desire our friendship, is an argument
which no one has less right even to mention, than those who induced you
to help the Spartans when they were in danger. {12} Such was not their
argument, when all the Peloponnesians came to you,[n] entreating you to
support them in their campaign against Sparta, and they persuaded you
to reject the entreaty, with the result that the Peloponnesians took
the only remaining course and applied to Thebes--when they bade you
contribute funds and imperil your lives for the deliverance of the
Spartans. Nor, I presume, would you have been willing to protect them,
had they warned you that you must expect no gratitude for their
deliverance, unless, after saving them, you allowed them once more to
do as they pleased and commit fresh aggressions. {13} And further,
however antagonistic it may be to the designs of the Spartans, that we
should make the Arcadians our allies, they are surely bound to feel a
gratitude towards us for saving them when they were in the utmost
extremity, which will outweigh their vexation at our preventing their
present wrongdoing. Must they not then either assist us to recover
Oropus, or else be regarded as the basest of mankind? For, by Heaven, I
can see no other alternative.
{14} I am astonished, also, to hear it argued that if we make the
Arcadians our allies, and carry out my advice, it will seem as though
Athens were changing her policy, and were utterly unreliable. I believe
that the exact reverse of this is the case, men of Athens, and I will
tell you why. I suppose that no one in the world can deny that when
this city saved the Spartans,[n] and before them the Thebans,[n] and
finally the Euboeans,[n] and subsequently made them her allies, she had
one and the same end always in view. {15} And what was this? It was to
deliver the victims of aggression. And if this is so, it is not we that
should be changing, but those who refuse to adhere to the right; and it
will be manifest that, although circumstances change from time to time
with the ambitious designs of others, Athens does not change.
{16} I believe that the Spartans are playing a very unscrupulous part.
At present they tell us that the Eleans are to recover part of
Triphylia,[n] and the Phliasians, Tricaranum;[n] other Arcadians are to
recover their own possessions, and we ourselves are to recover
Oropus--not that they have any desire to see every state enjoying its
own--far from it!-- such generosity on their part would be late indeed
in showing itself. {17} They wish rather to present the appearance of
co-operating with each separate state in the recovery of the territory
that it claims, in order that when they themselves march against
Messene, all may take the field with them, and give them their hearty
assistance, on pain of seeming to act unfairly, in refusing to return
an equivalent for the support which each of them received from Sparta
in regard to their own several claims. {18} My own view is that, even
without the tacit surrender of some of the Arcadians to Sparta, we can
recover Oropus, aided not only by the Spartans, if they are ready to
act honourably, but by all who disapprove of allowing Thebes to retain
what is not her own. But even if it were made quite plain to us, that
without allowing Sparta to subdue the Peloponnese, we should not be
able to take Oropus, I should still think it preferable, if I may dare
to say so, to let Oropus go, rather than sacrifice Messene and the
Peloponnese to Sparta. For our quarrel with them would not, I believe,
be confined to this; since--I will not say what occurs to me; but there
are many risks which we should run.
{19} But, to pass on, it is a monstrous thing to use the hostile
actions which, they say, the Megalopolitans committed against us, under
the influence of Thebes, as a ground of accusation against them to-day;
and, when they wish to be friends and so atone for their action by
doing us good, to look askance at them, to seek for some way of
avoiding their friendship, to refuse to recognize that in proportion to
the zeal which my opponents can prove the Megalopolitans to have shown
in supporting Thebes will be the resentment to which my opponents
themselves will deservedly be exposed, for depriving the city of such
allies as these, when they have appealed to you before appealing to
Thebes. {20} Such a policy is surely the policy of men who wish to make
the Arcadians for the second time the allies of others. And so far as
one can forecast the future by calculation, I am sure, and I believe
that most of you will agree with me, that if the Spartans take
Megalopolis, Messene will be in peril; and if they take Messene also,
then I predict that we shall find ourselves allies of Thebes.[n] {21}
It is a far more honourable, a far better, course that we should
ourselves take over the Theban confederacy,[n] refusing to leave the
field open to the cupidity of the Spartans, than that we should be so
afraid of protecting the allies of Thebes, as first to sacrifice them,
and then to save Thebes itself; and, in addition, to be in a state of
apprehension for our own safety. {22} For if the Spartans capture
Megalopolis and become a great power once more, the prospect, as I
conceive it, is not one which this city can view without alarm. For I
can see that even now they are determining to go to war, not to prevent
any evil which threatens them, but to recover their own ancient power:
and what their aims were when they possessed that power, you, I think,
know[n] perhaps better than I, and with that knowledge may well be
alarmed.
{23} Now I should be glad if the speakers who profess their hatred for
Thebes on the one side, or for Sparta on the other, would tell me if
their professed hatred is based on consideration for you and your
interests, or whether the one party hates Thebes from an interest in
Sparta, and the other Sparta from an interest in Thebes. If the latter
is the case, you should not listen to either, but treat them as insane:
but if the former, why this inordinate exaltation of one side or the
other? {24} For it is possible, perfectly possible, to humiliate Thebes
without rendering Sparta powerful. Indeed, it is by far the easier
course; and I will try to tell you how it can be done. We all know
that, however unwilling men may be to do what is right, yet up to a
certain point they are ashamed not to do so, and that they withstand
wrongdoers openly, particularly if there are any who receive damage
through the wrong done: and we shall find that what ruins everything
and is the source of all evil is the unwillingness to do what is right
without reserve. {25} Now in order that no such obstacle may stand in
the way of the humiliation of Thebes, let us demand the
re-establishment of Thespiae, Orchomenus, and Plataeae, co-operating
with their citizens ourselves, and requiring others to do so; for the
principle of refusing to allow ancient cities to lie desolate is a
right and honourable one. But let us at the same time decline to
abandon Megalopolis and Messene to the aggressors, or to suffer the
destruction of existing and inhabited cities, on the pretext of
restoring Plataeae and Thespiae. {26} Then, if our policy is made plain
to all, there is no one who will not wish to terminate the Thebans'
occupation of territory not their own. But if it is not, not only will
our designs be opposed by the Arcadians, in the belief that the
restoration of these towns carries with it their own ruin, but we shall
have troubles without end. For, honestly, where can we expect to reach
an end, when we permit the annihilation of existing cities, and require
the restoration of those that have been annihilated?
{27} It is demanded by those whose speeches display the strongest
appearance of fairness, that the Megalopolitans shall take down the
pillars[n] which commemorate their alliance with Thebes, if they are to
be trustworthy allies of Athens. The Megalopolitans reply that for them
it is not pillars, but interest, that creates friendship; and that it
is those who help them, that they consider to be their allies. Well,
that may be their attitude. Nevertheless, my own view is, roughly
speaking, this:--I say that we should simultaneously require the
Megalopolitans to take down the pillars, and the Spartans to keep the
peace: and that in the event of either side refusing to fulfil our
request, we should at once take the part of those who are willing to
fulfil it. {28} For if the Megalopolitans obtain peace, and yet adhere
to the Theban alliance, it will be clear to all that they prefer the
grasping policy of Thebes to that which is right. If, on the other
hand, Megalopolis makes alliance frankly with us, and the Spartans then
refuse to keep the peace, it will surely be clear to all that what the
Spartans desire so eagerly is not the re-establishment of Thespiae, but
an opportunity of subduing the Peloponnese while the Thebans are
involved in the war.[n] {29} And I am surprised to find that there are
some who are alarmed at the prospect of the enemies of Sparta becoming
allies of Thebes, and yet see nothing to fear in the subjugation of
these enemies by Sparta herself; whereas the experience of the past can
teach us that the Thebans always use such allies against Sparta, while,
when Sparta had them, she used to use them against us.
{30} There is another point which I think you should consider. Suppose
that you reject the overtures of the Megalopolitans. If they are
annihilated and dispersed, Sparta can recover her power at once. If
they actually survive--for things have happened before now beyond all
hope--they will quite rightly be the firm allies of Thebes. But suppose
you receive them. Then the immediate result, so far as they are
concerned, is that they are saved by you: and as to the future, let us
now transfer our calculation of possible risks to the case of the
Thebans and Spartans. {31} If the Thebans are crushed, as they ought to
be, the Spartans will not be unduly powerful, for they will always have
these Arcadians at their doors to hold them in check. But if the
Thebans actually recover and survive the attack, they will at least be
weaker; for the Arcadians will have become our allies, and will owe
their preservation to us. Thus on every ground it is to our interest
not to sacrifice the Arcadians, nor to let them think that their
deliverance, if they are really saved, is due to themselves, or to any
other people than you.
{32} And now, men of Athens, I solemnly declare that what I have said
has been prompted by no personal feeling, friendly or hostile, towards
either side. I have told you only what I believe to be expedient for
you; and I exhort you not to sacrifice the people of Megalopolis, and
to make it your rule, never to sacrifice a smaller power to a greater.
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS (OR. XV)
[_Introduction_. Dionysius of Halicarnassus places the speech in 351
B.C. He is not always accurate, and the internal evidence has been
thought by some to suggest a date perhaps two years earlier. The
reasons, however, for this are not strong, and there has recently been
a disposition to accept Dionysius' date.
As the result of the Social War, Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium had
made themselves independent of Athens. They had been assisted by
Mausolus, King of Caria, a vassal of Persia. After the termination of
the war, a Carian garrison occupied Cos and Rhodes; the democratic
constitution of Rhodes was overthrown and the democratic party driven
into banishment, as the result of an oligarchic plot, which Mausolus
had fostered. In 353 Mausolus died, and was succeeded by Artemisia, his
sister and wife. The exiles appealed to Athens for restoration, and for
the liberation of Rhodes from the Carian domination. It is evident that
the feeling in Athens against the Rhodians was very strong, owing to
their part in the late war, for which the democratic party had been
responsible; and there was some fear of the possible consequences of
offending Artemisia and perhaps becoming involved in war with Persia.
Demosthenes, nevertheless, urges the people to assist them, and to
forget their misconduct. He appeals to the traditional policy of
Athens, as the saviour of the oppressed and protectress of democracies,
and warns them of the danger which would threaten Athens herself, if
the conversion of free constitutions into oligarchies were allowed to
go unchecked. He takes a different view from that of his opponents of
the probable attitude of Artemisia, and utters an impressive warning
against corrupt and unpatriotic statesmen, which foreshadows his more
vehement attacks in the orations against Philip.
The appeal was unsuccessful, for in the speech on the Peace (§ 25)
Demosthenes speaks of Cos and Rhodes as still subject to Caria.
The speech is more eloquent than the last, and more outspoken.
Political principles and ideals are enunciated with some confidence,
and illustrated by striking examples from history. But there also
appears for the first time that sense of the difficulty of rousing the
Athenians to action of any kind, which is so strongly expressed in
later speeches.]
{1} It is, I think, your duty, men of Athens, when you are deliberating
upon affairs of such importance, to grant freedom of speech to every
one of your advisers. And for my part, I have never yet felt any
difficulty in pointing out to you the best course; for I believe that,
broadly speaking, you all know from the first what this is. My
difficulty is to persuade you to act upon your knowledge. For when a
measure is approved and passed by you, it is as far from execution as
it was before you resolved upon it. {2} Well, you have to render thanks
to Heaven for this, among other favours--that those who went to war
with you not long ago, moved by their own insolent pride, now place
their own hopes of preservation in you alone. Well may we rejoice at
our present opportunity! For if your decision in regard to it is what
it should be, you will find yourselves meeting the calumnies of those
who are slandering this city with a practical and a glorious
refutation. {3} For the peoples of Chios, Byzantium, and Rhodes accused
us of entertaining designs against them; and on this ground they
combined against us in the recent war. But now it will be seen[n] that,
while Mausolus, who under the pretence of friendship towards Rhodes,
directed and instigated their efforts, in reality robbed the Rhodians
of their freedom; while their declared allies, Chios and Byzantium,
never came to aid them in their misfortunes; {4} you, of whom they were
afraid, and you alone, have been the authors of their salvation. And
because all the world will have seen this, you will cause the popular
party in every city to consider your friendship a guarantee of their
own safety; nor could you reap any greater blessing than the goodwill
which will thus be offered to you, spontaneously and without
misgivings, upon every hand.
{5} I notice, to my surprise, that those who urge us to oppose the king
in the interest of the Egyptians,[n] are the very persons who are so
afraid of him when it is the interest of the popular party in Rhodes
that is in question. And yet it is known to every one that the Rhodians
are Hellenes, while the Egyptians have a place assigned them in the
Persian Empire. {6} I expect that some of you remember that, when you
were discussing our relations with the king, I came forward and was the
first to advise you[n] (though I had, I believe, no supporters, or one
at the most), that you would show your good sense, in my opinion, if
you did not make your hostility to the king the pretext of your
preparations, but prepared yourselves against the enemies whom you
already had; though you would resist him also, if he attempted to do
you any injury. {7} Nor, when I spoke thus, did I fail to convince you,
but you also approved of this policy. What I have now to say is the
sequel to my argument on that occasion. For if the king were to call me
to his side and make me his counsellor, I should give him the same
advice as I gave you--namely, that he should fight in defence of his
own possessions, if he were opposed by any Hellenic power, but should
absolutely forego all claim to what in no way belongs to him. {8} If,
therefore, you have made a general resolve, men of Athens, to retire
from any place of which the king makes himself master, either by
surprise or by the deception of some of the inhabitants, you have not
resolved well, in my judgement: but if you are prepared, in defence of
your rights, even to fight, if need be, and to endure anything that may
be necessary, not only will the need for such a step be less, the more
firmly your minds are made up, but you will also be regarded as showing
the spirit which you ought to show.
{9} To prove to you that I am not suggesting anything unprecedented in
bidding you liberate the Rhodians, and that you will not be acting
without precedent, if you take my advice, I will remind you of one of
those incidents in the past which have ended happily for you. You once
sent out Timotheus, men of Athens, to assist Ariobarzanes,[n] adding to
your resolution the provision that he must not break our treaty with
the king; and Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was now openly in
revolt against the king, but that Samos was occupied by a garrison
under Cyprothemis, who had been placed there by Tigranes, the king's
viceroy, abandoned his intention of helping Ariobarzanes, but sat down
before Samos, relieved it, and set it free. {10} And to this day no war
has ever arisen to trouble you on account of this. For to enter upon a
war for the purpose of aggrandizement is never the same thing as to do
so in defence of one's own possessions. Every one fights his hardest to
recover what he has lost; but when men endeavour to gain at the expense
of others, it is not so. They desire to do this, if it is allowed them;
but if they are prevented, they do not consider that their opponents
have done them any wrong.
{11} Now listen for a moment, and consider whether I am right or wrong,
when I conclude that if Athens were actively at work, Artemisia herself
would now not even oppose our action. If the king effects in Egypt all
that he is bent upon, I believe that Artemisia would make every attempt
to secure for him the continued possession of Rhodes--not from any
goodwill towards him, but from the desire to be credited with a great
service to him, while he is still in her neighbourhood,[n] and so to
win from him as friendly a reception as possible. {12} But if he is
faring as we are told, if all his attempts have failed, she will
consider, and rightly, that the island can be of no further use to the
king, except as a fortified post to command her own dominions--a
security against any movement on her part. Accordingly she would
prefer, I believe, that you should have it, without her openly
surrendering it to you, rather than that he should occupy it. I think,
therefore, that she would not even make an attempt to save it; or that
if she actually did so, it would be but weakly and ineffectively. {13}
For although I cannot, of course, profess to know what the king will
do, I must insist that it is high time that it should be made clear, in
the interests of Athens, whether he intends to lay claim to Rhodes or
not: for if he does so, we have then to take counsel, not for the
Rhodians alone, but for ourselves and for the Hellenes as a whole.
{14} At the same time, even if the Rhodians who are now in
possession[n] of the town held it by their own strength, I should never
have urged you to take them for your allies, for all the promises in
the world. For I observe that they took to their side some of their
fellow citizens, to help them overthrow the democracy, and that, having
done this, they turned and expelled them: and I do not think that men
who failed to keep faith with either party would ever be trustworthy
allies for yourselves. {15} And further, I should never have made my
present proposal, had I been thinking only of the interests of the
popular party in Rhodes. I am not their official patron,[n] nor have I
a single personal friend among them; and even if both these things were
otherwise, I should not have made this proposal, had I not believed it
to be for your advantage. For as for the Rhodians, if I may use such an
expression when I am pleading with you to save them, I share your
joy[1] at what has happened to them. For it is because they grudged you
the recovery of your rights that they have lost their own freedom; and
that, instead of the equal alliance which they might have had with
Hellenes, better than themselves, they are in bondage to foreigners and
slaves, whom they have admitted to their citadels. {16} Indeed, if you
resolve to go to their aid, I may almost say that this calamity has
been good for them; for, Rhodians as they are, I doubt if they would
ever have come to their right mind in prosperity; whereas actual
experience has now taught them that folly generally leads to manifold
adversities; and perhaps they will be wiser for the future. This
lesson, I feel sure, will be no small advantage to them. I say then
that you should endeavour to save these men, and should bear no malice,
remembering that you too have been greatly deceived by conspirators
against you, and yet would not admit that you deserved yourselves to
suffer for such mistakes.
Observe this also, men of Athens. {17} You have waged many wars both
against democracies and against oligarchies; and of this no doubt you
are as well aware as I. But I doubt whether any of you considers for
what objects you are fighting in each case. What then are these
objects? In fighting against a democracy, you are fighting either over
some private quarrel, when the parties have failed to settle their
disputes by the means publicly provided;[n] or you are contending for a
piece of territory, or about a boundary, or for a point of honour, or
for paramountcy. But in fighting against an oligarchy, it is not for
any such objects--it is your constitution and your freedom that are at
stake. {18} And therefore I should not hesitate to say that I believe
it would be better for you, that all the Hellenic peoples should be
democracies, and be at war with you, than that they should be governed
by oligarchies, and be your friends. For with a free people you would
have no difficulty, I believe, in making peace whenever you desired:
but with an oligarchical State friendship itself cannot be safe. For
there can be no goodwill between Few and Many--between those who seek
for mastery, and those who have chosen the life of political equality.
{19} It surprises me also that though Chios and Mytilene are ruled by
oligarchies, and though now the Rhodians and all mankind, I may almost
say, are being brought into the same bondage, no one considers that any
danger threatens our own constitution also, or reflects that if every
State is organized upon an oligarchic basis, it is not possible that
your own democracy should be suffered to remain. For they know that no
people but you could ever bring them forth into a state of liberty
again; and they will wish to put an end to so likely a source of
trouble to themselves. {20} As a rule we may regard wrongdoers as
enemies only to those whom they have wronged. But when men destroy free
constitutions and convert them into oligarchies, I say that you must
think of them as the common enemies of all whose hearts are set on
freedom. {21} Again, men of Athens, it is only right that you, a
democracy yourselves, should show towards other democracies in distress
the same spirit as you would expect them to show towards you, if any
such calamity (which God forbid!) should happen to you. It may be said
that the Rhodians are justly punished. If so, this is not the time to
exult over them. When men are prosperous they should always be found
taking thought how best to help the distressed; for the future is
unknown to all men.
{22} I have often heard it stated here in your presence, that when our
democracy had met with disaster,[n] you were joined by certain others
in your anxiety for its preservation. Of these I will only refer on the
present occasion to the Argives, and that briefly. For I cannot desire
that you, who enjoy the reputation of being always the saviours of the
distressed, should prove inferior to the Argives in that work. These
Argives, though their territory borders on that of the Spartans, whom
they saw to be masters by land and sea, neither hesitated nor feared to
display their goodwill towards you; but when envoys came from Sparta
(so the story goes) to demand the persons of certain Athenian refugees,
they even voted that unless the envoys departed before sunset, they
should be adjudged public enemies. {23} If then the democracy of Argos
in those days showed no fear of the might of the Spartan Empire, will
it not be a disgrace if you, who are Athenians, are afraid of one who
is a barbarian--aye, and a woman?[n] The Argives, moreover, could point
to many defeats sustained at the hands of Sparta, while you have often
defeated the king, and have not once proved inferior either to his
servants or to himself. For if ever the king has gained any success
against Athens, it has been by bribing the basest of the Hellenes to
betray their countrymen; in no other way has he ever succeeded. {24}
Indeed, even such success has done him no good. You will find that no
sooner had he rendered Athens weak,[n] by the help of the Spartans,
than he had to fight for his own kingdom against Clearchus and Cyrus.
His successes, therefore, have not been won in the open field, nor have
his plots brought him any good. Now some of you, I notice, are in the
habit of speaking contemptuously of Philip, as though he were not worth
reckoning with; while you dread the king, as a powerful enemy to any
whom he chooses to oppose. But if we are not to defend ourselves
against Philip, because he is so mean a foe, and are to give way in
everything to the king, because he is so formidable, who is there, men
of Athens, against whom we shall ever take the field?
{25} Men of Athens, you have among you those who are particularly
skilful in pleading with you the rights of the rest of the world; and I
should be glad to give them this single piece of advice--that they
should seek to plead your rights with the rest of the world,[n] and so
set an example of duty. It is monstrous to instruct you about rights,
without doing right oneself; and it is not right that a fellow citizen
of yours should have studied all the arguments against you and none of
those in your favour. {26} Ask yourselves, in God's name, why it is
that there is no one in Byzantium to tell the Byzantines that they must
not occupy Chalcedon,[n] which belongs to the king and formerly
belonged to you, but upon which they had no sort of claim; or that they
must not make Selymbria, once your ally, a contributory portion of the
Byzantine state; or include the territory of Selymbria[n] within the
Byzantine frontier, in defiance of the sworn treaty which ordains the
independence of the cities? {27} Why was there no one to tell Mausolus,
while he lived, and Artemisia after his death, that they must not
occupy Cos and Rhodes and other Hellenic cities as well, which the king
their master ceded to the Hellenes by the treaty,[n] and for the sake
of which the Hellenes of those days faced many a peril and fought many
a gallant fight? Even if there actually are such advisers[n] in both
cases, at least it is not likely that they will find listeners. {28}
For my part I believe that it is right to restore the exiled democracy
of Rhodes. But even if it were not right, I think it would be proper to
urge you to do it, when I consider the course taken by such speakers as
these; and for this reason. If all the world, men of Athens, were bent
upon doing right, it would be a disgrace to us if we alone were
unwilling to do so: but when all the world is preparing itself in order
to be able to commit wrong, then for us alone to abstain from every
enterprise, on the plea of right, is no righteousness, to my mind, but
cowardice. For I observe that the extent to which rights are admitted
is always in proportion to the claimant's power at the moment. {29} I
can illustrate this by an instance familiar to all of you. There are
two treaties[n] between the Hellenes and the king. The first was made
by our own city, and all men praise it; the second by the Spartans, and
it is denounced by all. The rights defined in these two treaties are
not the same. For whereas a common and equal share of private rights is
given by law to weak and strong alike, in a settlement of international
rights it is the stronger who legislate for the weaker.
Well, you already know what the right course is.[n] {30} It remains to
inquire how you can carry out your knowledge into action; and this will
be possible, if you come to be regarded as public champions of
universal liberty. But the great difficulty which you find in doing
your duty is, to my mind, natural enough. All other men have only one
conflict to face--the conflict with their declared foes; and when these
are subdued, there is no further obstacle to their secure enjoyment of
their happiness. {31} But for you there is a double conflict. In
addition to that to which all men are liable, there is another which is
harder, and which must be faced first: for you have to win the victory
in your councils over those who are deliberately working in your midst
against the interests of the city; and because, thanks to them, you can
effect nothing that is demanded of you without a struggle, it is
natural that you should often miss your mark. {32} The chief reason for
the fearless adoption of such a course in public life by so many men is
perhaps to be found in the benefits which they obtain from those who
hire them. Yet at the same time, some of the blame may fairly be laid
at your own doors. For you ought, men of Athens, to think of a man's
post in public life as you think of his post in the army in the field.
And how do you think of this? If a man leaves the post assigned to him
by his general, you think that he deserves to be disfranchised and to
lose all share in the privileges of a citizen. {33} And so when men
desert the post of civil duty, committed to them by our forefathers,
and follow an oligarchical[n] policy, they should forfeit the privilege
of acting as advisers to yourselves. As it is, while you believe that
those of your allies are best disposed towards you, who have sworn to
have the same friends and foes as yourselves, the politicians in whom
you place most faith are those whom you well know to have chosen the
side of the enemies of Athens.
{34} It is easy enough, however, to find reasons for accusing them and
reproaching all of you. But to find words or actions which will enable
us to rectify what is now amiss with us, is a task indeed. Moreover,
the present is not, perhaps, the time for entering into every point:
but if only you can confirm the policy which you have chosen by some
suitable action, it may be that other conditions will each in turn show
some improvement. {35} I think, therefore, that you ought to take this
enterprise in hand with vigour, and to act worthily of your country.
Remember with what delight you listen to the praises of your
forefathers,[n] the recital of their deeds, the enumeration of their
trophies. Consider then that your forefathers dedicated these trophies,
not that you might gaze at them in idle wonder, but that you might
imitate the actions of those who placed them there.
FOOTNOTES
[1] [Greek: humin sygchair_o].
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC (OR. IV)
[_Introduction_. Philip became King of Macedonia in 359 B.C. Being in
great difficulties both from external enemies and from internal
division, he made peace with the Athenians, who were supporting the
pretensions of Argaeus to the throne, in the hope of recovering (by
agreement with Argaeus) the colony of Amphipolis on the Strymon, which
they had lost in 424. Philip acknowledged the title of Athens to
Amphipolis, and sent home the Athenian prisoners, whom he had captured
among the supporters of Argaeus, without ransom. The Athenians,
however, neglected to garrison Amphipolis. In 358 (the year in which
Athens temporarily recovered her hold over Euboea, by compelling the
Thebans to evacuate the island), Philip carried on a successful
campaign against the Paeonian and Illyrian tribes, who were standing
enemies of Macedonia. For the next three years Athens was kept occupied
by the war with her allies, and Philip saw his opportunity. He besieged
Amphipolis: when the citizens sent Hierax and Stratocles to ask Athens
for help, he dispatched a letter promising the Athenians that he would
give them Amphipolis when he had taken it; and a secret understanding
was arrived at between Philip and the Athenian envoys sent to him, that
Athens should give him Pydna (once a Macedonian town, but now an ally
of Athens) in exchange. Athens, therefore, listened neither to
Amphipolis nor to Olynthus, which had also made overtures to her. The
Olynthians in consequence made a treaty with Philip, who gave them
Anthemus and promised to help them against their old rival Poteidaea, a
town in alliance with Athens. The Olynthians on their part agreed not
to make peace with Athens except in conjunction with him. But Philip,
when he had captured Amphipolis by a combination of siege and intrigue,
did not give it up to Athens, and instead of waiting to receive Pydna
from Athens, besieged and took it, aided once more by treachery from
within. In 356 he took Poteidaea (in conjunction with the Olynthians,
to whom he gave the town), the Athenians arriving too late to relieve
it; and then pursued his conquests along the Thracian coast. Further
inland he expelled the Thasians (allies of Athens) from Crenides and
founded Philippi on the site, in the centre of the gold-mines of Mount
Pangaeus, from which he henceforward derived a very large revenue;
while the forests of the district provided him with timber for
ship-building, of which he took full advantage: for in the next few
years his ships made descents upon the Athenian islands of Lemnos and
Imbros, plundered the Athenian corn-vessels off the coast of Euboea,
and even landed a force at Marathon. In the latter part of 356 and in
355 he was occupied with the conquest of the Paeonians and Illyrians,
with whom Athens had made an alliance in 356. At the end of 355 he laid
siege to Methone, the last Athenian port on the Thermaic gulf, and
captured it in 354. (Some place the siege and capture of Methone in
354-3, but an inscription, C.I.G. II. 70, makes it at least probable
that the siege had begun by the last month of 355.) In 353 Philip made
his way to the Thracian coast, and conquered Abdera and Maroneia. At
Maroneia we find him in company with Pammenes (his former host at
Thebes), who had been sent by the Thebans to assist Artabazus in his
revolt against the Persian king; and at the same place he received
Apollonides of Cardia, the envoy of the Thracian prince Cersobleptes.
On his way home his ships escaped from Chares, off Neapolis, by a ruse.
In the same year he interfered in the affairs of Thessaly, where the
Aleuadae of Larissa had invited his assistance against Lycophron and
Peitholaus of Pherae, who had invoked the aid of the Phocians. (In
opposing the Phocians, the antagonists of the Thebans in the Sacred
War, Philip was also helping the Thebans themselves, and gaining credit
as the opponent of the plunderers of the temple of Apollo at Delphi.)
Onomarchus, the Phocian leader, twice defeated Philip, but was
overthrown and slain in 352. Philip took Pherae and Pagasae (its port),
occupied Magnesia, and, by means of promises, obtained financial aid
from the Thessalians. The expedition sent by Athens to relieve Pagasae
arrived too late; but when Philip, after putting down the tyrants of
Pherae and arranging matters in Thessaly, advanced towards the Pass of
Thermopylae, an Athenian force, sent on the advice of Diophantus and
Eubulus, appeared in time to oblige him to retire to Macedonia. Late in
the autumn of 352 we find him once more in Thrace. It was probably now
that he assisted the peoples of Byzantium and Perinthus, together with
Amadocus, a rival of Cersobleptes, against the latter; with the result
that Cersobleptes was obliged to give up his son to Philip as a
hostage. Philip had also made alliance with Cardia, which, like
Byzantium, was on bad terms with Athens. He now laid siege to Heraeon
Teichos, a fortress on the Propontis, but illness obliged him to
suspend operations, and the rumour of his death prevented the Athenians
from sending against him the expedition which they had resolved upon.
(The retention of her influence in this region was essential for
Athens, if her corn-supply was to be secure.) In 351, on recovering
from his illness, he entered the territory of Olynthus, which, contrary
to the agreement with him, had made peace with Athens in the previous
year, apart from himself: but he did not at present pursue the invasion
further. In October 351 Athens sent Charidemus to the Hellespont with
ten ships, but no soldiers and little money. If these are the ships
alluded to in § 43 of the present Speech, the Speech must have been
delivered after that date. Otherwise any date after Philip's incursion
into the territory of Olynthus would suit the contents of the Speech,
and many writers place it earlier in the year. The question of the
relations of Athens with Philip had been brought forward; and
Demosthenes, who had risen first to speak, proposes the creation of a
large permanent fleet, and of a smaller force for immediate action,
laying great stress on the necessity of sending Athenian citizens both
to command and to form a substantial proportion of the troops, which,
had so far been mostly mercenaries. The scheme was worked out in
detail, both in its military and in its financial aspects, and
supported with an eloquence and an earnestness which are far in advance
of those displayed in the earlier speeches.
The statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, that the Speech as we have
it, is really a conflation of two speeches, of which the second
(beginning at § 30) was delivered in 347, is generally (and rightly)
discredited.]
{1} If some new subject were being brought before us, men of Athens, I
would have waited until most of your ordinary advisers had declared
their opinion; and if anything that they said were satisfactory to me,
I would have remained silent, and only if it were not so, would I have
attempted to express my own view. But since we find ourselves once more
considering a question upon which they have often spoken, I think I may
reasonably be pardoned for rising first of all. For if their advice to
you in the past had been what it ought to have been, you would have had
no occasion for the present debate.
{2} In the first place, then, men of Athens, we must not be downhearted
at our present situation, however wretched it may seem to be. For in
the worst feature of the past lies our best hope for the future-in the
fact, that is, that we are in our present plight because you are not
doing your duty in any respect; for if you were doing all that you
should do, and we were still in this evil case, we could not then even
hope for any improvement. {3} In the second place, you must bear in
mind (what some of you have heard from others, and those who know can
recollect for themselves), how powerful the Spartans were, not long
ago, and yet how noble and patriotic your own conduct was, when instead
of doing anything unworthy of your country you faced the war with
Sparta [n] in defence of the right. [n] Now why do I remind you of
these things? It is because, men of Athens, I wish you to see and to
realize, that so long as you are on your guard you have nothing to
fear; but that if you are indifferent, nothing can be as you would
wish: for this is exemplified for you both by the power of Sparta in
those days, to which you rose superior because you gave your minds to
your affairs; and by the insolence of Philip to-day, which troubles us
because we care nothing for the things which should concern us. {4} If,
however, any of you, men of Athens, when he considers the immense force
now at Philip's command, and the city's loss of all her strongholds,
thinks that Philip is a foe hard to conquer, I ask him (right though he
is in his belief) to reflect also that there was a time when we
possessed Pydna and Poteidaea and Methone; when all the surrounding
country was our own, and many of the tribes [n] which are now on his
side were free and independent, and more inclined to be friendly to us
than to him. {5} Now if in those days Philip had made up his mind that
it was a hard thing to fight against the Athenians, with all their
fortified outposts on his own frontiers, while he was destitute of
allies, he would have achieved none of his recent successes, nor
acquired this great power. But Philip saw quite clearly, men of Athens,
that all these strongholds were prizes of war, displayed for
competition. He saw that in the nature of things the property of the
absent belongs to those who are on the spot, and that of the negligent
to those who are ready for toil and danger. {6} It is, as you know, by
acting upon this belief, that he has brought all those places under his
power, and now holds them--some of them by right of capture in war,
others in virtue of alliances and friendly understandings; for every
one is willing to grant alliance and to give attention to those whom
they see to be prepared and ready to take action as is necessary. {7}
If then, men of Athens, you also will resolve to adopt this principle
to-day--the principle which you have never observed before--if each of
you can henceforward be relied upon to throw aside all this pretence of
incapacity, and to act where his duty bids him, and where his services
can be of use to his country; if he who has money will contribute, and
he who is of military age will join the campaign; if, in one plain
word, you will resolve henceforth to depend absolutely on yourselves,
each man no longer hoping that he will need to do nothing himself, and
that his neighbour will do everything for him; then, God willing, you
will recover your own; you will take back all that your indolence has
lost, and you will have your revenge upon Philip. {8} Do not imagine
that his fortune is built to last for ever, as if he were a God. He
also has those who hate him and fear him, men of Athens, and envy him
too, even among those who now seem to be his closest friends. All the
feelings that exist in any other body of men must be supposed to exist
in Philip's supporters. Now, however, all such feelings are cowed
before him: your slothful apathy has taken away their only rallying
point; and it is this apathy that I bid you put off to-day. {9} Mark
the situation, men of Athens: mark the pitch which the man's outrageous
insolence has reached, when he does not even give you a choice between
action and inaction, but threatens you, and utters (as we are told)
haughty language: for he is not the man to rest content in possession
of his conquests: he is always casting his net wider; and while we
procrastinate and sit idle, he is setting his toils around us on every
side. {10} When, then, men of Athens, when, I say, will you take the
action that is required? What are you waiting for? 'We are waiting,'
you say, 'till it is necessary.' But what must we think of all that is
happening at this present time? Surely the strongest necessity that a
free people can experience is the shame which they must feel at their
position! What? Do you want to go round asking one another, 'Is there
any news?' Could there be any stranger news than that a man of
Macedonia is defeating Athenians in war, and ordering the affairs of
the Hellenes? {11} 'Is Philip dead?' 'No, but he is sick.' And what
difference does it make to you? For if anything should happen to him,
you will soon raise up for yourselves a second Philip, if it is thus
that you attend to your interests. Indeed, Philip himself has not risen
to this excessive height through his own strength, so much as through
our neglect. I go even further. {12} If anything happened to Philip--if
the operation of Fortune, who always cares for us better than we care
for ourselves, were to effect this too for us--you know that if you
were at hand, you could descend upon the general confusion and order
everything as you wished; but in your present condition, even if
circumstances offered you Amphipolis, you could not take it; for your
forces and your minds alike are far away.
{13} Well, I say no more of the obligation which rests upon you all to
be willing and ready to do your duty; I will assume that you are
resolved and convinced. But the nature of the armament which, I
believe, will set you free from such troubles as these, the numbers of
the force, the source from which we must obtain funds, and the best and
quickest way, as it seems to me, of making all further
preparations--all this, men of Athens, I will at once endeavour to
explain when I have made one request of you. {14} Give your verdict on
my proposal when you have heard the whole of it; do not prejudge it
before I have done; and if at first the force which I propose appears
unprecedented, do not think that I am merely creating delays. It is not
those whose cry is 'At once', 'To-day', whose proposals will meet our
need; for what has already happened cannot be prevented by any
expedition now. {15} It is rather he who can show the nature, the
magnitude, and the financial possibility of a force which when provided
will be able to continue in existence either until we are persuaded to
break off the war, or until we have overcome the enemy; for thus only
can we escape further calamity for the future. These things I believe I
can show, though I would not stand in the way of any other speaker's
professions. It is no less a promise than this that I make; the event
will soon test its fulfilment, and you will be the judges of it.
First then, men of Athens, I say that fifty warships must {16} at once
be got in readiness: and next, that you must be in such a frame of mind
that, if any need arises, you will embark in person and sail. In
addition, you must prepare transports for half our cavalry, and a
sufficient number of boats. {17} These, I think, should be in readiness
to meet those sudden sallies of his from his own country against
Thermopylae, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and any other place which he may
select. For we must make him realize that there is a possibility of
your rousing yourselves out of your excessive indifference, just as
when once you went to Euboea,[n] and before that (as we are told) to
Haliartus,[n] and finally, only the other day, to Thermopylae. {18}
Such a possibility, even if you are unlikely to make it a reality, as I
think you ought to do, is not one which he can treat lightly; and you
may thus secure one of two objects. On the one hand, he may know that
you are on the alert--he will in fact know it well enough: there are
only too many persons, I assure you, in Athens itself, who report to
him all that happens here: and in that case his apprehensions will
ensure his inactivity. But if, on the other hand, he neglects the
warning, he may be taken off his guard; for there will be nothing to
hinder you from sailing to his country, if he gives you the
opportunity. {19} These are the measures upon which I say you should
all be resolved, and your preparations for them made. But before this,
men of Athens, you must make ready a force which will fight without
intermission, and do him damage. Do not speak to me of ten thousand or
twenty thousand mercenaries. I will have none of your paper-armies. [n]
Give me an army which will be the army of Athens, and will obey and
follow the general whom you elect, be there one general or more, be he
one particular individual, or be he who he may. {20} You must also
provide maintenance for this force. Now what is this force to be? how
large is it to be? how is it to be maintained? how will it consent to
act in this manner? I will answer these questions point by point. The
number of mercenaries--but you must not repeat the mistake which has so
often injured you, the mistake of, first, thinking any measures
inadequate, and so voting for the largest proposal, and then, when the
time for action comes, not even executing the smaller one; you must
rather carry out and make provision for the smaller measure, and add to
it, if it proves too small--{21} the total number of soldiers, I say,
must be two thousand, and of these five hundred must be Athenians,
beginning from whatever age you think good: they must serve for a
definite period--not a long one, but one to be fixed at your
discretion--and in relays. The rest must be mercenaries. With these
must be cavalry, two hundred in number, of whom at least fifty must be
Athenians, as with the infantry; and the conditions of service must be
the same. {22} You must also find transports for these. And what next?
Ten swift ships of war. For as he has a fleet, we need swift-sailing
warships too, to secure the safe passage of the army. And how is
maintenance to be provided for these? This also I will state and
demonstrate, as soon as I have given you my reasons for thinking that a
force of this size is sufficient, and for insisting that those who
serve in it shall be citizens.
{23} The size of the force, men of Athens, is determined by the fact
that we cannot at present provide an army capable of meeting Philip in
the open field; we must make plundering forays, and our warfare must at
first be of a predatory nature. Consequently the force must not be
over-big--we could then neither pay nor feed it--any more than it must
be wholly insignificant. {24} The presence of citizens in the force
that sails I require for the following reasons. I am told that Athens
once maintained a mercenary force in Corinth,[n] under the command of
Polystratus, Iphicrates, Chabrias and others, and that you yourselves
joined in the campaign with them; and I remember hearing that these
mercenaries, when they took the field with you, and you with them, were
victorious over the Spartans. But even since your mercenary forces have
gone to war alone, it is your friends and allies that they conquer,
while your enemies have grown more powerful than they should be. After
a casual glance at the war to which Athens has sent them, they sail off
to Artabazus,[n] or anywhere rather than to the war; and the general
follows them naturally enough, for his power over them is gone when he
can give them no pay. You ask what I bid you do. {25} I bid you take
away their excuses both from the general and the soldiers, by supplying
pay and placing citizen-soldiers at their side as spectators of these
mysteries of generalship;[n] for our present methods are a mere
mockery. Imagine the question to be put to you, men of Athens, whether
you are at peace or no. 'At peace?' you would say; 'Of course not! We
are at war with Philip.' {26} Now have you not all along been electing
from among your own countrymen ten captains and generals,[n] and
cavalry-officers, and two masters-of-the-horse? and what are they
doing? Except the one single individual whom you happen to send to the
seat of war, they are all marshalling your processions for you with the
commissioners of festivals. You are no better than men modelling
puppets of clay. Your captains and your cavalry-officers are elected to
be displayed in the streets, not to be sent to the war. {27} Surely,
men of Athens, your captains should be elected from among yourselves,
and your master-of-the-horse from among yourselves; your officers
should be your own countrymen, if the force is to be really the army of
Athens. As it is, the master-of-the-horse who is one of yourselves has
to sail to Lemnos; while the master-of-the-horse with the army that is
fighting to defend the possessions of Athens is Menelaus.[n] I do not
wish to disparage that gentleman; but whoever holds that office ought
to have been elected by you.
{28} Perhaps, however, while agreeing with all that I have said, you
are mainly anxious to hear my financial proposals, which will tell you
the amount and the sources of the funds required. I proceed, therefore,
with these at once. First for the sum. The cost of the bare rations for
the crews, with such a force, will be 90 talents and a little over--40
talents for ten swift ships, and 20 minae a month for each ship; and
for the soldiers as much again, each soldier to receive rations to the
value of 10 drachmae a month; and for the cavalry (two hundred in
number, each to receive 30 drachmae a month) twelve talents. {29} It
may be said that the supply of bare rations to the members of the force
is an insufficient initial provision; but this is a mistake. I am quite
certain that, given so much, the army will provide everything else for
itself from the proceeds of war, without injury to a single Hellene or
ally of ours, and that the full pay will be made up by these means. I
am ready to sail as a volunteer and to suffer the worst, if my words
are untrue. The next question then is of ways and means, in so far as
the funds are to come from yourselves. I will explain this at once.
[_A schedule of ways and means is read_.]
{30} This, men of Athens, is what we have been able to devise; and when
you put our proposals to the vote, you will pass them, if you approve
of them; that so your war with Philip may be a war, not of resolutions
and dispatches, but of actions.
{31} I believe that the value of your deliberations about the war and
the armament as a whole would be greatly enhanced, if you were to bear
in mind the situation of the country against which you are fighting,
remembering that most of Philip's plans are successfully carried out
because he takes advantage of winds and seasons; for he waits for the
Etesian winds[n] or the winter-season, and only attacks when it would
be impossible for us to effect a passage to the scene of action. {32}
Bearing this in mind, we must not carry on the war by means of isolated
expeditions; we shall always be too late. We must have a permanent
force and armament. As our winter-stations for the army we have Lemnos,
Thasos, Sciathos, and the islands in that region, which have harbours
and corn, and are well supplied with all that an army needs. And as to
the time of year, whenever it is easy to approach the shore and the
winds are not dangerous, our force can without difficulty lie close to
the Macedonian coast itself, and block the mouths of the ports.
{33} How and when he will employ the force is a matter to be
determined, when the time comes, by the commander whom you put in
control of it. What must be provided from Athens is described in the
scheme which I have drafted. If, men of Athens, you first supply the
sum I have mentioned, and then, after making ready the rest of the
armament--soldiers, ships, cavalry--bind the whole force in its
entirety,[n] by law, to remain at the seat of war; if you become your
own paymasters, your own commissioners of supply, but require your
general to account for the actual operations; {34} then there will be
an end of these perpetual discussions of one and the same theme, which
end in nothing but discussion: and in addition to this, men of Athens,
you will, in the first place, deprive him of his chief source of
supply. For what is this? Why, he carries on the war at the cost of
your own allies, harrying and plundering those who sail the seas! And
what will you gain besides this? You will place yourselves out of reach
of disaster. It will not be as it was in the past, when he descended
upon Lemnos and Imbros, and went off, with your fellow-citizens as his
prisoners of war, or when he seized the vessels off Geraestus,[n] and
levied an enormous sum from them; or when (last of all) he landed at
Marathon, seized the sacred trireme,[n] and carried it off from the
country; while all the time you can neither prevent these aggressions,
nor yet send an expedition which will arrive when you intend it to
arrive. {35} But for what reason do you think, men of Athens, do the
festival of the Panathenaea and the festival of the Dionysia[n] always
take place at the proper time, whether those to whom the charge of
either festival is allotted are specially qualified persons or
not--festivals upon which you spend larger sums of money than upon any
armament whatsoever, and which involve an amount of trouble[n] and
preparation, which are unique, so far as I know, in the whole world--;
and yet your armaments are always behind the time--at Methone, at
Pagasae, at Potidaea? {36} It is because for the festivals all is
arranged by law. Each of you knows long beforehand who is to supply the
chorus,[n] and who is to be steward of the games,[n] for his tribe: he
knows what he is to receive, and when, and from whom, and what he is to
do with it. No detail is here neglected, nothing is left indefinite.
But in all that concerns war and our preparation for it, there is no
organization, no revision, no definiteness. Consequently it is not
until the news comes that we appoint our trierarchs and institute
exchanges of property for them, and inquire into ways and means. When
that is done, we first resolve that the resident aliens and the
independent freedmen[n] shall go on board; then we change our minds and
say that citizens shall embark; then that we will send substitutes; and
while all these delays are occurring, the object of the expedition is
already lost. {37} For we spend on preparation the time when we should
be acting, and the opportunities which events afford will not wait for
our slothful evasions; while as for the forces on which we think we can
rely in the meantime, when the critical moment comes, they are tried
and found wanting. And Philip's insolence has reached such a pitch,
that he has sent such a letter as the following to the Euboeans.
[_The letter is read_.]
{38} The greater part of the statements that have been read are true,
men of Athens; and they ought not to be true! but I admit that they may
possibly be unpleasant to hear; and if the course of future events
would pass over all that a speaker passes over in his speech, to avoid
giving pain, we should be right in speaking with a view to your
pleasure. But if attractive words, spoken out of season, bring their
punishment in actual reality, then it is disgraceful to blind our eyes
to the truth, to put off everything that is unpleasant, {39} to refuse
to understand even so much as this, that those who conduct war rightly
must not follow in the wake of events, but must be beforehand with
them: for just as a general may be expected to lead his army, so those
who debate must lead the course of affairs, in order that what they
resolve upon may be done, and that they may not be forced to follow at
the heels of events. {40} You, men of Athens, have the greatest power
in the world-warships, infantry, cavalry, revenue. But none of these
elements of power have you used as you ought, down to this very day.
The method of your warfare with Philip is just that of barbarians in a
boxing-match. Hit one of them, and he hugs the place; hit him on the
other side, and there go his hands; but as for guarding, or looking his
opponent in the face, he neither can nor will do it. {41} It is the
same with you. If you hear that Philip is in the Chersonese, you
resolve to make an expedition there; if he is at Thermopylae, you send
one there; and wherever else he may be, you run up and down in his
steps. It is he that leads your forces. You have never of yourselves
come to any salutary decision in regard to the war. No single event do
you ever discern before it occurs--before you have heard that something
has happened or is happening. Perhaps there was room for this
backwardness until now; but now we are at the very crisis, and such an
attitude is possible no longer. {42} Surely, men of Athens, it is one
of the gods--one who blushes for Athens, as he sees the course which
events are taking--that has inspired Philip with this restless
activity. If he were content to remain at peace, in possession of all
that he has won by conquest or by forestalling us--if he had no further
plans--even then, the record against us as a people, a record of shame
and cowardice and all that is most dishonourable, would, I think, seem
complete enough to some of you. But now he is always making some new
attempt, always grasping after something more; and unless your spirit
has utterly departed, his conduct will perhaps bring you out into the
field. {43} It amazes me, men of Athens, that not one of you remembers
with any indignation, that this war had its origin in our intention to
punish Philip; and that now, at the end of it, the question is, how we
are to escape disaster at his hands. But that he will not stay his
progress until some one arrests it is plain enough. Are we then to wait
for that? Do you think that all is right, when you dispatch nothing but
empty ships and somebody's hopes? Shall we not embark? {44} Shall we
not now, if never before, go forth ourselves, and provide at least some
small proportion of Athenian soldiers? Shall we not sail to the enemy's
country? But I heard the question, 'At what point on his coast are we
to anchor?' The war itself, men of Athens, if you take it in hand, will
discover his weak points: but if we sit at home listening to the mutual
abuse and recriminations of our orators, you can never realize any of
the results that you ought to realize. {45} I believe that whenever any
portion of Athens is sent with the forces, even if the whole city does
not go, the favour of Heaven and of Fortune fights on our side. But
whenever you dispatch anywhere a general with an empty resolution and
some platform-hopes to support him, then you achieve nothing that you
ought to achieve, your enemies laugh at you, and your allies are in
deadly fear of all such armaments. {46} It is impossible, utterly
impossible, that any one man should be able to effect all that you wish
for you. He can give undertakings and promises;[n] he can accuse this
man and that; and the result is that your fortunes are ruined. For when
the general is at the head of wretched, unpaid mercenaries, and when
there are those in Athens who lie to you light-heartedly about all that
he does, and, on the strength of the tales that you hear, you pass
decrees at random, what _must_ you expect?
{47} How then can this state of things be terminated? Only, men of
Athens, when you expressly make the same men soldiers, witnesses of
their general's actions, and judges at his examination[n] when they
return home; for then the issue of your fortunes will not be a tale
which you hear, but a thing which you will be on the spot to see. So
shameful is the pass which matters have now reached, that each of your
generals is tried for his life before you two or three times, but does
not dare to fight in mortal combat with the enemy even once. They
prefer the death of kidnappers and brigands to that of a general. {48}
For it is a felon's death, to die by sentence of the court: the death
of a general is to fall in battle with the enemy. Some of us go about
saying that Philip is negotiating with Sparta[n] for the overthrow of
the Thebans and the breaking up of the free states; others, that he has
sent ambassadors to the king;[n] others, that he is fortifying cities
in Illyria. {49} We all go about inventing each his own tale. I quite
believe, men of Athens, that he is intoxicated with the greatness of
his successes, and entertains many such visions in his mind; for he
sees that there are none to hinder him, and he is elated at his
achievements. But I do not believe that he has chosen to act in such a
way that the most foolish persons in Athens can know what he intends to
do; for no persons are so foolish as newsmongers. {50} But if we
dismiss all such tales, and attend only to the certainty--that the man
is our enemy, that he is robbing us of our own, that he has insulted us
for a long time, that all that we ever expected any one to do for us
has proved to be against us, that the future is in our own hands, that
if we will not fight him now in his own country we shall perhaps be
obliged to do so in ours--if, I say, we are assured of this, then we
shall have made up our minds aright, and shall be quit of idle words.
For you have not to speculate what the future may be: you have only to
be assured that the future must be evil, unless you give heed and are
ready to do your duty.
{51} Well, I have never yet chosen to gratify you by saying anything
which I have not felt certain would be for your good; and to-day I have
spoken freely and without concealment, just what I believe. I could
wish to be as sure of the good that a speaker will gain by giving you
the best advice as of that which you will gain by listening to him. I
should then have been far happier than I am. As it is, I do not know
what will happen to me, for what I have said: but I have chosen to
speak in the sure conviction that if you carry out my proposals, it
will be for your good; and may the victory rest with that policy which
will be for the good of all!
THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS (OR. I-III)
[_Introduction_. It has already been noticed that when Philip took
Amphipolis in 357 B.C., the Olynthians made overtures to the Athenians,
with whom they had been at war for some years, and that, being
rejected, they became allies of Philip, who gave them Anthemus and
Poteidaea. In 352, alarmed at Philip's growing power, they once more
applied to Athens. Peace was made, and negotiations began with regard
to an alliance. In 351 Philip appeared in the territory of Olynthus. He
did not, however, at once carry the invasion further, but took pains,
during this year and the next, to foster a Macedonian party in the
town. In 349 Philip virtually declared war on the Olynthians by
demanding the surrender of his step-brother Arrhidaeus, who had taken
refuge with them. The Olynthians again appealed to Athens; an alliance
was made; Chares was sent with thirty ships and 2,000 mercenaries, but
seems to have mismanaged the war by misfortune or by design. Probably
he had been badly supplied with funds, and instead of helping Olynthus,
resorted to acts of piracy to satisfy his men. The Macedonian troops
proceeded to take Stageira and other towns of the Olynthian League,
though Philip still professed to have no hostile intentions against
Olynthus (see Phil. III, § ii). Chares was recalled and put on his
trial; and, probably in response to a further message from Olynthus,
Charidemus was transferred thither from the Hellespont. With a
considerable mercenary force at his disposal, Charidemus overran
Pallene and Bottiaea, and did some damage to Philip's territory, but
afterwards gave himself up to dissipation in Olynthus. In the meantime,
some of the Thessalians had become restless under Philip's supremacy
(see Olynth. I, § 22, II, § ii), and he was obliged to undertake an
expedition to suppress the revolt, and to put down Peitholaus (who had
apparently become tyrant of Pherae once more, though he had been
expelled in 352). But early in 348 he appeared in person in Chalcidice,
and took one after another of the towns of the League, including
Mecyberna the port of Olynthus, and Torone. He thrice defeated the
Olynthians in battle, and at last obtained possession of Olynthus
itself by the treachery of Euthycrates and Lasthenes, the commanders of
the Olynthian cavalry.
Athens had probably been occupied during the early part of the year [1]
with an expedition which she sent (against the advice of Demosthenes)
to help Plutarchus of Eretria to repel attacks which were partly, at
least, instigated by Philip; and in consequence she had done little for
Olynthus, though on a request of the Olynthians for cavalry, she had
ordered some of those which had been sent to Euboea to go to Olynthus,
and these may have been the Athenians whom Philip captured in that
city. The seventeen ships, 2,000 infantry, and 300 cavalry (all
citizens), which Athens dispatched under Chares in response to a last
urgent appeal from Olynthus, were delayed by storms and arrived too
late. Philip entirely destroyed Olynthus and thirty-two other towns,
sold their inhabitants into slavery, brought the whole of Chalcidice
within the Macedonian Empire, and celebrated his conquests by a
festival in honour of the Olympian Zeus at Dium.
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC
attacked or any other towns actually taken (Olynth. I, § 17); and both
the First and Second before the discontent with Philip in Thessaly had
taken an active form (I, § 22, II, § 7). Both, that is, belong to the
summer of 349, and the situation implied is very much the same in both.
The First was perhaps spoken when the Olynthians first appealed to
Athens in that year, before the mission of Chares; the Second, to
counteract the effect of something which had caused despondency in
Athens (possibly the conduct of the Athenian generals, or the account
given by other orators of Philip's power). In both Demosthenes urges
the importance of resisting Philip while he is still far away, and of
sending, not mercenaries, but a citizen-army; and while hinting at what
he regards as the true solution of the financial difficulty, proposes a
special war-tax. The solution which he thinks the right one is more
explicitly described in the Third Olynthiac, spoken (probably
[Footnote: See note on Olynth. III, Section 4]) in the autumn of the
same year, and certainly at a time when the situation had become much
more grave. The root of the financial difficulty lay in the existence
of a law which prohibited (evidently under severe penalties, Olynth.
III, Section 12) any proposal to devote to military purposes that
portion of the revenues which constituted the 'Festival' or 'Theoric
Fund', and was for the most part distributed to the citizens to enable
them to take part in the public festivals, and so join in fulfilling
what was no doubt a religious duty as well as a pleasure. This
particular form of expenditure is stated to have been introduced by the
demagogue Agyrrhius in 394, when it revived in an extended form a
distribution of theatre money instituted late in the fifth century by
Cleophon; but the special law in question appears to have been of
recent date (Olynth. III, Section 12), and was almost certainly the
work of Eubulus and his party. Demosthenes himself proposes an
extraordinary Legislative Commission, to repeal the mischievous laws
and leave the way clear for financial reform. At the same time he
attacks the whole policy of Eubulus, charging him with distributing
doles without regard to public service, adding to the amenities of
Athens instead of maintaining her honour in war, and enriching her
politicians while degrading her people. The main object of the speech
was unsuccessful; and just about this time (though whether before or
after the speech is disputed) Apollodorus proposed that the people
should decide whether the surplus revenues should go to the Festival
Fund, or be applied to military purposes, and was heavily fined for the
illegality of the proposal.
The Three Olynthiacs rank high among the Orations of Demosthenes. Some
passages, indeed, show that he had hardly as yet appreciated the genius
of Philip, or the unlikelihood of his making a false move either
through over-confidence or because he had come to the end of his
resources. But the noble patriotism of the speaker, the lofty tone of
his political reflections, the clearness of his diagnosis of the evils
of his time, and the fearlessness of his appeal for loyal and united
self-sacrifice, are nowhere more conspicuous.]
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC
{1} I believe, men of Athens, that you would give a great sum to know
what policy, in reference to the matter which you are now considering,
will best serve the interests of the city, and since that is so, you
ought to be ready and eager to listen to those who desire to give you
their advice. For not only can you hear and accept any useful proposals
which a speaker may have thought out before he came here; but such, I
conceive, is your fortune, that the right suggestion will often occur
to some of those present on the spur of the moment; and out of all
these suggestions it should be easy for you to choose the most
advantageous course.
{2} The present time, men of Athens, seems almost to cry aloud that you
must take matters into your own hands yonder, if you have any interest
in a successful termination of the crisis: and yet our attitude appears
to be--I do not know what. My own opinion, at all events, is that you
should at once resolve to send this assistance; that you should prepare
for the departure of the expedition at the first possible moment--you
must not fall victims to the same error as before--and that you should
dispatch an embassy to announce our intention, and to be present at the
scene of action. {3} For what we have most to fear is this--that he,
with his unscrupulous cleverness in taking advantage of
circumstances--now, it may be, by making concessions; now by uttering
threats, which he may well seem likely to fulfil; now by
misrepresenting ourselves and our absence from the scene--may turn and
wrest to his own advantage some of the vital elements of our power. {4}
And yet it may fairly be said, men of Athens, that our best hope lies
in that very circumstance which renders Philip's power so hard to
grapple with. The fact that the entire control over everything, open or
secret,[n] is concentrated in the hands of a single man; that he is at
one and the same time general, master, and treasurer; that he is always
present in person with his army--all this is a great advantage, in so
far as military operations must be prompt and well-timed. But as
regards the compact which he would so gladly make with the Olynthians,
the effect is just the reverse. {5} For the Olynthians know well that
they are not fighting now for honour and glory, nor for a strip of
territory, but to avert the devastation and enslavement of their
country. They know how he treated[n] those who betrayed to him their
city at Amphipolis, and those who received him at Pydna; and it is, I
imagine, universally true that tyranny is a faithless friend to a free
state, and that most of all, when they occupy adjoining territories.
{6} With this knowledge, men of Athens, and with all the reflections
that the occasion calls for in your minds, I say that now, if ever
before, you must make your resolve, rouse all your energies, and give
your minds to the war: you must contribute gladly, you must go forth in
person, you must leave nothing undone. There is no longer any reason or
excuse remaining, which can justify you in refusing to do your duty.
{7} For every one was but recently harping on the desirability of
exciting Olynthus to war with Philip; and this has now come to pass of
itself, and in the way which most completely suits your interests. Had
they taken up the war because you had persuaded them to do so, their
alliance might perhaps have been precarious, and their resolution might
only have carried them a certain way. But now their detestation of
Philip is based upon grievances which affect themselves; and we may
suppose that a hostility which is occasioned by their own fears and
sufferings will be a lasting one. {8} Since, therefore, men of Athens,
such an opportunity has been thrown in your way, you must not let it
go, nor fall victims to the mistake from which you have often suffered
before. If, for instance, when we had returned from our expedition in
aid of the Euboeans,[n] and Hierax and Stratocles came from Amphipolis
and stood upon this platform and urged us to sail and take over the
city; if, I say, we had continued to display in our own interest the
eagerness which we displayed in the deliverance of the Euboeans, you
would have kept Amphipolis then, and we should have been free from all
the trouble that we have had since. {9} And again, when news kept
coming of the investment of Pydna, Poteidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and all
the other places--I will not stay to enumerate them all--if we had
acted at once, and had gone to the rescue of the first place attacked,
with the energy which we ought to have shown, we should now have found
Philip much less proud and difficult to deal with. As it is, we are
always sacrificing the present, always fancying that the future will
turn out well of itself; and so we have raised Philip to a position of
such importance as no king of Macedonia has ever before attained. {10}
And now an opportunity has come to Athens, in this crisis at Olynthus,
as great as any of those former ones: and I believe, men of Athens,
that one who was to draw up a true account of the blessings which have
been given us by the gods, would, in spite of much that is not as it
should be, find great cause for thankfulness to them; and naturally so.
For our many losses in the war must in fairness be set down to our own
indifference; but that we did not suffer such losses long ago, and that
an alliance has presented itself to us, which, if we will only take
advantage of it, will act as a counterpoise to them--all this I, for
one, should set down as a favour due to their goodness towards us. But
it is, I imagine, in politics, as it is in money-making. {11} If a man
is able to keep all that he gets, he is abundantly grateful to Fortune;
but if he loses it all before he is aware, he loses with it his memory
of Fortune's kindness. So it is in politics. When men have not made a
right use of their opportunities, they do not remember any good that
heaven may actually have granted them: for it is by the ultimate issue
that men estimate all that they have enjoyed before. Therefore, men of
Athens, you must pay the very utmost heed to the future, that by the
better use you make of it, you may wipe out the dishonour of the past.
{12} But if you sacrifice these men also, men of Athens, and Philip in
consequence reduces Olynthus to subjection, I ask any of you to tell me
what is to prevent him from marching where he pleases. Is there a man
among you, men of Athens, who considers or studies the steps by which
Philip, weak enough at first, has become so strong? First he took
Amphipolis, next Pydna, then again Poteidaea, and then Methone. Next he
set foot in Thessaly. {13} Then when Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia[n] were
secured for his purposes, just as it suited him, he departed to Thrace.
In Thrace, after expelling one prince and setting up another, he fell
ill. When he grew easier again, he showed no inclination to take things
easily, but at once attacked the Olynthians[n]--and I am passing over
his campaigns against the Illyrians and the Paeonians, against
Arybbas,[n] and in every possible direction.
{14} Why, I may be asked, do I mention these things at the present
moment? I wish you to understand, men of Athens, and to realize these
two points: first, the unprofitableness of perpetually sacrificing your
interests one by one; and, secondly, the restless activity which is a
part of Philip's very being, and which will not allow him to content
himself with his achievements and remain at peace. For if it is to be
his fixed resolve, that he must always be aiming at something greater
than he has yet attained; and ours, that we will never set ourselves
resolutely to work; ask yourselves what you can expect to be the end of
the matter. {15} In God's name, is there one of you so innocent as not
to know that the war will be transferred from Olynthus to Attica, if we
pay no heed? But if that happens, men of Athens, I fear that we shall
be like men who light-heartedly borrow at a high rate of interest, and
after a brief period of affluence, lose even their original estate;
that like them we shall find that our carelessness has cost us dear;
that through making pleasure our standard in everything, we shall find
ourselves driven to do many of those unpleasant things which we wished
to avoid, and shall find our position even in our own country
imperilled.
{16} I may be told that it is easy to criticize--any one can do that;
but that a political adviser is expected to offer some practical
proposal to meet the existing situation. Now I am well aware, men of
Athens, that in the event of any disappointment, it is not upon those
who are responsible that your anger falls, but upon those who have
spoken last upon the subject in question. Yet I do not think that
consideration for my own safety should lead me to conceal my conviction
as to the course which your interests demand. {17} I say then that
there are two things which you must do to save the situation. You must
rescue these towns [n] for the Olynthians, and send troops to
accomplish this: and you must damage Philip's country with your ships
and with a second body of troops. {18} If you neglect either of these
things, our campaign, I greatly fear, will be in vain. For suppose that
you inflict damage on his country, and that he allows you to do so,
while he reduces Olynthus; he will have no difficulty in repelling you
when he returns. Suppose, on the other hand, that you only go to the
help of Olynthus; he will see that he has nothing to fear at home, and
so he will sit down before the town and remain at his task, until time
enables him to get the better of the besieged. The expedition,
therefore, must be large, and it must be in two parts.
Such is my view with regard to the expedition. {19} As to the sources
of supply, you have funds, men of Athens--funds larger than any one
else in the world; but you appropriate these without scruple, just as
you choose. Now if you will assign these to your troops, you need no
further supplies: otherwise, not only do you need further supplies--you
are destitute of supplies altogether. 'Well' (does someone say?), 'do
you move that this money should form a war-fund?' I assure you that I
make no such motion. {20} For while I do indeed believe that a force
ought to be made ready [and that this money should form a war-fund],
and that the receipt of money should be connected, as part of one and
the same system, with the performance of duty; you, on the contrary,
think it right to take the money, after your present fashion, for your
festivals, and spare yourselves trouble. And therefore, I suppose, our
only resource is a general tax--larger or smaller, according to the
amount required. In any case, we need funds, and without funds nothing
can be done that we ought to do. Various other sources of supply are
suggested by different persons. Choose whichever you think best of
these, and get to work, while you have the opportunity.
{21} It is worth while to remember and to take into account the nature
of Philip's position at this moment. For neither are his affairs at
present in such good order, or in so perfectly satisfactory a state, as
might appear to any but a careful observer; nor would he ever have
commenced this present war, if he had thought that he would really have
to fight. He hoped at first that by his mere advance he would carry all
before him; and he has since discovered his mistake. This
disappointment, then, is the first thing which disturbs him and causes
him great despondency: {22} and next there is the disposition of the
Thessalians, naturally inconstant as we know it has always been found
by all men; and what it has always been, that, in the highest degree,
Philip finds it now. For they have formally resolved to demand from him
the restitution of Pagasae; they have prevented him from fortifying
Magnesia, and I myself heard it stated that they intend even to refuse
him the enjoyment of their harbour and market dues for the future.
These, they say, should go to maintain the public administration of
Thessaly, instead of being taken by Philip. But if he is deprived of
these funds, the resources from which he must maintain his mercenaries
will be reduced to the narrowest limits. {23} Nay, more: we must surely
suppose that the chieftains of the Paeonians and Illyrians, and in fact
all such personages--would prefer freedom to slavery; for they are not
accustomed to obey orders, and the man, they say, is a bully. Heaven
knows, there is nothing incredible in the statement. Unmerited success
is to foolish minds a fountain-head of perversity, so that it is often
harder for men to keep the good they have, than it was to obtain it.
{24} It is for you then, men of Athens, to regard his difficulty as
your opportunity, to take up your share of the burden with readiness,
to send embassies to secure all that is required, to join the forces
yourselves, and to stir up every one else to do so. Only consider what
would happen, if Philip got such an opportunity to strike at us, and
there was war on our frontier. Can you not imagine how readily he would
march against us? Does it arouse no shame in you, that, when you have
the opportunity, you should not dare to do to him even as much as you
would have to suffer, were he able to inflict it?
{25} There is a further point, men of Athens, which must not escape
you. I mean that you have now to choose whether you are to carry on war
yonder, or whether he is to do so in your own country. If the
resistance of Olynthus is maintained, you will fight there and will
inflict damage on Philip's territory, while you remain secure in the
enjoyment of this land of your own which you now possess. But if Philip
captures Olynthus, who is to hinder him from marching to Athens? The
Thebans? {26} It seems, I fear, too bitter a thing to say; but they
will be glad to join him in the invasion. The Phocians? They cannot
protect their own country, unless you go to their aid, or some other
power. 'But, my good Sir,'[n] you say, 'he will not want to march
here.' And yet it would be one of the strangest things in the world,
if, when he has the power, he does not carry out the threats, which he
now blurts out in spite of the folly that they show. {27} But I suppose
that I need not even point out how vast is the difference between war
here and war in his country. For had you to camp outside the walls
yourselves, for only thirty days, and to take from the country such
things as men in camp must have--and I am assuming that there is no
enemy in the country--I believe that the loss your farmers would suffer
would exceed your whole expenditure on the war up to the present time.
What then must we think will be the extent of our loss, if ever war
comes to our doors? And besides the loss there is his insolence, and
the shame of our position, which to right-minded men is as serious as
any loss.
{28} When you take a comprehensive view of these things you must all go
to the rescue and stave the war off yonder; you who are well-to-do, in
order that, with a small expense in defence of the great fortunes which
you quite rightly enjoy, you may reap the benefit of the remainder
without fear; you who are of military age, that you may gain your
experience of war in Philip's country, and so become formidable
guardians of a fatherland unspoiled; and your orators, that they may
find it easy to render an account of their public life; for your
judgement upon their conduct will itself depend upon the position in
which you find yourselves. And may that be a happy one, on every ground!
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC
{1} Many as are the occasions, men of Athens, on which we may discern
the manifestation of the goodwill of Heaven towards this city, one of
the most striking is to be seen in the circumstances of the present
time. For that men should have been found to carry on war against
Philip; men whose territory borders on his and who possess some power;
men, above all, whose sentiments in regard to the war are such that
they think of the proposed compact with him, not only as untrustworthy,
but as the very ruin of their country--this seems to be certainly the
work of a superhuman, a divine, beneficence. {2} And so, men of Athens,
we must take care that we do not treat ourselves less well than
circumstances have treated us. For it is a shameful thing--nay, it is
the very depth of shame--to throw away openly, not only cities and
places which were once in our power, but even the allies and the
opportunities which have been provided for us by Fortune.
{3} Now to describe at length the power of Philip, men of Athens, and
to incite you to the performance of your duty by such a recital, is
not, I think, a satisfactory proceeding; and for this reason--that
while all that can be said on this subject tends to Philip's glory, it
is a story of failure on our part. For the greater the extent to which
his success surpasses his deserts, the greater is the admiration with
which the world regards him; while, for your part, the more you have
fallen short of the right use of your opportunities, the greater is the
disgrace that you have incurred. {4} I will therefore pass over such
considerations. For any honest inquirer must see that the causes of
Philip's rise to greatness lie in Athens, and not in himself. Of the
services for which he has to thank those whose policy is determined by
his interest--services for which you ought to require their
punishment--the present is not, I see, the moment to speak. But apart
from these, there are things which may be said, and which it is better
that you should all have heard--things which (if you will examine them
aright) constitute a grave reproach against him; and these I will try
to tell you.
{5} If I called him perjured and faithless, without giving his actions
in evidence, my words would be treated as idle abuse, and rightly: and
it happens that to review all his actions up to the present time, and
to prove the charge in every case, requires only a short speech. It is
well, I think, that the story should be told, for it will serve two
purposes; first, to make plain the real badness of the man's character;
and secondly, to let those who are over-alarmed at Philip, as if he
were invincible, see that he has come to the end of all those forms of
deceit by which he rose to greatness, and that his career is already
drawing to its close. {6} For I, too, men of Athens, should be
regarding Philip with intense fear and admiration, if I saw that his
rise was the result of a righteous policy. {7} But when I study and
consider the facts, I find that originally, when certain persons wished
to drive from your presence the Olynthians who desired to address you
from this place, Philip won over our innocent minds by saying that he
would deliver up Amphipolis to us, and by inventing the famous secret
understanding; that he afterwards conciliated the Olynthians by seizing
Poteidaea, which was yours, and injuring their former allies by handing
it over to themselves; and that, last of all, he recently won over the
Thessalians, by promising to give up Magnesia to them, and undertaking
to carry on the war with the Phocians on their behalf. There is
absolutely no one who has ever had dealings with him that he has not
deluded; and it is by deceiving and winning over, one after another,
those who in their blindness did not realize what he was, that he has
risen as he has done. {8} And therefore, just as it was by these
deceptions that he rose to greatness, in the days when each people
fancied that he intended to do some service to themselves; so it is
these same deceptions which should drag him down again, now that he
stands convicted of acting for his own ends throughout. Such, then, is
the crisis, men of Athens, to which Philip's fortunes have now come. If
it is not so, let any one come forward and show me (or rather you) that
what I say is untrue; or that those who have been deceived at the
outset trust him as regards the future; or that those who have been
brought into unmerited bondage would not gladly be free.
{9} But if any of you, while agreeing with me so far, still fancies
that Philip will maintain his hold by force, because he has already
occupied fortified posts and harbours and similar positions, he is
mistaken. When power is cemented by goodwill, and the interest of all
who join in a war is the same, then men are willing to share the
labour, to endure the misfortunes, and to stand fast. But when a man
has become strong, as Philip has done, by a grasping and wicked policy,
the first excuse, the least stumble, throws him from his seat and
dissolves the alliance. {10} It is impossible, men of Athens, utterly
impossible, to acquire power that will last, by unrighteousness, by
perjury, and by falsehood. Such power holds out for a moment, or for a
brief hour; it blossoms brightly, perhaps, with fair hopes; but time
detects the fraud, and the flower falls withered about its stem. In a
house or a ship, or any other structure, it is the foundations that
must be strongest; and no less, I believe, must the principles, which
are the foundation of men's actions, be those of truth and
righteousness. Such qualities are not to be seen to-day in the past
acts of Philip.
{11} I say, then, that we should help the Olynthians; and the best and
quickest method which can be proposed is the method which I approve.
Further, we should send an embassy to the Thessalians--to some, to
inform them of our intention; to others, to spur them on; for even now
they have resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and to make
representations in regard to Magnesia. {12} Take care, however, men of
Athens, that our envoys may not only have words to speak, but also
actions of yours to point to. Let it be seen that you have gone forth
in a manner that is worthy of Athens, and are already in action. Words
without the reality must always appear a vain and empty thing, and
above all when they come from Athens; for the more we seem to excel in
the glib use of such language, the more it is distrusted by every one.
{13} The change, then, which is pointed out to them must be great, the
conversion striking. They must see you paying your contributions,
marching to war, doing everything with a will, if any of them is to
listen to you. And if you resolve to accomplish all this in very deed,
as it should be accomplished, not only will the feeble and
untrustworthy nature of Philip's alliances be seen, but the weakness of
his own empire and power will also be detected.
{14} The power and empire of Macedonia is, indeed, to speak generally,
an element which tells considerably as an addition to any other power.
You found it so when it helped you against the Olynthians in the days
of Timotheus;[n] the Olynthians in their turn found its help of some
value, in combination with their own strength, against Poteidaea; and
it has recently come to the aid of the Thessalians, in their disordered
and disturbed condition, against the ruling dynasty: and wherever even
a small addition is made to a force, it helps in every way. {15} But in
itself the Macedonian Empire is weak and full of manifold evils. Philip
has in fact rendered his own tenure of it even more precarious than it
naturally was, by these very wars and campaigns which might be supposed
to prove his power. For you must not imagine, men of Athens, that
Philip and his subjects delight in the same things. Philip has a
passion for glory--that is his ambition; and he has deliberately chosen
to risk the consequences of a life of action and danger, preferring the
glory of achieving more than any King of Macedonia before him to a life
of security. {16} But his subjects have no share in the honour and
glory. Constantly battered about by all these expeditions, up and down,
they are vexed with incessant hardships: they are not suffered to
pursue their occupations or attend to their own affairs: for the little
that they produce, as best they can, they can find no market, the
trading stations of the country being closed on account of the war.
{17} From these facts it is not difficult to discover the attitude of
the Macedonians in general towards Philip; and as for the mercenaries
and Infantry of the Guard who surround him, though they have the
reputation of being a fine body of well-drilled warriors, I am told by
a man who has been in Macedonia, and who is incapable of falsehood,
that they are no better than any other body of men. {18} Granted that
there may be experienced campaigners and fighters among them; yet, he
tells me, Philip is so jealous of honour, that he thrusts all such men
away from him, in his anxiety to get the credit of every achievement
for himself; for in addition to all his other qualities, his jealousy
is insurpassable. On the other hand, any generally temperate or upright
man, who cannot endure the dissolute life there, day by day, nor the
drunkenness and the lewd revels, is thrust on one side and counts for
nothing. {19} Thus he is left with brigands and flatterers, and men
who, when in their cups, indulge in dances of a kind which I shrink
from naming to you now. And it is evident that this report is true; for
men whom every one tried to drive out of Athens, as far viler than even
the very juggler in the street--Callias the public slave and men like
him, players of farces, composers of indecent songs, written at the
expense of their companions in the hope of raising a laugh--these are
the men he likes and keeps about him. {20} You may think that these are
trivial things, men of Athens: but they are weighty, in the judgement
of every right-minded man, as illustrations of the temper with which
Philip is cursed. At present, I suppose, these facts are overshadowed
by his continual prosperity. Success has a wonderful power of throwing
a veil over shameful things like these. But let him only stumble, and
then all these features in his character will be displayed in their
true light. And I believe, men of Athens, that the revelation is not
far off, if Heaven be willing and you desirous of it. {21} So long as a
man is in good health, he is unconscious of any weakness; but if any
illness comes upon him, the disturbance affects every weak point, be it
a rupture or a sprain or anything else that is unsound in his
constitution. And as with the body, so it is with a city or a tyrant.
