The Questions of King Milinda (Milindapanha)

Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. xi INTRODUCTION. THE work of which a translation is here, for the first time, presented to the English reading public, has had a strange and interesting history. Written in Northern India, at or a little after the beginning of the Christian era, and either in Sanskrit itself or in some North Indian Prakrit, it has been entirely lost in the land of its origin, and (so far as is at present known) is not extant in any of the homes of the various sects and schools of the Buddhists, except only in Ceylon, and in those countries which have derived their Buddhism from Ceylon. It is true that General Cunningham says 1 that the name of Milinda, 'is still famous in all Buddhist countries.' But he is here drawing a very wide conclusion from an isolated fact. For in his note he refers only to Hardy, who is good evidence for Ceylon, but who does not even say that the 'Milinda' was known elsewhere. Preserved there, and translated at a very early date into Pâli, it has become, in its southern home, a book of standard authority, is put into the hands of those who have begun to doubt the cardinal points of Buddhist doctrine, has been long a popular work in its Pâli form, has been translated into Simhalese, and occupies a unique position, second only to the Pâli Pitakas (and perhaps also to the celebrated work of Buddhaghosa, the 'Path of Purity'). From Ceylon it has been transferred, in its Pâli form, to both Burma and Siam, and in those countries also it enjoys so high a repute, that it has been commented on (if not translated). It is not merely the only work composed among the Northern Buddhists which is regarded with reverence by the orthodox Buddhists of the southern p. xii schools; it is the only one which has survived at all amongst them. And it is the only prose work composed in ancient India which would be considered, from the modern point of view, as a successful work of art. The external evidence for these statements is, at present, both very slight and, for the most part, late. There appeared at Colombo in the year of Buddha 2420 (1877 A.D.) a volume of 650 pages, large 8vo.--the most considerable in point of size as yet issued from the Simhalese press--entitled MILINDA PRASNAYA. It was published at the expense of five Buddhist gentlemen whose names deserve to be here recorded. They are Karolis Pîris, Abraham Liwerâ, Luis Mendis, Nandis Mendis Amara-sekara, and Chârlis Arnolis Mendis Wijaya-ratna Amara-sekara. It is stated in the preface that the account of the celebrated discussion held between Milinda and Nâgasena, about 500 years after the death of the Buddha, was translated into the Mâgadhî language by 'teachers of old' (purwâkârin wisin);--that that Pâli version was translated into Simhalese, at the instance and under the patronage of King Kîrtti Srî Râga-simha, who came to the throne of Ceylon in the year of Buddha 2290 (1747 A. D.), by a member of the Buddhist Order named Hînati-kumburê Sumangala, a lineal successor, in the line of teacher and pupil (anusishya), of the celebrated Wliwita Saranankara, who had been appointed Samgha-râga, or chief of the Order--that 'this priceless book, unsurpassable as a means either for learning the Buddhist doctrine, or for growth in the knowledge of it, or for the suppression of erroneous opinions,' had become corrupt by frequent copying--that, at the instigation of the well-known scholar Mohotti-watte Gunânanda, these five had had the texts corrected and restored by several learned Bhikkhus (kîpa namak lawâ), and had had indices and a glossary added, and now published the thus revised and improved edition. The Simhalese translation, thus introduced to us, follows the Pâli throughout, except that it here and there adds, in the way of gloss, extracts from one or other of the numerous Pitaka texts referred to, and also that it starts with a prophecy, p. xiii put into the mouth of the Buddha when on his death-bed, that this discussion would take place about 500 years after his death, and that it inserts further, at the point indicated in my note on p. 3 of the present version, an account of how the Simhalese translator came to write his version. His own account of the matter adds to the details given above that he wrote the work at the Uposatha Ârâma of the Mahâ Wihâra near Srî-ward-hana-pura, 'a place famous for the possession of a temple containing the celebrated Tooth Relic, and a monastery which had been the residence of Wliwita Saranankara, the Samgha-râga, and of the famous scholars and commentators Daramiti-pola Dhamma-rakkhita and Madhurasatota Dhammakkhandha.' As Kîrtti Srî Râga-simha reigned till 1781 1, this would only prove that our Pâli work was extant in Ceylon in its present form, and there regarded as of great antiquity and high authority, towards the close of the last century. And no other mention of the work has, as yet, been discovered in any older Simhalese author. But in the present deplorable state of our ignorance of the varied and ancient literature of Ceylon, the argument ex silentio would be simply of no value. Now that the Ceylon Government have introduced into the Legislative Council a bill for the utilisation, in the interests of education, of the endowments of the Buddhist monasteries, it may be hoped that the value of the books written in those monasteries will not be forgotten, and that a sufficient yearly sum will be put aside for the editing and publication of a literature of such great historical value 2. At present we can only deplore the impossibility of tracing the history of the 'Questions of Milinda' in other works written by the scholarly natives of its southern home. That it will be mentioned in those works there can be p. xiv but little doubt. For the great Indian writer, who long ago found in that beautiful and peaceful island the best scope for his industrious scholarship, is already known to have: mentioned the book no less than four times in his commentaries; and that in such a manner that we may fairly hope to find other references to it when his writings shall. have been more completely published. In his commentary on the Book of the Great Decease, VI, 3, Buddhaghosa refers to the quotation of that passage made in the conversation between Milinda and Nâgasena, translated below, at IV, 2, 1 1. And again, in his commentary on the Ambattha Sutta (D. III, 2, 12) he quotes the words of a conversation between Milinda and Nâgasena on the subject he is there discussing. The actual words he uses (they will be found at pp. 275, 276 of the edition of the Sumangala Vilâsîni, edited for the Pâli Text Society by Professor Carpenter and myself) are not the same as those of our author at the corresponding passage of Mr. Trenckner's text (pp. 168, 169; IV, 3, 11), but they are the same in substance. The above two references in Buddhaghosa to our author were pointed out by myself. Dr. Morris has pointed out two others, and in each of those also Buddhaghosa is found to quote words differing from Mr. Trenckner's text. The former of these two was mentioned in a letter to the 'Academy' of the 12th November, 1881. In the Manoratha Pûranî, his commentary on the Anguttara, on the passage marked in Dr. Morris's edition as L 5, 8, Buddhaghosa says:-- 'Imasmim pan' atthe Milinda-râgâ dhamma-kathika-Nâgasenattheram pukkhi: "Bhante Nâgasena, ekasmim akkharakkhane pavattita-kitta-samkhârâ sake rûpino assa kîva mahâ-râsi bhavey-yâti?"' And he then gives the answer:--'Vâhasatânam kho mahâ-râga vihînam addha-kûlañ ka vâhâ vîhi sattammanâni dve ka tumbâ ekakkharakkhane p. xv pavattitassa kittassa sankham pi na upenti kalam pi na upenti kala-bhâgam pi na upentîti.' This passage of the Milinda, referred to by Buddhaghosa, will be found on p. 102 of Mr. Trenckner's edition, translated below at IV, 1, 19. But the question is not found there at all, and the answer, though much the same in the published text, still differs in the concluding words. Mr. Trenckner marks the passage in his text as corrupt, and it may well be that Buddhaghosa has preserved for us an older and better reading. The other passage quoted by Dr. Morris (in the 'Academy' of the 11th January, 1881) is from the Papañka Sûdanî, Buddhaghosa's still unedited Commentary on the Magghima Nikâya. It is in the comment on the Brahmâyu Suttanta, and as it is not accessible elsewhere I give this passage also in full herb. With reference, oddly enough, to the same passage referred to above (pp. 168, 169 of the text, translated below at IV, 3, 11) Buddhaghosa, there says:-- 'Vuttam etam Nâgasenattherena Milinda-rañña putthena: "Na mahârâga Bhagavâ guyham dasseti khâyam Bhagavâ dassetîti."' In this case, as in the other quotation of the same passage, the words quoted are not quite the same as those given in the published text, and on the other hand they agree with, though they are much shorter than, the words as given in the Sumangala Vilâsinî. It would be premature to attempt to arrive at the reason of this difference between Buddhaghosa's citations and Mr. Trenckner's edition of the text. It may be that Buddhaghosa is consciously summarising, or that he is quoting roughly from memory, or that he is himself translating or summarising from the original work, or that he is quoting from another Pâli version, or that he is quoting from another recension of the text of the existing Pâli version. We must have the full text of all his references to the 'Questions of Milinda' before us, before we try to choose between these, and possibly other, alternative explanations. What is at present certain is that when p. xvi [paragraph continues] Buddhaghosa wrote his great works, that is about 430 A.D., he had before him a book giving the conversations between Milinda and Nâgasena. And more than that. He introduces his comment above referred to on the Ambattha Sutta by saying, after simply quoting the words of the text he is explaining: 'What would be the use of any one else saying anything on this? For Nâgasena, the Elder, himself said as follows in reply to Milinda, the king 1'--and he then quotes Nâgasena, and adds not a word of his own. It follows that the greatest of all Buddhist writers known to us by name regarded the 'Questions of Milinda' as a work of so great authority that an opinion put by its author into the mouth of Nâgasena should be taken as decisive. And this is not only the only book, outside the Pâli Pitakas, which Buddhaghosa defers to in this way, it is the only book, except the previous commentaries, which he is known even to refer to at all. But, on the other hand, he says nothing in these passages to throw any further light on the date, or any light on the authorship, of the work to which he assigns so distinguished, even so unique, a position. So far as to what is known about our 'Questions of Milinda' in Ceylon. The work also exists, certainly in Pâli, and probably in translations into the local dialects, in Burma and Siam. For Mr. Trenckner mentions (Introduction, p. iv) a copy in the Burmese character of the Pâli text sent to him by Dr. Rost, there is another copy in that character in the Colombo Museum 2, and Mr. J. G. Scott, of the Burmese Civil Service, has sent to England a Burmese Nissaya of the Milinda, (a kind of translation, giving the Pâli text, word for word, followed by the interpretation of those words in Burmese 3). A manuscript of the Pâli text, brought from Siam, is referred to in the Simhalese MSS. in the marginal note quoted by Mr. Trenckner at p. vi of the p. xvii [paragraph continues] Introduction to his edition. And there exists in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, a complete MS., in excellent condition, in the Siamese-Pâli character 1, while there are numerous fragments in the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale of one or more MSS. of the text, in the same Kambojan character used in Siam for the writing of Pâli texts 2. It may be noticed here that there are seven MSS. of the text written in the Ceylon character known to exist in Europe. Two of them (one a very ancient one) are in the Copenhagen University Library, two in the Bibliothèque Nationale 2, one in the Cambridge University Library 3, and two in the India Office Library 4. Three only of these seven have been used by Mr. Trenckner for his very able and accurate edition of the text, published in 1880. ____________________ That is all the external evidence at present available. What can be inferred from the book itself is about as follows. It consists of the discussion of a number of points of Buddhist doctrine treated in the form of conversations between King Milinda and Nâgasena the Elder (Thera). It must be plain to every reader of the following pages that these are not real conversations. What we have before us is really an historical romance, though the didactic aim overshadows the story. Men of straw, often very skilfully put together, are set up for the purpose, not so much of knocking them down again, as of elucidating some points of ethical or psychological belief while doing so. The king himself plays a very subordinate part. The questions raised, or dilemmas stated, are put into his mouth. But the solutions, to give opportunity for which the questions or dilemmas are invented, are the really important part of the work, and these are put into the mouth of Nâgasena. The dialogues are introduced by a carefully constructed p. xviii preliminary story, in which the reader's interest in them is aroused by anticipation. And the ability of this part of the work is very great. For in spite of the facts that all the praise lavished therein upon both Milinda and Nâgasena is in reality only praise of the book itself, and that the reader knows this very well, yet he will find it almost impossible to escape from the influence of the eloquent words in which importance and dignity are lent to the occasion of their meeting; and of the charm and skill with which the whole fiction is maintained. The question then arises whether the personages were any more real than the conversations. Milinda is supposed to be the Menander, who appears in the list of the Greek kings of Baktria, since he is described in the book as being a king of the Yonakas reigning at Sâgala (the Euthydemia of the Greeks), and there is no other name in the list which comes so near to Milinda. This identification of the two names is certainly correct. For whether it was our author who deliberately made the change in adapting the Greek name to the Indian dialect in which he wrote, or whether the change is due to a natural phonetic decay, the same causes will have been of influence. Indra or Inda is a not uncommon termination of Indian names, and meaning king is so appropriate to a king, that a foreign king's name ending in -ander would almost inevitably come to end in -inda. Then the sequence of the liquids of m-n-n would tend in an Indian dialect to be altered in some way by dissimilation, and Mr. Trenckner adduces seven instances in Pâli of l taking the place of n, or n of l, in similar circumstances 1. There remains only the change of the first E in Menander to I. Now in the Indian part of the inscription, on undoubted coins of Menander, the oldest authorities read Minanda as the king's name 2, and though that interpretation has now, on the authority of better specimens, been given up, there is no doubt that Milinda runs more easily p. xix from the tongue than Melinda, and Mil may well have seemed as appropriate a commencement for a Milakkha's name as -inda is for the ending of a king's name. So Men-ander became Mil-inda. It may be added here that other Greek names are mentioned by our author--Devamantiya at I, 42, and the same officer, together with Anantakâya, Mankura, and Sabbadinna, at II, 3. There is a similar effort in these other Pâli forms of Greek words to make them give some approach to a meaning in the Indian dialect: but in each case the new forms remain as really unintelligible to an Indian as Mil-inda would be. Thus Deva-mantiya, which may be formed on Demetrios, looks, at first sight, Indian enough. But if it meant anything, it could only mean 'counsellor of the gods.' And so also both Ananta and Kâya are Indian words. But the compound Ananta-kâya would mean 'having an infinite body,' which is absurd as the name of a courtier. It may possibly be made up to represent Antiochos. What Mankura and Sabbadinna (called simply Dinna at p. 87) may be supposed to be intended for it is difficult to say 1. But the identification of Milinda with Menander is as certain as that of Kandagutta with Sandrokottos. ____________________ Very little is told us, in the Greek or Roman writers, about any of the Greek kings of Baktria. It is a significant fact that it is precisely of Menander-Milinda that they tell us most, though this most is unfortunately not much. Strabo, in his Geography 2, mentions Menander as one