So long as they are at war abroad, the mischief is hidden from the
world at large, but the close grapple of war on the frontier brings all
to light.
{22} Now if any of you, men of Athens, seeing Philip's good fortune,
thinks that this makes him a formidable enemy to fight against, he
reasons like a sensible man: for fortune weighs heavily in the
scale--nay, fortune is everything, in all human affairs. And yet, if I
were given the choice, it is the fortune of Athens that I should
choose, rather than that of Philip, provided that you yourselves are
willing to act even to a small extent as you should act. For I see that
there are far more abundant grounds for expecting the goodwill of
Heaven on your side than on his. {23} But here, of course, we are
sitting idle; and one who is a sluggard himself cannot require his
friends to help him, much less the gods. It is not to be wondered at
that Philip, who goes on campaigns and works hard himself, and is
always at the scene of action, and lets no opportunity go, no season
pass, should get the better of us who delay and pass resolutions and
ask for news; nor do I wonder at it. It is the opposite that would have
been wonderful--if we, who do nothing that those who are at war ought
to do, were successful against one who leaves nothing undone. {24} But
this I do wonder at, that you who once raised your hand against Sparta,
in defence of the rights of the Hellenes--you, who with opportunities
often open to you for grasping large advantages for yourselves, would
not take them, but to secure for others their rights spent your own
fortunes in war-contributions, and always bore the brunt of the dangers
of the campaign--that you, I say, are now shrinking from marching, and
hesitating to make any contribution to save your own possessions; and
that, though you have often saved the rest of the Hellenes, now all
together and now each in their turn, you are sitting idle, when you
have lost what was your own. {25} I wonder at this; and I wonder also,
men of Athens, that none of you is able to reckon up the time during
which you have been fighting with Philip, and to consider what you have
been doing while all this time has been going by. Surely you must know
that it is while we have been delaying, hoping that some one else would
act, accusing one another, bringing one another to trial, hoping
anew--in fact, doing practically what we are doing now--that all the
time has passed. {26} And have you now so little sense, men of Athens,
as to hope that the very same policy, which has made the position of
the city a bad one instead of a good, will actually make it a good one
instead of a bad? Why, it is contrary both to reason and to nature to
think so! It is always much easier to retain than to acquire. But now,
owing to the war, none of our old possessions is left for us to retain;
and so we must needs acquire. {27} This, therefore, is our own personal
and immediate duty; and accordingly I say that you must contribute
funds, you must go on service in person with a good will, you must
accuse no one before you have become masters of the situation; and then
you must honour those who deserve praise, and punish the guilty, with a
judgement based upon the actual facts. You must get rid of all excuses
and all deficiencies on your own part; you cannot examine mercilessly
the actions of others, unless you yourselves have done all that your
duty requires. {28} For why is it, do you think, men of Athens, that
all the generals whom you dispatch avoid this war,[n] and discover
private wars of their own--if a little of the truth must be told even
about the generals? It is because in this war the prizes for which the
war is waged are yours, and if they are captured, you will take them
immediately for your own; but the dangers are the personal privilege of
your commanders, and no pay is forthcoming: while in those wars the
dangers are less, and the profits--Lampsacus, Sigeum, and the ships
which they plunder--go to the commanders and their men. Each force
therefore takes the road that leads to its own advantage. {29} For your
part, when you turn your attention to the serious condition of your
affairs, you first bring the commanders to trial; and then, when you
have given them a hearing, and have been told of the difficulties which
I have described, you acquit them. The result, therefore, is that while
you are quarrelling with one another and broken into factions-one party
persuaded of this, another of that--the public interest suffers. You
used, men of Athens, to pay taxes by Boards:[n] to-day you conduct your
politics by Boards. On either side there is an orator as leader, and a
general under him; and for the Three Hundred, there are those who come
to shout. The rest of you distribute yourselves between the two
parties, some on either side. {30} This system you must give up: you
must even now become your own masters; you must give to all alike their
share in discussion, in speech and in action. If you assign to one body
of men the function of issuing orders to you, like tyrants; to another,
that of compulsory service as trierarchs or tax-payers or soldiers; and
to another, only that of voting their condemnation, without taking any
share in the labour, nothing that ought to be done will be done in
time. For the injured section will always be in default, and you will
only have the privilege of punishing them instead of the enemy. {31} To
sum up, all must contribute, each according to his wealth, in a fair
proportion: all must go on active service in turn, until you have all
served: you must give a hearing to all who come forward, and choose the
best course out of all that you hear--not the course proposed by this
or that particular person. If you do this, you will not only commend
the proposer of that course at the time, but you will commend
yourselves hereafter, for the whole position of your affairs will be a
better one.
THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC
{1} Very different reflections suggest themselves to my mind, I men of
Athens, when I turn my eyes to our real situation, and when I think of
the speeches that I hear. For I observe that the speeches are all
concerned with the taking of vengeance upon Philip; whereas in reality
matters have gone so far, that we have to take care that we are not
ourselves the first to suffer: so that those who speak of vengeance are
actually, as it seems to me, suggesting to you a false conception of
the situation which you are discussing. {2} That there was a time when
the city could both keep her own possessions in safety, and punish
Philip, I am very well aware. For it was not long ago, but within my
own lifetime, that both these things were so. But I am convinced that
it is now quite enough for us as a first step to make sure of the
preservation of our allies. If this is safely secured, we shall then be
able to consider upon whom vengeance is to fall, and in what way. But
until the first step is properly conceived, I consider it idle to say
anything whatever about the last.
{3} If ever the most anxious deliberation was required, it is required
in the present crisis; and my greatest difficulty is not to know what
is the proper advice to give you in regard to the situation: I am at a
loss rather to know, men of Athens, in what manner I should address you
in giving it. For I am convinced by what I have heard with my own ears
in this place that, for the most part, the objects of our policy have
slipped from our grasp, not because we do not understand what our duty
is, but because we will not do it; and I ask you to suffer me, if I
speak without reserve, and to consider only whether I speak truly, and
with this object in view--that the future may be better than the past.
For you see that it is because certain speakers make your gratification
the aim of their addresses, that things have gone on getting worse,
till at last the extremity has been reached.
{4} I think it necessary, first, to remind you of a few of the events
which have taken place. You remember, men of Athens, that two or three
years ago[n] the news came that Philip was in Thrace, besieging Heraeon
Teichos. That was in the month of November. Amidst all the discussion
and commotion which took place in this Assembly, you passed a
resolution that forty warships should be launched, that men under
forty-five years of age should embark in person, and that we should pay
a war-tax of 60 talents. {5} That year came to an end, and there
followed July, August, September. In the latter month, after the
Mysteries,[n] and with reluctance, you dispatched Charidemus[n] with
ten ships, carrying no soldiers, and 5 talents of silver. For so soon
as news had come that Philip was sick or dead--both reports were
brought--you dismissed the armament, men of Athens, thinking that there
was no longer any occasion for the expedition. But it was the very
occasion; for had we then gone to the scene of action with the same
enthusiasm which marked our resolution to do so, Philip would not have
been preserved to trouble us to-day. {6} What was done then cannot be
altered. But now a critical moment in another campaign has arrived; and
it is in view of this, and to prevent you from falling into the same
error, that I have recalled these facts. How then shall we use this
opportunity, men of Athens? For unless you will go to the rescue 'with
might and main to the utmost of your power',[n] mark how in every
respect you will have served Philip's interest by your conduct of the
war. {7} At the outset the Olynthians possessed considerable strength,
and such was the position of affairs, that neither did Philip feel safe
against them, nor they against Philip. We made peace with them, and
they with us. It was as it were a stumbling-block in Philip's path, and
an annoyance to him, that a great city which had made a compact with us
should sit watching for any opportunity he might offer. We thought that
we ought to excite them to war with him by every means; and now this
much-talked-of event has come to pass--by what means, I need not
relate. {8} What course then is open to us, men of Athens, but to go to
their aid resolutely and eagerly? I can see none. Apart from the shame
in which we should be involved, if we let anything be lost through our
negligence, I can see, men of Athens, that the subsequent prospect
would be alarming in no small degree, when the attitude of the Thebans
towards us is what it is, when the funds of the Phocians are
exhausted,[n] and when there is no one to prevent Philip, so soon as he
has made himself master of all that at present occupies him, from
bringing his energies to bear upon the situation further south. {9} But
if any of you is putting off until then his determination to do his
duty, he must be desirous of seeing the terrors of war close at hand,
when he need only hear of them at a distance, and of seeking helpers
for himself, when now he can give help to others. For that this is what
it must come to, if we sacrifice the present opportunity, we must all,
I think, be fairly well aware.
{10} 'But,' some one may say, 'we have all made up our minds that we
must go to their aid, and we will go. Only tell us how we are to do
it.' Now do not be surprised, men of Athens, if I give an answer which
will be astonishing to most of you. You must appoint a Legislative
Commission.[n] But when the commissioners meet, you must not enact a
single law--you have laws enough--you must cancel the laws which, in
view of present circumstances, are injurious to you. {11} I mean the
laws which deal with the Festival Fund--to put it quite plainly--and
some of those which deal with military service: for the former
distribute your funds as festival-money to those who remain at home;
while the latter give immunity to malingerers,[n] and thereby also take
the heart out of those who want to do their duty. When you have
cancelled these laws, and made the path safe for one who would give the
best advice, then you can look for some one to propose what you all
know to be expedient. {12} But until you have done this, you must not
expect to find a man who will be glad to advise you for the best, and
be ruined by you for his pains; for you will find no one, particularly
when the only result will be that some unjust punishment will be
inflicted on the proposer or mover of such measures, and that instead
of helping matters at all, he will only have made it even more
dangerous in future than it is at present to give you the best advice.
Aye, and you should require the repeal of these laws, men of Athens,
from the very persons who proposed them.[n] {13} It is not fair that
those who originally proposed them should enjoy the popularity which
was fraught with such mischief to the whole State, and that the
unpopularity, which would lead to an improvement in the condition of us
all, should be visited to his cost upon one who now advises you for the
best. Until you have thus prepared the way, men of Athens, you must
entertain no expectation whatever that any one will be influential
enough here to transgress these laws with impunity, or senseless enough
to fling himself to certain ruin.
{14} At the same time, men of Athens, you must not fail to realize this
further point. No resolution is worth anything, without the willingness
to perform at least what you have resolved, and that heartily. For if
decrees by themselves could either compel you to do what you ought, or
could realize their several objects unaided, you would not be decreeing
many things and performing few--nay, none--of the things that you
decree, nor would Philip have insulted you so long. {15} If decrees
could have done it, he would have paid the penalty long ago. But it is
not so. Actions come later than speeches and voting in order of
procedure, but in effectiveness they are before either and stronger
than either. It is action that is still needed; all else you already
have. For you have those among you, men of Athens, who can tell you
what your duty is; and no one is quicker than you are to understand the
speaker's bidding. Aye, and you will be able to carry it out even now,
if you act aright. {16} What time, what opportunity, do you look for,
better than the present? When, if not now, will you do your duty? Has
not the man seized every position from us already? If he becomes master
of this country too, will not our fate be the most shameful in the
world? And the men whom we promised to be ready to save, if they went
to war--are they not now at war? {17} Is he not our enemy? Are not our
possessions in his hands? Is he not a barbarian? Is he not anything
that you choose to call him? In God's name, when we have let everything
go, when we have all but put everything into his hands, shall we then
inquire at large who is responsible for it all? That we shall never
admit our own responsibility, I am perfectly sure. Just so amid the
perils of war, none of those who have run away accuses himself; he
accuses his general, his neighbour--any one but himself; and yet, I
suppose, all who have run away have helped to cause the defeat. He who
now blames the rest might have stood fast; and if every one had done
so, the victory would have been theirs. {18} And so now, if a
particular speaker's advice is not the best, let another rise and make
a proposal, instead of blaming him; and if some other has better advice
to give, carry it out, and good fortune be with you. What? Is the
advice disagreeable? That is no longer the speaker's fault--unless, of
course, he leaves out the prayer that you expect of him. There is no
difficulty in the prayer, men of Athens; a man need only compress all
his desires into a short sentence. But to make his choice, when the
question for discussion is one of practical policy, is by no means
equally easy. _Then_ a man is bound to choose what is best, instead of
what is pleasant, if both are not possible at once. {19} But suppose
that some one is able, without touching the Festival Fund, to suggest
other sources of supply for military purposes--is not he the better
adviser? Certainly, men of Athens--if such a thing _is_ possible. But I
should be surprised if it ever has happened or ever should happen to
any one to find, after spending what he has upon wrong objects, that
what he has _not_ is wealth enough to enable him to effect right ones.
Such arguments as these find, I think, their great support in each
man's personal desire, and, for that reason, nothing is easier than to
deceive oneself; what a man desires, he actually fancies to be true.
{20} But the reality often follows no such principle. Consider the
matter, therefore, men of Athens, after this fashion; consider in what
way our objects can be realized under the circumstances, and in what
way you will be able to make the expedition and to receive your pay.
Surely it is not like sober or high-minded men to submit
light-heartedly to the reproach which must follow upon any shortcomings
in the operations of the war through want of funds--to seize your
weapons and march against Corinthians and Megareans,[n] and then to
allow Philip to enslave Hellenic cities, because you cannot find
rations for your troops.
{21} These words do not spring from a wanton determination to court the
ill-will of any party among you. I am neither so foolish nor so
unfortunate as to desire unpopularity when I do not believe that I am
doing any good. But a loyal citizen ought, in my judgement, to care
more for the safety of his country's fortunes than for the popularity
of his utterances. Such, I have heard, and perhaps you have heard it
also, was the principle which the orators of our forefather's time
habitually followed in public life--those orators who are praised by
all who rise to address you, though they are far from imitating
them--the great Aristides, and Nicias, and my own namesake, and
Pericles. {22} But ever since these speakers have appeared who are
always asking you, 'what would you like?' 'what may I propose for you?'
'what can I do to please you?' the interests of the city have been
wantonly given away for the sake of the pleasure and gratification of
the moment; and we see the consequences--the fortunes of the speakers
prosper, while your own are in a shameful plight. {23} And yet
consider, men of Athens, the main characteristics of the achievements
of your forefathers' time, and those of your own. The description will
be brief and familiar to you; for you need not have recourse to the
history of others, when your own will furnish examples, by following
which you may achieve prosperity. {24} Our forefathers, who were not
courted and caressed by their politicians as you are by these persons
to-day, were leaders of the Hellenes, with their goodwill, for
forty-five years;[n] they brought up into the Acropolis more than
10,000 talents; the king[n] who then ruled Macedonia obeyed them as a
foreigner ought to obey a Hellenic people; serving in person, they set
up many glorious trophies for victories by land and sea; and alone of
all mankind they left behind them, as the crown of their exploits, a
fame that is beyond the reach of envy. {25} Such was the part they
played in the Hellenic world: and now contemplate the manner of men
they were in the city, both in public and in private life. As public
men, they gave us buildings and objects of such beauty and grandeur, in
the temples which they built and the offerings which they dedicated in
them, that no room has been left for any of those that come after to
surpass them: while in private life they were so modest, {26} so
intensely loyal to the spirit of the constitution, that if any one
actually knows what the house of Aristides, or Miltiades, or any other
of the glorious men of that day, is like, he can see that it is no more
imposing than those of their neighbours. For it was not to win a
fortune that they undertook affairs of State; but each thought it his
duty to add to the common weal. And thus, acting in a spirit of good
faith towards the Hellenes, of piety towards the gods, and of equality
towards one another, they naturally attained great prosperity. {27}
Such was the national life of those times, when those whom I have
mentioned were the foremost men in the State. How do matters stand
to-day, thanks to these worthy persons? Is there any likeness, any
resemblance, to old times? Thanks to them (and though I might say much,
I pass over all but this), when we had the field, as you see,
completely open to us--when the Spartans had been ruined,[n] and the
Thebans had their hands full,[n] and no other power could seriously
dispute the supremacy with us on the field of battle--when we could
have retained our own possessions in safety, and have stood as umpires
of the rights of others--we have been deprived of our own territory;
{28} we have spent more than 1,500 talents to no good purpose; the
allies whom we had gained in the war,[n] these persons have lost in
time of peace; and we have trained Philip to be the powerful enemy to
us that he is. Let any one rise and tell me how Philip has grown so
strong, if we ourselves are not the source of his strength. {29} 'But,
my good Sir,' you say, 'if we are badly off in these respects, we are
at any rate better off at home.' And where is the proof of this? Is it
in the whitewashing of the battlements, the mending of the roads, the
fountains, and all such trumperies? Look then at the men whose policy
gives you these things. Some of them who were poor have become rich;
others, who were unknown to fame, have risen to honour; some of them
have provided themselves with private houses more imposing than our
public buildings; and the lower the fortunes of the city have fallen,
the higher theirs have risen.
{30} What is the cause of all these things? Why is it that all was well
then, and all is amiss to-day? It is because then the people itself
dared to act and to serve in the army; and so the people was master of
its politicians; all patronage was in its own hands; any separate
individual was content to receive from the people his share of honour
or office or other emolument. The reverse is now the case. {31} All
patronage is in the hands of the politicians, while you, the people,
emasculated, stripped of money and allies, have been reduced to the
position of servile supernumeraries, content if they give you
distributions of festival-money, or organize a procession at the
Boedromia;[n] and to crown all this bravery, you are expected also to
thank them for giving you what is your own. They pen you up closely in
the city; they entice you to these delights; they tame you till you
come to their hand. {32} But a high and generous spirit can never, I
believe, be acquired by men whose actions are mean and poor; for such
as a man's practice is, such must his spirit be. And in all solemnity I
should not be surprised if I suffered greater harm at your hands for
telling you the things that I have told you, than the men who have
brought them to pass. Even freedom of speech is not possible on all
subjects in this place, and I wonder that it has been granted me to-day.
{33} If, even now, you will rid yourselves of these habits, if you will
resolve to join the forces and to act worthily of yourselves,
converting the superfluities which you enjoy at home into resources to
secure our advantage abroad, then it may be, men of Athens, it may be,
that you will gain some great and final good, and will be rid of these
your perquisites, which are like the diet that a physician gives a sick
man--diet which neither puts strength into him nor lets him die. For
these sums which you now share among yourselves are neither large
enough to give you any adequate assistance, nor small enough to let you
renounce them and go about your business; but these it is that[2]
increase the indolence of every individual among you. {34} 'Is it,
then, paid service that you suggest?'[n] some one will ask. I do, men
of Athens; and a system for immediate enforcement which will embrace
all alike; so that each, while receiving his share of the public funds
may supply whatever service the State requires of him.[3] If we can
remain at peace, then he will do better to stay at home, free from the
necessity of doing anything discreditable through poverty. But if a
situation like the present occurs, then supported by these same sums,
he will serve loyally in person, in defence of his country. If a man is
outside the military age, then let him take, in his place among the
rest, that which he now receives irregularly and without doing any
service, and let him act as an overseer and manager of business that
must be done. {35} In short, without adding or subtracting anything,[n]
beyond a small sum, and only removing the want of system, my plan
reduces the State to order, making your receipt of payment, your
service in the army or the courts, and your performance of any duty
which the age of each of you allows, and the occasion requires, all
part of one and the same system. But it has been no part of my proposal
that we should assign the due of those who act to those who do nothing;
that we should be idle ourselves and enjoy our leisure helplessly,
listening to tales of victories won by somebody's mercenaries;[n] for
this is what happens now. {36} Not that I blame one who is doing some
part of your duty for you; but I require you to do for yourselves the
things for which you honour others, and not to abandon the position
which your fathers won through many a glorious peril, and bequeathed to
you.
I think I have told you all that, in my belief, your interest demands.
May you choose the course which will be for the good of the city and of
you all!
FOOTNOTES
[1] See notes to Speech on the Peace, § 5. Some date the Euboean
expedition and the sending of the cavalry one or two years earlier, and
the whole chronology is much disputed; but there are strong arguments
for the date (348) given in the text.
[2] [Greek: esti tauta ta].
[3] [Greek: touto parechae].
ON THE PEACE (OR. V)
[_Introduction_. After the fall of Olynthus in 348, the Athenians, on
the proposal of Eubulus, sent embassies to the Greek States in the
Peloponnese and elsewhere, to invite them to join in a coalition
against Philip. Aeschines went for this purpose to Megalopolis, and did
his best to counteract Philip's influence in Arcadia. When the
embassies proved unsuccessful, it became clear that peace must be made
on such terms as were possible. Philip himself was anxious for peace,
since he wished to cross the Pass of Thermopylae without such
opposition from Athens as he had encountered in 352, and to be free
from the attacks of hostile ships upon his ports. Even before the fall
of Olynthus, informal communications passed between himself and Athens
(see Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 94, 315); and in consequence of these,
Philocrates proposed and the Assembly passed a decree, under which ten
ambassadors were appointed to go to Philip and invite him to send
plenipotentiaries to Athens to conclude a peace. Demosthenes (who had
strongly supported Philocrates) was among the ten, as well as Aeschines
and Philocrates himself. Delighted with Philip's reception of them, and
greatly attracted by his personality, the ambassadors returned with a
letter from him, promising in general terms to confer great benefits
upon Athens, if he were granted alliance as well as peace: in the
meantime he undertook not to interfere with the towns allied to Athens
in the Chersonese. Demosthenes proposed (in the Council, of which he
was a member in the year 347-346) the usual complimentary resolution in
honour of the ambassadors, and on his motion it was resolved to hold
two meetings of the Assembly, on the 18th and 19th of the month
Elaphebolion (i.e. probably just after the middle of April 346), when
Philip's envoys would have arrived, to discuss the terms of peace. The
envoys--Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus--reached Athens shortly
after this; and before the first of the two meetings was held, the
Synod of the allies of Athens, now assembled in the city, agreed to
peace on such terms as the Athenian people should decide, but added a
proposal that it should be permitted to any Greek State to become a
party to the Peace within three months. They said nothing of alliance.
Of the two meetings of the Assembly, in view of the conflicting
statements of Demosthenes and Aeschines, only a probable account can be
given. At the first, Philocrates proposed that alliance as well as
peace should be made by Athens and her allies with Philip and his
allies, on the understanding that both parties should keep what they
_de facto_ possessed--a provision entailing the renunciation by Athens
of Amphipolis and Poteidaea; but that the Phocians and the people of
Halus should be excluded. Aeschines opposed this strongly; and both he
and Demosthenes claim to have supported the resolution of the allies,
which would have given the excluded peoples a chance of sharing the
advantage of the Peace. The feeling of the Assembly was with them,
although the Phocians had recently insulted the Athenians by declining
to give up to Proxenus (the Athenian admiral) the towns guarding the
approaches to Thermopylae, which they had themselves offered to place
in the hands of Athens. But Philocrates obtained the postponement of
the decision till the next day. On the next day, if not before, it
became plain that Philip's envoys would not consent to forgo the
exclusion of the Phocians and Halus; but in order that the Assembly
might be induced to pass the resolution, the clause expressly excluding
them was dropped, and peace and alliance were made between Athens and
Philip, each with their allies.[n] Even this was not secured before
Aeschines and his friends had deprecated rash attempts to imitate the
exploits of antiquity by continuing the war, and had explained that
Philip could not openly accept the Phocians as allies, but that when
the Peace was concluded, he would satisfy all the wishes of the
Athenians in every way; while Eubulus threatened the people with
immediate war, involving personal service and heavy taxation, unless
they accepted Philocrates' decree. A few days afterwards the Athenians
and the representatives of the allies took the oath to observe the
Peace: nothing was said about the Phocians and Halus: Cersobleptes'
representative was probably not permitted to swear with the rest. The
same ten ambassadors as before were instructed to receive Philip's
oath, and the oaths of his allies, to arrange for the ransom of
prisoners, and generally to treat with Philip in the interests of
Athens. Demosthenes urged his colleagues (and obtained an instruction
from the Council to this effect) to sail at once, in order that Philip,
who was now in Thrace, might not make conquests at the expense of
Athens before ratifying the Peace; but they delayed at Oreus, went by
land, instead of under the escort of Proxenus by sea, and only reached
Pella (the Macedonian capital) twenty-three days after leaving Athens.
Philip did not arrive for twenty-seven days more. By this time he had
taken Cersobleptes prisoner, and captured Serrhium, Doriscus, and other
Thracian towns, which were held by Athenian troops sent to assist
Cersobleptes. Demosthenes was now openly at variance with his
colleagues. He had no doubt realized the necessity of peace, but
probably regarded the exclusion of the Phocians as unwarrantable, and
thought that the policy of his colleagues must end in Philip's conquest
of all Greece. At Pella he occupied himself in negotiations for the
ransom of prisoners. After taking the oath, Philip kept the ambassadors
with him until he had made all preparations for his march southward,
and during this time he played with them and with the envoys from the
other Greek States who were present at the same time. His intention of
marching to Thermopylae was clear; but he seems to have led all alike
to suppose that he would fulfil their particular wishes when he had
crossed the Pass. The ambassadors accompanied him to Pherae, where the
oath was taken by the representatives of Philip's allies; the Phocians,
Halus, and Cersobleptes were excluded from the Peace. (Halus was taken
by Philip's army shortly afterwards.) The ambassadors of Athens then
returned homewards, bearing a letter from Philip, but did not arrive at
Athens before Philip had reached Thermopylae. On their return
Demosthenes denounced them before the Council, which refused them the
customary compliments, and (on Demosthenes' motion) determined to
propose to the people that Proxenus with his squadron should be ordered
to go to the aid of the Phocians and to prevent Philip from crossing
the Pass. When the Assembly met on the 16th of Scirophorion (shortly
before the middle of July), Aeschines rose first, and announced in
glowing terms the intention of Philip to turn round upon Thebes and to
re-establish Thespiae and Plataeae; and hinted at the restoration to
Athens of Euboea and Oropus. Then Philip's letter was read, containing
no promises, but excusing the delay of the ambassadors as due to his
own request. The Assembly was elated at the promises announced by
Aeschines; Demosthenes' attempt to contradict the announcement failed;
and on Philocrates' motion, it was resolved to extend the Peace and
alliance with Philip to posterity, and to declare that if the Phocians
refused to surrender the Temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons, Athens
would take steps against those responsible for the refusal. Demosthenes
refused to serve on the Embassy appointed to convey this resolution to
Philip: Aeschines was appointed, but was too ill to start. The
ambassadors set out, but within a few days returned with the news that
the Phocian army had surrendered to Philip (its leader, Phalaecus, and
his troops being allowed to depart to the Peloponnese). The surrender
had perhaps been accelerated by the news of the Athenian resolution.
The Assembly, in alarm lest Philip should march southwards, now
resolved to take measures of precaution and defence, and to send the
same ambassadors to Philip, to do what they could. They went, Aeschines
among them, and arrived in the midst of the festivities with which
Philip was celebrating the success of his plans. The invitation which
Philip sent to Athens--to send a force to join his own, and to assist
in settling the affairs of Phocis--was (on Demosthenes' advice)
declined by the Assembly; and soon afterwards another letter from
Philip expressed surprise at the unfriendly attitude taken up by the
Athenians towards him. Philip next summoned the Amphictyonic Council
(the legitimate guardians of the Delphian Temple, on whose behalf the
Thebans and Thessalians, aided by Philip, were now at war with the
Phocians): and the Council, in the absence of many of its members,
resolved to transfer the votes of the Phocians in the Council-meeting
to Philip, to break up the Phocian towns into villages, disarming their
inhabitants and taking away their horses, to require them to repay the
stolen treasure to the temple by instalments, and to pronounce a curse
upon those actually guilty of sacrilege, which would render them liable
to arrest anywhere. The destructive part of the sentence was rigorously
executed by the Thebans. In order to punish the former supporters of
the Phocians, the right to precedence in consulting the oracle was
transferred from Athens to Philip, by order of the Council, and the
Spartans were excluded from the temple: Orchomenus and Coroneia were
destroyed and their inhabitants enslaved; and Thebes became absolute
mistress of all Boeotia. The Pythian games (at Delphi) in September 346
were celebrated under Philip's presidency; but both Sparta and Athens
refused to send the customary deputation to them, and Philip
accordingly sent envoys to Athens, along with representatives of the
Amphictyons, to demand recognition for himself as an Amphictyonic
power. Aeschines supported the demand, his argument being apparently to
the effect that Philip had been forced to act as he had done by the
Thebans and Thessalians; but the Assembly was very angry at the results
(as they seemed to be) of Aeschines' diplomacy and the calamities of
the Phocians; and it was only when Demosthenes, in the Speech on the
Peace, advised compliance, that they were persuaded to give way. To
have refused would have brought the united forces of the Amphictyonic
States against Athens: and these she could not have resisted. It was
therefore prudent to keep the Peace, though Demosthenes evidently
regarded it only as an armistice.]
{1} I see, men of Athens, that our present situation is one of great
perplexity and confusion, for not only have many of our interests been
sacrificed, so that it is of no use to make eloquent speeches about
them; but even as regards what still remains to us, there is no general
agreement in any single point as to what is expedient: some hold one
view, and some another. {2} Perplexing, moreover, and difficult as
deliberation naturally is, men of Athens, you have made it far more
difficult. For while all the rest of mankind are in the habit of
resorting to deliberation before the event, you do not do so until
afterwards: and consequently, during the whole time that falls within
my memory, however high a reputation for eloquence one who upbraids you
for all your errors may enjoy, the desired results and the objects of
your deliberation pass out of your grasp. {3} And yet I believe--and it
is because I have convinced myself of this that I have risen--that if
you resolve to abandon all clamour and contention, as becomes men who
are deliberating on behalf of their country upon so great an issue, I
shall be able to describe and recommend measures to you, by which the
situation may be improved, and what we have sacrificed, recovered.
{4} Now although I know perfectly well, men of Athens, that to speak to
you about one's own earlier speeches, and about oneself, is a practice
which is always extremely repaying, I feel the vulgarity and
offensiveness of it so strongly, that I shrink from it even when I see
that it is necessary. I think, however, that you will form a better
judgement on the subject on which I am about to speak, if I remind you
of some few of the things which I have said on certain previous
occasions. {5} In the first place, men of Athens, when at the time of
the disturbances in Euboea[n] you were being urged to assist
Plutarchus, and to undertake an inglorious and costly campaign, I came
forward first and unsupported to oppose this action, and was almost
torn in pieces by those who for the sake of their own petty profits had
induced you to commit many grave errors: and when only a short time had
elapsed, along with the shame which you incurred and the treatment
which you received--treatment such as no people in the world ever
before experienced at the hands of those whom they went to
assist--there came the recognition by all of you of the baseness of
those who had urged you to this course, and of the excellence of my own
advice. {6} Again, men of Athens, I observed that Neoptolemus[n] the
actor, who was allowed freedom of movement everywhere on the ground of
his profession, and was doing the city the greatest mischief, was
managing and directing your communications with Philip in Philip's own
interest: and I came forward and informed you; and that, not to gratify
any private dislike or desire to misrepresent him, as subsequent events
have made plain. {7} And in this case I shall not, as before, throw the
blame on any speakers or defenders of Neoptolemus--indeed, he had no
defenders; it is yourselves that I blame. For had you been watching
rival tragedies in the theatre, instead of discussing the vital
interests of a whole State, you could not have listened with more
partiality towards him, or more prejudice against me. {8} And yet, I
believe, you have all now realized that though, according to his own
assertion, this visit to the enemy's country was paid in order that he
might get in the debts owing to him there, and return with funds to
perform his public service[n] here; though he was always repeating the
statement that it was monstrous to accuse those who were transferring
their means from Macedonia to Athens; yet, when the Peace had removed
all danger, he converted his real estate here into money, and took
himself off with it to Philip. {9} These then are two events which I
have foretold--events which, because their real character was exactly
and faithfully disclosed by me, are a testimony to the speeches which I
have delivered. A third, men of Athens, was the following; and when I
have given you this one instance, I will immediately proceed to the
subject on which I have come forward to speak. When we returned from
the Embassy, after receiving from Philip his oath to maintain the
Peace, {10} there were some[n] who promised that Thespiae and
Plataeae[n] would be repeopled, and said that if Philip became master
of the situation, he would save the Phocians, and would break up the
city of Thebes into villages; that Oropus would be yours, and that
Euboea would be restored to you in place of Amphipolis--with other
hopes and deceptions of the same kind, by which you were seduced into
sacrificing the Phocians in a manner that was contrary to your interest
and perhaps to your honour also. But as for me, you will find that
neither had I any share in this deception, nor yet did I hold my peace.
On the contrary, I warned you plainly, as, I know you remember, that
_I_ had no knowledge and no expectations of this kind, and that I
regarded such statements as nonsense.
{11} All these plain instances of superior foresight on my part, men of
Athens, I shall not ascribe to any cleverness, any boasted merits, of
my own. I will not pretend that my foreknowledge and discernment are
due to any causes but such as I will name; and they are two. The first,
men of Athens, is that good fortune, which, I observe, is more powerful
than all the cleverness and wisdom on earth. {12} The second is the
fact that my judgement and reasoning are disinterested. No one can
point to any personal gain in connexion with my public acts and words:
and therefore I see what is to our interest undistorted, in the light
in which the actual facts reveal it. But when you throw money into one
scale of the balance, its weight carries everything with it; your
judgement is instantly dragged down with it, and one who has acted so
can no longer think soundly or healthily about anything.
{13} Now there is one primary condition which must be observed by any
one who would furnish the city with allies or contributions or anything
else--he must do it without breaking the existing Peace: not because
the Peace is at all admirable or creditable to you, but because,
whatever its character, it would have been better, in the actual
circumstances, that it should never have been made, than that having
been made, it should now be broken through our action. For we have
sacrificed many advantages which we possessed when we made it, and
which would have rendered the war safer and easier for us then than it
is now. {14} The second condition, men of Athens, is that we shall not
draw on these self-styled Amphictyons,[n] who are now assembled, until
they have an irresistible or a plausible reason for making a united war
against us. My own belief is that if war broke out again between
ourselves and Philip about Amphipolis or any such claim of our own, in
which the Thessalians and Argives and Thebans had no interest, none of
these peoples would go to war against us, least of all--{15} and let no
one raise a clamour before he hears what I have to say--least of all
the Thebans; not because they are in any pleasant mood towards us; not
because they would not be glad to gratify Philip; but because they know
perfectly well, however stupid one may think them,[n] that if war
springs up between themselves and you, _they_ will get all the
hardships of war for their share, while another will sit by, waiting to
secure all the advantages; and they are not likely to sacrifice
themselves for such a prospect, unless the origin and the cause of the
war are such as concern all alike. {16} Nor again should we, in my
opinion, suffer at all, if we went to war with Thebes on account of
Oropus[n] or any other purely Athenian interest. For I believe that
while those who would assist ourselves or the Thebans would give their
aid if their ally's own country were invaded, they would not join
either in an offensive campaign. For this is the manner of
alliances--such, at least, as are worth considering; and the
relationship is naturally of this kind. {17} The goodwill of each
ally--whether it be towards ourselves or towards the Thebans--does not
imply the same interest in our conquest of others as in our existence.
Our continued existence they would all desire for their own sakes; but
none of them would wish that through conquest either of us should
become their own masters. What is it then that I regard with
apprehension? What is it that we must guard against? I fear lest a
common pretext should be supplied for the coming war, a common charge
against us, which will appeal to all alike. {18} For if the Argives[n]
and Messenians and Megalopolitans, and some of the other Peloponnesians
who are in sympathy with them, adopt a hostile attitude towards us
owing to our negotiations for peace with Sparta, and the belief that to
some extent we are giving our approval to the policy which the Spartans
have pursued: if the Thebans already (as we are told) detest us, and
are sure to become even more hostile, because we are harbouring those
whom they have exiled,[n] and losing no opportunity of displaying our
ill-will towards them; {19} and the Thessalians, because we are
offering a refuge to the Phocian fugitives;[n] and Philip, because we
are preventing his admission to Amphictyonic rank; my fear is that,
when each power has thus its separate reasons for resentment, they may
unite in the war against us, with the decrees of the Amphictyons for
their pretext: and so each may be drawn on farther than their several
interests would carry them, just as they were in dealing with the
Phocians. {20} For you doubtless realize that it was not through any
unity in their respective ambitions, that the Thebans and Philip and
the Thessalians all acted together just now. The Thebans, for instance,
could not prevent Philip from marching through and occupying the
passes, nor even from stepping in at the last moment to reap the credit
of all that they themselves had toiled for.[n] {21} For, as it is,
though the Thebans have gained something so far as the recovery of
their territory is concerned, their honour and reputation have suffered
shamefully, since it now appears as though they would have gained
nothing, unless Philip had crossed the Pass. This was not what they
intended. They only submitted to all this in their anxiety to obtain
Orchomenus and Coroneia, and their inability to do so otherwise. {22}
And as to Philip, some persons,[n] as you know, are bold enough to say
that it was not from any wish to do so that he handed over Orchomenus
and Coroneia to Thebes, but from compulsion; and although I must part
company with them there, I am sure that at least he did not want to do
this _more_ than he desired to occupy the passes, and to get the credit
of appearing to have determined the issue of the war, and to manage the
Pythian games by his own authority. These, I am sure, were the objects
which he coveted most greedily. {23} The Thessalians, again, did not
desire to see either the Thebans or Philip growing powerful; for in any
such contingency they thought that they themselves were menaced. But
they did desire to secure two privileges--admission to the Amphictyonic
meeting, and the recovery of rights at Delphi;[n] and in their
eagerness for these privileges, they joined Philip in the actions in
question. Thus you will find that each was led on, for the sake of
private ends, to take action which they in no way desired to take. But
this is the very thing against which we have now to be on our guard.
{24} 'Are we then, for fear of this, to submit to Philip? and do _you_
require this of us?' you ask me. Far from it. Our action must be such
as will be in no way unworthy of us, and at the same time will not lead
to war, but will prove to all our good sense and the justice of our
position: and, in answer to those who are bold enough to think that we
should refuse to submit to anything whatever,[n] [2] and who cannot
foresee the war that must follow, I wish to urge this consideration. We
are allowing the Thebans to hold Oropus; and if any one asked us to
state the reason honestly, we should say that it was to avoid war. {25}
Again, we have just ceded Amphipolis to Philip by the Treaty of
Peace;[n] we permit the Cardians[n] to occupy a position apart from the
other colonists in the Chersonese; we allow the Prince of Caria[n] to
seize the islands of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and the Byzantines to
drive our vessels to shore[n]--obviously because we believe that the
tranquillity afforded by peace brings more blessings than any collision
or contention over these grievances would bring: so that it would be a
foolish and an utterly perverse policy, when we have behaved in this
manner towards each of our adversaries individually, where our own most
essential interests were concerned, to go now to war with all of them
together, on account of this shadow at Delphi.[n]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The term 'the allies of Athens' was ambiguous. It might be taken
(as it was taken by Philip and his envoys) to include only the
remaining members of the League (see p. 9), who were represented by the
Synod then sitting, and whose policy Athens could control. But it was
evidently possible to put a wider interpretation upon it, as the
Assembly probably did and as Demosthenes often does (e.g. Speech on
Embassy, § 278), and to understand it as including the Phocians and
others (such as Cersobleptes) with whom Athens had a treaty of
alliance. Much of the trouble which followed arose out of this
ambiguity.
[2] [Greek: oud hotioun].
THE SECOND PHILIPPIC (OR. VI)
[_Introduction_. After settling affairs at Delphi in 346, Philip
returned to Macedonia. During a considerable part of 345 and in the
early months of 344 he was occupied with campaigns against the
Illyrians, Dardani, and Triballi. But in the summer (probably) of 344
he resumed his activities in Greece, garrisoning Pherae and other towns
of Thessaly with Macedonians, appropriating the revenues derived from
the Thessalian ports, and establishing oligarchical governments
throughout the country. At the same time negotiations were going on
between himself and Athens with regard to the Thracian strongholds
which he had captured in 346. He refused to give these up, though he
offered to cut a canal across the Chersonese, for the protection of the
Athenian allies there from the attacks of the Thracians. He also sent
money and mercenaries to help the Messenians and Argives, who, like the
Megalopolitans, were anxious to secure their independence of Sparta.
Athens, which was on friendly terms with Sparta, sent envoys to the
Peloponnesian states to counteract Philip's influence, and of these
Demosthenes was one. In return, Argos and Messene complained to Athens
of her interference with their attempt to secure freedom, and Philip
sent envoys to deprecate the charges made against him by the Athenian
ambassadors in the Peloponnese. He pointed out that he had not broken
any promises made to Athens at the time of the Peace, for he had made
none. (In fact, if Demosthenes' account is correct, he had confined
himself to vague expressions of goodwill; the promises had been made by
Aeschines.) The Second Philippic, spoken late in 344, proposes a reply
to Philip, the text of which has unfortunately not come down to us. The
Peloponnesian envoys appear also to have been in Athens at the time;
and Philip's supporters had put forward various explanations of his
conduct at the time when the Peace was made. To these also Demosthenes
replies.]
{1} In all our discussions, men of Athens, with regard to the acts of
violence by which Philip contravenes the terms of the Peace, I observe
that, although the speeches on our side are always manifestly just and
sympathetic,[n] and although those who denounce Philip are always
regarded as saying what ought to be said, yet practically nothing is
done which ought to be done, or which would make it worth while to
listen to such speeches. {2} On the contrary, the condition of public
affairs as a whole has already been brought to a point at which, the
more and the more evidently a speaker can convict Philip both of
transgressing the Peace which he made with you and of plotting against
all the Hellenes, the harder it is for him to advise you how you should
act. {3} The responsibility for this rests with us all, men of Athens.
It is by deeds and actions, not by words, that a policy of encroachment
must be arrested: and yet, in the first place, we who rise to address
you will not face the duty of proposing or advising such action, for
fear of unpopularity with you, though we dilate upon the character of
Philip's acts, upon their atrocity, and so forth; and, in the second
place, you who sit and listen, better qualified though you doubtless
are than Philip for using the language of justice and appreciating it
at the mouths of others, are nevertheless absolutely inert, when it is
a question of preventing him from executing the designs in which he is
now engaged. {4} It follows as the inevitable and perhaps reasonable
consequence, that you are each more successful in that to which your
time and your interest is given--he in actions, yourselves in words.
Now if it is still enough for you, that your words are more just than
his, your course is easy, and no labour is involved in it. {5} But if
we are to inquire how the evil of the present situation is to be
corrected; if its advance is not still to continue, unperceived, until
we are confronted by a power so great that we cannot even raise a hand
in our own defence; then we must alter our method of deliberation, and
all of us who speak, and all of you who listen, must resolve to prefer
the counsels which are best, and which can save us, to those which are
most easy and most attractive.
{6} I am amazed, men of Athens, in the first place, that any one who
sees the present greatness of Philip and the wide mastery which he has
gained, can be free from alarm, or can imagine that this involves no
peril to Athens, or that it is not against you that all his
preparations are being made. And I would beg you, one and all, to
listen while I put before you in a few words the reasoning by which I
have come to entertain the opposite expectation, and the grounds upon
which I regard Philip as an enemy; that so, if my own foresight appears
to you the truer, you may believe me; but if that of the persons who
have no fears and have placed their trust in him, you may give your
adhesion to them. {7} Here then, men of Athens, is my argument. Of
what, in the first place, did Philip become master, when the Peace was
concluded? Of Thermopylae, and of the situation in Phocis. Next, what
use did he make of his power? He deliberately chose to act in the
interests of Thebes, not in those of Athens. And why? He scrutinized
every consideration in the light of his own ambition and of his desire
for universal conquest: he took no thought for peace, or tranquillity,
or justice; {8} and he saw quite correctly that our state and our
national character being what they are, there was no attraction that he
could offer, nothing that he could do, which would induce you to
sacrifice any of the other Hellenes to him for your own advantage. He
saw that you would take account of what was right; that you would
shrink from the infamy attaching to such a policy; that you would
exercise all the foresight which the situation demanded, and would
oppose any such attempt on his part, as surely as if you were at open
war with him. {9} But the Thebans, he believed--and the event proved
that he was right--in return for what they were getting would let him
do as he pleased in all that did not concern them; and far from acting
against him, or preventing him effectively, would even join him in his
campaign, if he bade them. His services to the Messenians and the
Argives at the present moment are due to his having formed the same
conception of them. And this, men of Athens, is the highest of all
tributes to yourselves: {10} for these actions of his amount to a
verdict upon you, that you alone of all peoples would never, for any
gain to yourselves, sacrifice the common rights of the Hellenes, nor
barter away your loyalty to them for any favour or benefit at his
hands. This conception of you he has naturally formed, just as he has
formed the opposite conception of the Argives and the Thebans, not only
from his observation of the present, but also from his consideration of
the past. {11} He discovers, I imagine, and is told, how when your
forefathers might have been rulers of the rest of the Hellenes, on
condition of submitting to the king themselves, they not only refused
to tolerate the suggestion, on the occasion when Alexander [n], the
ancestor of the present royal house, came as his herald to negotiate,
but chose rather to leave their country and to face any suffering which
they might have to endure; and how they followed up the refusal by
those deeds which all are so eager to tell, but to which no one has
ever been able to do justice; and for that reason, I shall myself
forbear to speak of them, and rightly; for the grandeur of their
achievements passes the power of language to describe. He knows, on the
other hand, how the forefathers of the Thebans and Argives, in the one
case, joined the barbarian army, in the other, offered no resistance to
it. {12} He knows, therefore, that both these peoples will welcome what
is to their own advantage, instead of considering the common interests
of the Hellenes: and so he thought that, if he chose you for his
allies, he would be choosing friends who would only serve a righteous
cause; while if he joined himself to them, he would win accomplices who
would further his own ambitions. That is why he chose them, as he
chooses them now, in preference to you. For he certainly does not see
them in possession of more ships than you; nor has he discovered some
inland empire, and withdrawn from the seaboard and the trading-ports;
nor does he forget the words and the promises, on the strength of which
he was granted the Peace.
{13} But some one may tell us, with an air of complete knowledge of the
matter, that what then moved Philip to act thus was not his ambition
nor any of the motives which I impute to him, but his belief that the
demands of Thebes were more righteous than your own. I reply, that this
statement, above all others, is one which he cannot possibly make
_now_. How can one who is ordering Sparta to give up Messene put
forward his belief in the righteousness of the act, as his excuse for
handing over Orchomenus and Coroneia to Thebes?
{14} 'But,' we are told (as the last remaining plea), 'he was forced to
make these concessions, and did so against his better judgement,
finding himself caught between the cavalry of Thessaly and the infantry
of Thebes.' Admirable! And so, we are informed, he intends henceforth
to be wary of the Thebans, and the tale goes round that he intends to
fortify Elateia [n]. 'Intends,' indeed! and I expect that it will
remain an intention! {15} But the help which he is giving to the
Messenians and Argives is no 'intention'; for he is actually sending
mercenaries to them and dispatching funds, and is himself expected to
arrive on the spot with a great force. Is he trying to annihilate the
Spartans, the existing enemies of Thebes, and at the same time
protecting the Phocians, whom he himself has ruined? Who will believe
such a tale? {16} For if Philip had really acted against his will and
under compulsion in the first instance--if he were now really intending
to renounce the Thebans--I cannot believe that he would be so
consistently opposing their enemies. On the contrary, his present
course plainly proves that his former action also was the result of
deliberate policy; and to any sound observation, it is plain that the
whole of his plans are being organized for one end--the destruction of
Athens. {17} Indeed, this has now come to be, in a sense, a matter of
necessity for him. Only consider. It is empire that he desires, and
you, as he believes, are his only possible rivals in this. He has been
acting wrongfully towards you for a long time, as he himself best
knows; for it is the occupation of your possessions that enables him to
hold all his other conquests securely, convinced, as he is, that if he
had let Amphipolis and Poteidaea go, he could not dwell in safety even
at home. {18} These two facts, then, he well knows--first, that his
designs are aimed at you, and secondly, that you are aware of it: and
as he conceives you to be men of sense, he considers that you hold him
in righteous detestation: and, in consequence, his energies are roused:
for he expects to suffer disaster, if you get your opportunity, unless
he can anticipate you by inflicting it upon you. {19} So he is wide
awake; he is on the alert; he is courting the help of others against
Athens--of the Thebans and those Peloponnesians who sympathize with
their wishes; thinking that their desire of gain will make them embrace
the immediate prospect, while their native stupidity will prevent them
from foreseeing any of the consequences. Yet there are examples,
plainly visible to minds which are even moderately
well-balanced[n]--examples which it fell to my lot to bring before
Messenian and Argive audiences, but which had better, perhaps, be laid
before yourselves as well.
{20} 'Can you not imagine,' I said, 'men of Messenia, the impatience
with which the Olynthians used to listen to any speeches directed
against Philip in those times, when he was giving up Anthemus to
them--a city claimed as their own by all former Macedonian kings; when
he was expelling the Athenian colonists from Poteidaea and presenting
it to the Olynthians; when he had taken upon his own shoulders their
quarrel with Athens, and given them the enjoyment of that territory?
Did they expect, do you think, to suffer as they have done? if any one
had foretold it, would they have believed him? {21} And yet,' I
continued, 'after enjoying territory not their own for a very short
time, they are robbed of their own by him for a great while to come;
they are foully driven forth--not conquered merely, but betrayed by one
another and sold; for it is not safe for a free state to be on these
over-friendly terms with a tyrant. {22} What, again, of the
Thessalians? Do you imagine,' I asked, 'that when he was expelling
their tyrants, or again, when he was giving them Nicaea and Magnesia,
they expected to see the present Council of Ten[n] established in their
midst? Did they expect that the restorer of their Amphictyonic rights
would take their own revenues from them for himself? Impossible! And
yet these things came to pass, as all men may know. {23} You
yourselves,' I continued, 'at present behold only the gifts and the
promises of Philip. Pray, if you are really in your right minds, that
you may never see the accomplishment of his deceit and treachery. There
are, as you know well,' I said, 'all kinds of inventions designed for
the protection and security of cities--palisades, walls, trenches, and
every kind of defence. {24} All these are made with hands, and involve
expense as well. But there is one safeguard which all sensible men
possess by nature--a safeguard which is a valuable protection to all,
but above all to a democracy against a tyrant. And what is this? It is
distrust. Guard this possession and cleave to it; preserve this, and
you need never fear disaster. {25} What is it that you desire?' I said.
'Is it freedom? And do you not see that the very titles that Philip
bears are utterly alien to freedom? For a king, a tyrant, is always the
foe of freedom and the enemy of law. Will you not be on your guard,' I
said, 'lest in striving to be rid of war, you find yourselves
slaves?'[n]
{26} My audience heard these words and received them with a tumult of
approbation, as well as many other speeches from the envoys, both when
I was present and again later. And yet, it seems, there is still no
better prospect of their keeping Philip's friendship and promises at a
distance. {27} In fact, the extraordinary thing is not that Messenians
and certain Peloponnesians should act against their own better
judgement, but that you who understand for yourselves, and who hear us,
your orators, telling you, that there is a design against you, and that
the toils are closing round you--that you, I say, by always refusing to
act at once, should be about to find (as I think you will) that you
have exposed yourselves unawares to the utmost peril: so much more does
the pleasure and ease of the moment weigh with you, than any advantage
to be reaped at some future date.
{28} In regard to the practical measures which you must take, you will,
if you are wise, deliberate by yourselves[n] later. But I will at once
propose an answer which you may make to-day, and which it will be
consistent with your duty to have adopted.
[_The answer is read._]
Now the right course, men of Athens, was to have summoned before you
those who conveyed the promises[n] on the strength of which you were
induced to make the Peace. {29} For I could never have brought myself
to serve on the Embassy, nor, I am sure, would you have discontinued
the war, had you imagined that Philip, when he had obtained peace,
would act as he has acted. What we were then told was something very
different from this. And there are others, too, whom you should summon.
You ask whom I mean? After the Peace had been made, and I had returned
from the Second Embassy, which was sent to administer the oaths, I saw
how the city was being hoodwinked, and I spoke out repeatedly,
protesting and forbidding you to sacrifice Thermopylae and the
Phocians: {30} and the men to whom I refer were those who then said
that a water-drinker[n] like myself was naturally a fractious and
ill-tempered fellow; while Philip, if only he crossed the Pass, would
fulfil your fondest prayers; for he would fortify Thespiae and
Plataeae; he would put an end to the insolence of the Thebans; he would
cut a canal through the Chersonese at his own charges, and would repay
you for Amphipolis by the restoration of Euboea and Oropus. All this
was said from this very platform, and I am quite sure that you remember
it well, though your memory of those who injure you is but short. {31}
To crown your disgrace, with nothing but these hopes in view, you
resolved that this same Peace should hold good for your posterity also;
so completely had you fallen under their influence. But why do I speak
of all this now? why do I bid you summon these men? By Heaven, I will
tell the truth without reserve, and will hold nothing back. {32} My
object is not to give way to abuse, and so secure myself as good a
hearing[n] as others in this place, while giving those who have come
into collision with me from the first an opportunity for a further
claim[n] upon Philip's money. Nor do I wish to waste time in empty
words. {33} No; but I think that the plan which Philip is pursuing will
some day trouble you more than the present situation does; for his
design is moving towards fulfilment, and though I shrink from precise
conjecture, I fear its accomplishment may even now be only too close at
hand. And when the time comes when you can no longer refuse to attend
to what is passing; when you no longer hear from me or from some other
that it is all directed against you, but all alike see it for
yourselves and know it for a certainty; then, I think, you will be
angry and harsh enough. {34} And I am afraid that because your envoys
have withheld from you the guilty secret of the purposes which they
have been bribed to forward, those who are trying to remedy in some
degree the ruin of which these men have been the instruments will fall
victims to your wrath. For I observe that it is the general practice of
some persons to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but upon those
who are most within their grasp. {35} While then the trouble is still
to come, still in process of growth, while we can still listen to one
another's words, I would remind each of you once more of what he well
knows--who it was that induced you to sacrifice the Phocians and
Thermopylae, the control of which gave Philip command of the road to
Attica and the Peloponnesus; who it was, I say, that converted your
debate about your rights and your interests abroad into a debate about
the safety of your own country, and about war on your own borders--a
war which will bring distress to each of us personally, when it is at
our doors, but which sprang into existence on that day. {36} Had you
not been misled by them, no trouble would have befallen this country.
For we cannot imagine that Philip would have won victories by sea which
would have enabled him to approach Attica with his fleet, or would have
marched by land past Thermopylae and the Phocians; but he would either
have been acting straightforwardly--keeping the Peace and remaining
quiet; or else he would have found himself instantly plunged into a war
no less severe than that which originally made him desirous of the
Peace. {37} What I have said is sufficient by way of a reminder to you.
Heaven grant that the time may not come when the truth of my words will
be tested with all severity: for I at least have no desire to see any
one meet with punishment, however much he may deserve his doom, if it
is accompanied by danger and calamity to us all.
ON THE EMBASSY (OR. XIX)
[_Introduction_. The principal events with which a reader of this
Speech ought to be acquainted have already been narrated (see
especially the Introductions to the last two Speeches). The influence
of the anti-Macedonian party grew gradually from the time of the Peace
onwards. In 346, within a month after the return of the Second Embassy,
the ambassadors presented their reports before the Logistae or Board of
Auditors (after a futile attempt on the part of Aeschines to avoid
making a report altogether); and Timarchus, supported by Demosthenes,
there announced his intention of taking proceedings against Aeschines
for misconduct on the Second Embassy. But Timarchus' own past history
was not above reproach: he was attacked by Aeschines for the
immoralities of his youth, which, it was stated, disqualified him from
acting as prosecutor, and though defended by Demosthenes, was condemned
and disfranchised (345 B.C.). But early in 343 Hypereides impeached
Philocrates for corruption as ambassador, and obtained his condemnation
to death--a penalty which he escaped by voluntary exile before the
conclusion of the trial; and, later in the same year, Demosthenes
brought the same charge against Aeschines.
In the meantime (since the delivery of Demosthenes' Second Philippic)
Philip had been making fresh progress. The Arcadians and Argives (for
the Athenian envoys to the Peloponnese in 344 seem to have had little
success) were ready to open their gates to him. His supporters in Elis
massacred their opponents, and with them the remnant of the Phocians
who had crossed over to Elis with Phalaecus. At Megara, Perillus and
Ptoeodorus almost succeeded in bringing a force of Philip's mercenaries
into the town, but the attempt was defeated, by the aid of an Athenian
force under Phocion. In Euboea Philip's troops occupied Porthmus, where
the democratic party of Eretria had taken refuge, owing to an overthrow
of the constitution (brought about by Philip's intrigues) which
resulted in the establishment of Cleitarchus as tyrant. In the course
of the same year (343) occurred two significant trials. The first was
that of Antiphon, who had made an offer to Philip to burn the Athenian
dockyards at the Peiraeus. He was summarily arrested by order of
Demosthenes (probably in virtue of some administrative office):
Aeschines obtained his release, but he was re-arrested by order of the
Council of Areopagus[1] and condemned to death. The other trial was
held before the Amphictyonic Council on the motion of the people of
Delos, to decide whether the Athenians should continue to possess the
right of managing the Temple of Delos. The Assembly chose Aeschines as
counsel for Athens; but the Council of Areopagus, which had been given
power to revise the appointment, put Hypereides in his place.
Hypereides won the case. Early in 343 (or at all events before the
middle of the year), Philip sent Python of Byzantium to complain of the
language used about him by Athenian orators, and to offer to revise and
amend the terms of the Peace of Philocrates. In response, an embassy
was sent, headed by Hegesippus, a violent opponent of Macedonia, to
propose to Philip (1) that instead of the clause 'that each party shall
retain possession of what they have', a clause, 'that each party shall
possess what is their own,' should be substituted; and (2) that all
Greek States not included in the Treaty of Peace should be declared
free, and that Athens and Philip should assist them, if they were
attacked. These proposals, if sanctioned, would obviously have reopened
the question of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Poteidaea, as well as of Cardia
and the Thracian towns taken by Philip in 346. Hegesippus, moreover,
was personally objectionable, and the embassy was dismissed with little
courtesy by Philip, who even banished from Macedonia the Athenian poet
Xenocleides for acting as host to the envoys. The feeling against
Philip in Athens was evidently strong, when the prosecution of
Aeschines by Demosthenes took place.
The trial was held before a jury (probably consisting of 1,501
persons), presided over by the Board of Auditors. Demosthenes spoke
first, and Aeschines replied in a speech which is preserved. There is
no doubt, on a comparison of the two speeches, that each, before it was
published, received alterations and insertions, intended to meet the
adversary's points, or to give a better colour to passages which had
been unfavourably received. Probably not all the refutations 'in
advance' were such in reality. But there is no sufficient reason to
doubt that the speeches were delivered substantially as we have them.
Aeschines was acquitted by thirty votes.
The question of the guilt or innocence of Aeschines will probably never
be finally settled. A great part of his conduct can be explained as a
sincere attempt to carry out the policy of Eubulus, or as the issue of
a genuine belief that it was best for Athens to make terms with Philip
and stand on his side. Even so the wisdom and the veracity of certain
speeches which he had made is open to grave question; but this is a
different thing from corruption. Moreover, to some of Demosthenes'
arguments he has a conclusive reply. It is more difficult to explain
his apparent change of opinion between the 18th and 19th of
Elaphebolion, 346 (if Demosthenes' report of the debates is to be
trusted); and some writers are disposed to date his corruption from the
intervening night. Nor is it easy to meet Demosthenes' argument that if
Aeschines had really been taken in by Philip, and believed the promises
which he announced, or if he had actually heard Philip make the
promises, he would have regarded Philip afterwards as a personal enemy,
and not as a friend. But even on these points Aeschines might reply
(though he could not reply so to the Athenian people or jury) that
though he did not trust the promises, he regarded the interest of
Athens as so closely bound up with the alliance with Philip, that he
considered it justifiable to deceive the people into making the
alliance, or at least to take the risk of the promises which he
announced proving untrue. In any case there is no convincing evidence
of corruption; and it may be taken as practically certain that he was
not bribed to perform particular services. It is less certain that he
was not influenced by generous presents from Philip in forming his
judgement of Philip's character and intentions. The standard of
Athenian public opinion in regard to the receipt of presents was not
that of the English Civil Service; and the ancient orators accuse one
another of corruption almost as a matter of course. (We have seen that
Demosthenes began the attack upon Eubulus' party in this form as early
as the Speech for the Rhodians; it appears in almost every subsequent
oration: and in their turn, his opponents make the same charge against
him.) It is, in any case, remarkable that at a time when the people was
plainly exasperated with the Peace and its authors, and very
ill-disposed towards Philip, a popular jury nevertheless acquitted
Aeschines; and the verdict is not sufficiently explained either by the
fact that Eubulus supported Aeschines or by the jurors' memory of
Demosthenes' own part in the earlier peace-negotiations, though this
must have weakened the force of his attack. That Demosthenes himself
believed Aeschines to have been bribed, and could himself see no other
explanation of his conduct, need not be doubted; and although the
speech contains some of those misrepresentations of fact and passages
of irrelevant personal abuse which deface some of his best work, it
also contains some of his finest pieces of oratory and narrative.
The second part of the speech is more broken up into short sections and
less clearly arranged than the first; earlier arguments are repeated,
and a few passages may be due (at least in their present shape) to
revision after the trial: but the latter part even as it stands is
successful in leaving the points of greatest importance strongly
impressed upon the mind.
The following analysis of the speech may enable the reader to find his
way through it without serious difficulty:--
INTRODUCTION (§§ 1-28)
(i) _Exordium_ (§§ 1, 2). Impartiality requested of the jury, in view
of Aeschines' attempt to escape by indirect means.
(ii) _Points of the trial_ (§§ 3-8). An ambassador must (1) give true
reports; (2) give good advice; (3) obey his instructions; (4) not lose
time; (5) be incorruptible.
(iii) _Preliminary exposition of the arguments_ (§§ 9-28).
(1) The previous anti-Macedonian zeal of Aeschines suddenly collapsed
after the First Embassy.
(2) In the deliberations on the Peace, Aeschines supported
Philocrates.
(3) After the Second Embassy, Aeschines prevented Athens from guarding
Thermopylae and saving the Phocians, by false reports and
promises.
(4) Such a change of policy is only explicable by corruption.
PART 1 (§§ 29-178)
The five points of Introduction (ii) are treated as three, or in three
groups.
(i) The reports made by Aeschines on his return from the Second
Embassy, and his advice, especially as to the ruin of the Phocians (§§
29-97).
(1) The reports (a) to the Senate, (b) to the People, and their
reception (§§ 29-46).
(2) Evidence that Aeschines conspired with Philip against the
Phocians, whose ruin is described (§§ 47-71).
(3) Refutation of three anticipated objections, beginning at § 72, §
78, § 80 respectively (§§ 72-82).
(4) The danger to Athens from Aeschines' treachery (§§ 83-7).
(5) Request to confine the trial strictly to relevant points
(§§ 88-97).
(ii) The corruption of Aeschines by the bribes of Philip (§§ 98-149).
(1) Arguments (beginning § 102, § 111, § 114, § 116) showing the
corruption of Aeschines (§§ 98-119).
(2) Refutation of anticipated objections (beginning at § 120, § 134,
§ 147) (§§ 120-49).
(iii) Aeschines' loss of time, by which Philip profited, and
disobedience to his instructions (§§ 150-77).
(1) Narrative of the Second Embassy (§§ 150-62).
(2) Comparison of the two Embassies (§§ 163-5).
(3) Comparison of Demosthenes' own conduct with that of the other
ambassadors (§§ 167-77). Recapitulation of the points established
(§§ 177, 178).
PART II (§§ 179-343)
(i) The injury done to Athens--
(a) by the loss of Thrace and the Hellespont;
(b) generally, by false reports from ambassadors (§§ 179-86).
(ii) Refutation of anticipated objections--
(a) 'It is not Philip's fault that he has not satisfied Athens'
(§ 187).
(b) 'Demosthenes has no right to prosecute' (§§ 188-220): including a
digression (§§ 192-200) on Aeschines' character and incidents in
his life.
(iii) Demosthenes' object in prosecuting, passing into reproof of the
laxity of Athens towards traitors (§§ 221-33).
(iv) Warning against any attempt by Aeschines to confuse the dates and
incidents of the two Embassies (§§ 234-6.)
(v) Criticism of Aeschines' brothers and his prosecution of Timarchus
(§§ 237-58).
(vi) The increasing danger from traitors, and the traditional attitude
of Athens towards them (§§ 259-87).
(vii) Attack upon Eubulus for defending Aeschines (§§ 288-99).
(viii) Philip's policy and methods; proofs of Aeschines' complicity
repeated (§§ 300-31).
(ix) Warnings to the jury against Aeschines' attempts to mislead them;
and conclusion (§§ 331-43).]
{1} How much interest this case has excited, men of Athens, and how
much canvassing has taken place, must, I feel sure, have become fairly
evident to you all, after the persistent overtures just now made to
you, while you were drawing your lots.[n] Yet I will make the request
of you all--a request which ought to be granted even when unasked--that
you will not allow the favour or the person of any man to weigh more
with you than justice and the oath which each of you swore before he
entered the court. Remember that what I ask is for your own welfare and
for that of the whole State; while the entreaties and the eager
interest of the supporters of the accused have for their aim the
selfish advantage of individuals: and it is not to confirm criminals in
the possession of such advantages that the laws have called you
together, but to prevent their attainment of them. {2} Now I observe
that while all who enter upon public life in an honest spirit profess
themselves under a perpetual responsibility, even when they have passed
their formal examination, the defendant Aeschines does the very
reverse. For before entering your presence to give an account of his
actions, he has put out of the way one of those[n] who appeared against
him at his examination; and others he pursues with threats, thus
introducing into public life a practice which is of all the most
atrocious and most contrary to your interests. For if one who has
transacted and managed any public business is to render himself secure
against accusation by spreading terror round him, rather than by the
justice of his case, your supremacy[n] must pass entirely out of your
hands.
{3} I have every confidence and belief that I shall prove the defendant
guilty of many atrocious crimes, for which he deserves the extreme
penalty of the law. But I will tell you frankly of the fear which
troubles me in spite of this confidence. It seems to me, men of Athens,
that the issue of every trial before you is determined as much by the
occasion as by the facts; and I am afraid that the length of time which
has elapsed since the Embassy may have caused you to forget the crimes
of Aeschines, or to be too familiar with them. {4} I will tell you
therefore how, in spite of this, you may yet, as I believe, arrive at a
just decision and give a true verdict to-day. You have, gentlemen of
the jury, to inquire and to consider what are the points on which it is
proper to demand an account from an ambassador. He is responsible first
for his report; secondly, for what he has persuaded you to do; thirdly,
for his execution of your instructions; next, for dates; and, besides
all these things, for the integrity or venality of his conduct
throughout. {5} And why is he responsible in these respects? Because on
his report must depend your discussion of the situation: if his report
is true, your decision is a right one: if otherwise, it is the reverse.
Again, you regard the counsels of ambassadors as especially
trustworthy. You listen to them in the belief that they have personal
knowledge of the matter with which they were sent to deal. Never,
therefore, ought an ambassador to be convicted of having given you any
worthless or pernicious advice. {6} Again, it is obviously proper that
he should have carried out your instructions to him with regard to both
speech and action, and your express resolutions as to his conduct. Very
good. But why is he responsible for dates? Because, men of Athens, it
often happens that the opportunity upon which much that is of great
importance depends lasts but for a moment; and if this opportunity is
deliberately and treacherously surrendered to the enemy, no subsequent
steps can possibly recover it. {7} But as to the integrity or
corruption of an ambassador, you would all, I am sure, admit that to
make money out of proceedings that injure the city is an atrocious
thing and deserves your heavy indignation. Yet the implied distinction
was not recognized by the framer of our law. He absolutely forbade
_all_ taking of presents, thinking, I believe, that a man who has once
received presents and been corrupted with money no longer remains even
a safe judge of what is to the interest of the city. {8} If then I can
convict the defendant Aeschines by conclusive proofs of having made a
report that was utterly untrue, and prevented the people from hearing
the truth from me; if I prove that he gave advice that was entirely
contrary to your interests; that on his mission he fulfilled none of
your instructions to him; that he wasted time, during which
opportunities for accomplishing much that was of great importance were
sacrificed and lost to the city; and that he received presents in
payment for all these services, in company with Philocrates; then
condemn him, and exact the penalty which his crimes deserve. If I fail
to prove these points, or fail to prove them all, then regard me with
contempt, and let the defendant go.
{9} I have still to charge him, men of Athens, with many atrocious acts
in addition to these--acts which would naturally call forth the
execration of every one among you. But I desire, before all else that I
am about to say, to remind you (though most of you, I know, remember it
well) of the position which Aeschines originally took up in public
life, and the speeches which he thought it right to address to the
people against Philip; for I would have you realize that his own
actions, his own speeches at the beginning of his career, are the
strongest evidence of his corruption. {10} According to his own public
declaration at that time, he was the first Athenian to perceive that
Philip had designs against the Hellenes and was corrupting certain
leading men in Arcadia. With Ischander, the son of Neoptolemus, to
second him in his performance, he came before the Council and he came
before the people, to speak on the subject: he persuaded you to send
envoys in all directions to bring together a congress at Athens to
discuss the question of war with Philip: {11} then, on his return from
Arcadia, he reported to you those noble and lengthy speeches which, he
said, he had delivered on your behalf before the Ten Thousand[n] at
Megalopolis, in reply to Philip's spokesman, Hieronymus; and he
described at length the criminal wrong that was done, not only to their
own several countries, but to all Hellas, by men who took bribes and
received money from Philip. {12} Such was his policy at that time, and
such the sample which he displayed of his sentiments. Then you were
induced by Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, Ctesiphon, and the rest of those
who brought reports from Macedonia in which there was not an honest
word, to send ambassadors to Philip and to negotiate for peace.
Aeschines himself is appointed one of them, in the belief, not that he
was one of those who would sell your interests, or had placed
confidence in Philip, but rather one who would keep an eye on the rest.
The speeches which he had already delivered, and his antipathy to
Philip, naturally led you to take this view of him. {13} Well, after
this he came to me[n] and tried to make an agreement by which we should
act in concert on the Embassy, and urged strongly that we should both
keep an eye upon that abominable and shameless man Philocrates; and
until we returned to Athens from the First Embassy, I at least, men of
Athens, had no idea that he had been corrupted and had sold himself.
For (not to mention the other speeches which, as I have told you, he
had made on former occasions) at the first of the assemblies in which
you debated about the Peace, he rose and delivered an exordium which I
think I can repeat to you word for word as he uttered it at the
meeting. {14} 'If Philocrates,' he said, 'had spent a very long time in
studying how he could best oppose the Peace, I do not think he could
have found a better device than a motion of this kind. The Peace which
he proposes is one which I can never recommend the city to make, so
long as a single Athenian remains alive. Peace, however, we ought, I
think, to make.' {15} And he made a brief and reasonable speech in the
same tone. But though he had spoken thus at the first meeting, in the
hearing of you all, yet at the second meeting, when the Peace was to be
ratified; when I was upholding the resolution of the allies and working
for a Peace on just and equitable terms; when you in your desire for
such a Peace would not even listen to the voice of the despicable
Philocrates; then, I say, Aeschines rose and spoke in support of him,
using language for which he deserves, God knows, to die many deaths,
{16} saying that you must not remember your forefathers, nor tolerate
speakers who recalled your trophies and your victories by sea; and that
he would frame and propose a law, that you should assist no Hellene who
had not previously assisted you. These words he had the callous
shamelessness to utter in the very presence and hearing of the
ambassadors[n] whom you had summoned from the Hellenic states, in
pursuance of the advice which he himself had given you, before he had
sold himself.
{17} You elected him again, men of Athens, to receive the oaths. How he
frittered away the time, how cruelly he injured all his country's
interests, and what violent mutual enmity arose between myself and him
in consequence of his conduct and of my desire to prevent it, you shall
hear presently. But when we returned from this Embassy which was sent
to receive the oaths, and the report of which is now under examination;
when we had secured nothing, either small or great, of all that had
been promised and expected when you were making the Peace, but had been
totally deceived; when they had again acted without regard to their
instructions,[n] and had conducted their mission in direct defiance of
your decree; we came before the Council: and there are many who have
personal knowledge of what I am about to tell you, for the
Council-Chamber was crowded with spectators. {18} Well, I came forward
and reported to the Council the whole truth: I denounced these men: I
recounted the whole story, beginning with those first hopes, aroused in
you by the report of Ctesiphon and Aristodemus, and going on to the
speeches which Aeschines delivered during the time of the
Peace-negotiations, and the position into which they had brought the
city: as regards all that remained to you--I meant the Phocians and
Thermopylae--I counselled you not to abandon these, not to be victims
once more of the same mistake, not to let yourselves be reduced to
extremities through depending upon a succession of hopes and promises:
and I carried the Council with me. {19} But when the day of the
Assembly came, and it was our duty to address you, the defendant
Aeschines came forward before any of his colleagues--and I entreat you,
in God's name, to follow me, and try to recollect whether what I tell
you is true; for now we have come to the very thing which so cruelly
injured and ruined your whole cause. He made not the remotest attempt
to give any report of the results of the Embassy--if indeed he
questioned the truth of my allegations at all--but instead of this, he
made statements of such a character, promising you benefits so numerous
and so magnificent, that he completely carried you away with him. {20}
For he said that,[n] before his return, he had persuaded Philip upon
all the points in which the interests of the city were involved, in
regard both to the Amphictyonic dispute and to all other matters: and
he described to you a long speech which he professed to have addressed
to Philip against the Thebans, and of which he reported to you the
substance, calculating that, as the result of his own diplomacy, you
would within two or three days, without stirring from home or taking
the field or suffering any inconvenience, hear that Thebes was being
blockaded, alone and isolated from the rest of Boeotia, {21} that
Thespiae and Plataeae were being repeopled, and that the debt due to
the god[n] was being exacted not from the Phocians, but from the
Thebans who had planned the seizure of the temple. For he said that he
gave Philip to understand that those who planned the act were no less
guilty of impiety than those whose hands executed the plan; and that on
this account the Thebans had set a price upon his head. {22} Moreover,
he said that he heard some of the Euboeans, who had been thrown into a
state of panic and confusion by the friendly relations established
between Athens and Philip, saying to the ambassadors, 'You have not
succeeded, gentlemen, in concealing from us the conditions on which you
have made your Peace with Philip; nor are we unaware that while you
have given him Amphipolis, he has undertaken to hand over Euboea to
you.' There was, indeed, another matter which he had arranged as well,
but he did not wish to mention this at present, since even as it was
some of his colleagues were jealous of him. {23} This was an
enigmatical and indirect allusion to Oropus. These utterances naturally
raised him high in your estimation; he seemed to be an admirable
speaker and a marvellous man; and he stepped down with a very lofty
air. Then I rose and denied all knowledge of these things, and at the
same time attempted to repeat some part of my report to the Council.
But they now took their stand by me, one on this side, one on that--the
defendant and Philocrates; they shouted, they interrupted me, and
finally they jeered, while you laughed. {24} You would not hear, and
you did not wish to believe anything but what Aeschines had reported.
Heaven knows, your feelings were natural enough; for who, that expected
all these marvellous benefits, would have tolerated a speaker who said
that the expectation would not be realized, or denounced the
proceedings of those who made the promise? All else, of course, was of
secondary importance at the time, in comparison with the expectations
and the hopes placed before you; any contradiction appeared to be
nothing but sheer obstruction and malignity, while the proceedings
described seemed to be of incredible importance and advantage to the
city.
{25} Now with what object have I recalled these occurrences to you
before everything else, and described these speeches of his? My first
and chief object, men of Athens, is that none of you, when he hears me
speak of any of the things that were done and is struck by their
unparalleled atrocity, may ask in surprise why I did not tell you at
once and inform you of the facts; {26} but may remember the promises
which these men made at each critical moment, and by which they
entirely prevented every one else from obtaining a hearing; and that
splendid pronouncement by Aeschines; and that you may realize that in
addition to all his other crimes, you have suffered this further wrong
at his hands--that you were prevented from learning the truth
instantly, when you ought to have learned it, because you were deluded
by hopes, deceits and promises. {27} That is my first and, as I have
said, my chief object in recalling all these occurrences. But there is
a second which is of no less importance than the first, and what is
this? It is that you may remember the policy which he adopted in his
public life, when he was still uncorrupted--his guarded and mistrustful
attitude towards Philip; and may consider the sudden growth of
confidence and friendship which followed; {28} and then, if all that he
announced to you has been realized, if the results achieved are
satisfactory, you may believe that all has been done out of an honest
interest in the welfare of Athens; but if, on the other hand, the issue
has been exactly the opposite of that which he predicted: if his policy
has involved the city in great disgrace and in grave perils, you may
then be sure that his conversion was due to his own base covetousness
and to his having sold the truth for money.
{29} And now, since I have been led on to this subject, I desire to
describe to you, before everything else, the way in which they took the
Phocian question entirely out of your hands. And let none of you,
gentlemen of the jury, when he looks at the magnitude of the
transactions, imagine that the crimes with which the defendant is
charged are on a grander scale than one of his reputation could
compass. You have rather to observe that any one whom you would have
placed in such a position as this--a position in which, as each
critical moment arrived, the decision would be in his hands--could have
brought about disasters equal to those for which Aeschines is
responsible, if, like Aeschines, he had wished to sell his services,
and to cheat and deceive you. {30} For however contemptible[n] may be
the men whom you frequently employ in the public service, it does not
follow that the part which the world expects this city to play is a
contemptible one. Far from it! And further, though it was Philip, of
course, who destroyed the Phocian people, it was Aeschines and his
party who seconded Philip's efforts. And so what you have to observe
and consider is whether, so far as the preservation of the Phocians
came within the scope of their mission, these men deliberately
destroyed and ruined that whole cause. You have not to suppose that
Aeschines ruined the Phocians by himself. How could he have done so?
{31} (_To the clerk._) Now give me the draft-resolution which the
Council passed in view of my report, and the deposition of the clerk
who wrote it. (_To the jury._) For I would have you know that I am not
repudiating to-day transactions about which I held my peace at the
time, but that I denounced them at once, with full prevision of what
must follow; and that the Council, which was not prevented from hearing
the truth from me, neither voted thanks to the ambassadors, nor thought
fit to invite them to the Town Hall.[n] From the foundation of the city
to this day, no body of ambassadors is recorded to have been treated
so; nor even Timagoras,[n] whom the people condemned to death. {32} But
these men have been so treated. (_To the clerk._) First read them the
deposition, and then the resolution.
[_The deposition and resolution are read._]
Here is no expression of thanks, no invitation of the ambassadors to
the Town Hall by the Council. If Aeschines asserts that there is any,
let him point it out and produce it, and I give way to him. But there
is none. Now on the assumption that we all fulfilled our mission in the
same way, the Council had good reason not to thank any of us, for the
transactions of all alike were in that case atrocious. But if some of
us acted uprightly, while others did the reverse, it must, it seems,
have been owing to the knavery of their colleagues that the virtuous
were forced to take their share of this dishonour. {33} How then can
you all ascertain without any difficulty who is the rogue? Recall to
your minds who it is that has denounced the transaction from the
outset. For it is plain that it must have been the guilty person who
was well content to be silent, to stave off the day of reckoning for
the moment, and to take care for the future not to present himself to
give an account of his actions; while it must have been he whose
conscience was clear to whom there occurred the thought of the danger,
lest through keeping silence he might be regarded as a partner in such
atrocious villany. Now it is I that have denounced these men from the
outset, while none of them has accused me. {34} Such then was the
resolution of the Council. The meeting of the Assembly took place when
Philip was already at Thermopylae: for this was the first of all their
crimes, that they placed Philip in command of the situation, so that,
when you ought first to have heard the facts, then to have deliberated,
and afterwards to have taken such measures as you had resolved upon,
you in fact heard nothing until he was on the spot, and it was no
longer easy to say what steps you ought to take. {35} In addition to
this, no one read the resolution of the Council to the people, and the
people never heard it; but Aeschines rose and delivered the harangue
which I just now described to you, recounting the numerous and
important benefits which he said he had, before his return, persuaded
Philip to grant, and on account of which the Thebans had set a price
upon his head. In consequence of this, appalled though you were at
first at the proximity of Philip, and angry with these men for not
having warned you of it, you became as mild as possible, having now
formed the expectation that all your wishes would be realized; and you
would not hear a word from me or from any one else. {36} After this was
read the letter from Philip, which Aeschines had written[n] when we had
left him behind, a letter which was nothing less than a direct and
express defence in writing of the misconduct of the ambassadors. For in
it is stated that Philip himself prevented them, when they were anxious
to go to the several cities and receive the oaths, and that he retained
them in order that they might help him to effect a reconciliation
between the peoples of Halus and Pharsalus. He takes upon his own
shoulders the whole of their misconduct, and makes it his own. {37} But
as to the Phocians and Thespiae, and the promises contained in
Aeschines' report to you--why, there is not the slightest mention of
them! And it was no mere accident that the proceedings took this form.
For the failure of the ambassadors to carry out or give effect to any
of the instructions imposed upon them by your resolution--the failure
for which you were bound to punish them--Philip makes himself
responsible in their stead, and says that the fault was his; for you
were not likely, of course, to be able to punish _him_. {38} But the
points in regard to which Philip wished to deceive you and to steal a
march upon the city were made the subject of the defendant's report, in
order that you might be able to find no ground of accusation or
reproach against Philip, since these points were not mentioned either
in his letter or in any other part of the communications received from
him. But (_to the clerk_) read the jury the actual letter--written by
Aeschines, sent by Philip; and (_to the jury_) do you observe that it
is such as I have described. (_To the clerk._) Read on.
[_The letter is read._]
{39} You hear the letter, men of Athens; you hear how noble and
generous it is. But about the Phocians or the Thebans or the other
subjects of the defendant's report--not a syllable. Indeed, in this
letter there is not an honest word, as you will very shortly see for
yourselves. He says that he retained the ambassadors to help him
reconcile the people of Halus: and such is the reconciliation that they
have obtained, that they are exiles from their country, and their city
is laid waste. And as to the prisoners, though he professed to be
wondering what he could do to gratify you, he says that the idea of
procuring their release had not occurred to any one. {40} But evidence
has, as you know, been laid before you many times in the Assembly, to
the effect that I myself went to ransom them, taking a talent[n] for
the purpose; and it shall now be laid before you once more. It follows,
therefore, that it was to deprive me of my laudable ambition[n] that
Aeschines persuaded Philip to insert this statement. But the strongest
point of all is this. In his former letter--the letter which we brought
back--he wrote, 'I should have mentioned expressly the great benefits
that I propose to confer upon you, if I felt sure that you would grant
me the alliance as well.' And yet when the alliance has been granted,
he says that he does not know what he can do to gratify you. He does
not even know what he had himself promised! Why, he must obviously have
known that, unless he was trying to cheat you! To prove that he did
write thus and in these terms, (_to the clerk_) take his former letter,
and read the very passage, beginning at this point. Read on.
[_An extract from the letter is read._]
{41} Thus, before he obtained the Peace, he undertook to set down in
writing the great benefits he would confer on the city, in the event of
an alliance also being granted him. But as soon as he had obtained both
his wishes, he says that he does not know what he can do to gratify
you, but that if you will inform him, he will do anything that will not
involve any disgrace or stigma upon himself. Such are the excuses in
which he takes refuge, to secure his retreat, in case you should
actually make any suggestion or should be induced to ask any favour.
{42} It would have been possible to expose this whole proceeding at the
time--and a great deal more--without delay; to inform you of the facts,
and to prevent you from sacrificing your cause, had not the thought of
Thespiae and Plataeae, and the idea that the Thebans were on the very
point of paying the penalty, robbed you of the truth. While, however,
there was good reason for mentioning these prospects, if the city was
to hear of them and then be cheated, it would have been better, if
their realization was actually intended, that nothing should have been
said about them. For if matters had already reached a stage at which
the Thebans would be no better off, even if they perceived the design
against them, why was the design not fulfilled? But if its fulfilment
was prevented because they perceived it in time, who was it that
betrayed the secret? {43} Must it not have been Aeschines? Its
fulfilment, however, was not in fact intended, nor did the defendant
either desire or expect it; so that he may be relieved of the charge of
betraying the secret. What was intended was that you should be
hoodwinked by these statements, and should refuse to hear the truth
from me; that you should not stir from home, and that such a decree
should carry the day as would involve the destruction of the Phocians.
Hence this prodigality in promises, and their proclamation in his
speech to the people.
{44} When I heard Aeschines making all these magnificent promises, I
knew perfectly well that he was lying; and I will tell you how I knew.
I knew it first, because when Philip was about to take the oath in
ratification of the Peace, the Phocians were openly excluded from it.
This was a point which it would have been natural to pass over in
silence, if the Phocians were really to be saved. And secondly, I knew
it because the promises were not made by Philip's ambassadors or in
Philip's letter, but by the defendant. {45} Accordingly, drawing my
conclusions from these facts, I rose and came forward and attempted to
contradict him; but as you were not willing to hear me, I held my
peace, with no more than these words of solemn protest, which I entreat
you, in Heaven's name, to remember. 'I have no knowledge of these
promises,' I said, 'and no share in making them; and,' I added, 'I do
not believe they will be fulfilled.' This last expression roused your
temper, and I proceeded, 'Take care, men of Athens, that if any of
these things comes to pass, you thank these gentlemen for it, and give
your honours and crowns to them, and not to me. If, however, anything
of an opposite character occurs, you must equally vent your anger on
them: I decline all responsibility.' {46} 'No, no!' interrupted
Aeschines, 'do not decline responsibility now! Take care rather that
you do not claim credit, when the time comes.' 'Indeed, it would be an
injustice if I did so,' I replied. Then Philocrates arose with a most
insolent air, and said, 'It is no wonder, men of Athens, that I and
Demosthenes should disagree; for he drinks water, I drink wine.' And
you laughed.
{47} Now consider the decree which Philocrates proposed and handed
in.[n] An excellent resolution it sounds, as you hear it now. But when
you take into account the occasion on which it was proposed, and the
promises which Aeschines was then making, you will see that their
action amounts to nothing less than a surrender of the Phocians to
Philip and the Thebans, and that, practically, with their hands tied
behind their backs. (_To the clerk._) Read the decree.
[_The decree is read._]
{48} There, men of Athens, is the decree, overflowing with expressions
of gratitude and auspicious language. 'The Peace,' it says, 'which is
granted to Philip shall be granted on the same terms to his
descendants, and also the alliance.' Again, we are 'to thank Philip for
his promised acts of justice'. Yet Philip made no promises: so far was
he from making promises that he said he did not know what he could do
to gratify you. {49} It was Aeschines who spoke in his name, and made
the promises. Then Philocrates took advantage of the enthusiasm which
Aeschines' words aroused in you, to insert in the decree the clause,
'and unless the Phocians act as they are bound, and surrender the
temple to the Amphictyons, the Athenian people will render their
assistance against those who still stand in the way of such surrender.'
{50} Thus, men of Athens, at a time when you were still at home and had
not taken the field, when the Spartans had foreseen the deception and
retired, and when none of the Amphictyons were on the spot but the
Thessalians and Thebans, he proposes in the most innocent-sounding
language in the world that they shall deliver up the temple to these.
For he proposes that they shall deliver it up to the Amphictyons. But
what Amphictyons? for there were none there but the Thessalians and
Thebans. He does not propose that the Amphictyons should be convoked,
or that they should wait until the Amphictyons met or that Proxenus
should render assistance in Phocis, or that the Athenians should take
the field, or anything of the sort. {51} Philip did indeed actually
send two letters to summon you.[n] But he did not intend you really to
march from Athens. Not a bit of it! For he would not have waited to
summon you until he had seen the time go by in which you could have set
out; nor would he have tried to prevent me, when I wished to set sail
and return hither; nor would he have instructed Aeschines to speak to
you in the terms which would be least likely to cause you to march. No!
he intended that you should fancy that he was about to fulfil your
desires, and in that belief should abstain from any resolution adverse
to him; and that the Phocians should, in consequence, make no defence
or resistance, in reliance upon any hopes inspired by you, but should
put themselves into his hands in utter despair. (_To the clerk._) Read
to the jury the letters of Philip.
[_The letters are read._]
{52} Now these letters summon you, and that, forsooth, instantly; and
it was surely for Aeschines and his party, if the proceeding was in any
way genuine, to support the summons, to urge you to march, and to
propose that Proxenus, whom they knew to be in those parts, should
render assistance at once. Yet it is plain that their action was of
precisely the opposite character; and naturally so. For they did not
attend to the terms of the letter, but to the intention with which
Philip wrote it. {53} With this intention they co-operated, and to this
they strove to give effect. As soon as the Phocians had learned the
news of your proceedings in the Assembly, and had received this decree
of Philocrates, and heard the defendant's announcement and his
promises, everything combined to effect their doom. Consider the
circumstances. There were some of them who had the wisdom to distrust
Philip. These were induced to trust him. And why? Because they believed
that even if Philip were trying to deceive them ten times over, the
ambassadors of Athens, at least, would never dare to deceive their own
countrymen. This report which Aeschines had made to you must therefore
be true: it was the Thebans, and not themselves, whose hour had come.
{54} There were others who advocated resistance at all hazards; but
these too were weakened in their resolution, now that they were
persuaded that they could count upon Philip's favour, and that, unless
they did as they were bidden, you, whose assistance they were hoping
for, would march against them. There was also a third party, who
thought that you repented of having made the Peace with Philip; but to
these they pointed out that you had decreed that the same Peace should
hold good for posterity also; so that on every ground, all assistance
from you was despaired of. That is why they crowded all these points
into one decree. {55} And in this lies, I think, the very greatest of
all their crimes against you. To have made a Peace with a mortal man,
whose power was due to the accidents of the moment--a Peace, whereby
they covenanted that the disgrace brought upon the city should be
everlasting; to have robbed the city, not only of all beside, but even
of the benefits that Fortune might hereafter bestow: to have displayed
such superabundant villany as to have done this wicked wrong not only
to their countrymen now living, but also to all those who should ever
thereafter be born--is it not utterly atrocious? {56} And this last
clause, by which the Peace was extended to your descendants, you would
certainly never have allowed to be added to the conditions of peace had
you not then placed your trust in the promises announced by Aeschines,
as the Phocians placed their trust in them and perished. For, as you
know, they delivered themselves up to Philip; they gave their cities
into his hands; and the consequences which befell them were the exact
opposite of all that Aeschines had predicted to you.
{57} That you may realize plainly that this calamity was brought about
in the manner that I have described, and that they are responsible for
it, I will go through the dates at which each separate event occurred;
and if any one can contradict me on any point, I invite him to rise and
speak in the time allotted to me. The Peace was made on the 19th of
Elaphebolion, and we were away on the mission which was sent to receive
the oaths three whole months. {58} All this time the Phocians remained
unharmed. We returned from that mission on the 13th of Scirophorion.
Philip had already appeared at Thermopylae, and was making promises to
the Phocians, none of which they believed--as is proved, when you
consider that otherwise they would not have appealed to you. Then
followed the Assembly, at which, by their falsehoods and by the
deception which they practised upon you, Aeschines and his party ruined
the whole cause. {59} That was on the 16th of Scirophorion. Now I
calculate that it was on the fifth day that the report of your
proceedings reached the Phocians: for the Phocian envoys were here on
the spot, and were deeply concerned to know what report these men would
make, and what your resolution would be. That gives us the 20th as the
date on which, as we calculate, the Phocians heard of your proceedings;
for, counting from the 16th, the 20th is the fifth day. Then followed
the 21st, the 22nd, and the 23rd. {60} On the latter day the truce was
made, and the ruin of the Phocians was finally sealed. This can be
proved as follows. On the 27th you were holding an Assembly in the
Peiraeus, to discuss the business connected with the dockyards, when
Dercylus arrived from Chalcis with the news that Philip had put
everything into the hands of the Thebans, and that this was the fifth
day since the truce had been made. 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th--the
27th is the fifth day precisely. Thus the dates, and their reports and
their proposals--everything, in short, convicts them of having
co-operated with Philip, and of sharing with him the responsibility for
the overthrow of the Phocians. {61} Again, the fact that none of the
towns in Phocis was taken by siege or by an attack in force, and that
the utter ruin of them all was the direct consequence of their truce
with Philip, affords the strongest evidence that it was the belief
inspired in the Phocians by these men, that they would be preserved
from destruction by Philip, which was the cause of their fate. Philip
himself they knew well enough. (_To the clerk._) Bring me our treaty of
alliance with the Phocians, and the decrees under which they demolished
their walls. (_To the jury._) You will then realize what were the
relations between themselves and you, upon which they relied, and what
nevertheless was the fate which befell them through the action of these
accursed men. (_To the clerk._) Read.
[_The Treaty of Alliance between the Athenians and Phocians is read._]
{62} These, then, were the things for which they relied upon
you--friendship, alliance, and assistance. Now listen to what befell
them, because Aeschines prevented your going to their assistance. (_To
the clerk._) Read.
[_The Agreement between Philip and the Phocians is read._]
You hear it, men of Athens. 'An Agreement between Philip and the
Phocians,' it runs--not between the Thebans and the Phocians, nor the
Thessalians and the Phocians, nor the Locrians, nor any one else who
was there. Again, 'the Phocians shall deliver up their cities to
Philip'--not to the Thebans or Thessalians or any one else. {63} And
why? Because the defendant's report to you was that Philip had crossed
the Pass with a view to the preservation of the Phocians. Thus it was
Aeschines in whom all their trust was placed; it was with him in their
minds that they considered the whole situation; it was with him in
their minds that they made the Peace. (_To the clerk._) Now read the
remainder. (_To the jury._) And do you observe for what they trusted
him, and what treatment they received. Does it show any resemblance or
similarity to what Aeschines predicted in his report? (_To the clerk._)
Read on.
[_The decrees of the Amphictyons are read._]
{64} Men of Athens, the horror and the immensity of this calamity have
never been surpassed in our day in the Hellenic world, nor even, I
believe, in the time before us. Yet these great and dreadful events a
single man has been given power to bring about, by the action of these
men, while the city of Athens was still in being--Athens, whose
traditional policy is to stand as the champion of the Hellenic peoples,
and not to suffer anything like this to take place. The nature of the
ruin which the unhappy Phocians have suffered may be seen, not only
from these decrees, but also from the actual results of the action
taken, and an awful and piteous sight it is, men of Athens. {65} For
when recently we were on our way to Delphi[n] we could not help seeing
it all--houses razed to the ground, cities stripped of their walls, the
land destitute of men in their prime--only a few poor women and little
children left, and some old men in misery. Indeed, no words can
describe the distress now prevailing there. Yet this was the people, I
hear you all saying, that once gave its vote against the Thebans,[n]
when the question of your enslavement was laid before them. {66} What
then, men of Athens, do you think would be the vote, what the sentence,
that your forefathers would give, if they could recover consciousness,
upon those who were responsible for the destruction of this people? I
believe that if they stoned them to death with their own hands, they
would hold themselves guiltless of blood. Is it not utterly
shameful--does it not, if possible, go beyond all shame--that those who
saved us then, and gave the saving vote for us, should now have met
with the very opposite fate through these men, suffering as no Hellenic
people has ever suffered before, with none to hinder it? Who then is
responsible for this crime? Who is the author of this deception? Who
but Aeschines?
{67} Of all the many reasons for which Philip might be congratulated
with good cause upon his fortune, the chief ground of congratulation is
a piece of good fortune, to which, by every Heavenly Power, I cannot
find any parallel in our days. To have captured great cities, to have
reduced a vast expanse of territory to subjection, and all similar
actions, are, of course, enviable and brilliant
achievements--undeniably so. But many other persons might be mentioned
who had achieved as much. {68} The good fortune of which I am about to
speak is peculiar to Philip, and has never been given to any other. It
is this--that when he needed scoundrels to do his work for him, he
found even greater scoundrels than he wanted. For as such we have
surely good reason to think of them. For when there were falsehoods
which Philip himself, in spite of the immense interests which he had at
stake, did not dare to utter on his own behalf--which he did not set
down in any of his letters, and which none of his envoys uttered--these
men sold their services for the purpose, and undertook your deception.
{69} Antipater and Parmenio, servants of a master as they were, and
unlikely ever to find themselves in your presence again, none the less
secured for themselves that _they_ should not be the instruments in
your deception, while these men, who were Athenians, citizens of the
most free city, and held an official position as your
ambassadors--though they would have to meet you and look you in the
face, and pass the remainder of their lives among you, and render
before you an account of their actions--they, I say, undertook the task
of deceiving you. How could vileness or desperation go further than
this?
{70} But I would have you understand further that he is under your
curse, and that you cannot, without violation of religion and piety,
acquit him, when he has thus lied to you. (_To the clerk._) Recite the
Curse. Take it from me, and read it out of the law.
[_The Curse is read._]
This imprecation is pronounced in your name, men of Athens, by the
herald, at every meeting of the Assembly, as the law appoints; and when
the Council sits, it is pronounced again there. Nor can Aeschines say
that he did not know it well. He was your under-clerk and servant to
the Council, and used himself to read this law over[n] to the herald.
{71} Surely, then, you will have done a strange and monstrous thing,
men of Athens, if to-day, when you have it in your power, you should
fail to do for yourselves the thing which you enjoin upon the gods, or
rather claim from them as your due; and should acquit a man whom you
pray to the gods to destroy utterly--himself, his race and his house.
You must not do this. You may leave it to the gods to punish one whom
you cannot yourselves detect; but when you have yourselves caught the
criminal, you must no longer lay the task of punishing him upon the
gods.
{72} Now I am told that he intends to carry his shamelessness and
impudence so far, as to avoid all mention of his own proceedings--his
report, his promises, the deception he has practised upon the city--as
though his trial were taking place before strangers, instead of before
you, who know all the facts; and that he intends to accuse first the
Spartans,[n] then the Phocians,[n] and then Hegesippus.[n] {73} That is
mere mockery; or rather, it is atrocious shamelessness. For all that he
will allege to-day against the Phocians or the Spartans or
Hegesippus--their refusal to receive Proxenus, their impiety--let him
allege what he will--all these allegations refer, as you know, to
actions which were already past when these ambassadors returned to
Athens, and which were no obstacle to the preservation of the
Phocians--the admission is made by whom? By the defendant Aeschines
himself. For what was his report on that occasion? {74} Not that if it
had not been for their refusal to receive Proxenus, nor that if it had
not been for Hegesippus, nor that if it had not been for such and such
things, the Phocians would have been saved. No! he discarded all such
qualifications, and stated expressly that before he returned he had
persuaded Philip to save the Phocians, to repeople Boeotia, and to
arrange matters to suit your convenience; that within two or three days
these things would be accomplished facts, and that for this reason the
Thebans had set a price upon his head. {75} Refuse then, to hear or to
tolerate any mention of what had already been done, either by the
Spartans or by the Phocians, before he made his report; and do not let
him denounce the rascality of the Phocians. It was not for their virtue
that you once saved the Spartans, nor the Euboeans, that accursed
people! nor many others; but because the interests of the city demanded
their preservation, as they demanded that of the Phocians just now. And
what wrong was done either by the Phocians or by the Spartans, or by
yourselves, or by any one else in the world after he made those
declarations, to prevent the fulfilment of the promises which he then
made? Ask him that: for that is what he will {76} not be able to show
you. It was within five days--five days and no more--that Aeschines
made his lying report, that you believed him, that the Phocians heard
of it, surrendered themselves and perished. This, I think, makes it as
plain as it can possibly be, that the ruin of the Phocians was the
result of organized deceit and trickery, and of nothing else.[n] For so
long as Philip was unable to proceed to Phocis on account of the
Peace,[n] and was only waiting in readiness to do so, he kept sending
for the Spartans, promising to do all that they wished,[n]in order that
the Phocians might not win {77} them over to their side by your help.
But when he had arrived at Thermopylae, and the Spartans had seen the
trap and retired, he now sent Aeschines in advance to deceive you, in
order that he might not, owing to your perceiving that he was playing
into the hands of the Thebans, find himself once more involved in loss
of time and war and delay, through the Phocians defending themselves
and your going to their assistance, but might get everything into his
power without a struggle; and this is what has in fact happened. Do
not, then, let the fact that Philip deceived the Spartans and Phocians
as well as yourselves enable Aeschines to escape his punishment for
deceiving you. That would not be just.
{78} But if he tells you that, to compensate for the Phocians and
Thermopylae and all your other losses, you have retained possession of
the Chersonese, do not, in Heaven's name, accept the plea! Do not
tolerate the aggravation of all the wrong that you have suffered
through his conduct as ambassador, by the reproach which his defence
would bring upon the city--the reproach of having sacrificed the
existence of your allies, in an underhand attempt to save part of your
own possessions! You did not act thus; for when the Peace had already
been made, and the Chersonese was no longer in danger, there followed
four whole months[n] during which the Phocians remained unharmed; and
it was not until after this that the lying statements of Aeschines
brought about their ruin by deceiving you. {79} And further, you will
find that the Chersonese is in much greater danger now than it was
then. For when do you think that we had the greater facilities for
punishing Philip for any trespass against the Chersonese?--before he
stole any of these advantages from the city, or now? For my part, I
think we had far greater facilities then. What, then, does this
'retention of the Chersonese' amount to, when all the fears and the
risks which attended one who would have liked to attack it have been
removed?
{80} Again, I am told that he will express himself to some such effect
as this--that he cannot think why he is accused by Demosthenes, and not
by any of the Phocians. It is better that you should hear the true
state of the case from me beforehand. Of the exiled Phocians, the best,
I believe, and the most respectable, after being driven into banishment
and suffering as they have suffered, are content to be quiet, and none
of them would consent to incur an enmity which would fall upon himself,
on account of the calamities of his people: while those who would do
anything for money have no one to give it to them. {81} For assuredly
_I_ would never have given any one anything whatever to stand by my
side here and cry aloud how cruelly they have suffered. The truth and
the deeds that have been done cry aloud of themselves. And as for the
Phocian people,[n] they are in so evil and pitiable a plight, that
there is no question for them of appearing as accusers at the
examination of every individual ambassador in Athens. They are in
slavery, in mortal fear of the Thebans and of Philip's mercenaries,
whom they are compelled to support, broken up into villages as they are
and stripped of their arms. {82} Do not, then, suffer him to urge such
a plea. Make him prove to you that the Phocians are not ruined, or that
he did not promise that Philip would save them. For the questions upon
which the examination of an ambassador turns are these: 'What have you
effected? What have you reported? If the report is true, you may be
acquitted; if it is false, you must pay the penalty.' How can you plead
the non-appearance of the Phocians, when it was you yourself, I fancy,
that brought them, so far as it lay in your power, into such a
condition that they could neither help their friends nor repel their
enemies.
{83} And further, apart from all the shame and the dishonour in which
also these proceedings are involved, it is easy to show that in
consequence of them the city has been beset with grave dangers as well.
Every one of you knows that it was the hostilities which the Phocians
were carrying on, and their command of Thermopylae, that rendered us
secure against Thebes, and made it impossible that either Philip or the
Thebans should ever march into the Peloponese or into Euboea or into
Attica. {84} But this guarantee of safety which the city possessed,
arising out of the position of Thermopylae and the actual circumstances
of the time, you were induced to sacrifice by the deceptions and the
lying statements of these ambassadors--a guarantee, I say, fortified by
arms, by a continuous campaign, by great cities of allies, and by a
wide tract of territory; and you have looked on while it was swept
away. Fruitless has your first expedition to Thermopylae become--an
expedition made at a cost of more than two hundred talents, if you
include the private expenditure of the soldiers--and fruitless your
hopes of triumph over Thebes! {85} But of all the wicked services which
he has done for Philip, let me tell you of that which is in reality the
greatest outrage of all upon Athens and upon you all. It is this--that
when Philip had determined from the very first to do for the Thebans
all that he has done, Aeschines, by reporting the exact opposite to
you, and so displaying to the world your antagonism to Philip's
designs, has brought about for you an increase in the enmity between
yourselves and the Thebans, and for Philip an increase in their
gratitude. How could a man have treated you more outrageously than this?
(_To the clerk._) {86} Now take and read the decrees of Diophantus[n]
and Callisthenes[n]; (_to the jury_) for I would have you realize that
when you acted as you ought, you were thought worthy to be honoured
with public thanksgivings and praises, both at home and abroad; but
when once you had been driven astray by these men, you had to bring
your children and wives in from the country, and to decree that the
sacrifice to Heracles[n] should take place within the walls, though it
was a time of peace. And in view of this it is an amazing idea, that
you should dismiss unpunished a man who even prevented the gods from
receiving their worship from you after the manner of your fathers. (_To
the clerk._) Read the decree.
[_The decree of Diophantus is read._]
This decree, men of Athens, was one which your conduct nobly deserved.
(_To the clerk._) Now read the next decree.
[_The decree of Callisthenes is read._]
{87} This decree you passed in consequence of the action of these men.
It was not with such a prospect in view that you made the Peace and the
alliance at the outset, or that you were subsequently induced to insert
the words which extended them to your posterity. You expected their
action to bring you benefits of incredible value. Aye, and besides
this, you know how often, after this, you were bewildered by the report
that Philip's forces and mercenaries were threatening Porthmus or
Megara. You have not then to reflect contentedly that Philip has not
yet set foot in Attica. You have rather to consider whether their
action has not given him power to do so when he chooses. It is that
danger that you must keep before your eyes, and you must execrate and
punish the man who is guilty of putting such power into Philip's hands.
{88} Now I am aware that Aeschines will eschew all defence of the
actions with which he is charged, and that, in his desire to lead you
as far away as possible from the facts, he will enumerate the great
blessings which Peace brings to all mankind, and will set against them
the evils that follow in the train of war. His whole speech will be a
eulogy of peace, and in that will consist his defence. But such an
argument actually incriminates the defendant further. If peace, which
brings such blessings to all other men, has been the source of such
trouble and confusion to us, what explanation can be found, except that
they have taken bribes and have cruelly marred a thing by nature so
fair? {89} 'What?' he may say, 'have you not to thank the Peace for
three hundred ships, with their fittings, and for funds which remain
and will remain yours?' In answer to this, you are bound to suppose
that, thanks to the Peace, Philip's resources too have become far more
ample--aye, and his command of arms, and of territory, and of revenues,
which have accrued to him to such large amounts. {90} We, too, have had
some increase of revenue. But as for power and alliances, by the
establishment of which all men retain their advantages, either for
themselves or their masters, ours have been sold by these men--ruined
and enfeebled; while Philip's have become more formidable and extensive
by far. Thus it is not fair that while Philip has been enabled by their
action to extend both his alliances and his revenue, all that would in
any case have been ours, as the result of the Peace, should be set off
against what they themselves sold to Philip. The former did not come to
us in exchange for the latter. Far from it! For had it not been for
them, not only should we have had the former, as we have now, but we
should have had the latter as well.
{91} You would doubtless admit, men of Athens, in general terms, that,
on the one hand, however many and terrible the disasters that have
befallen the city, your anger cannot justly be visited upon Aeschines,
if none of them has been caused by him; and that, on the other hand,
Aeschines is not entitled to be acquitted on account of any
satisfactory results that may have been accomplished through the action
of others. You must examine the acts of Aeschines himself, and then
show him your favour if he is worthy of it, or your resentment, on the
other hand, if his acts prove to be deserving ing of that. {92} How,
then, can you solve this problem fairly? You will do so if, instead of
allowing him to confound all questions with one another--the criminal
conduct of the generals, the war with Philip, the blessings that flow
from peace--you consider each point by itself. For instance, were we at
war with Philip? We were. Does any one accuse Aeschines on that ground?
Does any one wish to bring any charge against him in regard to things
that were done in the course of the war? No one whatever. He is
therefore acquitted in regard to such matters, and must not say
anything about them; for the witnesses and the proofs which a defendant
produces must bear upon the matters which are in dispute; he must not
deceive you by offering a defence upon points which are not disputed.
Take care, then, that you say nothing about the war; for no one charges
you with any responsibility for that. {93} Later on we were urged by
certain persons to make peace. We consented; we sent ambassadors; and
the ambassadors brought commissioners to Athens who were to conclude
the Peace. Once more, does any one blame Aeschines for this? Does any
one allege that Aeschines introduced the proposal of peace, or that he
committed any crime in bringing commissioners here to make it? No one
whatever. He must therefore say nothing in regard to the fact that the
city made peace; for he is not responsible for that. {94} 'Then what
_is_ your assertion, sir?' I may be asked. 'At what point _do_ your
charges begin?' They begin, men of Athens, from the time when the
question before you was not whether you should make peace or not (for
that had already been settled), but what sort of peace you should
make--when Aeschines opposed those who took the side of justice,
supported for a bribe the hireling mover of the decree, and afterwards,
when he had been chosen to receive the oaths, failed to carry out every
one of your instructions, destroyed those of your allies who had passed
unscathed through the war, and told you falsehoods whose enormity and
grossness has never been surpassed, either before or since. At the
outset, before Philip was given a hearing in regard to the Peace,
Ctesiphon and Aristodemus took the leading part in the work of
deception; but when the time had come for action, they surrendered
their rôle to Philocrates and Aeschines, who took it up and ruined
everything. {95} And then, when he is bound to answer for his actions
and to give satisfaction for them--like the unscrupulous God-forsaken
clerk that he is--he will defend himself as though it were the Peace
for which he was being tried. Not that he wishes to account for more
than is charged against him--that would be lunacy. No! He sees rather
that in all his own proceedings no good can be found--that his crimes
are his whole history; while a defence of the Peace, if it has no other
merits, has at least the kindly sound of the name to recommend it. {96}
I fear, indeed, men of Athens, I fear that, unconsciously, we are
enjoying this Peace like men who borrow at heavy interest. The
guarantees of its security--the Phocians and Thermopylae--they have
betrayed. But, be that as it may, it was not through _Aeschines_ that
we originally made it; for, paradoxical as it may seem, what I am about
to say is absolutely true--that if any one is honestly pleased at the
Peace, it is the generals, who are universally denounced, that he must
thank for it: for had they been conducting the war as you desired them
to do, {97}you would not have tolerated even the name of peace. For
peace, then, we must thank the generals; but the perilous, the
precarious, the untrustworthy nature of the Peace is due to the
corruption of these men. Cut him off, then, cut him off, I say, from
all arguments in defence of the Peace! Set him to defend his own
actions! Aeschines is not being tried on account of the Peace. On the
contrary, the Peace stands discredited owing to Aeschines. And here is
evidence of the fact:--if the Peace had been made, and if no subsequent
deception had been practised upon you, and none of your allies had been
ruined, who on earth would have been hurt by the Peace, except in so
far as it was inglorious? And for its inglorious character the
defendant in fact shares the responsibility, for he spoke in support of
Philocrates. At least no irreparable harm would have been done; whereas
now, I believe, much has been done, and the guilt rests with the
defendant. {98} That these men have been the agents in this shameful
and wicked work of ruin and destruction, I think you all know. Yet so
far am I, gentlemen of the jury, from putting any unfair construction
upon these facts or asking you to do so, that if it has been through
stupidity or simplicity, or ignorance in any form whatever, that such
results have been so brought about, I acquit Aeschines myself, and I
{99} recommend you also to acquit him. At the same time none of these
excuses is either constitutional[n] or justifiable. For you neither
command nor compel any one to undertake public business; but when any
one has satisfied himself of his own capacity and has entered political
life, then, like good-hearted, kindly men, you welcome him in a
friendly and ungrudging manner, and even elect him to office and place
your own interests in his hands. {100} Then, if a man succeeds, he will
receive honour and will so far have an advantage over the crowd. But if
he fails, is he to plead palliations and excuses? That is not fair. It
would not satisfy our ruined allies, or their children, or their wives,
or the rest of the victims, to know that it was through my
stupidity--not to speak of the stupidity of the defendant--that they
had suffered such a fate. Far from it! {101} Nevertheless, I bid you
forgive Aeschines for these atrocious and unparalleled crimes if he can
prove that it was simplicity of mind, or any form of ignorance
whatever, which led him to work such ruin. But if it was the rascality
of a man who had taken money and bribes--if he is plainly convicted of
this by the very facts themselves--then, if it be possible, put him to
death; or if not, make him, while he lives, an example to others.
And now give your thoughts to the proof by which he is convicted on
these points, and observe how straightforward it will be.
{102} If the defendant Aeschines was not deliberately deceiving you for
a price, he must necessarily, I presume, have had one of two reasons
for making the statements in question to you, in regard to the Phocians
and Thespiae and Euboea. Either he must have heard Philip promise in
express terms that such would be his policy and the steps he would
take; or else he must have been so far bewitched and deluded by
Philip's generosity in all other matters as to conceive these further
hopes of him. There is no possible alternative besides these two. {103}
Now in both these cases he, more than any living man, ought to detest
Philip. And why? Because, so far as Philip could bring it about, all
that is most dreadful and most shameful has fallen upon him. He has
deceived you; his reputation is gone [he is rightly ruined]; he is on
his trial; aye, and were the course of the proceedings in any way that
which his conduct called for, he would long ago have been impeached;[n]
{104-109} whereas now, thanks to your innocence and meekness, he
presents his report, and that at the time which suits his own wishes. I
ask, then, if there is one among you who has ever heard Aeschines raise
his voice in denunciation of Philip--one, I say, who has seen Aeschines
exposing him or saying a word against him? Not one! All Athens
denounces Philip before Aeschines does so. Every one whom you meet does
so, though not one of them has been injured by him--I mean, of course,
personally. On the assumption that Aeschines had not sold himself, I
should have expected to hear him use some such expressions as
these--'Men of Athens, deal with _me_ as you will. I trusted Philip; I
was deceived; I was wrong; I confess my error. But beware of _him_, men
of Athens. He is faithless--a cheat, a knave. Do you not see how he has
treated me? how he has deceived me?' {110} But I hear no such
expressions fall from him, nor do you. And why? Because he was _not_
misled; he was _not_ deceived; he made these statements, he betrayed
all to Philip, because he had sold his services and received the money
for them; and gallantly and loyally has he behaved--as Philip's
hireling. But as your ambassador, as your fellow citizen, he is a
traitor who deserves to die, not once, but thrice.
{111} This is not the only evidence which proves that all those
statements of his were made for money. For, recently, the Thessalians
came to you, and with them envoys from Philip, demanding that you
should decree the recognition of Philip as one of the Amphictyons. Who
then, of all men, should naturally have opposed the demand? The
defendant Aeschines. And why? Because Philip had acted in a manner
precisely contrary to the announcement which Aeschines had made to you.
{112} Aeschines declared that Philip would fortify Thespiae and
Plataeae; that he intended, not to destroy the Phocians, but to put
down the insolence of Thebes. But in fact Philip has raised the Thebans
to an undue height of power, while he has utterly destroyed the
Phocians; and instead of fortifying Thespiae and Plataeae, he has
brought Orchomenus and Coroneia into the same bondage with them. How
could any contradiction be greater than this? Aeschines did not oppose
the demand. He neither opened his lips nor uttered a sound in
opposition to it. {113} But even this, monstrous as it is, is not yet
the worst. For he, and he alone, in all Athens, actually supported the
demand. This not even Philocrates dared to do, abominable as he was; it
was left for the defendant Aeschines. And when you raised a clamour and
would not listen to him, he stepped down from the platform, and,
showing off before the envoys who had come from Philip, told them that
there were plenty of men who made a clamour, but few who took the field
when it was required of them--you remember the incident, no
doubt--being himself, of course, a marvellous soldier, God knows!
{114} Again, if we had been unable to prove that any of the ambassadors
had received anything--if the fact were not patent to all--we might
then have resorted to examination by torture,[n] and other such
methods. But if Philocrates not only admitted the fact frequently in
your presence at the Assembly, but used actually to make a parade of
his guilt--selling wheat, building houses, saying that he was going[n]
whether you elected him or not, importing timber, changing Macedonian
gold openly at the bank--it is surely impossible for _him_ to deny that
he received money, when he himself confesses and displays his guilt.
{115} Now, is any human being so senseless or so ill-starred that, in
order that Philocrates might receive money, while he himself incurred
infamy and disgrace, he would want to fight against those upright
citizens in whose ranks he might have stood, and to take the side of
Philocrates and face a trial? I am sure that there is no such man; but
in all these considerations, if you examine them aright, you will find
strong and evident signs of the corruption of the defendant.
{116} Consider next an incident which occurred last in order of time,
but which is second to none as an indication that Aeschines had sold
himself to Philip. You doubtless know that in the course of the recent
impeachment of Philocrates by Hypereides, I came forward and expressed
my dissatisfaction with one feature of the impeachment--namely, the
idea that Philocrates alone had been responsible for all these
monstrous crimes, and that the other nine ambassadors had no share in
them. I said that it was not so, for Philocrates by himself would have
been nowhere, had he not had some of them to co-operate with him. {117}
'And therefore,' I said, 'in order that I may not personally acquit or
accuse any one, and that the guilty may be detected, and those who have
had no share in the crime acquitted by the evidence of their own
conduct, let any one who wishes to do so rise and come forward into
your midst, and let him declare that he has no share in it, and that
the actions of Philocrates are displeasing to him. Any one who does
this,' I said, 'I acquit.' You remember the incident, I am sure. {118}
Well, no one came forward or showed himself. Each of the others has
some excuse. One was not liable to examination; another, perhaps, was
not present; a third is related to Philocrates. But Aeschines has no
such excuse. No! So completely has he sold himself, once for all--so
plain is it that his wages are not for past services only, but that, if
he escapes now, Philip can equally count upon his help against you in
the future--that to avoid letting fall even a word that would be
unfavourable to Philip, he does not accept his discharge[n] even when
you offer to discharge him, but chooses to suffer infamy, to stand his
trial and to endure any treatment in this court, rather than to take a
step that would not please Philip. {119} But what is the meaning of
this partnership, this careful forethought for Philocrates? For if
Philocrates had by his diplomacy accomplished the most honourable
results and achieved all that your interest required, and yet admitted
(as he did admit) that he had made money by his mission, this very fact
was one by which an uncorrupted colleague should have been repelled and
set him on his guard, and led to protest to the best of his power.
Aeschines has not acted in this way. Is it not all clear, men of
Athens? Do not the facts cry aloud and tell you that Aeschines has
taken money, that he is a rascal for a price, and that
consistently--not through stupidity, or ignorance, or bad luck? {120}
'But where is the witness who testifies to my corruption?' he asks.
Why, this is the finest thing of all![n] The witnesses, Aeschines, are
facts; and they are the surest of all witnesses: none can assert or
allege against them, that they are influenced by persuasion or by
favour to any one: what your treachery and mischief have made them,
such, when examined, they must appear. But, besides the facts, you
shall at once bear witness against yourself. Come, stand up[n] and
answer me! Surely you will not plead that you are so inexperienced as
not to know what to say. For when, under the ordinary limitations of
time, you prosecute and win cases that have all the novelty of a
play[n]--cases, too, that have no witness to support them--you must
plainly be a speaker of tremendous genius.
{121} Many and atrocious as are the crimes of the defendant Aeschines,
and great as is the wickedness which is implied by them (as I am sure
you also feel) there is none which is more atrocious than that of which
I am about to speak to you, and none which will afford more palpable
proof that he has taken bribes and sold everything. For when once more,
for the third time, you sent the ambassadors to Philip on the strength
of those high and noble expectations which the defendant's promises had
roused, you elected both Aeschines and myself, and most of those whom
you had previously sent. {122} For my part I came forward and declined
upon oath to serve;[n] and though some raised a clamour and bade me go,
I declared that I would not; but the defendant had already been
elected. Afterwards, when the Assembly had risen, he and his party met
and discussed whom they should leave behind in Athens. For while
everything was still in suspense, and the future doubtful, there were
all kinds of gatherings and discussions in the market-place. {123} They
were afraid, no doubt, that a special meeting of the Assembly might
suddenly be called, and that you might then hear the truth from me, and
pass some of the resolutions which it was your duty to pass in the
interest of the Phocians, and that so Philip's object might slip from
his grasp. For had you merely passed a resolution and shown them the
faintest ray of hope of any kind, the Phocians would have been saved.
It was absolutely impossible for Philip to stay where he was, unless
you were misled. There was no corn in the country, for, owing to the
war, the land had not been sown; and to import corn was impossible so
long as your ships were there and in command of the sea; while the
Phocian towns were many in number, and difficult to take except by a
prolonged siege. Even assuming that he were taking a town a day, there
are two and twenty of them. {124} For all these reasons they left
Aeschines in Athens, to guard against any alteration of the course
which you had been deluded into taking. Now to decline upon oath to
serve, without any cause, was a dangerous and highly suspicious
proceeding. 'What?' he would have been asked, 'are you not going on the
mission which is to secure all those wonderful good things which you
have foretold?' Yet he was bound to remain. How could it be done? He
pleads illness. His brother took with him Execestus the physician, came
before the Council, swore that Aeschines was too ill to serve, and was
himself elected in his place. {125} Five or six days later the ruin of
the Phocians had been accomplished, and Aeschines' contract--a mere
matter of business--had been fulfilled. Dercylus turned back, and on
his arrival here from Chalcis announced to you the destruction of the
Phocians, while you were holding an Assembly in the Peiraeus. On
hearing the news you were naturally struck with sympathy for them, and
with terror for yourselves. You passed resolutions to bring in your
children and wives from the country, to repair the garrison-forts, to
fortify the Peiraeus, and to celebrate the sacrifice to Heracles within
the city walls: {126} and in the midst of all this, in the midst of the
confusion and the tumult which had fallen upon the city, this learned
and able speaker, so loud of voice, though not elected[n] either by the
Council or by the people, set off as ambassador to the man who had
wrought the destruction, taking no account of the illness which he had
previously made his excuse, upon oath, for not serving, nor of the
election of another ambassador in his place, nor of the law which
imposes the penalty of death for such offences; {127} nor yet
reflecting how utterly atrocious it was, that after announcing that the
Thebans had placed a price on his head, he should choose the moment
when the Thebans had (in addition to all Boeotia, which they already
possessed) become masters of the territory of the Phocians as well, to
go into the very midst of Thebes, and into the very camp of the
Thebans. But so beside himself was he, so utterly bent upon his profits
and his bribe, that he ruled out and overlooked all such
considerations, and took his departure.
{128} Such was the nature of this transaction; and yet his proceedings
when he arrived at his destination are far worse. All of you who are
present, and all other Athenians as well, thought the treatment of the
unhappy Phocians so atrocious and so cruel that you sent to the Pythian
games neither the official deputation from the Council, nor the
Thesmothetae,[n] but abandoned that ancient representation of
yourselves at the festival. But Aeschines went to the triumphal
feast[n] with which the Thebans and Philip were celebrating the victory
of their cause and their arms. He joined in the festival: he shared in
the libations and the prayers which Philip offered over the ruined
walls and country and arms of your allies: with Philip he set garlands
on his head, and raised the paean, and drank the loving-cup. {129} Nor
is it possible for the defendant to give a different version of the
facts from that which I have given. As regards his sworn refusal to
serve, the facts are in your public records in the Metroon,[n] guarded
by your officer; and a decree stands recorded with express reference to
the name of Aeschines.[n] And as for his conduct there, his fellow
ambassadors, who were present, will bear witness against him. They told
me the story; for I was not with them on this Embassy, having entered a
sworn refusal to serve.
(_To the clerk._) {130} Now read me the resolution [and the record],
and call the witnesses.
[_The decree is read, and the witnesses called._]
What prayers, then, do you imagine Philip offered to the gods, when he
poured his libation, or the Thebans? Did they not ask them to give
success in war, and victory, to themselves and their allies, and the
contrary to the allies of the Phocians? In these prayers, therefore--in
these imprecations upon his own country--Aeschines joined. It is for
you to return them upon his own head to-day.
{131} His departure, then, was a contravention of the law which imposes
the penalty of death for the offence, and it has been shown that on his
arrival he acted in a manner for which he deserves to die again and
again, while his former proceedings and the work which he did as
ambassador, in their interest,[n] would justly slay him. Ask yourselves
what penalty can be found, which will adequately atone for all these
crimes? {132} It would surely be shameful, men of Athens, that while
all of you, and the whole people, denounce publicly all the
consequences of the Peace; while you decline to take part in the
business of the Amphictyons; while your attitude towards Philip is one
of vexation and mistrust, because the deeds that have been done are
impious and atrocious, instead of righteous and advantageous to you;
that nevertheless, when you have come into court as the sworn
representatives of the State, to sit in judgement upon the report of
these proceedings, you should acquit the author of all the evil, when
you have taken him red-handed in actions like these. {133} Who is there
of all your fellow citizens--nay, who of all the Hellenes--that would
not have good cause for complaint against you, when he saw that though
you were enraged against Philip, who in making peace after war was
merely purchasing the means to his end from those who offered them for
sale--a very pardonable transaction--you were yet acquitting Aeschines,
who sold your interests in this shameful manner, notwithstanding the
extreme penalties which the laws appoint for such conduct?
{134} Now it is possible that an argument may also be used by the other
side to some such effect as this--that the condemnation of those whose
diplomacy brought about the Peace will mean the beginning of enmity
with Philip. If this is true, then, I can imagine, upon consideration,
no more serious charge that I could bring against the defendant, than
this. If Philip, who spent his money on the Peace which he wished to
obtain, has become so formidable, so powerful, that you have already
ceased to regard your oaths and the justice of the case, and are
seeking how you can gratify Philip, what penalty, that those who are
responsible for this could suffer, would be adequate to the offence?
{135} I believe, however, that I shall actually show you that it would
more probably mean the beginning of a friendship, advantageous to you.
For you must be well assured, men of Athens, that Philip does not
despise your city; nor was it because he regarded you as less
serviceable than the Thebans, that he preferred them to you. No! {136}
He had been instructed by these men and had heard from them, what I
once told you in the Assembly, without contradiction from any of them,
that the People is the most unstable thing in the world, and the most
incalculable, inconstant as a wave of the sea, stirred by any chance
wind. One comes, another goes; but no one cares for the public
interest, or remembers it. Philip needs (he is told) friends upon whom
he can rely to execute and manage his business with you--such friends,
for instance, as his informant.[n] If this were secured for him, he
would easily effect all that he desired in Athens. {137} Now if he
heard that those who had used such language to him had immediately upon
their return been beaten to death, he would doubtless have behaved as
the Persian king did. And how was this? He had been deceived by
Timagoras,[n] and had given him, it is said, forty talents; but when he
heard that Timagoras had been put to death here, and had not even power
to secure his own life, much less to carry out the promises he had made
to him, he recognized that he had not paid the price to the man who had
the power to effect his object. For first, as you know, he sent a
dispatch, acknowledging once more your title to Amphipolis, which he
had previously described as in alliance and friendship with himself;
and secondly, he thenceforward wholly abstained from giving money to
any one. {138} This is exactly what Philip would have done, if he had
seen that any of these men had paid the penalty, and what, if he sees
it, he will still do. But when he hears that they address you, and
enjoy a high reputation with you, and prosecute others, what is he to
do? Is he to seek to spend much, when he can spend less? or to desire
to court the favour of all, when he need but court two or three? That
would be madness. For even those public benefits which Philip conferred
upon the Thebans he conferred not from choice-- far from it--but
because he was induced to do so by their ambassadors; and I will tell
you how. {139} Ambassadors came to him from Thebes just at the time
when we were there upon our mission from you. Philip wished to give
them money, and that (so they said) in very large amounts. The Theban
ambassadors would not accept or receive it. After that, while drinking
at a sacrificial banquet and displaying his generosity towards them,
Philip offered, as he drank to them, presents of many kinds--captives
and the like--and finally he offered them goblets of gold and silver.
All these they steadily refused, declining to put themselves in his
power in any way. {140} At last Philo, one of the ambassadors, made a
speech, men of Athens, which was worthy to be made in the name, not of
Thebes, but of yourselves. For he said that it gave them pleasure and
delight to see the magnanimous and generous attitude of Philip towards
them; but for their own personal part, they were already his good
friends even without these presents; and they begged him to apply his
generosity to the existing political situation of their country, and to
do something worthy of himself and Thebes, promising that, if he did
so, their whole city, as well as themselves, would become attached to
him. {141} And now observe what the Thebans have gained by this, and
what consequences have followed; and contemplate in a real instance the
advantages of refusing to sell your country's interests. First of all,
they obtained peace when they were already distressed and suffering
from the war, in which they were the losing side. Next, they secured
the utter ruin of their enemies, the Phocians, and the complete
destruction of their walls and towns. And was this all? No, indeed! For
besides all this they obtained Orchomenus, Coroneia, Corsia, the
Tilphossaeum, and as much of the territory of the Phocians as they
desired. {142} This then was what the Thebans gained by the Peace; and
surely no more could they have asked even in their prayers. And the
ambassadors of Thebes gained--what? Nothing but the credit of having
brought this good fortune to their country; and a noble reward it was,
men of Athens, a proud record on the score of merit and honour--that
honour which Aeschines and his party sold for money. Let us now set
against one another the consequences of the Peace to the city of Athens
and to the Athenian ambassadors respectively; and then observe whether
its effects have been similar in the case of the city and of these men
personally. {143} The city has surrendered all her possessions and all
her allies; she has sworn to Philip that even if another approaches
them to preserve them for her, you will prevent him; that you will
consider any one who wishes to give them up to you as your enemy and
foe, and the man who has robbed you of them as your ally and friend.
{144} That is the resolution which Aeschines supported, and which was
moved by his accomplice Philocrates; and although on the first day I
was successful, and had persuaded you to ratify the decree of the
allies and to summon Philip's envoys,[n] the defendant forced an
adjournment of the question till the next day, and persuaded you to
adopt the resolution of Philocrates, in which these proposals, and many
others even more atrocious, are made. {145} These were the consequences
of the Peace to Athens. It would not be easy to devise anything more
shameful. What were the consequences to the ambassadors who brought
these things about? I say nothing of all that you have seen for
yourselves--the houses, the timber, the wheat. But they also possess
properties and extensive estates in the country of your ruined allies,
bringing in incomes of a talent to Philocrates and thirty minae to the
defendant. {146} Yet surely, men of Athens, it is an atrocious and a
monstrous thing, that the calamities of your allies should have become
sources of revenue to your ambassadors, and that the same Peace which
to the city that sent them meant the ruin of her allies, the surrender
of her possessions, and shame in the place of honour, should have
created for the ambassadors who brought these things to pass against
their country, revenue, affluence, property, and wealth, in the place
of abject poverty. To prove, however, that what I am telling you is
true (_to the clerk_) call me the witnesses from Olynthus.
[_The witnesses are called._]
{147} Now I should not wonder if he even dared to make some such
statement as this--that the Peace which we were making could not have
been made an honourable one, or such as I demanded, because our
generals had mismanaged the war. If he argues thus, then remember, in
Heaven's name, to ask him whether[n] it was from some other city that
he went as ambassador, or from this city itself? If it was from some
other, to whose success in war and to whose excellent generals he can
point, then it was natural for him to take Philip's money: but if it
was from Athens itself, why do we find him taking presents as part of a
transaction which involved the surrender of her possessions by the city
which sent him? For in any honest transaction the city that sent the
ambassadors ought to have shared the same fortune as the ambassadors
whom she sent. {148} Consider also this further point, men of Athens.
Do you think that the successes of the Phocians against the Thebans in
the war, or the successes of Philip against you, were the more
considerable? Those of the Phocians against the Thebans, I am quite
certain. At least, they held Orchomenus and Coroneia and the
Tilphossaeum;[n] they had intercepted the Theban garrison at Neones;[n]
they had slain two hundred of them on Hedyleum;[n] a trophy had been
raised, their cavalry were victorious, and a whole Iliad of misfortunes
had beset the Thebans. You were in no such position as this, and may
you never be so in the future! Your most serious disadvantage in your
hostilities with Philip was your inability to inflict upon him all the
damage that you desired; you were completely secure against suffering
any harm yourselves. How is it then that, as the result of one and the
same Peace, the Thebans, who were being so badly worsted in the war,
have recovered their own possessions and, in addition, have gained
those of their enemies; while you, the Athenians, have lost under the
Peace even what you retained safely through the war? It is because
their ambassadors did not sell their interests, while these men have
sold yours. [Ah! he will say,[n] but the allies were exhausted by the
war....]. That this is how these things were accomplished, you will
realize still more clearly from what I have yet to say.
{150}For when this Peace was concluded--the Peace of Philocrates, which
Aeschines supported--and when Philip's envoys had set sail, after
receiving the oaths from us--and up to this time nothing that had been
done was irreparable, for though the Peace was disgraceful and unworthy
of Athens, still we were to get those marvellous good things in
return--then I say, I asked and told the ambassadors to sail as quickly
as possible to the Hellespont, and not to sacrifice any of our
positions there, nor allow Philip to occupy them in the interval. {151}
For I knew very well that everything that is sacrificed when peace is
in process of being concluded after war, is lost to those who are so
neglectful; since no one who had been induced to make peace with regard
to the situation as a whole ever yet made up his mind to fight afresh
for the sake of possessions which had been left unsecured; such
possessions those who first take them keep. And, apart from this, I
thought that, if we sailed, the city could not fail to secure one of
two useful results. Either, when we were there and had received
Philip's oath according to the decree, he would restore the possessions
of Athens which he had taken, and keep his hands off the rest; {152}
or, if he did not do so, we should immediately report the fact to you
here, and so, when you saw his grasping and perfidious disposition in
regard to those your remoter and less important interests, you would
not in dealing with greater matters close at hand--in other words, with
the Phocians and Thermopylae--let anything be lost. If he failed to
forestall you in regard to these, and you were not deceived, your
interests would be completely secured, and he would give you your
rights without hesitation. {153} And I had good reason for such
expectations. For if the Phocians were still safe and sound, as they
then were, and were in occupation of Thermopylae, Philip would have had
no terror to brandish before you, which could make you overlook any of
your rights. For he was not likely either to make his way through by
land, or to win a victory by sea, and so reach Attica; while if he
refused to act as was right, you would instantly close his ports,
reduce him to straits for money and other supplies, and place him in a
state of siege; and in that case it would be he, and not you, to whom
the advantages of peace would be the overmastering consideration. {154}
And that I am not inventing this or claiming wisdom after the
event--that I knew it at once, and, with your interest in view, foresaw
what must happen and told my colleagues--you will realize from the
following facts. When there was no longer any meeting of the Assembly
available (since you had used up all the appointed days) and still the
ambassadors did not depart, but wasted time here, I proposed a decree
as a member of the Council, to which the people had given full powers,
that the ambassadors should depart directly, and that the admiral
Proxenus should convey them to any district in which he should
ascertain Philip to be. My proposal was just what I now tell you,
couched expressly in those terms. (_To the clerk_.) Take this decree
and read it.
[_The decree is read_.]
{155} I brought them away, then, from Athens, sorely against their
will, as you will clearly understand from their subsequent conduct.
When we reached Oreus and joined Proxenus, instead of sailing and
following their instructions, they made a circuitous journey by land,
and before we reached Macedonia we had spent three and twenty days. All
the rest of the time, until Philip's arrival, we were sitting idle at
Pella; and this, with the journey, brought the time up to fifty days in
all. {156} During this interval, in a time of peace and truce, Philip
was taking Doriscus,[n] Thrace, the district towards the Walls, the
Sacred Mountain--everything, in fact, and making his own arrangements
there; while I spoke out repeatedly and insistently, first in the tone
of a man giving his opinion to his colleagues, then as though I were
informing the ignorant, till at last I addressed them without any
concealment as men who had sold themselves and were the most impious of
mankind. {157} And the man who contradicted me openly and opposed
everything which I urged and which your decree enjoined, was Aeschines.
Whether his conduct pleased all the other ambassadors as well, you will
know presently; for as yet I allege nothing about any of them, and make
no accusation: no one of them need appear an honest man to-day because
I oblige him to do so, but only of his own free will, and because he
was no partner in Aeschines' crimes. That the conduct in question was
disgraceful, atrocious, venal, you have all seen. Who were the partners
in it, the facts will show.
{158} 'But of course, during this interval they received the oaths from
Philip's allies, or carried out their other duties.' Far from it! For
though they had been absent from home three whole months, and received
1,000 drachmae from you for their expenses, they did not receive the
oaths from a single city, either on their journey to Macedonia, or on
the way back. It was in the inn before the temple of the Dioscuri--any
one who has been to Pherae will understand me--when Philip was already
on the march towards Athens at the head of an army, that the oaths were
taken, in a fashion which was disgraceful, men of Athens, and insulting
to you. {159} To Philip, however, it was worth anything that the
transaction should have been carried out in this form. These men had
failed in their attempt to insert among the terms of the Peace the
clause which excluded the people of Halus and Pharsalus; Philocrates
had been forced by you to expunge the words, and to write down
expressly 'the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians'; and Philip
did not wish any of his own allies to have taken such an oath; for then
they would not join him in his campaign against those possessions of
yours which he now holds, but would plead their oaths in excuse; {160}
nor did he wish them to be witnesses of the promises on the strength of
which he was obtaining the Peace. He did not wish it to be revealed to
the world that the city of Athens had not, after all, been defeated in
the war, and that it was Philip who was eager for peace, and was
promising to do great things for Athens if he obtained it. It was just
to prevent the revelation of these facts that he thought it inadvisable
that the ambassadors should go to any of the cities; while for their
part, they sought to gratify him in everything, with ostentatious and
extravagant obsequiousness. {161} But when all this is proved against
them--their waste of time, their sacrifice of your position in Thrace,
their complete failure to act in accordance either with your decree or
your interests, their lying report to you--how is it possible that
before a jury of sane men, anxious to be true to their oath, Aeschines
can be acquitted? To prove, however, that what I say is true (_to the
clerk_), first read the decree, under which it was our duty to exact
the oaths, then Philip's letter, and then the decree of Philocrates and
that of the people.
[_The decrees and letter are read._]
{162} And now, to prove that we should have caught Philip in the
Hellespont, had any one listened to me, and carried out your
instructions as contained in the decrees, (_to the clerk_) call the
witnesses who were there on the spot.
[_The witnesses are called._]
(_To the clerk._) Next read also the other deposition--Philip's answer
to Eucleides,[n] who is present here, when he went to Philip afterwards.
[_The deposition is read._]
{163} Now listen to me, while I show that they cannot even deny that it
was to serve Philip's interest that they acted as they did. For when we
set out on the First Embassy--that which was to discuss the Peace--you
dispatched a herald in advance to procure us a safe conduct. Well, on
that occasion, as soon as ever they had reached Oreus, they did not
wait for the herald, or allow any time to be lost; but though Halus was
being besieged, they sailed there direct, and then, leaving the town
again, came to Parmenio, who was besieging it, set out through the
enemy's camp to Pagasae, and, continuing their journey, only met the
herald at Larissa: with such eager haste did they proceed. {164} But at
a time when there was peace and they had complete security for their
journey and you had instructed them to make haste, it never occurred to
them either to quicken their pace or to go by sea. And why? Because on
the former occasion Philip's interest demanded that the Peace should be
made as soon as possible; whereas now it required that as long an
interval as possible should be wasted before the oaths were taken.
{165} To prove that this is so, (_to the clerk_) take and read this
further deposition.
[_The deposition is read._]
How could men be more clearly convicted of acting to serve Philip's
interest throughout, than by the fact that they sat idle, when in your
interest they ought to have hurried, on the very same journey over
which they hastened onward, without even waiting for the herald, when
they ought not to have moved at all?
{166} Now observe how each of us chose to conduct himself while we were
there, sitting idle at Pella. For myself, I chose to rescue and seek
out the captives, spending my own money and asking Philip to procure
their ransom[n] with the sums which he was offering us in the form of
presents. How Aeschines passed his whole time you shall hear presently.
{167} What then was the meaning of Philip's offering money to us in
common? He kept sounding us all--for this too I would have you know.
And how? He sent round privately to each of us, and offered us, men of
Athens, a very large sum in gold. But when he failed in a particular
case (for I need not mention my own name myself, since the proceedings
and their results will of themselves show to whom I refer), he thought
that we should all be innocent enough to accept what was given to us in
common; and then, if we all alike had a share, however small, in the
common present, those who had sold themselves privately would be
secure. {168} Hence these offers, under the guise of presents to his
guest-friends. And when I prevented this, my colleagues further divided
among themselves the sum thus offered. But when I asked Philip to spend
this sum on the prisoners, he could neither, without discredit,
denounce my colleagues, and say, 'But So-and-so has the money, and
So-and-so,' nor yet evade the expense. So he gave the promise, but
deferred its fulfilment, saying that he would send the prisoners home
in time for the Panathenaea. (_To the clerk._) Read the evidence of
Apollophanes, and then that of the rest of those present.
[_The evidence is read._]
{169} Now let me tell you how many of the prisoners I myself ransomed.
For while we were sitting waiting there at Pella, before Philip's
arrival, some of the captives--all, in fact, who were out on bail--not
trusting, I suppose, my ability to persuade Philip to act as I wished,
said that they wished to ransom themselves, and to be under no
obligation to Philip for their freedom: and they borrowed, one three
minae, another five, and another--whatever the amount of the ransom was
in each case. {170} But when Philip had promised that he would ransom
the rest, I called together those to whom I had advanced the money; I
reminded them of the circumstances; and, lest they should seem to have
suffered by their impatience, and to have been ransomed at their own
cost, poor men as they were, when all their comrades expected to be set
free by Philip, I made them a present of their ransom. To prove that I
am speaking the truth, (_to the clerk_) read these depositions.
[_The depositions are read._]
{171} These, then, are the sums which I excused them, and gave as a
free gift to fellow citizens who had met with misfortune. And so, when
Aeschines says presently, in his speech to you, 'Demosthenes, if, as
you say, you knew, from the time when I supported Philocrates'
proposal, that we were acting altogether dishonestly, why did you go
again as our colleague on the subsequent mission to take the oaths,
instead of entering a sworn excuse?' remember this, that I had promised
those whose freedom I had procured that I would bring them their
ransom, and deliver them to the best of my power. {172} It would have
been a wicked thing to break my word and abandon my fellow citizens in
their misfortune; while, on the other hand, if I had excused myself
upon oath from service, it would not have been altogether honourable,
nor yet safe, to make a tour there in a private capacity. For let
destruction, utter and early, fall upon me, if I would have joined in a
mission with these men for a very large sum of money, had it not been
for my anxiety to rescue the prisoners. It is a proof of this, that
though you twice elected me to serve on the Third Embassy, I twice
swore an excuse. And all through the journey in question my policy was
entirely opposed to theirs. {173} All, then, that it was within my own
power to decide in the course of my mission resulted as I have
described; but wherever in virtue of their majority they gained their
way, all has been lost. And yet, had there been any who listened to me,
all would have been accomplished in a manner congruous with my own
actions. For I was not so pitiful a fool as to give away money, when I
saw others receiving it, in my ambition to serve you, and yet not to
desire what could have been accomplished without expense, and would
have brought far greater benefits to the whole city. I desired it
intensely, men of Athens; but, of course, they had the advantage over
me.
{174} Come now and contemplate the proceedings of Aeschines and those
of Philocrates, by the side of my own; for the comparison will bring
out their character more vividly. Well, they first pronounced the
exclusion from the Peace of the Phocians and the people of Halus, and
of Cersobleptes, contrary to your decree and to the statements made to
you. Then they attempted to tamper with and alter the decree, which we
had come there as ambassadors to execute. Then they entered the
Cardians as allies of Philip and voted against sending the dispatch
which I had written to you, sending in its stead an utterly unsound
dispatch of their own composition. {175} And then the gallant gentleman
asserted that I had promised Philip that I would overthrow your
constitution, because I censured these proceedings, not only from a
sense of their disgracefulness, but also from fear lest through the
fault of these men I might have to share their ruin: while all the time
he was himself having incessant private interviews with Philip. And, to
pass over all besides, Dercylus (not I) watched him through the night
at Pherae, along with my slave who is here present; and as the slave
came out of Philip's tent he took him and bade him report what he had
seen, and remember it himself; and finally, this disgusting and
shameless fellow was left behind with Philip for a night and a day,
when we went away. {176} And to prove that I am speaking the truth, I
will myself give evidence which I have committed to writing,[n] so as
to put myself in the position of a responsible witness; and after that
I call upon each of the other ambassadors, and I will compel them to
choose their alternative--either to give evidence, or to swear that
they have no knowledge of the matter. If they take the latter course, I
shall convict them of perjury beyond doubt.
[_Evidence is read._]
{177} You have seen now by what mischief and trouble I was hampered,
throughout our absence from home. For what must you imagine their
conduct to have been there, with their paymaster close at hand, when
they act as they do before your very eyes, though you have power either
to confer honour or, on the other hand, to inflict punishment upon them?
I wish now to reckon up from the beginning the charges which I have
made, in order to show you that I have done all that I undertook to do
at the beginning of my speech. {178} I have proved that there was no
truth in his report--that, on the contrary, he deceived you--by the
evidence not of words but of the actual course of events. I have proved
that he was the cause of your unwillingness to hear the truth from my
mouth, captivated as you were at the time by his promises and
undertakings; that he gave you advice which was the exact opposite of
that which he ought to have given, opposing the Peace which was
suggested by the allies, and advocating the Peace of Philocrates; that
he wasted time, in order that you might not be able to march to the aid
of the Phocians, even if you wished to do so; and that he has done many
atrocious deeds during his absence from home; for he has betrayed and
sold everything, he has taken bribes, and has left no form of rascality
untried. These are the points which I promised at the outset to prove,
and I have proved them. {179} Observe, then, what follows; for what I
have now to say to you has already become a simple matter. You have
sworn that you will vote according to the laws and the decrees of the
people and the Council of Five Hundred. The defendant is proved, in all
his conduct as ambassador, to have acted in contravention of the laws,
of the decrees, and of justice. He ought, therefore, to be convicted in
any court composed of rational men. Even if there were no other crimes
at his door, two of his actions are sufficient to slay him; for he
betrayed to Philip not only the Phocians but also Thrace. {180} Two
places in the whole world of greater value to Athens than Thermopylae
on land, and the Hellespont over sea, could not possibly be found; and
both these places these men have shamefully sold, and placed in
Philip's hands to be used against you. The enormity of this crime
alone--the sacrifice of Thrace and the Walls--apart from all the rest,
might be proved in countless ways,[n] and it is easy to point out how
many men have been executed or fined vast sums of money by you for such
offences--Ergophilus,[n] Cephisodotus,[n] Timomachus,[n] Ergocles[n]
long ago, Dionysius, and others; all of whom together, I may almost
say, have done the city less harm than the defendant. {181} But in
those days, men of Athens, you still guarded against danger by
calculation and forethought; whereas now you overlook any danger which
does not annoy you from day to day, or cause you pain by its immediate
presence, and then pass such resolutions here as 'that Philip shall
take the oath in favour of Cersobleptes also,' 'that we will not take
part in the proceedings of the Amphictyons,' 'that we must amend the
Peace.' But none of these resolutions would have been required, had
Aeschines then been ready to sail and to do what was required. As it
is, by urging us to go by land, he has lost all that we could have
saved by sailing; and by lying, all that could have been saved by
speaking the truth.
{182} He intends, I am told, to express immediately his indignation
that he alone of all the speakers in the Assembly should have to render
an account of his words. I will not urge that all speakers would
reasonably be called upon to render such an account, if any of their
words were spoken for money; I only say this. If Aeschines in his
private capacity has spoken wildly on some occasion or committed some
blunder, do not be over-strict with him, but let it pass and grant him
pardon: but if as your ambassador he has deliberately deceived you for
money, then do not let him go, or tolerate the plea that he ought not
to be called to account for what he _said_. {183} Why, for what, if not
for his words, is an ambassador to be brought to justice? Ambassadors
have no control over ships or places or soldiers or citadels--no one
puts such things in their hands--but over words and times. As regards
times, if he did not cause the times of the city's opportunities to be
lost, he is not guilty; but if he did so, he has committed crime. And
as to his words, if the words of his report were true or expedient, let
him escape; but if they were at once false, venal, and disastrous, let
him be convicted. {184} No greater wrong can a man do you, than is done
by lying speeches. For where government is based upon speeches, how can
it be carried on in security, if the speeches are not true? and if, in
particular, a speaker takes bribes and speaks to further the interests
of the enemy, how can you escape real danger? For to rob you of your
opportunities is not the same thing as to rob an oligarchy or a tyrant.
Far from it. {185} Under such governments, I imagine, everything is
done promptly at a word of command. But with you the Council must first
hear about everything, and pass its preliminary resolution--and even
that not at any time, but only when notice has been given of the
reception of heralds and embassies: then you must convoke an Assembly,
and that only when the time comes for one, as ordained by law: then
those who speak for your true good have to master and overcome those
who, through ignorance or wickedness, oppose them. {186} Besides all
this, even when a measure is resolved upon, and its advantages are
already plain, time must be granted to the impecuniosity of the
majority, in which they may procure whatever means they require in
order to be able to carry out what has been resolved. And so he who
causes times so critical to be lost, in a state constituted as ours is,
has not caused you to lose times, but has robbed you absolutely of the
realization of your aims.
{187} Now all those who are anxious to deceive you are very ready with
such expressions as 'disturbers of the city,' 'men who prevent Philip
from conferring benefits on the city.' In reply to these, I will use no
argument, but will read you Philip's letters, and will remind you of
the occasion on which each piece of deception took place, that you may
know that Philip has got beyond this exaggerated title of
'benefactor',[n] of which we are so sickened, in his attempts to take
you in by it.
[_Philip's letters are read._]
{188} Now although his work as ambassador has been so shameful, so
detrimental to you in many--nay, in all points, he goes about asking
people what they think of Demosthenes, who prosecutes his own
colleagues. I prosecute you indeed, whether I would or no, because
throughout our entire absence from home you plotted against me as I
have said, and because now I have the choice of only two alternatives:
either I must appear to share with you the responsibility for such work
as yours, or I must prosecute you. {189} Nay, I deny that I was ever
your colleague in the Embassy. I say that your work as ambassador was
an atrocious work, while my own was for the true good of those present
here. It is Philocrates that has been your colleague, as you have been
his, and Phrynon. For your policy was the same as theirs, and you all
approved of the same objects. But 'where are the salt, the table, the
libations that we shared?' So he asks everywhere in his theatrical
style--as though it were not the criminals, but the upright, that were
false to such pledges! {190} I am certain that though all the Prytanes
offer their common sacrifice on each occasion, and join one with
another in their meal and their libation, the good do not on this
account copy the bad; but if they detect one of their own number in
crime they report the fact to the Council and the people. In the very
same way the Council offers its inaugural sacrifice and feasts
together, and joins in libations and sacred rites. So do the generals,
and, one may practically say, every body of magistrates. Does that mean
that they grant an indemnity to any of their number who is guilty of
crime? Very far from it. {191} Leon accuses Timagoras,[n] after being
his fellow ambassador for four years: Eubulus accuses Tharrex and
Smicythus, after sharing the banquet with them: the great Conon, the
elder, prosecuted Adeimantus,[n] though they were generals together.
Which sinned against the salt and the libation, Aeschines--the traitors
and the faithless ambassadors and the hirelings, or their accusers?
Plainly those who violated, as you have done, the sanctity, not of
private libations, but of libations poured in the name of the whole
country.
{192} That you may realize that these men have been the most worthless
and wicked not only of all who have ever gone to Philip in a public
capacity, but even of those who have gone as private persons, and
indeed of all mankind, I ask you to listen to me while I describe
briefly an incident which falls outside the story of this Embassy. When
Philip took Olynthus he celebrated Olympian games, and gathered
together all the artists to the sacrifice and the festal gathering.
{193} And while he was entertaining them at a banquet, and crowning the
victors, he asked Satyrus, the well-known comic actor, why he alone
requested no favour of him. Did he see any meanness in him, or any
dislike towards himself? Satyrus answered (so the story goes) that he
happened to stand in no need of the things for which the rest were
asking, but that the boon which he would like to ask was a favour which
it would be very easy indeed for Philip to bestow; only he was afraid
that he might fail to obtain it. {194} Philip bade him name his
request, declaring with some spirit that there was nothing that he
would not do for him. Satyrus is then said to have stated that
Apollophanes of Pydna was formerly his friend and guest-friend,[n] and
that when he had perished by a treacherous assassination, his kinsman
had, in alarm, conveyed his daughters, then little children, to
Olynthus secretly. 'These girls,' said Satyrus, 'have been taken
prisoners at the capture of the city; they are with you, and they are
now of marriageable age. {195} It is these girls that I beg and entreat
you to give to me. But I should like you to hear and understand what
sort of present you will be giving me, if you really give it. I shall
gain nothing by receiving it: I shall give them in marriage, and a
dowry with them, and shall not allow them to suffer anything unworthy
of us or of their father.' When those who were present at the feast
heard this, there was such applause and cheering and approbation on all
hands, that Philip was moved and granted the request, although the
Apollophanes who was spoken of was one of the murderers of Alexander,
Philip's brother. {196} Now let us examine side by side with this
banquet of Satyrus, that in which these men took part in Macedonia.