of the two Baktrian kings who were instrumental in spreading the Greek dominion furthest to the East into India. He crossed the Hypanis (that is the Sutlej) and penetrated as far as the Isamos (probably the Jumna). Then in the title of the lost forty-first book of Justin's work, Menander and Apollodotus are mentioned as 'Indian kings.' Finally, Plutarch 3 tells us an anecdote of Menander. p. xx [paragraph continues] He was, he says, as a ruler noted for justice, and enjoyed such popularity with his subjects, that upon his death, which took place in camp, diverse cities contended for the possession of his ashes. The dispute was only adjusted by the representatives of the cities agreeing that the relics should be divided amongst them, and that they should severally erect monuments (&#0956&#0957&#0951&#0956&#0949&#8150&#0945, no doubt dâgabas or sthûpas) to his memory. This last statement is very curious as being precisely analogous to the statement in the 'Book of the Great Decease 1,' as to what occurred after the death of the Buddha himself. But it would be very hazardous to draw any conclusion from this coincidence. The only remaining ancient evidence about Menander-Milinda (apart from what is said by our author himself), is that of coins. And, as is usually the case, the evidence of the coins will be found to confirm, but to add very little to, what is otherwise known. As many as twenty-two 2 different coins have been discovered, some of them in very considerable numbers, bearing the name, and eight of them the effigy, of Menander. They have been found over a very wide extent of country, as far west as Kâbul, as far east as Mathurâ, and one of them as far north as Kashmir. Curiously enough we find a confirmation of this wide currency of Menander-Milinda's coins in the work of the anonymous author of the 'Periplus Maris Erythræi.' He says 3 that Menander's coins, together with those of Apollodotos, were current, many years after his death, at Barygaza, the modern Baroach, on the coast of Gujarat. The portrait on the coins is very characteristic, with a long face and an intelligent expression, and is sometimes that of a young man, and at other times that of a very old man. It may be inferred therefore that his reign p. xxi was as long as his power was extensive. All the coins have a legend in Greek letters on one side, and a corresponding legend in Ariano-pâli letters on the other side. On twenty-one out of the twenty-two, the inscriptions, according to the latest interpretations from a comparison of the best examples, are respectively, BASILEÔS SÔTÊROS MENANDROU and MAHARAGASA TRADATASA MENANDRASA 1. Wilson read 2 the last word Minadasa. But when he wrote, in 1840, the alphabet was neither so well known as it is now, nor had such good examples come to hand. So that though the Mi- is plain enough on several coins, it is almost certainly a mere mistake for Me, from which it only differs by the centre vowel stroke being slightly prolonged. Fifteen of the coins have a figure of Pallas either on one side or the other. A 'victory,' a horse jumping, a dolphin, a head (perhaps of a god), a two-humped camel, an elephant goad, a boar, a wheel, and a palm branch are each found on one side or the other of one of the coins; and an elephant, an owl, and a bull's head each occur twice. These are all the emblems or figures on the coins. None of them are distinctively Buddhist, though the wheel might be claimed as the Buddhist wheel, and the palm branch and the elephant would be quite in place on Buddhist coins. It may be said, therefore, that the bulk of the coins are clearly pagan, and not Buddhist; and that though two or three are doubtful, even they are probably not Buddhist, One coin, however, a very rare one, differs, as to its inscription, from all the rest that have the legend. It has on one side BASILEÔS DIKATOU MENANDROU, and on the other, MAHARAGASA DHARMIKASA 3 MENANDRASA. p. xxii Is any reference intended here to the Buddhist Dharma as distinct from the ordinary righteousness of kings? I think not. The coin is one of those with the figure of Pallas on the side which bears the Greek legend, and five others of the Baktrian Greek kings use a similar legend on their coins. These are Agathocles, Heliokles, Archebios, Strato, and Zoilos. There is also another coin in the series with a legend into which the word Dharma enters, but which has not yet been deciphered with certainty--that bearing in the Greek legend the name of Sy-Hermaios, and supposed to have been struck by Kadphises I. If there is anything Buddhist in this coin of Menander's, then the others also must be Buddhist. But it is much simpler to take the word dharmikasa in the sense of the word used in the corresponding Greek legend, and to translate it simply 'the Righteous,' or, better still, 'the Just.' Only when we call to mind how frequent in the Pâli texts is the description of the ideal king (whether Buddhist or not) as dhammiko dhamma-râga, we cannot refuse to see the connection between this phrase and the legend of the coins, and to note how at least six of the Greek kings, one of whom is Menander, are sufficiently desirous to meet the views of their Buddhist subjects to fix upon 'Righteousness' or 'Justice' as the characteristic by which they wish to be known. The use of this epithet is very probably the foundation of the tradition preserved by Plutarch, that Menander was, as a ruler, noted for justice; and it is certainly evidence of the Buddhist influences by which he was surrounded. But it is no evidence at all that he actually became a Buddhist. To sum up.--Menander-Milinda was one of those Greek kings who carried on in Baktria the Greek dominion founded by Alexander the Great. He was certainly one of the most important, probably the most important, of those kings. He carried the Greek arms further into India than any of his predecessors had done, and everything confirms the view given by our author at I, 9 of his justice and his power, of his ability and his wealth. He must have reigned for a considerable time in the latter p. xxiii part of the second century B.C., probably from about 140 to about 115, or even 110 B.C. 1 His fame extended, as did that of no other Baktrian king, to the West, and he is the only Baktrian Greek king who has been remembered in India. Our author makes him say, incidentally 2, that he was born at Kalasi in Alasanda (= Alexandria), a name given to an island presumably in the Indus. And, as was referred to above, Plutarch has preserved the tradition that he died in camp, in a campaign against the Indians in the valley of the Ganges. [It is interesting to point out, in this connection, that the town (gâma) of Kalasi has not been found mentioned elsewhere. Now among the very numerous coins of the Baktrian kings there is one, and only one, giving in the legend, not the name of a king, but the name of a city, the city of Karisi. As this coin was struck about 180 B.C. by Eukratides, who was probably the first of these kings to obtain a settlement on the banks of the Indus, it is possible that the two names, one in the Pâli form (or more probably in the form of the dialect used by our author), the other in the local form, are identical; and that the coin was struck in commemoration of the fact of the Greeks having reached the Indus. If that be so, then that they gave the name Alasanda (Alexandria) to the island on which the town was built, and not to the town itself, seems to show that the town was not founded by them, but was already an important place when they took it.] ____________________ Beyond this all is conjecture. When our author says that Milinda, was converted to Buddhism 3, he may be either relating an actual tradition, or he may be inventing for his own purposes. There is nothing inherently impossible, or even improbable, in the story. We know that all the Baktrians, kings and people alike, eventually became p. xxiv [paragraph continues] Buddhist. But the passage occurs in a part of the book which is open to much doubt. We have to place against it the negative evidence that none of Menander's coins show any decisive signs of his conversion. And the passage in question goes much further. It says that he afterwards gave up the kingdom to his son, and having entered the Buddhist Order, attained to Arahatship. The Simhalese MSS. add a marginal note to the effect that the whole of this passage with its context was derived from a MS. brought from Siam. Mr. Trenckner is therefore of opinion 1 that it belongs to a spurious supplement. That may be so, in spite of the fact that it is quite in our author's style, and forms an appropriate close to the book. But it is incredible that an author of the literary skill so evident throughout the work should have closed his book deliberately in the middle of a paragraph, without any closing words to round it off. The Siamese MS. may after all have preserved the reading of older and better MSS. than those in Ceylon, and the last leaf of the book may have been lost there. There must have been some conclusion, if not in the manner of the paragraph under discussion, then in some other words which we may not be able to trace. But even if our author actually wrote that Menander did become a Bhikkhu and an Arahat, that is very poor evidence of the fact, unless he not only intended what he states to be taken quite literally, but also wrote soon after the events he thus deliberately records. Now the opinion has been expressed above that we have to deal with a book of didactic ethics and religious controversy cast into the form of historical romance. If this is correct no one would be more astonished than the author himself at the inconsistency of modern critics if they took his historical statements au grand serieux, while they made light of his ethical arguments. It is true that he would scarcely have been guilty of anything that seemed grossly improbable, at the time when he wrote, to the readers whom he addressed. But if, as is most probable, he wrote in North-Western p. xxv [paragraph continues] India when the memory of the actual facts of Menander's reign was fading away--that is, some generations after his death--he may well have converted him to Buddhism, as the most fitting close to the discussion he records, without intending at all to convey thereby any real historical event. This brings us to the next point of our argument. ____________________ We have seen that the work must have been written some considerable time before Buddhaghosa, and after the death of Menander. Can its date be determined with greater accuracy than this? The story of Nâgasena introduces to us his father Sonuttara, his teachers Rohana, Assagutta of the Vattaniya hermitage, and Dhamma-rakkhita of the Asoka Ârâma near Pâtaliputta, and there is also mention of a teacher named Âyupâla dwelling at the Sankheyya hermitage near Sâgala. None of these persons and none of these places are read of elsewhere in any Buddhist text, whether Sanskrit or Pâli. For the Asvagupta referred to in passing at p. 351 of the Divyâvadâna has nothing in common (except the name) with our Assagutta, the Rohana of Anguttara, III, 66, is quite distinct from our Rohana, and there is not the slightest reason for supposing Nâgasena to be another form of the name Nâgârguna, found in both the Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist literatures 1, and in the Jain lists 2. The famous Buddhist scholar so called was the reputed founder of the Mahâyâna school of Buddhism. Our Nâgasena represents throughout the older teaching. If there is any connection at all between the two names, Nâgasena must have been invented as a contrast to Nâgârguna, and not with the least idea of identifying two men whose doctrines are so radically opposed. Even were there any reason to believe this to be the case, it would not help us much, for the date p. xxvi of Nâgârguna is quite as much open to dispute as that of the author of the 'Questions of Milinda 1.' I ought to mention here that an opinion of a Nâgasena is, according to Burnouf 2, discussed at length in the Abhidharma Kosa Vyâkhyâ; and that Schiefner 3 quotes from a Tibetan work, the Bu-ston, the statement that a schism took place under a Thera Nâgasena 137 years after the Buddha's death. It would be very interesting if the former were our Nâgasena. And if Schiefner's restoration of the name found in his Tibetan authority be correct, and the authority itself be trustworthy, it is possibly the fading memory of that Nâgasena which induced our author to adopt the name as that of the principal interlocutor in his 'Questions of Milinda.' Finally, Professor Kern, of Leiden--who believes that Buddha is the sun, and most of his principal disciples stars--believes also not only that our Nâgasena is an historical person, but also that there never was a Buddhist cleric of that name; and that Nâgasena is simply Patañgali, the author of the Yoga philosophy, under another name. If this is not a joke, it is a strange piece of credulity. The only reason alleged in support of it is that Patañgali has the epithets of Nâgesa and of Phanin. That he was a Hindu who believed in the soul-theory of the current animistic creed, while all the opinions put into Nâgasena's mouth are those of a thorough-going Buddhist and non-individualist, is to count as nothing against this chance similarity, not of names, but of the name on one side with an epithet on the other. To identify John Stuart Mill with Dean Milman would be sober sense compared with this proposal. p. xxvii [paragraph continues] But it is deliberately put forward to support an accusation against the Buddhists of having falsely appropriated to themselves every famous man in India 1. Any mud, it would seem, is good enough to pelt the Buddhists with. Yet who is it, after all, who really makes the 'appropriation,' the Buddhists or Professor Kern himself? ____________________ It would seem, therefore, that most of our author's person and place names are probably inventions of his own 2. But it is quite different with the books quoted by our author. In several passages he has evidently in his mind certain Pâli texts which deal with similar matters. So far as yet ascertained the texts thus silently referred to, either in. the present volume or in the subsequent untranslated portion of the book, are as follows: Page of this volume. 8 Dîgha Nikâya II, 1, 2. 10 " " II, 20. 10 " " II, 1. 38 " " II, 10. 38 " " II, 11. 40 Kathâ Vatthu I, 1. 41 Anguttara I, 15, 4-7. 41 Dîgha Nikâya II, 17. 41 " " II, 23. 42 " " II, 26. 59 " " XVII. 80 Mahâvagga I, 1, 1. 129 Various (see my note). 132 Kullavagga IX, 1, 4. 163 Kullavagga VII, 1, 27. 170 Vessantara Gâtaka. 179 Sivi Gâtaka. 204 Magghima Nikâya LXIII. p. xxviii Page of this volume. 212 Gâtaka (No. 69). 256 Sutta Vibhanga (Pâr. 4). 257 Kâtuma Sutta (No. 67). 259 Kullavagga IX, 1, 3. 264 Mahâvagga II, 16, 8. 275 Dhamma-kakka-pavattana Sutta. 277 Anguttara II, 1, 1. 283 The 540th Gâtaka. 285 Amba Gâtaka, (No. 474). 285 Dummedha Gâtaka (No. 122). 286 Tittira Gâtaka (No. 438). 286 Khantivâda Gâtaka (No. 313). 287 Kûla-Nandiya Gâtaka (No. 222). 287 Takkha-sûkara Gâtaka (No. 492). 288 Kariyâ-pitaka II, 6. 288 Sîlava-nâga Gâtaka (No. 72). 288 Sabba-dâtha Gâtaka (No. 241). 289 Apannaka Gâtaka (No. 1). 289 Nigrodha-miga Gâtaka (No. 12). 290 Nigrodha Gâtaka (No. 445). 290 Mahâ-paduma Gâtaka (No. 472). 290 Mahâ-patâpa Gâtaka (No. 358). 294 Ummagga Gâtaka (No. 546). 298 Kullavagga VII, 3, 11. 302 Anguttara IV, 13. Page of the Pâli Text. 220 Gâtaka, No. 310 (vol. iii, p. 32). 231 Sutta Nipâta 1, 4. 236 Gâtaka (vol. i, p. 56). 256 " (Vol. iv, p. 232, line 20). 277 Vessantara Gâtaka. 289 Gâtaka (vol. i, p. 57). 291 Gâtaka (Nos. 258, 541, 494, and 243). 313 Magghima Nikâya, No. 75 (p. 502). In several other passages he refers to a Pâli book, or a chapter in a Pâli book, by name. This is much more valuable for our purposes than the silent, and sometimes doubtful, references in the last list. So far as is yet ascertained, these references are as follows: p. xxix Page of this volume. 1, 2 Vinaya, Sutta, Abhidhamma. 21 The Suttantas. 21 The Abhidhamma. 21 Dhamma Samgani. 21 Vibhanga. 21 Dhâtu Kathâ. 21 Puggala Paññatti. 21 Kathâ Vatthu. 22 Yamaka. 22 Patthâna. 22 The Abhidhamma Pitaka. 25 The Abhidhamma. 27 The Abhidhamma. 28 The three Pitakas. 31 Mahâ Samaya Suttanta (No. 20 in the Dîgha). 31 Mahâ Mangala Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta II, 4). 32 Sama-kitta-pariyâya Suttanta (unknown). 32 Râhulovâda Suttanta (No. 147 in the Magghima). 32 Parâbhava Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta I, 6). 34 The three Pitakas. 56 Samyutta Nikâya (the words quoted are in the Sutta Nipâta). 71 ,88 The Abhidhamma. 137 The ninefold Scriptures. 195 Moliya Sîvaka chapter of the Samyutta. 213 Ratana Sutta (in the Sutta Nipâta II, 1). 213 Khandha Parittâ (not traced). 213 Mora Parittâ (Gâtaka, Nos. 159, 491). 