Observe what likeness and resemblance there is between the two! For
these men were invited to the house of Xenophron, the son of Phaedimus,
who was one of the Thirty,[n] and went. I did not go. But when it came
to the time for wine, he brought in an Olynthian woman--good-looking,
but well-bred and modest, as the event proved. {197} At first, I
believe (according to the account which Iatrocles gave me the next
day), they only forced her to drink a little wine quietly and to eat
some dessert; but as the feast proceeded and they waxed warm, they bade
her recline and even sing a song. And when the poor creature, who was
in great distress, neither would nor could do as they bade her,
Aeschines and Phrynon declared that it was an insult and quite
intolerable, that a captive woman--one of those god-forsaken devils the
Olynthians--should give herself airs. 'Call a slave,' they cried, 'and
let some one bring a strap.' A servant came with a lash; they had been
drinking, I imagine, and were easily annoyed; and as soon as she said
something and burst into tears, the servant tore open her dress and
gave her a number of cuts across the back. {198} Beside herself with
the pain and the sense of her position, the woman leaped up and fell
before the knees of Iatrocles, overturning the table as she did so. And
had he not rescued her, she would have perished as the victim of a
drunken debauch; for the drunkenness of this abominable creature is
something horrible.[n] The case of this woman was also mentioned in
Arcadia before the Ten Thousand, and Diophantus reported to you what I
shall now force him to testify; for the matter was much talked of in
Thessaly and everywhere.
{199} Yet with all this on his conscience this unclean creature will
dare to look you in the face, and will very soon be speaking to you of
the life he has lived, in that magnificent voice of his. It chokes me
to hear him! Does not the jury know how at first you used to read over
the books to your mother at her initiations,[n] and wallow amid bands
of drunken men at their orgies, while still a boy? {200} and how you
were afterwards under-clerk to the magistrates, and played the rogue
for two or three drachmae?[n] and how at last, in recent days, you
thought yourself lucky to get a parasitic living in the training-rooms
of others, as a third-rate actor? What then is the life of which you
propose to speak? Where have you lived it? For the life which you have
really lived has been what I have described. And how much does he take
upon himself! He brought another man to trial here for unnatural
offences! But I leave this point for the moment. (_To the clerk._)
First, read me these depositions.
[_The depositions are read._]
{201} So many, then, and so gross, gentlemen of the jury, being the
crimes against you of which he stands convicted--and what wickedness do
they not include? he is corrupt, he is a minion, he is under the curse,
a liar, a betrayer of his own people; all the most heinous offences are
there--he will not defend himself against a single one of these
charges, and will have no defence to offer that is either just or
straightforward. But the statement which, I am told, he intends to
make, borders on madness; though perhaps a man who has no other plea to
offer must contrive anything that he can. {202} For I hear that he is
to say that I, forsooth, have been a partner in everything of which I
accuse him; that at first I used to approve of his policy and to act
with him; and that I have suddenly changed my mind and become his
accuser. As a defence of his conduct such assertions are, of course,
neither legitimate nor to the point, though they do imply some kind of
charge against myself; for, of course, if I have acted thus, I am a
worthless person. But the conduct itself is no better for that. Far
from it! {203} At the same time, I think it is proper for me to prove
to you both the points in question--first, that if he makes such an
assertion he will be lying; and secondly, what is the just line of
defence. Now a just and straightforward defence must show either that
the acts charged against him were not committed, or that having been
committed, they are to the advantage of the city. {204} But Aeschines
cannot do either of these things. For I presume that it is not possible
for him to say that it is to the advantage of the city that the
Phocians have been ruined, that Thermopylae is in Philip's hands, that
Thebes is powerful, that there are soldiers in Euboea and plotting
against Megara, and that the Peace should not have been sworn to,[n]
when on the former occasion he announced the very contrary of all these
things to you in the guise of advantages, and advantages about to be
realized? Nor will he be able to persuade you that these things have
not been done, when you yourselves have seen them and know the facts
well. {205} It remains for me, therefore, to show you that I have had
no share in any of their proceedings. Shall I then dismiss everything
else from consideration--all that I have said against them in your
presence, all my collisions with them during our absence, all my
antagonism to them from first to last--and produce my opponents
themselves as witnesses to the fact that my conduct and theirs have
been absolutely contrary the one to the other--that they have taken
money to your detriment, and that I refused to receive it? Then mark
what I say.
{206} Who, would you say, was of all men in Athens the most offensive,
most overflowing with effrontery and contemptuousness? I am sure that
none of you, even by mistake, would name any other than Philocrates.
And who, would you say, possessed the loudest voice and could enunciate
whatever he pleased most clearly? Aeschines the defendant, I am sure.
Who is it then that these men describe as cowardly and timid before a
crowd, while I call him cautious? It is myself; for I have never
annoyed you or forced myself upon you against your will. {207} Now at
every meeting of the Assembly, as often as a discussion has arisen upon
these subjects, you hear me accusing and convicting these men,
declaring explicitly that they have taken money and have sold all the
interests of the city. And not one of them has ever to this day
contradicted the statement, when he heard it, or opened his mouth, or
shown himself. {208} What then is the reason, why the most offensive
men in the city, the men with the loudest voices, are so cowed before
me, the timidest of men, whose voice is no louder than any other? It is
because Truth is strong; while to them, on the other hand, the
consciousness of having sold public interests is a source of weakness.
It is this that steals away the boldness of these men, this that binds
down their tongues and stops their mouths--chokes them, and makes them
silent. {209} You remember, of course, how at the recent meeting in the
Peiraeus, when you would not have him for your representative,[n] he
was shouting that he would impeach me and indict me, and crying, 'Oh!
Oh!' But such steps are the beginning of long and numerous trials and
speeches; whereas the alternative was but to utter perhaps two or three
words, which even a slave purchased yesterday could have
pronounced--'Men of Athens, this is utterly atrocious. Demosthenes is
accusing me here of crimes in which he himself was a partner; he says
that I have taken money, when he has taken money, or shared it,
himself.' {210} But no such words, no such sound, did he utter, nor did
one of you hear him do so; he only uttered threats to a different
effect. And why? Because he knew that he had done what he was charged
with doing; he was abjectly afraid to use any such expressions; his
resolution could not rise to them, but shrank back; for it was in the
grip of his conscience; whereas there was nothing to hinder him from
uttering irrelevant abuse and slander. {211} But here is the strongest
proof of all, and it consists not in words, but in fact. For when I was
anxious to do what it was right to do, namely, to make a second report
to you, after serving a second time as ambassador, Aeschines came
before the Board of Auditors with a number of witnesses, and forbade
them to call me before the court, since I had rendered my account
already, and was no longer liable to give it. The incident was
extremely ridiculous. And what was the meaning of it? He had made his
report with reference to the First Embassy, against which no one
brought any charge, and did not wish to go before the court again with
regard to the Second Embassy, with reference to which he now appears
before you, and within which all his crimes fell. {212} But if I came
before you twice, it became necessary for him also to appear again; and
so he tried to prevent them from summoning me. But this action of his,
men of Athens, plainly proves to you two things--first, that he had so
condemned himself that none of you can now acquit him without impiety;
and secondly, that he will not speak a word of truth about me. Had he
anything true to assert, he would have been found asserting it and
accusing me then; he would certainly not have tried to prevent my being
summoned. {213} To prove the truth of what I say, (_to the clerk_) call
me the witnesses to the facts.
But further, if he makes slanderous statements against me which have
nothing to do with the Embassy, there are many good reasons for your
refusing to listen to him. For I am not on my trial to-day, and when I
have finished my speech I have no further time allotted to me.[n] What
can such statements mean, except that he is bankrupt of legitimate
arguments? For who that was on his trial and had any defence to make,
would prefer to accuse another? {214} And consider also this further
point, gentlemen of the jury. If I were on my trial, with the defendant
Aeschines for accuser and Philip for judge; and if, being unable to
disprove my guilt, I abused Aeschines and tried to sully his character,
do you not think that Philip would be indignant at the very fact of a
man abusing _his_ benefactors in his own presence? Do not _you_ then
prove worse than Philip; but force Aeschines to defend himself against
the charges which are the subject of the trial. (_To the clerk._) Read
the deposition.
[_The deposition is read._]
{215} So for my part, because I had nothing on my conscience, I felt it
my duty to render an account and submit all the information that the
laws required, while the defendant took the opposite view. How then can
his conduct and mine have been the same? or how can he possibly assert
against me now things of which he has never even accused me before? It
is surely impossible. And yet he will assert these things, and, Heaven
knows, it is natural enough. For you doubtless know well that ever
since the human race began and trials were instituted, no one was ever
convicted admitting his crime: they brazen it out, they deny it, they
lie, they make up excuses, they take every means to escape paying the
penalty. {216} _You_ must not let any of these devices mislead you
to-day; your judgement must be given upon the facts, in the light of
your own knowledge; you must not attend to words, whether mine or his,
still less to the witnesses whom he will have ready to testify
anything, since he has Philip to pay his expenses--you will see how
glibly they will give evidence for him; nor must you care whether his
voice is fine and loud, or whether mine is poor. {217} For it is no
trial of orators or of speeches that you have to hold to-day, if you
are wise men. You have rather, in the name of a cause shamefully and
terribly ruined, to thrust off the present disgrace on to the shoulders
of the guilty, after a scrutiny of those results which are known to you
all. {218} And these results, which you know and do not require us to
tell you of--what are they? If the consequences of the Peace have been
all that they promised you; if you admit that you were so filled with
an unmanly cowardice, that, though the enemy was not in your land,
though you were not blockaded by sea, though your city was menaced by
no other danger whatever, though, on the contrary, the price of corn
was low and you were in other respects as well off as you are to-day,
{219} though you knew beforehand on the information of these men that
your allies were about to be ruined and Thebes to become powerful, that
Philip was about to occupy the Thracian strongholds and to establish a
basis of operations against you in Euboea, and that all that has now
happened was about to come to pass, you nevertheless made peace
cheerfully;--if that is so, then acquit Aeschines, and do not add
perjury to all your disgrace. For in that case he is guilty of no crime
against you; it is I that am mad and brainsick to accuse him now. {220}
But if what they told you was altogether the reverse of this, if it was
a tale of great generosity--of Philip's love for Athens, of his
intention to save the Phocians, to check the insolence of the Thebans,
and beside all this (if he obtained the Peace) to confer on you
benefits that would more than compensate for Amphipolis, and to restore
to you Euboea and Oropus; if, I say, they stated and promised all this,
and have now totally deceived and cheated you, and have all but robbed
you of Attica itself, then condemn him, and do not, in addition to all
the outrages--I know not what other word to use--that you have
suffered, carry with you to your homes, through upholding their
corruption, the curse and the guilt of perjury.
{221} Again, gentlemen of the jury, ask yourselves what reason I could
have had for choosing to accuse these men, if they had done no wrong?
You will find none. Is it pleasant to have many enemies? Pleasant? It
is not even safe. Was there any quarrel between me and Aeschines? None.
What then? 'You were afraid for yourself, and in your cowardice thought
to save yourself this way:' for that, I have heard, is what he says.
What? I was afraid, when, according to your own statement, there was
nothing to be afraid of, and no crime had been committed? If he repeats
such an assertion, men of Athens, consider[n] what these men
themselves, the actual criminals, ought to suffer for their offences,
if I, who am absolutely guiltless, was afraid of being ruined owing to
them. {222} But what is my motive for accusing you? I am an informer,
of course, and want to get money out of you![n] And which was the
easier course for me--to get money out of Philip, who offered a large
sum--to get as much as any of these men, and to have not only Philip
for my friend, but also my opponents (for they would assuredly have
been friends, had I been partner with them, since even now they have no
inherited quarrel against me, but only the fact that I refused to join
in their actions); or to beg them for a share of their gains, and be
regarded with hostility both by Philip and by them? Is it likely that
when I was ransoming the prisoners at such cost to myself, I should ask
to receive a paltry sum from these men, in a disgraceful manner and
with their enmity accompanying it? {223} Impossible! My report was
true. I abstained from taking money for the sake of justice and truth
and my own future. For I thought, as others among you have thought,
that my own uprightness would receive its reward, and that I must not
barter my ambition to stand well with you for gain of any kind. And I
abhor these men, because I saw that they were vile and impious in the
conduct of their mission, and because I have been robbed of the objects
of my own ambition, owing to their corruption, now that you have come
to be vexed with the Embassy as a whole. And it is because I foresee
what must happen that I now accuse him, and appear to challenge his
report; for I would have it decided here, in a trial before a jury,
that my conduct has been the opposite of his. {224} And I am
afraid--afraid, I say, for I will speak all my mind to you--that though
when the time comes you may drag me in spite of my entire innocence to
the same ruin with them, you are now utterly supine. For, men of
Athens, you appear to me to be altogether unstrung, waiting to suffer
the horrors which others are suffering before your eyes, and taking no
precautions, no thought for the city, which for so long has been
exposed to destruction in many a dreadful form. {225} Is it not, think
you, dreadful and preternatural? For even where I had resolved upon
silence, I am driven to speak. You doubtless know Pythocles here, the
son of Pythodorus. I had been on very kindly terms with him, and to
this day there has been no unpleasantness between us. He avoids me now,
when he meets me--ever since he visited Philip--and if he is obliged to
encounter me anywhere, he starts away immediately, lest any one should
see him talking with me. But with Aeschines he walks all round the
marketplace, discussing their plans. {226} Now is it not a terrible and
shocking thing, men of Athens, that those who have made it their choice
to foster Philip's interests should be able to rely upon so accurate a
discrimination on Philip's part, that all that any one of them does
here can no more be hid from Philip (so they believe) than if he were
standing by their side, and that his friends and foes alike are those
that Philip chooses; while those whose life is lived for _your_ good,
who are greedy of honour at _your_ hands, and have not betrayed you,
should be met by such deafness, such blindness, on your part, that
to-day I have to wrestle with these devils incarnate on equal terms,
and that before you, who know the whole truth? {227} Would you know or
hear the cause of these things? I will tell you, and I beg that none of
you be angry with me for speaking the truth. It is, I imagine, that
Philip has but one body and one soul, and it is with all his heart that
he cherishes those who do him good and detests those who do him evil:
whereas each of you, in the first place, has no feeling that the good
or the evil which is being done to the city, is being done to himself;
{228} other feelings are of more consequence, and often lead you
astray--pity, envy, anger, favour towards the suppliant, and an
infinite number of other motives: while if a man has actually escaped
all these, he will still not escape from those who do not want such a
man to exist at all. And so the error due to each of these single
causes steals on little by little, till the state is exposed to the
whole accumulated mischief.
{229} Do not fall victims to any such error to-day, men of Athens: do
not let the defendant go, when he has done you all this wrong. For
honestly, if you let him go, what will be said of you? 'Certain men,'
it will be said, 'went as ambassadors to Philip yonder--Philocrates,
Aeschines, Phrynon, and Demosthenes; and, what happened? One of them
not only gained nothing by his mission, but ransomed the prisoners at
his private expense; another, with the money for which he sold the
interests of his country, went about purchasing harlots and fish. {230}
One of them, the abominable Phrynon, sent his son to Philip before he
had registered him as an adult; the other did nothing unworthy of
himself or his city. One, though serving as choregus and trierarch,[n]
felt it his duty voluntarily to incur that further expense [to ransom
the prisoners] rather than see any of his fellow citizens suffering
misfortune for want of means; the other, so far from rescuing any of
those who were already in captivity, joined in bringing a whole
district, and more than 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry with them,
the forces of the actual allies of his country, into captivity to
Philip. What followed? {231} When the Athenians got them into their
hands (for they had long known the truth) what did they do? They let go
the men who had received bribes and had disgraced themselves, and their
city, and their children; they thought that these were wise men, and
that all was well[n] with the city; and as for their accuser, they
thought him thunderstruck--a man who did not understand his country,
and did not know where to fling his money away.' {232} And who, men of
Athens, with this example before his eyes, will be willing to offer you
his honest service? who will act as ambassador for nothing, if he is
not only to gain nothing by it, but is not to be more trustworthy in
your eyes than those who have taken money? You are not only trying
these men to-day, but you are laying down a law for all future time--a
law which will declare whether your ambassadors are to serve the enemy
for a price, or to act disinterestedly for your true good and to take
no bribe? {233} On all the other points you require no evidence; but to
prove that Phrynon sent his son, (_to the clerk_) call me the witnesses
to the facts.
Aeschines then did not prosecute Phrynon, for sending his own son to
Philip for a disgraceful purpose. But because a man, who in his youth
was above the average in appearance, did not foresee the suspicion
which his good looks might entail, and afterwards lived a somewhat fast
life, he has prosecuted him for unnatural offences.
{234} Now let me speak of the banquet and the decree; for I had almost
overlooked what I was especially bound to tell you. In drawing up the
resolution of the Council with reference to the First Embassy, and
again in addressing the people, at the assemblies in which you were to
discuss the question of peace, not a single word or act of a criminal
nature on the part of these men having so far come to light, I followed
the ordinary custom, and proposed to accord them a vote of thanks, and
to invite them to the Town Hall. {235} And I did, of course, entertain
Philip's ambassadors as well, and on a very splendid scale, men of
Athens. For when I saw that in their own country they prided themselves
even on things like these, as showing their prosperity and splendour, I
thought that I must begin by outdoing them in this respect, and
displaying even greater magnificence. These incidents Aeschines will
shortly bring forward to prove that 'Demosthenes himself voted thanks
to us, and gave a banquet to the ambassadors', without telling you the
precise time when the incidents occurred. {236} For these things belong
to a time before any injury had been done to the city, and before it
was evident that they had sold themselves. The ambassadors had only
just arrived on their first visit; the people had still to hear what
they proposed; and there was nothing as yet to show that Aeschines
would support Philocrates, or that Philocrates would make such
proposals as he did. If, then, Aeschines uses any such argument,
remember that the dates of the incidents are earlier than those of his
crimes. But since then there has been no friendliness between myself
and them, and no common action. (_To the clerk._) Read the deposition.
[_The deposition is read._]
{237} Now perhaps his brother Philochares will support him, and
Aphobetus. There is much that you may fairly urge in reply to both; and
I am obliged, men of Athens, to speak to you quite freely and without
any reserve. You, Philochares, are a painter of vase-cases and drums;
your brothers are under-clerks and quite ordinary men--not that there
is any harm in these things, but at the same time they do not qualify a
man to be a general.[n] And yet, Aphobetus and Philochares, we thought
you worthy to be ambassadors and generals, and to receive the highest
honours; {238} so that even if none of you were guilty of any crime, we
should owe no gratitude to you; you would rather owe gratitude to us
for your preferment. For we passed by many others, more deserving of
such honours than you were, and exalted you instead. But if in the
enjoyment of these very honours one of you has actually committed
crimes, and crimes of such a nature, how much more deserving are you of
execration than of acquittal? Much more, I am sure. Perhaps they will
force their claims upon you, for they are loud-voiced and shameless,
and they have taken to themselves the motto that 'it is pardonable for
brother to help brother'. {239} But you must not give way. Remember
that if it is right for them to think of Aeschines, it is for you to
think of the laws and the whole State, and, above all, of the oath
which you yourselves, who sit here, have taken. Yes, and if they have
entreated some of you to save the defendant, then ask yourselves
whether you are to save him if he is proved innocent of crime, or even
if he is proved guilty. If they ask you to do so, should he be
innocent, I too say that you must acquit him. But if you are asked to
acquit him, whatever he has done, then they have asked you to commit
perjury. For though your vote is secret, it will not be hidden from the
gods; and the framer of our law [which enjoins secret voting] was
absolutely right, when he saw that though none of these men will know
which of you has granted his request, the gods will know, and the
unseen powers, who has given the unjust vote. {240} And it is better
for a man to lay up, for his children and himself, those good hopes
which _they_ can bestow, by giving the decision that is just and right,
than to win credit from these men for a favour of whose reality they
can have no certain knowledge, and to acquit the defendant, when his
own testimony condemns him. For what stronger testimony can I produce,
Aeschines, to prove how terrible your work as ambassador has been, than
your own testimony against yourself? For when you thought it necessary
to involve in so great and dreadful a calamity one who wished to reveal
some of your actions as ambassador, it is plain that you expected your
own punishment to be a terrible one, if your countrymen learned what
you had done.
{241} That step, if you are wise, he will prove to have taken to his
own detriment; not only because it is an overwhelming proof of the
nature of his conduct as ambassador, but also because of those
expressions which he used in the course of the prosecution, and which
are now at our disposal against himself. For the principles of justice,
as defined by you when you were prosecuting Timarchus, must, I presume,
be no less valid when used by others against yourself. {242} His words
to the jury on that occasion were these. 'Demosthenes intends to defend
Timarchus, and to denounce my acts as ambassador. And then, when he has
led you off the point by his speech, he will brag of it, and go about
saying, "Well? what do you think?[2] Why I led the jury right away from
the point, and stole the case triumphantly out of their hands."' Then
you at least must not act thus, but must make your defence with
reference to the real points of your case, though, when you were
prosecuting Timarchus on that occasion, you permitted yourself to make
any charges and assertions that you chose.
{243} But there were verses too, which you recited before the jury, in
your inability to produce any witness to the charges on which you were
prosecuting Timarchus:--
Rumour, the voice of many folk, not all
Doth die, for Rumour too a goddess is.[3]
Well, Aeschines, all those who are present say that you have made money
out of your mission; and so it holds true against you, I suppose, that
'Rumour, the voice of many folk, not all doth die'. {244} For observe
how easily you can ascertain how much larger a body of accusers appears
in your case than in his. Timarchus was not known even to all his
neighbors; while there is not a man, Hellene or foreigner, but says
that you and your fellow ambassadors made money out of your mission.
And so, if the rumour is true, then the rumour which is the voice of
many folk is against you; and you have yourself laid down that such a
rumour is to be believed, that 'Rumour too a goddess is', and that the
poet who composed these lines was a wise man.
{245} Then, you remember, he collected some iambic verses, and recited
the whole passage; for instance:--
Whoso in evil company delights
Of him I ne'er enquired, for well I trow,
As is his company, such is the man.[3]
And 'when a man goes to the cockpit[n] and walks about with
Pittalacus'--he added more to the same effect--'surely,' said he, 'you
know what to think of him.' Well, Aeschines, these same verses will now
exactly serve my turn against you, and if I quote them to the jury, the
quotation will be true and apposite. 'But whoso in the company
delights' of Philocrates, and that when he is an ambassador, 'Of him I
ne'er enquired, for well I trow' that he has taken money, as did
Philocrates who does not deny it.
{246} He attempts to insult others by labelling them hack-writers[n]
and sophists. He shall himself be proved liable to these very
imputations. The verses he quoted are derived from the _Phoenix_ of
Euripides--a play which has never to this day been acted either by
Theodorus or Aristodemus, the actors under whom Aeschines always played
third-rate parts, though it was performed by Molon, and no doubt by
other actors of former times. But the _Antigone_ of Sophocles has often
been acted by Theodorus and often by Aristodemus; and in this play
there are some admirable and instructive verses, which he must know
quite well by heart, since he has often delivered them himself, but
which he has omitted to quote. {247} For you know, I am sure, that in
every tragedy it is, as it were, the special privilege of third-rate
actors to play in the rôle of tyrants and sceptred kings. Consider,
then, these excellent lines, placed by the poet in the mouth of our
Creon-Aeschines in this play--lines which he neither repeated to
himself to guide him as an ambassador, nor yet quoted to the jury. (_To
the clerk._) Read the passage.
_Verses from the 'Antigone' of Sophocles._
To learn aright the soul and heart and mind
Of any man--for that, device is none,
Till he be proved in government and law,
And so revealed. For he who guides the State,
Yet cleaves not in his counsels to the best,
But from some fear in prison locks his tongue,
Is in mine eyes, as he hath ever been,
Vilest of men. And him, who sets his friend
Before his land, I count of no esteem.
For I--be it known to God's all-viewing eye--
Would ne'er keep silence, seeing the march of doom
Upon this city--doom in safety's stead,
Nor ever take to me as mine own friend
My country's foe.' For this I know, that she,
Our country, is the ship that bears us safe,
And safe aboard her, while she sails erect,
We make good friends.
{248} None of these lines did Aeschines ever repeat to himself during
his mission. Instead of preferring his country he thought that to be
friend and guest-friend of Philip was much more important and
profitable for himself, and bade a long farewell to the wise Sophocles.
He saw the 'march of doom' draw near, in the campaign against the
Phocians; but he gave no warning, no announcement of what was to come.
On the contrary, he helped to conceal it, he helped to carry out the
doom, he prevented those who would have given warning--{249} not
remembering that 'Our country is the ship that bears us safe, and safe
aboard her' his mother with the help of her initiations and
purifications and the property of the clients, on whom she lived,
reared up these sons of hers to their destined greatness;[n] while his
father, who kept an elementary school, as I am told by my elders, near
the temple of the Hero-Physician,[n] made a living, such as he could
indeed, but still on the same ship. The sons, who had received money as
under-clerks and servants in all the magistrates' offices, were finally
elected clerks by you, and for two years continued to get their living
in the Round Chamber;[n] and Aeschines was just now dispatched as your
ambassador--from this same ship. He regarded none of these things.
{250} He took no care that the ship should sail erect. Nay, he capsized
her; he sank the ship; he did all that he could to bring her into the
power of the enemy. What then? Are you not a sophist? Aye, and a
villanous one. Are you not a hack? Aye, and one detested of Heaven--for
you passed over the scene which you had so often performed and knew
well by heart, while you sought out a scene which you had never acted
in your life, and produced the passage in the hope of injuring one of
your fellow citizens.
{251} And now examine his speech about Solon. He told us that the
statue of Solon, with his hand concealed in the drapery of his robe,
was erected as an illustration of the self-restraint of the orators of
that day. (This was in the course of a scurrilous attack upon the
impetuosity of Timarchus.) But the Salaminians tell us that this statue
was erected less than fifty years ago, whereas some two hundred and
forty years have passed between the time of Solon and the present day;
so that not only was the artist, who modelled him in this attitude, not
living in Solon's day, but even his grandfather was not. {252} That
then is what he told the jury, copying the attitude as he did so. But
that which it would have done his country far more good to see--the
soul and the mind of Solon--he did not copy. No, he did the very
reverse. For when Salamis had revolted from Athens and the
death-penalty had been decreed against any one who proposed to attempt
its recovery, Solon, by singing, at the risk of his own life,[n] a lay
which he had composed, won back the island for his country, and wiped
out her disgrace: {253} while Aeschines, when the king and all the
Hellenes had decided that Amphipolis was yours, surrendered and sold
it, and supported Philocrates, who proposed the resolution for this
purpose. It is indeed worth his while (is it not?) to remember Solon!
Nor was he content with acting thus in Athens; for when he had gone to
Macedonia, he did not even mention the name of the place which it was
the object of his mission to secure. This, in fact, he reported to you
himself, in words which doubtless you remember: 'I too had something to
say about Amphipolis; but in order that Demosthenes might have an
opportunity of speaking upon the subject, I left it to him.' {254} Upon
which I came forward and denied that Aeschines had left to me anything
which he was anxious to say to Philip; he would rather have given any
one a share in his lifeblood than in his speech. The truth is, I
imagine, that he had taken money; and as Philip had given him the money
in order that he might not have to restore Amphipolis, he could not
speak in opposition to Philip's case. Now (_to the clerk_) take this
lay of Solon's and read it; and (_to the jury_) then you will know how
Solon used to hate all such men as this.
{255} It is not when you are speaking, Aeschines, but when you are upon
an embassy, that you should keep your hand within your robe. But on the
Embassy you held out your hand, and held it open; you brought shame to
your countrymen: and do you here assume a solemn air and recite in
those practised tones the miserable phrases that you have learned by
heart, and expect to escape the penalty for all your heinous
crimes--even if you do go round with a cap on your head,[n] uttering
abuse against me? (_To the clerk._) Read the verses.
_Solon's Lay._
The Father's voice hath spoken,
Whose word is Destiny,
And the blest Gods have willed it,
The Gods who shall not die;
That ne'er shall the Destroyer
Prevail against our land;
The Dread Sire's valiant Daughter
Guards us with eye and hand.
Yet her own sons, in folly,
Would lay their country low,
For pelf; and in her leaders
An heart of sin doth grow.
For them--their pride's fell offspring--
There waiteth grievous pain;
For sated still, they know not
Their proud lust to contain.
Not theirs, if mirth be with them,
The decent, peaceful feast;
To sin they yield, and sinning
Rejoice in wealth increased.
No hallowed treasure sparing,
Nor people's common store,
This side and that his neighbour
Each robs with havoc sore.
The holy law of Justice
They guard not. Silent she,
Who knows what is and hath been,
Awaits the time to be.
Then cometh she to judgement,
With certain step, tho' slow;
E'en now she smites the city,
And none may 'scape the blow.
To thraldom base she drives us,
From slumber rousing strife,--
Fell war of kin, destroying
The young, the beauteous life.
The foemen of their country
In wicked bands combine,
Fit company; and stricken
The lovely land doth pine.
These are the Wrong, the Mischief,
That pace the earth at home;
But many a beggared exile
To other lands must roam--
Sold, chained in bonds unseemly;
For so to each man's hall
Comes home the People's Sorrow,
And leaps the high fence-wall.
No courtyard door can stay it;
It follows to his side,
Flee tho' he may, and crouching
In inmost chamber hide.
Such warning unto Athens
My spirit bids me sound,
That Lawlessness in cities
Spreads evil all around;
But Lawfulness and Order
Make all things good and right,
Chaining Sin's hands in fetters,
Quenching the proud soul's light,
Smoothing the rough, the sated
Staying, and withering
The flowers, that, fraught with ruin,
From fatal seed upspring.
The paths of crooked justice
Are turned into straight;
The ways of Pride grow gentle,
The ways of Strife and Hate;
Then baleful Faction ceases,
Then Health prevails alway,
And Wisdom still increases,
Beneath Law's wholesome sway.
{256} You hear, men of Athens, how Solon speaks of men like these, and
of the gods, who, he says, preserve the city. It is my belief and my
hope that this saying of his, that the gods preserve our city, is true
at all times; but I believe that all that has happened in connexion
with the present examination is, in a sense, a special proof of the
goodwill of some unseen power towards the city. {257} Consider what has
happened. A man who as ambassador did a work of great wickedness, and
has surrendered countries in which the gods should have been worshipped
by yourselves and your allies, has disfranchised one who accepted the
challenge[n] to prosecute him. To what end? To the end that he himself
might meet with no pity or mercy for his own iniquities. Nay, more;
while prosecuting his victim he deliberately set himself to speak evil
of me; and again, before the People, he threatened to enter an
indictment against me, and said more to the same effect. And to what
end? To the end that I, who had the most perfect knowledge of all his
acts of villany, and had followed them closely throughout, might have
your full indulgence in prosecuting him. {258} Aye, and through
postponing his appearance before you continually up to the present
moment, he has been insensibly brought to a time when, on account of
what is coming upon us, if for no other reason, it is neither possible
nor safe for you to allow him (after his corruption) to escape
unscathed. For though, men of Athens, you ought always to execrate and
to punish those who are traitors and corrupt, to do so at this time
would be more than ever seasonable, and would confer a benefit upon all
mankind in common. {259} For a disease, men of Athens, an awful disease
has fallen upon Hellas--a disease hard to cope with, and requiring
abundant good fortune, and abundant carefulness on your own part. For
the most notable men in their several cities, the men who claim[n] to
lead in public affairs, are betraying their own liberty--unhappy
men!--and bringing upon themselves a self-chosen servitude, under the
milder names of friendship and companionship with Philip, and other
such phrases; while the other citizens, and the sovereign bodies in
each city, however composed, whose duty it was to punish these men and
slay them out of hand, are so far from taking any such action, that
they admire and envy them, and every one would be glad to be in the
same case. {260} Yet it is from this very cause--it is through
entertaining ambitions like these--that the Thessalians, who up to
yesterday or the day before had lost thereby only their paramount
position[n] and their dignity as a state, are now already being
stripped of their very liberty; for there are Macedonian garrisons in
some of their citadels. This same disease it is which has invaded the
Peloponnese and brought about the massacres in Elis, infecting the
unhappy people of that country with such insanity and frenzy, that in
order to be lords over one another and to gratify Philip, they murder
their kinsmen and fellow citizens. {261} Not even here has the disease
been stayed: it has penetrated Arcadia and turned it upside-down; and
now many of the Arcadians, who should be no less proud of liberty than
yourselves--for you and they alone are indigenous peoples--are
declaring their admiration for Philip, erecting his image in bronze,
and crowning him; and, to complete the tale, they have passed a
resolution that, if he comes to the Peloponnese, they will receive him
within their walls. {262} The Argives have acted in exactly the same
way. These events, I say it in all solemnity and earnestness, call for
no small precautions: for this plague, men of Athens, that is spreading
all around us, has now found its way to Athens itself. While then we
are still safe, ward it off, and take away the citizenship of those who
first introduced it. Beware lest otherwise you realize the worth of the
advice given you this day, only when there is no longer anything that
you can do. {263} Do you not perceive, men of Athens, how vivid and
plain an example has been afforded you by the unhappy Olynthians? The
destruction of those wretched men was due to nothing so much as to
conduct like that of which I speak. You can test this clearly if you
review their history. {264} For at a time when they possessed only 400
cavalry, and numbered not more than 5,000 men in all, since the
Chalcidians were not yet all united under one government, the Spartans
came against them with a large force, including both army and fleet
(for you doubtless remember that at that period the Spartans were
virtually masters both of land and sea); and yet, though this great
force came against them, the Olynthians lost neither the city nor any
single fortress, but won many battles, killed three of the enemy's
commanders, and finally concluded the war on their own terms.[n] {265}
But when some of them began to take bribes, and the people as a whole
were foolish enough, or rather unfortunate enough, to repose greater
confidence in these men than in those who spoke for their own good;
when Lasthenes roofed his house with the timber which came from
Macedonia, and Euthycrates was keeping a large herd of cattle for which
he had paid no one anything; when a third returned with sheep, and a
fourth with horses, while the people, to whose detriment all this was
being done, so far from showing any anger or any disposition to
chastise men who acted so, actually gazed on them with envy, and paid
them honour and regarded them as heroes--{266} when, I say, such
practices were gaining ground in this way, and corruption had been
victorious; then, though they possessed 1,000 cavalry and numbered more
than 10,000 men; though all the surrounding peoples were their allies;
though you went to their assistance with 10,000 mercenaries and 50
ships, and with 4,000 citizen-soldiers as well, none of these things
could save them. Before a year of the war had expired they had lost all
the cities in Chalcidice, while Philip could no longer keep pace with
the invitations of the traitors, and did not know which place to occupy
first. {267} Five hundred horsemen were betrayed by their own
commanders and captured by Philip, with their arms--a larger number
than were ever before captured by any one. And the men who acted thus
were not ashamed to face the sun or the earth--the soil of their native
land--on which they stood, or the temples, or the sepulchres of the
dead, or the disgrace which was bound to follow upon such deeds
afterwards. Such is the madness and distraction which corruption
engenders. So it is for you--for you, the People--to be wise, to refuse
to suffer such things, and to visit them with public chastisement. For
it would be monstrous indeed, if, after the terrible condemnation which
you passed upon those who betrayed the Olynthians, it were seen that
you allowed the criminals who are in your very midst to go unpunished.
(_To the clerk._) Read the decree passed with reference to the
Olynthians.
[_The decree is read._]
{268} This decree, gentlemen of the jury, is one which in the eyes of
all, Hellenes and foreigners alike, it was right and honourable in you
to have passed in condemnation of traitors and men detested of Heaven.
And so, since the taking of the bribe is the step which precedes such
actions, and it is the bribe that prompts the traitor's deeds,
whenever, men of Athens, you find a man receiving a bribe, you must
count him a traitor as well. That one man betrays opportunities, and
another affairs of state, and another soldiers, means only, I imagine,
that each works mischief in the particular department over which he has
control; but there should be no distinction in your execration of all
such men. {269} You, men of Athens, are the only people in the world
who can draw from your own history examples which bear upon this
matter, and who have those ancestors, whom you rightly praise, to
imitate in your actions. You may not be able, at the present time, to
imitate them in the battles, the campaigns, the perils in which they
distinguished themselves, since at the present moment you are at peace;
but at least you can imitate their wisdom. {270} For of wisdom there is
need everywhere; and a right judgement is no more laborious or
troublesome a thing than a wrong one. Each of you need sit here no
longer, in order to judge and vote on the question before him aright,
and so to make his country's position a better one, and worthy of our
ancestors, than he must in order to judge and vote wrongly, and so make
it worse and unworthy of our ancestors. What then were their sentiments
on this matter? (_To the clerk._) Take this, clerk, and read it: (_to
the jury_) for I would have you see that the acts towards which you are
so indifferent are acts for which your forefathers voted death to the
doers. (_To the clerk._) Read.
[_An inscription is read._]
{271} You hear the inscription, men of Athens, declaring that
Arthmius[n] of Zeleia, son of Pythonax, is a foe and a public enemy to
the people of Athens and their allies--both he and all his house. And
why? Because he brought the gold from the foreigner to the Hellenes.
Apparently, therefore, we may judge from this, that your ancestors
sought to ensure that no one, not even a stranger, should work mischief
against Hellas for money; whereas you do not even seek to prevent any
of your fellow citizens from injuring his own city. {272} 'But,' it may
be said, 'the inscription occupies a quite unimportant position.' On
the contrary, although all yonder Acropolis is sacred and there is no
lack of space upon it, this inscription stands on the right hand of the
great bronze statue of Athena, the prize of valour in the war against
the barbarians, set up by the State with funds which the Hellenes had
presented to her. In those days, therefore, uprightness was so sacred,
and such merit was attached to the punishment of actions like these,
that the sentences passed upon such crimes were thought to deserve the
same position as the prize-statue of the goddess. And now, unless you,
in your turn, set a check upon this excess of licence, the result must
be ridicule, impunity, and shame.[5] {273} You would do well, I think,
men of Athens, to imitate your forefathers, not in this or that point
alone, but continuously, and in all that they did. Now I am sure that
you have all heard the story of Callias,[n] the son of Hipponicus, to
whose diplomacy was due the Peace which is universally celebrated, and
which provided that the king should not come down by land within a
day's ride of the sea, nor sail with a ship of war between the
Chelidonian islands and the Cyanean rocks. He was thought to have taken
bribes on his mission; and your forefathers almost put him to death,
and actually fined him, at the examination of his report, a sum of 50
talents. {274} True it is, that no more honourable peace can be
mentioned than this, of all which the city ever made before or
afterwards. But it was not to this that they looked. The nature of the
Peace they attributed to their own prowess and the glory of their city:
but whether the transaction was disinterested or corrupt, depended upon
the character of the ambassador; and they expected the character
displayed by one who took part in public affairs to be upright and
incorruptible. {275} Your ancestors, then, regarded corruption as so
inimical, so unprofitable, to the state, that they would not admit it
in connexion with any single transaction or any single man; while you,
men of Athens, though you have seen that the Peace which has laid low
the walls of your own allies is building the houses of your
ambassadors--that the Peace which has robbed the city of her
possessions has secured for them more than they had ever before hoped
for even in their dreams--you, I say, instead of putting them to death
of your own accord, need a prosecutor to assist you; and when all can
see their crimes in very deed, you are making their trial a trial of
words.
{276} It is not, however, by the citation of ancient history, nor by
these examples alone, that one may stimulate you to vengeance: for even
within the lifetime of yourselves, who are here and still living, many
have paid the penalty. All the rest of these I will pass over; but I
will mention one or two of those who were punished with death, on
returning from a mission whose results have been far less disastrous to
the city than those of the present Embassy. (_To the clerk._) Take then
this decree and read it.
[_The decree is read._]
{277} In this decree, men of Athens, you passed sentence of death upon
those ambassadors, one of whom was Epicrates,[n] a good man, as I am
told by my elders, and one who had in many ways been of service to his
country--one of those who brought the people back from the Peiraeus,[n]
and who was generally an upholder of the democracy. Yet none of these
services helped him, and rightly. For one who claims to manage affairs
of such magnitude has not merely to be half honest; he must not secure
your confidence and then take advantage of it to increase his power to
do mischief; he must do absolutely no wrong against you of his own
will. {278} Now if there is one of the things for which those men were
sentenced to death, that these men have not done, you may put me to
death without delay. Observe what the charges were. 'Since they
conducted their mission,' says the decree,[n] 'contrary to the terms of
the resolution'--that is the first of the charges. And have not these
men contravened the terms of the resolution? Does not the decree speak
of peace 'for the Athenians and the allies of the Athenians?' and did
they not exclude the Phocians from the treaty? Does not the decree bid
them administer the oath to the magistrates in the several cities? and
did they not administer it to men sent to them by Philip? Does not the
resolution forbid them 'to meet Philip anywhere alone?' and did they
not incessantly do business with him privately? {279} Again I read,
'And some of them have been convicted of making a false report before
the Council.' But these men have been convicted of doing so before the
People as well. And convicted by whom? for this is the splendid
thing.[n] Convicted by the actual facts; for all that has happened, as
you know, has been the exact reverse of what they announced. 'And,' the
decree goes on, 'of not sending true dispatches.' Nor did these men.
'And of accusing our allies falsely and taking bribes.' Instead of
'accusing falsely', say, 'of having utterly ruined'--surely a far more
heinous thing than a false accusation. And as for the charge of taking
bribes, if it had been denied, it would still have required proof; but
since they admitted it, a summary procedure was surely the proper one.
{280} What then will you do, men of Athens? You are the offspring of
that generation, and some of you are actually survivors from it; and
will you endure it, that Epicrates, the benefactor of the people, one
of the men from the Peiraeus, should have been exiled and punished;[n]
that Thrasybulus, again, the son of the great Thrasybulus, the People's
friend, who brought the people back from Phyle, should recently have
been fined ten talents; and that the descendant of Harmodius,[n] and of
those who achieved for you the greatest of blessings, and whom, for the
benefits which they conferred upon you, you have caused to share in the
libations and the bowls outpoured, in every temple where sacrifice is
offered, singing of them and honouring them as you honour heroes and
gods--{281} that all these, I say, should have undergone the penalty
ordained by the laws, and that no feeling of compassion or pity, nor
the tears of their children who bore the names of our benefactors, nor
aught else, should have availed them anything: and yet, when you have
to do with the son of Atrometus the schoolmaster, and Glaucothea, who
used to hold those meetings of the initiated, a practice for which
another priestess[n] was put to death--when you have in your hands the
son of such parents, a man who never did a single service to his
country--neither himself, nor his father, nor any of his house--will
you let him go? {282} Where is the horse, the trireme, the military
service, the chorus, the burden undertaken[n] for the state, the
war-contribution, the loyal action, the peril undergone, for which in
all their lifetime the city has had to thank him or his? Aye, and even
if all these stood to his credit, and those other qualifications, of
uprightness and integrity in his mission, were not also to be found in
him, it would surely have been right that he should perish. But when
neither the one nor the other are to be found, will you not avenge
yourselves upon him? {283} Will you not call to mind his own words,
when he was prosecuting Timarchus--that there was no help for a city
which had no sinews to use against the criminal, nor for a constitution
in which compassion and solicitation were more powerful than the
laws--that it was your duty not to pity the aged mother of Timarchus,
nor his children, nor any one else, but to attend solely to one point,
namely, that if you abandoned the cause of the laws and the
constitution, you would look in vain for any to have pity on
yourselves. {284} Is that unhappy man to have lost his rights as a
citizen, because he witnessed the guilt of Aeschines, and will you then
suffer Aeschines to escape unscathed? On what ground can you do so? for
if Aeschines demanded so heavy a penalty from those whose sins were
against their own persons, what must be the magnitude of the penalty
which _you_ should require--you, the sworn judges of the case--from
those who have sinned so greatly against their country's interests, and
of whom Aeschines is convincingly proved to be one? {285} 'But,' we are
told, 'that was a trial which will raise the moral standard of our
young men.' Yes, and this trial will raise that of our statesmen, upon
whose character the supreme interests of the city are staked. For your
care ought to extend to them also. But you must realize that his real
motive for ruining Timarchus himself was not, Heaven knows, to be found
in any anxiety for the virtue of your sons. Indeed, men of Athens, they
are virtuous even now; for I trust that the city will never have fallen
so low, as to need Aphobetus and Aeschines to reform the morals of the
young. {286} No! the reason was that Timarchus had proposed in the
Council, that if any one was convicted of conveying arms or fittings
for ships of war to Philip, the penalty should be death. And here is a
proof. How long had Timarchus been in the habit of addressing you? For
a long time. Now throughout all this time Aeschines was in Athens, and
never showed any vexation or indignation at the fact of such a man
addressing you, until he had been to Macedonia and made himself a
hireling. (_To the clerk._) Come, take the actual decree which
Timarchus proposed, and read it.
[_The decree is read._]
{287} So the man who proposed on your behalf the resolution which
forbade, on pain of death, the supply of arms to Philip during the war,
has been ruined and treated with contumely; while Aeschines, who had
surrendered the arms of your very allies to Philip, was his accuser,
and charged him--I call Heaven and Earth to witness--with unnatural
offences, although two of his own kinsmen stood by his side, the very
sight of whom would call forth a cry of protest from you--the
disgusting Nicias, who went to Egypt and hired himself to Chabrias, and
the accursed Cyrebion,[n] who joins in processions, as a reveller,[n]
without a mask. Nay, why mention these things? His own brother
Aphobetus was there before his eyes! In very truth all the words that
were spoken on that day about unnatural offences were water flowing up
stream.[n]
{288} And now, to show you the dishonour into which the villainy and
mendacity of the defendant have brought our country, passing by all
besides, I will mention a fact known to you all. Formerly, men of
Athens, all the other Hellenes used to watch attentively, to see what
had been resolved in your Assembly; but now we are already going about
and inquiring what others have decided--trying to overhear what the
Arcadians are doing, or the Amphictyons, or where Philip will be next,
and whether he is alive or dead. {289} We do this, do we not? But for
me the terrible question is not whether Philip is alive, but whether in
this city the habit of execrating and punishing criminals is dead.
Philip has no terrors for me, if your own spirit is sound; but the
prospect that you may grant security to those who wish to receive their
wages from him--that they may be supported by some of those whom you
have trusted, and that those who have all along denied that they were
acting in Philip's interests may now mount the platform in their
defence--that is the prospect which terrifies me. {290} Tell me,
Eubulus, why it was, that at the recent trial of your cousin
Hegesilaus,[n] and of Thrasybulus, the uncle of Niceratus, when the
primary question[n] was before the jury, you would not even respond
when they called upon you; and that when you rose to speak on the
assessment of the penalty,[n] you uttered not a word in their defence,
but only asked the jury to be indulgent to you? Do you refuse to ascend
the platform in defence of kinsmen and relations, {291} and will you
then do so in defence of Aeschines, who, when Aristophon was
prosecuting Philonicus, and in accusing him was denouncing your own
acts, joined with him in accusing you, and was found in the ranks of
your enemies? You frightened your countrymen here by saying that they
must either march down to the Peiraeus at once, and pay the war-tax,
and convert the festival-fund into a war-fund, or else pass the decree
advocated by Aeschines and proposed by the shameless Philocrates--{292}
a decree, of which the result was that the Peace became a disgraceful
instead of a fair one, and that these men have ruined everything by
their crimes: and have you, after all this, become reconciled to him?
You uttered imprecations upon Philip, in the presence of the people,
and swore by the life of your children that you would be glad if
perdition seized him; and will you now come to the aid of Aeschines?
How can perdition seize Philip, when you are trying to save those who
take bribes from him? {293} Why is it that you prosecuted Moerocles for
misappropriating 20 drachmae out of the sums paid by each of the
lessees of the mines, and indicted Ctesiphon for the theft of sacred
moneys, because he paid 7 minae into the bank three days too late; and
yet, when men have taken money and confess it, and are convicted, by
being caught in the very act, of having done so in order to bring about
the ruin of our allies, you do not prosecute them, but even command
their acquittal? {294} But the appalling character of these crimes and
the great watchfulness and caution that they call for, and the
triviality of the offences for which you prosecuted those other men,
may further be seen in this way. Were there any men in Elis who stole
public funds? It is very likely indeed. Well, had any of them anything
to do with the overthrow of the democracy there? Not one of them.
Again, while Olynthus was standing, were there others of the same
character there? I am sure that there were. Was it then through them
that Olynthus was destroyed? No. Again, do you not suppose that in
Megara there was someone who was a thief and who embezzled public
funds? There must have been. Well, has any such person been shown to be
responsible for the recent crisis there? {295} Not one. But of what
sort _are_ the men who commit crimes of such a character and magnitude?
They are those who count themselves worthy to be styled friends and
guest-friends of Philip, who would fain be generals, who claim[n] to be
leaders, who must needs be exalted above the people. Was not Perillus
put on his trial lately before the Three Hundred at Megara, because he
went to Philip's court; and did not Ptoeodorus, the first man in Megara
in wealth, family, and distinction, come forward and beg him off, and
send him back again to Philip? and was not the consequence that the one
came back at the head of the mercenaries, while the other was churning
the butter[n] at home? {296} For there is nothing, nothing, I say, in
the world, which you must be so careful not to do, as not to allow any
one to become more powerful than the People. I would have no man
acquitted or doomed, to please any individual. Only let us be sure that
the man whose actions acquit or condemn him will receive from you the
verdict he deserves. {297} That is the true democratic principle. And
further, it is true that many men have come to possess great influence
with you at particular times--Callistratus, and again Aristophon,
Diophantus, and others before them. But where did each of these
exercise his primacy? In the Assembly of the People. But in the
law-courts no man has ever, to this day, carried more influence than
the laws and the juror's oath. Do not then allow the defendant to have
such influence to-day. To prove to you that there is good reason for
you not to trust, but to beware of such influence, I will read you an
oracle of the gods, who always protect the city far better than do its
foremost citizens. (_To the clerk._) Read the oracles.
[_The oracles are read._]
{298} You hear, men of Athens, the warnings of the gods. If these
responses were given by them when you were at war, they mean that you
must beware of your generals, since in war it is the generals who are
leaders; but if they were uttered after you had made peace, they must
refer to those who are at the head of your government; for these are
the leaders whom you obey, and it is by these that you are in danger of
being led astray. 'And hold the state together' [says the oracle]
'until all are of one mind, and afford no joy to their foes.' {299}
Which event then, men of Athens, do you think would afford joy to
Philip--the acquittal of one who has brought about all this evil, or
his punishment? His acquittal, I am sure. But the oracle, you see, says
that we should so act as not to afford joy to our foes; and therefore,
by the mouth of Zeus, of Dione,[n] and of all the gods, is this
exhortation given to us all, that with one mind we chastise those who
have done any service to our enemies. Without are those who are
plotting against us, within are their confederates. The part of the
plotters is to offer the bribe; that of their confederates is to
receive it, and to save from condemnation those who have received it.
{300} And further, it needs no more than human reason to arrive at the
conclusion that nothing can be more hateful and dangerous than to allow
your first citizen to be intimate with those whose objects are not
those of the People. Consider by what means Philip has become master of
the entire situation, and by what means he has accomplished the
greatest of his successes. It has been by purchasing the opportunities
for action from those who offered them for sale--by corrupting and
exciting the aspirations of the leaders of their several cities. {301}
These have been the means. Now both of these methods it is in your
power, if you wish it, to render futile to-day, if you will refuse to
listen to prominent persons who speak in defence of such practices, and
will thus prove that they have no power over you--for now they assert
that they have you under their control--while at the same time you
punish the man who has sold himself, and let all the world see what you
have done. {302} For you would have reason enough, men of Athens, for
being angry with any man who had acted so, and had betrayed your allies
and your friends and your opportunities (for with these are bound up
the whole prosperity or adversity of every people), but with no one
more than with Aeschines, or with greater justice. After taking up a
position as one of those who mistrusted Philip--after being the first
and the only man to perceive that Philip was the common enemy of all
the Hellenes--he deserted, he betrayed you; he suddenly became Philip's
supporter. Surely he deserves to die many times over! {303} Nay, he
himself will not be able to deny that these things are so. For who was
it that brought Ischander forward before you originally, stating that
he had come from the friends of Athens in Arcadia? Who was it that
cried out that Philip was organizing Hellas and the Peloponnese against
you, while you were asleep? Who was it that delivered those long and
noble orations to the people, that read to you the decrees of Miltiades
and Themistocles, and the oath of the young soldiers[n] in the temple
of Aglaurus? {304} Was it not the defendant? Who was it that persuaded
you to send embassies almost as far as the Red Sea, on the ground that
Philip was plotting against Hellas, and that it was for you to foresee
this and not to sacrifice the interests of the Hellenes? Was it not
Eubulus who proposed the decree, while the ambassador to the
Peloponnese was the defendant Aeschines? What expressions he used in
his address to the people, after he arrived there, is best known to
himself: but I know you all remember what he reported to you. {305}
Many a time in the course of his speech he called Philip 'barbarian'
and 'devil'; and he reported the delight of the Arcadians at the
thought that Athens was now waking up and attending to public affairs.
One thing he told us, which caused him, he said, more distress than
anything else. As he was leaving, he met Atrestidas, who was travelling
home from Philip's court, and with him were walking some thirty women
and children. Wondering at this, he asked one of the travellers who the
man was, and what this crowd was along with him; {306} and on hearing
that it was Atrestidas, who was on his way home, and that these with
him were captives from Olynthus whom Philip had given him as a present,
he was struck with the atrocity of the thing and burst into tears, and
lamented the unhappy condition of Hellas, that she should allow such
tragedies to pass unnoticed. At the same time he counselled you to send
representatives to Arcadia to denounce Philip's agents, saying that his
friends told him that if Athens took notice of the matter and sent
envoys, Philip's agents would be punished. {307} Such, men of Athens,
was the tenor of his speeches then; and very noble they were, and
worthy of this city. But when he had been to Macedonia, and had seen
the enemy of himself and of the Hellenes, were his speeches couched any
more in the same or a similar tone? Far from it! He told you that you
must neither remember your forefathers nor mention your trophies, nor
go to the aid of any one. He was amazed, he said, at those who urged
you to confer with the rest of the Hellenes in regard to the Peace with
Philip, as though there was any need to convince some one else about a
matter which was purely your own affair. {308} And as for Philip, 'Why,
good gracious!' said he, 'Philip is the most thorough Hellene in the
world, a most able speaker, and most friendly towards Athens: only
there are certain persons in Athens so unreasonable and so churlish,
that they are not ashamed to slander him and call him "barbarian".' Now
is it possible that the man who had formerly spoken as Aeschines did,
should now have dared to speak in such a way, if he had not been
corrupted? What? {309} Is there a man who after conceiving such
detestation for Atrestidas, owing to those children and women from
Olynthus, could have endured to act in conjunction with Philocrates,
who brought freeborn Olynthian women here to gratify his lust, and is
so notorious for his abominable living, that it is unnecessary for me
now to use any offensive or unpleasant expression about him; for if I
say that Philocrates brought women here, the rest will be understood by
all of you and of the bystanders, and you will, I am sure, pity the
poor unhappy creatures--though Aeschines felt no pity for them, and
shed no tears for Hellas at the sight of them, or at the thought of the
outrages they were suffering among their own allies at the hands of our
ambassadors. {310} No! he will shed tears on his own behalf--he whose
proceedings as ambassador have had such results--and perhaps he will
bring forward his children, and mount them upon the platform. But,
gentlemen of the jury, when you see the children of Aeschines, remember
that the children of many of your allies and friends are now vagabonds,
wandering in beggary, owing to the cruel treatment they have suffered
in consequence of his conduct, and that these deserve your compassion
far more than those whose father is a criminal and a traitor. Remember
that your own children have been robbed even of their hopes by these
men, who inserted among the terms of the Peace the clause which
extended it to posterity. And when you see the tears of Aeschines,
remember that you have now before you a man who urged you to send
representatives to Arcadia to denounce the agents of Philip. {311} Now
to-day you need send no embassy to the Peloponnese; you need take no
long journey; you need incur no travelling expenses. Each of you need
only come as far as this platform, to deposit the vote which piety and
justice demand of him, on behalf of your country; and to condemn the
man who--I call Earth and Heaven to witness!--after originally
delivering the speeches which I described, speaking of Marathon and of
Salamis, and of your battles and your trophies, suddenly--so soon as he
had set foot in Macedonia--changed his tone completely, and told you
that you must not remember your forefathers, nor recount your trophies,
nor go to the aid of any one, nor take common counsel with the
Hellenes--who all but told you that you must pull down your walls.
{312} Never throughout all time, up to this day, have speeches more
shameful than these been delivered before you. What Hellene, what
foreigner, is so dense, or so uninstructed, or so fierce in his hatred
of our city, that if one were to put to him this question, and say,
'Tell me now; of all Hellas, as it now is--all this inhabited
country--is there any part which would have been called by this name,
or inhabited by the Hellenes who now possess it, unless those who
fought at Marathon and Salamis, our forefathers, had displayed that
high prowess on their behalf?' Why, I am certain that not one would
answer 'Yes': they would say that all these regions must have been
conquered by the barbarians. {313} If then no single man, not even one
of our enemies, would have deprived them of these their panegyrics and
praises, does Aeschines forbid you to remember them--you their
descendants--in order that he himself may receive money? In all other
blessings, moreover, the dead have no share; but the praises which
follow their noble deeds are the peculiar possession of those who have
died thus; for then even envy opposes them no longer. Of these praises
Aeschines would deprive them; and justly, therefore, would he now be
deprived of his privileges as as a citizen, and justly, in the name of
your forefathers, would you exact from him this penalty. Such words you
used, nevertheless, in the wickedness of your heart, to despoil and
traduce the deeds of our forefathers, and by your word you ruined all
our interests in very deed. {314} And then, as the outcome of this, you
are a landed gentleman, and have become a personage of consequence! For
this, too, you must notice. Before he had wrought every kind of
mischief against the city he acknowledged that he had been a clerk; he
was grateful to you for having elected him, and behaved himself
modestly. But since he has wrought countless evils, he has drawn up his
eyebrows, and if any one speaks of 'Aeschines the late clerk', he is
his enemy at once, and declares that he has been insulted: he walks
through the market-place with his cloak trailing down to his ankles,
keeping step with Pythocles,[n] and puffing out his cheeks--already one
of Philip's friends and guest-friends, if you please--one of those who
would be rid of the democracy, and who regard the established
constitution as so much tempestuous madness--he who was once the humble
servant of the Round Chamber.
{315} I wish now to recapitulate to you summarily the ways in which
Philip got the better of you in policy, when he had taken these
heaven-detested men to aid him. It is well worth while to review and
contemplate the course of his deception as a whole. It began with his
anxiety for peace; for his country was being plundered, and his ports
were closed, so that he could enjoy none of the advantages which they
afforded; and so he sent the messengers who uttered those generous
sentiments on his behalf--Neoptolemus, Aristodemus, and Ctesiphon.
{316} But so soon as we went to him as your ambassadors, he immediately
hired the defendant to second and co-operate with the abominable
Philocrates, and so get the better of those who wished to act
uprightly; and he composed such a letter to you as he thought would be
most likely to help him to obtain peace. {317} But even so, he had no
better chance than before of effecting anything of importance against
you, unless he could destroy the Phocians. And this was no easy matter.
For he had now been reduced, as if by chance, to a position in which he
must either find it impossible to effect any of his designs, or else
must perforce lie and forswear himself, and make all men, whether
Hellenes or foreigners, witnesses of his own baseness. {318} For if, on
the one hand, he received the Phocians as allies, and administered the
oath to them together with yourselves, it at once became necessary for
him to break his oaths to the Thessalians and Thebans; for he had sworn
to aid the latter in the reduction of Boeotia, and the former in the
recovery of their place in the Amphictyonic Council; but if, on the
other hand, he refused to receive them (as in fact he did reject them),
he thought that you would not let him cross the Pass, but would rally
to Thermopylae--and so you would have done, had you not been misled;
and if this happened, he calculated that he would be unable to march
across. {319} Nor had he to learn this from others; he had already the
testimony of his own experience. For on the occasion of his first
defeat of the Phocians, when he destroyed their mercenaries and their
leader and general, Onomarchus, although not a single human being,
Hellene or foreigner, came to the aid of the Phocians, except
yourselves, so far was he from crossing the Pass and thereafter
carrying out any of his designs, that he could not even approach near
it. {320} He realized, I imagine, quite clearly, that at a time when
the feelings of the Thessalians were turning against him, and the
Pheraeans (to take the first instance) refused to accompany him--when
the Thebans were being worsted and had lost a battle, and a trophy had
been erected to celebrate their defeat--it was impossible for him to
cross the Pass, if you rallied to its defence; and that if he made the
attempt he would regret it, unless some cunning could be called in to
aid him. How then, he asked, can I avoid open falsehood, and yet
accomplish all that I wish without appearing perjured? How can it be
done? It can be done, if I can get some of the Athenians to deceive the
Athenians. In that case the discredit no longer falls to my share.
{321} And so Philip's own envoys first informed you that Philip
declined to receive the Phocians as allies; and then these men took up
the tale, and addressed you to the effect that it was inconvenient to
Philip to receive the Phocians as your allies openly, on account of the
Thebans and the Thessalians; but if he gets command of the situation,
they said, and is granted the Peace, he will do just what we should now
request him to promise to do. {322} So they obtained the Peace from
you, by holding out these seductive hopes, without including the
Phocians. But they had still to prevent the expedition to Thermopylae,
for the purpose of which, despite the Peace, your fifty ships were
still lying ready at anchor, in order that, if Philip marched, you
might prevent him. {323} How then could it be done? what cunning could
be used in regard to this expedition in its turn? They must deprive you
of the necessary time, by bringing the crisis upon you suddenly, so
that, even if you wished to set out, you might be unable to do so. So
this, it appears, was what these men undertook to do; while for my
part, as you have often been told, I was unable to depart in advance of
them, and was prevented from sailing even when I had hired a boat for
the purpose. {324} But it was further necessary that the Phocians
should come to believe in Philip and give themselves up to him
voluntarily, in order that there might be no delay in carrying out the
plan, and that no hostile decree whatever might issue from you. 'And
therefore,' said he, 'the Athenian ambassadors shall announce that the
Phocians are to be preserved from destruction, so that even if any one
persists in distrusting me, he will believe them, and put himself in my
hands. We will summon the Athenians themselves, so that they may
imagine that all that they want is secured, and may pass no hostile
decree: but the ambassadors shall make such reports about us, and give
such promises, as will prevent them from moving under any
circumstances.' {325} It was in this way, and by such trickery as this,
that all was ruined, through the action of these doomed wretches. For
immediately afterwards, as you know, instead of seeing Thespiae and
Plataeae repeopled, you heard that Orchomenus and Coroneia had been
enslaved; instead of Thebes being humbled and stripped of her insolence
and pride, the walls of your own allies were being razed, and it was
the Thebans who were razing them--the Thebans who, according to
Aeschines' story, were as good as broken up into villages. {326}
Instead of Euboea being handed over to you in exchange for Amphipolis,
Philip is making new bases of operations against you in Euboea itself,
and is plotting incessantly against Geraestus and Megara. Instead of
the restoration of Oropus to you, we are making an expedition under
arms to defend Drymus and the country about Panactum[n]--a step which
we never took so long as the Phocians remained unharmed. {327} Instead
of the restoration of the ancestral worship in the temple, and the
exaction of the debt due to the god, the true Amphictyons are
fugitives, who have been banished and their land laid desolate; and
Macedonians, foreigners, men who never were Amphictyons in the past,
are now forcing their way to recognition; while any one who mentions
the sacred treasures is thrown from the rocks, and our city has been
deprived of her right to precedence in consulting the oracle. {328}
Indeed, the story of all that has happened to the city sounds like a
riddle. Philip has spoken no falsehood, and has accomplished all that
he wished: you hoped for the fulfilment of your fondest prayers, and
have seen the very opposite come to pass; you suppose yourselves to be
at peace, and have suffered more terribly than if you had been at war;
while these men have received money for all this, and up to this very
day have not paid the penalty. {329} For that the situation has been
made what it is solely by bribery, and that these men have received
their price for it all, has, I feel sure, long been plain to you in
many ways; and I am afraid that, quite against my will, I may long have
been wearying you by attempting to prove with elaborate exactness what
you already know for yourselves. {330} Yet this one point I ask you
still to listen to. Is there, gentlemen of the jury, one of the
ambassadors whom Philip sent, whose statue in bronze you would erect in
the market-place? Nay, one to whom you would give maintenance in the
Town Hall, or any other of those complimentary grants with which you
honour your benefactors? I think not. And why? For you are of no
ungrateful or unfair or mean disposition. You would reply, that it is
because all that they did was done in the interest of Philip, and
nothing in your own; and the reply would be true and just. {331} Do you
imagine then that, when such are your sentiments, Philip's are not also
such? Do you imagine that he gives all these magnificent presents
because your ambassadors conducted their mission honourably and
uprightly with a view to _your_ interest? Impossible. Think of
Hegesippus, and the manner in which he and the ambassadors who
accompanied him were received by Philip. To go no further, he banished
Xenocleides, the well-known poet, by public proclamation, because he
received the ambassadors, his own fellow citizens. For so it is that he
behaves to men who honestly say what they think on your behalf: while
to those who have sold themselves he behaves as he has to these men. Do
we then need witnesses? do we need stronger proofs than these to
establish my conclusions? Will any one be able to steal these
conclusions from your minds?
{332} Now I was told a most extraordinary thing just now by some one
who accosted me in front of the Court, namely, that the defendant is
prepared to accuse Chares, and that by such methods and such arguments
as that, he hopes to deceive you. I will not lay undue stress on the
fact that Chares,[n] subjected to every form of trial, was found to
have acted on your behalf, so far as was in his power, with
faithfulness and loyalty, while his frequent shortcomings were due to
those who, for money, were cruelly injuring your cause. But I will go
much further. Let it be granted that all that the defendant will say of
Chares is true. {333} Even so it is utterly absurd that Aeschines
should accuse him. For I do not lay the blame on Aeschines for anything
that was done in the course of the war--it is the generals who have to
account for all such proceedings--nor do I hold him responsible for the
city's having made peace. So far I acquit him of everything. What then
do I allege, and at what point does my accusation begin? I accuse him
of having supported Philocrates, at the time when the city was making
peace, instead of supporting those who proposed what was for your real
good. I accuse him of taking bribes, and subsequently, on the Second
Embassy, of wasting time, and of not carrying out any of your
instructions. I accuse him of cheating the city, and ruining
everything, by the suggestion of hopes that Philip would do all that we
desired; and then I accuse him of speaking afterwards in defence of one
of whom[n] all warned him to beware, on account of the great crimes of
which he had been guilty. {334} These are my charges, and these are
what you must bear in mind. For a Peace that was honest and fair, and
men that had sold nothing and had told no falsehoods afterwards, I
would even have commended, and would have bidden you crown them. But
the injuries which some general may have done you have nothing to do
with the present examination. Where is the general who has caused the
loss of Halus? or of the Phocians? or of Doriscus? or of Cersobleptes?
or of the Sacred Mountain? or of Thermopylae? Who has secured Philip a
road to Attica that leads entirely through the country of allies and
friends? who has given Coroneia and Orchomenus and Euboea to others?
who has all but given Megara to the enemy, only recently? who has made
the Thebans powerful? {335} Not one of all these heavy losses was the
work of the generals; nor does Philip hold any of these places because
you were persuaded to concede it to him by the treaty of peace. The
losses are due to these men and to their corruption. If then he evades
these points, and tries to mislead you by speaking of every other
possible subject, this is how you must receive his attempt. 'We are not
sitting in judgement upon any general,' you must say, 'nor are you on
your trial for the things of which you speak. Do not tell us whether
some one else may not also be responsible for the ruin of the Phocians:
prove to us that no responsibility attaches to yourself. Why do you
tell us _now_ of the alleged iniquities of Demosthenes, instead of
accusing him when his report was under examination? For such an
omission alone you deserve to perish. {336} Do not speak of the beauty
of peace, nor of its advantages. No one holds you responsible for the
city's having made peace. But show that it was not a shameful and
discreditable peace; that we have not since been deceived in many ways;
that all was not lost. It is for all these things that the
responsibility has been proved to be yours. And why, even to this hour,
do you praise the man who has done us all this evil?' If you keep a
watch upon him thus, he will have nothing to say; and then he will lift
up his voice here, in spite of all his vocal exercises, to no purpose.
{337} And yet perhaps it is necessary for me to speak about his voice
also. For of this too, I am told, he is extremely proud, and expects to
carry you away by his declamation. But seeing that you used to drive
him away and hiss him out of the theatre and almost stone him, when he
was performing the tragic story of Thyestes or of the Trojan War, so
that at last he gave up his third-rate playing, you would be acting in
the most extraordinary way if, now that he has wrought countless ills,
not on the stage, but in the most important affairs in the public life
of the state, you listened to him for his fine voice. {338} By no means
must you do this, or give way to any foolish sentiment. Rather reflect,
that if you were testing the qualifications of a herald, you would then
indeed look for a fine voice; but when you are testing those of an
ambassador, or a man who claims the administration of any public
business, you must look for an upright man--a man who bears himself
proudly indeed, as your representative, but seeks no more than equality
with yourselves--as I myself refused to pay respect to Philip, but did
pay respect to the captives, whom I saved, and never for a moment drew
back; whereas Aeschines rolled at Philip's feet, and chanted his
paeans, while he looks down upon you. {339} And further, whenever you
notice that cleverness or a good voice or any other natural advantage
has been given to an honest and public-spirited man, you ought all to
congratulate him and help him to cultivate his gift; for the gift is an
advantage in which you all share, as well as he. But when the gift is
found in a corrupt and villainous man, who can never resist the chance
of gain, then you should exclude him from your presence, and give a
harsh and hostile reception to his words: for villainy, which wins from
you the reputation of ability, is the enemy of the State. {340} You see
what great troubles have fallen upon the city, through those qualities
which have brought renown to Aeschines. But whereas all other faculties
are more or less independent, the gift of eloquence, when it meets with
hostility from you who listen, is a broken thing. Listen, then, to the
defendant as you would listen to a corrupt villain, who will not speak
a single word of truth.
{341} Observe also that the conviction of the defendant is in every way
expedient, not only on all other grounds, but even when you consider
our relations with Philip himself. For if ever Philip finds himself
compelled to give the city any of her rights, he will change his
methods. As it is, he has chosen to deceive the people as a whole, and
to show his favours to a few persons; whereas, if he learns that these
men have perished, he will prefer for the future to act in the interest
of yourselves collectively, in whose hands all power rests. {342} If,
however, he intends to persist in his present domineering and
outrageous insolence, you will, by getting rid of these men, have rid
the city of those who would do anything in the world for him. For when
they have acted as they have done, with the expectation of having to
pay the penalty in their minds, what do you think they will do, if you
relax your severity towards them? Where is the Euthycrates,[n] or the
Lasthenes, or the traitor of any description, whom they will not outdo?
{343} And who among all the rest will not be a worse citizen, when he
sees that, for those who have sold themselves, the friendship of Philip
serves, in consequence, for revenue, for reputation, and for capital;
while to those who have conducted themselves uprightly, and have spent
their own money as well, the consequences are trouble, hatred, and ill
will from a certain party. Let it not be so. It is not for your
good--whether you regard your reputation or your duty towards Heaven or
your safety or any other object, that you should acquit the defendant;
but rather that you should avenge yourselves upon him, and make him an
example in the eyes of all your fellow citizens and of the whole
Hellenic world.
FOOTNOTES
[1] This body was composed of life-members, the archons passing into it
annually at the conclusion of their term of office. A certain religious
solemnity attached to it, and it was generally respected as a
public-spirited and high-minded body.
[2] [Greek: p_os: ti;].
[3] Hesiod, _Works and Days_, 761.
[4] Euripides, _Phoenix_ fragment.
[5] [Greek: adeia, aischuv_e.].
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Public Orations of Demosthenes, volume 2
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Title: The Public Orations of Demosthenes, volume 2
Author: Demosthenes
Translator: Sir Arthur Wallace Pickard-Cambridge
Release date: October 1, 2005 [eBook #9061]
Most recently updated: October 13, 2014
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Anne Soulard, Jon Ingram and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES, VOLUME 2 ***
Produced by Anne Soulard, Jon Ingram and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team.
THE PUBLIC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL II
TRANSLATED BY
ARTHUR WALLACE PICKARD
ON THE CHERSONESE (OR. VIII)
[_Introduction_. Late in the year 343 (some time after the acquittal of
Aeschines) Philip invaded Epirus, made Alexander, brother of his wife
Olympias, king of the Molossi instead of Arybbas, and so secured, his
own influence in that region. Arybbas was honourably received at
Athens. Philip next threatened Ambracia and Leucas, which were colonies
of Corinth, and promised to restore Naupactus, which was in the hands
of the Achaeans, to the Aetolians. But Athens sent Demosthenes,
Hegesippus, Polyeuctus and others to rouse the Corinthians to
resistance, and also dispatched a force of citizens to Acarnania to
help in the defence against Philip. Philip thereupon returned, captured
Echinus and Nicaea on the Malian Gulf, and established a tetrarch in
each division of Thessaly (343 B.C., or early in 342). In 342
Philistides was established, by Philip's influence, as tyrant at Oreus
in Euboea (as Cleitarchus had been at Eretria in the preceding year),
and the democratic leader Euphraeus committed suicide in prison.[1] The
town of Chalcis, however, under Callias and Taurosthenes, remained
friendly to Athens, and made a treaty of alliance with her.
About the same time a controversy, begun in the previous year, in
regard to Halonnesus, was renewed. This island had belonged to Athens,
but had been occupied by pirates. At some time not recorded (but
probably since the Peace of 346) Philip had expelled the pirates and
taken possession of the island. He now sent a letter, offering to give
Halonnesus to Athens, but not to _give it back_ (since this would
concede their right to it); or else to submit the dispute to
arbitration. He also offered to discuss a treaty for the settlement of
private disputes between Athenians and Macedonians, and to concert
measures with Athens for clearing the Aegean of pirates. He was willing
to extend the advantages of the Peace to other Greek States, but not to
agree that he and Athens should respectively possess 'what was their
own', instead of 'what they held'; though he was ready to submit to
arbitration in regard to Cardia and other disputed places. He again
denied having made the promises attributed to him, and asked for the
punishment of those who slandered him. Hegesippus replied in an extant
speech ('On Halonnesus'), while Demosthenes insisted that no impartial
arbitrator could possibly be found. Philip's terms in regard to
Halonnesus were refused, but the Athenian claim to the island was not
withdrawn.
Philip spent the greater part of 342 and 341 in Thrace, mainly in the
valley of the Hebrus, where he endured very great hardships through the
winter, and founded colonies of Macedonian soldiers, the chief of these
being Philippopolis and Cabyle. He also entered into relations with the
Getae, beyond the Haemus, and garrisoned Apollonia on the Euxine. These
operations were all preparatory to his projected attack upon Byzantium.
(Byzantium and Athens were at this time on unfriendly terms, owing to
the part taken by the latter in the Social War.)
But the immediate subject of the present Speech was the state of
affairs in the Chersonese in 342. The Chersonese (with the exception of
Cardia) had been secured for Athens in 357, but had been threatened by
Philip in 352,[2] when he made alliance with Cardia, and forced the
neighbouring Thracian Prince Cersobleptes to submit. Soon after the
Peace of Philocrates, Athens sent settlers to the Chersonese under
Diopeithes. Cardia alone refused to receive them, and Diopeithes, with
a mercenary force, prepared to compel the Cardians to admit them; while
Philip sent troops to hold the town, and complained to Athens in
threatening terms of the actions of Diopeithes, and more particularly
of an inroad which Diopeithes had made upon Philip's territory in
Thrace. Diopeithes had been ill-supported with money and men by Athens,
and had had recourse to piratical actions, in order to obtain supplies,
thus arousing some indignation at Athens; but the prospect of the heavy
expenditure which would be necessary, if an expedition were sent to his
aid, was also unattractive. Demosthenes, however, proposed that
Diopeithes should be vigorously supported, on the ground that Philip
was really at war with Athens, and that this was not the time to
interfere with the general who alone was pushing the Athenian cause.
The speech was delivered early in the spring of 341. It is a
masterpiece of oratory, at once statesmanlike and impassioned, and
shows a complete command of every variety of tone. The latter part of
it contains a strong denunciation of the Macedonian party in Athens, a
defence of the orator's own career, and an urgent demand for the
punishment of disloyalty. At the same time Demosthenes does not embody
the policy which he advises in any formal motion. For this we have to
wait for the Third Philippic.]
{1} It was the duty, men of Athens, of every speaker not to allow
either malice or favour to influence any speech which he might make,
but simply to declare the policy which he considered to be the best,
particularly when your deliberations were concerned with public affairs
of great importance. But since there are some who are led on to address
you, partly out of contentiousness, partly from causes which I need not
discuss, it is for you, men of Athens--you, the People--to dismiss all
other considerations, and both in the votes that you give and in the
measures that you take to attend solely to what you believe to be for
the good of the city. {2} Now our present anxiety arises out of affairs
in the Chersonese, and the campaign, now in its eleventh month, which
Philip is conducting in Thrace. But most of the speeches which we have
heard have been about the acts and intentions of Diopeithes. For my
part, I conceive that all charges made against any one who is amenable
to the laws and can be punished by you when you will are matters which
you are free to investigate, either immediately or after an interval,
as you think fit; and there is no occasion for me or any one else to
use strong language about them. {3} But all those advantages which an
actual enemy of the city, with a large force in the Hellespont, is
trying to snatch from you, and which, if we once fall behind-hand, we
shall no longer be able to recover--these, surely, are matters upon
which our interest demands that our plans be formed and our
preparations made with the utmost dispatch; and that no clamour, no
accusations about other matters, be allowed to drive us from this point.
{4} Often as I am surprised at the assertions which are habitually made
in your presence, nothing, men of Athens, has surprised me more than
the remark which I heard only lately in the Council--that one who
advises you ought, forsooth, to advise you plainly either to go to war
or to keep the peace. {5} Very good.[3] If Philip is remaining
inactive, if he is keeping nothing that is ours, in violation of the
Peace, if he is not organizing all mankind against us, there is nothing
more to be said--we have simply to observe the Peace; and I see that,
for your part, you are quite ready to do so. But what if the oath that
we swore, and the terms upon which we made the Peace, stand inscribed
for our eyes to see? {6} What if it is proved that from the outset,
before Diopeithes sailed from Athens with the settlers who are now
accused of having brought about the war, Philip wrongfully seized many
of our possessions--and here, unrepealed, are your resolutions charging
him with this--and that all along he has been uninterruptedly seizing
the possessions of the other Hellenic and foreign peoples, and uniting
their resources against us? What is _then_ the meaning of the statement
that we ought either to go to war or to keep the Peace? {7} For we have
no choice in the matter: nothing remains open to us but the most
righteous and most necessary of all acts--the act that they
deliberately refuse to consider--I mean the act of retaliation against
the aggressor: unless indeed, they intend to argue that, so long as
Philip keeps away from Attica and the Peiraeus, he does the city no
wrong and is not committing acts of war. {8} But if _this_ is their
criterion of right and wrong, if _this_ is their definition of peace,
then, although what they say is iniquitous, intolerable, and
inconsistent with your security, as all must see, at the same time
these very statements are actually contradictory of the charges which
they are making against Diopeithes. {9} Why, I beg to ask,[n] are we to
give Philip full leave to act in whatever way he chooses, so long as he
does not touch Attica, when Diopeithes is not to be allowed even to
assist the Thracians, without being accused of initiating war? But even
if this inconsistency is brought home to them, still, we are told, the
conduct of the mercenaries in ravaging the Hellespontine country is
outrageous, and Diopeithes has no right to drive the vessels to
shore,[n] and ought to be stopped. {10} I grant it: let it be done: I
have nothing to say against it. Yet nevertheless, if their advice is
genuinely based on considerations of right, and right alone, I consider
that they are bound to prove that, as surely as they are seeking to
break up the force on which _Athens_ at present relies, by slandering
its commander to you when he tries to provide funds to support it, so
surely _Philip's_ force will be disbanded if you accept their advice.
If they fail to prove this, you must consider that they are simply
setting the city once more upon the same course which has already
resulted in the utter ruin of her fortunes. {11} For surely you know
that nothing in the world has contributed so much to Philip's
successes, as his being always first on the scene of action. With a
standing force always about him, and knowing beforehand what he intends
to do, he suddenly falls upon whomsoever he pleases: while we wait
until we learn that something is happening, and only then, in a
turmoil, make our preparations. {12} It follows, of course, that every
position which he has attacked, he holds in undisturbed possession;
while we are all behindhand; all our expenditure proves to have been so
much useless waste; we have displayed our hostility and our desire to
check him; but we are too late for action, and so we add disgrace to
failure.
{13} You must therefore not fail to recognize, men of Athens, that now,
as before, all else that you hear consists of mere words and pretexts;
and that the real aim of all that is being done is to secure that you
may remain at home, that Athens may have no force outside the city, and
that thus Philip may give effect to all his desires without let or
hindrance. Consider, in the first place, what is actually occurring at
the present moment. {14} He is at present passing the time[n] in
Thrace, with a great army under him; and, as we are told by those who
are on the spot,[n] he is sending for a large addition to it from
Macedonia and Thessaly. Now if he waits for the Etesian winds,[n] and
then goes to Byzantium and besieges it, tell me first whether you think
that the Byzantines will persist in their present infatuation,[n] and
will not call upon you and entreat you to go to their aid? {15} I do
not think so. Why, I believe that they would open their gates to men
whom they distrust even more than they distrust you (if such exist),
rather than surrender the city to Philip--supposing, that is, that he
does not capture them first. And then, if we are unable to set sail
from Athens, and if there are no forces there on the spot to help them,
nothing can prevent their destruction. {16} 'Of course,' you say, 'for
the men are possessed, and their infatuation passes all bounds.' Very
true; and yet they must be preserved; for the interests of Athens
require it. And besides, we cannot by any means be certain that he will
not invade the Chersonese. Indeed, if we are to judge by the letter
which he has sent to you, he there says that he _will_ punish the
settlers[n] in the Chersonese. {17} If then the army that is now formed
there is in existence, it will be able to help the Chersonese, and to
injure some part of Philip's country. But when once it is dissolved,
what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese? 'We shall of
course put Diopeithes on his trial.' And how will that improve our
position? 'Well, we should go to the rescue from Athens ourselves.'
What if the winds make it impossible? {18} 'But, of course, he will not
really get there.' And who can guarantee that? Do you realize, men of
Athens, or take into account, what the coming season of the year is,
the season against which some think you ought to evacuate the
Hellespont and hand it over to Philip? What if, when he leaves Thrace,
he does not go near the Chersonese or Byzantium at all--for this, too,
is a possibility which you must consider--but comes to Chalcis[n] or
Megara, just as he lately came to Oreus? Is it better to resist him
here, and to allow the war to come into Attica, or to provide something
to keep him busy there? The latter course is surely the better.
{19} Realizing these things, therefore, as you all must, and taking due
account of them, you must not, Heaven knows, look askance at the force
which Diopeithes is trying to provide for Athens, or attempt to disband
it. You must yourselves prepare another force to support it: you must
help him freely with money, and give him in all other respects your
loyal co-operation. {20} If Philip were asked to say whether he would
wish these soldiers who are now with Diopeithes--describe them as you
will, for I in no way dispute your description--to be prosperous and in
high favour with the Athenians, and to be augmented in numbers by the
co-operation of the city; or whether he would rather see them broken up
and destroyed in consequence of calumnious charges against them; he
would prefer, I imagine, the latter alternative. Can it then be, that
there are men among us here who are trying to bring about the very
thing that Philip would pray Heaven for? And if so, do you need to seek
any further for the cause of the total ruin of the city's fortunes?
{21} I wish, therefore, to examine without reserve the present crisis
of our affairs, to inquire what we ourselves are now doing, and how we
are dealing with it. We do not wish to contribute funds, nor to serve
with the forces in person; we cannot keep our hands from the public
revenues;[n] we do not give the contributions of the allies[n] to
Diopeithes, nor do we approve of such supplies as he raises for
himself; {22} but we look malignantly at him, we ask whence he gets
them, what he intends to do, and every possible question of that kind:
and yet we are still not willing to confine ourselves to our own
affairs, in consequence of the attitude which we have adopted; we still
praise with our lips those who uphold the dignity of the city, though
in our acts we are fighting on the side of their opponents. {23} Now
whenever any one rises to speak, you always put to him the question
'What are we to do?' I wish to put to _you_ the question, 'What are we
to _say_?' For if you will neither contribute, nor serve in person, nor
leave the public funds alone, nor grant him the contributions, nor let
him get what he can for himself, nor yet confine yourselves to your own
affairs, I do not know what I can say. For when you give such licence
to those who desire to make charges and accusations, that you listen to
them even when they denounce him by anticipation for his alleged
intentions--well, what _can_ one say?
{24} The possible effect of this is a matter which some of you require
to understand, and I will speak without reserve; for indeed I could not
speak otherwise. All the commanders who have ever yet sailed from
Athens--if I am wrong, I consent to any penalty that you
please[n]--take money from the Chians, from the Erythraeans,[n] from
any people from whom they can severally get it--I mean, any of the
Asiatic settlers who are now in question. {25} Those who have one or
two ships take less, those who have a larger force take more. And those
who give to them do not give either little or much for nothing; they
are not so insane: in fact, with these sums they buy immunity from
injury for the merchants who sail from their ports, freedom from
piracy, the convoying of their vessels, and so on. They call the gifts
'benevolences',[n] and that is the name given to the sums thus
obtained. {26} And in the present case, when Diopeithes is there with
his army, it is obvious that all these peoples will give him money.
From what other source do you imagine that a general can maintain his
troops, when he has received nothing from you, and has no resources
from which he can pay his men? Will money drop from the sky? Of course
not. He subsists upon what he can collect or beg or borrow. {27} The
real effect, therefore, of the accusations made against him here, is
simply to warn every one that they should refuse to give him anything,
since he is to pay the penalty for his very intentions, not to speak of
any action that he may have taken or any success that he may have
achieved. That is the only meaning of the cry that 'he is preparing a
blockade', or 'he is surrendering[n] the Hellenes'. Do any of his
critics care about the Hellenes who live in Asia? {28} Were it so, they
would be more thoughtful for the rest of mankind than for their own
country. And the proposal to send another general to the Hellespont
amounts to no more than this. For if Diopeithes is acting outrageously
and is driving the vessels to shore, then, gentlemen, one little
wax-tablet[n] is enough to put an end to it all: and what the laws
command is that for these offences we should impeach the
wrong-doers--not that we should keep a watch upon our own forces at
such expense and with so many ships.[n] {29} Such insanity really
passes all bounds. No! Against the enemy whom we cannot arrest and
render amenable to the laws, it is both right and necessary to maintain
a force, to send war-ships, and to contribute war-funds: but against
one of ourselves, a decree, an impeachment, a dispatch-boat[n] will
answer our purpose. These are the means which sensible men would use:
the policy of the other side is the policy of men whose spitefulness[n]
is ruining your fortunes. {30} And that there should be some such men,
bad though it is, is not the worst. No! for you who sit there are
already in such a frame of mind, that if any one comes forward and says
that Diopeithes is the cause of all the mischief, or Chares,[n] or
Aristophon,[n] or any Athenian citizen that he happens to name, you at
once agree, and clamorously declare that he is right; {31} but if any
one comes forward and tells you the truth, and says, 'Men of Athens,
this is nonsense. It is Philip that is the cause of all this mischief
and trouble; for if he were quiet, the city would have nothing to
disturb her,' you cannot, indeed, deny the truth of his words, but you
seem, I think, to be annoyed, as though you were losing something.[n]
{32} And the cause of these things is this--and I beseech you, in
Heaven's name, to let me speak unreservedly, when I am speaking for
your true good--that some of your politicians have contrived that you
should be terrifying and severe in your assemblies, but easy-going and
contemptible in your preparations for war. And accordingly, if any one
names as the culprit some one whom you know you can arrest in your own
midst, you agree and you wish to act; but if one is named whom you must
first master by force of arms, if you are to punish him at all, you are
at a loss, I fancy, what to do, and you are vexed when this is brought
home to you. {33} For your politicians, men of Athens, should have
treated you in exactly the opposite way to this; they should train you
to be kind and sympathetic in your assemblies; for there it is with the
members of your own body and your own allies that your case is argued:
but your terrors and your severity should be displayed in your
preparations for war, where the struggle is with your enemies and your
rivals. {34} As it is, by their popular speeches, and by courting your
favour to excess, they have brought you into such a condition that,
while in your assemblies you give yourselves airs and enjoy their
flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please you, in the
world of facts and events you are in the last extremity of peril.
Imagine, in God's name, what would happen, if the Hellenes were to call
you to account for the opportunities which, in your indolence, you have
now let pass, and were to put to you the question, {35} 'Is it true,
men of Athens, that you send envoys to us on every possible occasion,
to tell us of Philip's designs against ourselves and all the Hellenes,
and of the duty of keeping guard against the man, and to warn us in
every way?' We should have to confess that it was true. We do act thus.
'Then,' they would proceed, 'is it true, you most contemptible of all
men, that though the man has been away for ten months, {36} and has
been cut off from every possibility of returning home, by illness and
by winter and by wars, you have neither liberated Euboea nor recovered
any of your own possessions? Is it true that you have remained at home,
unoccupied and healthy--if such a word can be used of men who behave
thus--and have seen him set up two tyrants in Euboea, one to serve as a
fortress directly menacing Attica, the other to watch Sciathus; {37}
and that you have not even rid yourselves of these dangers--granted
that you did not want to do anything more--but have let them be?
Obviously you have retired in his favour, and have made it evident that
if he dies ten times over, you will not make any move the more. Why
trouble us then with your embassies and your accusations?' If they
speak thus to us, what will be our answer? What shall we say,
Athenians? I do not see what we can say.
{38} Now there are some who imagine that they confute a speaker, as
soon as they have asked him the question, 'What then are we to do?' I
will first give them this answer--the most just and true of all--'Do
not do what you are doing now.' {39} But at the same time I will give
them a minute and detailed reply; and then let them show that their
willingness to act upon it is not less than their eagerness to
interrogate. First, men of Athens, you must thoroughly make up your
minds to the fact that Philip is at war with Athens, and has broken the
Peace--you must cease to lay the blame at one another's doors--and that
he is evilly-disposed and hostile to the whole city, down to the very
ground on which it is built; {40} nay, I will go further--hostile to
every single man in the city, even to those who are most sure that they
are winning his favour. (If you think otherwise, consider the case of
Euthycrates[n] and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who fancied that they were on
the most friendly terms with him, but, after they had betrayed their
city, suffered the most utter ruin of all.) But his hostilities and
intrigues are aimed at nothing so much as at our constitution, whose
overthrow is the very first object in the world to him. {41} And in a
sense it is natural that he should aim at this. For he knows very well
that even if he becomes master of all the rest of the world, he can
retain nothing securely, so long as you are a democracy; and that if he
chances to stumble anywhere, as may often happen to a man, all the
elements which are now forced into union with him will come and take
refuge with you. {42} For though you are not yourselves naturally
adapted for aggrandizement or the usurpation of empire, you have the
art of preventing any other from seizing power and of taking it from
him when he has it; and in every respect you are ready to give trouble
to those who are ambitious of dominion, and to lead all men forth into
liberty. And so he would not have Freedom, from her home in Athens,
watching for every opportunity he may offer--far from it--and there is
nothing unsound or careless in his reasoning. {43} The first essential
point, therefore, is this--that you conceive him to be the
irreconcilable foe of your constitution and of democracy: for unless
you are inwardly convinced of this, you will not be willing to take an
active interest in the situation. Secondly, you must realize clearly
that all the plans which he is now so busily contriving are in the
nature of preparations against this country; and wherever any one
resists him, he there resists him on our behalf. {44} For surely no one
is so simple as to imagine that when Philip is covetous of the wretched
hamlets[n] of Thrace--one can give no other name to Drongilum, Cabyle,
Masteira, and the places which he is now seizing--and when to get these
places he is enduring heavy labours, hard winters, and the extremity of
danger;--{45} no one can imagine, I say, that the harbours and the
dockyards, and the ships of the Athenians, the produce of your
silver-mines, and your huge revenue, have no attraction for him, or
that he will leave you in possession of these, while he winters in the
very pit of destruction[n] for the sake of the millet and the spelt in
the silos[n] of Thrace. No, indeed! It is to get these into his power
that he pursues both his operations in Thrace and all his other
designs. {46} What then, as sensible men, must you do? Knowing and
realizing your position, as you do, you must lay aside this excessive,
this irremediable[n] indolence: you must contribute funds, and require
them from your allies; you must so provide and act, that this force
which is now assembled may be held together; in order that, as Philip
has the force in readiness that is to injure and enslave all the
Hellenes, you may have in readiness that which shall preserve and
succour them. {47} You cannot effect by isolated expeditions any of the
things which must be effected. You must organize a force, and provide
maintenance for it, and paymasters, and a staff of servants; and when
you have taken such steps as will ensure the strictest possible watch
being kept over the funds, you must hold these officials accountable
for the money, and the general for the actual operations. If you act
thus, and honestly make up your minds to take this course, you will
either compel Philip to observe a righteous peace and remain in his own
land--and no greater blessing could you obtain than that--or you will
fight him on equal terms.
{48} It may be thought that this policy demands heavy expenditure, and
great exertions and trouble. That is true indeed; but let the objector
take into account what the consequences to the city must be, if he is
unwilling to assent to this policy, and he will find that the ready
performance of duty brings its reward. {49} If indeed some god is
offering us his guarantee--for no human guarantee would be sufficient
in so great a matter--that if you remain at peace and let everything
slide, Philip will not in the end come and attack yourselves; then,
although, before God and every Heavenly Power, it would be unworthy of
you and of the position that the city holds, and of the deeds of our
forefathers, to abandon all the rest of the Hellenes to slavery for the
sake of our own ease--although, for my part, I would rather have died
than have suggested such a thing--yet, if another proposes it and
convinces you, let it be so: do not defend yourselves: let everything
go. {50} But if no one entertains such a belief, if we all know that
the very opposite is true, and that the wider the mastery we allow him
to gain, the more difficult and powerful a foe we shall have to deal
with, what further subterfuge is open to us? Why do we delay? {51} When
shall we ever be willing, men of Athens, to do our duty? 'When we are
compelled,' you say. But the hour of compulsion, as the word is applied
to free men, is not only here already, but has long passed; and we must
surely pray that the compulsion which is put upon slaves may not come
upon us. And what is the difference? It is this--that for a free man
the greatest compelling force is his shame at the course which events
are taking--I do not know what greater we can imagine; but the slave is
compelled by blows and bodily tortures, which I pray may never fall to
our lot; it is not fit to speak of them.
{52} I would gladly tell you the whole story, and show how certain
persons are working for your ruin by their policy. I pass over,
however, every point but this. Whenever any question of our relations
with Philip arises, at once some one stands up and talks of the
blessings of peace, of the difficulty of maintaining a large force, and
of designs on the part of certain persons to plunder our funds; with
other tales of the same kind, which enable them to delay your action,
and give Philip time to do what he wishes unopposed. {53} What is the
result? For you the result is your leisure, and a respite from
immediate action--advantages which I fear you will some day feel to
have cost you dear; and for them it is the favour they win, and the
wages for these services. But I am sure that there is no need to
persuade you to keep the Peace--you sit here fully persuaded. It is the
man who is committing acts of war that we need to persuade; for if he
is persuaded, you are ready enough. {54} Nor is it the expenditure
which is to ensure our preservation that ought to distress us, but the
fate which is in prospect for us, if we are not willing to take this
action: while the threatened 'plunder of our funds' is to be prevented
by the proposal of some safeguard which will render them secure, not by
the abandonment of our interests. {55} And even so, men of Athens, I
feel indignant at the very fact that some of you are so much pained at
the prospect of the plunder of our funds, when you have it in your
power both to protect them and to punish the culprits, and yet feel no
pain when Philip is seizing all Hellas piecemeal for his plunder, and
seizing it to strengthen himself against you. {56} What then is the
reason, men of Athens, that though Philip's campaigns, his aggressions,
his seizure of cities, are so unconcealed, none of my opponents has
ever said that _he_ was bringing about war? Why is it those who advise
you not to allow it, not to make these sacrifices, that they accuse,
and say that _they_ will be the cause of the war? I will inform you.
{57} It is because[n] they wish to divert the anger which you are
likely to show, if you suffer at all from the war, on to the heads of
those who are giving you the best advice in your own interests. They
want you to sit and try such persons, instead of resisting Philip; and
they themselves are to be the prosecutors, instead of paying the
penalty for their present actions. That is the meaning of their
assertion that there are some here, forsooth, who want to bring about
war. {58} That is the real point of these allegations of
responsibility. But this I know beyond all doubt--that without waiting
for any one in Athens to propose the declaration of war, Philip has not
only taken many other possessions of ours, but has just now sent an
expedition to Cardia. If, in spite of this, we wish to pretend that he
is not making war on us, he would be the most senseless man living,
were he to attempt to convince us of our error. {59} But what shall we
say, when his attack is made directly upon ourselves? He of course will
say that he is not at war with us--just as he was not at war with
Oreus,[n] when his soldiers were in the land; nor with the
Pheraeans,[n] before that, when he was assaulting their walls; nor with
the Olynthians, first of all, until he and his army were actually
within their territory. Or shall we still say that those who urge
resistance are bringing about war? If so, all that is left to us is
slavery. If we may neither offer resistance, nor yet be suffered to
remain at peace, no other compromise[n] is possible. {60} And further,
the issues at stake are not for you merely what they are for other
states. What Philip desires is not your subjection, but your utter
annihilation. For he knows full well that you will never consent to be
his slaves, and that even if you were willing, you would not know the
way, accustomed as you are to govern; and he knows that you will be
able to give him more trouble, if you get the opportunity, than all the
rest of the world. {61} The struggle, then, is a struggle for
existence; and as such you ought to think of it: and you should show
your abhorrence of those who have sold themselves to Philip by beating
them to death. For it is impossible, utterly impossible, to master your
enemies outside the city, before you punish your enemies in the city
itself. {62} Whence comes it, think you, that he is insulting us now
(for his conduct seems to me to be nothing less than this), and that
while he at least deceives all other peoples by doing them favours, he
is using threats against you without more ado? For instance, he enticed
the Thessalians by large gifts into their present servitude; and words
cannot describe how greatly he deceived the Olynthians at first by the
gift of Poteidaea and much beside. {63} At this moment he is alluring
the Thebans, by delivering up Boeotia to them, and ridding them of a
long and arduous campaign. Each of these peoples has first reaped some
advantage, before falling into those calamities which some of them have
already suffered, as all the world knows, and some are destined to
suffer whenever their time comes. But as for yourselves, to pass over
all that you have been robbed of at an earlier period,[n] what
deception, what robbery have been practised upon you in the very act of
making the Peace! {64} Have not the Phocians, and Thermopylae, and the
Thracian seaboard--Doriscus, Serrhium, Cersobleptes himself--been taken
from you? Does not Philip at this moment occupy the city of the
Cardians, and avow it openly? Why is it then, that he behaves as he
does to all others, and so differently to you? Because yours is the one
city in the world where men are permitted to speak on behalf of the
enemy without fear; because here a man may take bribes, and still
address you with impunity, even when you have been robbed of your own.
In Olynthus it was only safe to take Philip's side when the people of
Olynthus as a whole had shared Philip's favours, and was enjoying the
possession of Poteidaea. {65} In Thessaly it was only safe to take
Philip's side when the Thessalian commons had shared Philip's favours;
for he had expelled the tyrants for them, and restored to them their
Amphictyonic position. In Thebes it was not safe, until he had restored
Boeotia to Thebes and annihilated the Phocians. {66} But at
Athens--though Philip has not only robbed you of Amphipolis and the
territory of the Cardians, but has turned Euboea into a fortress
overlooking your country, and is now on his way to attack Byzantium--at
Athens it _is_ safe to speak in Philip's interest. Aye, and you know
that, of such speakers, some who were poor are rapidly growing rich;
and some who were without name or fame are becoming famous and
distinguished, while you, on the other hand, are becoming inglorious
instead of famous, bankrupt instead of wealthy. For a city's wealth
consists, I imagine, in allies, confidence, loyalty--and of all these
you are bankrupt. {67} And because you are indifferent to these
advantages, and let them drift away from you, he has become prosperous
and powerful, and formidable to all, Hellenes and foreigners alike;
while you are deserted and humbled, with a splendid profusion of
commodities in your market, and a contemptible lack of all those things
with which you should have been provided. But I observe that certain
speakers do not follow the same principles in the advice which they
give you, as they follow for themselves. _You_, they tell you, ought to
remain quiet, even when you are wronged; but _they_ cannot remain quiet
in your presence, even when no one is wronging them.
{68} But now some one or other comes forward and says, 'Ah, but you
will not move a motion or take any risk. You are a poor-spirited
coward.' Bold, offensive, shameless, I am not, and I trust I may never
be; and yet I think I have more courage than very many of your dashing
statesmen. {69} For one, men of Athens, who overlooks all that the
city's interest demands--who prosecutes, confiscates, gives,
accuses--does so not from any bravery, but because in the popular
character of his speeches and public actions he has a guarantee of his
personal safety, and therefore is bold without risk. But one who in
acting for the best sets himself in many ways against your wishes--who
never speaks to please, but always to advise what is best; one who
chooses a policy in which more issues must be decided by chance than by
calculation, and yet makes himself responsible to you for both--that is
the courageous man, {70} and such is the citizen who is of value to his
country, rather than those who, to gain an ephemeral popularity, have
ruined the supreme interests of the city. So far am I from envying
these men, or thinking them worthy citizens of their country, that if
any one were to ask me to say, what good _I_ had really done to the
city, although, men of Athens, I could tell how often I had been
trierarch and choregus,[n] how I had contributed funds, ransomed
prisoners, and done other like acts of generosity, I would mention none
of these things; {71} I would say only that my policy is not one of
measures like theirs--that although, like others, I could make
accusations and shower favours and confiscate property and do all that
my opponents do, I have never to this day set myself to do any of these
things; I have been influenced neither by gain nor by ambition; but I
continue to give the advice which sets me below many others in your
estimation, but which must make you greater, if you will listen to it;
for so much, perhaps, I may say without offence. {72} Nor, I think,
should I be acting fairly as a citizen, if I devised such political
measures as would at once make me the first man in Athens, and you the
last of all peoples. As the measures of a loyal politician develop, the
greatness of his country should develop with them; and it is the thing
which is best, not the thing which is easiest, that every speaker
should advocate. Nature will find the way to the easiest course
unaided. To the best, the words and the guidance of the loyal citizen
must show the way.
{73} I have heard it remarked before now, that though what I _say_ is
always what is best, still I never contribute anything but words;
whereas the city needs work of some practical kind. I will tell you
without any concealment my own sentiments on this matter. There _is_ no
work that can be demanded of any of your public advisers, except that
he should advise what is best; and I think I can easily show you that
this is so. {74} No doubt you know how the great Timotheus[n] delivered
a speech to the effect that you ought to go to the rescue and save the
Euboeans, when the Thebans were trying to reduce them to servitude; and
how, in the course of his speech, he spoke somewhat in this
strain:--'What?' said he, 'when you actually have the Thebans in the
island, do you debate what you are to do with them, and how you are to
act? Will you not cover the sea with warships, men of Athens? Will you
not rise from your seats and go instantly to the Peiraeus and launch
your vessels?' {75} So Timotheus spoke, and you acted as he bade you;
and through his speech and your action the work was done. But if he had
given you the best possible advice (as in fact he did), and you had
lapsed into indolence and paid no attention to it, would the city have
achieved any of the results which followed on that occasion?
Impossible! And so it is with all that I say to-day, and with all that
this or that speaker may say. For the actions you must look to
yourselves; from the speaker you must require that he give you the best
counsel that he can.[n]
{76} I desire now to sum up my advice and to leave the platform. I say
that we must contribute funds, and must keep together the force now in
existence, correcting anything that may seem amiss in it, but not
disbanding the whole force because of the possible criticisms against
it. We must send envoys everywhere to instruct, to warn, and to act.
Above all, we must punish those who take bribes in connexion with
public affairs, and must everywhere display our abhorrence of them; in
order that reasonable men, who offer their honest services, may find
their policy justified in their own eyes and in those of others. {77}
If you treat the situation thus, and cease to ignore it altogether,
there is a chance--a chance I say, even now--that it may improve. If,
however, you sit idle, with an interest that stops short at applause
and acclamation, and retires into the background when any action is
required, I can imagine no oratory, which, without action on your part,
will be able to save your country.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Third Philippic §§ 59 sqq.
[2] See Introduction to First Philippic.
[3] [Greek: est_o d_e.]
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC (Or. IX)
[_Introduction_. The Third Philippic seems to have been delivered in
the late spring or early summer of 341 B. C., about two months after
the Speech on the Chersonese, which apparently had little positive
result, though it probably prevented the recall and prosecution of
Diopeithes. The immediate occasion of the Third Philippic was a request
from the forces in the Chersonese for supplies. The general situation
is the same as at the date of the last speech, but the danger to
Byzantium is more pressing. Demosthenes now takes the broad ground of
Panhellenic policy, and formally proposes to send envoys throughout
Greece, to unite all the Greek states against Philip, as well as to
send immediate reinforcements and supplies to the Chersonese.
Many critics, ancient and modern, have regarded this as the greatest of
all Demosthenes' political orations. The lessons of history (from the
speaker's point of view) are repeated and enforced by the citation of
instance after instance. The tone of the speech, while less varied than
that of the last, is grave and intense. The passage (§§ 36 ff.) in
which the orator contrasts the spirit of Athenian political life in the
past with that of his own day is one of the most impressive in all his
works, and the nobility of his appeal to the traditional ideals of
Athenian policy has been universally recognized even by his most severe
critics.
The speech is found in the MSS. in two forms, of which the shorter
omits a number of passages[1] which the longer includes, though there
are signs of an imperfect blending of the two versions in certain
places. It seems probable that both versions are due to Demosthenes,
and the speech may have been more than once revised by him before
publication or republication. In which form it was delivered there is
not sufficient evidence to show.]
{1} Many speeches are made, men of Athens, at almost every meeting of
the Assembly, with reference to the aggressions which Philip has been
committing, ever since he concluded the Peace, not only against
yourselves but against all other peoples; and I am sure that all would
agree, however little they may act on their belief, that our aim, both
in speech and in action, should be to cause him to cease from his
insolence and to pay the penalty for it. And yet I see that in fact the
treacherous sacrifice of our interests has gone on, until what seems an
ill-omened saying may, I fear, be really true--that if all who came
forward desired to propose, and you desired to carry, the measures
which would make your position as pitiful as it could possibly be, it
could not (so I believe), be made worse than it is now. {2} It may be
that there are many reasons for this, and that our affairs did not
reach their present condition from any one or two causes. But if you
examine the matter aright, you will find that the chief responsibility
rests with those whose aim is to win your favour, not to propose what
is best. Some of them, men of Athens, so long as they can maintain the
conditions which bring them reputation and influence, take no thought
for the future [and therefore think that you also should take none];
while others, by accusing and slandering those who are actively at
work,[n] are simply trying to make the city spend its energies in
punishing the members of its own body, and so leave Philip free to say
and do what he likes. {3} Such political methods as these, familiar to
you as they are, are the real causes of the evil. And I beg you, men of
Athens, if I tell you certain truths outspokenly, to let no resentment
on your part fall upon me on this account. Consider the matter in this
light. In every other sphere of life, you believe that the right of
free speech ought to be so universally shared by all who are in the
city, that you have extended it both to foreigners and to slaves; and
one may see many a servant in Athens speaking his mind with greater
liberty than is granted to citizens in some other states: but from the
sphere of political counsel you have utterly banished this liberty. {4}
The result[n] is that in your meetings you give yourselves airs and
enjoy their flattery, listening to nothing but what is meant to please
you, while in the world of facts and events, you are in the last
extremity of peril. If then you are still in this mood to-day, I do not
know what I can say; but if you are willing to listen while I tell you,
without flattery, what your interest requires, I am prepared to speak.
For though our position is very bad indeed, and much has been
sacrificed, it is still possible, even now, if you will do your duty,
to set all right once more. {5} It is a strange thing, perhaps, that I
am about to say, but it is true. The worst feature in the past is that
in which lies our best hope for the future. And what is this? It is
that you are in your present plight because you do not do any part of
your duty, small or great; for of course, if you were doing all that
you should do, and were still in this evil case, you could not even
hope for any improvement. As it is, Philip has conquered your indolence
and your indifference; but he has not conquered Athens. You have not
been vanquished--you have never even stirred. {6} [Now if it was
admitted by us all that Philip was at war with Athens, and was
transgressing the Peace, a speaker would have to do nothing but to
advise you as to the safest and easiest method of resistance to him.
But since there are some who are in so extraordinary a frame of mind
that, though he is capturing cities, though many of your possessions
are in his hands, and though he is committing aggressions against all
men, they still tolerate certain speakers, who constantly assert at
your meetings that it is some of _us_ who are provoking the war, it is
necessary to be on our guard and come to a right understanding on the
matter. {7} For there is a danger lest any one who proposes or advises
resistance should find himself accused of having brought about the war.]
[Well, I say this first of all, and lay it down as a principle, that if
it is open to us to deliberate whether we should remain at peace or
should go to war ...]
{8} Now if it is possible for the city to remain at peace--if the
decision rests with us (that I may make this my starting-point)--then,
I say that we ought to do so, and I call upon any one who says that it
is so to move his motion, and to act and not to defraud us.[n] But if
another with weapons in his hands and a large force about him holds out
to you the _name_ of peace, while his own acts are acts of war, what
course remains open to us but that of resistance? though if you wish to
profess peace in the same manner as he, I have no quarrel with you. {9}
But if any man's conception of peace is that it is a state in which
Philip can master all that intervenes till at last he comes to attack
ourselves, such a conception, in the first place, is madness; and, in
the second place, this peace that he speaks of is a peace which you are
to observe towards Philip, while he does not observe it towards you:
and this it is--this power to carry on war against you, without being
met by any hostilities on your part--that Philip is purchasing with all
the money that he is spending.
{10} Indeed, if we intend to wait till the time comes when he admits
that he is at war with us, we are surely the most innocent persons in
the world. Why, even if he comes to Attica itself, to the very
Peiraeus, he will never make such an admission, if we are to judge by
his dealings with others. {11} For, to take one instance, he told the
Olynthians, when he was five miles from the city, that there were only
two alternatives--either they must cease to live in Olynthus, or he to
live in Macedonia: but during the whole time before that, whenever any
one accused him of any such sentiments, he was indignant and sent
envoys to answer the charge. Again, he marched into the Phocians'
country, as though visiting his allies:[n] it was by Phocian envoys
that he was escorted on the march; and most people in Athens contended
strongly that his crossing the Pass would bring no good to Thebes. {12}
Worse still, he has lately seized Pherae[n] and still holds it, though
he went to Thessaly as a friend and an ally. And, latest of all, he
told those unhappy citizens of Oreus[n] that he had sent his soldiers
to visit them and to make kind inquiries; he had heard that they were
sick, and suffering from faction, and it was right for an ally and a
true friend to be present at such a time. {13} Now if, instead of
giving them warning and using open force, he deliberately chose to
deceive these men, who could have done him no harm, though they might
have taken precautions against suffering any themselves, do you imagine
that he will make a formal declaration of war upon you before he
commences hostilities, and that, so long as you are content to be
deceived? {14} Impossible! For so long as you, though you are the
injured party, make no complaint against him, but accuse some of your
own body, he would be the most fatuous man on earth if _he_ were to
interrupt your strife and contentions with one another--to bid you turn
upon himself, and so to cut away the ground from the arguments by which
his hirelings put you off, when they tell you that _he_ is not at war
with Athens.
{15} In God's name, is there a man in his senses who would judge by
words, and not by facts, whether another was at peace or at war with
him? Of course there is not. Why, from the very first, when the Peace
had only just been made, before those who are now in the Chersonese had
been sent out, Philip was taking Serrhium[n] and Doriscus, and
expelling the soldiers who were in the castle of Serrhium and the
Sacred Mountain, where they had been placed by your general. {16} But
what was he doing, in acting thus? For he had sworn to a Peace.[n] And
let no one ask, 'What do these things amount to? What do they matter to
Athens?' For whether these acts were trifles which could have no
interest for you is another matter; but the principles of religion[n]
and justice, whether a man transgress them in small things or great,
have always the same force. What? When he is sending mercenaries into
the Chersonese, which the king and all the Hellenes have acknowledged
to be yours; when he openly avows that he is going to the rescue, and
states it in his letter, what is it that he is doing? {17} He tells
you, indeed, that he is not making war upon you. But so far am I from
admitting that one who acts in this manner is observing the Peace which
he made with you, that I hold that in grasping at Megara, in setting up
tyrants in Euboea, in advancing against Thrace at the present moment,
in pursuing his machinations in the Peloponnese, and in carrying out
his entire policy with the help of his army, he is violating the Peace
and is making war against you;--unless you mean to say that even to
bring up engines to besiege you is no breach of the Peace, until they
are actually planted against your walls. But you will not say this; for
the man who is taking the steps and contriving the means which will
lead to my capture is at war with me, even though he has not yet thrown
a missile or shot an arrow. {18} Now what are the things which would
imperil your safety, if anything should happen?[n] The alienation of
the Hellespont, the placing of Megara and Euboea in the power of the
enemy, and the attraction of Peloponnesian sympathy to his cause. Can I
then say that one who is erecting such engines of war as these against
the city is at peace with you? {19} Far from it! For from the very day
when he annihilated the Phocians--from that very day, I say, I date the
beginning of his hostilities against you. And for your part, I think
that you will be wise if you resist him at once; but that if you let
him be, you will find that, when you wish to resist, resistance itself
is impossible. Indeed, so widely do I differ, men of Athens, from all
your other advisers, that I do not think there is any room for
discussion to-day in regard to the Chersonese or Byzantium. {20} We
_must_ go to their defence, and take every care that they do not suffer
[and we must send all that they need to the soldiers who are at present
there]. But we _have_ to take counsel for the good of all the Hellenes,
in view of the grave peril in which they stand. And I wish to tell you
on what grounds I am so alarmed at the situation, in order that if my
reasoning is correct, you may share my conclusions, and exercise some
forethought for yourselves at least, if you are actually unwilling to
do so for the Hellenes as a whole; but that if you think that I am
talking nonsense, and am out of my senses, you may both now and
hereafter decline to attend to me as though I were a sane man.
{21} The rise of Philip to greatness from such small and humble
beginnings; the mistrustful and quarrelsome attitude of the Hellenes
towards one another; the fact that his growth out of what he was into
what he is was a far more extraordinary thing than would be his
subjugation of all that remains, when he has already secured so
much;--all this and all similar themes, upon which I might speak at
length, I will pass over. {22} But I see that all men, beginning with
yourselves, have conceded to him the very thing which has been at issue
in every Hellenic war during the whole of the past. And what is this?
It is the right to act as he pleases --to mutilate and to strip the
Hellenic peoples, one by one, to attack and to enslave their cities.
{23} For seventy-three years[n] you were the leading people of Hellas,
and the Spartans for thirty years save one;[n] and in these last times,
after the battle of Leuctra,[n] the Thebans too acquired some power:
yet neither to you nor to Thebes nor to Sparta was such a right ever
conceded by the Hellenes, as the right to do whatever you pleased. Far
from it! {24} First of all it was your own behaviour--or rather that of
the Athenians of that day--which some thought immoderate; and all, even
those who had no grievance against Athens, felt bound to join the
injured parties, and to make war upon you. Then, in their turn, the
Spartans, when they had acquired an empire and succeeded to a supremacy
like your own, attempted to go beyond all bounds and to disturb the
established order[n] to an unjustifiable extent; and once more, all,
even those who had no grievance against them, had recourse to war. {25}
Why mention the others? For we ourselves and the Spartans, though we
could originally allege no injury done by the one people to the other,
nevertheless felt bound to go to war on account of the wrongs which we
saw the rest suffering. And yet all the offences of the Spartans in
those thirty years of power, and of your ancestors in their seventy
years, were less, men of Athens, than the wrongs inflicted upon the
Greeks by Philip, in the thirteen years, not yet completed, during
which he has been to the fore. Less do I say? {26} They are not a
fraction of them. [A few words will easily prove this.] I say nothing
of Olynthus, and Methone, and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities in the
Thracian region,[n] all annihilated by him with such savagery, that a
visitor to the spot would find it difficult to tell that they had ever
been inhabited. I remain silent in regard to the extirpation of the
great Phocian race. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not
robbed their very cities of their governments,[n] and set up
tetrarchies, that they may be enslaved, not merely by whole cities, but
by whole tribes at a time? {27} Are not the cities of Euboea even now
ruled by tyrants, and that in an island that is neighbour to Thebes and
Athens? Does he not write expressly in his letters, 'I am at peace with
those who choose to obey me'? And what he thus writes he does not fail
to act upon; for he is gone to invade the Hellespont; he previously
went to attack Ambracia;[n] the great city of Elis[n] in the
Peloponnese is his; he has recently intrigued against Megara;[n] and
neither Hellas nor the world beyond it is large enough to contain the
man's ambition. {28} But though all of us, the Hellenes, see and hear
these things, we send no representatives to one another to discuss the
matter; we show no indignation; we are in so evil a mood, so deep have
the lines been dug which sever city from city, that up to this very day
we are unable to act as either our interest or our duty require. {29}
We cannot unite; we can form no combination for mutual support or
friendship; but we look on while the man grows greater, because every
one has made up his mind (as it seems to me) to profit by the time
during which his neighbour is being ruined, and no one cares or acts
for the safety of the Hellenes. For we all know that Philip is like the
recurrence or the attack of a fever or other illness, in his descent
upon those who fancy themselves for the present well out of his reach.
{30} And further, you must surely realize that all the wrongs that the
Hellenes suffered from the Spartans or ourselves they at least suffered
at the hands of true-born sons of Hellas; and (one might conceive) it
was as though a lawful son, born to a great estate, managed his affairs
in some wrong or improper way;--his conduct would in itself deserve
blame and denunciation, but at least it could not be said that he was
not one of the family, or was not the heir to the property. {31} But
had it been a slave or a supposititious son that was thus ruining and
spoiling an inheritance to which he had no title, why, good Heavens!
how infinitely more scandalous and reprehensible all would have
declared it to be. And yet they show no such feeling in regard to
Philip, although not only is he no Hellene, not only has he no kinship
with Hellenes, but he is not even a barbarian from a country that one
could acknowledge with credit;--he is a pestilent Macedonian, from
whose country it used not to be possible to buy even a slave of any
value.
{32} And in spite of this, is there any degree of insolence to which he
does not proceed? Not content with annihilating cities, does he not
manage the Pythian games,[n] the common meeting of the Hellenes, and
send his slaves to preside over the competition in his absence? [Is he
not master of Thermopylae, and of the passes which lead into Hellenic
territory? Does he not hold that district with garrisons and
mercenaries? Has he not taken the precedence in consulting the oracle,
and thrust aside ourselves and the Thessalians and Dorians and the rest
of the Amphictyons, though the right is not one which is given even to
all of the Hellenes?] {33} Does he not write to the Thessalians to
prescribe the constitution under which they are to live? Does he not
send one body of mercenaries to Porthmus, to expel the popular party of
Eretria, and another to Oreus, to set up Philistides as tyrant? And yet
the Hellenes see these things and endure them, gazing (it seems to me)
as they would gaze at a hailstorm--each people praying that it may not
come their way, but no one trying to prevent it. Nor is it only his
outrages upon Hellas that go unresisted. {34} No one resists even the
aggressions which are committed against himself. Ambracia and Leucas
belong to the Corinthians--he has attacked them: Naupactus to the
Achaeans--he has sworn to hand it over to the Aetolians: Echinus[n] to
the Thebans--he has taken it from them, and is now marching against
their allies the Byzantines--is it not so? {35} And of our own
possessions, to pass by all the rest, is not Cardia, the greatest city
in the Chersonese, in his hands? Thus are we treated; and we are all
hesitating and torpid, with our eyes upon our neighbours, distrusting
one another, rather than the man whose victims we all are. But if he
treats us collectively in this outrageous fashion, what do you think he
will do, when he has become master of each of us separately?
{36} What then is the cause of these things? For as it was not without
reason and just cause that the Hellenes in old days were so prompt for
freedom, so it is not without reason or cause that they are now so
prompt to be slaves. There was a spirit, men of Athens, a spirit in the
minds of the people in those days, which is absent to-day--the spirit
which vanquished the wealth of Persia, which led Hellas in the path of
freedom, and never gave way in face of battle by sea or by land; a
spirit whose extinction to-day has brought universal ruin and turned
Hellas upside down. What was this spirit? [It was nothing subtle nor
clever.] {37} It meant that men who took money from those who aimed at
dominion or at the ruin of Hellas were execrated by all; that it was
then a very grave thing to be convicted of bribery; that the punishment
for the guilty man was the heaviest that could be inflicted; that for
him there could be no plea for mercy, nor hope of pardon. {38} No
orator, no general, would then sell the critical opportunity whenever
it arose--the opportunity so often offered to men by fortune, even when
they are careless and their foes are on their guard. They did not
barter away the harmony between people and people, nor their own
mistrust of the tyrant and the foreigner, nor any of these high
sentiments. {39} Where are such sentiments now? They have been sold in
the market and are gone; and those have been imported in their stead,
through which the nation lies ruined and plague-stricken--the envy of
the man who has received his hire; the amusement which accompanies his
avowal; [the pardon granted to those whose guilt is proved;] the hatred
of one who censures the crime; and all the appurtenances of corruption.
{40} For as to ships, numerical strength, unstinting abundance of funds
and all other material of war, and all the things by which the strength
of cities is estimated, every people can command these in greater
plenty and on a larger scale by far than in old days. But all these
resources are rendered unserviceable, ineffectual, unprofitable, by
those who traffic in them.
{41} That these things are so to-day, you doubtless see, and need no
testimony of mine: and that in times gone by the opposite was true, I
will prove to you, not by any words of my own, but by the record
inscribed by your ancestors on a pillar of bronze, and placed on the
Acropolis [not to be a lesson to themselves--they needed no such record
to put them in a right mind--but to be a reminder and an example to you
of the zeal that you ought to display in such a cause]. {42} What then
is the record? 'Arthmius,[n] son of Pythonax, of Zeleia, is an outlaw,
and is the enemy of the Athenian people and their allies, he and his
house.' Then follows the reason for which this step was taken--'because
he brought the gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese.' {43} Such is
the record. Consider, in Heaven's name, what must have been the mind of
the Athenians of that day, when they did this, and their conception of
their position. They set up a record, that because a man of Zeleia,
Arthmius by name, a slave of the King of Persia (for Zeleia is in
Asia), as part of his service to the king, had brought gold, not to
Athens, but to the Peloponnese, he should be an enemy of Athens and her
allies, he and his house, and that they should be outlaws. {44} And
this outlawry is no such disfranchisement as we ordinarily mean by the
word. For what would it matter to a man of Zeleia, that he might have
no share in the public life of Athens? But there is a clause in the Law
of Murder, dealing with those in connexion with whose death the law
does not allow a prosecution for murder [but the slaying of them is to
be a holy act]: 'And let him die an outlaw,' it runs. The meaning,
accordingly, is this--that the slayer of such a man is to be pure from
all guilt. {45} They thought, therefore, that the safety of all the
Hellenes was a matter which concerned themselves--apart from this
belief, it could not have mattered to them whether any one bought or
corrupted men in the Peloponnese; and whenever they detected such
offenders, they carried their punishment and their vengeance so far as
to pillory their names for ever. As the natural consequence, the
Hellenes were a terror to the foreigner, not the foreigner to the
Hellenes. It is not so now. Such is not your attitude in these or in
other matters. {46} But what is it? [You know it yourselves; for why
should I accuse you explicitly on every point? And that of the rest of
the Hellenes is like your own, and no better; and so I say that the
present situation demands our utmost earnestness and good counsel.[n]]
And what counsel? Do you bid me tell you, and will you not be angry if
I do so?
[_He reads from the document_.]
{47} Now there is an ingenuous argument, which is used by those who
would reassure the city, to the effect that, after all, Philip is not
yet in the position once held by the Spartans, who ruled everywhere
over sea and land, with the king for their ally, and nothing to
withstand them; and that, none the less, Athens defended herself even
against them, and was not swept away. Since that time the progress in
every direction, one may say, has been great, and has made the world
to-day very different from what it was then; but I believe that in no
respect has there been greater progress or development than in the art
of war. {48} In the first place, I am told that in those days the
Spartans and all our other enemies would invade us for four or five
months--during, that is, the actual summer--and would damage Attica
with infantry and citizen-troops, and then return home again. And so
old-fashioned were the men of that day--nay rather, such true
citizens--that no one ever purchased any object from another for money,
but their warfare was of a legitimate and open kind. {49} But now, as I
am sure you see, most of our losses are the result of treachery, and no
issue is decided by open conflict or battle; while you are told that it
is not because he leads a column of heavy infantry[n] that Philip can
march wherever he chooses, but because he has attached to himself a
force of light infantry, cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and similar
troops. {50} And whenever, with such advantages,[n] he falls upon a
State which is disordered within, and in their distrust of one another
no one goes out in defence of its territory, he brings up his engines
and besieges them. I pass over the fact that summer and winter are
alike to him--that there is no close season during which he suspends
operations. {51} But if you all know these things and take due account
of them, you surely must not let the war pass into Attica, nor be
dashed from your seat through looking back to the simplicity of those
old hostilities with Sparta. You must guard against him, at the
greatest possible distance, both by political measures and by
preparations; you must prevent his stirring from home, instead of
grappling with him at close quarters in a struggle to the death. {52}
For, men of Athens, we have many natural advantages for a war,[n] if we
are willing to do our duty. There is the character of his country, much
of which we can harry and damage, and a thousand other things. But for
a pitched battle he is in better training than we.
{53} Nor have you only to recognize these facts, and to resist him by
actual operations of war. You must also by reasoned judgement and of
set purpose come to execrate those who address you in his interest,
remembering that it is impossible to master the enemies of the city,
until you punish those who are serving them in the city itself. {54}
And this, before God and every Heavenly Power--this you will not be
able to do; for you have reached such a pitch of folly or distraction
or--I know not what to call it; for often has the fear actually entered
my mind, that some more than mortal power may be driving our fortunes
to ruin--that to enjoy their abuse, or their malice, or their jests, or
whatever your motive may chance to be, you call upon men to speak who
are hirelings, and some of whom would not even deny it; and you laugh
to hear their abuse of others. {55} And terrible as this is, there is
yet worse to be told. For you have actually made political life safer
for these men, than for those who uphold your own cause. And yet
observe what calamities the willingness to listen to such men lays up
in store. I will mention facts known to you all.
{56} In Olynthus, among those who were engaged in public affairs, there
was one party who were on the side of Philip, and served his interests
in everything; and another whose aim was their city's real good, and
the preservation of their fellow citizens from bondage. Which were the
destroyers of their country? which betrayed the cavalry, through whose
betrayal Olynthus perished? Those whose sympathies were with Philip's
cause; those who, while the city still existed brought such dishonest
and slanderous charges against the speakers whose advice was for the
best, that, in the case of Apollonides at least, the people of Olynthus
was even induced to banish the accused.
{57} Nor is this instance of the unmixed evil wrought by these
practices in the case of the Olynthians an exceptional one, or without
parallel elsewhere. For in Eretria,[n] when Plutarchus and the
mercenaries had been got rid of, and the people had control of the city
and of Porthmus, one party wished to entrust the State to you, the
other to entrust it to Philip. And through listening mainly, or rather
entirely, to the latter, these poor luckless Eretrians were at last
persuaded to banish the advocates of their own interests. {58} For, as
you know, Philip, their ally, sent Hipponicus with a thousand
mercenaries, stripped Porthmus of its walls, and set up three
tyrants--Hipparchus, Automedon, and Cleitarchus; and since then he has
already twice expelled them from the country when they wished to
recover their position [sending on the first occasion the mercenaries
commanded by Eurylochus, on the second, those under Parmenio].
{59} And why go through the mass of the instances? Enough to mention
how in Oreus Philip had, as his agents, Philistides, Menippus,
Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus--the very men who are now in possession
of the city--and every one knew the fact; while a certain Euphraeus,[n]
who once lived here in Athens, acted in the interests of freedom, to
save his country from bondage. {60} To describe the insults and the
contumely with which he met would require a long story; but a year
before the capture of the town he laid an information of treason
against Philistides and his party, having perceived the nature of their
plans. A number of men joined forces, with Philip for their paymaster
and director, and haled Euphraeus off to prison as a disturber of the
peace. {61} Seeing this, the democratic party in Oreus, instead of
coming to the rescue of Euphraeus, and beating the other party to
death, displayed no anger at all against them, and agreed with a
malicious pleasure that Euphraeus deserved his fate. After this the
conspirators worked with all the freedom they desired for the capture
of the city, and made arrangements for the execution of the scheme;
while any of the democratic party, who perceived what was going on,
maintained a panic-stricken silence, remembering the fate of Euphraeus.
So wretched was their condition, that though this dreadful calamity was
confronting them, no one dared open his lips, until all was ready and
the enemy was advancing up to the walls. Then the one party set about
the defence, the other about the betrayal of the city. {62} And when
the city had been captured in this base and shameful manner, the
successful party governed despotically: and of those who had been their
own protectors, and had been ready to treat Euphraeus with all possible
harshness, they expelled some and murdered others; while the good
Euphraeus killed himself, thus testifying to the righteousness and
purity of his motives in opposing Philip on behalf of his countrymen.
{63} Now for what reason, you may be wondering, were the peoples of
Olynthus and Eretria and Oreus more agreeably disposed towards Philip's
advocates than towards their own? The reason was the same as it is with
you--that those who speak for your true good can never, even if they
would, speak to win popularity with you; they are constrained to
inquire how the State may be saved: while their opponents, in the very
act of seeking popularity, are co-operating with Philip. {64} The one
party said, 'You must pay taxes;' the other, 'There is no need to do
so.' The one said, 'Go to war, and do not trust him;' the other,
'Remain at peace,'--until they were in the toils. And--not to mention
each separately--I believe that the same thing was true of all. The one
side said what would enable them to win favour; the other, what would
secure the safety of their State. And at last the main body of the
people accepted much that they proposed--not now from any such desire
for gratification, nor from ignorance, but as a concession to
circumstances, thinking that their cause was now wholly lost. {65} It
is this fate, I solemnly assure you, that I dread for you, when the
time comes that you make your reckoning, and realize that there is no
longer anything that can be done. May you never find yourselves, men of
Athens, in such a position! Yet in any case, it were better to die ten
thousand deaths, than to do anything out of servility towards Philip
[or to sacrifice any of those who speak for your good]. A noble
recompense did the people in Oreus receive, for entrusting themselves
to Philip's friends, and thrusting Euphraeus aside! {66} and a noble
recompense the democracy of Eretria, for driving away your envoys, and
surrendering to Cleitarchus! They are slaves, scourged and butchered! A
noble clemency did he show to the Olynthians, who elected Lasthenes to
command the cavalry, and banished Apollonides! {67} It is folly, and it
is cowardice, to cherish hopes like these, to give way to evil
counsels, to refuse to do anything that you should do, to listen to the
advocates of the enemy's cause, and to fancy that you dwell in so great
a city that, whatever happens, you will not suffer any harm. {68} Aye,
and it is shameful to exclaim after the event, 'Why, who would have
expected this? Of course, we ought to have done, or not to have done,
such and such things!' The Olynthians could tell you of many things, to
have foreseen which in time would have saved them from destruction. So
too could the people of Oreus, and the Phocians, and every other people
that has been destroyed. {69} But how does that help them now? So long
as the vessel is safe, be it great or small, so long must the sailor
and the pilot and every man in his place exert himself and take care
that no one may capsize it by design or by accident: but when the seas
have overwhelmed it, all their efforts are in vain. {70} So it is, men
of Athens, with us. While we are still safe, with our great city, our
vast resources, our noble name, what are we to do? Perhaps some one
sitting here has long been wishing to ask this question. Aye, and I
will answer it, and will move my motion; and you shall carry it, if you
wish. We ourselves, in the first place, must conduct the resistance and
make preparation for it--with ships, that is, and money, and soldiers.
For though all but ourselves give way and become slaves, we at least
must contend for freedom. {71} And when we have made all these
preparations ourselves, and let them be seen, then let us call upon the
other states for aid, and send envoys to carry our message [in all
directions--to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, to the king; for
it is not unimportant for his interests either that Philip should be
prevented from subjugating the world]; that so, if you persuade them,
you may have partners to share the danger and the expense, in case of
need; and if you do not, you may at least delay the march of events.
{72} For since the war is with a single man, and not against the
strength of a united state, even delay is not without its value, any
more than were those embassies[n] of protest which last year went round
the Peloponnese, when I and Polyeuctus, that best of men, and
Hegesippus and the other envoys went on our tour, and forced him to
halt, so that he neither went to attack Acarnania, nor set out for the
Peloponnese. {73} But I do not mean that we should call upon the other
states, if we are not willing to take any of the necessary steps
ourselves. It is folly to sacrifice what is our own, and then pretend
to be anxious for the interests of others--to neglect the present, and
alarm others in regard to the future. I do not propose this. I say that
we must send money to the forces in the Chersonese, and do all that
they ask of us; that we must make preparation ourselves, while we
summon, convene, instruct, and warn the rest of the Hellenes. That is
the policy for a city with a reputation such as yours. {74} But if you
fancy that the people of Chalcis or of Megara will save Hellas, while
you run away from the task, you are mistaken. They may well be content
if they can each save themselves. The task is yours. It is the
prerogative that your forefathers won, and through many a great peril
bequeathed to you. {75} But if each of you is to sit and consult his
inclinations, looking for some way by which he may escape any personal
action, the first consequence will be that you will never find any one
who will act; and the second, I fear, that the day will come when we
shall be forced to do, at one and the same time, all the things we wish
to avoid.
{76} This then is my proposal, and this I move. If the proposal is
carried out, I think that even now the state of our affairs may be
remedied. But if any one has a better proposal to make, let him make
it, and give us his advice. And I pray to all the gods that whatever be
the decision that you are about to make, it may be for your good.
FOOTNOTES
[1] These are printed in square brackets in the translation.
ON THE CROWN (Or. XVIII)
[_Introduction_. The advice given by Demosthenes in the Third Philippic
(spoken before the middle of 341) was in the main followed. He himself
was sent almost immediately to Byzantium, where he renewed the alliance
between that city and Athens, and at the same time entered into
relations with Abydos and the Thracian princes. Rhodes, and probably
Chios and Cos, were also conciliated, and an embassy was sent to the
King of Persia to ask for aid against Philip. The king appears to have
sent assistance to Diopeithes, and it is also stated (not on the best
authority) that he sent large sums of money to Demosthenes and
Hypereides. Demosthenes further succeeded, in conjunction with Callias
of Chalcis, in organizing a league against Philip, which included
Corinth, Megara, Corcyra, and the Acarnanians, and which at least
supplied a considerable number of men and some funds. The cities of
Euboea, most of which had been in the hands of Philip's party, were
also formed into a confederacy, in alliance with Athens, under the
leadership of Chalcis; Philistides was expelled from Oreus, about July
341, by the allied forces under Cephisophon; and later in the summer,
Phocion drove Cleitarchus from Eretria. On the motion of Aristonicus,
the Athenians voted Demosthenes a golden crown, which was conferred on
him in the theatre at the Great Dionysia in March 340. The arrest of
Anaxinus of Oreus, and his condemnation as a spy, acting in Philip's
interest, must have occurred about the same time. Not long afterwards
Demosthenes succeeded in carrying out a complete reorganization of the
trierarchic system, by which he made the burden of the expense vary
strictly according to property, and secured a regular and efficient
supply of ships, money, and men.
In the meantime (in 341 or 340) the island of Peparethus was attacked
by Philip's ships, in revenge for the seizure of the Macedonian
garrison in Halonnesus by the Peparethians: and the Athenian admirals
were ordered to retaliate. Philip himself had been pursuing his course
in Thrace; and on the rejection of his request to Byzantium for an
alliance, he laid siege (late in 340) to Perinthus (which lay on his
way to Byzantium), sending part of his forces through the Chersonese.
Aided by Byzantine and Persian soldiers, Perinthus held out, till at
last Philip took off most of his forces and besieged Byzantium itself.
He had shortly before this sent to Athens an express declaration of
war, and received a similar declaration from her, the formal excuse for
which was found in the recent seizure by his ships of some Athenian
merchant-vessels. But with help from Athens, Chios, Rhodes, and Cos,
the Byzantines maintained the defence. Philip's position became
serious; but he managed by a ruse to get his ships away into the open
sea, and even to do some damage to the Athenian settlers in the
Chersonese. In the winter he withdrew from Byzantium, and in 339 made
an incursion into Scythia; but, returning through the country of the
Triballi, he sustained some loss, and was severely wounded. Later in
the year a new Sacred War which had arisen gave him a convenient
opportunity for the invasion of Greece.
At the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in the autumn of 340,[1]
Aeschines was one of the representatives of Athens. The Athenians had
recently offended Thebes by re-gilding and dedicating in the restored
temple at Delphi fifty shields, with an inscription stating that they
were spoil 'taken from the Medes and the Thebans, when they fought
against the Hellenes' (probably at Plataeae in 479). The Locrians of
Amphissa intended (according to Aeschines' account) to propose that the
Council should fine Athens fifty talents. Aeschines rose to state the
case for Athens; but a delegate from Amphissa forbade all mention of
the Athenians, and demanded their exclusion from the temple, on the
ground of their alliance with the accursed Phocians. Aeschines retorted
by charging the Amphisseans with cultivating and building upon the
sacred plain of Cirrha--acts forbidden for all time in 586 B.C.--and
roused the Council to such indignation that they gathered a body of men
and destroyed the harbour and the unlawful buildings of Cirrha; but
they were severely handled by the Amphisseans, and the Council now
voted that the Amphictyonic states should send representatives, to
discuss the question of war against Amphissa, to a meeting to be held
at Thermopylae before the spring meeting of the Council. To this
preliminary meeting, the Athenians (though inclined to view Aeschines'
performance with favour), on the advice of Demosthenes, sent no
representatives; nor did the Thebans (the allies of Amphissa). War was
declared by the Amphictyons against Amphissa; but Cottyphus, the
Thessalian, who had been appointed general, made little headway, and
(at the spring or the autumn meeting of the Council) declared that the
Amphictyonic states must either send men and money, or else make Philip
their general. Philip was, of course, at once appointed; but instead of
proceeding against Amphissa, marched to Elateia and fortified it. This
caused the greatest alarm at Athens. Demosthenes was immediately
dispatched to Thebes, where he succeeded, by what appear to have been
liberal and judicious proposals, in making an alliance between Thebes
and Athens, in spite of the attempts of Philip's envoys to counteract
his influence. Euboea, Megara, Corinth, and other members of the league
also sent help. Philip himself called upon his own friends in the
Peloponnese for aid, and at last moved towards Amphissa. Demosthenes
seems now to have succeeded in applying the festival-money to purposes
of war, and with the aid of Lycurgus, who became Controller of the
Festival Fund, to have amassed a large sum for the use of the State. At
the Dionysia of 338 he was again crowned, on the proposal of Demomeles
and Hypereides. The allies at first won some successes and refortified
some of the Phocian towns, but afterwards unfortunately divided their
forces, and so enabled Philip to defeat the two divisions separately,
and to destroy Amphissa. Philip's proposals of peace found supporters
both in Thebes and in Athens, but were counteracted by Demosthenes.
Late in the summer of 338, the decisive battle was fought at
Chaeroneia, and resulted in the total rout of the allies. Demosthenes
himself was one of the fugitives. Philip placed a Macedonian garrison
in Thebes, restored his exiled friends to power there, established a
Council of Three Hundred, and (through them) put to death or banished
his enemies. He also gave Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Plataeae their
independence. After a moment of panic, the Athenians, led by
Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hypereides, proceeded to take all possible
measures for the defence of the city, while private munificence
supplied the treasury. Demosthenes himself superintended the repair of
the fortifications, and went on a mission to secure a supply of corn.
But Philip, instead of marching upon Athens, sent a message by Demades,
whom he had taken prisoner at Chaeroneia; and the Assembly, in reply,
instructed Demades, Aeschines, and Phocion to ask Philip to release his
Athenian prisoners. Philip released them without ransom, and sent
Antipater and Alexander (with the ashes of the Athenian dead) to offer
terms of peace. By the 'Peace of Demades', concluded while Demosthenes
was still absent, the alliance between Athens and Philip was renewed;
the independence of Athens was guaranteed; Oropus was taken from Thebes
and restored to Athens; and she was permitted to retain Salamis, Samos,
Delos, and probably Lemnos and Imbros. On the other hand, she lost all
her possessions on the Hellespont and in the Chersonese, and promised
to join the league which Philip intended to form for the invasion of
Persia. Demosthenes was selected by the Assembly to deliver the funeral
oration upon those who fell at Chaeroneia; and although the Macedonian
party attacked him repeatedly in the law-courts, he was always
acquitted. Philip paid a long visit to the Peloponnese, in the course
of which he placed a Macedonian garrison in Corinth, ravaged Laconia,
giving parts of it to his allies, the Argives and Arcadians, and
announced his plans for the invasion of Persia at the head of the
Greeks; he then returned to Macedonia.
In 337 Demosthenes was again Commissioner of Fortifications, as well as
Controller of the Festival Fund--the most important office in the
State. He not only performed his work most efficiently, but gave
considerable sums for public purposes out of his private fortune; and
early in 336 Ctesiphon proposed, and the Council resolved, that he
should once more be crowned at the Dionysia. But before the proposal
could be brought before the Assembly, Aeschines indicted Ctesiphon for
its alleged illegality. The trial did not take place until late in the
summer of 330. We do not know the reason for so long a delay, but
probably the events of the intervening time were such as to render the
state of public feeling unfavourable to Aeschines. In 336 Philip was
assassinated, and was succeeded by Alexander. In 335 Alexander
destroyed Thebes, which had revolted, and sold its inhabitants into
slavery. He also demanded from Athens the surrender of Demosthenes and
other anti-Macedonian politicians and generals, but was persuaded to be
content with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, and the
promise of the prosecution of Demosthenes for using subsidies from
Persia to help Thebes--a prosecution which was allowed to drop. From
334 onwards Alexander was pursuing his conquests in the East, and we
know practically nothing of the history of Athens until the trial of
Ctesiphon came on in 330.
Aeschines alleged against Ctesiphon (1) that it was illegal to propose
to crown any one who had not passed his examination before the Board of
Auditors at the end of his term of office; and that Demosthenes, who
had been Commissioner of Fortifications and Controller of the Festival
Fund, was still in this position: (2) that it was illegal to proclaim
the grant of a crown at the Dionysia, except in the case of crowns
conferred by foreign states: (3) that it was illegal to insert untrue
statements in the public records, and that the language in which
Ctesiphon's decree described the political career of Demosthenes was
untrue. On the first point Aeschines was almost certainly right:
Demosthenes' defence is sophistical, and all that could really be said
was that the rule had often been broken before. On the second point,
certainty is impossible: the most probable view (though it also has its
difficulties) is that there were two inconsistent laws, and that one of
them permitted the proclamation in the theatre, if expressly voted by
the people; but the alleged illegality had certainly been often
committed. The third point, which raised the question of the value to
Athens of Demosthenes' whole political life, was that upon which the
case really turned; and it is to this that Demosthenes devotes the
greater part of his speech, breaking up his reply into convenient
stages by discussions (of a far less happy description) of the other
counts of the indictment, and of the character and career of Aeschines.
As in the Speech on the Embassy, certain facts are misrepresented, and
there are passages which are in bad taste; but Demosthenes proves
beyond doubt his unswerving loyalty to the high ideal of policy which
he had formed for his country, and it is with good reason that parts of
this speech have always been felt to reach a height of eloquence which
has never been surpassed.
The jury acquitted Ctesiphon: and Aeschines, failing to obtain a fifth
part of the votes, and thus incurring a heavy fine and the loss of some
of the rights of a citizen, left Athens, and lived most of the
remainder of his life at Rhodes.
The following is an analysis of the speech in outline:--
I. Introduction (§§ 1-8).
II. Defence against charges irrelevant to the indictment (§§ 9-52).
(1) Introduction (§ 9).
(2) Postponement of reply to charges against his private life
(§§ 10, 11).
(3) Reply to charges against his public life (§§ 12-52).
(a) Criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 12-16).
(b) Reply in reference to the Peace of Philocrates (§§ 17-52).
III. Defence against the indictment itself (§§ 53-125).
(1) Introduction (§§ 53-9).
(2) Defence of his policy B.C. 346-340 (§§ 60-109).
(3) The alleged illegality of crowning him before he had passed
his audit (§§ 110-19).
(4) The alleged illegality of the proclamation in the theatre
(§§ 120, 121).
(5) Conclusion, including criticism of Aeschines' method of attack
(§§ 122-5).
IV. Aeschines' life and character (§§ 126-59).
(1) Introduction (§§ 126-8).
(2) Parentage and early life of Aeschines (§§ 129-31).
(3) Aeschines' connexion with Antiphon, Python, Anaxinus, and
others (§§ 132-8).
(4) Aeschines' part in stirring up the war against Amphissa in
339 (§§ 139-59).
V. Demosthenes' own policy in 339 and 338 (§§ 160-226).
(1) Narrative and defence of the alliance with Thebes (§§ 160-95).
(2) Why did not Aeschines protest at the time? (§§ 196-8).
(3) Defence of his policy as true to the spirit of Athenian history
(§§ 199-210).
(4) Narrative and defence, continued (§§ 211-22).
(5) Further criticism of Aeschines' method of attack (§§ 223-6).
VI. Replies to various arguments of Aeschines (§§ 227-96).
(1) Aeschines' comparison of the inquiry to the examination of
a balance-sheet (§§ 227-31).
(2) A proper inquiry would show that Demosthenes had increased
the resources of Athens (§§ 232-7).
(3) Reply to the charge of saddling Athens with an undue share
of the expense of the war (§§ 238-43).
(4) Reply to the charge of responsibility for the defeat of Chaeroneia
(§§ 244-7).
(5) Vindication of his policy after the battle of Chaeroneia
(§§ 248-51).
(6) Reply to Aeschines' remarks about the harm done to Athens
by Demosthenes' bad fortune (§§ 252-75).
(a) General remarks (§§ 252-5).
(b) The fortune of Demosthenes (§§ 257, 258).
(c) The fortune of Aeschines (§§ 259-64).
(d) Comparison of the two (§§ 265, 266).
(e) Demosthenes' use of his fortune for purposes of public and
private munificence (§§ 267-9).
(f) Demosthenes not responsible for the misfortunes of Athens
(§§ 270-5).
(7) Reply to Aeschines' warning against Demosthenes' cleverness
(§§ 276-90).
(a) Comparison of the use made of their talents by the two
orators (§§ 276-84).
(b) The choice of Demosthenes, not Aeschines, to deliver the
Funeral Oration (§§ 285-90).
(8) Aeschines' feelings about the defeat of Chaeroneia (§§ 291-3).
(9) The part played by traitors in recent history (§§ 294-6).
VII. Epilogue (§§ 297-324).
(1) Demosthenes' incorruptibility (§§ 297, 298).
(2) Demosthenes' measures for the protection of Athens (§§ 299-305).
(3) Comparison of the services of the two orators to Athens
(§§ 306-13).
(4) Reply to the comparison of Demosthenes with the men of old,
by a final comparison of the two orators (§§ 314-23).
(5) Peroration (§ 324).]
{1} I pray first, men of Athens, to every god and goddess, that the
goodwill, which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you,
may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this present trial:
and secondly--a prayer which especially touches yourselves, your
consciences, and your reputation--that the gods may put it into your
minds not to take counsel of my adversary[n] in regard to the spirit in
which you ought to hear me (for that would surely be a cruel thing),
{2} but of the laws and of your oath; wherein besides all other
precepts of justice, this also is written--that you shall listen to
both sides with a like mind. And this means, not only that you should
have formed no prejudice, and should accord equal goodwill to each, but
also that you should give leave to every man who pleads before you to
adopt that order, and make that defence, upon which he has resolved and
fixed his choice.
{3} I am in many respects at a disadvantage in the present controversy,
as compared with Aeschines; and particularly, men of Athens, in two
points of importance. The first is that I am not contending for the
same stake as he. It is not the same thing for me to lose your goodwill
now, as it is for him to fail to win his case; since for me--but I
would say nothing unpleasant [n]* at the opening of my address--I say
only that Aeschines can well afford to risk this attack upon me. The
second disadvantage lies in the natural and universal tendency of
mankind to hear invective and denunciation with pleasure, and to be
offended with those who praise themselves. {4} And of the two courses
in question, that which contributes to men's pleasure has been given to
Aeschines, and that which annoys (I may say) every one is left for me.
If, to avoid giving such annoyance, I say nothing of all that I myself
have done, it will be thought that I am unable to clear myself of the
charges against me, or to show the grounds upon which I claim to
deserve distinction. If, on the other hand, I proceed to speak of my
past acts and my political life, I shall often be compelled to speak of
myself. I will endeavour, then, to do this as modestly as possible; and
for all that the necessities of the case compel me to say, the blame
must in fairness be borne by the prosecutor, who initiated a trial of
such a kind as this.
{5} I think, men of Athens, that you would all admit that this present
trial equally concerns myself and Ctesiphon, and demands no less
earnest attention from me than from him. For while it is a painful and
a grievous thing for a man to be robbed of anything, particularly if it
is at the hands of an enemy that this befalls him, it is especially so,
when he is robbed of your goodwill and kindness, just in proportion as
to win these is the greatest possible gain. {6} And because such is the
issue at stake in the present trial, I request and entreat you all
alike to give me, while I make my defence upon the charges that have
been brought against me, a fair hearing, as you are commanded to do by
the laws--those laws to which their original maker, your well-wisher
and the People's friend, Solon, thought fit to give the sanction not of
enactment only, but also of an oath on the part of those who act as
judges: {7} not because he distrusted you (so at least it seems to me),
but because he saw that a defendant cannot escape from the imputations
and the slanders which fall with special force from the prosecutor,
because he is the first to speak, unless each of you who sit in
judgement, keeping his conscience pure in the sight of God, will
receive the pleadings of the later speaker also with the same favour,
and will thus, because his attention has been given equally and
impartially to both sides, form his decision upon the case in its
entirety.
{8} And now, when I am about, as it seems, to render an account of my
whole private life and public career, I would once more invoke the aid
of the gods; and in the presence of you all I pray, first, that the
goodwill which I ever feel towards this city and towards all of you,
may in equal measure be vouchsafed to me by you at this trial; and
secondly, that whatsoever judgement upon this present suit will conduce
to your public reputation, and the purity of each man's conscience,
that judgement they may put it into all your minds to give.
{9} Now if Aeschines had confined his charges to the subject of the
indictment, I too, in making my defence, would have dealt at once with
the actual resolution of the Council. But since he has devoted no less
a portion of his speech to the relation of other matters, and for the
most part has spoken against me falsely, I think it is necessary, and
at the same time just, that I should deal briefly, men of Athens, with
these, in order that none of you may be led by irrelevant arguments to
listen less favourably to my pleas in answer to the indictment itself.
{10} As for his slanderous vituperation of my private life, mark how
straightforward and how just is the reply that I make. If you know me
as the man that he charged me with being (for my life has been spent
nowhere but in your own midst), do not even suffer me to speak--no, not
though my whole public career has been one of transcendent merit--but
rise and condemn me without delay. But if, in your judgement and
belief, I am a better man than Aeschines, and come of better men; if I
and mine are no worse than any other respectable persons (to use no
offensive expression); then do not trust him even in regard to other
points, for it is plain that all that he said was equally fictitious;
but once more accord to me to-day the goodwill which throughout the
past you have so often displayed towards me in previous trials. {11}
Knave as you are,[n] Aeschines, you were assuredly more fool than
knave, when you thought that I should dismiss all that I had to say
with regard to my past acts and political life, and should turn to meet
the abuse that fell from you. I shall not do so; I am not so
brain-sick; but I will review the falsehoods and the calumnies which
you uttered against my political career; and then, if the court desires
it, I will afterwards refer to the ribald language that has been so
incontinently used.