211 Dhagagga Parittâ (in the Gâtaka Book). 213 Âtânâtiya Parittâ (in the Dîgha Nikâya). 213 Angulimâla Parittâ (not traced). 232 The Pâtimokkha. 264-267 Pâtimokkha, Vinaya Pitaka. Page of the Pâli Text. 241 Dhamma-dâyâda Sutta of the Magghima Nikâya (Vol. i, p. 13). 242 Samyutta Nikâya (vol. i, p. 67). 258 Dakkhinâ Vibhanga of the Magghima Nikâya (No. 142). 281 Kariyâ Pitaka G. 53. p. xxx Page of the Pâli Text. 341 Navangam Buddha-vakanam. 341 The Gâtaka Book. 341 The Dîgha Nikâya. 341 The Magghima Nikâya. 342 The Samyutta Nikâya. 342 The Khuddaka Nikâya. 348 The three Pitakas. 349 Mahâ Râhulovâda (in the Magghima, No. 147) 349 Mahâ Mangala Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipâta II, 4). 349 Sama-kitta Pariyâya (not traced). 349 Parâbhava Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipâta I, 6). 349 Purâbheda Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 10). 349 Kalaha-vivâda Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 11). 349 Kûla Vyûha Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 12). 349 Mahâ Vyûha Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 13) 349 Tuvataka Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 14). 349 Sâriputta Suttanta (Sutta Nipâta IV, 16). 350 Mahâ-samaya Suttanta (in the Dîgha, No. 20). 350 Sakkha-pañha Suttanta (Dîgha, No. 21). 350 Tirokudda Suttanta (in the Khuddaka Pâtha, No. 7). 350 Ratana Suttanta (in the Sutta Nipâta II, 1). 350 The Abhidhamma. 362 Ekuttara Nikâya (= Anguttara I, 13, 7). 369 Dhaniya-sutta of the Sutta Nipâta (I, 2). 371 Kummûpama Suttanta of the Samyutta Nikâya (not yet printed). 372 Vidhura Punnaka Gâtaka. 377 Sakka Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikâya (not yet printed). 378 Dhammapada (verse 327). 379 Samyutta (55, 7). 381 Sutasoma Gâtaka (No. 537). 384 Kanha Gâtaka (No. 440, vol. iv, p. 10). 385 Sutta Nipâta (1, 12, 1). 389 Samyutta Nikâya. 392 Ekuttara Nikâya (= Anguttara X, 5, 8). 396 Lomahamsana Pariyâya. 399 Samyutta Nikâya (III. 5, 6, vol. i, p. 73). 401 " " (XVI, 1, 3, vol. ii, p. 194). 402 Kakkavâka Gâtaka (No. 451, vol. iv, p. 71). 403 Kulla Nârada Gâtaka (not traced). p. xxxi Page of the Pâli Text. 403 Samyutta Nikâya (not traced). 405 Lakkhana Suttanta of the Dîgha Nikâya (No. 30). 406 Bhallâtiya Gâtaka (No. 504, vol. iv, p. 439). 408 Parinibbâna-suttanta of the Dîgha Nikâya (D. XVI, 5, 2 4). 408 Dhammapada (verse 32). 409 Samyutta Nikâya (XIV, 16, vol. ii, p. 158). 411 Sutta Nipâta (II, 6, 10), 414 " " 23 (III, 11, 43). Lastly, our author quotes a large number of passages from the Pitaka texts, which he introduces (without naming any book) by the formulas: 'It was said by the Blessed One;' or, 'It is said by you' (you in the plural, you members of the Order); or, 'It was said by so and so' (naming some particular member of the Order). A great many of these quotations have already been traced, either by Mr. Trenckner or myself. Occasionally words thus attributed, by our author, to the Buddha, are, in the Pitakas, attributed to some one else. Such passages are distinguished in the following list by an asterisk added to the letter B, which marks those of them attributed by our author to the Buddha. The women quoted are distinguished by the title 'Sister.' II, 1, 1, p. 45. Sister Vagirâ. Samyutta Nikâya V, 10, 6. II, 1, 9, p. 53. B*. " " VII, 1, 6. II, 9, p. 54. B. Not traced. II, 1, 11, p. 57. B. " " II, 1, 13, p. 61. B. Samyutta Nikâya XXI, 5. II, 2, 4, p. 69. B. Not traced. II, 3, 1, p. 79. B. Magghima Nikâya XXI. II, 3, 2, p. 80. B. " " XVIII. II, 4, 3, p. 101. B* Samyutta Nikâya II, 3, 2. III, 4, 4, p. 104. B. Anguttara III, 35, 4. III, 6, 1, p. 114. B. Not traced. III, 1, 10, p. 145. Sâriputta. " " W, 1, 13, p. 150. B. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 6, 1. IV, 1, 35, p. 170. B. " " XIV, 3, 13. IV, 1, 42, p. 179. In the Sutta. Not traced. IV, 1, 55, p. 185. B. Kullavagga X, 1, 6. IV, 1, 55, p. 186. B. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 5, 62. p. xxxii IV, 1, 67, p. 196. You. Not traced. IV, 1, 67, p. 196. You. " " IV, 1, 71, p. 199. B. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 3, 60. IV, 1, 71, p. 199. B. " " XIV, 3, 63. IV, 2, 1, p. 202. B. Not traced. IV, 2, 1, p. 202. B. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 6, 3. IV, 2, 4, p. 204. B " " XIV, 2, 32. IV, 2, 6, p. 206. B Dhammapada 129. IV, 2, 6, p. 206. B. Not traced IV, 2, 15, p. 213. B. Dhammapada 127, 8. IV, 2, 20, p. 214. You. Not traced. IV, 2, 20, p. 214. You. " " IV, 2, 27, p. 224. You. " " IV, 2, 29, p. 225. B. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 2, 32. IV, 2, 29, p. 225. B. Not traced. IV, 2, 31, p. 227. You. " " IV, 2, 31, p. 227. You. " " IV, 3, 1, p. 229. B. Various (see note). IV, 3, 1, p. 229. You. Aggañña Sutta (Dîgha). IV, 3, 5, p. 234. You. Not traced. IV, 3, 5, p. 234. You. " " IV, 3, 15, p. 238. Sâriputta. " " IV, 3, 15, p. 238 B. Pârâgika I, 5, 11. IV, 3, 19, p. 241. B*. Gâtaka III, 24. IV, 3, 19, p. 241. B. Gâtaka IV, 210. IV, 3, 21, p. 242. The Theras. Dîgha Nikâya XIV, 4, 23. IV, 3, 21, p. 243. B. " " XIV, 4, 57. IV, 3, 24, p. 246. B. Not traced. IV, 3, 24, p. 246. B.* Mahâ-parinibbâna Sutta (D. XVI, 5, 24). IV, 3, 27, p. 248. You. Not traced. IV, 3, 27, p. 248. You. Kullavagga VII, 3, 9. IV, 3, 31, p. 251. B. Not traced. IV, 3, 31, p. 251. B. " " IV, 3, 33, p. 253. B. Brahmagala Sutta (D. I, 1, 5). IV, 3, 33, p. 253. B. Sela Sutta (SN. III, 7, 7). IV, 3, 35, p. 254. B*. The 521st Gâtaka. IV, 3, 38, p. 257. B. Dhaniya Sutta (SN. I, 2, 2). IV, 4, 1, p. 261. B. Anguttara I, 14, 1. IV, 4, 4, p. 264. B. Anguttara III, 124. IV, 4, 9, p. 268. B. Pâtimokkha (Pâk. 1). IV, 4, 11, p. 270. B. Not traced. IV, 4, 11, p. 271. B. " " p. xxxiii IV, 4, 13, p. 273. B. Sutta Vibhanga (Pâr. 3, 5,113). IV, 4, 13, p. 273. B. Not traced. IV, 4, 16, p. 279. B. Anguttara XI, 2, 5, and the 169th Gâtaka. IV, 4, 16, p. 280. You. The 540th Gâtaka. IV, 4, 17, p. 283. You. Not traced. IV, 4, 42, p. 294. B*. The 536th Gâtaka. IV, 4, 44, p. 297. B. Not traced. IV, 4, 46, p. 301. You. " " The Pâli Text. P. 211, l. 6. B. Muni Sutta (SN. I, 12, 3). 211, l. 8. B. Kullavagga VI, 1, 5. 213, l. 6. B. Dhammapada 168. 211, l. 7. B. Magghima Nikâya 77. 215, l. 10. B. Not traced. 215, l. 12. B. Anguttara I, 14, 4. 217. l. 9. B. Samyutta Nikâya XXI. 217, l. 11. B. Not traced. 219, l. 14. B. " " 219, l. 15. It is said. Gâtaka (No. 433). 221, l. 20. B. Khaddanta Gâtaka (vol. v., p.49). 221, l. 24. It is said. Not traced. 223, l. 16. B. Magghima Nikâya (No. 87). 223, l. 18. It is said. " " 225, l. 2. B. Sela Sutta (SN. III, 7, 33). 228, l. 2. B. Sutta Nipâta I, 4, 6 = III, 4, 26. 230, l. 13. B*. Kapi Gâtaka (vol. iii, p. 354). 232, l. 7. You. Not traced. 232, l. 10. You. " " 235, l. 2. B. Magghima I, p. 177 = Vinaya I, p. 8. 235, l. 4. B. Magghima (No. 86). 236, l. 27. B. Anguttara I, 15, 10. 240, l. 3. B. Magghima Nikâya (No. 142). 242, l. 17. Sâriputta. Not traced. 242, l. 26. B. Samyutta Nikâya 44. 245, l. 1. B. Samyutta 6, 14 (vol. i, p. 157) =Thera-gâthâ 256, 7 = Divyâvadâna, p. 300. 253, l. 1. You. Not traced. 255, l. 8. You. " " 262. B. " " 323. You. " " p. xxxiv The Pâli Text. P. 333. B. Dhammapada 54-56 (taken in part from Anguttara III, 79). 366, l. 6. B. Samyutta XX, 8, 5. 366, l. 10. Sâriputta. Thera-gâthâ 985. 367, l. 8. B. Not traced (see S. XII, 63, 8). 367, l. 19. Mahâ Kakkâyana. Thera-gâthâ 501. 368, l. 2. B. Samyutta 46, 7. 368, l. 6. Sâriputta. Not traced. 368, l. 20. Kulla Panthaka. " " 369, l. 5. B. Sutta Nipâta I, 2, 12. 369, l. 22. The Theras who held the Synod (at Râgagaha). Not traced. 370, l. 11. Sâriputta. Not traced. 371, l. 14. Upasena. Thera-gâthâ 577. 371, l. 28. B. Samyutta I, 17, 2 (Vol. i, p. 7). 372, l. 12. Râhula. Not traced. 372, l. 23. B. Gâtaka (No. 545). 371, l. 13. Sâriputta. Not traced. 374, l. 5. Sâriputta. " " 374, l. 16. Sâriputta. " " 375, l. 15. B. Magghima (vol. I, p. 33). 376, l. 3. Anuruddha. Not traced. 376, l. 17. Râhula. " " 377, l. 14. B. Samyutta 55, 7. 378, l. 5. Sâriputta. Not traced. 378, l. 17. B. Mahâ-parinibbâna Sutta (D. XVI, 2, 12). 379, l. 1. B. Dhammapada 327. 379, l. 14. B. Samyutta 55, 7. 380, l. 1. Sâriputta. Not traced. 381, l. 15. B. Sutasoma Gâtaka (No. 537). 383, l. 3. Sister Subhaddâ. Not traced. 384, l. 4. B. Kanha Gâtaka, (vol. iv, p. 10). 385, l. 1. B. (?) Magghima Nikâya, (No. 62). 385, l. 28. B. Sutta Nipâta 1, 12, 1. 386, l. 12. B. Dhammapada 81. 386, l. 19. B Dhammapada 404 (from SN. M, 9, 35). 386, l. 26. Subhûti. Not traced. 387, l. 8. B. Dhammapada 28. 387, l. 16. Sister Subhaddâ. Not traced. 388, l. 14. B. Magghima Nikâya (vol. 1, p. 424). p. xxxv The Pâli Text. P. 389, l. 9. B. Samyutta Nikâya XVI, 3. 390, l. 17. Vangîsa. Not traced. 391, l. 6. Subhûti. " " 391, l. 21. B. Dhammapada 350. 392, l. 3. B. Anguttara X, 5, 8. 392, l. 10. B. Not traced. 391, l. 3. Vangîsa. " " 393, l. 25. B. " " 394, l. 6. Upasena. " " 394, l. 16. Upasena. " " 394, l. 28. Sâriputta. " " 395, l. 9. Mahâ Kassapa. " " 395, l. 22. Upasena. Thera-gâthâ 580. 396, l. 32 B. Magghima Nikâya (vol. i, p. 74). 396, l. 20. Sâriputta. Not traced. 397, l. 15. Sâriputta. " " 398, l. 5. Pindola. " " 399, l. 16. B. Samyutta Nikâya III, 5, 6 (vol. i, p. 7 3). 401, l. 10. B. Samyutta Nikâya XVI, 1, 3 (vol. ii, p. 194). 402, l. 8. B. Kakkavâka, Gâtaka (vol. iv, p. 71; not in III, 520). 402, l. 26. Brahmâ. Samyutta Nikâya VI, 2,4 (vol. it P. 154 Thera-gâthâ 142). 403, l. 13. B. Kulla-nârada Gâtaka (vol. iv, p. 223). 403, l. 27. B. Samyutta Nikâya (vol. iii, p. 125). 404, l. 12. Pindola. Not traced. 405, l. 3. B. Dîgha Nikâya, XXX. 405, l. 22. Anuruddha. Not traced. 407, l. 1. Sâriputta. Thera-gâthâ 982, 3. 407, l. 20. Anuruddha. Not traced. 408, l. 8. B. Dîgha Nikâya XVI, 5, 24. 408, l. 22. B. Dhammapada 32. 409, l. 17. B. Samyutta Nikâya XIV, 16 (= Thera-gâthâ 148, 266). 410, l. 8. Sâriputta. Not traced 1 411, l. 9. Sâriputta. " " 411, l. 29. B. Sutta Nipâta II, 6, 10. p. xxxvi The Pâli Text. P. 412, l. 21. Mogharâga. Not traced. 411, l. 6. Rahula. 33 91 414, l. 1. B. Sutta Nipâta (not traced 1). 414, l. 18. B. " " III, 11, 43. 415, l. 14. B. Not traced. 416, l. 4. Sâriputta. " " 416, l. 29. Upâli. " " 417, l. 12. B. " " 418, l. 1. Moggallâna. " " 419, l. 11. Sâriputta. " " Now the Pâli Pitakas consist of the following twenty-nine books: Title. No. of printed pages 8vo. 1. The Sutta Vibhanga 617* THE VINAYA PITAKA. 2. The Khandhakas 668* a. Mahâvagga 360 b. Kullavagga 308 3. The Parivâra 226* Total 1511* 4. The Dîgha Nikâya 750 THE SUTTA PITAKA. (The four great Nikâyas.) 5. The Magghima Nikâya 1000 6. The Samyutta Nikâya 1250 7. The Anguttara Nikâya 1500 Total 4500 8. The Khuddaka Pâtha 10* THE KHUDDAKA NIKÂYA. (The repeaters of the Dîgha add these to the Sutta Pitaka. The repeaters of the Magghima add them to the Abhidhamma Pitaka.) 9. The Dhammapadas 40* 10. The Udânas 80* 11. The Iti-vuttakas 100* 12. The Sutta Nipâta 200* 13. The Vimâna Vatthu 85* 14. The Peta Vatthu 90* 15. The Thera-Gâthâ 100* 16. The Theri-Gâthâ 35 17. The Gâtakas 70 18. The Niddesa 300 19. The Patisambhidâ 400 20. The Apadânas 400 21. The Buddha Vansa 60* 22. The Kariyâ Pitaka 30* Total 2000 p. xxxvii THE ABHIDHAMMA PITAKA. 23. The Dhamma Sangani 260* 24. The Vibhanga 325 25. The Kathâ Vatthu 440 26. The Puggala Paññatti 75 27. The Dhâtu Kathâ 100 28. The Yamakas 400 29. The Patthâna 600 Total Abhidhamma 2200 TOTAL 10,211 This shows the total extent of the three Pitakas to be about 10,000 pages 8vo. as printed, or to be printed, by the Pâli Text Society 1. If our English Bible, in the older authorised version, were to be printed in the same manner and type and on the same size of page, it would occupy about 5,000 pages. So that the Buddhist Bible without its repetitions (some of which are very frequent, and others very long), would only occupy about double the space of the English Bible. This would not have been a literature too large to be familiarly known to our author. What is the conclusion which can fairly be drawn, from a comparison of the last list with those preceding it, as to his knowledge of those books now held, by living Buddhists, to be canonical? The answer to this question will be of some importance for another reason beyond the help it will afford towards settling the date of the: original 'Questions of Milinda.' As is well known, Asoka, in the only one of his edicts, addressed specially to the members of the Buddhist Order of mendicants, selects seven portions of the Buddhist Scriptures, which he mentions by name, and expresses his desire that not only the brethren and sisters of the Order, but also the laity, should constantly learn by heart and reflect upon those seven. Now not one of the seven titles which occur in the edict is identical with any of the twenty-nine in the last list. Whereupon certain Indianists have rejoiced at being able to score a point, as they think, against these p. xxxviii unbrahmanical Buddhists, and have jumped to the conclusion that the Buddhist canon must be late and spurious; and that the Buddhism of Asoka's time must have been very different from the Buddhism of the Pâli Pitakas. That would be much the same as if a Japanese scholar, at a time when he knew little or nothing of Christianity, except the names of the books in the Bible, were to have found an open letter of Constantine's in which he urges both the clergy and laity to look upon the Word of God as their only authority, and to constantly repeat and earnestly meditate upon the Psalm of the Shepherd, the words of Lemuel, the Prophecy of the Servant of the Lord, the Sermon on the Mount, the Exaltation of Charity, the Question of Nicodemus, and the story of the Prodigal Son--and that our Oriental critic should jump to the conclusion that the canonical books of the Christians could not have been known in the time of Constantine, and that the Christianity of Constantine was really quite different from, and much more simple than the Christianity of the Bible. As a matter of fact the existence of such a letter would prove very little, either way, as to the date of the books in the Bible as we now have them. If our Japanese scholar were to discover afterwards a Christian work, even much later than the time of Constantine, in which the canonical books of the Christians were both quoted and referred to, he would have much surer ground for a sounder historical criticism. And he would possibly come to see that the seven portions selected for special honour and commendation were not intended as an exhaustive list even of remarkable passages, much less for an exhaustive list of canonical books, but that the number seven was merely chosen in deference to the sacred character attaching to that number in the sacred literature. Such a book is our Milinda. It is, as we have seen, later than the canonical books of the Pâli Pitakas, and on the other hand, not only older than the great commentaries, but the only book, outside the canon, regarded in them as an authority which may be implicitly followed. And I venture to think that the most simple working hypothesis p. xxxix by which to explain the numerous and varied references and quotations it makes, as shown in the preceding lists, from the Pitakas as a whole, and from the various books contained in them, is that the Pâli Pitakas were known, in their entirety, and very nearly, if not quite, as we now have them, to our author. For out of the twenty-nine books of the Pitakas, we find in the lists of works referred to by him the three Pitakas as a whole, the Vinaya Pitaka as a whole, and all of its component books except the Parivâra (which was composed in Ceylon), the Sutta Pitaka and each of the four great Nikâyas, the Abhidhamma Pitaka and each of its seven component books, and the Khuddaka Nikâya as a whole and several of its separate books. And when we further recollect the very large number of quotations appearing in my lists as not yet traced in the Pitakas, we see the necessity of being very chary in drawing any argument ex silentio with respect to those books not occurring in the lists. To sum up.