{12} The offences charged against me are many; and for some of them the
laws assign heavy and even the most extreme penalties. But I will tell
you what is the motive which animates the present suit. It gives play
to the malice of a personal enemy, to his insolence, his abuse, his
contumelies, and every expression of his hostility: and yet, assuming
that the charges and the imputations which have been made are true, it
does not enable the State[n] to exact a penalty that is adequate, or
nearly adequate, to the offences. {13} For it is not right to seek to
debar another from coming before the people[n] and receiving a hearing,
nor to do so in a spirit of malice and envy. Heaven knows, it is
neither straightforward, nor citizen-like, nor just, men of Athens! If
the crimes by which he saw me injuring the city were of such a
magnitude as he just now so theatrically set forth, he should have had
recourse to the punishments enjoined by the laws at the time of the
crimes themselves. If he saw me so acting as to deserve impeachment, he
should have impeached me, and so brought me to trial before you; if he
saw me proposing illegal measures, he should have indicted me for their
illegality. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he
would not have failed to indict me in person, had he thought that he
could convict me. {14} And further, if he saw me committing any of
those other crimes against you, which he just now slanderously
enumerated, or any other crimes whatsoever, there are laws which deal
with each, and punishments, and lawsuits and judgements involving
penalties that are harsh and severe: to all of these he could have had
recourse; and from the moment when it was seen that he had acted so,
and had conducted his hostilities against me on that plan, his present
accusation of me would have been in line with his past conduct. {15}
But as it is, he has forsaken the straight path of justice; he has
shrunk from all attempts to convict me at the time; and after all these
years, with the imputations, the jests, the invectives, that he has
accumulated, he appears to play his part. So it is, that though his
accusations are against me, it is Ctesiphon that he prosecutes; and
though he sets his quarrel with me in the forefront of the whole suit,
he has never faced me in person to settle the quarrel, and it is
another whom we see him trying to deprive of his civil rights. {16} Yet
surely, besides everything else that may be pleaded on behalf of
Ctesiphon, this, I think, may surely be most reasonably urged--that we
ought in justice to have brought our own quarrel to the test by
ourselves, instead of avoiding all conflict with one another, and
looking for a third party to whom we could do harm. Such iniquity
really passes all bounds.
{17} From this one may see the nature of all his charges alike,
uttered, as they have been, without justice or regard for truth. Yet I
desire also to examine them severally, and more particularly the false
statements which he made against me in regard to the Peace and the
Embassy, when he ascribed to me[n] the things which he himself had done
in conjunction with Philocrates. And here it is necessary, men of
Athens, and perhaps appropriate,[n] that I should remind you of the
state of affairs subsisting during that period, so that you may view
each group of actions in the light of the circumstances of the time.
{18} When the Phocian war had broken out[n] (not through any action of
mine, for I had not yet entered public life), your own attitude, in the
first place, was such, that you wished for the preservation of the
Phocians, although you saw that their actions were unjustifiable; while
you would have been delighted at anything that might happen to the
Thebans, against whom you felt an indignation that was neither
unreasonable nor unfair; for they had not used their good fortune at
Leuctra with moderation. And, in the second place, the Peloponnese was
all disunited: those who detested the Spartans [n] were not strong
enough to annihilate them, and those who had previously governed with
the support of Sparta [n] were no longer able to maintain their control
over their cities; but both these and all the other states were in a
condition of indeterminate strife and confusion. {19} When Philip saw
this (for it was not hard to see), he tried, by dispensing money to the
traitors whom each state contained, to throw them all into collision
and stir up one against another; and thus, amid the blunders and
perversity of others, he was making his own preparations, and growing
great to the danger of all. And when it became clear to all that the
then overbearing (but now unhappy) Thebans, distressed by the length of
the war, would be forced to fly to you for aid,[n] Philip, to prevent
this--to prevent the formation of any union between the cities--made
offers of peace to you, and of assistance to them. {20} Now what was it
that helped him, and enabled him to find in you his almost willing
dupes? It was the baseness (if that is the right name to use), or the
ignorance, or both, of the rest of the Hellenes, who, though you were
engaged in a long and continuous war, and that on behalf of the
interests of all, as has been proved by the event, never assisted you
either with money or with men, or in any other way whatsoever. And in
your just and proper indignation with them, you listened readily to
Philip. It was for these reasons, therefore, and not through any action
of mine, that the Peace which we then conceded was negotiated; and any
one who investigates the matter honestly will find that it is the
crimes and the corrupt practices of these men, in the course of the
negotiations, that are responsible for our position to-day. {21} It is
in the interests of truth that I enter into all these events with this
exactitude and thoroughness; for however strong the appearance of
criminality in these proceedings may be, it has, I imagine, nothing to
do with me. The first man to suggest or mention the Peace was
Aristodemus[n] the actor; and the person who took the matter up and
moved the motion, and sold his services for the purpose, along with
Aeschines, was Philocrates of Hagnus--your partner, Aeschines, not
mine, even if you split your sides with lying; while those who
supported him, from whatever motive (for of that I say nothing at
present), were Eubulus and Cephisophon. I had no part in the matter
anywhere. {22} And yet, although the facts are such as with absolute
truth I am representing them to be, he carried his effrontery so far as
to dare to assert that I was not only responsible for the Peace, but
had also prevented the city from acting in conjunction with a general
assembly of the Hellenes in making it. What? and you--oh! how can one
find a name that can be applied to you?--when you saw me (for you were
there) preventing the city from taking this great step and forming so
grand an alliance as you just now described, did you once raise a
protest or come forward to give information and to set forth the crimes
with which you now charge me? {23} If I had covenanted with Philip for
money that I would prevent the coalition of the Hellenes, your only
course was to refuse to keep silence--to cry aloud, to protest, to
reveal the fact to your fellow countrymen. On no occasion did you do
this: no such utterance of yours was ever heard by any one. In fact
there was no embassy away at the time on a mission to any Hellenic
state; the Hellenes had all long ago been tried and found wanting;[n]
and in all that he has said upon this matter there is not a single
sound word. {24} And, apart from that, his falsehoods involve the
greatest calumnies upon this city. For if you were at one and the same
time convoking the Hellenes with a view to war, and sending ambassadors
yourselves to Philip to discuss peace, it was a deed for a
Eurybatus,[n] not a task for a state or for honest men, that you were
carrying out. But that is not the case; indeed it is not. For what
could possibly have been your object in summoning them at that moment?
Was it with a view to peace? But they all had peace already. Or with a
view to war? But you were yourselves discussing peace. It is therefore
evident that neither was it I that introduced or was responsible for
the Peace in its original shape, nor is one of all the other falsehoods
which he told of me shown to be true.
{25} Again, consider the course of action which, when the city had
concluded the Peace, each of us now chose to adopt. For from this you
will know who it was that co-operated with Philip throughout, and who
it was that acted in your interest and sought the good of the city. As
for me, I proposed, as a member of the Council, that the ambassadors
should sail as quickly as possible to any district in which they should
ascertain Philip to be, and receive his oath from him. {26} But even
when I had carried this resolution, they would not act upon it. What
did this mean, men of Athens? I will inform you. Philip's interest
required that the interval before he took the oath should be as long as
possible; yours, that it should be as short as possible. And why?
Because you broke off all your preparations for the war, not merely
from the day when he took the oath, but from the day when you first
hoped that Peace would be made; and for his part, this was what he was
all along working for; for he thought (and with truth) that whatever
places he could snatch from Athens before he took the oath, would
remain securely his, since no one would break the Peace for their sake.
{27} Foreseeing and calculating upon this, men of Athens, I proposed
this decree--that we should sail to any district in which Philip might
be, and receive his oath as soon as possible, in order that the oaths
might be taken while the Thracians, your allies, were still in
possession of those strongholds[n] of which Aeschines just now spoke
with contempt--Serrhium, Myrtenum, and Ergiske; and that Philip might
not snatch from us the keys of the country and make himself master of
Thrace, nor obtain an abundant supply of money and of soldiers, and so
proceed without difficulty to the prosecution of his further designs.
{28} And now, instead of citing or reading this decree he slanders me
on the ground that I thought fit, as a member of the Council, to
introduce the envoys. But what should I have done? Was I to propose
_not_ to introduce those who had come for the express purpose of
speaking with you? or to order the lessee of the theatre not to assign
them seats? But they would have watched the play from the threepenny
seats,[n] if this decree had not been proposed. Should I have guarded
the interests of the city in petty details, and sold them wholesale, as
my opponents did? Surely not. (_To the clerk_.) Now take this decree,
which the prosecutor passed over, though he knew it well, and read it.
{29} [_The decree of Demosthenes is read_.]
{30} Though I had carried this decree, and was seeking the good not of
Philip, but of the city, these worthy ambassadors paid little heed to
it, but sat idle in Macedonia for three whole months,[n] until Philip
arrived from Thrace, after subduing the whole country; when they might,
within ten days, or equally well[n] within three or four, have reached
the Hellespont, and saved the strongholds, by receiving his oath before
he could seize them. For he would not have touched them when we were
present; or else, if he had done so, we should have refused to
administer the oath to him; and in that case he would have failed to
obtain the Peace: he would not have had both the Peace and the
strongholds as well.
{31} Such was Philip's first act of fraud, during the time of the
Embassy, and the first instance of venality on the part of these wicked
men; and over this I confess that then and now and always I have been
and am at war and at variance with them. Now observe, immediately after
this, a second and even greater piece of villainy. {32} As soon as
Philip had sworn to the Peace, after first gaining possession of Thrace
because these men did not obey my decree, he obtained from them--again
by purchase--the postponement of our departure from Macedonia, until
all should be in readiness for his campaign against the Phocians; in
order that, instead of our bringing home a report of his intentions and
his preparations for the march, which would make you set out and sail
round to Thermopylae with your war-ships as you did before,[n] you
might only hear our report of the facts when he was already on this
side of Thermopylae, and you could do nothing. {33} And Philip was
beset with such fear and such a weight of anxiety, lest in spite of his
occupation of these places, his object should slip from his grasp, if,
before the Phocians were destroyed, you resolved to assist them, that
he hired this despicable creature, not now in company with his
colleagues, but by himself alone, to make to you a statement and a
report of such a character that owing to them all was lost. {34} But I
request and entreat you, men of Athens, to remember throughout this
whole trial, that, had Aeschines made no accusation that was not
included in the indictment, I too would not have said a word that did
not bear upon it; but since he has had recourse to all kinds of
imputation and slander at once, I am compelled also to give a brief
answer to each group of charges. {35} What then were the statements
uttered by him that day, in consequence of which all was lost? 'You
must not be perturbed,' he said, 'at Philip's having crossed to this
side of Thermopylae; for you will get everything that you desire, if
you remain quiet; and within two or three days you will hear that he
has become the friend of those whose enemy he was, and the enemy of
those whose friend he was, when he first came. For,' said he, 'it is
not phrases that confirm friendships' (a finely sententious
expression!) 'but identity of interest; and it is to the interest of
Philip and of the Phocians and of yourselves alike, to be rid of the
heartless and overbearing demeanour of the Thebans.' {36} To these
statements some gave a ready ear, in consequence of the tacit
ill-feeling towards the Thebans at the time. What then followed--and
not after a long interval, but immediately? The Phocians were
overthrown; their cities were razed to the ground; you, who had
believed Aeschines and remained inactive, were soon afterwards bringing
in your effects from the country; while Aeschines received his gold;
and besides all this, the city reaped the ill-will of the Thebans and
Thessalians, while their gratitude for what had been done went to
Philip. {37} To prove that this is so, (_to the clerk_) read me both
the decree of Callisthenes,[n] and Philip's letter. (_To the jury_.)
These two documents together will make all the facts plain. (_To the
clerk_.) Read.
{38} [_The decree of Callisthenes is read_.]
Were these the hopes, on the strength of which you made the Peace? Was
this what this hireling promised you? {39} (_To the clerk_.) Now read
the letter which Philip sent after this.
[_Philip's letter is read_.]
{40} You hear how obviously, in this letter sent to you, Philip is
addressing definite information to his own allies. 'I have done these
things,' he tells them, 'against the will of the Athenians, and to
their annoyance; and so, men of Thebes and Thessaly, if you are wise,
you will regard them as enemies, and will trust me.' He does not write
in those actual terms, but that is what he intends to indicate. By
these means he so carried them away, that they did not foresee or
realize any of the consequences, but allowed him to get everything into
his own power: and that is why, poor men, they have experienced their
present calamities. {41} But the man who helped him to create this
confidence, who co-operated with him, who brought home that false
report and deluded you, he it is who now bewails the sufferings of the
Thebans and enlarges upon their piteousness--he, who is himself the
cause both of these and of the misery in Phocis, and of all the other
evils which the Hellenes have endured. Yes, it is evident that you are
pained at what has come to pass, Aeschines, and that you are sorry for
the Thebans, when you have property in Boeotia[n] and are farming the
land that was theirs; and that I rejoice at it--I, whose surrender was
immediately demanded by the author of the disaster! {42} But I have
digressed into subjects of which it will perhaps be more convenient to
speak presently. I will return to the proofs which show that it is the
crimes of these men that are the cause of our condition to-day.
For when you had been deceived by Philip, through the agency of these
men, who while serving as ambassadors had sold themselves and made a
report in which there was not a word of truth--when the unhappy
Phocians had been deceived and their cities annihilated--what followed?
{43} The despicable Thessalians and the slow-witted Thebans regarded
Philip as their friend, their benefactor, their saviour. Philip was
their all-in-all. They would not even listen to the voice of any one
who wished to express a different opinion. You yourselves, though you
viewed what had been done with suspicion and vexation, nevertheless
kept the Peace; for there was nothing else that you could have done.
And the other Hellenes, who, like yourselves, had been deluded and
disappointed of their hopes,[n] also kept the Peace, and gladly;[n]
since in a sense they also were remotely aimed at by the war. {44} For
when Philip was going about and subduing the Illyrians and Triballi and
some of the Hellenes as well, and bringing many large forces into his
own power, and when some of the members of the several States were
taking advantage of the Peace to travel to Macedonia, and were being
corrupted--Aeschines among them--at such a time all of those whom
Philip had in view in thus making his preparations were really being
attacked by him. {45} Whether they failed to realize it is another
question, which does not concern me. For I was continually uttering
warnings and protests, both in your midst and wherever I was sent. But
the cities were stricken with disease: those who were engaged in
political and practical affairs were taking bribes and being corrupted
by the hope of money; while the mass of private citizens either showed
no foresight, or else were caught by the bait of ease and leisure from
day to day; and all alike had fallen victims to some such delusive
fancy, as that the danger would come upon every one but themselves, and
that through the perils of others they would be able to secure their
own position as they pleased. {46} And so, I suppose, it has come to
pass that the masses have atoned for their great and ill-timed
indifference by the loss of their freedom, while the leaders in
affairs, who fancied that they were selling everything except
themselves, have realized that they had sold themselves first of all.
For instead of being called friends and guest-friends, as they were
called at the time when they were taking their bribes, they now hear
themselves called flatterers, and god-forsaken, and all the other names
that they deserve. {47} For no one, men of Athens, spends his money out
of a desire to benefit the traitor; nor, when once he has secured the
object for which he bargains, does he employ the traitor to advise him
with regard to other objects: if it were so, nothing could be happier
than a traitor. But it is not so, of course. Far from it! When the
aspirant after dominion has gained his object, he is also the master of
those who have sold it to him: and because then he knows their
villainy, he then hates and mistrusts them, and covers them with
insults. {48} For observe--for even if the time of the events is past,
the time for realizing truths like these is ever present to wise men.
Lasthenes[n] was called his 'friend'; but only until he had betrayed
Olynthus. And Timolaus;[n] but only until he had destroyed Thebes. And
Eudicus and Simus[n] of Larissa; but only until they had put Thessaly
in Philip's power. And now, persecuted as they are, and insulted, and
subjected to every kind of misery, the whole inhabited world has become
filled with such men. And what of Aristratus[n] at Sicyon? what of
Perillus[n] at Megara? Are they not outcasts? {49} From these instances
one can see very clearly, that it is he who best protects his own
country and speaks most constantly against such men, that secures for
traitors and hirelings like yourselves, Aeschines, the continuance of
your opportunities for taking bribes. It is the majority of those who
are here, those who resist your will, that you must thank for the fact
that you live and draw your pay; for, left to yourselves, you would
long ago have perished.
{50} There is still much that I might say about the transactions of
that time, but I think that even what I have said is more than enough.
The blame rests with Aeschines, who has drenched me with the stale
dregs[n] of his own villainy and crime, from which I was compelled to
clear myself in the eyes of those who are too young to remember the
events; though perhaps you who knew, even before I said a single word,
of Aeschines' service as a hireling, may have felt some annoyance as
you listened. {51} He calls it, forsooth, 'friendship' and
'guest-friendship'; and somewhere in his speech just now he used the
expression, 'the man who casts in my teeth my guest-friendship with
Alexander.' _I_ cast in your teeth your guest-friendship with
Alexander? How did you acquire it? How came you to be thought worthy of
it? Never would I call you the guest-friend of Philip or the friend of
Alexander--I am not so insane--unless you are to call harvesters and
other hired servants the friends and guest-friends of those who have
hired them. [But that is not the case, of course. Far from it!] {52}
Nay, I call you the hireling, formerly of Philip, and now of Alexander,
and so do all who are present. If you disbelieve me, ask them--or
rather I will ask them for you. Men of Athens, do you think of
Aeschines as the hireling or as the guest-friend of Alexander? You hear
what they say.
{53} I now wish, without more delay, to make my defence upon the
indictment itself, and to go through my past acts, in order that
Aeschines may hear (though he knows them well) the grounds on which I
claim to have a right both to the gifts which the Council have
proposed, and even to far greater than these. (_To the clerk_.) Now
take the indictment and read it.
{54, 55} [The indictment is read.]
{56} These, men of Athens, are the points in the resolution which the
prosecutor assails; and these very points will, I think, afford me my
first means of proving to you that the defence which I am about to
offer is an absolutely fair one. For I will take the points of the
indictment in the very same order as the prosecutor: I will speak of
each in succession, and will knowingly pass over nothing. {57} Any
decision upon the statement that I 'consistently do and say what is
best for the People, and am eager to do whatever good I can', and upon
the proposal to vote me thanks for this, depends, I consider, upon my
past political career: for it is by an investigation of my career that
either the truth and the propriety, or else the falsehood, of these
statements which Ctesiphon has made about me will be discovered. {58}
Again, the proposal to crown me, without the addition of the clause
'when he has submitted to his examination', and the order to proclaim
the award of the crown in the theatre, must, I imagine, stand or fall
with my political career; for the question is whether I deserve the
crown and the proclamation before my fellow countrymen or not. At the
same time I consider myself further bound to point out to you the laws
under which the defendant's proposal could be made. In this honest and
straightforward manner, men of Athens, I have determined to make my
defence; and now I will proceed to speak of my past actions themselves.
{59} And let no one imagine that I am detaching my argument from its
connexion with the indictment, if I break into a discussion of
international transactions. For it is the prosecutor who, by assailing
the clause of the decree which states that I do and say what is best,
and by indicting it as false, has rendered the discussion of my whole
political career essentially germane to the indictment; and further,
out of the many careers which public life offers, it was the department
of international affairs that I chose; so that I have a right to derive
my proofs also from that department.
{60} I will pass over all that Philip snatched from us and secured, in
the days before I took part in public life as an orator. None of these
losses, I imagine, has anything to do with me. But I will recall to
you, and will render you an account of all that, from the day when I
entered upon this career, he was _prevented_ from taking, when I have
made one remark. {61} Philip, men of Athens, had a great advantage in
his favour. For in the midst of the Hellenic peoples--and not of some
only, but of all alike--there had sprung up a crop of
traitors--corrupt, god-forsaken men--more numerous than they have ever
been within the memory of man. These he took to help and co-operate
with him; and great as the mutual ill-will and dissensions of the
Hellenes already were, he rendered them even worse, by deceiving some,
making presents to others, and corrupting others in every way; and at a
time when all had in reality but one interest--to prevent his becoming
powerful--he divided them into a number of factions. {62} All the
Hellenes then being in this condition, still ignorant of the growing
and accumulating evil, you have to ask yourselves, men of Athens, what
policy and action it was fitting for the city to choose, and to hold me
responsible for this; for the person who assumed that responsibility in
the State was myself. {63} Should she, Aeschines, have sacrificed her
pride and her own dignity? Should she have joined the ranks of the
Thessalians and Dolopes,[n] and helped Philip to acquire the empire of
Hellas, cancelling thereby the noble and righteous deeds of our
forefathers? Or, if she should not have done this (for it would have
been in very truth an atrocious thing), should she have looked on,
while all that she saw would happen, if no one prevented it--all that
she realized, it seems, at a distance--was actually taking place? {64}
Nay, I should be glad to ask to-day the severest critic of my actions,
which party he would have desired the city to join--the party which
shares the responsibility for the misery and disgrace which has fallen
upon the Hellenes (the party of the Thessalians and their supporters,
one may call it), or the party which looked on while these calamities
were taking place, in the hope of gaining some advantage for
themselves--in which we should place the Arcadians and Messenians and
Argives. {65} But even of these, many--nay, all--have in the end fared
worse than we. For if Philip had departed immediately after his
victory, and gone his way; if afterwards he had remained at peace, and
had given no trouble whatever to any of his own allies or of the other
Hellenes; then there would have been some ground for blaming and
accusing those who had opposed his plans. But if he has stripped them
all alike of their dignity, their paramountcy, and their
independence--nay, even of their free constitutions,[n] wherever he
could do so--can it be denied that the policy which you adopted on my
advice was the most glorious policy possible?
{66} But I return to my former point. What was it fitting for the city
to do, Aeschines, when she saw Philip establishing for himself a
despotic sway over the Hellenes? What language should have been used,
what measures proposed, by the adviser of the people at Athens (for
that it was at Athens makes the utmost difference), when I knew that
from the very first, up to the day when I myself ascended the platform,
my country had always contended for pre-eminence, honour, and glory,
and in the cause of honour, and for the interests of all, had
sacrificed more money and lives than any other Hellenic people had
spent for their private ends: {67} when I saw that Philip himself, with
whom our conflict lay, for the sake of empire and absolute power, had
had his eye knocked out, his collar-bone broken, his hand and his leg
maimed, and was ready to resign any part of his body that Fortune chose
to take from him, provided that with what remained he might live in
honour and glory? {68} And surely no one would dare to say that it was
fitting that in one bred at Pella, a place then inglorious and
insignificant, there should have grown up so lofty a spirit that he
aspired after the empire of Hellas, and conceived such a project in his
mind; but that in you, who are Athenians, and who day by day in all
that you hear and see behold the memorials of the gallantry of your
forefathers, such baseness should be found, that you would yield up
your liberty to Philip by your own deliberate offer and deed. {69} No
man would say this. One alternative remained, and that, one which you
were bound to take--that of a righteous resistance to the whole course
of action by which he was doing you injury. You acted thus from the
first, quite rightly and properly; while I helped by my proposals and
advice during the time of my political activity, and I do not deny it.
But what ought I to have done? For the time has come to ask you this,
Aeschines, and to dismiss everything else. {70} Amphipolis, Pydna,
Poteidaea, Halonnesus--all are blotted from my memory. As for Serrhium,
Doriscus, the sack of Peparethus, and all the other injuries inflicted
upon the city, I renounce all knowledge of their ever having
happened--though you actually said that _I_ involved my countrymen in
hostility by talking of these things, when the decrees which deal with
them were the work of Eubulus and Aristophon[n] and Diopeithes,[n] and
not mine at all--so glibly do you assert anything that suits your
purpose! {71} But of this too I say nothing at present. I only ask you
whether Philip, who was appropriating Euboea,[n] and establishing it as
a stronghold to command Attica; who was making an attempt upon Megara,
seizing Oreus, razing the walls of Porthmus, setting up Philistides as
tyrant at Oreus and Cleitarchus at Eretria, bringing the Hellespont
into his own power, besieging Byzantium, destroying some of the cities
of Hellas, and restoring his exiled friends to others--whether he, I
say, in acting thus, was guilty of wrong, violating the truce and
breaking the Peace, or not? Was it fit that one of the Hellenes should
arise to prevent it, or not? {72} If it was not fit--if it was fit that
Hellas should become like the Mysian booty[n] in the proverb before
men's eyes, while the Athenians had life and being, then I have lost my
labour in speaking upon this theme, and the city has lost its labour in
obeying me: then let everything that has been done be counted for a
crime and a blunder, and those my own! But if it was right that one
should arise to prevent it, for whom could the task be more fitting
than for the people of Athens? That then, was the aim of _my_ policy;
and when I saw Philip reducing all mankind to servitude, I opposed him,
and without ceasing warned and exhorted you to make no surrender.
{73} But the Peace, Aeschines, was in reality broken by Philip, when he
seized the corn-ships, not by Athens. (_To the clerk_.) Bring the
decrees themselves, and the letter of Philip, and read them in order.
(_To the jury_.) For they will make it clear who is responsible, and
for what.
{74} [_A decree is read_.]
{75} This decree then was proposed by Eubulus, not by me; and the next
by Aristophon; he is followed first by Hegesippus, and he by Aristophon
again, and then by Philocrates, then by Cephisophon, and then by all of
them. But I proposed no decree upon this subject. (_To the clerk_.)
Read.
[_Decrees are read_.]
{76} As then I point to these decrees, so, Aeschines, do you point to a
decree of any kind, proposed by me, which makes me responsible for the
war. You cannot do so: for had you been able, there is nothing which
you would sooner have produced. Indeed, even Philip himself makes no
charge against me as regards the war, though he complains of others.
(_To the clerk_.) Read Philip's letter itself.
{77, 78} [_Philip's letter is read_.]
{79} In this letter he has nowhere mentioned the name of Demosthenes,
nor made any charge against me. Why is it then that, though he
complains of others, he has not mentioned my own actions? Because, if
he had written anything about me, he must have mentioned his own acts
of wrong; for it was these acts upon which I kept my grip, and these
which I opposed. First of all, when he was trying to steal into the
Peloponnese, I proposed the embassy to the Peloponnese;[n] then, when
he was grasping at Euboea, the embassy to Euboea;[n] then the
expedition--not an embassy any more--to Oreus,[n] and that to Eretria,
when he had established tyrants in those cities. {80} After that I
dispatched all the naval expeditions, in the course of which the
Chersonese and Byzantium and all our allies were saved. In consequence
of this, the noblest rewards at the hands of those who had benefited by
your action became yours--votes of thanks, glory, honours, crowns,
gratitude; while of the victims of his aggression, those who followed
your advice at the time secured their own deliverance, and those who
neglected it had the memory of your warnings constantly in their minds,
and regarded you not merely as their well-wishers, but as men of wisdom
and prophetic insight; for all that you foretold has come to pass. {81}
And further, that Philistides would have given a large sum to retain
Oreus, and Cleitarchus to retain Eretria, and Philip himself, to be
able to count upon the use of these places against you, and to escape
all exposure of his other proceedings and all investigation, by any one
in any place, of his wrongful acts--all this is not unknown to any one,
least of all to you, Aeschines. {82} For the envoys sent at that time
by Cleitarchus and Philistides lodged at your house, when they came
here, and you acted as their patron.[n] Though the city rejected them,
as enemies whose proposals were neither just nor expedient, to you they
were friends. None of their attempts succeeded, slander me though you
may, when you assert that I say nothing when I receive money, but cry
out when I spend it. That, certainly, is not _your_ way: for you cry
out with money in your hands, and will never cease, unless those
present cause you to do so by taking away your civil rights[n] to-day.
{83} Now on that occasion, gentlemen, you crowned me for my conduct.
Aristonicus proposed a decree whose very syllables were identical with
those of Ctesiphon's present proposal; the crown was proclaimed in the
theatre; and this was already the second proclamation[n] in my honour:
and yet Aeschines, though he was there, neither opposed the decree, nor
indicted the mover. (_To the clerk_.) Take this decree also and read it.
{84} [_The decree of Aristonicus is read_.]
{85} Now is any of you aware of any discredit that attached itself to
the city owing to this decree? Did any mockery or ridicule ensue, such
as Aeschines said must follow on the present occasion, if I were
crowned? But surely when proceedings are recent and well known to all,
then it is that, if they are satisfactory, they meet with gratitude,
and if they are otherwise, with punishment. It appears, then, that on
that occasion I met with gratitude, not with blame or punishment.
{86} Thus the fact that, up to the time when these events took place, I
acted throughout as was best for the city, has been acknowledged by the
victory of my advice and my proposals in your deliberations, by the
successful execution of the measures which I proposed, and the award of
crowns in consequence of them to the city and to myself and to all, and
by your celebration of sacrifices to the gods, and processions, in
thankfulness for these blessings.
{87} When Philip had been expelled from Euboea--and while the arms
which expelled him were yours, the statesmanship and the decrees (even
though some of my opponents may split their sides) were mine--he
proceeded to look for some other stronghold from which he could
threaten the city. And seeing that we were more dependent than any
other people upon imported corn, and wishing to get our corn-trade into
his power, he advanced to Thrace. First, he requested the Byzantines,
his own allies, to join him in the war against you; and when they
refused and said (with truth) that they had not made their alliance
with him for such a purpose, he erected a stockade against the city,
brought up his engines, and proceeded to besiege it. {88} I will not
ask again what you ought to have done when this was happening; it is
manifest to all. But who was it that went to the rescue of the
Byzantines, and saved them? Who was it that prevented the Hellespont
from falling into other hands at that time? It was you, men of
Athens--and when I say 'you', I mean this city. And who was it that
spoke and moved resolutions and acted for the city, and gave himself up
unsparingly to the business of the State? It was I. {89} But of the
immense benefit thus conferred upon all, you no longer need words of
mine to tell you, since you have had actual experience of it. For the
war which then ensued, apart from the glorious reputation that it
brought you, kept you supplied with the necessaries of life in greater
plenty and at lower prices than the present Peace, which these worthy
men are guarding to their country's detriment, in their hopes of
something yet to be realized. May those hopes be disappointed! May they
share the fortune which you, who wish for the best, ask of the gods,
rather than cause you to share that upon which their own choice is
fixed! (_To the clerk_.) Read out to the jury the crowns awarded to the
city in consequence of her action by the Byzantines and by the
Perinthians.
{90, 91} [_The decree of the Byzantines is read_.]
{92} Read out also the crowns awarded by the peoples of the Chersonese.
[_The decree of the peoples of the Chersonese is read_.]
{93} Thus the policy which I had adopted was not only successful in
saving the Chersonese and Byzantium, in preventing the Hellespont from
falling at that time into the power of Philip, and in bringing honours
to the city in consequence, but it revealed to the whole world the
noble gallantry of Athens and the baseness of Philip. For all saw that
he, the ally of the Byzantines, was besieging them--what could be more
shameful or revolting? {94} and on the other hand, it was seen that
you, who might fairly have urged many well-founded complaints against
them for their inconsiderate conduct[n] towards you at an earlier
period, not only refused to remember your grudge and to abandon the
victims of aggression, but actually delivered them; and in consequence
of this, you won glory and goodwill on all hands. And further, though
every one knows that you have crowned many public men before now, no
one can name any but myself--that is to say, any public counsellor and
orator--for whose merits the city has received a crown.
{95} In order to prove to you, also, that the slanders which he uttered
against the Euboeans and Byzantines, as he recalled to you any
ill-natured action that they had taken towards you in the past, are
disingenuous calumnies, not only because they are false (for this, I
think, you may all be assumed to know), but also because, however true
they might be, it was still to your advantage to deal with the
political situation as I have done, I desire to describe, and that
briefly, one or two of the noble deeds which this city has done in your
own time. For an individual and a State should strive always, in their
respective spheres, to fashion their future conduct after the highest
examples that their past affords. {96} Thus, men of Athens, at a time
when the Spartans were masters of land and sea,[n] and were retaining
their hold, by means of governors and garrisons, upon the country all
round Attica--Euboea, Tanagra, all Boeotia, Megara, Aegina, Ceos, and
the other islands--and when Athens possessed neither ships nor walls,
you marched forth to Haliartus, and again, not many days later, to
Corinth, though the Athenians of that day might have borne a heavy
grudge against both the Corinthians and the Thebans for the part they
had played in reference to the Deceleian War.[n] {97} But they bore no
such grudge. Far from it! And neither of these actions, Aeschines, was
taken by them to help benefactors; nor was the prospect before them
free from danger. Yet they did not on that account sacrifice those who
fled to them for help. For the sake of glory and honour they were
willing to expose themselves to the danger; and it was a right and a
noble spirit that inspired their counsels. For the life of all men must
end in death, though a man shut himself in a chamber and keep watch;
but brave men must ever set themselves to do that which is noble, with
their joyful hope for their buckler, and whatsoever God gives, must
bear it gallantly. {98} Thus did your forefathers, and thus did the
elder among yourselves: for, although the Spartans were no friends or
benefactors of yours, but had done much grievous wrong to the city,
yet, when the Thebans, after their victory at Leuctra, attempted to
annihilate them, you prevented it, not terrified by the strength or the
reputation which the Thebans then enjoyed, nor reckoning up what the
men had done to you, for whom you were to face this peril. {99} And
thus, as you know, you revealed to all the Hellenes, that whatever
offences may be committed against you, though under all other
circumstances you show your resentment of them, yet if any danger to
life or freedom overtakes the transgressors, you will bear no grudge
and make no reckoning. Nor was it in these instances only that you were
thus disposed. For once more, when the Thebans were appropriating
Euboea,[n] you did not look on while it was done; you did not call to
mind the wrong which had been done to you in the matter of Oropus[n] by
Themison and Theodorus: you helped even these; and it was then that the
city for the first time had voluntary trierarchs, of whom I was one.[n]
But I will not speak of this yet. {100} And although to save the island
was itself a noble thing to do, it was a yet nobler thing by far, that
when their lives and their cities were absolutely in your power, you
gave them back, as it was right to do, to the very men who had offended
against you, and made no reckoning, when such trust had been placed in
you, of the wrongs which you had suffered. I pass by the innumerable
instances which I might still give--battles at sea, expeditions [by
land, campaigns] both long ago and now in our day; in all of which the
object of the city has been to defend the freedom and safety of the
other Hellenic peoples. {101} And so, when in all these striking
examples I had beheld the city ever ready to strive in defence of the
interests of others, what was I likely to bid her do, what action was I
likely to recommend to her, when the debate to some extent concerned
her own interests? 'Why,' you would say, 'to remember her grudge
against those who wanted deliverance, and to look for excuses for
sacrificing everything!' And who would not have been justified in
putting me to death, if I had attempted to bring shame upon the city's
high traditions, though it were only by word? The deed itself you would
never have done, I know full well; for had you desired to do it, what
was there to hinder you? Were you not free so to act? Had you not these
men here to propose it?
{102} I wish now to return to the next in succession of my political
acts; and here again you must ask yourselves, what was the best thing
for the city? For, men of Athens, when I saw that your navy was
breaking up, and that, while the rich were obtaining exemption on the
strength of small payments,[n] citizens of moderate or small means were
losing all that they had; and further, that in consequence of these
things the city was always missing her opportunities; I enacted a law
in accordance with which I compelled the former--the rich--to do their
duty fairly; I put an end to the injustice done to the poor, and (what
was the greatest service of all to the State) I caused our preparations
to be made in time. {103} When I was indicted for this, I appeared
before you at the ensuing trial, and was acquitted; the prosecutor
failed to obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. But what sums do
you think the leaders of the Taxation-Boards, or those who stood second
or third, offered me, to induce me, if possible, not to enact the law,
or at least to let it drop and lie under sworn notice of
prosecution?[n] They offered sums so large, men of Athens, that I
should hesitate to mention them to you. It was a natural course for
them to take. {104} For under the former laws it was possible for them
to divide their obligation between sixteen persons, paying little or
nothing themselves, and grinding down their poorer fellow citizens:
while by my law each must pay down a sum calculated in proportion to
his property; and a man came to be charged with two warships, who had
previously been one of sixteen subscribers to a single one (for they
used now to call themselves no longer captains of their ships, but
subscribers). Thus there was nothing that they were not willing to
give, if only the new plan could be brought to nothing, and they could
escape being compelled to do their duty fairly. (_To the clerk_.) {105}
Now read me, first, the decree[n] in accordance with which I had to
meet the indictment; and then the lists of those liable under the
former law, and under my own, respectively. Read.
[_The decree is read_.]
{106} Now produce that noble list.
[_A list is read_.]
Now produce, for comparison with this, the list under my own law.
[_A list is read_.]
Was this, think you, but a trifling assistance which I rendered to the
poor among you? {107} Would the wealthy have spent but a trifling sum
to avoid doing their duty fairly? I am proud not only of having refused
all compromise upon the measure, not only of having been acquitted when
I was indicted, but also of having enacted a law which was beneficial,
and of having given proof of it in practice. For throughout the war the
armaments were equipped under my law, and no trierarch ever laid the
suppliants' branch[n] before you in token of grievance, nor took
sanctuary at Munychia; none was imprisoned by the Admiralty Board; no
warship was abandoned at sea and lost to the State, or left behind here
as unseaworthy. Under the former laws all these things used to happen;
{108} and the reason was that the obligation rested upon the poor, and
in consequence there were many cases of inability to discharge it. I
transferred the duties of the trierarchy from the poor to the rich; and
therefore every duty was properly fulfilled. Aye, and for this very
reason I deserve to receive praise--that I always adopted such
political measures as brought with them accessions of glory and honour
and power to the city. No measure of mine is malicious, harsh, or
unprincipled; none is degrading or unworthy of the city. The same
spirit will be seen both in my domestic and my international policy.
{109} For just as in home affairs I did not set the favour of the rich
above the rights of the many, so in international affairs I did not
embrace the gifts and the friendship of Philip, in preference to the
common interests of all the Hellenes.
It still remains for me, I suppose, to speak about the proclamation,
and about my examination. {110} The statement that I acted for the
best, and that I am loyal to you throughout and eager to do you good
service, I have proved, I think, sufficiently, by what I have said. At
the same time I am passing over the most important parts of my
political life and actions; for I conceive that I ought first to render
to you in their proper order my arguments in regard to the alleged
illegality itself: which done, even if I say nothing about the rest of
my political acts, I can still rely upon that personal knowledge of
them which each of you possesses.
{111} Of the arguments which the prosecutor jumbled together in utter
confusion with reference to the laws accompanying his indictment,[n] I
am quite certain that you could not follow the greater part, nor could
I understand them myself; but I will simply address you
straightforwardly upon the question of right. So far am I from claiming
(as he just now slanderously declared) to be free from the liability to
render an account, that I admit a life-long liability to account for
every part of my administration and policy. {112} But I do not admit
that I am liable for one single day--you hear me, Aeschines?--to
account for what I have given to the People as a free-will offering out
of my private estate; nor is any one else so liable, not even if he is
one of the nine archons. What law is so replete with injustice and
churlishness, that when a man has made a present out of his private
property and done an act of generosity and munificence, it deprives him
of the gratitude due to him, hales him before a court of disingenuous
critics, and sets them to audit accounts of sums which he himself has
given? There is no such law. If the prosecutor asserts that there is,
let him produce it, and I will resign myself and say no more. {113} But
the law does not exist, men of Athens; this is nothing but an
informer's trick on the part of Aeschines, who, because I was
Controller of the Festival Fund when I made this donation, says,
'Ctesiphon proposed a vote of thanks to him when he was still liable to
account.' The vote of thanks was not for any of the things for which I
was liable to account; it was for my voluntary gift, and your charge is
a misrepresentation. 'Yes,' you say, 'but you were also a Commissioner
of Fortifications.' I was, and thanks were rightly accorded me on the
very ground that, instead of charging the sums which I spent, I made a
present of them. A statement of account, it is true, calls for an audit
and scrutineers; but a free gift deserves gratitude and thanks; and
that is why the defendant proposed this motion in my favour. {114} That
this principle is not merely laid down in the laws, but rooted in your
national character, I shall have no difficulty in proving by many
instances. Nausicles,[n] to begin with, has often been crowned by you,
while general, for sacrifices which he had made from his private funds.
Again, when Diotimus[n] gave the shields, and Charidemus[n] afterwards,
they were crowned. And again, Neoptolemus here, while still director of
many public works, has received honours for his voluntary gifts. It
would really be too bad, if any one who held any office must either be
debarred thereby from making a present to the State, or else, instead
of receiving due gratitude, must submit accounts of the sums given.
{115} To prove the truth of my statements, (_to the clerk_) take and
read the actual decrees which were passed in honour of these persons.
Read.
{116} [_Two decrees are read_.]
{117} Each of these persons, Aeschines, was accountable as regards the
office which he held, but not as regards the services for which he was
crowned. Nor am I, therefore; for I presume that I have the same rights
as others with reference to the same matters. I made a voluntary gift.
For this I receive thanks; for I am not liable to account for what I
gave. I was holding office. True, and I have rendered an account of my
official expenditure, but not of what I gave voluntarily. Ah! but I
exercised my office iniquitously! What? and you were there, when the
auditors brought me before them, and did not accuse me?
{118} Now that the court may see that the prosecutor himself bears me
witness that I was crowned for services of which I was not liable to
render an account, (_to the clerk_) take and read the decree which was
proposed in my honour, in its entirety. (_To the jury_.) The points
which he has omitted to indict in the Council's resolution will show
that the charges which he does make are deliberate misrepresentations.
(_To the clerk_.) Read.
[_The decree is read_.]
{119} My donations then, were these, of which you have not made one the
subject of indictment. It is the reward for these, which the Council
states to be my due, that you attack. You admit that it was legal to
accept the gifts offered, and you indict as illegal the return of
gratitude for them. In Heaven's name, what must the perfect scoundrel,
the really heaven-detested, malignant being be like? Must he not be a
man like this?
{120} But as regards the proclamation in the theatre, I pass by the
fact that ten thousand persons have been thus proclaimed on ten
thousand different occasions, and that my own name has often been so
proclaimed before. But, in Heaven's name, Aeschines, are you so
perverse and stupid, that you cannot grasp the fact that the recipient
of the crown feels the same pride wherever the crown is proclaimed, and
that it is for the benefit of those who confer it that the proclamation
is made in the theatre? For those who hear are stimulated to do good
service to the State, and commend those who return gratitude for such
service even more than they commend the recipient of the crown. That is
why the city has enacted this law. (_To the clerk_.) Take the law
itself and read it.
[_The law is read_.]
{121} Do you hear, Aeschines, the plain words of the law? 'Except such
as the People or the Council shall resolve so to proclaim. But let
these be proclaimed.' Why, wretched man, do you lay this dishonest
charge? Why do you invent false arguments? Why do you not take
hellebore[n] to cure you? What? Are you not ashamed to bring a case
founded upon envy, not upon any crime--to alter some of the laws, and
to leave out parts of others, when they ought surely, in justice, to be
read entire to those who have sworn to give their votes in accordance
with the laws? {122} And then, while you act in this way, you enumerate
the qualities which should be found in a friend of the People, as if
you had contracted for a statue, and discovered on receiving it that it
had not the features required by the contract; or as if a friend of the
People was known by a definition, and not by his works and his
political measures! And you shout out expressions, proper and improper,
like a reveller on a cart[n]--expressions which apply to you and your
house, not to me. I will add this also, men of Athens. {123} The
difference between abuse and accusation is, I imagine, that an
accusation is founded upon crimes, for which the penalties are assigned
by law; abuse, upon such slanders as their own character leads enemies
to utter about one another. And I conceive that our forefathers built
these courts of law, not that we might assemble you here and revile one
another with improper expressions suggested by our adversary's private
life, but that we might convict any one who happens to have committed
some crime against the State. {124} Aeschines knew this as well as I;
and yet he chose to make a ribald attack instead of an accusation. At
the same time, it is not fair that he should go off without getting as
much as he gives, even in this respect; and when I have asked him one
question, I will at once proceed to the attack. Are we to call you,
Aeschines, the enemy of the State, or of myself? Of myself, of course.
What? And when you might have exacted the penalty from me, on behalf of
your fellow countrymen, according to the laws--at public examinations,
by indictment, by all other forms of trial--did you always omit to do
so? {125} And yet to-day, when I am unassailable upon every ground--on
the ground of law, of lapse of time, of the statutable limit,[n] of the
many previous trials which I have undergone upon every charge, without
having once been convicted of any crime against you to this day--and
when the city must necessarily share to a greater or smaller degree in
the glory of acts which were really acts of the people, have you
confronted me upon such an issue as this? Take care lest, while you
profess to be _my_ enemy, you prove to be the enemy of your fellow
countrymen!
{126} Since then I have shown you all what is the vote which religion
and justice demand of you, I am now obliged, it would seem, by the
slanders which he has uttered (though I am no lover of abuse) to reply
to his many falsehoods by saying just what is absolutely necessary
about himself, and showing who he is, and whence he is sprung, that he
so lightly begins to use bad language, pulling to pieces certain
expressions of mine, when he has himself used expressions which any
respectable man would have shrunk from uttering; {127} for if the
accuser were Aeacus or Rhadamanthus or Minos,[n] instead of a
scandal-monger,[n] an old hand in the marketplace,[n] a pestilent
clerk, I do not believe that he would have spoken thus, or produced
such a stock of ponderous phrases, crying aloud, as if he were acting a
tragedy, 'O Earth and Sun and Virtue,'[n] and the like; or again,
invoking 'Wit and Culture, by which things noble and base are discerned
apart'--for, of course, you heard him speaking in this way. {128} Scum
of the earth! What have you or yours to do with virtue? How should
_you_ discern what is noble and what is not? Where and how did you get
your qualification to do so? What right have _you_ to mention culture
anywhere? A man of genuine culture would not only never have asserted
such a thing of himself, but would have blushed to hear another do so:
and those who, like you, fall far short of it, but are tactless enough
to claim it, succeed only in causing distress to their hearers, when
they speak--not in seeming to be what they profess.
{129} But though I am not at a loss to know what to say about you and
yours, I am at a loss to know what to mention first. Shall I tell
first[n] how your father Tromes was a slave in the house of Elpias, who
kept an elementary school near the temple of Theseus, and how he wore
shackles and a wooden halter? Or how your mother, by celebrating her
daylight nuptials in her hut near the shrine of the Hero of the
Lancet,[n] was enabled to rear you, her beautiful statue, the prince of
third-rate actors? But these things are known to all without my telling
them. Shall I tell how Phormio, the ship's piper, the slave of Dion of
Phrearrii, raised her up out of this noble profession? But, before God
and every Heavenly Power, I shudder lest in using expressions which are
fitly applied to you, I may be thought to have chosen a subject upon
which it ill befits myself to speak. {130} So I will pass this by, and
will begin with the acts of his own life; for they were not like any
chance actions,[n] but such as the people curses. For only
lately--lately, do I say? only yesterday or the day before--did he
become at once an Athenian and an orator, and by the addition of two
syllables converted his father from Tromes into Atrometus, and gave his
mother the imposing name of Glaucothea,[n] when every one knows that
she used to be called Empusa[n]--a name which was obviously given her
because there was nothing that she would not do or have done to her;
for how else should she have acquired it? {131} Yet, in spite of this,
you are of so ungrateful and villainous a nature, that though, thanks
to your countrymen, you have risen from slavery to freedom, and from
poverty to wealth, far from feeling gratitude to them, you devote your
political activity to working against them as a hireling. I will pass
over every case in which there is any room for the contention that he
has spoken in the interests of the city, and will remind you of the
acts which he was manifestly proved to have done for the good of her
enemies.
{132} Which of you has not heard of Antiphon,[n] who was struck off the
list of citizens,[n] and came into the city in pursuance of a promise
to Philip that he would burn the dockyards? I found him concealed in
the Peiraeus, and brought him before the Assembly; but the malignant
Aeschines shouted at the top of his voice, that it was atrocious of me,
in a democratic country, to insult a citizen who had met with
misfortune, and to go to men's houses without a decree;[n] and he
obtained his release. {133} And unless the Council of Areopagus had
taken notice of the matter, and, seeing the inopportuneness of the
ignorance which you had shown, had made a further search for the man,
and arrested him, and brought him before you again, a man of that
character would have been snatched out of your hands, and would have
evaded punishment, and been sent out of the country by this pompous
orator. As it was, you tortured and executed him--and so ought you also
to have treated Aeschines. {134} The Council of Areopagus knew the part
which he had played in this affair; and for this reason, when, owing to
the same ignorance which so often leads you to sacrifice the public
interests, you elected him[n] to advocate your claims in regard to the
Temple of Delos, the Council (since you had appointed it to assist you
and entrusted it with full authority to act in the matter) immediately
rejected Aeschines as a traitor, and committed the case to Hypereides.
When the Council took this step, the members took their votes from the
altar,[n] and not one vote was given for this abominable man. {135} To
prove that what I say is true, (_to the clerk_) call the witnesses who
testify to it.
[_The witnesses are called_.]
{136} Thus when the Council rejected him from the office of advocate,
and committed the case to another, it declared at the same time that he
was a traitor, who wished you ill.
Such was one of the public appearances of this fine fellow, and such
its character--so like the acts with which he charges me, is it not?
Now recall a second. For when Philip sent Python of Byzantium,[n] and
with him envoys from all his allies, in the hope of putting the city to
shame and showing her to be in the wrong, I would not give way before
the torrent of insolent rhetoric which Python poured out upon you, but
rose and contradicted him, and would not betray the city's rights, but
proved the iniquity of Philip's actions so manifestly, that even his
own allies rose up and admitted it. But Aeschines supported Python; he
gave testimony in opposition to his country, and that testimony false.
{137} Nor was this sufficient for him; for again after this he was
detected going to meet Anaxinus[n] the spy in the house of Thrason. But
surely one who met the emissary of the enemy alone and conferred with
him, must himself have been already a born spy and an enemy of his
country. To prove the truth of what I say, (_to the clerk_) call the
witnesses to these facts.
[_The witnesses are called_.]
{138} There are still an infinite number of things which I might relate
of him; but I pass them over. For the truth is something like this. I
could still point to many instances in which he was found to be serving
our enemies during that period, and showing his spite against me. But
you do not store such things up in careful remembrance, to visit them
with the indignation which they deserve; but, following a bad custom,
you have given great freedom to any one who wishes to trip up the
proposer of any advantageous measure by dishonest charges--bartering,
as you do, the advantage of the State for the pleasure and
gratification which you derive from invective; and so it is always
easier and safer to be a hireling in the service of the enemy, than a
statesman who has chosen to defend your cause.
{139} To co-operate with Philip before we were openly at war with him
was --I call Earth and Heaven to witness--atrocious enough. How could
it be otherwise--against his own country? Nevertheless, concede him
this, if you will, concede him this. But when the corn-ships had been
openly plundered, and the Chersonese was being ravaged, and the man was
on the march against Attica; when the position of affairs was no longer
in doubt, and war had begun; what action did this malignant mouther of
verses ever do for your good? He can point to none. There is not a
single decree, small or great, with reference to the interests of the
city, standing in the name of Aeschines. If he asserts that there is,
let him produce it in the time allotted to me. But no such decree
exists. In that case, however, only two alternatives are possible:
either he had no fault to find at the time with my policy, and
therefore made no proposal contrary to it; or else he was seeking the
advantage of the enemy, and therefore refrained from bringing forward
any better policy than mine.
{140} Did he then abstain from speaking, as he abstained from proposing
any motion, when any mischief was to be done? On the contrary, no one
else had a chance of speaking. But though, apparently, the city could
endure everything else, and he could do everything else unobserved,
there was one final deed which was the culmination of all that he had
done before. Upon this he expended all that multitude of words, as he
went through the decrees relating to the Amphisseans, in the hope of
distorting the truth. But the truth cannot be distorted. It is
impossible. Never will you wash away the stain of your actions there!
You will not say enough for that!
{141} I call upon all the gods and goddesses who protect this land of
Attica, in the presence of you all, men of Athens; and upon Apollo of
Pytho, the paternal deity[n] of this city, and I pray to them all, that
if I should speak the truth to you--if I spoke it at that very time
without delay, in the presence of the people, when first I saw this
abominable man setting his hand to this business (for I knew it, I knew
it at once),--that then they may give me good fortune and life: but if,
to gratify my hatred or any private quarrel, I am now bringing a false
accusation against this man, then they may take from me the fruition of
every blessing.
{142} Why have I uttered this imprecation with such vehemence and
earnestness? Because, although I have documents, lying in the public
archives, by which I will prove the facts clearly; although I know that
you remember what was done; I have still the fear that he may be
thought too insignificant a man to have done all the evil which he has
wrought--as indeed happened before, when he caused the ruin of the
unhappy Phocians by the false report which he brought home. {143} For
the war at Amphissa, which was the cause of Philip's coming to Elateia,
and of one being chosen[n] commander of the Amphictyons, who overthrew
the fortunes of the Hellenes--_he_ it is who helped to get it up; he,
in his sole person, is to blame for disasters to which no equal can be
found. I protested at the time, and cried out, before the Assembly,
'You are bringing war into Attica, Aeschines--an Amphictyonic War.' But
a packed group of his supporters refused to let me speak, while the
rest were amazed, and imagined that I was bringing a baseless charge
against him, out of personal animosity. {144} But what the true nature
of these proceedings was, men of Athens--why this plan was contrived,
and how it was executed--you must hear from me to-day, since you were
prevented from doing so at the time. You will behold a business
cunningly organized; you will advance greatly in your knowledge of
public affairs; and you will see what cleverness there was in Philip.
{145} Philip had no prospect of seeing the end of the war with you, or
ridding himself of it, unless he could make the Thebans and Thessalians
enemies of Athens. For although the war was being wretchedly and
inefficiently conducted by your generals, he was nevertheless suffering
infinite damage from the war itself and from the freebooters. The
exportation of the produce of his country and the importation of what
he needed were both impossible. {146} Moreover, he was not at that time
superior to you at sea, nor could he reach Attica, if the Thessalians
would not follow him, or the Thebans give him a passage through their
country; and although he was overcoming in the field the generals whom
you sent out, such as they were (for of this I say nothing), he found
himself suffering from the geographical conditions themselves, and from
the nature of the resources[n] which either side possessed. {147} Now
if he tried to encourage either the Thessalians or the Thebans to march
against you in order to further his own quarrel, no one, he thought,
would pay any attention to him; but if he adopted their own common
grounds of action and were chosen commander, he hoped to find it easier
to deceive or to persuade them, as the case might be. What then does he
do? He attempts (and observe with what skill) to stir up an
Amphictyonic War, and a disturbance in connexion with the meeting of
the Council. {148} For he thought that they would at once find that
they needed his help, to deal with these. Now if one of his own or his
allies' representatives on the Council[n] brought the matter forward,
he thought that both the Thebans and the Thessalians would regard the
proceeding with suspicion, and that all would be on their guard: but if
it was an Athenian, sent by you, his adversaries, that did so, he would
easily escape detection--as, in fact, happened. {149}* How then did he
manage this? He hired Aeschines. No one, I suppose, either realized
beforehand what was going on or guarded against it--that is how such
affairs are usually conducted here; Aeschines was nominated a delegate
to the Council; three or four people held up their hands for him, and
he was declared elected. But when, bearing with him the prestige of
this city, he reached the Amphictyons, he dismissed and closed his eyes
to all other considerations, and proceeded to perform the task for
which he had been hired. He composed and recited a story, in attractive
language, of the way in which the Cirrhaean territory had come to be
dedicated; {150} and with this he persuaded the members of the Council,
who were unused to rhetoric and did not foresee what was about to
happen, that they should resolve to make the circuit of the
territory,[n] which the Amphisseans said they were cultivating because
it was their own, while he alleged that it was part of the consecrated
land. The Locrians were not bringing any suit against us, or taking any
such action as (in order to justify himself) he now falsely alleges.
You may know this from the following consideration. It was clearly
impossible[n] for the Locrians to bring a suit against Athens to an
actual issue, without summoning us. Who then served the summons upon
us? Before what authority was it served? Tell us who knows: point to
him. You cannot do so. It was a hollow and a false pretext of which you
thus made a wrongful use. {151} While the Amphictyons were making the
circuit of the territory in accordance with Aeschines' suggestion, the
Locrians fell upon them and came near to shooting them all down with
their spears; some of the members of the Council they even carried off
with them. And now that complaints and hostilities had been stirred up
against the Amphisseans, in consequence of these proceedings, the
command was first held by Cottyphus, and his force was drawn from the
Amphictyonic Powers alone. But since some did not come, and those who
came did nothing, the men who had been suborned for the
purpose--villains of long standing, chosen from the Thessalians and
from the traitors in other States--took steps with a view to entrusting
the affair to Philip, as commander, at the next meeting of the Council.
{152} They had adopted arguments of a persuasive kind. Either, they
said, the Amphictyons must themselves contribute funds, maintain
mercenaries, and fine those who refused to do so; or they must elect
Philip. To make a long story short, the result was that Philip was
appointed. And immediately afterwards, having collected a force and
crossed the Pass, ostensibly on his way to the territory of Cirrha, he
bids a long farewell to the Cirrhaeans and Locrians, and seizes
Elateia. {153} Now if the Thebans had not changed their policy at once,
upon seeing this, and joined us, the trouble would have descended upon
the city in full force, like a torrent in winter. As it was, the
Thebans checked him for the moment; chiefly, men of Athens, through the
goodwill of some Heavenly Power towards us; but secondarily, so far as
it lay in one man's power, through me also. (_To the clerk_.) Now give
me the decrees in question, and the dates of each proceeding; (_to the
jury_) that you may know what trouble this abominable creature stirred
up, unpunished. (_To the clerk_.) Read me the decrees.
{154} [_The decrees of the Amphictyons are read_.]
{155} (_To the clerk_.) Now read the dates of these proceedings. (_To
the jury_.) They are the dates at which Aeschines was delegate to the
Council. (_To the clerk_.) Read.
[_The dates are read_.]
{156} Now give me the letter which Philip sent to his allies in the
Peloponnese, when the Thebans failed to obey his summons. For from
this, too, you may clearly see that he concealed the real reason for
his action--the fact that he was taking measures against Hellas and the
Thebans and yourselves--and pretended to represent the common cause and
the will of the Amphictyons. And the man who provided him with all
these occasions and pretexts was Aeschines. (_To the clerk_.) Read.
{157} [_Philip's letter is read_.]
{158} You see that he avoids the mention of his own reasons for action,
and takes refuge in those provided by the Amphictyons. Who was it that
helped him to prepare such a case? Who put such pretexts at his
disposal? Who is most to blame for the disasters that have taken place?
Is it not Aeschines? And so, men of Athens, you must not go about
saying that Hellas has suffered such things as these at the hands of
one man.[n] I call Earth and Heaven to witness, that it was at the
hands, not of one man, but of many villains in each State. {159} And of
these Aeschines is one; and, had I to speak the truth without any
reserve, I should not hesitate to describe him as the incarnate curse
of all alike--men, regions or cities--that have been ruined since then.
For he who supplied the seed is responsible for the crop. I wonder that
you did not turn away your eyes at the very sight of him: but a cloud
of darkness seems to hang between you and the truth.
{160} I find that in dealing with the measures taken by Aeschines for
the injury of his country, I have reached the time when I must speak of
my own statesmanship in opposition to these measures; and it is fair
that you should listen to this, for many reasons, but above all because
it will be a shameful thing, if, when I have faced the actual realities
of hard work for you, you will not even suffer the story of them to be
told. {161} For when I saw the Thebans, and (I may almost say)
yourselves as well, being led by the corrupt partisans of Philip in
either State to overlook, without taking a single precaution against
it, the thing which was really dangerous to both peoples and needed
their utmost watchfulness--the unhindered growth of Philip's power;
while, on the contrary, you were quite ready to entertain ill-feeling
and to quarrel with one another; I kept unceasing watch to prevent
this. Nor did I rely only on my own judgement in thinking that this was
what your interest required. {162} I knew that Aristophon, and
afterwards Eubulus, always wished to bring about this friendly union,
and that, often as they opposed one another in other matters, they
always agreed in this. Cunning fox! While they lived, you hung about
them and flattered them; yet now that they are dead, you do not see
that you are attacking them. For your censure of my policy in regard to
Thebes is far more a denunciation of them than of me, since they were
before me in approving of that alliance. {163} But I return to my
previous point--that it was when Aeschines had brought about the war at
Amphissa, and the others, his accomplices, had effectually helped him
to create the ill-feeling against the Thebans, that Philip marched
against us. For it was to render this possible that their attempt to
throw the two cities into collision was made; and had we not roused
ourselves a little before it was too late, we should never have been
able to regain the lost ground; to such a length had these men carried
matters. What the relations between the two peoples already were, you
will know when you have heard these decrees and replies. (_To the
clerk_.) Take these and read them.
{164, 165} [_The decrees are read_.]
{166} (_To the clerk_.) Now read the replies.
{167} [_The replies are read_.]
{168} Having established such relations between the cities, through the
agency of these men, and being elated by these decrees and replies,
Philip came with his army and seized Elateia, thinking that under no
circumstances whatever should we and the Thebans join in unison after
this. And though the commotion which followed in the city is known to
you all, let me relate to you briefly just the bare facts.
{169} It was evening, and one had come to the Prytanes[n] with the news
that Elateia had been taken. Upon this they rose up from supper without
delay; some of them drove the occupants out of the booths in the
market-place and set fire to the wicker-work;[n] others sent for the
generals and summoned the trumpeter; and the city was full of
commotion. On the morrow, at break of day, the Prytanes summoned the
Council to the Council-Chamber, while you made your way to the
Assembly; and before the Council had transacted its business and passed
its draft-resolution,[n] the whole people was seated on the
hill-side.[n] {170} And now, when the Council had arrived, and the
Prytanes had reported the intelligence which they had received, and had
brought forward the messenger, and he had made his statement, the
herald proceeded to ask, 'Who wishes to speak?' But no one came
forward; and though the herald repeated the question many times, still
no one rose, though all the generals were present, and all the orators,
and the voice of their country was calling for some one to speak for
her deliverance. For the voice of the herald, uttered in accordance
with the laws, is rightly to be regarded as the common voice of our
country. {171} And yet, if it was for those to come forward who wished
for the deliverance of the city, all of you and all the other Athenians
would have risen, and proceeded to the platform, for I am certain that
you all wished for her deliverance. If it was for the wealthiest, the
Three Hundred[n] would have risen; and if it was for those who had both
these qualifications--loyalty to the city and wealth--then those would
have risen, who subsequently made those large donations; for it was
loyalty and wealth that led them so to do. {172} But that crisis and
that day called, it seems, not merely for a man of loyalty and wealth,
but for one who had also followed the course of events closely from the
first, and had come to a true conclusion as to the motive and the aim
with which Philip was acting as he was. For no one who was unacquainted
with these, and had not scrutinized them from an early period, was any
the more likely, for all his loyalty and wealth, to know what should be
done, or to be able to advise you. {173} The man who was needed was
found that day in me. I came forward and addressed you in words which I
ask you to listen to with attention, for two reasons--first, because I
would have you realize that I was the only orator or politician who did
not desert his post as a loyal citizen in the hour of danger, but was
found there, speaking and proposing what your need required, in the
midst of the terror; and secondly, because by the expenditure of a
small amount of time, you will be far better qualified for the future
in the whole art of political administration. {174} My words then were
these: 'Those who are unduly disturbed by the idea that Philip can
count upon the support of Thebes do not, I think, understand the
present situation. For I am quite sure that, if this were so, we should
have heard of his being, not at Elateia, but on our own borders. At the
same time, I understand quite well, that he has come to prepare the way
for himself at Thebes. {175} Listen,' I said, 'while I tell you the
true state of affairs. Philip already has at his disposal all the
Thebans whom he could win over either by bribery or by deception; and
those who have resisted him from the first and are opposing him now, he
has no chance of winning. What then is his design and object in seizing
Elateia? He wishes, by making a display of force in their neighbourhood
and bringing up his army, to encourage and embolden his own friends,
and to strike terror into his enemies, that so they may either concede
out of terror what they now refuse, or may be compelled. {176} Now,' I
said, 'if we make up our minds at the present moment to remember any
ill-natured action which the Thebans may have done us, and to distrust
them on the assumption that they are on the side of our enemies, we
shall be doing, in the first place, just what Philip would pray for:
and further, I am afraid that his present opponents may then welcome
him, that all may philippize[n] with one consent, and that he and they
may march to Attica together. If, however, you follow my advice, and
give your minds to the problem before us, instead of to contentious
criticism of anything that I may say, I believe that I shall be able to
win your approval for my proposals, and to dispel the danger which
threatens the city. {177} What then must you do? You must first
moderate your present alarm, and then change your attitude, and be
alarmed, all of you, for the Thebans. They are far more within the
reach of disaster than we: it is they whom the danger threatens first.
Secondly, those who are of military age, with the cavalry, must march
to Eleusis,[n] and let every one see that you yourselves are in arms;
in order that those who sympathize with you in Thebes may be enabled to
speak in defence of the right, with the same freedom that their
opponents enjoy, when they see that, just as those who are trying to
sell their country to Philip have a force ready to help them at
Elateia, so those who would struggle for freedom have you ready at hand
to help them, and to go to their aid, if any one attacks them. {178}
Next I bid you elect ten envoys, and give them full authority, with the
generals, to decide the time of their own journey to Thebes, and to
order the march of the troops. But when the envoys arrive in Thebes,
how do I advise that they should handle the matter? I ask your special
attention to this. They must require nothing of the Thebans--to do so
at such a moment would be shameful; but they must undertake that we
will go to their aid, if they bid us do so, on the ground that they are
in extreme peril, and that we foresee the future better than they; in
order that, if they accept our offer and take our advice, we may have
secured our object, and our action may wear an aspect worthy of this
city; or, if after all we are unsuccessful, the Thebans may have
themselves to blame for any mistakes which they now make, while we
shall have done nothing disgraceful or ignoble.' {179} When I had
spoken these words, and others in the same strain, I left the platform.
All joined in commending these proposals; no one said a word in
opposition; and I did not speak thus, and then fail to move a motion;
nor move a motion, and then fail to serve as envoy; nor serve as envoy,
and then fail to persuade the Thebans. I carried the matter through in
person from beginning to end, and gave myself up unreservedly to meet
the dangers which encompassed the city. (_To the clerk_.) Bring me the
resolution which was then passed.
{180} But now, Aeschines, how would you have me describe your part, and
how mine, that day? Shall I call myself, as you would call me by way of
abuse and disparagement, _Battalus_?[n] and you, no ordinary hero even,
but a real stage-hero, _Cresphontes_ or _Creon_,[n] or--the character
which you cruelly murdered at Collytus[n]--_Oenomaus_? Then I, Battalus
of Paeania, proved myself of more value to my country in that crisis
than Oenomaus of Cothocidae. In fact you were of no service on any
occasion, while I played the part which became a good citizen
throughout. (_To the clerk_.) Read this decree.
{181-7} [_The decree of Demosthenes is read_.]
{188} This was the first step towards our new relations with Thebes,
and the beginning of a settlement. Up to this time the cities had been
inveigled into mutual hostility, hatred, and mistrust by these men. But
this decree caused the peril that encompassed the city to pass away
like a cloud. It was for an honest citizen, if he had any better plan
than mine, to make it public at the time, instead of attacking me now.
{189} The true counsellor and the dishonest accuser, unlike as they are
in everything, differ most of all in this: the one declares his opinion
before the event, and freely surrenders himself as responsible, to
those who follow his advice, to Fortune, to circumstances, to any
one.[n] The other is silent when he ought to speak, and then carps at
anything untoward that may happen. {190} That crisis, as I have said,
was the opportunity for a man who cared for his country, the
opportunity for honest speaking. But so much further than I need will I
go, that if any one can _now_ point to any better course--or any course
at all except that which I chose--I admit my guilt. If any one has
discovered any course to-day, which would have been for our advantage,
had we followed it at the time, I admit that it ought not to have
escaped me. But if there neither is nor was such a possibility; if even
now, even to-day, no one can mention any such course, what was the
counsellor of the people to do? Had he not to choose the best of the
plans which suggested themselves and were feasible? {191} This I did.
For the herald asked the question, Aeschines, 'Who wishes to speak?'
not 'Who wishes to bring accusations about the past?' nor 'Who wishes
to guarantee the future?' And while you sat speechless in the Assembly
throughout that period, I came forward and spoke. Since, however, you
did not do so then, at least inform us now, and tell us what words,
which should have been upon my lips, were left unspoken, what precious
opportunity, offered to the city, was left unused, by me? What alliance
was there, what course of action, to which I ought, by preference, to
have guided my countrymen?
{192} But with all mankind the past is always dismissed from
consideration, and no one under any circumstances proposes to
deliberate about it. It is the future or the present that make their
call upon a statesman's duty. Now at that time the danger was partly in
the future, and partly already present; and instead of cavilling
disingenuously at the results, consider the principle of my policy
under such circumstances. For in everything the final issue falls out
as Heaven wills; but the principle which he follows itself reveals the
mind of the statesman. {193} Do not, therefore, count it a crime on my
part, that Philip proved victorious in the battle. The issue of that
event lay with God, not with me. But show me that I did not adopt every
expedient that was possible, so far as human reason could calculate;
that I did not carry out my plan honestly and diligently, with
exertions greater than my strength could bear; or that the policy which
I initiated was not honourable, and worthy of Athens, and indeed
necessary: and then denounce me, but not before. {194} But if the
thunderbolt [or the storm] which fell has proved too mighty, not only
for us, but for all the other Hellenes, what are we to do? It is as
though a ship-owner, who had done all that he could to ensure safety,
and had equipped the ship with all that he thought would enable her to
escape destruction, and had then met with a tempest in which the
tackling had been strained or even broken to pieces, were to be held
responsible for the wreck of the vessel. 'Why,' he would say, 'I was
not steering the ship'--just as I was not the general[n]--'I had no
power over Fortune: she had power over everything.' But consider and
observe this point. {195} If it was fated that we should fare as we
did, even when we had the Thebans to help us in the struggle, what must
we have expected, if we had not had even them for our allies, but they
had joined Philip?--and this was the object for which Philip
employed[n] every tone that he could command. And if, when the battle
took place, as it did, three days' march from Attica, the city was
encompassed by such peril and terror, what should we have had to
expect, if this same disaster had occurred anywhere within the borders
of our own country? Do you realize that, as it was, a single day, and a
second, and a third gave us the power to rally, to collect our forces,
to take breath, to do much that made for the deliverance of the city:
but that had it been otherwise--it is not well, however, to speak of
things which we have not had to experience, thanks to the goodwill of
one of the gods, and to the protection which the city obtained for
herself in this alliance, which you denounce.
{196} The whole of this long argument, gentlemen of the jury, is
addressed to yourselves and to the circle of listeners outside the bar;
for to this despicable man it would have been enough to address a
short, plain sentence. If to you alone, Aeschines, the future was
clear, before it came, you should have given warning, when the city was
deliberating upon the subject; but if you had no such foreknowledge,
you have the same ignorance to answer for as others. Why then should
you make these charges against me, any more than I against you? {197}
For I have been a better citizen than you with regard to this very
matter of which I am speaking--I am not as yet talking of anything
else--just in so far as I gave myself up to the policy which all
thought expedient, neither shrinking from nor regarding any personal
risk; while you neither offered any better proposals than mine (for
then they would not have followed mine), nor yet made yourself useful
in advancing mine in any way. What the most worthless of men, the
bitterest enemy of the city, would do, you are found to have done, when
all was over; and at the same time as the irreconcilable enemies of the
city, Aristratus in Naxos, and Aristoleos in Thasos, are bringing the
friends of Athens to trial, Aeschines, in Athens itself, is accusing
Demosthenes. {198} But surely one who treasured up[n] the misfortunes
of the Hellenes, that he might win glory from them for himself,
deserved to perish rather than to stand as the accuser of another; and
one who has profited by the very same crisis as the enemies of the city
cannot possibly be loyal to his country. You prove it, moreover, by the
life you live, the actions you do, the measures you take --and the
measures, too, that you do not take. Is anything being done which seems
advantageous to the city? Aeschines is speechless. Has any obstruction,
any untoward event occurred? There you find Aeschines, like a rupture
or a sprain, which wakes into life, so soon as any trouble overtakes
the body.
{199} But since he bears so hardly upon the results, I desire to say
what may even be a paradox; and let no one, in the name of Heaven, be
amazed at the length to which I go, but give a kindly consideration to
what I say. Even if what was to come was plain to all beforehand; even
if all foreknew it; even if you, Aeschines, had been crying with a loud
voice in warning and protestation--you who uttered not so much as a
sound; even then, I say, it was not right for the city to abandon her
course, if she had any regard for her fame, or for our forefathers, or
for the ages to come. {200} As it is, she is thought, no doubt, to have
failed to secure her object--as happens to all alike, whenever God
wills it: but then, by abandoning in favour of Philip her claim to take
the lead of others, she must have incurred the blame of having betrayed
them all. Had she surrendered without a struggle those claims in
defence of which our forefathers faced every imaginable peril, who
would not have cast scorn upon you, Aeschines--upon you, I say; not, I
trust, upon Athens nor upon me? {201} In God's name, with what faces
should we have looked upon those who came to visit the city, if events
had come round to the same conclusion as they now have--if Philip had
been chosen as commander and lord of all, and we had stood apart, while
others carried on the struggle to prevent these things; and that,
although the city had never yet in time past preferred an inglorious
security to the hazardous vindication of a noble cause? {202} What
Hellene, what foreigner, does not know, that the Thebans, and the
Spartans, who were powerful still earlier, and the Persian king would
all gratefully and gladly have allowed Athens to take what she liked
and keep all that was her own, if she would do the bidding of another,
and let another take the first place in Hellas? {203} But this was not,
it appears, the tradition of the Athenians; it was not tolerable; it
was not in their nature. From the beginning of time no one had ever yet
succeeded in persuading the city to throw in her lot with those who
were strong, but unrighteous in their dealings, and to enjoy the
security of servitude. Throughout all time she has maintained her
perilous struggle for pre-eminence, honour, and glory. {204} And this
policy you look upon as so lofty, so proper to your own national
character, that, of your forefathers also, it is those who have acted
thus that you praise most highly. And naturally. For who would not
admire the courage of those men, who did not fear to leave their
land[n] and their city, and to embark upon their ships, that they might
not do the bidding of another; who chose for their general Themistocles
(who had counselled them thus), and stoned Cyrsilus to death, when he
gave his voice for submission to a master's orders--and not him alone,
for your wives stoned his wife also to death. {205} For the Athenians
of that day did not look for an orator or a general who would enable
them to live in happy servitude; they cared not to live at all, unless
they might live in freedom. For every one of them felt that he had come
into being, not for his father and his mother alone, but also for his
country. And wherein lies the difference? He who thinks he was born for
his parents alone awaits the death which destiny assigns him in the
course of nature: but he who thinks he was born for his country also
will be willing to die, that he may not see her in bondage, and will
look upon the outrages and the indignities that he must needs bear in a
city that is in bondage as more to be dreaded than death.
{206} Now were I attempting to argue that _I_ had induced you to show a
spirit worthy of your forefathers, there is not a man who might not
rebuke me with good reason. But in fact, I am declaring that such
principles as these are your own; I am showing that _before_ my time
the city displayed this spirit, though I claim that I, too, have had
some share, as your servant, in carrying out your policy in detail.
{207} But in denouncing the policy as a whole, in bidding you be harsh
with me, as one who has brought terrors and dangers upon the city, the
prosecutor, in his eagerness to deprive me of my distinction at the
present moment, is trying to rob you of praises that will last
throughout all time. For if you condemn the defendant on the ground
that my policy was not for the best, men will think that your own
judgement has been wrong, and that it was not through the unkindness of
fortune that you suffered what befell you. {208} But it cannot,[n] it
cannot be that you were wrong, men of Athens, when you took upon you
the struggle for freedom and deliverance. No! by those who at Marathon
bore the brunt of the peril--our forefathers. No! by those who at
Plataeae drew up their battle-line, by those who at Salamis, by those
who off Artemisium fought the fight at sea, by the many who lie in the
sepulchres where the People laid them, brave men, all alike deemed
worthy by their country, Aeschines, of the same honour and the same
obsequies--not the successful or the victorious alone! And she acted
justly. For all these have done that which it was the duty of brave men
to do; but their fortune has been that which Heaven assigned to each.
{209} Accursed, poring pedant![n] if you, in your anxiety to deprive me
of the honour and the kindness shown to me by my countrymen, recounted
trophies and battles and deeds of long ago--and of which of them did
this present trial demand the mention?--what spirit was I to take upon
me, when I mounted the platform, I who came forward to advise the city
how she should maintain her pre-eminence? Tell me, third-rate actor!
The spirit of one who would propose things unworthy of this people?
{210} I should indeed have deserved to die! For you too, men of Athens,
ought not to judge private suits and public in the same spirit. The
business transactions of everyday life must be viewed in the light of
the special law and practice associated with each; but the public
policy of statesmen must be judged by the principles that your
forefathers set before them. And if you believe that you should act
worthily of them, then, whenever you come into court to try a public
suit, each of you must imagine that with his staff[n] and his ticket
there is entrusted to him also the spirit of his country.
{211} But I have entered upon the subject of your forefathers'
achievements, and have passed over certain decrees and transactions. I
desire, therefore, to return to the point from which I digressed.
When we came to Thebes, we found envoys there from Philip, and from the
Thessalians and his other allies--our friends in terror, his full of
confidence. And to show you that I am not saying this now to suit my
own purpose, read the letter which we, your envoys, dispatched without
delay. {212} The prosecutor, however, has exercised the art of
misrepresentation to so extravagant a degree, that he attributes to
circumstances, not to me, any satisfactory result that was achieved;
but for everything that fell out otherwise, he lays the blame upon me
and the fortune that attends me. In his eyes, apparently, I, the
counsellor and orator, have no share in the credit for what was
accomplished as the result of oratory and debate; while I must bear the
blame alone for the misfortunes which we suffered in arms, and as a
result of generalship. What more brutal, more damnable
misrepresentation can be conceived? (_To the clerk_.) Read the letter.
[_The letter is read_.]
{213} When they had convened the Assembly, they gave audience to the
other side first, on the ground that they occupied the position of
allies; and these came forward and delivered harangues full of the
praises of Philip and of accusations against yourselves, recalling
everything that you had ever done in opposition to the Thebans. The sum
of it all was that they required the Thebans to show their gratitude
for the benefits which they had received from Philip, and to exact the
penalty for the injuries they had received from you, in whichever way
they preferred--either by letting them march through their country
against you, or by joining them in the invasion of Attica; and they
showed (as they thought) that the result of the course which they
advised would be that the herds and slaves and other valuables of
Attica would find their way into Boeotia; while the result of what (as
they alleged) you were about to propose would be that those of Boeotia
would be plundered in consequence of the war. {214} They said much
more, but all tending to the same effect. As for our reply, I would
give my whole life to tell it you in detail; but I fear lest, now that
those times have gone by, you may feel as if a very deluge[n] had
overwhelmed all, and may regard anything that is said on the subject as
vanity and vexation. But hear at least what we persuaded them to do,
and their answer to us. (_To the clerk_.) Take this and read it.
[_The answer of the Thebans is read_.]
{215} After this they invited and summoned you; you marched; you went
to their aid; and (to pass over the events which intervened) they
received you in so friendly a spirit that while their infantry and
cavalry were encamped outside the walls,[n] they welcomed your troops
into their houses, within the city, among their children and wives, and
all that was most precious to them. Three eulogies did the Thebans
pronounce upon you before the world that day, and those of the most
honourable kind--the first upon your courage, the second upon your
righteousness, the third upon your self-control. For when they chose to
side with you in the struggle, rather than against you, they judged
that your courage was greater, and your requests more righteous, than
Philip's; and when they placed in your power what they and all men
guard most jealously, their children and wives, they showed their
confidence in your self-control. {216} In all these points, men of
Athens, your conduct proved that their judgement had been correct. For
the force came into the city; but no one made a single complaint--not
even an unfounded complaint--against you; so virtuously did you conduct
yourselves. And twice you fought by their side, in the earliest
battles-the battle by the river[n] and the winter-battle[n]--and showed
yourselves, not only irreproachable, but even admirable, in your
discipline, your equipment, and your enthusiasm. These things called
forth expressions of thanks to you from other states, and sacrifices
and processions to the gods from yourselves. {217} And I should like to
ask Aeschines whether, when all this was happening, and the city was
full of pride and joy and thanksgiving, he joined in the sacrifices and
the rejoicing of the multitude, or whether he sat at home grieving and
groaning and angry at the good fortune of his country. If he was
present, and was seen in his place with the rest, surely his present
action is atrocious--nay, even impious--when he asks you, who have
taken an oath by the gods, to vote to-day that those very things were
not excellent, of whose excellence he himself on that day made the gods
his witnesses. If he was not present, then surely he deserves to die
many times, for grieving at the sight of the things which brought
rejoicing to others. (_To the clerk_.) Now read these decrees also.
[_The decrees ordering sacrifices are read_.]
{218} Thus we were occupied at that time with sacrifices, while the
Thebans were reflecting how they had been saved by our help; and those
who, in consequence of my opponents' proceedings, had expected that
they would themselves stand in need of help, found themselves, after
all, helping others, in consequence of the action they took upon my
advice. But what the tone of Philip's utterance was, and how greatly he
was confounded by what had happened, you can learn from his letter,
which he sent to the Peloponnese. (_To the clerk_.) Take these and read
them: (_to the jury_) that you may know what was effected by my
perseverance, by my travels, by the hardships I endured, by all those
decrees of which Aeschines spoke so disparagingly just now.
{219} You have had, as you know, many great and famous orators, men of
Athens, before my time--Callistratus himself, Aristophon, Cephalus,
Thrasybulus, and a vast number of others. Yet not one of these ever
gave himself up entirely to the State for any purpose: the mover of a
decree would not serve as ambassador, the ambassador would not move the
decree. Each left himself, at one and the same time, some respite from
work, and somewhere to lay the blame,[n] in case of accidents. {220}
'Well,' some one may say, 'did _you_ so excel them in force and
boldness, as to do everything yourself?' I do not say that. But so
strong was my conviction of the seriousness of the danger that had
overtaken the city, that I felt that I ought not to give my personal
safety any place whatever in my thoughts; it was enough for a man to do
his duty and to leave nothing undone. {221} And I was convinced with
regard to myself--foolishly perhaps, but still convinced--that no mover
would make a better proposal, no agent would execute it better, no
ambassador would be more eager or more honest in his mission, than I.
For these reasons, I assigned every one of these offices to myself.
(_To the clerk_.) Read Philip's letters.
[_Philip's letters are read_.]
{222} To this condition, Aeschines, was Philip reduced by my
statesmanship. This was the tone of his utterances, though before this
he used to threaten the city with many a bold word. For this I was
deservedly crowned by those here assembled, and though you were
present, you offered no opposition; while Diondas, who indicted the
proposer, did not obtain the necessary fraction of the votes. (_To the
clerk_.) Read me these decrees, (_to the jury)_ which escaped
condemnation, and which Aeschines did not even indict.
[_The decrees are read_.]
{223} These decrees, men of Athens, contain the very same syllables,
the very same words, as those which Aristonicus previously employed in
his proposal, and which Ctesiphon, the defendant, has employed now; and
Aeschines neither prosecuted the proposer of them himself, nor
supported the person who indicted him. Yet surely, if the charges which
he is bringing against me to-day are true, he would have had better
reason then for prosecuting Demomeles (the proposer of the decree) and
Hypereides, than he has for prosecuting Ctesiphon. And why? {224}
Because Ctesiphon can refer you to them--to the decision of the courts,
to the fact that Aeschines himself did not accuse them, though they had
moved exactly what he has moved now, to the prohibition by law of
further prosecution in such cases, and to many other facts: whereas
then the case would have been tried on its merits, before the defendant
had got the advantage of any such precedent. {225} But of course it was
impossible then for Aeschines to act as he has acted now--to select out
of many periods of time long past, and many decrees, matters which no
one either knew or thought would be mentioned to-day; to misrepresent
them, to change the dates, to put false reasons for the actions taken
in place of the true, and so appear to have a case. {226} At the time
this was impossible. Every word spoken then must have been spoken with
the truth in view, at no distance of time from the events, while you
still remembered all the facts and had them practically at your
fingers' ends. For that reason he evaded all investigation at the time;
and he has come before you now, in the belief (I fancy) that you will
make this a contest of oratory, instead of an inquiry into our
political careers, and that it is upon our eloquence, not upon the
interests of the city, that you will decide.
{227} Yes, and he ingeniously suggests that you ought to disregard the
opinion which you had of each of us when you left your homes and came
into court; and that just as, when you draw up an account in the belief
that some one has a balance, you nevertheless give way when you find
that the counters all disappear[n] and leave nothing over, so now you
should give your adhesion to the conclusion which emerges from the
argument. Now observe how inherently rotten everything that springs
from dishonesty seems to be. {228} By his very use of this ingenious
illustration he has confessed that to-day, at all events, our
respective characters are well established--that I am known to speak
for my country's good, and he to speak for Philip. For unless that were
your present conception of each of us, he would not have sought to
change your view. {229} And further, I shall easily show you that it is
not fair of him to ask you to alter this opinion--not by the use of
counters--that is not how a political reckoning is made--but by briefly
recalling each point to you, and treating you who hear me both as
auditors of my account and witnesses to the facts. For that policy of
mine which he denounces caused the Thebans, instead of joining Philip,
as all expected them to do, in the invasion of our country, to range
themselves by our side and stay his progress. {230} It caused the war
to take place not in Attica, but on the confines of Boeotia, eighty
miles from the city. Instead of our being harried and plundered by
freebooters from Euboea, it gave peace to Attica from the side of the
sea throughout the war. Instead of Philip's taking Byzantium and
becoming master of the Hellespont, it caused the Byzantines to join us
in the war against him. {231} Can such achievements, think you, be
reckoned up like counters? Are we to cancel them out,[n] rather than
provide that they shall be remembered for all time? I need not now add
that it fell to others to taste the barbarity which is to be seen in
every case in which Philip got any one finally into his power; while
you reaped (and quite rightly) the fruits of the generosity which he
feigned while he was bringing within his grasp all that remained. But I
pass this over.
{232} Nay, I will not even hesitate to say, that one who wished to
review an orator's career straightforwardly and without
misrepresentation, would not have included in his charges such matters
as you just now spoke of--making up illustrations, and mimicking words
and gestures. Of course the fortune which befell the Hellenes--surely
you see this?--was entirely due to my using this word instead of that,
or waving my hand in one direction rather than the other! {233} He
would have inquired, by reference to the actual facts, what resources
and what forces the city had at her command when I entered political
life; what I subsequently collected for her when I took control; and
what was the condition of our adversaries. Then if I had diminished our
forces, he would have proved that the fault lay at my door; but if I
had greatly increased them, he would have abstained from deliberate
misrepresentation. But since you have avoided such an inquiry, I will
undertake it; and do you, gentlemen, observe whether my argument is
just.
{234} The military resources of the city included the islanders--and
not all, but only the weakest. For neither Chios nor Rhodes nor Corcyra
was with us. Their contribution in money came to 45 talents, and these
had been collected in advance.[n] Infantry and cavalry, besides our
own, we had none. But the circumstance which was most alarming to us
and most favourable to our enemies was that these men had contrived
that all our neighbours should be more inclined to enmity than to
friendship--the Megareans, the Thebans, and the Euboeans. {235} Such
was the position of the city at the time; and what I say admits of no
contradiction. Now consider the position of Philip, with whom our
conflict lay. In the first place, he held absolute sway over his
followers--and this for purposes of war is the greatest of all
advantages. Next, his followers had their weapons in their hands
always. Then he was well off for money, and did whatever he resolved to
do, without giving warning of it by decrees, or debating about it in
public, or being put on trial by dishonest accusers, or defending
himself against indictments for illegality, or being bound to render an
account to any one. He was himself absolute master, commander, and lord
of all. {236} But I who was set to oppose him--for this inquiry too it
is just to make--what had I under my control? Nothing! For, to begin
with, the very right to address you--the only right I had--you extended
to Philip's hirelings in the same measure as to me; and as often as
they defeated me--and this frequently happened, whatever the reason on
each occasion--so often you went away leaving a resolution recorded in
favour of the enemy. {237} But in spite of all these disadvantages, I
won for you the alliance of the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians,
Thebans, Megareans, Leucadians, and Corcyreans, from whom were
collected--apart from their citizen-troops--15,000 mercenaries and
2,000 cavalry. {238} And I instituted a money-contribution, on as large
a scale as I could. But if you refer,[n] Aeschines, to what was fair as
between ourselves and the Thebans or the Byzantines or the Euboeans--if
at this time you talk to us of equal shares--you must be ignorant, in
the first place, of the fact that in former days also, out of those
ships of war, three hundred [n] in all, which fought for the Hellenes,
Athens provided two hundred, and did not think herself unfairly used,
or let herself be seen arraigning those who had counselled her action,
or taking offence at the arrangement. It would have been shameful. No!
men saw her rendering thanks to Heaven, because when a common peril
beset the Hellenes, she had provided double as much as all the rest to
secure the deliverance of all. {239} Moreover, it is but a hollow
benefit that you are conferring upon your countrymen by your dishonest
charges against me. Why do you tell them _now_, what course they ought
to have taken? Why did you not propose such a course at the time (for
you were in Athens, and were present) if it was possible in the midst
of those critical times, when we had to accept, not what we chose, but
what circumstances allowed; since there was one at hand, bidding
against us, and ready to welcome those whom we rejected, and to pay
them into the bargain.
{240} But if I am accused to-day, for what I have actually done, what
if at the time I had haggled over these details, and the other states
had gone off and joined Philip, and he had become master at once of
Euboea and Thebes and Byzantium? What do you think these impious men
would then have done? {241} What would they have said? Would they not
have declared that the states had been surrendered? that they had been
driven away, when they wished to be on your side? 'See,' they would
have said (would they not?), 'he has obtained through the Byzantines
the command of the Hellespont and the control of the corn trade of
Hellas; and through the Thebans a trying border war has been brought
into Attica; and owing to the pirates who sail from Euboea, the sea has
become unnavigable,' and much more in addition. {242} A villainous
thing, men of Athens, is the dishonest accuser always--villainous, and
in every way malignant and fault-finding! Aye, and this miserable
creature is a fox by nature, that has never done anything honest or
gentlemanly--a very tragical ape, a clodhopping Oenomaus, a counterfeit
orator! {243} Where is the profit to your country from your cleverness?
Do you instruct us now about things that are past? It is as though a
doctor, when he was paying his visits to the sick, were to give them no
advice or instructions to enable them to become free from their
illness, but, when one of his patients died and the customary
offerings[n] were being paid him, were to explain, as he followed to
the tomb, 'if this man had done such and such things, he would not have
died.' Crazy fool! Do you tell us this _now_?
{244} Nor again will you find that the defeat--if you exult at it, when
you ought to groan, accursed man!--was determined by anything that was
within my control. Consider the question thus. In no place to which I
was sent by you as ambassador, did I ever come away defeated by the
ambassadors of Philip--not from Thessaly nor from Ambracia, not from
the Illyrians nor from the Thracian princes, not from Byzantium nor
from any other place, nor yet, on the last occasion, from Thebes. But
every place in which his ambassadors were defeated in argument, he
proceeded to attack and subdue by force of arms. {245} Do you then
require those places at _my_ hands? Are you not ashamed to jeer at a
man as a coward, and in the same breath to require him to prove
superior, by his own unaided efforts, to the army of Philip--and that
with no weapons to use but words? For what else was at my disposal? I
could not control the spirit of each soldier, or the fortune of the
combatants, or the generalship displayed, of which, in your perversity,
you demand an account from me. {246} No; but every investigation that
can be made as regards those duties for which an orator should be held
responsible, I bid you make. I crave no mercy. And what are those
duties? To discern events in their beginnings, to foresee what is
coming, and to forewarn others. These things I have done. Again, it is
his duty to reduce to the smallest possible compass, wherever he finds
them, the slowness, the hesitation, the ignorance, the contentiousness,
which are the errors inseparably connected with the constitution of all
city-states; while, on the other hand, he must stimulate men to unity,
friendship, and eagerness to perform their duty. All these things I
have done, and no one can discover any dereliction of duty on my part
at any time. {247} If one were to ask any person whatever, by what
means Philip had accomplished the majority of his successes, every one
would reply that it was by means of his army, and by giving presents
and corrupting those in charge of affairs. Now I had no control or
command of the forces: neither, then, does the responsibility for
anything that was done in that sphere concern me. And further, in the
matter of being or not being corrupted by bribes, I have defeated
Philip. For just as the bidder has conquered one who accepts his money,
if he effects his purchase, so one who refuses to accept it [and is not
corrupted] has conquered the bidder. In all, therefore, in which I am
concerned, the city has suffered no defeat.
{248} The justification, then, with which I furnished the defendant for
such a motion as he proposed with regard to me, consisted (along with
many other points) of the facts which I have described, and others like
them. I will now proceed to that justification which all of you
supplied. For immediately after the battle, the People, who knew and
had seen all that I did, and now stood in the very midst of the peril
and terror, at a moment when it would not have been surprising if the
majority had shown some harshness towards me--the People, I say, in the
first place carried my proposals for ensuring the safety of the city;
and all the measures undertaken for its protection--the disposition of
the garrisons, the entrenchments, the funds for the
fortifications--were all provided for by decrees which I proposed. And,
in the second place, when the People chose a corn-commissioner, out of
all Athens they elected me. {249} Subsequently all those who were
interested in injuring me combined, and assailed me with indictments,
prosecutions after audit, impeachments, and all such proceedings--not
in their own names at first, but through the agency of men behind whom,
they thought, they would best be screened against recognition. For you
doubtless know and remember that during the early part of that period I
was brought to trial every day; and neither the desperation of
Sosicles, nor the dishonest misrepresentations of Philocrates,[n] nor
the frenzy of Diondas and Melantus, nor any other expedient, was left
untried by them against me. And in all these trials, thanks to the gods
above all, but secondarily to you and the rest of the Athenians, I was
acquitted--and justly; for such a decision is in accordance both with
truth and with the credit of jurors who have taken their oath, and
given a verdict in conformity with it. {250} So whenever I was
impeached, and you absolved me and did not give the prosecutor the
necessary fraction of the votes, you were voting that my policy was the
best. Whenever I was acquitted upon an indictment, it was a proof that
my motion and proposals were according to law. Whenever you set your
seal to my accounts at an audit, you confessed in addition that I had
acted throughout with uprightness and integrity. And this being so,
what epithet was it fitting or just that Ctesiphon should apply to my
actions? Was it not that which he saw applied by the People, and by
juries on their oath, and ratified by Truth in the judgement of all men?
{251} 'Yes,' he replies, 'but Cephalus'[n] boast was a noble one--that
he had never been indicted at all.' True, and a happy thing also it was
for him. But why should one who has often been tried, but has never
been convicted of crime, deserve to incur criticism any the more on
that account? Yet in truth, men of Athens, so far as Aeschines is
concerned, I too can make this noble boast that Cephalus made. For he
has never yet preferred or prosecuted any indictment against me; so
that by you at least, Aeschines, I am admitted to be no worse a citizen
than Cephalus.
{252} His want of feeling and his malignity may be seen in many ways,
and not least in the remarks which he made about fortune. For my part,
I think that, as a rule, when one human being reproaches another with
his fortune, he is a fool. For when he who thinks himself most
prosperous and fancies his fortune most excellent, does not know
whether it will remain so until the evening, how can it be right to
speak of one's fortune, or to taunt another with his? But since
Aeschines adopts a tone of lofty superiority upon this as upon many
other subjects, observe, men of Athens, how much more truthful and more
becoming in a human being my own remarks upon Aeschines' fortune will
be. {253} I believe that the fortune of this city is good; and I see
that the God of Dodona also declares this to you through his oracle.
But I think that the prevailing fortune of mankind as a whole to-day is
grievous and terrible. For what man, Hellene or foreigner, has not
tasted abundance of evil at this present time? {254} Now the fact that
we chose the noblest course, and that we are actually better off than
those Hellenes who expected to live in prosperity if they sacrificed
us, I ascribe to the good fortune of the city. But in so far as we
failed, in so far as everything did not fall out in accordance with our
wishes, I consider that the city has received the share which was due
to us of the fortune of mankind in general. {255} But my personal
fortune, and that of every individual among us, ought, I think, in
fairness to be examined with reference to our personal circumstances.
That is my judgement with regard to fortune, and I believe (as I think
you also do) that my judgement is correct and just. But Aeschines
asserts that my personal fortune has more influence than the fortune of
the city as a community--the insignificant and evil more than the good
and important! How can this be?
{256} If, however, you determine at all costs to scrutinize my fortune,
Aeschines, then compare it with your own; and if you find that mine is
better than yours, then cease to revile it. Examine it, then, from the
very beginning. And, in Heaven's name, let no one condemn me for any
want of good taste. For I neither regard one who speaks insultingly of
poverty, nor one who prides himself on having been brought up in
affluence, as a man of sense. But the slanders and misrepresentations
of this unfeeling man oblige me to enter upon a discussion of this
sort; and I will conduct it with as much moderation as the facts allow.
{257} I then, Aeschines, had the advantage as a boy of attending the
schools which became my position, and of possessing as much as one who
is to do nothing ignoble owing to poverty must possess. When I passed
out of boyhood, my life corresponded with my upbringing--I provided
choruses and equipped warships; I paid the war-tax; I neglected none of
the paths to distinction in public or private life, but gave my
services both to my country and my friends; and when I thought fit to
enter public life, the measures which I decided to adopt were of such a
character that I have been crowned many times both by my country and by
many other Hellenic peoples, while not even you, my enemies, attempt to
say that my choice was not at least an honourable one. {258} Such is
the fortune which has accompanied my life, and though I might say much
more about it, I refrain from doing so, in my anxiety not to annoy any
one by the expression of my pride. And you--the lofty personage, the
despiser of others--what has been your fortune when compared with
this?--the fortune, thanks to which you were brought up as a boy in the
depths of indigence, in close attendance upon the school along with
your father, pounding up the ink, sponging down the forms, sweeping the
attendants' room,[n] occupying the position of a menial, not of a
free-born boy! {259} Then, when you became a man, you used to read out
the books[n] to your mother at her initiations, and help her in the
rest of the hocus-pocus, by night dressing the initiated[n] in
fawnskins, drenching them from the bowl, purifying them and wiping them
down with the clay and the bran, and (when they were purified) bidding
them stand up and say, 'The ill is done, the good begun,' priding
yourself upon raising the shout of joy more loudly than any one had
ever done before--and I can believe it, for, when his voice is so loud,
you dare not imagine that his shout is anything but superlatively fine.
{260} But by day you used to lead those noble companies through the
streets, men crowned with fennel and white poplar,[n] throttling the
puff-adders and waving them over your head, crying out 'Euoe,
Saboe,'[n] and dancing to the tune of 'Hyes Attes, Attes
Hyes'--addressed by the old hags as leader, captain, ivy-bearer,
fan-bearer, and so on; and as the reward of your services getting sops
and twists and barley-bannocks! Who would not congratulate himself with
good reason on such things, and bless his own fortune? {261} But when
you were enrolled among your fellow parishioners,[n] by whatever means
(for of that I say nothing)--when, I say, you _were_ enrolled, you at
once selected the noblest of occupations, that of a clerk and servant
to petty magistrates. {262} And when at length you escaped from this
condition also, after yourself doing all that you impute to others, you
in no way--Heaven knows!--disgraced your previous record by the life
which you subsequently lived; for you hired yourself out to the actors
Simylus and Socrates--the Roarers, they were nicknamed --and played as
a third-rate actor, collecting figs[n] and bunches of grapes and
olives, like a fruiterer gathering from other peoples' farms, and
getting more out of this than out of the dramatic competitions in which
you were competing for your lives; for there was war without truce or
herald between yourselves and the spectators; and the many wounds you
received from them make it natural for you to jeer at the cowardice of
those who have had no such experiences. {263} But I will pass over all
that might be accounted for by your poverty, and proceed to my charges
against your character itself. For you chose a line of political action
(when at length it occurred to you to take up politics too), in
pursuance of which, when your country's fortune was good, you lived the
life of a hare, in fear and trembling, always expecting a thrashing for
the crimes which lay on your conscience; whereas all have seen your
boldness amid the misfortunes of others. {264} But when a man plucks up
courage at the death of a thousand of his fellow citizens, what does he
deserve to suffer at the hands of the living? I have much more to say
about him, but I will leave it unsaid. It is not for me, I think, to
mention lightly all the infamy and disgrace which I could prove to be
connected with him, but only so much as it is not discreditable to
myself to speak of.
{265} And now review the history of your life and of mine, side by
side--good temperedly, Aeschines, not unkindly: and then ask these
gentlemen which fortune, of the two, each of them would choose. You
taught letters; I attended school. You conducted initiations; I was
initiated. You were a clerk; I a member of the Assembly: you, a
third-rate actor, I a spectator of the play. You used to be driven from
the stage, while I hissed. Your political life has all been lived for
the good of our enemies, mine for the good of my country. {266} To pass
over all besides, even on this very day, I am being examined with
regard to my qualification for a crown--it is already admitted that I
am clear of all crimes; while you have already the reputation of a
dishonest informer, and for you the issue at stake is whether you are
to continue such practices, or to be stopped once for all, through
failing to obtain a fifth part of the votes. A good fortune indeed--can
you not see?--is that which has accompanied your life, that you should
denounce mine!
{267} And now let me read to you the evidence of the public burdens
which I have undertaken; and side by side with them, do you, Aeschines,
read the speeches which you used to murder--
'I leave the abysm of death and gates of gloom,'[n]
and
'Know that I am not fain ill-news to bring';
and 'evil in evil wise',[n] may you be brought to perdition, by the
gods above all, and then by all those here present, villainous citizen,
villainous third-rate actor that you are. (_To the clerk_.) Read the
evidence.
[_The evidence is read_.]
{268} Such was I in my relation to the State. And as to my private
life, unless you all know that I was open-hearted and generous and at
the disposal of all who had need of me, I am silent; I prefer to tell
you nothing, and to produce no evidence whatever, to show whether I
ransomed some from the enemy, or helped others to give their daughters
in marriage, or rendered any such services. {269} For my principle may
perhaps be expressed thus. I think that one who has received a kindness
ought to remember it all his life; but that the doer of the kindness
should forget it once for all; if the former is to behave like a good
man, the latter like one free from all meanness. To be always recalling
and speaking of one's own benefactions is almost like upbraiding the
recipients of them. I will do nothing of the kind, and will not be led
into doing so. Whatever be the opinion that has been formed of me in
these respects, with that I am content.
{270} But I desire to be rid of personal topics, and to say a little
more to you about public affairs. For if, Aeschines, you can mention
one of all those who dwell beneath the sun above us, Hellene or
foreigner, who has not suffered under the absolute sway, first of
Philip, and now of Alexander, so be it! I concede that it is my fortune
or misfortune, whichever you are pleased to call it, that has been to
blame for everything. {271} But if many of those who have never once
even seen me or heard my voice have suffered much and terribly--and not
individuals alone, but whole cities and nations--how much more just and
truthful it is to regard the common fortune (as it seems to be) of all
mankind, and a certain stubborn drift of events in the wrong direction,
as the cause of these sufferings. {272} Such considerations, however,
you discard. You impute the blame to me, whose political life has been
lived among my own fellow countrymen--and that, though you know that
your slander falls in part (if not entirely) upon all of them, and
above all upon yourself. For if, when I took part in the discussion of
public affairs, I had had absolute power, it would have been possible
for all of you, the other orators, to lay the blame on me. {273} But if
you were present at every meeting of the Assembly; if the city always
brought forward questions of policy for public consideration; if at the
time my policy appeared the best to every one, and above all to you
(for it was certainly from no goodwill that you relinquished to me the
hopes, the admiration, the honours, which all attached themselves to my
policy at that time, but obviously because the truth was too strong for
you, and you had nothing better to propose); then surely you are guilty
of monstrous iniquity, in finding fault to-day with a policy, than
which, at the time, you could propose nothing better. {274} Among all
the rest of mankind, I observe that some such principles as the
following have been, as it were, determined and ordained. If a man
commits a deliberate crime, indignation and punishment are ordained
against him. If he commits an involuntary mistake, instead of
punishment, he is to receive pardon. If, without crime or mistake, one
who has given himself up wholly to that which seems to be for the
advantage of all has, in company with all, failed to achieve success,
then it is just, not to reproach or revile such a man, but to
sympathize with him. {275} Moreover, it will be seen that all these
principles are not so ordained in the laws alone. Nature herself has
laid them down in her unwritten law, and in the moral consciousness of
mankind. Aeschines, then, has so far surpassed all mankind in brutality
and in the art of misrepresentation, that he actually denounces me for
things which he himself mentioned under the name of misfortunes.
{276} In addition to everything else, as though he had himself always
spoken straightforwardly and in loyalty, he bade you keep your eyes on
me carefully, and make sure that I did not mislead or deceive you. He
called me 'a clever speaker', 'a wizard', 'a sophist', and so on: just
as if it followed that when a man had the first word and attributed his
own qualities to another, the truth was really as he stated, and his
hearers would not inquire further who he himself was, that said such
things. But I am sure that you all know this man, and are aware that
these qualities belong to him far more than to me. And again, {277} I
am quite sure that my cleverness--yes, let the word pass; though I
observe that the influence of a speaker depends for the most part on
his audience; for in proportion to the welcome and the goodwill which
you accord to each speaker is the credit which he obtains for
wisdom;--I am sure, I say, that if I too possess any such skill, you
will all find it constantly fighting on your behalf in affairs of
State, never in opposition to you, never for private ends; while the
skill of Aeschines, on the contrary, is employed, not only in upholding
the cause of the enemy, but in attacking any one who has annoyed him or
come into collision with him anywhere. He neither employs it uprightly,
nor to promote the interests of the city. {278} For a good and
honourable citizen ought not to require from a jury, who have come into
court to represent the interests of the community, that they shall give
their sanction to his anger, or his enmity, or any other such passion;
nor ought he to come before you to gratify such feelings. It were best
that he had no such passions in his nature at all; but if they are
really inevitable, then he should keep them tame and subdued. Under
what circumstances, then, should a politician and an orator show
passion? {279} When any of the vital interests of his country are at
stake; when it is with its enemies that the People has to deal: those
are the circumstances. For then is the opportunity of a loyal and
gallant citizen. But that when he has never to this day demanded my
punishment, either in the name of the city or in his own, for any
public--nor, I will add, for any private--crime, he should have come
here with a trumped-up charge against the grant of a crown and a vote
of thanks, and should have spent so many words upon it--that is a sign
of personal enmity and jealousy and meanness, not of any good quality.
{280} And that he should further have discarded every form of lawsuit
against myself, and should have come here to-day to attack the
defendant, is the very extremity of baseness. It shows, I think,
Aeschines, that your motive in undertaking this suit was your desire,
not to exact vengeance for any crime, but to give a display of rhetoric
and elocution. Yet it is not his language, Aeschines, that deserves our
esteem in an orator, nor the pitch of his voice, but his choice of the
aims which the people chooses, his hatred or love of those whom his
country loves or hates. {281} He whose heart is so disposed will always
speak with loyal intent; but he who serves those from whom the city
foresees danger to herself, does not ride at the same anchor as the
People, and therefore does not look for safety to the same quarter. But
I do, mark you! For I have made the interests of my countrymen my own,
and have counted nothing as reserved for my own private advantage.
What? {282} You have not done so either? How can that be, when
immediately after the battle you went your way as an ambassador to
Philip, the author of the calamities which befell your country at that
time; and that, despite the fact that until then you always denied this
intimacy[n] with him, as every one knows? But what is meant by a
deceiver of the city? Is it not one who does not say what he thinks?
Upon whom does the herald justly pronounce the curse? Is it not upon
such a man as this? With what greater crime can one charge a man who is
an orator, than that of saying one thing and thinking another? Such a
man you have been found to be. {283} And after this do you open your
mouth, or dare to look this audience in the face? Do you imagine that
they do not know who you are? or that the slumber of forgetfulness has
taken such hold upon them all, that they do not remember the speeches
which you used to deliver during the war, when you declared with
imprecations and oaths that you had nothing to do with Philip, and that
I was bringing this accusation against you, when it was not true, to
satisfy my personal enmity? {284} But so soon as the news of the battle
had come, you thought no more of all this, but at once avowed and
professed that you stood on a footing of friendship and
guest-friendship with him; though these were nothing but your
hireling-service under other names; for upon what honest or equal basis
could Aeschines, the son of Glaucothea the tambourine--player,[n] enjoy
the guest-friendship, or the friendship, or the acquaintance of Philip?
I cannot see. In fact, you had been hired by him to ruin the interests
of these your countrymen. And yet, though your own treason has been so
plainly detected--though you have been an informer against yourself
after the event--you still revile me, and reproach me with crimes of
which, you will find, any one is more guilty than I.
{285} Many a great and noble enterprise, Aeschines, did this city
undertake and succeed in, inspired by me; and she did not forget them.
It is a proof of this, that when, immediately after the event, the
People had to elect one who should pronounce the oration over the dead,
and you were nominated, they did not elect you, for all your fine
voice, nor Demades, who had just negotiated the Peace, nor Hegemon,[n]
nor any other member of your party: they elected me. And when you and
Pythocles[n] came forward in a brutal and shameless fashion, God knows!
and made the same charges against me as you are making again to-day,
and abused me, the People elected me even more decidedly. {286} And the
reason you know well; but I will tell it you nevertheless. They knew
for themselves both the loyalty and zeal which inspired my conduct of
affairs, and the iniquity of yourself and your friends. For what you
denied with oaths when our cause was prosperous, you admitted in the
hour of the city's failure; and those, accordingly, who were only
enabled by the misfortunes of their country to express their views
without fear, they decided to have been enemies of their own for a long
while, though only then did they stand revealed.{287} And further, they
thought that one who was to pronounce an oration over the dead, and to
adorn their valour, should not have come beneath the same roof, nor
shared the same libation,[n] as those who were arrayed against them;
that he should not there join with those who with their own hands had
slain them, in the revel[n] and the triumph-song over the calamities of
the Hellenes, and then come home and receive honour--that he should not
play the mourner over their fate with his voice, but should grieve for
them in his heart. What they required they saw in themselves and in me,
but not in you; and this was why they appointed me, and not any of you.
{288} Nor, when the people acted thus, did the fathers and brothers of
the slain, who were then publicly appointed to conduct the funeral, act
otherwise. For since (in accordance with the ordinary custom) they had
to hold the funeral-feast in the house of the nearest of kin, as it
were, to the slain, they held it at my house, and with reason; for
though by birth each was more nearly akin to his dead than I, yet none
stood nearer to them all in common. For he who had their life and their
success most at heart, had also, when they had suffered what I would
they had not, the greatest share of sorrow for them all.
(_To the clerk _) {289} Read him the epitaph which the city resolved to
inscribe above them at the public cost; (_to Aeschines_) that even by
these very lines, Aeschines, you may know that you are a man destitute
of feeling, a dishonest accuser, an abominable wretch!
_The Inscription_.[n]
These for their country, fighting side by side,
By deeds of arms dispelled the foemen's pride.
heir lives they saved not, bidding Death make clear--
Impartial Judge!--their courage or their fear.
For Greece they fought, lest, 'neath the yoke brought low,
In thraldom she th' oppressor's scorn should know.
Now in the bosom of their fatherland
After their toil they rest--'tis God's command.
'Tis God's alone from failure free to live;[n]
Escape from Fate to no man doth He give.
{290} Do you hear, Aeschines [in these very lines], 'Tis God's alone
from failure free to live'? Not to the statesman has he ascribed the
power to secure success for those who strive, but to the gods. Why
then, accursed man, do you revile _me_, for our failure, in words which
I pray the gods to turn upon the heads of you and yours?
{291} But, even after all the other lying accusations which he has
brought against me, the thing which amazed me most of all, men of
Athens, was that when he mentioned what had befallen the city, he did
not think of it as a loyal and upright citizen would have thought. He
shed no tears; he felt no emotion of sorrow in his heart: he lifted up
his voice, he exulted, he strained his throat, evidently in the belief
that he was accusing me, though in truth he was giving us an
illustration, to his own discredit, of the utter difference between his
feelings and those of others, at the painful events which had taken
place. {292} But surely one who professes, as Aeschines professes now,
to care for the laws and the constitution, ought to show, if nothing
else, at least that he feels the same griefs and the same joys as the
People, and has not, by his political profession, ranged himself on the
side of their opponents. That you have done the latter is manifest
today, when you pretend that the blame for everything is mine, and that
it is through me that the city was plunged in trouble: though it was
not through my statesmanship or my policy, gentlemen, {293} that you
began to help the Hellenes: for were you to grant me this--that it was
through me that you had resisted the dominion which was being
established over the Hellenes--you would have granted me a testimonial
which all those that you have given to others together could not equal.
But neither would I make such an assertion; for it would be unjust to
you; nor, I am sure, would you concede its truth: and if Aeschines were
acting honestly, he would not have been trying to deface and
misrepresent the greatest of your glories, in order to satisfy his
hatred towards me.
{294} But why do I rebuke him for this, when he has made other lying
charges against me, which are more outrageous by far? For when a man
charges me--I call Heaven and Earth to witness!--with philippizing,
what will he not say? By Heracles and all the gods, if one had to
inquire truthfully, setting aside all calumny and all expression of
animosity, who are in reality the men upon whose heads all would
naturally and justly lay the blame for what has taken place, you would
find that it was those in each city who resemble Aeschines, not those
who resemble me. {295} For they, when Philip's power was weak and quite
insignificant--when we repeatedly warned and exhorted you and showed
you what was best--they, to satisfy their own avarice, sacrificed the
interests of the community, each group deceiving and corrupting their
own fellow citizens, until they brought them into bondage. Thus the
Thessalians were treated by Daochus, Cineas, and Thrasydaeus; the
Arcadians by Cercidas, Hieronymus and Eucampidas; the Argives by
Myrtis, Teledamus, and Mnaseas; the Eleans by Euxitheus, Cleotimus and
Aristaechmus; the Messenians by the sons of the godforsaken
Philiadas--Neon and Thrasylochus; the Sicymians by Aristratus and
Epichares; the Corinthians by Deinarchus and Demaretus; the Megareans
by Ptoeodorus, Helixus and Perillus; the Thebans by Timolaus,
Theogeiton, and Anemoetas; the Euboeans by Hipparchus and Sosistratus.
{296} Daylight will fail me before the list of the traitors is
complete. All these, men of Athens, are men who pursue the same designs
in their own cities, as my opponents pursue among you--abominable men,
flatterers, evil spirits, who have hacked the limbs each of his own
fatherland, and like boon companions have pledged away their freedom,
first to Philip and now to Alexander; men whose measure of happiness is
their belly, and their lowest instincts; while as for freedom, and the
refusal to acknowledge any man as lord--the standard and rule of good
to the Hellenes of old--they have flung it to the ground.
{297} Of this shameful and notorious conspiracy and wickedness--or
rather (to speak with all earnestness, men of Athens), of this treason
against the freedom of the Hellenes--Athens has been guiltless in the
eyes of all men, in consequence of my statesmanship, as I have been
guiltless in your eyes. And do you then ask me for what merits I count
myself worthy to receive honour? I tell you that at a time when every
politician in Hellas had been corrupted--beginning with
yourself--[firstly by Philip, and now by Alexander], {298} no
opportunity that offered, no generous language, no grand promises, no
hopes, no fears, nor any other motive, tempted or induced me to betray
one jot of what I believed to be the rights and interests of the city;
nor, of all the counsel that I have given to my fellow countrymen, up
to this day, has any ever been given (as it has by you) with the scales
of the mind inclining to the side of gain, but all out of an upright,
honest, uncorrupted soul. I have taken the lead in greater affairs than
any man of my own time, and my administration has been sound and honest
throughout all. {299} That is why I count myself worthy of honour. But
as for the fortifications and entrenchments, for which you ridiculed
me, I judge them to be deserving, indeed, of gratitude and
commendation--assuredly they are so--but I set them far below my own
political services. Not with stones, nor with bricks, did I fortify
this city. Not such are the works upon which I pride myself most. But
would you inquire honestly wherein my fortifications consist? You will
find them in munitions of war, in cities, in countries, in harbours, in
ships, in horses, and in men ready to defend my fellow countrymen.
{300} These are the defences I have set to protect Attica, so far as by
human calculation it could be done; and with these I have fortified our
whole territory--not the circuit of the Peiraeus or of the city alone.
Nor in fact, did _I _prove inferior to Philip in calculations--far from
it!--or in preparations for war; but the generals of the
confederacy,[n] and their forces, proved inferior to him in fortune.
Where are the proofs of these things? They are clear and manifest. I
bid you consider them.
{301} What was the duty of a loyal citizen--one who was acting with
all forethought and zeal and uprightness for his country's good? Was it
not to make Euboea the bulwark of Attica on the side of the sea, and
Boeotia on that of the mainland, and on that of the regions towards the
Peloponnese, our neighbours[n] in that direction? Was it not to provide
for the corn-trade, and to ensure that it should pass along a
continuously friendly coast all the way to the Peiraeus? {302} Was it
not to preserve the places which were ours--Proconnesus, the
Chersonese, Tenedos--by dispatching expeditions to aid them, and
proposing and moving resolutions accordingly; and to secure the
friendship and alliance of the rest--Byzantium, Tenedos, Euboea? Was it
not to take away the greatest of the resources which the enemy
possessed, and to add what was lacking to those of the city? {303} All
this has been accomplished by my decrees and by the measures which I
have taken; and all these measures, men of Athens, will be found by any
one who will examine them without jealousy, to have been correctly
planned, and executed with entire honesty: the opportunity for each
step was not, you will find, neglected or left unrecognized or thrown
away by me, and nothing was left undone, which it was within the power
and the reasoning capacity of a single man to effect. But if the might
of some Divine Power, or the inferiority of our generals, or the
wickedness of those who were betraying your cities, or all these things
together, continuously injured our whole cause, until they effected its
overthrow, how is Demosthenes at fault? {304} Had there been in each of
the cities of Hellas one man, such as I was, as I stood at my own post
in your midst--nay, if all Thessaly and all Arcadia had each had but
one man animated by the same spirit as myself--not one Hellenic people,
either beyond or on this side of Thermopylae, would have experienced
the evils which they now suffer. {305} All would have been dwelling in
liberty and independence, free from all fears, secure and prosperous,
each in their own land, rendering thanks for all these great blessings
to you and the rest of the Athenian people, through me. But that you
may know that in my anxiety to avoid jealousy, I am using language
which is far from adequate to the actual facts, (_to the clerk_) read
me this; and take and recite the list of the expeditions sent out in
accordance with my decrees.
[_The list of expeditions is read]_
{306} These measures, and others like them, Aeschines, were the
measures which it was the duty of a loyal and gallant citizen to take.
If they were successful, it was certain that we should be indisputably
the strongest power, and that with justice as well as in fact: and now
that they have resulted otherwise, we are left with at least an
honourable name. No man casts reproach either upon the city, or upon
the choice which she made: they do but upbraid Fortune, who decided the
issue thus. {307} It was not, God knows, a citizen's duty to abandon
his country's interests, to sell his services to her opponents, and
cherish the opportunities of the enemy instead of those of his country.
Nor was it, on the one hand, to show his malice against the man who had
faced the task of proposing and moving measures worthy of the city, and
persisting in that intention; while, on the other hand, he remembered
and kept his eyes fixed upon any private annoyance which another had
caused him: nor was it to maintain a wicked and festering inactivity,
as you so often do. {308} Assuredly there is an inactivity that is
honest and brings good to the State--the inactivity which you,[n] the
majority of the citizens, observe in all sincerity. But that is not the
inactivity of Aeschines. Far from it! He, on the contrary, retires just
when he chooses, from public life (and he often chooses to do so), that
he may watch for the moment when you will be sated with the continual
speeches of the same adviser, or when fortune has thrown some obstacle
in your path, or some other disagreeable event has happened (for in the
life of man many things are possible); and then, when such an
opportunity comes, suddenly, like a gale of wind, out of his retirement
he comes forth an orator, with his voice in training, and his phrases
and his sentences collected; and these he strings together lucidly,
without pausing for breath, though they bring with them no profit, no
accession of anything good, but only calamity to one or another of his
fellow citizens, and shame to all alike. {309} Surely, Aeschines, if
all this practice and study sprang from an honest heart, resolved to
pursue the interests of your country, the fruits of it should have been
noble and honourable and profitable to all--alliances of cities,
supplies of funds, opening of ports,[n] enactment of beneficial laws,
acts of opposition to our proved enemies. {310} It was for all such
services that men looked in bygone days; and the past has offered, to
any loyal and gallant citizen, abundant opportunities of displaying
them: but nowhere in the ranks of such men will you ever be found to
have stood--not first, nor second, nor third, nor fourth, nor fifth,
nor sixth, nor in any position whatsoever; at least, not in any matters
whereby your country stood to gain. {311} For what alliance has the
city gained by negotiations of yours? What assistance, what fresh
access of goodwill or fame? What diplomatic or administrative action of
yours has brought new dignity to the city? What department of our home
affairs, or our relations with Hellenic and foreign states, over which
you have presided, has shown any improvement? Where are your ships?
Where are your munitions of war? Where are your dockyards? Where are
the walls that you have repaired? Where are your cavalry? Where in the
world _is_ your sphere of usefulness? What pecuniary assistance have
you ever given, as a good and generous fellow citizen,[n] either to
rich or poor? {312} 'But, my good sir, 'you say, 'if I have done none
of these things, I have at least given my loyalty and goodwill.' Where?
When? Why, even at a time when all who ever opened their lips upon the
platform contributed voluntarily to save the city, till, last of all,
Aristonicus gave what he had collected to enable him to regain his
civil rights--even then, most iniquitous of men! you never came forward
or made any contribution whatever: and assuredly it was not from
poverty, when you had inherited more than five talents out of the
estate of your father-in-law Philo, and had received two talents
subscribed by the leaders of the Naval Boards,[n] for your damaging
attack upon my Naval Law.[n] {313} But I will say no more about this,
lest by passing from subject to subject I should break away from the
matter in hand. It is at least plain that your failure to contribute
was not due to your poverty, but to your anxiety to do nothing in
opposition to those whose interest is the guide of your whole public
life. On what occasions, then, do your spirit and your brilliancy show
themselves? When something must be done to injure your fellow
countrymen--then your voice is most glorious, your memory most perfect;
then you are a prince of actors, a Theocrines[n] on the tragic stage!
{314} Again, you have recalled the gallant men of old, and you do well
to do so. Yet it is not just, men of Athens, to take advantage of the
good feeling which you may be relied upon to entertain towards the
dead, in order to examine me before you by their standard, and compare
me, who am still living amongst you, with them. {315} Who in all the
world does not know that against the living there is always more or
less of secret jealousy, while none, not even their enemies, hate the
dead any more? And am I, in spite of this law of nature, to be judged
and examined to-day by the standard of those who were before me? By no
means! It would be neither just nor fair, Aeschines. But let me be
compared with yourself, or with any of those who have adopted the same
policy as yourself, and are still alive. {316} And consider this also.
Which of these alternatives is the more honourable? Which is better for
the city?--that the good services done by men of former
times--tremendous, nay even beyond all description though they may
be--should be made an excuse for exposing to ingratitude and contumely
those that are rendered to the present generation? or that all who act
in loyalty should have a share in the honours and the kindness which
our fellow citizens dispense? {317} Aye, and (if I must say this after
all) the policy and the principles which I have adopted will be found,
if rightly viewed, to resemble and to have the same aims as those of
the men who in that age received praise; while yours resemble those of
the dishonest assailants of such persons in those days. For in their
time also there were obviously persons who disparaged the living and
praised the men of old, acting in the same malicious way as yourself.
{318} Do you say then, that I am in no way like them? But are you like
them, Aeschines? or your brother? or any other orator of the present
day? For my part, I should say, 'None.' Nay, my good sir--to use no
other epithet--compare the living with the living, their
contemporaries, as men do in every other matter, whether they are
comparing poets or choruses or competitors in the games. {319} Because
Philammon was not so powerful as Glaucus of Carystus[n] and some other
athletes of former times, he did not leave Olympia uncrowned: but
because he fought better than all who entered against him, he was
crowned and proclaimed victor. Do you likewise examine me beside the
orators of the day--beside yourself, beside any one in the world that
you choose. {320} I fear no man's rivalry. For, while the city was
still free to choose the best course, and all alike could compete with
one another in loyalty to their country, I was found the best adviser
of them all. It was by my laws, by my decrees, by my diplomacy, that
all was effected. Not one of your party appeared anywhere, unless some
insult was to be offered to your fellow countrymen. But when there
happened, what I would had never happened--when it was not statesmen
that were called to the front, but those who would do the bidding of a
master, those who were anxious to earn wages by injuring their country,
and to flatter a stranger--then, along with every member of your party,
you were found at your post, the grand and resplendent owner of a
stud;[n] while I was weak, I confess, yet more loyal to my fellow
countrymen than you. {321} Two characteristics, men of Athens, a
citizen of a respectable character (for this is perhaps the least
invidious phrase that I can apply to myself) must be able to show: when
he enjoys authority, he must maintain to the end the policy whose aims
are noble action and the pre-eminence of his country: and at all times
and in every phase of fortune he must remain loyal. For this depends
upon his own nature; while his power and his influence are determined
by external causes. And in me, you will find, this loyalty has
persisted unalloyed. For mark this. {322} Not when my surrender was
demanded, not when I was called to account before the Amphictyons, not
in face either of threats or of promises, not when these accursed men
were hounded on against me like wild beasts, have I ever been false to
my loyalty towards you. For from the very first, I chose the straight
and honest path in public life: I chose to foster the honour, the
supremacy, the good name of my country, to seek to enhance them, and to
stand or fall with them. {323} I do not walk through the market,
cheerful and exultant over the success of strangers, holding out my
hand and giving the good tidings to any whom I expect to report my
conduct yonder, but shuddering, groaning, bowing myself to the earth,
when I hear of the city's good fortune, as do these impious men, who
make a mock of the city --not remembering that in so doing they are
mocking themselves--while they direct their gaze abroad, and, whenever
another has gained success through the failure of the Hellenes, belaud
that state of things, and declare that we must see that it endures for
all time.
{324} Never, O all ye gods, may any of you consent to their desire! If
it can be, may you implant even in these men a better mind and heart.
But if they are verily beyond all cure, then bring them and them alone
to utter and early destruction, by land and sea. And to us who remain,
grant the speediest release from the fears that hang over us, and
safety that naught can shake!
FOOTNOTES
[1] Some writers suppose that it was at the meeting in the spring of
339. The evidence is not conclusive, but appears to point to the date
given here.
NOTES
ON THE NAVAL BOARDS
§ 1. _who praise your forefathers_. The advocates of war with Persia
had doubtless appealed to the memory of Marathon and Salamis, and the
old position of Athens as the champion of Greece against Persia.
§ 10, 11. The argument is this: 'If a war with Persia needed a special
kind of force, we could not prepare for it without being detected: but
as all wars need the same kind of force, our preparations need rouse no
suspicion in Persia particularly.'
_acknowledged foes_: i.e. probably Thebes, or the revolted allies of
Athens, with whom a disadvantageous peace had, perhaps, just been made.
It is not, however, impossible that Philip also is in the orator's
mind; for though at the time he was probably engaged in war with the
Illyrians and Paeonians, his quarrel with Athens in regard to
Amphipolis had not been settled. The Olynthians may also be thought of.
(See Introd. to Phil. I and Olynthiacs.)
§ 12. _rhapsodies_. The rhapsodes who went about Greece reciting Homer
and other poets had lost the distinction they once enjoyed, and
'rhapsody' became a synonym for idle declamation.
§ 14. _a bold speech_: i.e. a demand for instant war, helped out by
rhetorical praises of the men of old.
§ 16. _unmarried heiresses and orphans_. These would be incapable of
discharging the duties of the trierarchy, though their estates were
liable for the war-tax. Partners were probably exempted, when none of
them possessed so large a share in the common property as would render
him liable for trierarchy.
_property outside Attica_. According to the terms made by Athens with
her allies when the 'Second Delian League' was formed in 378, Athens
undertook that no Athenian should hold property in an allied State. But
this condition had been broken, and the multiplication of Athenian
estates [Greek: _kl_erhouchiai_] in allied territories had been one of
the causes of the war with the allies.
_unable to contribute_: e. g. owing to no longer possessing the estate
which he had when the assessment was made.
§ 17. _to associate, &c_. The sections which contained a very rich man
were to have poor men included in it, so that the total wealth of every
section might be the same, and the distribution of the burden between
the sections fair.
§ 18. _the first hundred, &c_. Demosthenes thinks of the fleet as
composed, according to need, of 100, 200, or 300 vessels, and treats
each hundred as a separate squadron, to be separately divided among the
Boards.
_by lot_. In this and other clauses of his proposal, Demosthenes
stipulates for the use of the lot ([Greek: _sunkl_er_osai_], [Greek:
epikl_erosai]) to avoid all unfair selection. It is only in the
distribution of duties among the smaller sections within each Board
that assignment by arrangement ([Greek: _apodounai_], a word suggesting
distribution according to fitness or convenience) is to be allowed.
§ 19. _taxable capital_ ([Greek: _tim_ema_]). The war-tax and the
trierarchic burdens were assessed on a valuation of the contributor's
property. Upon this valuation of his taxable capital he paid the
percentage required. (The old view that he was taxed not upon his
capital, as valued, but upon a fraction of it varying with his wealth,
rests upon an interpretation of passages in the Speeches against
Aphobus, which is open to grave question.) The total amount of the
single valuations was the 'estimated taxable capital of the country'
([Greek: _tim_ema t_es ch_oras_]). This, in the case of the trierarchy,
would be the aggregate amount of the valuations of the 1,200 wealthiest
men, viz. 6,000 talents. (Of course the capital taxable for the war-tax
would be considerably larger. Even at a time when the prosperity of
Attica was much lower, in 378-377 B.C., it was nearly 6,000 talents,
according to Polybius, ii. 62. 6.)
§ 20. A tabular statement will make this plain:--
_Persons _Total capital taxable
_Ships_. responsible_. for each ship_.
100 12 60 tal.
200 6 30 "
300 4 20 "
The percentage payable on the taxable capital was of course higher, the
larger the number of ships required. Each ship appears to have cost on
the average a talent to equip. The percentages in the three cases
contained in the table would therefore be 1-2/3, 3-1/3, and 5,
respectively. (Compare § 27.)
§ 21. _fittings ... in arrear_. Apparently former trierarchs had not
always given back the fittings of their vessels, which had either been
provided at the expense of the State, or lent to the trierarchs by the
State.
§ 23. _wards_ ([Greek: _trittyes_]). The trittys or ward was one-third
of a tribe.
§ 25. _you see ... city_. The Assembly met on the Pnyx, whence there
was a view of the Acropolis and of the greater part of the ancient city.
_prophets_. The Athenian populace seems always to have been liable to
the influence of soothsayers, who professed to utter oracles from the
gods, particularly when war was threatening. This was so (e. g.) at the
time of the Peloponnesian War (Thucyd. ii. 8, v. 26), and the
soothsayer is delightfully caricatured by Aristophanes in the _Birds_
and elsewhere.
§ 29. _two hundred ships ... one hundred were Athenian_. In the Speech
on the Crown, § 238, Demosthenes gives the numbers as 300 and 200.
Perhaps a transcriber at an early stage in the history of the text
accidentally wrote HH (the symbol for 200) instead of HHH, in the case
of the first number, and a later scribe then 'corrected' the second
number into H instead of HH. The numbers given by Herodotus are 378 and
180, and, for the Persian ships, 1,207.
§ 31. _against Egypt_, which was now in rebellion against Artaxerxes.
Orontas, Satrap of Mysia, was more or less constantly in revolt during
this period.
§ 32. _even more certainly_ [Greek: _palai_]: lit. 'long ago'. The
transition from temporal to logical priority is paralleled in certain
uses of other temporal adverbs, e.g. [Greek: _euthys_] (Aristotle,
_Poet_. v), and [Greek: _schol_e_] (of which, as Weil notes, [Greek:
_palai_] is the exact opposite).
§ 34. _sins against Hellas_. This refers to the support given to the
Persian invaders by Thebes in the Persian Wars (Herod. viii. 34).
FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS
§ 4. _Plataeae_ (which had been overthrown by the enemies of Athens in
the course of the Peloponnesian War, but rebuilt, with the aid of
Sparta, in 378) was destroyed by Thebes in 373-372. About the same time
Thebes destroyed Thespiae, which, like Plataeae, was well-disposed
towards Athens; and in 370 the Thebans massacred the male population of
Orchomenus, and sold the women and children into slavery.
§ 11. _Oropus_ had sometimes belonged to Thebes and sometimes to
Athens. In 366 it was taken from Athens by Themison, tyrant of Eretria
(exactly opposite Oropus, on the coast of Euboea), and placed in the
hands of Thebes until the ownership should be decided. Thebes retained
it until it was restored to Athens by Philip in 338.
§ 12. _when all the Peloponnesians, &c_. The reference seems to be to
the year 370, shortly after the battle of Leuctra, when the
Peloponnesian States sought the protection of Athens against Sparta,
and, being refused, became allies of Thebes (Diodorus xv. 62). In 369
Athens made an alliance with Sparta.
§ 14. _saved the Spartans_. See last note. Athens also assisted the
Spartans at Mantineia in 362.
_the Thebans_. In 378 and the following years Athens assisted Thebes
against the Spartans under Agesilaus and Cleombrotus.
_the Euboeans_. In 358 or 357 Euboea succeeded in obtaining freedom
from the domination of Thebes by the aid of Athenian troops under
Timotheus.
§ 16. _Triphylia_, a district between Elis and Messenia, was the
subject of a long-standing dispute between the Eleans and the
Arcadians, and seems to have been in the hands of the latter since
(about) 368.
_Tricaranum_, a fortress in the territory of Phlius, had been seized by
the Argives in 369, and used as a centre from which incursions were
made into Phliasian territory.
§ 20. _allies of Thebes_: in order to preserve the balance of power
between Thebes and Sparta.
§ 21. _the Theban confederacy_. The reference is particularly to the
Arcadian allies of Thebes, but the wider expression perhaps suggests a
general policy of a more ambitious kind.
§ 22. _you, I think, know_. He refers to the older members of the
Assembly, who would remember the tyrannical conduct of Sparta during
the period of her supremacy (the first quarter of the fourth century
B.C.).
§ 27. _pillars_. The terms of an alliance were usually recorded upon
pillars erected by each State on some site fixed by agreement or custom.
§ 28. _in the war_: i.e. the 'Sacred War', against the Phocians.
FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE RHODIANS
§ 3. _now it will be seen_: i.e. if you come to a right decision, and
help the Rhodians.
§ 5. _the Egyptians_. See Speech on Naval Boards, § 31 n.
§ 6. _to advise you_: i.e. in the Speech on the Naval Boards (see
especially §§ 10, 11 of that Speech).
§ 9. _Ariobarzanes_, Satrap of the Hellespont, joined in the general
revolt of the princes of Asia Minor against Persia in 362, at first
secretly (as though making war against other satraps) but afterwards
openly. Timotheus was sent to help him, on the understanding that he
must not break the Peace of Antalcidas (378 B.C.), according to which
the Greek cities in Asia were to belong to the king, but the rest were
to be independent (except that Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and
Scyros). When Ariobarzanes broke out in open revolt, Timotheus could
not help him without breaking the first provision; but the Persian
occupation tion of Samos was itself a violation of the second, and he
was therefore justified in relieving the town.
§ 11. _while he is in her neighbourhood_. Artaxerxes almost certainly
went in person to Egypt about this time. (That he went before 346 is
proved by Isocrates, _Philippus_, § 101; and he was no doubt expected
to go, even before he went.) The alternative rendering, 'since he is
still to be a neighbouring power to herself,' is less good, since he
would be this, whether he conquered Egypt or not.
§ 14. _Rhodians who are now in possession_: i.e. the oligarchs, who
held the town with the help of Caria.
_some of their fellow-citizens_: i.e. some of the democratic party.
§ 15. _official patron_ ([Greek: _proxenos_]). The 'official patron' of
another State in Athens was necessarily an Athenian, and so differed
from the modern consul, whom he otherwise resembled in many ways (cf.
Phillipson, _International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome_,
vol. i, pp. 147-56).
§ 17. _publicly provided_: i.e. in treaties between the States.
§ 22. _when our democracy_, &c.: i.e. in 404, when, at the conclusion
of the Peloponnesian War, the tyranny of the Thirty was established,
and a very large number of democratic citizens were driven into exile.
The Argives refused the Spartan demand for the surrender of some of
these to the Thirty (Diodorus xiv. 6).
§ 23. _one who is a barbarian-aye, and a woman_ ([Greek: _barbaron
anthr_opon kai tauta gynaika_]). This has been taken to refer (1) to
Artaxerxes and Artemisia. But [Greek: _kai tauta_] cannot be simply
[Greek: _pros tont_o_], and [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] must refer to
the same person as [Greek: _barbaron anthr_opon_]; (2) to Artaxerxes
alone, the words [Greek: _kai tauta gynaika_] being a gratuitous insult
such as it was customary for Athenians to level at any Persian; (3) to
Artemisia alone, [Greek: anthr_opos] being feminine here as often. It
is not possible to decide certainly between (2) and (3). Artemisia is
more prominent in the speech than the king, but it is the king who is
referred to in the next sentence.
§ 24. _rendered Athens weak_. The success of Sparta in the
Peloponnesian War was rendered possible, to a great extent, by the
supply of funds from Persia. In 401 Cyrus made his famous expedition
against Artaxerxes II, and Clearchus (with other generals) commanded
the Greek troops which assisted him. The death of Cyrus in the battle
of Cunaxa in 401 put an end to his rebellion.
§ 25. _rights of the rest of the world_. Weil suggests that it may have
been argued that to intervene in Rhodian affairs would be to break the
treaty made with the allies in 355 (about), at the end of the Social
War, whereby their independence was guaranteed.
§ 26. _Chalcedon_ was on the Asiatic shore of the Bosporus, and
therefore by the Peace of Antalcidas belonged to the king (see n. on §
9). By the same treaty, Selymbria, on the north coast of the Propontis,
ought to have been independent. The Byzantines, who had obtained their
independence of Athens in the Social War, were extending their
influence greatly at this time.
§ 27. _the treaty_: again the Peace of Antalcidas.
_even if there actually are such advisers_: or, 'even if any one
actually asserts the existence of such persons.'
§ 29. _two treaties_. The first must be the Peace of Callias (444
B.C.), the terms of which are given in the Speech on the Embassy, §
273. The second was the Peace of Antalcidas.
§ 30. _the knowledge of what is right_. The parallel passage in § 1
seems to confirm this rendering, rather than the alternative, 'the
intention to do what is right.'
§ 33. _oligarchical_. This expression is partly directed at those who,
in opposing the exiled democrats, supported the oligarchs of Rhodes;
and it may be partly explained by the fact that the policy of Eubulus,
who wished to avoid all interferences which might lead to war, was
particularly satisfactory to the wealthier classes in Athens. But it
was a common practice to accuse an opponent of anti-democratic
sentiments, and of trying to get the better of the people by
illegitimate means (cf. Speech on Embassy, § 314, &c.).
§ 35. Cf. Speech on Naval Boards, § 41.
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC
§ 3. _the war with Sparta_. Probably the Boeotian War (378-371 B.C.),
when Athens supported Thebes against Sparta.
_in defence of the right_. The attempt of the Spartans to conquer
Boeotia was a violation of the Peace of Antalcidas (see n. on Speech
for Rhodians, § 6). But Demosthenes' expression may be quite general in
its meaning.
§ 4. _tribes_. Probably refers especially to the Thracians (see Introd.
to the Speech). The Paeonian and Illyrian chieftains also made alliance
with Athens in 356.
§ 17. _to Euboea_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § 14 n.
_to Haliartus_: in 395, when Athens sent a force to aid the Thebans
against the Spartans under Lysander. (For other allusions see Introd.
to the Speech.)
§ 19. _paper-armies_ ([Greek: epistolimaious ... dynameis]): lit.
'armies existing in dispatches.'
§ 24. _Athens once maintained_, &c. The reference is to the Corinthian
war of 394-387 B.C. The Athenian general Iphicrates organized a
mercenary force of peltasts in support of Corinth, and did great damage
to Sparta; he was succeeded in the command by Chabrias. Nothing more is
certainly known of Polystratus than is told us here, though he may be
referred to in the Speech against Leptines, § 84, as receiving honours
from Athens.
_to Artabazus_. In 356 Chares was sent to oppose the revolted allies of
Athens, but being short of funds, assisted Artabazus in his rebellion
against Persia, and was richly rewarded. (See Introd. to Speech on
Naval Boards.)
§ 25. _spectators of these mysteries of generalship_ ([Greek: epoptai
t_on ] [Greek: *_strat_egoumen_on_]). The word [Greek: _epopt_es_] is
chiefly used of spectators of the mysteries, and is here applied
sarcastically to the citizens whom Demosthenes desires to see what has
hitherto been a hidden thing from them--the conduct of their generals.
§ 26. _ten captains and generals, &c_. There was one general ([Greek:
_strat_egos_]) and one captain ([Greek: _taxiarchos_]) of infantry, and
one general of cavalry ([Greek: _phylarchos_]), for each of the ten
tribes. There were two regular masters of the horse ([Greek:
_hipparchoi_]), and a third appointed for the special command of the
Athenian troops in Lemnos. The generals ([Greek: _strat_egoi_]) had
various civil duties, among them the organization of the military
processions at the Panathenaea and other great festivals.
§ 27. _Menelaus_. Either a Macedonian chieftain, who had assisted the
Athenian commander Timotheus against Poteidaea in 364, and probably
received Athenian citizenship; or else Philip's half-brother Menelaus.
But there is no evidence that the latter ever served in the Athenian
forces, and probably the former is meant.
§ 31. _Etesian winds_. These blow strongly from the north over the
Aegean from July to September.
§ 33. _the whole force in its entirety_. So with Butcher's punctuation.
But it is perhaps better to place a comma after [Greek: _dynamin_], and
translate, 'after making ready ... soldiers, ships, cavalry--the entire
force complete--you bind them,' &c.
§ 34. See Introd. to the Speech. Geraestus was the southernmost most
point of Euboea. The 'sacred trireme', the Paralus, when conveying the
Athenian deputation to the Festival of Delos, put in on its way at
Marathon, where there was an altar of the Delian Apollo, to offer
sacrifice.
§ 35. The festival of the Panathenaea was managed by the Athlothetae,
who were appointed by lot, and consequently could not be specially
qualified; whereas the stewards ([Greek: _epimel_etai_]) who assisted
the Archon in the management of the Dionysia, were at this time
elected, presumably on the ground of their fitness.
_an amount of trouble_ ([Greek: _ochlon_]). Possibly 'a larger crowd'.
But there is no point in mentioning the crowd; the point lies in the
pains taken; and Thucyd. vi. 24 ([Greek: _upo tou ochl_odous t_es
parhaskeu_es_]) confirms the rendering given.
§ 36. The choregus paid the expenses of a chorus at the Dionysiac (and
certain other) festivals. The gymnasiarchs, or stewards of the games,
managed the games and torch-races which formed part of the Panathenaea
and many other festivals. The offices were imposed by law upon men who
possessed a certain estate, but any one who felt that another could
bear the burden better might challenge him either to perform the duty
or to exchange property with him. (See Appendix to Goodwin's edition of
Demosthenes' Speech against Meidias.)
_independent freedmen_: lit. 'dwellers apart,' i.e. freedmen who no
longer lived with the master whose slaves they had been.
§ 43. _empty ships_. If these are the ships referred to in Olynth. III,
Section 4, the date of the First Philippic must be later than October
351 B.C.
§ 46. _promises_. The 'promises of Chares' became almost proverbial.
§ 47. _examination_, or 'audit'. A general, like every other
responsible official, had to report his proceedings, at the end of his
term of office, to a Board of Auditors, and might be prosecuted before
a jury by any one who was dissatisfied with his report.
§ 48. _negotiating with Sparta, &c_. As a matter of fact, Philip had
evidently come to an understanding with Thebes by this time; but he may
have caused some such rumours to be spread, in order to get rid of any
possible opposition from Sparta. The 'breaking-up of the free states'
probably refers to the desire of Sparta to destroy Megalopolis, which
was in alliance with Thebes.
_sent ambassadors to the king_. Arrian, ii. 14, mentions a letter of
Darius to Alexander, recalling how Philip had been in friendship and
alliance with Artaxerxes Ochus. It is possible, therefore, that the
rumour to which Demosthenes alludes had some foundation.
THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC
(_Note_.--Most of the allusions in the Olynthiacs are explained by the
Introduction to the First Philippic.)
§ 4. _power over everything, open or secret_. The translation generally
approved, 'power to publish or conceal his designs,' is hardly
possible. The [Greek: kai] in the phrase [Greek: rh_eta kai aporr_eta]
(or [Greek: arr_eta]) cannot be taken disjunctively here, when it is
always conjunctive in this phrase elsewhere, the whole phrase being
virtually equivalent to 'everything whatever'.
§ 5. _how he treated_, &c. The scholiast says that Philip killed the
traitors at Amphipolis first, saying that if they had not been faithful
to their own countrymen, they were not likely to be faithful to
himself; and that the traitors at Pydna, finding that they were not
likely to be spared, took sanctuary, and having been persuaded to
surrender themselves on promise of their lives, were executed
nevertheless. Neither story is confirmed by other evidence.
§ 8. _in aid of the Euboeans_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for
Megalopolitans, § 14 n.
§ 13. _Magnesia_. There seems to have been a town of the same name as
the district.
_attacked the Olynthians_. This refers to the short invasion of 351
(see vol. i, p. 70), not to that which is the subject of the Olynthiacs.
_Arybbas_ was King of the Molossi, and uncle of Philip's wife,
Olympias. Nothing is known of this expedition against him. He was
deposed by Philip in 343. (See vol. ii, p. 3.)
§ 17. _these towns_: the towns of the Chalcidic peninsula, over which
Olynthus had acquired influence. This sentence shows that Olynthus
itself had not yet been attacked.
§ 26. _But, my good Sir_, &c. This must be the objection of an
imaginary opponent. It can hardly be taken (as seems to be intended by
Butcher) as Demosthenes' reply to the question, 'Or some other power?'
('But, my good Sir, the other power will not want to help him.') There
is, however, much to be said for Sandys's punctuation, [Greek: _ean m_e
bo_eth_es_eth umeis _e allos tis_], 'unless you or some other power go
to their aid.' After the death of Onomarchus in 352, the Phocians were
incapable of withstanding invasion without help.
THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC
§ 14. _Timotheus, &c_. In 364 an Athenian force under Timotheus invaded
the territory of the Olynthian League, and took Torone, Poteidaea, and
other towns, with the help of Perdiccas, King of Macedonia.
_ruling dynasty_: i.e. the dynasty of Lycophron and Peitholaus at
Pherae. (See Introd. to First Philippic.)
§ 28. _this war_: i.e. the war with Philip generally. The reference is
supposed to be to the conduct of Chares in 356 (cf. Phil. I, Section 24
ii.), though in fact it was against the revolted allies, not against
Philip, that he had been sent. Sigeum was a favourite resort of Chares,
and it is conjectured that he may have obtained possession of Lampsacus
and Sigeum (both on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont) in 356. The
explanation of the conduct of the generals is to be found in the fact
that in Asia Minor they could freely appropriate prizes of war and
plunder, since under the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens could
claim nothing in Asia for her own.
§ 29. _taxes by Boards_. Each of the Boards constituted in 378-377 for
the collection of the war-tax (see vol. i, p. 31) had a leader or
chairman ([Greek: __hegem_on_]), one of the 300 richest men in Athens,
whose duty it was to advance the sums required by the State, recovering
them afterwards from the other members of the Boards. Probably the
Three Hundred were divided equally among the 100 Boards, a leader, a
'second', and a 'third' (Speech on Crown, § 103) being assigned to
each. The 'general' here perhaps corresponds to the 'second'.
THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC
§ 4. _two or three years ago_ (lit. 'this is the third or fourth year
since). It was in November 352 B.C. If the present Speech was delivered
before November 349, not quite three years would have elapsed. (The
Greek words, [Greek: triton _he tetarton etos touti], must, on the
analogy of the Speech against Meidias, § 13, against Stephanus, II. §
13, and against Aphobus, I. § 24, &c., mean 'two or three', not 'three
or four years ago'). The vagueness of the expression is more likely to
be due to the date of the Third Olynthiac being not far short of three
years from that of the siege of Heraeon Teichos, than to the
double-dating (on the one hand by actual lapse of time, and on the
other by archon-years--from July to July--or by military campaigning
seasons) which most commentators assume to be intended here, but which
seems to me over-subtle and unlike Demosthenes.
_that year_: i.e. the archonship of Aristodemus, which ran from July
352 B.C. to July 351.
§ 5. _the mysteries_. These were celebrated from the 14th to the 27th
of Boedromion (late in September).
_Charidemus_, of Oreus in Euboea, was a mercenary leader who had served
many masters at different times--Athens, Olynthus, Cotys, and
Cersobleptes--and had played most of them false at some time or other.
But he was given the citizenship in 357 for the part which he had taken
in effecting the cession of the Chersonese to Athens, and was a
favourite with the people. He was sent on the occasion here referred to
with ten ships, for which he was to find mercenary soldiers.
§ 6. _with might ... power_. A quotation, probably from the text of the
treaty of alliance between Athens and Olynthus.
§ 8. _funds of the Phocians are exhausted_. The Phocian leader
Phalaecus had been using the temple-treasures of Delphi, but they were
now exhausted.
§ 10. _a Legislative Commission_: i.e. a Special Commission on the
model of the regular Commission which was appointed annually from the
jurors for the year (if the Assembly so decreed), and before which
those who wished to make or to oppose changes in the laws appeared, the
proceedings taking the form of a prosecution and defence of the laws in
question. The Assembly itself did not legislate, though it passed
decrees, which had to be consistent with the existing laws. As regards
legislation, it merely decided whether in any given year alterations in
the laws should or should not be allowed.
§ 11. _malingerers_. The scholiast says that the choregi were persuaded
to choose persons as members of their choruses, in order to enable them
to escape military service, choreutae being legally exempted. Other
exemptions also existed.
§ 12. _persons who proposed them_. This can only refer to Eubulus and
his party.
§ 20. _Corinthians and Megareans_. From the pseudo-Demosthenic Speech
on the Constitution ([Greek: _pe_ri suntaxe_os_]) and from Philochorus
(quoted in the Scholia of Didymus upon that Speech) it appears that the
Athenians had in 350 invaded Megara, under the general Ephialtes, and
forced the Megareans to agree to a delimitation of certain land sacred
to the two goddesses of Eleusis, which the Megareans had violated,
perhaps for some years past (see Speech against Aristocrates, § 212). A
scholiast also refers to the omission by Corinth to invite the
Athenians to the Isthmian games, in consequence of which the Athenians
sent an armed force to attend the games. Probably this was also a
recent occurrence, and due to an understanding between Corinth and
Megara.
§ 21. _my own namesake_: i.e. Demosthenes, who was a distinguished
general during the Peloponnesian War, and perished in the Sicilian
expedition.
§ 24. _for forty-five years_: i.e. between the Persian and
Peloponnesian Wars, 476-431 B.C.
_the king_: i.e. Perdiccas II, who, however, took the side of Sparta
shortly after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. He died in 413.
(The date of the beginning of his reign is unknown, but he did not
become sole king of the whole of Macedonia until 436.)
§ 27. _Spartans had been ruined_: sc. by the battles of Leuctra (in
371) and Mantineia (in 362).
_Thebans had their hands full_, owing to the war with the Phocians,
from 356 onwards.
§ 28. _in the war_, when Athens joined Thebes against Sparta (in 378).
'The allies' are those members of the Second Delian League (formed in
378) who had been lost in the Social War which ended in or about 355,
when Athens was at peace with Thebes and Sparta. (See Introduction,
vol. i, p. 9.)
§ 31. _procession at the Boedromia_. The Boedromia was a festival held
in September in honour of Apollo and Artemis Agrotera, Probably a
procession was not a regular part of the festival at this time. The
importance which the populace attached to such processions is
illustrated by the Speech against Timocrates, § 161.
§ 34. _is it then paid service, &c_.: almost, 'do you then suggest that
we should _earn_ our money?'
§ 35. _adding or subtracting_: sc. from the sums dispensed by the State
to the citizens.
_somebody's mercenaries_. The reference is probably to the successes of
Charidemus when first sent (see Introd. to Olynthiacs).
ON THE PEACE
§ 5. _disturbances in Euboea_. Plutarchus of Eretria applied for
Athenian aid against Callias of Chalcis, who was attacking him with the
aid of Macedonian troops. Demosthenes was strongly opposed to granting
the request, but it was supported by Eubulus and Meidias, and a force
was sent under Phocion, probably early in 348 (though the chronology
has been much debated, and some place the expedition in 350 or 349).