--It may be said generally that while the Sutta Vibhanga and the Khandhakas, the four great Nikâyas, and the Abhidhamma were certainly known to our author, he very likely had no knowledge of the Parivâra; and it remains to be seen how far his knowledge of the Khuddaka Nikâya, which he happens to mention once 1 as a whole by name, did actually extend. At present it is only clear that he knew the Khuddaka Pâtha, the Dhammapada collection of sacred verses, the Sutta Nipâta, the Thera and Theri-gâthâ, the Gâtakas, and the Kariyâ Pitaka. I hope to return to this question in the Introduction to my second volume, only pointing out here that the doubtful books (those concerning which our author is apparently silent) would occupy about two thousand pages octavo, out of the ten thousand of which the three Pitakas would, if printed, consist: and that those two thousand pages belong, for the most part, precisely to that part of the Pitakas which have not yet been edited, so that there they may very likely, after all, be quoted in one or other p. xl of the numerous quotations entered as 'not traced' in my lists 1. ____________________ Such being the extent, so far as can at present be shown, of our author's knowledge of the three Pitakas, the question arises as to the degree and accuracy of his knowledge. In the great majority of cases his quotations or references entirely agree with the readings shown by our texts. But there are a few exceptions. And as these are both interesting and instructive, it will be advisable to point them out in detail. The reference to the Avîki Hell as being outside the earth, if not at variance with, is at least an addition to the teaching of the Pitakas as to cosmogony 2. But there is some reason to believe that the passage may be an interpolation, and the difference itself is not only doubtful but also of no particular importance. The description of the contents of the Puggala Paññatti given in I, 26, does not really agree with the text. The book, in its first section, sets out six different sorts of discrimination or distinction. One paragraph only is devoted to each of the first five discriminations, and the author or authors then proceed, in the rest of the book, to deal with the details of the last of the six. Our author gives the six as the divisions of the book itself. But I think it is clear that so far as the description is inaccurate, the error is due, not to any difference between the text as he had it and that which we now possess, but simply to our author laying too great a stress upon the opening paragraphs of the book. In the reference to the Buddha's first sermon, the Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness (in 1, 38), our author says that 'eighteen kotis of Brahma gods, and an innumerable company of other gods, attained to comprehension p. xli of the truth.' There is no statement of the kind in the Pitaka account of this event (see my translation in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 146-155). But it is not inconsistent with the Pâli, and is doubtless added from some edifying commentary. There is a difference of reading between the lines put into Sâriputta's mouth, at II, 2, 4, and those ascribed to Sâriputta in the Thera Gâthâ (1002, 1003). If the Milinda reading is not found in some hitherto unpublished passage, we have here a real case of divergence. Perhaps the most important apparent variation between our author and the Pitaka texts is the statement put by him, in IV, 4, 9, into the mouth of the Buddha, that a deliberate lie is one of the offences called Pârâgika, that is, involving exclusion from the Order. Now in the old Canon Law there are only four Pârâgika offences--breach of chastity, theft, murder, and a false claim to extraordinary spiritual powers (see my translation in vol. i, pp. 1-5 of the 'Vinaya Texts'); and falsehood is placed quite distinctly under another category, that of the Pâkittiyas, offences requiring repentance (see p. 32 of the same translation). If our author was a member of the Order, as he almost certainly was, it' would seem almost incredible that he should make an error in a matter of such common knowledge, and of such vital importance, as the number and nature of the Pârâgikas. And indeed, in the immediate context, he refers to the Pâkittiya rule, though not in the exact words used in the text of the Pâtimokkha. I think that he must have known very well what he was talking about. And that a passage, not yet traced, will be found in the unpublished parts of the Pitakas, in which the Buddha is made to say that falsehood is a Pârâgika--just as a Christian might maintain that falsehood is forbidden in the Ten Commandments, and yet be perfectly aware of the exact phraseology of the Ten Words. In IV, 4, 26, our author identifies the learned pig in the Takkha-sûkara Gâtaka with the Bodisat. He differs here from the Gâtaka Commentary, in which the Bodisat is identified with the tree-god, who acts as a kind of Greek chorus in the story. And the summaries in IV, 4, 28 of p. xlii [paragraph continues] Ruru Gâtaka, and in IV, 4, 30 of the Sabba-dâtha Gâtaka, do not exactly agree with Professor Fausböll's text 1. But the commentary is not the text; and it is well known that there are numerous such light variations in the different expansions of the verses, which latter alone form the actual text. In IV, 4, 44 we find our author giving a version of a well-known incident in the Buddhist Gospel story different from the oldest version of it in the Pitaka texts. This is another instance of an expansion of the original adopted from some unknown commentator, and does not argue an ignorance of the text as we have it. I have noticed in the untranslated portion of our author, four or five cases of readings apparently different from the Pitaka texts he refers to. These I hope to deal with in my next volume. But I may notice here that two stanzas, given on p. 414 of the text, and said on p. 413 to be 'in the Sutta Nipâta,' are not found in Professor Fausböll's edition of that work; and we have there, in all probability, another case of real divergence. But the reading in the Milinda may possibly be found to be incorrect. The general result of this comparison, when we remember the very large number of passages quoted, will be held, I trust, to confirm the conclusion reached above, that our author knew the Pitakas practically as we now have them, that is as they have been handed down in Ceylon. Outside the Pitakas there are unfortunately no references to actual books. But there are several references to countries and persons which are of importance, in as much as they show a knowledge in our author of places or occurrences not mentioned in the sacred books. It will be most convenient to arrange these passages first in an alphabetical list, and then to make a few remarks on the conclusions the list suggests. They are as follows: Name. Page of the Pâli Text Anantakâya (Yonako) 29, 30. Alasando (dîpo) 82, 327, 331, 359 Asoka (dhamma-râgâ) 121. p. xliii Asokârâma (near Patna) 16, 17. Assagutta (âyasmâ) 6, 7, 14. Âyupâla (âyasmâ) 19. Uhâ (nadî) 70 Kalasi (gâmo) 83. Kasmîra (rattham) 82, 327, 331. Kola-pattana (seaport) 359. Gandhâra (rattham) 327, 331 Kandagutto (râgâ) 292. Kîna (? China) 121, 327, 331, 359. Takkola (? = Karkota) 359. Tissatthera (lekhâkariyo) 71. Devamantiya (Yonako) 22-24, 29, 30. Dhamma-rakkhita (âyasmâ) 16, 18. Nikumba (rattham) 327. Bindumatî (ganikâ) 121. Bhaddasâla (senâpati-putto) 292. Bharukakkha (men of) 331 Mankura (Yonako) 29, 30 Madhura (nigamo) 331. Yonakâ (the tribe) 1, 4, 20, 68. Rakkhita-tala (in the Himâlayas) 6, 7, 12, 18. Rohana (âyasmâ) 7, 10. Vanga (Bengal) 359. Vattaniya (senâsanam) 10, 12, 14-16. Vigamba-vatthu (senâsanam) 12. Vilâta (rattham) 327, 331. Saka-yavana (the countries of) 327, 331. Sankheyya (parivenam) 19, 22. Sabbadinna or Dinna (Yonako) 29, 56. Sâgala (nagaram) 1, 3, 5, 14, 22. Surattha (nigamo) 359, men of, 331. Suvanna-bhûmi (? Burma) 359 Sonuttara (brâhmano) 9. It will be noticed that the only names of persons, besides those occurring in the story itself, are, in one passage, Asoka and Bindumatî the courtesan, and in another Kandragupta and Bhaddasâla who fought against him. Of places, besides those in the story, we have a considerable number of names referring to the Panjâb, and adjacent countries; and besides these the names only of a few places or countries on p. xliv the sea coast. The island Alasanda in the Indus, and the town of Kalasi situated in that island, have been discussed above. The country of the Sakas and Yavanas, Gandhâra, Kashmir, Bharukakkha, Surat, and Madhura, explain themselves. Nikumba and Vilâta were probably in the same neighbourhood, but these names have not been met with elsewhere, and I can suggest no identification of them. The places on the sea coast, to which a merchant ship could sail, mentioned on p. 359, are mostly well known. Kolapattana must, I think, be some place on the Koromandel coast, and Suvanna-bhûmi be meant for the seaboard of Burma and Siam. The author mentions no places in the interior south of the Ganges. At four places he gives lists of famous rivers. In three out of the four he simply repeats the list of five--Gangâ, Yamunâ, Akiravatî, Sarabhû, and Mahî--so often enumerated together in the Pitakas 1. In the fourth passage (p. 114) he adds five others--the Sindhu, the Sarassatî, the Vetravatî, the Vîtamsâ, and the Kandabhâgâ. Of these the first two are well known. Professor Eduard Müller suggests 2 that the Vîtamsâ is the same as the Vitastâ (the Hydaspes of the Greeks and the modern Bihat). The Vetravatî is one of the principal affluents of the Jumna; and the Kandabhâgâ rises in the North-West Himâlayas, and is not unfrequently referred to as the Asiknî of the Vedas, the Akesines of the Greek geographers, the modern Kînâb 3. The list is meagre enough. An ethical treatise is scarcely the place to look for much geographical or historical matter. But unless our author deliberately concealed his knowledge, and made all the remarks he put into the mouth of Nâgasena correspond with what that teacher might fairly be expected to have known, the whole list points to the definite conclusion that the writer of the 'Questions of Milinda' resided in the far North-West of p. xlv India, or in the Panjâb itself. And this is confirmed by the great improbability of any memory of Menander having survived elsewhere, and more especially in Ceylon, where we should naturally look for our author's residence if he did not live in the region thus suggested. ____________________ As my space is here limited, I postpone to the next volume the discussion as to how far the knowledge displayed by our author, the conditions of society with which he shows himself acquainted, and the religious beliefs he gives utterance to, afford evidence of his date. I will only say here that on all these points his work shows clear signs of being later than the Pitaka texts. And in the present state of our knowledge, or rather of our ignorance, of Pâli, there is very little to be drawn from the language used by our author. In the first place we do not know for certain whether we have the original before us, or a translation from the Sanskrit or from some Northern dialect. And if, as is probably the case, we have a translation, it would be very difficult to say whether any peculiarity we may find in it is really due to the translator, or to the original author. No doubt a translator, finding in his original a word not existing in Pâli, but formed according to rules of derivation obtaining in Pâli, would coin the corresponding Pâli form. And in doing so he might very likely be led into mistake, if his original were Prakrit, by misunderstanding the derivation of the Prakrit word before him. Childers in comparing Buddhist Sanskrit with Pâli, has pointed out several cases where such mistakes have occurred, and has supposed that in every case the Sanskrit translator misunderstood a Pâli word before him 1. As I have suggested elsewhere it is, to say the least, quite as likely that the Sanskrit Buddhist texts are often founded on older works, not in Pâli, but in some other Prakrit 2. And it may be possible hereafter to form some opinion as to what that dialect was which the Sanskrit writers must have had before p. xlvi them, to lead them into the particular blunders they have made. In the same way an argument may be drawn from the words found exclusively in Milinda as to the dialect which he spoke, and in which he probably wrote. A list of the words our author uses, and not found in the Pitakas, can only be tentative, as we have not as yet the whole of the Pitaka texts in print. But it will be useful, even now, to give the following imperfect list of such as I have noted in my copy of Childers' 'Dictionary.' A Word. Page of the Pâli Text. Note. Âlaka 418 See 'Journal,' 1886, p. 158. Anekamsikatâ 93 " " " p. 123. Ânâpako 147 Peon, officer. Anîkattha 234 Sentinel. Anughâyati 343 Trace by smell. Anuparivattati 204, 253, 307 Turn towards. Antobhaviko 95 'Journal,' 1886, p. 124. Âvapana 279 " " p. 157 Asipâsâ 191 A caste so called. Anupeseti 31, 36 Send after. Âsâdaniyam 205 Injury. Atonâ 1 191 Professional beggars. Âyûhito 181 Busy. Âyûhako 207 Busy. Bhaddiputtâ 2 191 A caste so called. Bhattiputtâ 133 " " Bhavatîha 92, 93, 342 Introducing verses. Kandakanta 118 A kind of gem. Kavaka 156, 200 Wretch. Dhamadhamâyati 117 To blow. Ekâniko 402 On the one true path. Ghanikâ 191 Musicians. Gilânako 74 A sick man, a patient. Hiriyati 117 Is made afraid of sin. Issatthako 419 Archer. Galûpikâ 407 Leech. Kali-devatâ 191 Worshippers of Kali. Katumika 78, 79 Reminding. Kummiga 346 Animal. p. xlvii Lakanaka 377 Anchor. Lañkaka 137, 242, 256, 362 Epithet of the Nikâyas. Langhako 34, 191, 331 Tumbler. Lekhaniyo 172 Sharp (of medicine). Mamkata 384 Done by me. Manthayati 173 Churn. Manibhaddâ 191 A caste so called. Natthâyiko 201 (?) Farmer. Nârâka 105 The weapon so called. Niyyâmaka 194, 376 Pilot. Okassa 210 Rudely. Pabbatâ 191 A caste so called. Pakkhanno 144, 390 Lost, fallen. Parimaggakâ 343 Touchers of. Parimutti 112 Release. Parirañgita 75 Marked over. Parisanha 198 Subtle. Pariyoga 1 118 Cauldron. Patisallîyati 139 To be secluded. Patisîsaka 90 Chignon. Penâhikâ 402 A bird so called. Pitaka 18, &c. See my note to p. 28. Pimsati 43 Compound (a medicine). Ratani 2 85 Cubit. Sakkika 226 True Sâmâyiko 22 Learned in doctrine. Supâna 147 Dog. Tamyathâ 1 See Trenckner's 'Pâli Miscellany,' p. 55. Thâla 62 Gong. Tipetako 90 Who knows the Pitakas. Ukkhadeti 241 (see 315) Perfume the body. Ûhana 32 Synthesis. Ukkalati 143 Revoke. Uparama 41, 44 Cessation. Viggâdharo 153, 200 Magician. Yogâvakaro 43, 400, and foll. See my note on p. 68. Yogin 2, 400 foll. Ascetic. p. xlviii This list might be considerably extended if words were included which differ from those used in the Pitakas only by the addition of well-known suffixes or prefixes--such, for instance, as viparivattati, at p. 117, only found as yet elsewhere in the Tela Katâha Gâthâ, verse 37. But such words are really only a further utilisation of the existing resources of the language, and would afford little or no ground for argument as to the time and place at which our author wrote. I have thought it best, therefore, to omit them, at least at present. If we turn from isolated words to the evidence of style it will be acknowledged by every reader that the Milinda has a marked style of its own, different alike from the formal exactness of most of the Pitaka texts, and from the later manner of any other Pâli or Sanskrit-Buddhist authors as yet published. It is no doubt the charm of its style which has been one of the principal reasons for the great popularity of the book. Even a reader who takes no interest in the points that are raised, or in the method in which the questions are discussed, will be able, I trust, to see, even through the dark veil of a lame and wooden translation, what the merits of the original must be. And to a devout Buddhist, in whose eyes the book he was reading offered a correct solution of the most serious difficulties in religion, of the deepest problems of life,--to whose whole intellectual training and sympathies the way in which the puzzles are put, and solved, so exactly appealed,--to such a reader both the easy grace of the opening dialogue, as of a ship sailing in calm waters, and the real eloquence of occasional passages, more especially of the perorations by which the solutions are sometimes closed, must have been a continual feast. I venture to think that the 'Questions of Milinda' is undoubtedly the master-piece of Indian prose; and indeed is the best book of its class, from a literary point of view, that had then been produced in any country. Limits of space prevent the discussion of this last proposition, however interesting: and it would be, no doubt, difficult to prove that anything from India was better than the corresponding thing produced by our noble selves, or by those p. xlix whose Karma we inherit. But in ancient Indian literature there are only two or three works which can at all compare with it. It ought not to seem odd that these also are Buddhist and Pâli; that is, that they come from the same school. And while the Dîgha Nikâya may be held to excel it in stately dignity, the Visuddhi Magga in sustained power, and the Gâtaka book in varied humour, the palm will probably be eventually given to the 'Questions of Milinda' as a work of art. I am aware that this conclusion is entirely at variance with the often repeated depreciation of Buddhist literature. But the fact is that this depreciation rests upon ignorance, and is supported by prejudice. As a critical judgment it will not survive the publication and translation of those great Buddhist works which it overlooks or ignores. Some Sanskrit scholars, familiar with the Brahmin estimate of matters Indian, and filled with a very rational and proper admiration for the many fine qualities which the old Brahmins possessed, may find it hard to recognise the merits of sectarian works written in dialects which violate their most cherished laws of speech. But the historical student of the evolution of thought, and of the rise of literature in India, will more and more look upon the question as a whole, and will estimate at its right value all Indian work, irrespective of dialect or creed. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