Owing to the premature action or the treachery of Plutarchus at Tamynae
(where the Athenian army was attacked), Phocion had some difficulty in
winning a victory. Plutarchus afterwards seized a number of Athenian
soldiers, and Athens had actually to ransom them. Phocion's successor,
Molossus, was unsuccessful. When peace was made in the summer of 348,
the Euboeans became for the most part independent of Athens, and were
regarded with ill-feeling by Athens for some years. There is no proof
that the proposers of the expedition were bribed, as Demosthenes
alleges.
§ 6. _Neoptolemus_. See Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 315.
§ 8. _public service_: i.e. as trierarch or choregus or gymnasiarch,
&c. See n. on Phil. I. § 36.
§ 10. _there were some_ : i.e. Aeschines and his colleagues. (See
Introd.)
_Thespiae and Plataeae_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 4 n.
§ 14. _self-styled Amphictyons_. The Amphictyonic Council represented
the ancient Amphictyonic League of Hellenic tribes (now differing
widely in importance, but equally represented on the Council), and was
supreme in all matters affecting the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. (See
n. on Speech on Crown, § 148.) The Council summoned by Philip was open
to criticism (1) because only certain members of it were present, of
whom the Thebans and Thessalians were the chief, (2) because Philip had
been given the vote of the dispossessed Phocians.
§ 15. _however stupid, &c_. It had been conventional for over a century
to apply this adjective to the Boeotians, and therefore to the Thebans.
For a more favourable view, see W. Rhys Roberts, _Ancient Boeotians_,
chap. i.
§ 16. _Oropus_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, § ii n.
§ 18. _Argives, &c_. See Speech for Megalopolitans throughout (with
Introd.).
_those whom they have exiled_: especially the refugees from Orchomenus
and Coroneia. See vol. i, p. 124.
_Phocian fugitives_. The Amphictyonic Council had recently declared
that these had been guilty of sacrilege, and might be seized wherever
they might be.
§ 20. _all that they themselves had toiled for_: i.e. the conquest of
the Phocians in the Sacred War.
§ 22. _some persons_: i.e. Aeschines and others who tried to excuse
Philip's treatment of the Phocians to the Athenian people.
§ 23. _admission ... Delphi_. The Phocians had formerly contrived their
exclusion from the Amphictyonic meeting and from the temple and oracle
of Delphi. The Council now restored them, and excluded the Phocians.
§ 24. _refuse to submit_: reading [Greek: (_oud) otioun upomeinai_.]
The insertion of [Greek: _oude_] (after Cobet) seems necessary, [Greek:
_otioun upomeinai_] alone would mean 'face any risk', but this would be
contradicted by the next clause. To translate, 'who think that we
should face any risk, but do not see that the risk would be one of
war,' is to narrow the meaning of [Greek: _otioun_] unduly.
§ 25. _Treaty of Peace_: i.e. the Peace of Philocrates.
_Cardians_. The Athenians claimed Cardia (the key of the Chersonese on
the Thracian side) as an ally, though in fact it was expressly excluded
from the towns ceded to Athens by Cersobleptes in 357, and had made
alliance with Philip in 352.
_prince of Caria_. See Speech for Rhodians (with Introd.).
_drive our vessels to shore_: a regular form of ancient piracy (see
Speech on Chersonese, § 28). The Byzantines drove the Athenian
corn-ships into their own harbour. The victims were relieved of their
money or their corn.
_shadow at Delphi_: i.e. the empty privilege (as Demosthenes here
chooses to represent it) of membership of the Amphictyonic League and
Council, now claimed by Philip.
THE SECOND PHILIPPIC
§ 1. _sympathetic_: i.e. towards other Greek states, desirous of
securing independence.
§ 2. _Alexander_, &c. Alexander of Macedon was sent by Mardonius, the
Persian commander, to offer Athens alliance with Persia on favourable
terms. Demosthenes has confused the order of events, and speaks as if
this message was brought before the battle of Salamis. The Athenians
left the city twice, before the battle of Salamis and before that of
Plataeae; it was after Salamis that Alexander was sent (Herod. viii.
140, &c.).
§ 14. _fortify Elateia_. This would be a menace to Thebes (cf. Speech
on the Crown, §§ 174, 175). Elateia commands the road from Thermopylae
to Thebes.
§ 19. _well-balanced_ ([Greek: _s_ophronousi_]), or 'free from
passion', i.e. not liable to be carried away by ambition or cupidity as
the Thebans were. This is different from mere 'good sense' ([Greek:
_syphronein, noun echea_]). For Theban 'stupidity', see Speech on
Peace, § 15 (and n.).
§ 22. _Council of Ten_ ([Greek: _dekadarchian_]). It is clear that some
sort of oligarchical government, nominated by Philip, is referred to;
but the relation of this to the tetrarchies mentioned in the Speech on
the Chersonese, § 26, as established by Philip, is uncertain. These
corresponded to the four tribes or divisions of Thessaly (Thessaliotis,
Phthiotis, Pelasgiotis, Histiaeotis); and this is confirmed by a
statement in Theopompus' forty-fourth book, to which Harpocration (s.v.
[Greek: _dekadarchia_]) refers. Harpocration states that Philip did not
establish a decadarchy in Thessaly; and if he is right, then either (a)
Demosthenes purposely used an inaccurate word, in order to suggest to
the Messenians the idea of a government like that of the Councils of
Ten established some sixty years before by Sparta in the towns subject
to her; or (b) the text is wrong, and [Greek: _dekadarchian_] is a
misreading of [Greek: DARCHIAN], in which [Greek: D] was the numeral (=
4), and the whole stood for [Greek: _tetrarchian_]. As to (a), it is
difficult to suppose that the Messenians would not know what had
happened in Thessaly so well that the innuendo would fall flat. There
is no evidence that 'decadarchy' could be used simply as a synonym for
'oligarchy'. As to (b), the supposed corruption is possible; but then
we are left with [Greek: _tetrarchian_] where we should expect [Greek:
_tetrarchias_]: for there is no parallel to [Greek: _tetrarchia_]
(sing.) in the sense of 'a system of tetrarchies'. It is, however,
quite possible that Demosthenes was thinking especially of the
Thessalians of Pherae, and of the particular tetrarchy established over
them: and this seems on the whole the best solution. If, on the other
hand, Harpocration is wrong, the reference here may be to a Council of
Ten, either established previously to the tetrarchies, and superseded
by them, or else coexistent with and superior to them; in either case,
since the singular is used, this decadarchy must have been a single
government over the whole of Thessaly (or perhaps of the district about
Pherae only), not a number of Councils, one in each city or division of
Thessaly. (Theopompus' forty-fourth book probably dealt with 342 B.C.,
two years after the present speech, though before the Speech on the
Chersonese; but we are not told that he assigned the establishment of
the tetrarchies to that year.)
§ 25. _find yourselves slaves_: lit. 'find your master.'
§ 28. _by yourselves_: i.e. in the absence of the ambassadors from
Philip and other States.
_who conveyed the promises_: i.e. Ctesiphon, Aristodemus, and
Neoptolemus (see Speech on Embassy, §§ 12, 94, 315, &c.): but
Demosthenes has probably Aeschines also in view.
§ 30. _water-drinker_. See Speech on Embassy, § 46.
§ 32. _secure myself as good a hearing_. Most editions accept this
rendering of [Greek: _emaut_o logon poi_es-o_]. But though [Greek:
_logon didonai_] = 'grant a hearing,' and [Greek: _logon tychein_] =
'get a hearing,' [Greek: _logon eaut_o poiein_] is strange for 'secure
oneself a hearing', and the passage regularly quoted from the Speech
against Aristocrates, § 81, is not parallel, since [Greek: _tout_o_] in
that passage is not a reflexive pronoun, and [Greek: _logon pepoi_eke_]
almost = [Greek: _logon ded_oki_]. Possibly the text is corrupt, and we
should either read [Greek: _psogon_] (with H. Richards) or [Greek:
_emautou_] ('make you take as much account of me as of my opponents').
_further claim_: since an attack on the part of Demosthenes would
incite them to make out a plausible case for Philip once more, and so
earn his gratitude.
ON THE EMBASSY
[The literal translation of the title is 'On the misconduct as
ambassador'.]
§ 1. _drawing your lots_. The jurors who were to serve in each trial
were selected by lot out of the total number of jurors for the year.
§ 2. _one of those_: i.e. Timarchus (see Introd.).
_supremacy_. The sovereignty of the people was exercised to a great
extent through the law-courts, the jury being always large enough to be
fairly representative of popular opinion, though probably there was
generally a rather disproportionate preponderance of poorer men among
the jurors, the payment being insufficient to attract others. (See
Introduction, vol. i, pp. 18, 19, 23.)
§ 11. _the Ten Thousand_: the General Assembly of the Arcadians at
Megalopolis.
§ 13. _he came to me_, &c. Aeschines denies this, saying that it would
have been absurd, when he knew that Demosthenes and Philocrates had
acted together throughout (see Introd.).
§ 16. _in the very presence_, &c.: contrast Speech on the Crown,
§ 23 (and see n. there). Aeschines states that he was in fact replying
to inflammatory speeches made by orators who pointed to the Propylaea,
and appealed to the memory of ancestral exploits; and that he simply
urged that it was possible for the Athenians to copy the wisdom of
their forefathers without giving way to an unseasonable passion for
strife.
§ 17. _had again acted_: i.e. as on the First Embassy, if the reading
is correct (or perhaps, 'had committed a fresh series of wrongful
acts'). But possibly [Greek: _peprhakot_on_] is right, 'had sold fresh
concessions' to Philip.
§ 20. Aeschines replies that every one expected Philip to turn against
Thebes; and that for the rest, he was only reporting the gossip of the
Macedonian camp, where the representatives of many states were gathered
together, and not making promises at all. It is noteworthy, however,
that in the Speech on the Peace, § 10, shortly after the events in
question, when the speeches made would be fresh in every one's memory,
Demosthenes gives the same account of his opponent's assertions; and
Aeschines probably said something very like what is attributed to him.
§ 21. _debt due to the god_: i.e. the value of the Temple-treasure of
Delphi, which the Phocians had plundered.
§ 30. _for however contemptible_, &c. The argument seems to be this.
'You must not say that a man like Aeschines could not have brought
about such vast results. Athens may employ inferior men, but any one
who represents Athens has to deal with great affairs, and so his acts
may have great consequences. And again, although it may have been
Philip who actually ruined the Phocians, and although Aeschines could
never have done it alone, still he did his best to help.'
§ 31. _the Town Hall_, or Prytaneum, where the Prytanes (the acting
Committee of the Council) met, and other magistrates had their offices.
_Timagoras_ was accused (according to Xenophon) by his colleague Leon
of having conspired with Pelopidas of Thebes against the interests of
Athens, when on a mission to the court of Artaxerxes in 357. In § 137
Demosthenes also states that he received large sums of money from
Artaxerxes.
§ 36. Aeschines denies that he wrote the letter for Philip, and his
denial is fairly convincing.
§ 40. _a talent_. According to Aristotle (_Eth. Nic_. v. 7) the
conventional amount payable as ransom was one mina per head. But from §
169 it appears that the Macedonians sometimes asked for more than this.
_laudable ambition_: i.e. to get credit for having thought of the
ransom of the prisoners.
§ 47. _handed in_: either to the Clerk or to the Proedroi (the
committee of Chairmen of the Assembly).
§ 51. Aeschines states that Philip's invitation was declined because it
was suggested that Philip would keep the soldiers sent as hostages.
§ 65. _on our way to Delphi_. Demosthenes had been one of the Athenian
representatives at the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi
this year.
_gave its vote_, &c. After the battle of Aegospotami at the end of the
Peloponnesian War, the representative of Thebes proposed to the
Spartans and their allies that Athens should be destroyed and its
inhabitants sold into slavery.
§ 70. _read this law over_: i.e. that the herald might proclaim it
after him.
§ 72. For the Spartans see § 76. The Phocians had treated the Athenians
badly when Proxenus was sent to Thermopylae (see Introd. to Speech on
Peace). Hegesippus may have opposed the acceptance of Philip's
invitation to the Athenians to join him. Aeschines (on the Embassy, §§
137, 138) mentions no names in connexion with the refusal, but
represents it as the sacrifice of a unique opportunity of saving the
Phocians (cf. § 51 n.).
§ 76. _deceit and cunning, and of nothing else_ ([Greek: _pasa
apat_e_]). The argument is, 'Aeschines will try to allege wrongful acts
on the part of the Phocians; but there was no time for such acts in the
five days; and this proves that there were no such acts to justify
their ruin, and that their overthrow was due to nothing but trickery.'
This is better than to translate '_every kind of_ deceit and trickery
was concocted for the ruin of the Phocians'; for this is not the point,
nor is it what would be inferred from the fact that there was only a
five-days' interval between the speech of Aeschines and the
capitulation of the Phocians. There is no need to emend to [Greek: _h_e
pasa apat_e_].
_on account of the Peace_: i.e. of the negotiations for the Peace,
before it was finally arranged.
_all that they wished_: viz. the restoration of the Temple of Delphi to
their kinsmen, the Dorians of Mount Parnassus.
§ 78. _four whole months_: in reality, three months and a few days.
§ 81. _Phocian people_: i.e. those who were left in Phocis, as distinct
from the exiles just referred to.
§ 86. _of Diophantus_. In 352, when Philip had been repulsed by
Onomarchus, Diophantus proposed that public thanksgivings should be
held (see Introd. to First Philippic).
_of Callisthenes_: in 346, after the Phocians had surrendered to Philip.
_the sacrifice to Heracles_: perhaps one of the two festivals which
were respectively held at Marathon and at Cynosarges.
§ 99. _constitutional_: lit. 'an excuse for a citizen,' under a
constitution by which no one was compelled to enter public life, and
any one who did so without the requisite capacity had to take the
responsibility for his errors.
§ 103. _impeached_. An impeachment was brought before the Council (or,
more rarely, the Assembly). The procedure was only applied to cases of
extraordinary gravity, and particularly to what would now be called
cases of treason.
§ 114. _by torture_. The evidence of slaves might be given under
torture, in response to a challenge from one or other of the parties to
a suit. The most diverse opinions as to the value of such evidence are
expressed by the orators, according to the requirements of their case.
The consent of both sides was necessary; and in a very large number of
cases, one side or the other appears to have refused to allow evidence
to be taken in this way.
_was going_: i.e. to Philip.
§ 118. _accept his discharge_. There seems to be a play on two senses
of the verb [Greek: aphienai], viz. 'to discharge from the obligations
of a contract', and 'to acquit'.
§ 120. _Why, this is the finest_, &c. The expression ([Greek: touto gar
esti to lamprhon]) recurs in § 279, a closely parallel passage, and
need not be regarded as an interpolation in either case. The
interpretation given seems slightly preferable, and is approved by
Weil. It is almost equally possible to translate the Greek by 'such is
the brilliant defence which he offers'; but perhaps this does not suit
§ 279 so well.
_stand up_. Apparently Aeschines declined the invitation, which was
quite within the custom of the Athenian courts. Either of the principal
parties could ask the other questions, and have the answers taken down
as evidence.
_cases that have all_, &c. The reference is to the prosecution of
Timarchus, when advanced in age, for offences committed in early youth.
There may also be an allusion to Aeschines' early career as an actor.
§ 122. _declined on oath_. An elected official could refuse to serve,
if he took an oath that there was some good reason (such as illness)
for excusing him.
§ 126. _though not elected_. Aeschines (on the Embassy, § 94) replies
that in fact the commission was renewed at a second meeting of the
Assembly, and that he was then well enough to go and was elected. (That
there was a second election of ambassadors is confirmed by Demosthenes'
own statement in § 172 of the present speech, that he himself was twice
elected and twice refused to serve.)
§ 128. _Thesmothetae_: the six archons who did not hold the special
offices of archon eponymus, polemarch, or king archon.
_Aeschines went_, &c. To have refused to be present would really have
been to make a political demonstration against Thebes, which would have
had perilous results. Aeschines defends himself on the ground that in
his view the Peace was no disadvantage to Athens, so that he might well
join in the honours paid to the Gods.
§ 129. _Metroon_. The temple of the Great Mother (Cybele), which was
the Athenian record-office.
_the name of Aeschines_: i.e. its removal from the list of ambassadors.
§ 131. _in their interest_. If the words are not corrupt, the meaning
is probably 'in the interest of Philip and the Thebans'; or possibly,
'in reference to these matters.'
§ 136. _as his informant_. The text is possibly corrupt, though as it
stands it might perhaps bear the meaning given, if [Greek: hyparchei]
were understood with [Greek: autos]. Others (with or without
emendation) take the sense to be 'to manage his business ... just as he
would manage it in person '.
§ 137. For Timagoras see § 31 n.
§ 144. _summon Philip's envoys_: i.e. in order to report the decision
of the Assembly, and so close the matter.
§ 147. _ask him whether_, &c. The argument seems to be this 'if
Aeschines was the ambassador of a city which had been victorious
against Philip, the latter would naturally wish to buy easy terms of
peace; and Aeschines might undertake to procure such terms, without
committing a particularly heinous offence, since he would only be
getting some advantage for himself out of the general good fortune of
his country. But to secure advantages for himself at his country's
expense, when his country was already suffering disaster, would be far
worse. And as Aeschines complains that the generals had incurred
disaster, he convicts himself of the worse offence.'
§ 148. The _Tilphossaeum_ was apparently a mountain near Lake Copais in
Boeotia. The town which Strabo calls Tilphusium may have been on the
mountain. Neones, or Neon, was a Phocian village; Hedyleion, a mountain
in Boeotia.
§ 149. _Ah! he will say_, &c. Either the words are interpolated, or
there is a lacuna. The objection is nowhere refuted.
§ 156. Doriscus, &c. The places mentioned did not really belong to
Athens, but to Cersobleptes, who was being assisted by Athenian troops,
so that, strictly speaking, Philip was within his rights; and in fact
(according to Aeschines), Cersobleptes and the Sacred Mountain were
taken by Philip the day before the Athenians and their allies swore to
the Peace at Athens.
§ 162. _Eucleides_ had been sent to protest against Philip's attack
upon Cersobleptes in 346 (see vol. i, p. 122). Philip replied that he
had not yet been officially informed by the Athenian ambassadors of the
conclusion of the Peace, and was therefore not yet bound by it.
§ 166. _procure their ransom_: i.e. from the various Macedonians who
had captured them, or to whom they had been given or sold.
§ 176. _committed to writing_, &c. Formal evidence (as distinct from
the mere assertions of a speaker) was written down, and the witness was
asked to swear to it. A witness who was called upon might swear that he
had no knowledge of the matter in question ([Greek: _exomnysthai_]). By
writing down his evidence and swearing to it, Demosthenes took the risk
of prosecution for perjury.
§ 180. _might be proved in countless ways_: or 'would need a speech of
infinite length '. But as [Greek: _kai_] and not [Greek: _de_] follows,
I slightly prefer the former rendering. (The latter is supported by the
Third Philippic, § 60, but there the next clause is connected by
[Greek: _de_].)
_Ergophilus_ was heavily fined in 362 (see Speech against Aristocrates,
§ 104); Cephisodotus in 358 (ibid. § 167, and Aeschines against
Ctesiphon, § 52); Timomachus went into exile in 360 to escape
condemnation (against Aristocrates, § 115, &c.). Ergocles was perhaps
the friend of Thrasybulas (see Lysias, Orations xxviii, xxix), and may
have been condemned for his conduct in Thrace, as well as for
malversation at Halicarnassus. Dionysius is unknown.
§ 187. _has got beyond_, &c.: an ironical way of saying that he has so
much overdone his application to himself of the title of (prospective)
'benefactor' of Athens, that another word (e.g. 'deceiver') would be
more appropriate. The word [Greek: _psychrhon_] is (at least by Greek
literary critics) applied to strong expressions out of place, and here
also, probably, of an exaggerated phrase which falls flat. This is
perhaps the best interpretation of a very difficult passage.
§ 191. For Timagoras, see § 31 n. Tharrex and Smicythus are unknown.
Adeimantus was one of the generals at Aegospotami, the only Athenian
prisoner spared by Lysander, and on that account suspected of treason
by the Athenians, and prosecuted by Conon (called 'the elder', to
distinguish him from his grandson, who was a contemporary of
Demosthenes).
§ 194. guest-friend. The term ([Greek: xenos]) was applied to the
relationship (more formal than that of simple friendship) between
citizens of different states, who were bound together by ties of
hospitality and mutual goodwill.
§ 196. _the Thirty_: i.e. the 'Thirty Tyrants' who ruled Athens (with
the support of Sparta) for a few months in 403. See n. on § 277.
§ 198. Aeschines warmly denies this story. He says that Demosthenes
tried to bribe Aristophanes of Olynthus to swear that it was true, and
that the woman was his own wife. He adds that the jury, on an appeal
from Eubulus, refused to let Demosthenes complete the story.
§ 199. _initiations_: see Speech on Crown, §§ 259 ff., with notes.
§ 200. _played the rogue_. The scholiast says that clerks were
sometimes bribed to alter the laws and decrees which they read to the
Court; and a magistrates' clerk had doubtless plenty of opportunities
for conniving at petty frauds.
§ 204. _should not have been sworn to_. This is out of chronological
order as it stands, and emendations have been proposed, but
unnecessarily.
§ 209. _would not have him for your representative_: in the question
about Athenian rights at Delos. See Introduction to the Speech.
§ 213. _I have no further time, &c_.: lit. 'no one will pour water for
me' into the water-clock, by which all trials were regulated.
§ 221. _consider_, &c. There is an anacoluthon in the Greek, which may
be literally translated, 'Consider, if, where I who am absolutely
guiltless was afraid of being ruined by them--what ought these men
themselves, the actual criminals, to suffer?'
§ 222. _get money out of you_: i.e. to be bought off.
§ 230. _choregus and trierarch_: see Introd. to Speech on Naval Boards,
and n. on Philippic I. § 36.
§ 231. _all was well_ ([Greek: eupenespai]). The reading is almost
certainly wrong. Weil rightly demands some word contrasting with
[Greek: agnoein] ('did not understand his country') in the
corresponding clause.
§ 237. _vase-cases_: i.e. boxes to contain bottles of oil or perfume
for toilet use.
§ 245. _the cock-pit_. That this is the meaning seems to be proved by
the words of Aeschines (against Timarchus, § 53); otherwise the natural
translation would be 'to the bird-market'. Cocks were no doubt sold in
the bird-market; but Aeschines refers directly to cock-fighting, not to
the purchase of the birds.
§ 246. _hack-writers_: lit. 'speech-writers,' who composed speeches for
litigants, and no doubt padded them out with quotations from poets, as
well as with rhetorical commonplaces. Demosthenes taunts Aeschines
particularly with ransacking unfamiliar plays, instead of those he knew
well.
§ 249. _reared up... greatness_: or possibly, 'reared up all these sons
of hers.'
_Hero-Physician_. See Speech on the Crown, § 129 n.
_Round Chamber_, in the Prytaneum or Town Hall (see § 31 n.).
§ 252. _at the risk of his own life_. He tried to avoid the risk by
feigning madness. Salamis was in the hands of the Megareans, and the
Athenians had become so weary of their unsuccessful attempts to recover
it, that they decreed the penalty of death upon any one who proposed to
make a fresh attempt. The verses, however, which are quoted in the
text, are probably derived not from the poem which Solon composed for
this purpose, but from another of his political poems.
§ 255. _with a cap on your head_. Plutarch (Solon 82 c) says that
'Solon burst into the market-place suddenly, with a cap on his head'.
The cap was intended to suggest that he had just returned from Salamis,
since it was the custom to wear a cap only when on a journey, or in
case of illness (of. Plato, _Republic_, iii. 406_d_). There may
possibly be an allusion also to Aeschines' own alleged sickness (§ 136
above), but this is very doubtful. The words more probably mean,
'however closely you copy Solon' (as you copied his attitude in
speaking), 'when you run about declaiming against me.'
§ 257. _accepted the challenge_. At the examination before the Board of
Auditors (Logistae) the question was almost certainly put, whether any
one present wished to challenge the report of the ambassador under
examination.
§ 259. _claim_ ([Greek: axioumenoi]): or, 'are thought worthy'; but the
first sense is much better in the parallel passage in § 295, and this
'middle' use seems to be sufficiently attested, though the active voice
is used in the same sense in § 338.
§ 260. _paramount position_: i.e. among the tribes of North Greece
(Magnetes, Perrhaebi, &c.).
§ 264. _concluded the war, &c_. In 383 B.C. In fact, however, they only
obtained peace by joining the Spartan alliance.
§ 271. _Arthmius_: see Philippic III. § 42 (and note).
§ 273. _Callias_, in 444 B.C. Cf. Speech for the Rhodians, § 29. The
Chelidonian Islands lay off the south coast of Lycia, the Cyanean rocks
at the northern mouth of the Bosporus.
§ 277. _Epicrates_ was sent as ambassador to Persia early in the fourth
century, and received large presents. According to Plutarch he escaped
condemnation; but he may have been tried more than once. The comic
poets make fun of his long beard.
_who brought the people back from the Peiraeus_. Thrasybulus occupied
the Peiraeus in 403, secured the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants from
Athens, and restored the democracy.
§ 278. _the decree_: i.e. the decree by which Epicrates and his
colleagues were condemned.
§ 279. _for this is the splendid thing_: cf. § 120 n.
§ 280. _exiled_ and _punished_. We should perhaps (with Weil) read
[Greek: _e] ('or') for [Greek: kai] ('and').
_descendant of Harmodius_: i.e. Proxenus, who had been only recently
condemned, and is therefore not named.
§ 281. _another priestess_. According to the scholiast, the reference
is to Ninus, a priestess of Sabazios, who was prosecuted by Menecles
for making love-potions for young men. The connexion of this offence
with the meetings of the initiated is left to be understood.
§ 282. _the burden undertaken_. Such burdens as the duties of choregus,
trierarch, &c., might be voluntarily undertaken, as they were by
Demosthenes (see n. on Philippic I. § 36).
§ 287. _Cyrebion_, or 'Light-as-Chaff', was the nickname of Epicrates,
Aeschines' brother-in-law (not the Epicrates of § 277). _as a
reveller_, no doubt in some Dionysiac revel, in which it was not
considered decent to take part without a mask. (The original purpose of
masks, however, was not to conceal one's identity from motives of
shame, though Demosthenes suggests it as a motive here.)
_were water flowing upstream_. A half-proverbial expression implying
that the world was being turned upside-down, when such a person could
prosecute for such offences.
§ 290. _Hegesilaus_ was one of the generals sent to Euboea to help
Plutarchus; cf. Speech on the Peace, § 5 n. He was accused of abetting
Plutarchus in the deception which he practised upon Athens. For
Thrasybulus, cf. § 277.
_the primary question_: i.e. of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. If he was pronounced guilty, the question of sentence (or
damages) had to be argued and decided separately.
§ 295. _claim to be_: cf. n. on § 259.
_churning the butter_ ([Greek: etyrheue]): i.e. concocting the plot.
(For the metaphor cf. Aristophanes, _Knights_ 479.)
§ 299. _Zeus and Dione_. These names show that the oracles referred to
were probably given at Dodona.
§ 303. _oath of the young soldiers_. When the young Athenian came of
age, he received a shield and spear in the temple of Aglaurus, and
swore to defend his country and to uphold its constitution (cf.
Lycurgus, _Against Leocrates_, § 76).
§ 314. _keeping step with Pythocles_, who was a tall man, while
Aeschines was short.
§ 326. _Drymus and Panactum_ were on the border between Boeotia and
Attica. Nothing else is known of the expedition.
§ 332. _Chares_. See nn. on Philippic I. §§ 24, 46; Olynthiac II. § 28,
and Introductions.
§ 333. _of one of whom_, &c.: i.e. of Philip (see § 111 ff., and
Introd. to Speech on the Peace).
§ 342. _Euthycrates_. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.
ON THE CHERSONESE
§ 9. The argument is, 'if Philip is not committing hostilities so long
as he keeps away from Attica, Diopeithes is not doing so, so long as he
keeps away from Macedonia, and only operates in Thrace.'
_drive the vessels_, &c. See Speech on the Peace, § 25 n.
§ 14. _passing the time_: i.e. until a convenient season for an attack
arrives.
_those who are on the spot_: i.e. in Thrace, and who had doubtless sent
messages to Athens. Others think that the words mean 'those who are
here from Thrace'.
_Etesian winds_. See First Philippic, § 31 n.
_infatuation_: i.e. hostility to Athens.
§ 16. _punish the settlers_: i.e. those who were sent with Diopeithes
and demanded admission to Cardia.
§ 18. _Chalcis_, in Euboea (see Introd.).
§ 21. _keep our hands ... revenues_: a reference to the distributions
of Festival-Money (see Third Olynthiac, with Introduction and notes).
_contributions of the allies_. This interpretation seems on the whole
better warranted than 'contributions promised to Diopeithes'.
§ 24. _I consent to any penalty_: lit. *'I assess my own penalty at
anything'--a metaphor from the practice of the law-courts, which
allowed a convicted prisoner to propose an alternative penalty to that
suggested by the prosecutor.
_Erythraeans_: Erythrae was on the coast of Asia Minor, opposite Chios.
§ 25. _benevolences_: the same word as was used of the forced
contributions levied by English kings.
§ 27. _surrendering_: i.e. to his soldiers, to be plundered (if the
phrase is meant to convey anything but a vague accusation).
§ 28. _wax-tablet_: i.e. a summons.
_so many ships_. The critics of Diopeithes must have proposed the
sending of a definite force to control him.
§ 29. _a dispatch-boat_: lit. 'the _Paralus_'. This ship, and the
_Salaminia_, were the two vessels regularly employed on public errands.
_spitefulness_: i.e. towards Diopeithes.
§ 30. _Chares_: see references in n. on Speech on Embassy, § 332.
_Aristophon_. The reference may be to his conduct as general in the
early days of the war with Philip about Amphipolis. His activity as a
statesman began as far back as 403, and he was one of the most
influential politicians in Athens from about 361 to 354.
§ 31. _losing something_: _sc_. a scapegoat whom you could punish.
§ 40. _Euthycrates_, &c. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.
§ 44. _wretched hamlets_ ([Greek: kak_on]): lit. 'evils' or 'miseries';
but the word is possibly corrupt. (The original reading may possibly
have been [Greek: kalyb_on].) According to the scholiast, Drongilum and
Cabyle are near Amphipolis and the Strymon; but others assign different
localities to them. Masteira is quite unknown.
§ 45. _pit of destruction_ ([Greek: barhathrh_o]). This was literally
the pit into which the bodies of condemned criminals were thrown at
Athens.
_silos_: underground store-houses for grain, such as were found in Ceos
not many years ago, and may still be in use.
§ 46. _irremediable_ ([Greek: an_ekeston]). The reading of two good
manuscripts [Greek: aneikaston] (otherwise only known as a late Greek
word) may be correct. If so, it may mean 'unparalleled', or
'inexplicable'.
§ 57. The meaning is, that by denouncing those who propose active
measures now, they are preparing the way in order to prosecute them so
soon as you find the war burdensome; whereas they should themselves be
prosecuted for letting things go as far as they have gone.
§ 59. _Oreus_. See Introd.
_Pheraeans_, in 344. See Introd. to Second Philippic; and cf. Third
Philippic, § 12.
_compromise_. Slavery seems to be ironically regarded as a compromise
between activity and quiescence.
§ 63. _robbed of at an earlier period_. The sense must either be this,
or else 'all that you have lost in open war '. In either case
emendation is required.
§ 70. _trierarch and choregus_. Demosthenes was choregus in 348, and
trierarch in 363, 359, and 357.
§ 74. _Timotheus_: in 358, when Athens liberated Euboea from the
Thebans. Cf. First Philippic, § 17, First Olynthiac, § 8. The effect of
Timotheus' speech was such that the expedition started within three
days. (Speech against Androtion, § 14.)
§ 75. _best counsel that he can_. The text is probably corrupt; but
this was probably the sense of the original.
THE THIRD PHILIPPIC
§ 2. _actively at work_: the reference is to Diopeithes (see Speech on
Chersonese, § 57).
§§ 4, 5. Passages are repeated from the Speech on the Chersonese, § 4,
and First Philippic, § 2.
§ 8. _not to defraud us_: i.e. by making statements which he is not
prepared to act upon.
§ 11. _as though visiting his allies_. This is not true, though envoys
from the Phocians, as from most other Greek states of importance, were
in Philip's camp. With the whole passage, cf. Speech on Embassy, §§ 20
ff.
§ 12. _Pherae_. See Speech on Chersonese, § 59 n. For Oreus see Introd.
to Speech on Chersonese, and § 33 and 59 ff. of this Speech.
§ 15. _Serrhium, &c_. See Introd. to Speech on Peace.
_he had sworn to a Peace_. This is untrue; see Speech on Embassy, §
156, where it is part of the charge against Aeschines' party, that they
had enabled Philip to take these places _before_ he had sworn to the
Peace.
§16. _religion_: with special reference here to the sanctity of the
oath.
_into the Chersonese_: i.e. to help Cardia. The claim of Athens to
Cardia was not good, and it appears from the Speech of Hegesippus
against Halonnesus, § 2, that the Athenians had recognized the
independence of the town.
§ 18. _if anything should happen_: e.g. the outbreak of open war, or
(more probably) a defeat.
§ 23. _seventy-three years_: i.e. 476-404 B. c.
_thirty years save one_: i.e. 404-376 B.C. (in the latter year Chabrias
defeated the Spartans off Naxos).
_battle of Leucira_: in 371 B.C.
§ 24. _disturb the established order_: i.e. by establishing
oligarchical governments in place of democracy.
§ 26. _in the Thracian region_: strictly, in Chalcidice and the
neighbourhood. See Introd. to Olynthiacs.
_robbed their very cities of their governments_. This is preferable to
the (grammatically) equally possible rendering, 'robbed them of their
constitutions and their cities,' as it suits the facts better. Philip
seems to have substituted tetrarchies for separate city-states. (See
Speech on Chersonese, §26, and Second Philippic, § 22 n.)
§ 27. _Ambracia_. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. _Elis_: Introd.
to Speech on Embassy. _Megara_: Speech on Embassy, §§ 294, 295.
§ 32. _Pythian games_. See Introd. to Speech on Peace. In 342 Philip
sent a deputy to preside in his name.
§§ 33, 34. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese. Echinus was a Theban
colony in Thessaly, on the north coast of the Malian Gulf.
§ 42. _Arthmius_, &c. (cf. Speech on Embassy, §271). Zeleia was in the
Troad, near Cyzicus. Arthmius was apparently proxenus of Athens at
Zeleia, and as such had probably certain rights at Athens, of which the
decree deprived him; so that Demosthenes' remarks at the beginning of
§44 are slightly misleading.
§ 46. At the end of this section two versions are imperfectly blended,
and it does not appear what were the contents of the document. Some
suppose that the insertion 'He reads from the document' is an early
conjectural interpolation.
§ 49. _because be leads_, &c. Philip did, in fact, bring the Macedonian
heavy infantry to great perfection for the purposes of a pitched
battle, though the decisive action was generally that of the cavalry.
But the other troops which Demosthenes names would enable him to
execute rapid movements with success. The use of light-armed troops had
already been developed by the Athenian general, Iphicrates.
§ 50. _with such advantages_: lit. 'under these conditions' (_not_ 'to
crown all', nor 'at the head of these troops').
§ 52. Contrast Speech on Naval Boards, Section 9.
§§ 57 ff. See Introd. to Speech on Embassy.
§ 59. Euphraeus had been a disciple of Plato, and an adviser of
Perdiccas, Philip's elder brother. It was he who recommended Perdiccas
to entrust the government of part of Macedonia to Philip, whom he
afterwards so strongly opposed.
§ 72. _embassies_. See Introd. to Speech on Chersonese.
ON THE CROWN
§ 1. _to take counsel_, &c. Aeschines had asked the jury to refuse
Demosthenes a hearing, or at least to require him to follow the same
order of treatment as himself.
§ 3. _unpleasant_. Many render [Greek: duocheres] 'inauspicious',
'ill-omened'; but as we do not know exactly what was in Demosthenes'
mind, it is better not to give the word a meaning which it does not
bear elsewhere. It may, however, mean 'vexatious'.
§ 11. _knave as you are_, &c. The assonance of the original might
perhaps be partly reproduced by rendering 'evil-minded as you are, it
was yet a very simple-minded idea that your mind conceived', &c.
§ 12. _it does not enable the State_: lit. 'it is not possible for the
State.' The point is that the prosecution of Ctesiphon, while
expressing the malice of Aeschines towards Demosthenes, does not enable
the State to punish Demosthenes himself for his alleged offences, since
any penalty inflicted would fall on Ctesiphon.
§ 13. _to debar another_, &c. This probably refers to the attempt to
deprive Demosthenes of a hearing, not (as some have thought) to the
attempt to get so heavy a fine inflicted upon Ctesiphon that he would
be unable to pay it, and would therefore lose his rights as a citizen.
§ 17. _ascribed to me_, &c. Aeschines was anxious, in view of the
existing state of feeling at Athens, to disown his part in connexion
with the Peace of Philocrates; while Demosthenes undoubtedly assisted
Philocrates in the earlier of the negotiations and discussions which
led to the Peace.
_appropriate_. 'The recapitulation of the history is not a mere
argumentative necessity, but has a moral fitness also; in fact, the
whole defence of Demosthenes resolves itself into a proof that he only
acted in the spirit of Athenian history' (Simcox).
§ 18. _When the Phocian war bad broken out_: i.e. in 356-5. Demosthenes
made his first speech in the Assembly in 354.
_those who detested the Spartans_: i.e. the Messenians and Arcadians.
_those who had previously governed_, &c.: e.g. the oligarchies which
had governed with the help of Sparta in Phlius and Mantinea, and were
overthrown after the battle of Leuctra.
§ 19. _would be forced_, &c. This is a misrepresentation, since Philip
and the Thebans had been in alliance for some time, and Thebes had no
such grounds for apprehending evil from Philip, as would make her apply
to Athens.
§ 21. _Aristodemus_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace. As a
matter of fact, Demosthenes acted with Philocrates at least down to the
return of the First Embassy, and himself proposed to crown Aristodemus
for his services (Aeschines, On the Embassy, §§ 15-17).
§ 23. _the Hellenes bad all_, &c. It is not easy to reconcile this
passage with § 16 of the Speech on the Embassy, from which it appears
that representatives of other states were present in Athens; but these
so-called envoys may have been private visitors, and in any case there
was no real hope of uniting Greece against Philip.
§ 24. _Eurybatus_ is said to have been sent as an envoy by Croesus to
Cyrus, and to have turned traitor. The name came to be proverbial.
§ 27. _those strongholds_. See Introd. to Speech on the Peace.
§ 28. _But they would have watched_, &c. The passage has been taken in
several ways: (1) 'They would have had to watch,' &c., and this would
have been discreditable to Athens; (2) 'They would have watched,' &c.,
i.e. they would not have been excluded, as you desired, in any case;
(3) 'But, you say, they would have paid two obols apiece,' and the city
would have gained this. The sentence which follows favours (3), but
perhaps (2) is best. The petty interests of the city would include
(from the point of view assumed by Aeschines) the abstention from
showing civility to the enemy's envoys. The two-obol (threepenny) seats
were the cheapest.
§ 30. _three whole months_. In fact the ambassadors were only absent
from Athens about ten weeks altogether.
_equally well_. The reading ([Greek: homoios]) is probably wrong; but
if it is right, this must be the meaning.
§ 32. _as you did before_, in 352. See Introd. to First Philippic.
§ 36. _decree of Callisthenes_. This ordered the bringing in of effects
from the country. See Speech on Embassy, §§ 86, 125.
§ 41. _property in Boeotia_. See Speech on Embassy, § 145.
§ 43. _their hopes_: sc. of the humiliation of Thebes.
_and gladly_: i.e. they were glad to be free from a danger which
(though remotely) threatened themselves, as the next sentence explains.
I can see no good reason for taking the participle [Greek:
polemoumenoi] as concessive ('_although_ they also,' &c.).
§ 48. For Lasthenes see Introd. to Olynthiacs. Timolaus probably
contrived the surrender of Thebes after the battle of Chaeroneia.
Eudicus is unknown. Simus invoked Philip's aid against the tyrants at
Pherae in 352 (see Introd, to First Philippic). Aristratus was tyrant
of Sicyon, and made alliance with Philip in 338. For Perillus, see
Speech on Embassy, Section 295.
§ 50. _stale dregs_: strictly the remains, and especially the wine left
in the cups, from the previous night's feast; here the long-admitted
responsibility of Aeschines for the Peace of 346.
§ 63. _Dolopes_: a small tribe living to the south-west of Thessaly.
§ 65. _free constitutions_. This refers especially to the Thessalians,
who had been placed under tetrarchies (see Philippic III. § 26).
§ 70. _Aristophon_. See Speech on Chersonese, § 30 n. Diopeithes is
perhaps Diopeithes of Sphettus (mentioned by Hypereides, Speech against
Euxenippus, § 39), not the general sent by Athens to the Chersonese.
§ 71. For the events mentioned in this section, see Introd. to Speech
on the Embassy.
§ 72. _Mysian booty_. A proverbial expression derived from the helpless
condition of Mysia (according to legend) in the absence of its king,
Telephus.
§ 79. _to the Peloponnese_, in 344 (see Introd. to Second Philippic):
_to Euboea_ in 343-2 (see Introd. to Speech on Embassy); _to Oreus_,
&c., in 341 (see Introd. to this Speech).
§ 82. _as their patron_, i.e. as consul (or official patron) of Oreus
in Athens. See n. on Speech for Rhodians, § 15. civil rights. See vol.
i, p. 52.
§ 83. _this was already the second proclamation_: i.e. the proclamation
in accordance with the decree of Aristonicus. It is indeed just
possible that the reference is to the proposal of Ctesiphon, 'for this
is now the second proclamation,' &c. If so, we should have to assume
that the proclamation under the decree of Demomeles in 338 was
prevented by the disaster of Chaeroneia. But the first sentence of §
120 is against this (see Goodwin's edition _ad loc_.).
§ 94. _inconsiderate conduct_: i.e. in joining the revolt of the
Athenian allies in 356.
§ 96. _when the Spartans_, &c. The section refers to the events of 395.
_Deceleian War_: i.e. the last part of the Peloponnesian War (413-404
B.C.), when Deceleia (in Attica) was occupied by the Spartans.
§ 99. _Thebans... Euboea_: in 358 or 357. See Speech for
Megalopolitans, § 14 n.
§ 100. _Oropus_. See Speech for Megalopolitans, Section 11 n.
_I was one_. Demosthenes was, in fact, co-trierarch with Philinus
(Speech against Meidias, § 161).
§ 102. See Speech on Naval Boards (with Introd. and notes), and n. on
Olynthiac II, § 29.
_obtaining exemption_. The undertaking of the trierarchy conferred
exemption from other burdens for the year, and (conversely) no one
responsible for another public burden need be trierarch. The leaders of
the Taxation Boards referred to in § 103 are probably not (as generally
supposed) the richest men in the _Naval_ Boards [Footnote: They may
indeed have been so, but it was in virtue of their function as leading
members of the Hundred Boards (for collecting the war tax) that they
were grouped together as the Three Hundred.] (responsible for
trierarchy), but those in the Hundred Boards responsible for the war
tax. In each of these Boards there was a leader, a 'second', and a
'third', and these, all together, are almost certainly identical with
the 'Three Hundred' responsible for advancing the sum due. When these
were already advancing the war tax, they became exempt from trierarchy,
and their poorer colleagues in the Naval Boards (to which of course
they also belonged) had to bear the burden without them. But under
Demosthenes' law the trierarchic payment was required from all alike,
in strict proportion to their valuation as entered for the purposes of
the war tax; and the Three Hundred (the leaders, seconds, and thirds)
were no longer exempted. (This explains their anxiety to get the law
shelved.) Even in years when they were not exempt, before Demosthenes'
law was passed, they only paid a very small share in proportion to
their wealth, since all the members of each Naval Board paid the same
sum. It appears, however, that (though the Three Hundred as such cannot
be shown to have had any office in connexion with the trierarchy) the
richer men in the Naval Boards arranged the contracts for the work of
equipment, and that when they had contracted that the work should be
done (e.g.) for a talent, they sometimes recovered the whole talent
from their poorer colleagues. (Speech against Meidias, § 155.)
§ 103. _lie under sworn notice_, &c. ([Greek: en hupomosia]). One who
intended to indict the proposer of a law for illegality had probably to
give sworn notice of his intention, and the suggestion made to
Demosthenes was that when such notice had been given, he should let the
law drop.
§ 105. _the decree_, &c.: i.e. either a decree suspending the law until
the indictment should be heard, or one ordering the trial on the
indictment to be held.
§ 107. _no trierarch_, &c. A trierarch who thought the burden too heavy
for him could appeal against it by laying a branch on the altar in the
Pnyx, or by taking sanctuary in the Temple of Artemis at Munychia. A
dilatory or recalcitrant trierarch could be arrested by order of the
ten commissioners ([Greek: apostuleis]) who constituted a sort of
Admiralty Board.
§ 111. _the laws_, &c. The laws alleged to have been violated were
copied out, and accompanied the indictment. With regard to the laws in
the present case, see Goodwin's edition, pp. 313-6.
§ 114. _Nausides_ was sent to oppose Philip at Thermopylae in 352 (see
Introd. to First Philippic). Diotimus had a command at sea in 338, and
his surrender was demanded by Alexander in 335, as was also that of
Charidernus (see n. on Olynthiac III, § 5), who had now been a regular
Athenian general for many years, and had been sent to assist Byzantium
in 340 (see Speech against Aristocrates, _passim_).
§ 121. _hellebore_: supposed in antiquity to cure madness.
§ 122. _reveller on a cart_, e.g. on the second day of the Anthesteria,
when masked revellers rode in wagons and assailed the bystanders with
abusive language. Such ceremonial abuse was perhaps originally supposed
to have power to avert evil, and occurs in primitive ritual all over
the world.
§ 125. _the statutable limit_. There was a limit of time (differing
according to the alleged offence) after which no action could be
brought. Demosthenes could not now be prosecuted for any of the
offences with which Aeschines charged him.
§ 127. _Aeacus_, &c.: the judges of the dead in Hades, according to
popular legend.
_scandal-monger_. The Greek word ([Greek: spermologos]) is used
primarily of a small bird that pecks up seeds, and hence of a person
who picks up petty gossip. (In Acts xvii. 18 it is the word which is
applied to St. Paul, and translated 'this babbler'.)
_an old band in the market-place_: i.e. a rogue. A clerk would perhaps
often be found in the offices about the market-place; or the reference
may be to the market-place as a centre of gossip.
_O Earth_, &c. Demosthenes quotes from the peroration of Aeschines'
speech.
§ 129. The stories which Demosthenes retails in these sections deal
with a time which must have been forty or fifty years before the date
of this speech, and probably contain little truth, beyond the facts
that Aeschines' father was a schoolmaster (not a slave), and was
assisted by Aeschines himself; and that his mother was priestess of a
'thiasos' or voluntary association of worshippers of Dionysus-Sabazios,
among whose ceremonies was doubtless one symbolizing a marriage or
mystical union between the god and his worshippers. (Whether the form
of 'sacred marriage' which was originally intended to promote the
fertility of the ground by 'sympathetic magic' entered into the ritual
of Sabazios is doubtful.) Such a rite, though probably in fact quite
innocent, gave rise to suspicions, of which Demosthenes takes full
advantage; and the fact that well-known courtesans (such as Phryne and
perhaps Ninus) sometimes organized such 'mysteries' would lend colour
to the suspicions.
_Hero of the Lancet_ ([Greek: to kalamit_e aer_oi]). The interpretation
is very uncertain (see Goodwin, pp. 339 ff.); and, according as [Greek:
kalamos] is taken in the sense of 'lancet', 'splints', or 'bow',
editors render the phrase 'hero of the lancet', 'hero of the splints',
'archer-hero' (identified by some with Toxaris, the Scythian physician,
whose arrival in Athens in Solon's time is described in Lucian's
[Greek: Skuth_es ae Proxenos]). That the Hero was a physician is shown
by the Speech on the Embassy, § 249.
§ 130. _for they were not like_, &c. ([Greek: ouge gar h_onetuchen _en,
all ois hu daemos kataratai]). The meaning is quite uncertain. The most
likely interpretations are: (1) that given in the text, [Greek: a
bebioken] being understood as the subject of [Greek: _en], and [Greek:
_on etuchen] as = [Greek: tout_on a etuchen], i.e. 'not belonging to
the class of acts which were such as chance made them,' but acts of a
quite definite kind, viz. the kind which the People curses (through the
mouth of the herald at each meeting of the Assembly); (2) 'for he was
not of ordinary parents, but of such as the People curses'; the subject
of [Greek: _en] being Aeschines. But there is the difficulty that, with
this subject for [Greek: _en, _on etuchen] can only represent [Greek:
tout_on _on etuchen _on], whereas the sense required is [Greek: tout_on
oi etuchon], or (the regular idiom) [Greek: t_on tuchunt_on]; and the
sense is not so good, for the context [Greek: opse gar]) shows that the
clause ought to refer to the _acts_ of Aeschines about which he is
going to speak, not to his parentage, which the orator has done with.
_Glaucothea_. Her real name is said to have been Glaucis. Glaucothea
was the name of a sea-nymph. The change of the father's name Tromes
('Trembler') to Atrometus ('Dauntless') would also betoken a rise in
the world.
_Empusa_, or 'The Foul Phantom': a female demon capable of assuming any
shape. Obscene ideas were sometimes associated with her.
§ 132. For Antiphon, see Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.
_struck off the list_: at the revision of the lists in 346. (Each deme
revised the list of its own members, subject to an appeal to the
courts.)
_without a decree_: i.e. a decree authorizing a domiciliary visit.
§ 134. _when ... you elected him_. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.
_from the altar_: a peculiarly solemn form of voting; it is mentioned
in the Speech against Macartatus, § 14.
§ 136. _when Philip sent_, &c. See Introd. to Speech on the Embassy.
§ 137. The ostensible purpose of Anaxinus' visit was to make purchases
for Olympias, Philip's wife. Aeschines states that Anaxinus had once
been Demosthenes' own host at Oreus.
§ 141. _paternal deity_: as father of Ion, the legendary ancestor of
the Ionians, and so of the Athenians.
§ 143. _and of one_, &c. I have followed the general consensus of
recent editors; but I do not feel at all sure that the antecedent of
[Greek: us] is not [Greek: polemos]. In that case we should translate,
'which led to Philip's coming to Elateia and being chosen commander of
the Amphictyons, and which overthrew,' &c.
§ 146. _nature of the resources_, &c.: i.e. especially the possession
by Athens of a strong fleet.
§ 148. _representatives on the Council_. The Amphictyonic Council was
composed of two representatives (Hieromnemones) from each of twelve
primitive tribes, of which the Thessalians, the Boeotians, the Ionians
(one of whose members was appointed by Athens), and the Dorians (one
member appointed by Sparta) were the chief, while some of the tribes
were now very obscure. There were also present delegates (Pylagori)
from various towns. These were not members of the Council, and had no
vote, but might speak. Athens sent three such delegates to each
meeting. (See Goodwin, pp. 338, 339.)
§ 150. _make the circuit_, or 'beat the bounds'. The actual proceedings
(according to Aeschines' account, summarized in the Introd. to this
Speech) were much more violent.
_It was clearly impossible_, &c. The argument is unconvincing.
Aeschines may have known of the intention of the Locrians without their
having served a formal summons.
§ 158. _one man_: i.e. Philip.
§ 169. _the Prytanes_: the acting Committee of the Council.
_set fire to the wicker-work_: i.e. probably the hurdles, &c., of which
the booths were partly composed. Probably a bonfire was a
well-understood form of summons to an Assembly called in an emergency.
_the draft-resolution_. See Introd., vol. i, p. 18.
_on the hill-side_: i.e. on the Pnyx, the meeting-place of the Assembly.
§ 171. _the Three Hundred_. See n. on § 102.
§ 176. _philippize_. The word was coined during the wars with Philip,
on the analogy of 'medize'--the term used of the action of the traitors
who supported the invading Persians (Medes) early in the fifth century.
§ 177. _to Eleusis_, which was on the most convenient (though not the
shortest) route for an army marching to Thebes.
§ 180. _Battalus_: a nickname given to Demosthenes by his nurse on
account of the impediment in his speech from which he suffered in early
days, or of his general delicacy. Aeschines had tried to fix an obscene
interpretation upon it.
_Creon_. See Speech on the Embassy, § 247.
_at Collytus_: i.e. at the Rural Dionysia held in that deme.
§ 189. _any one_: lit. 'any one who chooses,' i.e. to call him to
account. The expression ([Greek: ho boulomenos]) is apparently half
technical, as applied to a self-appointed prosecutor. (Cf.
Aristophanes, _Plutus_ 908 and 918.)
§ 194. _the general_: i.e. at Chaeroneia.
§ 195. _Philip employed_. Most editors say '_Aeschines_ employed'. But
this would require [Greek: outos] not [Greek: ekeinos], and § 218 also
supports the interpretation here given.
§ 198. _treasured up_, &c. The suggestion seems to be that Aeschines
foresaw the disasters, but concealed his knowledge, 'storing them up'
in order to make a reputation out of them later.
§ 204. _to leave their land_, &c.: i.e. at the time of Xerxes' invasion
in 480, when the Athenians abandoned the city and trusted to the
'wooden walls' of their ships.
§ 208. On this magnificent passage, see the treatise _On the Sublime_,
chaps, xvi, xvii.
§ 209. _poring pedant_: lit. 'one who stoops over writings'. Here used
perhaps with reference to Aeschines' having 'worked up' allusions to
the past for the purpose of his Speech, while he remained blind to the
great issues of the present. Many editors think that the reference is
to his earlier occupation as a schoolmaster or a clerk; but this is
perhaps less suitable to the context.
§ 210. _staff...ticket_. The colour of the staff indicated the court in
which the juror was to sit; the ticket was exchanged for his pay at the
end of the day.
§ 214. _a very deluge_. He is thinking, no doubt, of the disaster at
Chaeroneia and the destruction of Thebes.
§ 215. _while their infantry_, &c. The Theban forces when prepared for
action would naturally camp outside the walls (see Olynth. I, § 27,
where Demosthenes similarly thinks of the Athenian army encamping
outside Athens). But although they were thus encamped outside, and had
left their wives and children unguarded within, they allowed the
Athenian soldiers to enter the city freely.
§ 216. _the river_: probably the Cephisus. Both battles are otherwise
unknown. If one of them was in winter, it must have taken place not
long after the capture of Elateia, and several months before the battle
of Chaeroneia.
§ 219. _somewhere to lay the blame_: or possibly, 'some opportunity of
recovering himself,' or 'some place of retreat'. But the interpretation
given (which is that of Harpocration) is supported by the use of
[Greek: anenenkein] in § 224.
§ 227. _counters all disappear_. The calculation was made by taking
away, for each item of debt or expenditure, so many counters from the
total representing the sum originally possessed. When the frame (or
_abacus_) containing the counters was left clear, it meant that there
was no surplus. (The right reading, however, may be [Greek: an
kathair_osin], 'if the counters are decisive,' or [Greek: han
kathair_osin], 'whatever the counters prove, you concede.')
§ 231. _cancel them out_ ([Greek: antanelein]): strictly, to strike
each out of the account in view of something on the opposite side (i.e.
in view of the alternative which you would have proposed).
§ 234. _collected in advance_: i.e. Athens had been anticipating her
income.
§ 238. _if you refer_, &c. Aeschines had accused Demosthenes of
saddling Athens with two-thirds of the expense of the war, and Thebes
with only one-third.
_three hundred_, &c. See Speech on Naval Boards, § 29 n.
§ 243. _customary offerings_, made at the tomb on the third and ninth
days after the death.
§ 249. _Philocrates_: not Philocrates of Hagnus, the proposer of the
Peace of 346, but an Eleusinian. For Diondas, see § 222. The others are
unknown.
§ 251. _Cephalus_. Cf. § 219. He was an orator and statesman of the
early part of the fourth century. (The best account of him is in
Beloch, _Attische Politik_, p. 117.)
§ 258. _the attendants' room_. The 'attendants' are those who escorted
the boys to and from school--generally slaves.
§ 259. _the books_, &c. Cf. § 129 and notes. The books probably
contained the formulae of initiation, or the hymns which were chanted
by some Dionysiac societies. The service described here is probably
that of the combined worship of Dionysus-Sabazios and the Great Mother
(Cybele).
_dressing_, &c. The candidate for initiation was clothed in a
fawn-skin, and was 'purified' by being smeared with clay (while sitting
down, with head covered) and rubbed clean with bran, and after the
initiation was supposed to enter upon a new and higher life. It is
possible that the veiling and disguising with clay originally signified
a death to the old life, such as is the ruling idea in many initiations
of a primitive type. (Cf. Aristophanes, travesty of an
initiation-ceremony in the _Clouds_ 256.)
§ 260. _fennel and white poplar_. These were credited with magical and
protective properties.
_Euoe, Saboe_: the cry to Sabazios. One is tempted to render it by
'Glory! Hallelujah!' In fact, the Dionysiac 'thiasoi', or some of them,
had many features, good as well as bad, in common with the Salvation
Army. The cry 'Euoe, Saboe' is of Thracian origin; 'Hyes Attes' is
Phrygian. The serpents, the ivy, and the winnowing-fan figured in more
than one variety of Dionysiac service. It is not certain that for
'ivy-bearer' ([Greek: kittophorhos]) we should not read 'chest-bearer'
([Greek: kistophoros]) used with reference to the receptacle containing
sacred objects, of which we hear elsewhere in connexion with similar
rites.
§ 261. _fellow-parishioners_; lit. 'members of your deme'. Each deme
kept the register of citizens belonging to it. Enrolment was possible
at the age of 18 years, and had to be confirmed by the Council. (See
Aristotle, _Constitution of Athens_, chap. xiii.)
§ 262. _collecting figs_, &c. Two interpretations are possible: (1)
that the spectators in derision threw fruit--probably not of the
best--at Aeschines on the stage, and he gathered it up, as a fruiterer
collects fruit from various growers, and lived on it; or (2) that while
he was a strolling player, Aeschines used to rob orchards. Of these (1)
seems by far the better in the context.
§ 267. _I leave the abysm_, &c. The opening of Euripides' _Hecuba_. The
line next quoted is unknown. 'Evil in evil wise' ([Greek: kakon
kak_os]) is found in a line of Lynceus, a fourth-century tragedian.
§ 282. _denied this intimacy with him_: or possibly (with the
scholiast), 'declined this office.'
§ 284. _the tambourine-player_. Such instruments were used in orgiastic
rites.
§ 285. Hegemon and Pythocles were members of the Macedonian party, who
were put to death in 317 by order of the Assembly. (See Speech on
Embassy, §§ 215, 314.)
§ 287. _same libation_: i.e. the same banquet. The libation preceded
the drinking. To 'go beneath the same roof' with a polluted person was
supposed to involve contamination.
_in the revel_. Cf. Speech on the Embassy, § 128. The reference,
however, is here more particularly to Philip's revels after the battle
of Chaeroneia, in which, Demosthenes suggests, the Athenian envoys took
part.
§ 289. The genuineness of the epitaph is doubtful. Line 2 is singularly
untrue. The text is almost certainly corrupt in places (e.g. ll. 3 and
10).
_their lives_, &c. As the text stands, [Greek: aret_es] and [Greek:
deimatos] must be governed by [Greek: brab_e,], 'made Hades the judge
of their valour or their cowardice.' But this leaves [Greek: ouk
esa_osan psuchas] as a quasiparenthesis, very difficult to accept in so
simple and at the same time so finished a form of composition as the
epigram. There are many emendations.
_'Tis God's_, &c. The line, [Greek: m_eden hamartein esti the_on kai
panta katorhthoun], is taken from Simonides' epitaph on the heroes of
Marathon. The sense of the couplet is plain from § 290; but [Greek: en
biot_e] in l. 10 is possibly corrupt.
§ 300. _the confederacy_, i.e. Athens, Thebes, and their allies at
Chaeroneia.
§ 301. _our neighbours_, especially Megara and Corinth.
§ 308. _the inactivity which you_, &c.: i.e. abstention from taking a
prominent part in public life.
§ 309. _opening of ports_: i.e. to Athenian commerce.
§ 311. _What pecuniary assistance_, &c. Demosthenes is thinking of his
own services in ransoming prisoners, &c. Some editors translate, 'What
public financial aid have you ever given to rich or poor?' i.e. 'When
have you ever dispensed State funds in such a way as to benefit any
one?' It is impossible to decide with certainty between the two
alternatives; but the meanings of [Greek: politik_e] ('citizen-like',
'such as one would expect from a good fellow-citizen') and [Greek:
koin_e], which I assume, seem to be supported by §§ 13 and 268
respectively.
§ 312. _leaders of the Naval Boards_. See Introd. to Speech on Naval
Boards.
_damaging attack_, &c. This probably refers to modifications introduced
on Aeschines' proposal into Demosthenes' Trierarchic Law of 340, not at
the time of its enactment, but after some experience of its working.
(See Aeschines, 'Against Ctesiphon,' § 222.)
§ 313. Theocrines was a tragic actor, who was attacked in the
pseudo-Demosthenic Speech 'Against Theocrines'. Harpocration's
description of him as a 'sycophant', or dishonest informer, may be
merely an inference from the Speech.
§ 318. _your brother_. See Speech on the Embassy, §§ 237, 249. It is
not known which brother is here referred to.
§ 319. Philammon was a recent Olympic victor in the boxing match;
Glaucus, a celebrated boxer early in the fifth century.
§ 320. _owner of a stud_. To keep horses was a sign of great wealth in
Athens.
INDEX
Abdera, i.
Abydos, ii.
Acarnania, Acarnanians, ii.
Achaeans, ii.
Acropolis, i.; ii.
Adeimantus, i.
Admiralty Board ([Greek: apostoleis]), ii.
Aeacus, ii.
Aegina, ii.
Aeschines, i.; ii.
Aetolia, Aetolians, ii.
Agapaeus, ii.
Aglaurus, temple of, i.; ii.
Agyrrhius, i.
Alcidamas, i.
Alenadae, i.
Alexander (480 B.C.), i.; ii.
Alexander the Great, ii.
Amadocus, i.
Ambassadors, duties of, i.
Ambracia, ii.
Amphictyonic Council,
its constitution and functions, i.; ii.
from 346-343 B.C., i.; ii.
and the Amphissean War, ii.
Demosthenes at the, ii.
Amphipolis, i.; ii.
Amphissa, Amphissean War:
_see_ Amphictyonic Council.
Anaximenes, i.
Anaxinus, ii.
Androtion, i.
Anemoetas, ii.
Antalcidas: _see_ Peace.
Anthemus, i.
Antipater, i.
Antiphon, i.; ii.
Aphobetus, i.
Apollodorus, i.
Apollonia, ii.
Apollonides,
of Cardia, i.
of Olynthus, ii.
Apollophanes, i.
Arcadia, Arcadians, i.; ii.
(_See_ also Megalopolis.)
Areopagus,
Council of, i.; ii.
Argaeus, i.
Argives, Argos, i.; ii.
Ariobarzanes, i.; ii.
Aristaechmus, ii.
Aristides, i.
Aristocrates, i.
Aristodemus, i.; ii.
Aristoleos, ii.
Aristonicus, ii.
Aristophanes, ii.
Aristophon, i.; ii.
Aristotle, i.
Aristratus,
of Naxos, ii.
of Sicyon, ii.
Arrhidaeus, i.
Artabazus, i.; ii.
Artaxerxes, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Persia.)
Artemisia, i.; ii.
Artemisium, ii.
Arthmius, i.; ii.
Arybbas, i.; ii.
Asiatic Greeks, i.; ii.
Assembly, the Athenian,
its functions, character, and defects, i.; ii.
debates in, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Athenian People.)
Athenian People,
their indifference and procrastination, i.; ii.
their incalculability, i.
their traditions and traditional policy, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Assembly, Democracy.)
Atrestidas, i.
Atrometus, i.; ii.
Auditors, Board of (Logistae), i.; ii.
Automedon, ii.
Balance of Power, principle of, i.
Battalus, ii.
Boedromia, i.; ii.
Boeotia, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Thebes.)
Boeotian War, ii.
Brougham, Lord; Preface; i.
Byzantium, i; ii.
Cabyle, ii.
Callias
(Author of Peace), i.
(_See also _Peace.)
(of Chalcis), ii.
(public slave), i.
Callisthenes, i.; ii.
Callistratus, i.; ii.
Cardia, Cardians, i.; ii.
Caria, Prince of, i.
(_See also_ Artemisia, Mausolus.)
Ceos, ii.
Cephalus, ii.
Cephisodotus, i.; ii.
Cephisophon, ii.
Cercidas, ii.
Cersobleptes, i.; ii.
Chabrias, i.; ii.
Chaeroneia, battle of, ii.
Chalcedon, i.; ii.
Chalcidic League, i.; ii.
Chalcis, ii.
Chares, i.; ii.
Charidemus, i.; ii.
Chelidonian Islands, ii.
Chersonese, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Cardia.)
Chios, i.; ii.
Cineas, ii.
Cirrha, Cirrhaean plain, ii.
Clearchus, i.; ii.
Cleitarchus, i.; ii.
Cleophon, i.
Cleotimus, ii.
Collytus, ii.
Conon, i.
Corcyra, i.; ii.
Corinth, Corinthians, i.; ii.
Corn-supply, &c. (Athenian), i.; ii.
Coroneia, i.; ii.
Corsia, i.
Cos, i.; ii.
Cottyphus, ii.
Council,
of Areopagus.
(_See_ Areopagus.)
of Five Hundred, i.; ii.
Crenides, i.
Creon, i.; ii.
Cresphontes, ii.
Ctesiphon
(negotiator of Peace), i.; ii.
(indicted by Eubulus), i.
(proposer of Crown), ii.
Curse, public, i.; ii.
Cyanean Rocks, ii.
Cyprothemis, i.
Cyrebion, i.; ii.
Cyrsilus, ii.
Cyrus, i.; ii.
Daochus, ii.
Dardani, i.
Deceleian War, ii.
Deinarchus, ii.
Delos, i.; ii.
Delphi, temple at, i.; ii.
Demades, i.; ii.
Demaretus, ii.
Democracy,
and Oligarchy, i.
and Tyranny, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Athenian People.)
Demomeles, ii.
Demosthenes (General), i.; ii.
Dercylus, i.
Diodorus, i.
Dion, ii.
Diondas, ii.
Dionysia, i.; ii.
Dionysius (General), i.; ii.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, i.
Dionysus, ii.
Diopeithes
(General), ii.
(of Sphettus?), ii.
Diophantus, i.; ii.
Diotimus, ii.
Disunion of the Hellenes, i.; ii.
Dium, i.
Dodona, oracle of, ii.
Dolopes, ii.
Dorians of Parnassus, ii.
Doriscus, i.; ii.
Drongilum, ii.
Drymus, i.
Echinus, ii.
Egypt, i; ii.
Elateia, i.; ii.
Election by lot, i.
Eleusis, ii.
Elis, i.; ii.
Elpias, ii.
Embassies to Peloponnesian States, ii.
Embassy,
the First, i.
the Second, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Peace of Philocrates.)
the Third, i.; ii.
Empusa, ii.
Ephialtes, ii.
Epichares, ii.
Epicrates, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Cyrebion).
Epirus, ii.
Eretria, i.; ii.
Ergiske, ii.
Ergocles, i.; ii.
Ergophilus, i.; ii.
Erythraeans, ii.
Etesian Winds, i.; ii.
Euboea, Euboeans, i.; ii.
Eubulus, i.; ii.
Eucleides, i.; ii.
Eudicus, ii.
Euphraeus, ii.
Eurybatus, ii.
Eurylochus, i.
Euripides, i.
Euthycles, i.
Euthycrates, i.; ii.
Execcstus, i.
Festival Fund, i.; ii.
Financial System (Athenian), i.; ii.
(_See also_ Military System, Naval System.)
Fortifications,
Commissioner of, ii.
of Athens, ii.
Fortune, i.; ii.
Funeral Oration, after Chaeroneia, ii.
Geraestus, i.; ii.
Getae, ii.
Glaucothea, i.; ii.
Glaucus, ii.
Gods,
and crime, i.
and perjury, i.
command issues of events, ii.
protect Athens, i.; ii.
Guest-friendship, ii.
Haliartus, i.; ii.
Halonnesus, ii.
Halus, i.
Harmodius, i.
Hedyleum, i.; ii.
Hegemon, ii.
Hegesilaus, i.; ii.
Hegesippus, i.; ii.
Hellespont, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Chersonese, Thrace.)
Heracles, sacrifice to, i.; ii.
Heraeon Teichos, i.; ii.
Hero of the Lancet (Hero-Physician), i.; ii.
Hierax, i.
Hieronymus, i.
Hipparchus, ii.
Hipponicus, ii.
Hypereides, i.; ii.
Iatrocles, i.
Illyria, Illyrians, i.; ii.
Imbros, i.; ii.
Iphicrates, i.; ii.
Isaeus, i.
Ischander, i.
Isocrates, i.; ii.
Lacedaemon, Lacedaemonians.
(_See_ Sparta, Spartans.)
Lampsacus, i.; ii.
Lasthenes, i.; ii.
Larissa, i.; ii.
Law-Courts, supremacy of, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Trials.)
Legislative Commission, i.; ii.
Lemnos, i.; ii.
Leon, i.; ii.
Leptines, i.
Leucas, ii.
Leuctra, battle of, i.; ii.
Locrians, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Amphissa.)
Logistae.
(_See_ Auditors.)
Longinus, i.
Lycophron, i.
Lycurgus, ii.
Macedonian Empire, i.
Magnesia, i.; ii.
Mantineia,
battle of, i.; ii.
oligarchy in, ii.
Marathon, i.; ii.
battle of, i.; ii.
Mardonius, ii.
Maroneia, i.
Masteira, ii.
Mausolus, i.
Mecyberna, i.
Megalopolis, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Arcadia.)
Megara, Megareans, i.; ii.
Meidias, ii.
Melantus, ii.
Menecles, ii.
Menelaus, i.; ii.
Menippus, ii.
Mercenaries, i.; ii.
Messene, Messenians, i.; ii.
Methone, i.; ii.
Metroon, i.; ii.
Military System (Athenian), i.; ii.
(_See also_ Mercenaries, Naval System.)
Miltiades, i.
Mnaseas, ii.
Moerocles, i.
Molon, i.
Molossi, ii.
Molossus, ii.
Minos, ii.
Mother, the Great, ii.
Mountain, Sacred, i.; ii.
Munychia, ii.
Murder, Law of, ii.
Myrtenum, ii.
Myrtis, ii.
'Mysian booty,' ii.
Mysteries, the, ii.
Mytilene, i.
Naval Boards, i.; ii.
Naval System (Athenian), i.; ii.
(_See also_ Financial System, Military System.)
Naupactus, ii.
Nausicles, ii.
Neapolis, i.
Neoptolemus, i.; ii.
(another?), ii.
Neon, ii.
Neones, i.; ii.
Nicaea, i.; ii.
Nicias
(General), i.
(another), i.
Ninus, ii.
Oenomaus, ii.
Oligarchy, i.; ii.
Olympian games, i.
Olympias, ii.
Olynthus, Olynthians, i.; ii.
Onomarchus, i.
Orators,
corrupt and disloyal, i.; ii.
and Speech on the Crown, _passim_.
(_See also_ Traitors.)
difficulties and risks of, i.; ii.
duties of, i.; ii.
past and present Athenian, i.; ii.
position of, in Athens, i.; ii.
recriminations of, i.; ii.
seeking popularity, i.; ii.
Orchomenus, i.; ii.
Oreus, i.; ii.
Orontas, i.; ii.
Oropus, i.; ii.
Paeonians, i.; ii.
Pagasae, i.
Pammenes, i.
Panactum, i.; ii.
Panathenaea, i.; ii.
Pangaeus, Mount, i.
Parmenio, i.
Peace
of Antalcidas, i.; ii.
of Callias, i.; ii.
of Demades, ii.
of Philocrates, i.; ii.
Peitholaus, i.
Peiraeus, i.; ii.
Pella, i.; ii.
Pelopidas, ii.
Peparethus, ii.
Periander, Law of, i.
Perdiccas, ii.
Pericles, i.
Perillus, i.; ii.
Perinthus, i.; ii.
Persia, Persian King, i.; ii.
Phalaecus, i.; ii.
Pharsalus, i.
Pherae, Pheraeans, i.; ii.
Philammon, ii.
Philiadas, ii.
Philinus, ii.
Philip,
his advantages over Athens, i.; ii.
his army, ii.
his character, i.; ii.
his policy, i.; ii.
Philippi, i.
Philippopolis, ii.
Philo, i.; ii.
Philochares, i.
Philocrates
(author of Peace), i.; ii.
(another), ii.
Philonicus, i.
Philistides, ii.
Phlius, Phliasians, i.; ii.
Phocians, Phocis, i.; ii.
Phocion, i.; ii.
Phormio, ii.
Phryne, ii.
Phrynon, i.
Phyle, i.
Pirates, &c., ii.
Pittalacus, i.
Plataeae, i.; ii.
(battle of), ii.
Plutarchus, i.; ii.
Pnyx, ii.
Polyeuctus, ii.
Polystratus, i.; ii.
Porthmus, i.; ii.
Poteidaea, i.; ii.
Prisoners, ransom of, i.; ii.
Proconnesus, ii.
Proedroi, ii.
Prophets, i.; ii.
Proxenus, i.; ii.
Prytanes, i.; ii.
Ptoeodorus, i.; ii.
Pydna, i.; ii.
Pythian Games, i.; ii.
Pythocles, i.; ii.
Python, i.; ii.
Rhadamanthus, ii.
Rhodes, Rhodians, i.; ii.
River, battle by the, ii.
Round Chamber, i.; ii.
Sabazios.
(_See_ Dionysus.)
Sacred War, i.
(_See also_ Amphissean War.)
Salamis, Salaminians, i.; ii.
battle of, i.; ii.
Samos, i.; ii.
Satyrus, i.
Schools (Athenian), i.; ii.
Sciathus, i.; ii.
Scyros, i.
Scythia, ii.
Selymbria, i.; ii.
Serrhium, i.; ii.
Sicyon, ii.
Sigeum, i.; ii.
Simonides, ii.
Simus, ii.
Simylus, ii.
Smicythus, i.; ii.
Socrates
(of Oreus), ii.
(actor), ii.
Solon, i.; ii.
Sophocles, i.
Sosicles, ii.
Sosistratus, ii.
Sparta, Spartans, i.; ii.
Stageira, i.
Symmories.
(_See_ Naval Boards.)
Tamynae, ii.
Tanagra, ii.
Taurosthenes, ii.
Taxation.
(_See_ Financial System.)
Teledamus, ii.
Tenedos, ii.
Tetrarchies, ii.
Tharrex, i.; ii.
Thasos, i.
Thebans, Thebes, i.; ii.
Themison, ii.
Themistocles, i.; ii.
Theocrines, ii.
Theodoras
(actor), i.
(of Oropus), ii.
Theogeiton, ii.
Theopompus, ii.
Theoric Fund.
(_See_ Festival Fund.)
Thermopylae, i.; ii.
Theseus, temple of, ii.
Thesmothetae, i.; ii.
Thessalians, Thessaly, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Magnesia, Pagasae, Pharsalus, Pherae.)
Thirty Tyrants, the, i.; ii.
Thoas, ii.
Thrace, Thracians, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Cersobleptes, Chersonese, Hellespont.)
Thrason, ii.
Thrasybulus, i.; ii.
Thrasydaeus, ii.
Thrasylochus, ii.
Thucydides, i.
Tigranes, i.
Tilphossaeum, i; ii.
173.
Timagoras, i.; ii.
Timarchus, i.; ii.
Timocrates, i.
Timolaus, ii.
Timomachus, i.
Timotheus, i.; ii.
Torone, i.; ii.
Torture, i.; ii.
Traitors, i.; ii.
(_See also_ Orators, corruption of.)
Trials, Athenian (character and
procedure), i.
(_See also_ Law-Courts.)
Triballi, i.; ii.
Tricaranum, i.; ii.
Trierarchy.
(_See_ Naval Boards Naval System.)
Triphylia, i.; ii.
Tromes, ii.
Walls, the, i.
Winter-battle, the, ii.
Xenocleides, i.
Xenophron, i.
Zeleia, i.; ii.
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