August, 1889. Footnotes xi:1 In his 'Ancient Geography of India,' p. 186. xiii:1 See Turnour's Mahavansa, p. lxviii. xiii:2 I believe that none of the many vernacular literatures of India can compare for a moment with the Simhalese, whether judged from the point of view of literary excellence, variety of contents, age, or historical value. And yet a few hundreds a year for ten years would probably suffice, on the system followed by the Pâli Text Society, for the editing and publication of the whole. xiv:1 This was already pointed out in a note to my translation of the text commented on ('Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi of the Sacred Books of the East, p. 112). xvi:1 Kim ettha aññena vattabbam? Vuttam etam Nâgasenattheren' eva Milinda-rañña putthena .... (Sumangala Vilâsinî, loc. cit.). xvi:2 See p. 51 of the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1882. xvi:3 This Nissaya is now in the possession of his brother, the Bursar of St. John's College, Cambridge. xvii:1 By the kindness of the Master and Fellows of the College I have been allowed to collate this MS. in London. xvii:2 See 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1882, p. 35. xvii:3 See 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1883, p. 146. xvii:4 See 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1882, p. 119. xviii:1 'Pâli Miscellany,' part i, p. 55. xviii:2 For instance, Wilson in his 'Ariana Antiqua,' p. 283. xix:1 Compare Mr. Trenckner's note at p. 70 of the 'Pâli Miscellany.' xix:2 Edit. Müller, xi, II, 1. xix:3 De Repub. Ger., p. 821. xx:1 Mahâparinibbâna Suttanta VI, 58-62, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas' (vol. xi of the Sacred Books of the East), pp. 133-135. xx:2 This number would be greatly increased if the differences of the monograms were allowed for. xx:3 Chapter 47 of Müller's edition. xxi:1 See Alfred Von Sallet, 'Die Nachfolger Alexander's des Grossen in Baktrien und Indien,' Berlin, 1879; and Professor Percy Gardiner's 'Catalogue of the Coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings of Baktria and India,' London, 1886. xxi:2 In his 'Ariana Antiqua,' p. 283, London, 1841. xxi:3 The r is a little doubtful and is written, if at all, after the dh, though intended to be pronounced before the m. xxiii:1 See the chronological table in the Introduction to Professor Gardner's work, quoted below. xxiii:2 See the translation below of III, 7, 5 xxiii:3 See p. 420 of the Pâli text. xxiv:1 'Introduction,' pp. v, vi. xxv:1 See the passages quoted by Dr. Wenzel in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1886, pp. 1-4. xxv:2 See Professor Weber in the 'Handschriftenverzeichniss der königlichen Bibliothek in Berlin,' vol. v, part 2, p. 365. xxvi:1 Compare on this point Dr. Wenzel, loc. cit., with Dr. Burgess in the 'Archaeological Reports for Southern India,' vol. i, pp. 5-9. Dr. Burgess thinks the most probable date of his death is about 200 A. D. xxvi:2 The identification of Nâgârguna and Nâgasena was made independently by Major Bird in the 'Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society' for October, 1844 (who was followed by the Rev. R. Spence Hardy at p. 517 of his 'Manual of Buddhism,' published in 1860), and by Benfey in his article 'Indien' in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopedia (who was followed by Burnouf at p. 570 of his 'Introduction,' &c., published in 1844). xxvi:3 Loc. cit. Note to his translation of Târanâtha, p. 298. xxvii:1 Kern's 'Buddhismus' (the German translation), vol. ii, p. 443. xxvii:2 As these pages were passing through the press I have found Assagutta of the Vattaniya hermitage, mentioned in the last chapter of the Saddhamma Samgaha, which is passing through the press for the Pâli Text Society. But this is taken no doubt from the Milinda, and is not an independent reference to any such teacher as an historical person. (The Saddhamma Samgaha was written by Dhamma-kitti in Ceylon, probably in the twelfth century.) xxxv:1 That is, not in the Pitakas. The stanza is found in the commentary on the Dhammapada (Fausböll, p. 147), and also in Buddhaghosa's Papañka Sûdanî (see Trenckner's note)--each time with a variation at the close of the verse. xxxvi:1 Mr. Trenckner gives no reference, and I have searched through the Sutta Nipâta, which has no index, in vain. xxxvii:1 This estimate excludes the space occupied by notes. The books marked with an asterisk in the foregoing list have already been printed. xxxix:1 Page 342 of the printed text. xl:1 About half of the canonical books, besides a considerable number of the uncanonical works, have already been edited in the last few years, chiefly owing to the Pâli Text Society's labours. xl:2 See the passages quoted in my note at p. 9. xlii:1 See my notes to the passages quoted. xliv:1 See pp. 70, 87, 380 of the Pâli text. xliv:2 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1888, p. 87. xliv:3 See Lassen, 'Indische Alterthumskunde,' vol. i, p. 43 (first edition, p. 55 of the second edition), and the passages there quoted. xlv:1 See the articles in his 'Pâli Dictionary,' referred to under note 3, p. xi of the Introduction. xlv:2 See the note on pp. 178, 179 of my 'Buddhist Suttas.' xlvi:1 Hînati-kumburê (p. 252) reads anânayo. xlvi:2 The Simhalese has bhaddiputrayo. xlvii:1 1 This word has been found in the Pitakas (e. g. Magghima I, 480) in the sense of 'practice.' xlvii:2 The Pitaka form is ratana. Next: Book I Sacred Texts | Buddhism

Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book I: The Secula... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 1 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. REVERENCE BE TO THE BLESSED ONE, THE ARAHAT, THE SAMMÂ-SAMBUDDHA.

THE SECULAR NARRATIVE 1. 1. King Milinda, at Sâgala the famous town of yore, To Nâgasena, the world famous sage, repaired. (So the deep Ganges to the deeper ocean flows.) To him, the eloquent, the bearer of the torch Of Truth, dispeller of the darkness of men's minds, Subtle and knotty questions did he put, many, Turning on many points. Then were solutions given Profound in meaning, gaining access to the heart, Sweet to the ear, and passing wonderful and strange. For Nâgasena's talk plunged to the hidden depths Of Vinaya and of Abhidhamma (Law and Thought) p. 2 Unravelling all the meshes of the Suttas' net, Glittering the while with metaphors and reasoning high. Come then! Apply your minds, and let your hearts rejoice, And hearken to these subtle questionings, all grounds Of doubt well fitted to resolve. 2. Thus hath it been handed down by tradition--There is in the country of the Yonakas 1 a great centre of trade 2, a city that is called Sâgala, situate in a delightful country well watered and hilly, abounding in parks and gardens and groves and lakes and tanks, a paradise of rivers and mountains and woods. Wise architects have laid it out 3, and its people know of no oppression, since all their enemies and adversaries have been put down. Brave is its defence, with many and various strong towers and ramparts, with superb gates and entrance archways; and with the royal citadel in its midst, white walled and deeply moated. Well laid out are its streets, squares, cross roads, and market places 4. Well displayed are the innumerable sorts of costly merchandise [2] with which its shops are filled. It is richly adorned with hundreds of alms-halls p. 3 of various kinds; and splendid with hundreds of thousands of magnificent mansions, which rise aloft like the mountain peaks of the Himalayas. Its streets are filled with elephants, horses, carriages, and foot-passengers, frequented by groups of handsome men and beautiful women, and crowded by men of all sorts and conditions, Brahmans, nobles, artificers, and servants. They resound with cries of welcome to the teachers of every creed, and the city is the resort of the leading men of each of the differing sects. Shops are there for the sale of Benares muslin, of Kotumbara stuffs 1, and of other cloths of various kinds; and sweet odours are exhaled from the bazaars, where all sorts of flowers and perfumes are tastefully set out. jewels are there in plenty, such as men's hearts desire, and guilds of traders in all sorts of finery display their goods in the bazaars that face all quarters of the sky. So full is the city of money, and of gold and silver ware, of copper and stone ware, that it is a very mine of dazzling treasures. And there is laid up there much store of property and corn and things of value in warehouses-foods and drinks of every sort, syrups and sweetmeats of every kind. In wealth it rivals Uttara-kuru, and in glory it is as Âlakamandâ, the city of the gods 2. 3. Having said thus much we must now relate the previous birth history of these two persons (Milinda p. 4 and Nâgasena) and the various sorts of puzzles 1. This we shall do under six heads:-- 1. Their previous history (Pubba-yoga). 2. The Milinda problems. 3. Questions as to distinguishing characteristics. 4. Puzzles arising out of contradictory statements. 5. Puzzles arising out of ambiguity. 6. Discussions turning on metaphor. And of these the Milinda problems are in two divisions-questions as to distinctive characteristics, and questions aiming at the dispelling of doubt; and the puzzles arising out of contradictory statements are in two divisions--the long chapter, and the problems in the life of the recluse. ____________________ THEIR PREVIOUS HISTORY (PUBBA-YOGA). 4. By Pubba-yoga is meant their past Karma (their doings in this or previous lives). Long ago, they say, when Kassapa the Buddha was promulgating the faith, there dwelt in one community near the Ganges a great company of members of the Order. There the brethren, true to established rules and duties, rose early in the morning, and taking the long-handled brooms, would sweep out the courtyard and collect the rubbish into a heap, meditating the while on the virtues of the Buddha. 5. One day a brother told a novice to remove the heap of dust. But he, as if he heard not, went about his business; and on being called a second time, and a third, still went his way as if he had not heard. Then the brother, angry with so intractable a novice, dealt him a blow with the broom stick. p. 5 [paragraph continues] [3] This time, not daring to refuse, he set about the task crying; and as he did so he muttered to himself this first aspiration: 'May I, by reason of this meritorious act of throwing out the rubbish, in each successive condition in which I may be born up to the time when I attain Nirvâna, be powerful and glorious as the midday sun!' 6. When he had finished his work he went to the river side to bathe, and on beholding the mighty billows of the Ganges seething and surging, he uttered this second aspiration: 'May I, in each successive condition in which I may be born till I attain Nirvâna, possess the power of saying the right thing, and saying it instantly, under any circumstance that may arise, carrying all before me like this mighty surge!' 7. Now that brother, after he had put the broom away in the broom closet, had likewise wandered down to the river side to bathe, and as he walked he happened to overhear what the novice had said. Then thinking: 'If this fellow, on the ground of such an act of merit, which after all was instigated by me, can harbour hopes like this, what may not I attain to?' he too made his wish, and it was thus: 'In each successive condition in which I may be born till I attain Nirvâna, may I too be ready in saying the right thing at once, and more especially may 1 have the power of unravelling and of solving each problem and each puzzling question this young man may put-carrying all before me like this mighty surge!' 8. Then for the whole period between one Buddha and the next these two people wandered from existence to existence among gods and men. And our Buddha saw them too, and just as he did p. 6 to the son of Moggalî and to Tissa the Elder, so to them also did he foretell their future fate, saying: 'Five hundred years after I have passed away will these two reappear, and the subtle Law and Doctrine taught by me will they two explain, unravelling and disentangling its difficulties by questions put and metaphors adduced.' ____________________ 9. Of the two the novice became the king of the city of Sâgala in India, Milinda by name, learned, eloquent, wise, and able; and a faithful observer, and that at the right time, of all the various acts of devotion and ceremony enjoined by his own sacred hymns concerning things past, present, and to come. Many were the arts and sciences he knew--holy tradition and secular law; the Sânkhya, Yoga, Nyâya, and Vaiseshika systems of philosophy; arithmetic; music; medicine; the four Vedas, the Purânas, and the Itihâsas; astronomy, magic, causation 1, and spells; the art of war; poetry; conveyancing 2--in a word, the whole nineteen 3. [4] As a disputant he was hard to equal, harder p. 7 still to overcome; the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. And as in wisdom so in strength of body, swiftness, and valour there was found none equal to Milinda in all India. He was rich too, mighty in wealth and prosperity, and the number of his armed hosts knew no end. 10. Now one day Milinda the king proceeded forth out of the city to pass in review the innumerable host of his mighty army in its fourfold array (of elephants, cavalry, bowmen, and soldiers on foot). And when the numbering of the forces was over, the king, who was fond of wordy disputation, and eager for discussion with casuists, sophists 1, and gentry of that sort, looked at the sun (to ascertain the time), and then said to his ministers: 'The day is yet young. What would be the use of getting back to town so early? Is there no learned person, whether wandering teacher 2 or Brahman, the head of some school or order, or the master of some band of pupils (even though he profess faith p. 8 in the Arahat, the Supreme Buddha), who would be able to talk with me, and resolve my doubts?' 11. Thereupon the five hundred Yonakas said to Milinda the king: 'There are the six Masters, O king!--Pûrana Kassapa, Makkhali of the cowshed 1, the Nigantha of the Nâta clan, Sañgaya the son of the Belattha woman, Agita of the garment of hair, and Pakudha Kakkâyana. These are well known as famous founders of schools, followed by bands of disciples and hearers, and highly honoured by the people. Go, great king! put to them your problems, and have your doubts resolved 2.' 12. So king Milinda, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted the royal car with its splendid equipage, and went out to the dwelling-place of Pûrana Kassapa, exchanged with him the compliments of friendly greeting, and took his seat courteously apart. And thus sitting he said to p. 9 him: 'Who is it, venerable Kassapa, who rules the world?' 'The Earth, great king, rules the world!' 'But, venerable Kassapa, if it be the Earth that rules the world, how comes it that some men go to the Avîki hell 1, thus getting outside the sphere of the Earth?' [5] When he had thus spoken, neither could Pûrana Kassapa swallow the puzzle, nor could he bring it up; crestfallen, driven to silence, and moody 2, there he sat. 13. Then Milinda the king said to Makkhali of the cowshed 3: 'Are there, venerable Gosâla, good and evil acts? Is there such a thing as fruit, ultimate result, of good and evil acts?' 'There are no such acts, O king; and no such fruit, or ultimate result. Those who here in the world are nobles, they, O king, when they go to the p. 10 other world, will become nobles once more. And those who are Brahmans, or of the middle class, or workpeople, or outcasts here, will in the next world become the same. What then is the use of good or evil acts 1? ' 'If, venerable Gosâla, it be as you say then, by parity of reasoning, those who, here in this world, have a hand cut off, must in the next world become persons with a hand cut off, and in like manner those who have had a foot cut off or an ear or their nose!' And at this saying Makkhali was silenced. 14. Then thought Milinda the king within himself 2: 'All India is an empty thing, it is verily like chaff! There is no one, either recluse or Brahman, capable of discussing things with me, and dispelling my doubts.' And he said to his ministers: 'Beautiful is the night and pleasant! Who is the recluse or Brahman we can visit to-night to question him, who will be able to converse with us and dispel our doubts 3?' And at that saying the counsellors remained silent, and stood there gazing upon the face of the king. 15. Now at that time the city of Sâgala had for twelve years been devoid of learned men, whether Brahmans, Samanas, or laymen. But wherever the king heard that such persons dwelt, thither he would p. 11 go and put his questions to them 1. [6] But they all alike, being unable to satisfy the king by their solution of his problems, departed hither and thither, or if they did not leave for some other place, were at all events reduced to silence. And the brethren of the Order went, for the most part, to the Himâlaya mountains. 16. Now at that time there dwelt, in the mountain region of the Himâlayas, on the Guarded Slope, an innumerable company of Arahats (brethren who, while yet alive, had attained Nirvâna). And the venerable Assagutta, by means of his divine power of hearing, heard those words of king Milinda. And he convened an assembly of the Order on the summit of the Yugandhara mountain, and asked the brethren: 'Is there any member of the Order able to hold converse with Milinda the king, and resolve his doubts?' Then were they all silent. And a second and a third time he put the same question to them, and still none of all the number spake. Then he said to the assembled Order: 'There is, reverend Sirs, in the heaven of the Thirty-three 2, and east of the Vegayanta palace, a mansion called Ketumatî, wherein dwells the god Mahâsena. He is able to hold converse with Milinda the king, and to resolve his doubts.' And the innumerable company of p. 12 [paragraph continues] Arahats vanished from the summit of the Yugandhara mountain, and appeared in the heaven of the Thirty-three. 17. And Sakka, the king of the gods, beheld those brethren of the Order as they were coming from afar. And at the sight of them he went up to the venerable Assagutta, and bowed down before him, and stood reverently aside. And so standing he said to him: 'Great, reverend Sir, is the company of the brethren that has come. What is it that they want? I am at the service of the Order. What can I do for you?' And the venerable Assagutta replied: 'There is, O king, in India, in the city of Sâgala, a king named Milinda. As a disputant he is hard to equal, harder still to overcome, he is the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. He is in the habit of visiting the members of the Order and harassing them by questions of speculative import.' Then said Sakka, the king of the gods, to him: 'That same king Milinda, venerable one, left this condition to be born as a man. And there dwells in the mansion Ketumatî a god, Mahâsena by name, who is able to hold converse with him and to resolve his doubts. [7] That god we will beseech to suffer himself to be reborn into the world of men.' 18. So Sakka, the king of the gods, preceded by the Order, entered the Ketumatî mansion; and when he had embraced Mahâsena the god, he said to him: 'The Order of the brethren, Lord, makes this request of you-to be reborn into the world of men.' 'I have no desire, Sir, for the world of men, so overladen with action (Karma). Hard is life as a p. 13 man. It is here, Sir, in the world of the gods that, being reborn in ever higher and higher spheres, I hope to pass away!' And a second and a third time did Sakka, the king of the gods, make the same request, and the reply was still the same. Then the venerable Assagutta addressed Mahâsena the god, and said: 'On passing in review, Lord, the worlds of gods and men, there is none but thee that we find able to succour the faith by refuting the heretical views of Milinda the king. The whole Order beseeches thee, Lord, saying: "Condescend, O worthy one, to be reborn among men, in order to lend to the religion of the Blessed One thy powerful aid."' Then was Mahâsena the god overjoyed and delighted in heart at the thought that he would be able to help the faith by refuting the heresy of Milinda; and he gave them his word, and said: 'Very well then, venerable ones, I consent to be reborn in the world of men,' 19. Then the brethren, having thus accomplished the task they had taken in hand, vanished from the heaven of the Thirty-three, and reappeared on the Guarded Slope in the Himâlaya mountains. And the venerable Assagutta addressed the Order, and said: 'Is there, venerable ones, any brother belonging to this company of the Order, who has not appeared in the assembly?' Thereupon a certain brother said there was, that Rohana had a week previously gone into the mountains, and become buried in meditation, [8] and suggested that a messenger should be sent to him. And at that very moment the venerable Rohana aroused himself from his meditation, and was aware p. 14 that the Order was expecting him 1. And vanishing from the mountain top, he appeared in the presence of the innumerable company of the brethren. And the venerable Assagutta said to him: 'How now, venerable Rohana! When the religion of the Buddha is in danger of crumbling away, have you no eyes for the work of the Order?' 'It was through inadvertence, Sir,' said he. 'Then, venerable Rohana, atone for it.' 'What, Sir, should I do?' 'There is a Brahman village, venerable Rohana, called Kagangala 2, at the foot of the Himâlaya mountains, and there dwells there a Brahman called Sonuttara. He will have a son called Nâgasena. Go to that house for alms during seven years and ten months. After the lapse of that time thou shalt draw away the boy from a worldly life, and cause him to enter the Order. When he shall have abandoned the world, then shalt thou be free of the atonement for thy fault.' 'Let it be even as thou sayest,' said the venerable Rohana in assent. 20. Now Mahâsena the god passed away from the world of the gods, and was reborn in the womb of the wife of the Brahman Sonuttara. And at the moment of his conception three strange, wonderful things took place:--arms and weapons became all p. 15 ablaze, the tender grain became ripe in a moment, and there was a great rain (in the time of drought). And the venerable Rohana went to that house for alms for seven years and ten months from the day of Mahâsena's re-incarnation, but never once did he receive so much as a spoonful of boiled rice, or a ladleful of sour gruel, or a greeting, or a stretching forth of the joined hands, or any sort of salutation. Nay rather it was insults and taunts that fell to his share: and there was no one who so much as said, Be so good, 'Sir, as to go on to the next house 1.' But when all that period had gone by he one day happened to have those very words addressed to him. And on that day the Brahman, on his way back from his work in the fields, [9] saw the Elder as he met him on his return, and said: 'Well, hermit, have you been to our place 'Yes, Brahman, I have.' 'But did you get anything there?' 'Yes, Brahman, I did.' And he was displeased at this, and went on home, and asked them: 'Did you give anything to that hermit?' 'We gave him nothing,' was the reply. 21. Thereupon the Brahman, the next day, seated himself right in the doorway, thinking to himself: 'To-day I'll put that hermit to shame for having told a lie.' And the moment that the Elder in due course came up to the house again, he said: 'Yesterday you said you had got something at my house, having p. 16 all the while got nothing! Is lying allowed to you fellows?' And the Elder replied: 'Brahman, for seven years and ten months no one even went so far as to suggest politely that I should pass on. Yesterday this courtesy was extended to me. It was to that that I referred.' The Brahman thought to himself: 'If these men, at the mere experience of a little courtesy, acknowledge in a public place, and with thanks, that they have received an alms, what will they not do if they really receive a gift!' And he was much struck by this, and had an alms bestowed upon the Elder from the rice and curry prepared for his own use, and added furthermore: 'Every day you shall receive here food of the same kind.' And having watched the Elder as he visited the place from that day onwards, and noticed how subdued was his demeanour, he became more and more pleased with him, and invited him to take there regularly his midday meal. And the Elder gave, by silence, his consent; and daily from that time forth, when he had finished his meal, and was about to depart, he would pronounce some short passage or other from the words of the Buddha 1. 22. Now the Brahman's wife had, after her ten months, brought forth her son; and they called his name Nâgasena. He grew up in due course till he became seven years old, and his father said to the child: 'Do you want, [10] dear Nâgasena, to study the learning traditional in this Brahmanical house of ours?' p. 17 'What is it called, father?' said he. 'The three Vedas are called learning (Sikkhâ), other kinds of knowledge are only arts, my dear.' 'Yes, I should like to learn them, father,' said the boy. Then Sonuttara the Brahman gave to a Brahman teacher a thousand pieces as his teaching fee, and had a divan spread for him aside in an inner chamber, and said to him: 'Do thou, Brahman, teach this boy the sacred hymns by heart.' So the teacher made the boy repeat the hymns, urging him to get them by heart. And young Nâgasena, after one repetition of them, had learnt the three Vedas by heart, could intone them correctly, had understood their meaning, could fix the right place of each particular verse 1, and had grasped the mysteries they contained 2. All at once there arose in him an intuitive insight into the Vedas, with a knowledge of their lexicography, of their prosody, of their grammar, and of the legends attaching to the characters in them. He became a philologist and grammarian, and skilled alike in casuistry and in the knowledge of the bodily marks that foreshadow the greatness of a man 3. 23. Then young Nâgasena said to his father: 'Is p. 18 there anything more to be learned in this Brahmanical family of ours, or is this all?' 'There is no more, Nâgasena, my dear. This is all,' was the reply. And young Nâgasena repeated his lesson to his teacher for the last time, and went out of the house, and in obedience to an impulse arising in his heart as the result of previous Karma, sought a place of solitude, where he gave himself up to meditation. And he reviewed what he had learnt throughout from beginning to end, and found no value in it anywhere at all. And he exclaimed in bitterness of soul: 'Empty forsooth are these Vedas, and as chaff. There is in them neither reality, nor worth, nor essential truth!' That moment the venerable Rohana, seated at his hermitage at Vattaniya, felt in his mind what was passing in the heart of Nâgasena. And he robed himself, and taking his alms-bowl in his hand, he vanished from Vattaniya and appeared near the Brahman village Kagangala. And young Nâgasena, as he stood again in the doorway, saw him coming in the distance. At the sight of him he became happy and glad, and a sweet hope sprang up in his heart that from him he might learn the essential truth. And he went [11] to him, and said: 'Who art thou, Sir, that thou art thus bald-headed, and wearest yellow robes?' 'They call me a recluse, my child' (Pabbagita: literally, 'one who has abandoned;' that is, the worldly life). 'And why do they call thee "one who has abandoned?"' 'Because a recluse is one who has receded from p. 19 the world in order to make the stain of sinful things recede. It is for that reason, my child, that they call me a recluse.' 'Why, Sir, dost thou not wear hair as others do?' 'A recluse shaves off his hair and beard on the recognition of the sixteen impediments therein to the higher life. And what are those sixteen 1? The impediments of ornamenting it, and decking it out, of putting oil upon it, of shampooing it, of placing garlands round it, of using scents and unguents, and myrobalan seeds, and dyes, and ribbons, and combs, of calling in the barber, of unravelling curls, and of the possibility of vermin. When their hair falls off they are grieved and harassed; yea, they lament sometimes, and cry, and beat their breasts, or fall headlong in a swoon--and entangled by these and such impediments men may forget those parts of wisdom or learning which are delicate and subtle.' 'And why, Sir, are not thy garments, too, as those of other men?' 'Beautiful clothes, my boy, such as are worn by worldly men, are inseparable from the five cravings 2. But whatsoever dangers lurk in dress he who wears the yellow robes knows nothing of. It is for that reason that my dress is not as other men's.' 'Dost thou know, Lord, what is real knowledge?' 'Yes, lad, the real knowledge I know; and what is the best hymn (mantra) in the world, that too I know.' 'Couldst thou teach it, Lord, to me too?' p. 20 'Yes, I could.' 'Teach me, then.' 'Just now is not the right time for that; we, have come down to the village for alms.' 24. Then young Nâgasena took the alms-bowl the venerable Rohana was carrying, and led him into the house, and with his own hand supplied him with food, hard and soft, as much as he required. And when he saw that he had finished his meal, and withdrawn his hand from the bowl, he said to him: 'Now, Sir, will you teach me that hymn?' 'When thou hast become free from impediments, my lad, by taking upon thee, and with thy parents' consent, the hermit's dress I wear, then I can teach it thee.' 25. So young [12] Nâgasena went to his father and mother, and said: 'This recluse says he knows the best hymn in the world, but that he cannot teach it to any one who has not entered the Order as his pupil. I should like to enter the Order and learn that hymn.' And his parents gave their consent; for they wished him to learn the hymn, even at the cost of retiring from the world; and they thought that when he had learned it he would come back again 1. Then the venerable Rohana took Nâgasena to the Vattaniya hermitage, to the Vigamba Vatthu, and having spent the night there, took him on to the Guarded Slope, and there, in the midst of the innumerable company of the Arahats, young Nâgasena was admitted, as a novice, into the Order. p. 21 26. And then, when he had been admitted to the Order, the venerable Nâgasena said to the venerable Rohana: 'I have adopted your dress; now teach me that hymn.' Then the venerable Rohana thought thus to himself: 'In what ought I first to instruct him, in the Discourses (Suttanta) or in the deeper things of the faith (Abhidhamma)?' and inasmuch as he saw that Nâgasena was intelligent, and could master the Abhidhamma with ease, he gave him his first lesson in that. And the venerable Nâgasena, after hearing it repeated but once, knew by heart the whole of the Abhidhamma--that is to say, the Dhamma Sangani, with its great divisions into good, bad, and indifferent qualities, and its subdivisions into couples and triplets 1--the Vibhanga, with its eighteen chapters, beginning with the book on the constituent elements of beings--the Dhâtu Kathâ, with its fourteen books, beginning with that on compensation and non-compensation--the Puggala. Paññatti, with its six divisions into discrimination of the various constituent elements, discrimination of the various senses and of the properties they apprehend, and so on 2--the Kathâ Vatthu, with its thousand sections, five hundred on as many points p. 22 of our own views, and five hundred on as many points of our opponents' views--the Yamaka, with its ten divisions into complementary propositions as to origins, as to constituent elements, and so on--and the Patthâna, with its twenty-four chapters on the reason of causes, the reason of ideas, and the rest. And he said [13]: 'That will do, Sir. You need not propound it again. That will suffice for my being able to rehearse it.' 27. Then Nâgasena went to the innumerable company of the Arahats, and said: 'I should like to propound the whole of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, without abridgement, arranging it under the three heads of good, bad, and indifferent qualities.' And they gave him leave. And in seven months the venerable Nâgasena recited the seven books of the Abhidhamma in full. And the earth thundered, the gods shouted their applause, the Brahma gods clapped their hands, and there came down a shower from heaven of sweet-scented sandal-wood dust, and of Mandârava flowers! And the innumerable company of the Arahats, then and there at the Guarded Slope, admitted the venerable Nâgasena, then twenty years of age, to full membership in the higher grade of the Order. 28. Now the next day after he had thus been admitted into full membership in the Order, the venerable Nâgasena robed himself at dawn, and taking his bowl, accompanied his teacher on his round for alms to the village below. And as he went this thought arose within him: 'It was, after all, empty-headed and foolish of my teacher to leave the rest of the Buddha's word aside, and teach me the Abhidhamma first!' p. 23 And the venerable Rohana became aware in his own mind of what was passing in the mind of Nâgasena, and he said to him: 'That is an unworthy reflection that thou art making, Nâgasena; it is not worthy of thee so to think.' 'How strange and wonderful,' thought Nâgasena, 'that my teacher should be able to tell in his own mind what I am thinking of! I must ask his pardon.' And he said: 'Forgive me, Sir; I will never make such a reflection again.' [14] 'I cannot forgive you, Nâgasena, simply on that promise,' was the reply. 'But there is a city called Sâgala, where a king rules whose name is Milinda, and he harasses the brethren by putting puzzles to them of heretical tendency. You will have earned your pardon, Nâgasena, when you shall have gone there, and overcome that king in argument, and brought him to take delight in the truth.' 'Not only let king Milinda, holy one, but let all the kings of India come and propound questions to me, and I will break all those puzzles up and solve them, if only you will pardon me!' exclaimed Nâgasena. But when he found it was of no avail, he said: 'Where, Sir, do you advise me to spend the three months of the rains now coming on 1?' 29. 'There is a brother named Assagutta dwelling at the Vattaniya hermitage. Go, Nâgasena, to him; and in my name bow down to his feet, and say: "My teacher, holy one, salutes you reverently, and asks whether you are in health and ease, in full vigour and comfort. He has sent me here to pass p. 24 the three months of the rains under your charge." When he asks you your teacher's name, tell it him. But when he asks you his own name, say: "My teacher, Sir, knows your name."' And Nâgasena bowed down before the venerable Rohana, and passing him on his right hand as he left him, took his bowl and robe, and went on from place to place till he came to the Vattaniya hermitage, begging for his food on the way. And on his arrival he saluted the venerable Assagutta, and said exactly what he had been told to say, [15] and to the last reply Assagutta said: 'Very well then, Nâgasena, put by your bowl and robe.' And the next day Nâgasena swept out the teacher's cell, and put the drinking water and tooth-cleansers ready for him to use. The Elder swept out the cell again, threw away the water and the tooth-cleansers, and fetched others, and said not a word of any kind. So it went on for seven days. On the seventh the Elder again asked him the same questions as before. And on Nâgasena again making the same replies, he gave him leave to pass the rainy season there. 30. Now a certain woman, a distinguished follower of the faith, had for thirty years and more administered to the wants of the venerable Assagutta. And at the end of that rainy season she came one day to him, and asked whether there was any other brother staying with him. And when she was told that there was one, named Nâgasena, she invited the Elder, and Nâgasena, with him, to take their midday meal the next day at her house. And the Elder signified, by silence, his consent. The next forenoon the Elder robed himself, and taking his bowl in his hand, went down, accompanied by Nâgasena as his p. 25 attendant, to the dwelling-place of that disciple, and there they sat down on the seats prepared for them. And she gave to both of them food, hard and soft, as much as they required, waiting upon them with her own hands. When Assagutta had finished his meal, and the hand was withdrawn from the bowl, he said to Nâgasena: 'Do thou, Nâgasena, give the thanks to this distinguished lady.' And, so saying, he rose from his seat, and went away. [16] 31. And the lady said to Nâgasena: 'I am old, friend Nâgasena. Let the thanksgiving be from the deeper things of the faith.' And Nâgasena, in pronouncing the thanksgiving discourse 1, dwelt on the profounder side of the Abhidhamma, not on matters of mere ordinary morality, but on those relating to Arahatship 2. And as the lady sat there listening, there arose in her heart the Insight into the Truth 3, clear and stainless, which perceives that whatsoever has beginning, that has the inherent quality of passing away. And Nâgasena also, when he had concluded that thanksgiving discourse, felt the force of the truths he himself had preached, and he too arrived at insight 4--he too p. 26 entered, as he sat there, upon the stream (that is to say, upon the first stage of the Excellent Way to Arahatship). 32. Then the venerable Assagutta, as he was sitting in his arbour, was aware that they both had attained to insight, and he exclaimed: 'Well done! well done, Nâgasena! by one arrow shot you have hit two noble quarries!' And at the same time thousands of the gods shouted their approval. Now the venerable Nâgasena arose and returned to Assagutta, and saluting him, took a seat reverently apart. And Assagutta said to him: 'Do thou now go, Nâgasena, to Pâtaliputta. There, in the Asoka Park, dwells the venerable Dhamma-rakkhita. Under him you should learn the words of the Buddha.' 'How far is it, Sir, from here to Pâtaliputta.' 'A hundred leagues 1, Nâgasena.' 'Great, Sir, is the distance. It will be difficult to get food on the way. How shall I get there?' 'Only go straight on, Nâgasena. You shall get food on the way, rice from which the black grains have been picked out, with curries and gravies of various sorts.' 'Very well, Sir!' said Nâgasena, and bowing p. 27 down before his teacher, and passing him on the right side as he went, he took his bowl and his robe and departed for Pâtaliputta. 33. [17] At that time a merchant of Pâtaliputta, was on his way back to that city with five hundred waggons. And when he saw the venerable Nâgasena coming in the distance, he stopped the waggons, and saluted Nâgasena, and asked him: 'Whither art thou going, father?' 'To Pâtaliputta, householder.' 'That is well, father. We too are going thither. It will be more convenient for thee to go with us.' And the merchant, pleased with Nâgasena's manners, provided him with food, hard and soft, as much as he required, waiting upon him with his own hands. And when the meal was over, he took a low seat, and sat down reverently apart. So seated, he said to the venerable Nâgasena: 'What, father, is your name?' 'I am called Nâgasena, householder.' 'Dost thou know, father, what are the words of Buddha?' 'I know the Abhidhamma.' 'We are most fortunate, father; this is indeed an advantage. I am a student of the Abhidhamma, and so art thou. Repeat to me, father, some passages from it.' Then the venerable Nâgasena preached to him from the Abhidhamma, and by degrees as he did so there arose in Nâgasena's heart the Insight into the Truth, clear and stainless, which perceives that whatsoever has in itself the necessity of beginning, that too has also the inherent quality of passing away. 34. And the Pâtaliputta merchant sent on his p. 28 waggons in advance, and followed himself after them. And at a place where the road divided, not far from Pâtaliputta, he stopped, and said to Nâgasena: 'This is the turning to the Asoka Park. Now I have here a rare piece of woollen stuff, sixteen cubits by eight. [18] Do me the favour of accepting it.' And Nâgasena did so. And the merchant, pleased and glad, with joyful heart, and full of content and happiness, saluted the venerable Nâgasena, and keeping him on his right hand as he passed round him, went on his way. 35. But Nâgasena went on to the Asoka Park to Dhamma-rakkhita. And after saluting him, and telling him on what errand he had come, he learnt by heart, from the mouth of the venerable Dhamma-rakkhita, the whole of the three baskets 1 of the Buddha's word in three months, and after a single recital, so far as the letter (that is, knowing the words by heart) was concerned.. And in three months more he mastered the spirit (that is, the deeper meaning of the sense of the words). But at the end of that time the venerable Dhamma-rakkhita p. 29 addressed him, and said: 'Nâgasena, as a herdsman tends the cows, but others enjoy their produce, so thou too carriest in thy head the whole three baskets of the Buddha's word, and still art not yet a partaker of the fruit of Samanaship.' 'Though that be so, holy one, say no more,' was the reply. And on that very day, at night, he attained to Arahatship and with it to the fourfold power of that Wisdom possessed by all Arahats (that is to say: the realisation of the sense, and the appreciation of the deep religious teaching contained in the word, the power of intuitive judgment, and the power of correct and ready exposition) 1. And at the moment of his penetrating the truth all the gods shouted their approval, and the earth thundered, and the Brahma gods clapped their hands, and there fell from heaven a shower of sweet-scented sandal dust and of Mandârava flowers. 36. Now at that time the innumerable company of the Arahats at the Guarded Slope in the Himâlaya mountains sent a message to him to come, for they were anxious to see him. And when he heard the message the venerable Nâgasena vanished from the Asoka Park and appeared before them. And they said: 'Nâgasena, that king Milinda is in the habit of harassing the brethren by knotty questions and by argumentations this way and that. Do thou, Nâgasena, go and [19] master him.' 'Not only let king Milinda, holy ones, but let all the kings of India, come and propound questions to p. 30 me. I will break all those puzzles up and solve them. You may go fearlessly to Sâgala.' Then all the Elders went to the city of Sâgala, lighting it up with their yellow robes like lamps, and bringing down upon it the breezes from the heights where the sages dwell 1. ____________________ 237. At that time the venerable Âyupâla was living at the Sankheyya hermitage. And king Milinda said to his counsellors: 'Beautiful is the night and pleasant! Who is the wandering teacher or Brahman we can visit to night to question him who will be able to converse with us and to resolve our doubts?' And the five hundred Yonakas replied: 'There is the Elder, Lord, named Âyupâla, versed in the three baskets, and in all the traditional lore. He is living now at the Sankheyya hermitage. To him you might go, O king, and put your questions to him.' 'Very well, then. Let the venerable one be informed that we are coming.' p. 31 Then the royal astrologer sent a message to Âyupâla to the effect that king Milinda desired to call upon him. And the venerable one said: 'Let him come.' So Milinda the king, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted his royal chariot and proceeded to the Sankheyya hermitage, to the place where Âyupâla dwelt, and exchanged with him the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And then he said to him: 38. 'Of what use, venerable Âyupâla, is the renunciation of the world carried out by the members of your Order, and in what do you place the summum bonum?' 'Our renunciation, O king,' replied the Elder, 'is for the sake of being able to live in righteousness, and in spiritual calm.' 'Is there, Sir, any layman who lives so?' 'Yes, great king, there are such laymen. At the time when the Blessed One set rolling the royal chariot wheel of the kingdom of righteousness at Benares, at the Deer Park, [20] eighteen kotis of the Brahma gods, and an innumerable company of other gods, attained to comprehension of the truth 1. And not one of those beings, all of whom were laymen, had renounced the world. And again when the Blessed One delivered the Mahâ Samaya discourse 2, and the discourse on the 'Greatest Blessing 3,' p. 32 and the Exposition of Quietism 1, and the Exhortation to Râhula 2, the multitude of gods who attained to comprehension of the truth cannot be numbered. And not one of those beings, all of whom were laymen, had renounced the world 3.' 'Then, most venerable Âyupâla, your renunciation is of no use. It must be in consequence of sins committed in some former birth, that the Buddhist Samanas renounce the world, and even subject themselves to the restraints of one or other of the thirteen aids to purity 4! Those who remain on one seat till they have finished their repast were, forsooth, in some former birth, thieves who robbed other men of their food. It is in consequence of the Karma of having so deprived others of food that they have now only such food as they can get at one sitting; and are not allowed to eat from time to time as they want. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life. And they who live in the open air were, forsooth, in p. 33 some former birth, dacoits who plundered whole villages. It is in consequence of the Karma of having destroyed other people's homes, that they live now without a home, and are not allowed the use of huts. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life. And those who never lie down, they, forsooth, in some former birth, were highwaymen who seized travellers, and bound them, and left them sitting there. It is in consequence of the Karma of that habit that they have become Nesaggikâ in this life (men who always sit) and get no beds to lie on. It is no virtue on their part, no meritorious abstinence, no righteousness of life!' 39. And when he had thus spoken the venerable Âyupâla was silenced, and had not a word to say in reply. Then the five hundred Yonakas said to the king: 'The Elder, O king, is learned, but is also diffident. It is for that reason that he makes no rejoinder. But the king on seeing how silent Âyupâla had become, clapped his hands [21] and cried out: 'All India is an empty thing, it is verily like chaff! There is no one, either Samana or Brahman, capable of discussing things with me and dispelling my doubts 1!' As he looked, however, at the assembly and saw how fearless and self-possessed the Yonakas appeared, he thought within himself: 'For a certainty there must be, methinks, some other learned brother capable of disputing with me, or those Yonakas would not be thus confident.' And he said to them: p. 34 [paragraph continues] 'Is there, my good men, any other learned brother to discuss things with me and dispel my doubts?' 40. Now at that time the venerable Nâgasena, after making his alms-tour through the villages, towns, and cities, had in due course arrived at Sâgala, attended by a band of Samanas, as the leader of a company of the Order; the head of a body of disciples; the teacher of a school; famous and renowned, and highly esteemed by the people. And he was learned, clever, wise, sagacious, and able; a skilful expounder, of subdued manners, but full of courage; well versed in tradition, master of the three Baskets (Pitakas), and erudite in Vedic lore 1. He was in possession of the highest (Buddhist) insight, a master of all that had been handed down in the schools, and of the various discriminations 2 by which the most abstruse points can be explained. He knew by heart the ninefold divisions of the doctrine of the Buddha to perfection 3, and was equally skilled in discerning both the spirit and the letter of the Word. Endowed with instantaneous and varied power of repartee, and wealth of language, and beauty of eloquence, he was difficult to equal, and still more difficult to excel, difficult to answer, to repel, or to refute. He was imperturbable as the depths of the sea, immovable as the king of mountains; victorious in the struggle with evil, a dispeller p. 35 of darkness and diffuser of light; mighty in eloquence, a confounder of the followers of other masters, and a crusher-out of the adherents of rival doctrines (malleus hereticorum). Honoured and revered by the brethren and sisters of the Order, and its lay adherents of either sex, and by kings and their high officials, he was in the abundant receipt of all the requisites of a member of the Order--robes and bowl and lodging, and whatever is needful for the sick--receiving the highest veneration no less than material gifts. To the wise and discerning who came to him with listening ear he displayed the ninefold jewel of the Conqueror's word, he pointed out to them the path of righteousness, bore aloft for them the torch of truth, set up for them the sacred pillar of the truth 1, and celebrated for their benefit the sacrifice of the truth. For them he waved the banner, raised the standard, blew the trumpet, and beat the drum of truth. And with his mighty lion's voice, [22] like Indra's thunder but sweet the while, he poured out upon them a plenteous shower, heavy with drops of mercy, and brilliant with the coruscations of the lightning flashes of his knowledge, of the nectar waters of the teaching of the Nirvâna of the truth--thus satisfying to the full a thirsty world. 41. There then, at the Sankheyya hermitage, did the venerable Nâgasena, with a numerous company of the brethren, dwell 2. Therefore is it said: p. 36 'Learned, with varied eloquence, sagacious, bold, Master of views, in exposition sound, The brethren--wise themselves in holy writ, Repeaters of the fivefold sacred word-- Put Nâgasena as their leader and their chief. Him, Nâgasena of clear mind and wisdom deep, Who knew which was the right Path, which the false, And had himself attained Nirvâna's placid heights! Attended by the wise, by holders to the Truth, He had gone from town to town, and come to Sâgala; And now he dwelt there in Sankheyya's grove, Appearing, among men, like the lion of the hills.' 42. And Devamantiya said to king Milinda: 'Wait a little, great king, wait a little! There is an Elder named Nâgasena, learned, able, and wise, of subdued manners, yet full of courage, versed in the traditions, a master of language, and ready in reply, one who understands alike the spirit and the letter of the law, and can expound its difficulties and refute objections to perfection 1. He is staying at present at the Sankheyya hermitage. You should go, great king, and put your questions to him. He is able to discuss things with you, and dispel your doubts.' Then when Milinda the king heard the name Nâgasena, thus suddenly introduced, he was seized with fear, and with anxiety, and the hairs of his body stood on end 2. But he asked Devamantiya: 'Is that really so?' p. 37 And Devamantiya replied: 'He is capable, Sire, of discussing things with the guardians of the world--with Indra, Yama, Varuna, Kuvera, Pragâpati, Suyâma, [23] and Santushita--and even with the great Brahma himself, the progenitor of mankind, how much more then with a mere human being!' 'Do you then, Devamantiya,' said the king, 'send a messenger to say I am coming.' And he did so. And Nâgasena sent word back that he might come. And the king, attended by the five hundred Yonakas, mounted his royal chariot, and proceeded with a great retinue to the Sankheyya hermitage, and to the place where Nâgasena dwelt. 43. At that time the venerable Nâgasena was seated with the innumerable company of the brethren of the Order, in the open hall in front of the hermitage 1. So king Milinda saw the assembly from afar, and he said to Devamantiya: 'Whose, Devamantiya, is this so mighty retinue?' 'These are they who follow the venerable Nâgasena,' was the reply. Then at the sight there came over king Milinda p. 38 a feeling of fear and of anxiety, and the hairs of his body stood on end 1. But nevertheless, though he felt like an elephant hemmed in by rhinoceroses, like a serpent surrounded by the Garudas (the snake-eating mythical birds), like a jackal surrounded by boa-constrictors, or a bear by buffaloes, like a frog pursued by a serpent, or a deer by a panther, like a snake in the hands of a snake charmer, or a rat played with by a cat, or a devil charmed by an exorcist, like the moon when it is seized by Râhu, like a snake caught in a basket, or a bird in a cage, or a fish in a net, like a man who has lost his way in a dense forest haunted by wild beasts, like a Yakkha (ogre) who has sinned against Vessavana (the king of ogres and fairies), or like a god whose term of life as a god has reached its end--though confused and terrified, anxious, and beside himself in an agony of fear like that--yet at the thought that he must at least avoid humiliation in the sight of the people, he took courage, and said to Devamantiya: 'You need not [24] trouble to point out to me which is Nâgasena. I shall pick him out unaided.' 'Certainly, Sire, recognise him yourself,' said he 2. 44. Now Nâgasena was junior in seniority (reckoned from the date of his full membership in the p. 39 [paragraph continues] Order) to the half of that great company seated in front of him, and senior to the half seated behind him. And as he looked over the whole of the assembly, in front, and down the centre, and behind, king Milinda detected Nâgasena seated in the middle, and, like a shaggy lion who knows no fear or frenzy, entirely devoid of nervous agitation, and free from shyness and trepidation. And as soon as he saw him, he knew by his mien that that was Nâgasena, and he pointed him out to Devamantiya. 'Yes, great king,' said he, 'that is Nâgasena. Well hast thou, Sire, recognised the sage.' 'Whereupon the king rejoiced that he had recognised Nâgasena without having had him pointed out to him. But nevertheless, at the sight of him, the king was seized with nervous excitement and trepidation and fear. Therefore is it said: 'At the sight of Nâgasena, wise and pure, Subdued in all that is the best subjection, Milinda uttered this foreboding word-- "Many the talkers I have visited, Many the conversations I have had, But never yet, till now, to-day, has fear, So strange, so terrible, o'erpowered my heart. Verily now defeat must be my lot, And victory his, so troubled is my mind."' Here ends the introductory secular narrative (Bâhira-kathâ) 1. Footnotes 1:1 Bâhira-kathâ, literally 'outside talk;' so called in contradistinction to the religious character of the subjects treated of in the remaining books. 2:1 That is Ionians, the Pâli word for Baktrian Greeks. 2:2 Nânâ-puta-bhedanam, literally 'the distributing place of parcels of merchandise of many kinds.' Trenckner renders it 'surrounded with a number of dependent towns,' but surely entrepôt is the idea suggested. 2:3 Sutavanta-nimmitam; which Trenckner renders 'pious are its people.' But I prefer the Simhalese interpretation. 2:4 This list recurs at pp. 34, 330 of the text. See below, p. 53. 3:1 It is worth noting, as there is a doubt about the spelling, that Hînati-kumburê reads Kotumbara, not Kodumbara. 3:2 Here follow in Hînati-kumburê's version two pages of introductory matter, explaining how he came to undertake his translation. 4:1 These six words are added from Hînati-kumburê. 6:1 Hetu, literally 'cause.' Trenckner has 'logic(?);' Hînati-kumburê repeats the word. 6:2 Muddâ, literally 'seal-ring.' The meaning of the term (which recurs in similar lists at Dîgha I, 1, 25; I, 2, 14; and below, p. 59 of the text) is quite clear, but the exact details of the 'art' are unknown. I follow Buddhaghosa's comment on those passages. Trenckner leaves the word untranslated, and Hînati-kumburê says, 'Ængillen l-wîma,' that is, 'adhering with the finger,' which I do not understand, unless it means the scaling of a document. At IV, 3, 2 5, the context makes it probable that 'law of property' would be the best rendering. 6:3 The number of the Sippas (Arts and Sciences) is usually given as eighteen. In the Gâtaka (p. 58, 1. 29, Professor Fausböll's edition) it is twelve. 7:1 Lokâyatas and Vitandas. Other Pâli passages, where they are mentioned, are Kullavagga V, 3, 2; Anguttara III, 58, 1; Sumangala Vilâsinî, 96, 247; and below, 22 (p. 17). See also Weber, 'Bhagavatî,' II, 246; Muir, 'Sanskrit Texts,' III, 95; Deussen, 'Das Vedânta-System,' 310. 7:2 Samana. There is no expression in English corresponding to this common word in Pâli texts. It means any 'religious' (in the technical meaning of that word) who is not a recluse according to the orthodox Brahman rules. It includes therefore many who were not Buddhists, and also even Brahmans if they had joined the Buddhists or Gains, or any other of the non-conforming. bodies. The Samanas remained in one place during the rains, and for the rest of the year wandered from place to place, promulgating their particular views. They were not necessarily ascetics in any strict use of that term; though they were usually celibates. 8:1 So called because he was said to have been born in a cowshed. See the Sumangala, p. 143. All these six teachers were contemporaries of the Buddha, and lived therefore about five hundred years before Milinda. 8:2 All this is a mere echo of the opening paragraphs in the Sâmañña-phala (D. 2), where Agâtasattu is described as visiting these six famous sophists. And the plagiarism is all the more inartistic as the old names are retained, and no explanation is given of their being born twice at an interval of five hundred years. One may indeed ask what is a glaring anachronism to our good Buddhist romancer compared with the advantage of introducing the stock-names when he has to talk of heretics? But the whole book is so full of literary skill, that it is at least strange that its author should have made this blunder; and there are other reasons for thinking the whole episode an interpolation. (See note on 13, 15.) So that probably our 15 came originally immediately after 10, and then (after the episode in 15-36) 37 takes up the narrative interrupted at the end of 10. 9:1 Avîki (probably 'the Waveless'). The mention of this particular hell as being outside the earth is noteworthy. One would expect to find the Lokântarika hell so described. Spence Hardy indeed goes so far as to say that the Avîki is seven hundred miles directly under the great Bo Tree at Budh Gâyâ (Manual, p. 26), which would be within the sphere of the earth. But there is nothing in the Pâli texts yet published as to its position. See Kullavagga VII, 4, 8; Anguttara III, 56; Gâtaka I, 71, 96; Pañka Gati Dîpana, 20. There is a list of the hells at Sutta Nipâta III, 10, but the Avîki is not one of them. This blunder, improbable in a writer so learned as our author elsewhere shows himself, is another reason for thinking these sections to be an interpolation. 9:2 Pattakkhando pagghâyanto. See my note on Kullavagga IV, 4, 7, and compare Anguttara III, 73, 4. 9:3 This, again, is most clumsy, as the rival teachers must have dwelt far apart. And it will be seen that, notwithstanding the parade of the six names at the beginning of this episode, the remaining four are no further mentioned. 10:1 This is quite in accord with the opinions attributed to Makkhali Gosâla in the Sâmañña-phala (D. 2, 20), and in the Sumangala Vilâsinî on it (see especially p. 166). 10:2 See below, p. 30. 10:3 This is an echo of the words in the corresponding passage of the Sâmañña-phala Sutta (D. 2, 1). 11:1 This paragraph is so unnecessary after what has been said in the preceding episode, and at the same time so contradictory to the fact of two teachers at least living in or near the city, that it would really seem probable that it (or perhaps 14) came originally directly after 10, the rest being an interpolation, and a clumsy one. 11:2 These are the principal gods of the Vedic pantheon. 14:1 Patimâneti. Childers does not give this meaning to the word. But it is the usual one. Compare Sumangala, vol. i, pp. 276, 280; Vinaya Pitaka IV, 212; Kullavagga, VI, 13, 2; Gâtaka II, 423. 14:2 This is a famous place in Buddhist story. It is at the extreme limit, to the East, of the Buddhist Holy Land, the 'Middle Country.' See Sumangala Vilâsinî on D. 2, 40 (p. 173); Mahâvagga V, 13,12; Gâtaka I, 49. 15:1 This is the ordinary polite formula used by an Indian peasant when he wishes to express his inability (or his disinclination) to give food to a mendicant friar. 16:1 This custom is a rule with the mendicant friars. It is their way of 'returning thanks,' as we should say. See below, p. 25. 17:1 Suvavatthâpitâ, or perhaps its use in ceremonies or sacrifices. The phrase only occurs in this passage. It is literally, 'The three Vedas were well fixed by the boy.' Hînati-kumburê simply repeats the word. 17:2 On the exact force of the special terms translated in these clauses, one may further compare the corresponding phrases used of learning the Buddhist texts in Kullavagga IV, 14, 17; IX, 5, 1. 17:3 The above are the stock phrases for the learning of a scholarly Brahman, and one or two points in the details are uncertain. 19:1 This odd idea of the 'impediments' in the wearing of hair and beard is in accord both with modern habits of shaving, and also with a good deal of early Christian and mediaeval ethics. 19:2 The lust of the eye, of the ear, &c. 20:1 Under the rules of the Buddhist Order any one can leave it as soon as he likes. 21:1 Compare, for instance, p. 125 of the edition of this summary of Buddhist ethical psychology, edited for the Pâli Text Society, by Dr. Edward Müller, of Bern (London, 1885). 21:2 The six kinds of discrimination (Paññatti) referred to, are those set out in 1 of the Puggala. The work itself is an ethical tractate dealing only with the last of the six (the discrimination of individuals). See the edition by Dr. Morris, published by the Pâli Text Society (London, 1883). 23:1 It would be against the rules to go at once, during the rains, to Sâgala. So he would spend that time in preparation. 25:1 See the note above, p. 15. 25:2 Suññatâ, used here in the sense of Nirvâna. Compare Anguttara II, 5, 6; Gâtaka III, 191; Kullavagga XII, 2, 5. 25:3 Dhamma-kakkhu. This perception of the impermanency of all things and all beings is called 'the Eye for the Truth,' and is the sign of the entrance upon the path to Arahatship, i. e. Nirvâna. It is the same among Buddhists as conversion is among the Christians. Compare Acts xxvi. 18 ('Open their eyes, and turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God') and other similar passages. 25:4 Vipassanâ. Childers says this is an attribute of Arahatship and Trenckner translates it 'superior intelligence.' But Arahats p. 26 only have it, because they have all the powers possessed by those in the previous stages of the path, and it is only superior as being above and beyond the intelligence of the worldly wise, or even of the mere moralist. it is less than the 'Divine Eye,' and Nâgasena was not yet an Arahat. Compare the passages quoted by Childers under Dhamma-kakkhu and Dibba-kakkhu, and also Mahâvagga I, 6, 33; Gâtaka I, 140; Sumangala Vilâsinî, 237, 278. 26:1 Yoganas: that is, leagues of seven miles each. See my 'Ancient Coins and Measures of Ceylon,' p. 16, in Thomas's 'Numismata orientalia,' vol. i. 28:1 Pitakas. This expression is not used in the sacred books of the canon itself. When it first came into use is unknown. This is the earliest passage in which it has hitherto been found in the technical sense of a division of the Scriptures. It was in full use at the time of Buddhaghosa (see the Sumangala Vilâsinî, pp. 15, 16, 17, 18, &c., and the Samanta Pâsâdikâ, printed in Oldenberg's 'Vinaya Pitaka,' vol. iii, p. 293). The tertium quid of the comparison is not the basket or the box as a receptacle for preservation, but as a means of handing on (as Eastern navvies removing earth put it into baskets and pass these latter on from hand to hand). So the expression 'three baskets' means not 'the three collections,' but 'the three bodies of oral tradition as handed down from teacher to teacher.' See Trenckner's decisive argument in his 'Pâli Miscellanies,' pp. 67-69. 29:1 The four Patisambhidâs, which form the subject of one of the books of the Sutta Pitaka. 30:1 Isi-vâtam parivâtam (nagaram) akamsu. The meaning of this phrase, which has not been found elsewhere, is doubtful. Trenckner renders 'making it respire the odour of saints.' The literal translation would be 'making it blown round about by Rishi-wind.' Perhaps it may be meant to convey the idea of 'scented with the sweet breath of the wise.' But in any case the connotation is intended to be a pleasant one. Calling to mind the analogous phrase viganavâtam ârâmam, 'a hermitage with breezes from the desert.' (Mahâvagga I, 22, 17 = Kullavagga VI, 4, 8) I venture to suggest the rendering adopted above. Hînati-kumburê (p. 24) has Rishiwarayange gamanâgamanayem ganita wa kîvara wâtayem pratiwâtaya kalâhuya. 'They set its air in commotion produced by the waving of the robes of the coming and going Rishis.' 30:2 We here take up the original episode of Milinda as interrupted at 15 (or if there is an interpolation at 10). 31:1 See my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 153-155. There is nothing about the eighteen kolis in the Pitaka text referred to. 31:2 No. 20 in the Dîgha Nikâya. 31:3 In the Mahâ Mangala, translated in my 'Buddhism,' pp. 125-127. 32:1 Sama-kitta-pariyâya Suttanta. It is not certain which Sutta is here referred to. Trenckner identifies it with a short Sutta in the Anguttara (II, 4, 5). It is true that the ten short Suttas in A. II, 4 are (in the Burmese MSS. only) called collectively Sama-kitta-pariyâya. But the separate Suttas have no separate titles; the title of the Vagga is not found in the Simhalese MSS., and is probably later than the text; and it is not, after all, identical with the title here given. 32:2 There are several Suttas of this name in the Pâli Pitakas. The one referred to here (and also, it may be added, in the Asoka Edicts) is probably the shorter one (Kûla Râhulovâda Sutta) found both in the Magghima (No. 147) and in the Samyutta (XXXIV, 120). See Trenckner's note on this passage. 32:3 This way of looking at gods as laymen, still 'in the world,' is thoroughly Buddhist. 32:4 The dhutangas, enumerated by Childers sub voce. 33:1 See above, p. 10 14. 34:1 This is always explained as wise in the Buddhist Vedas, that is, the three Pitakas. 34:2 Patisambhidâs: see above, the note on p. 29. 34:3 Pârami-ppatto. This is an unusual use of Pârami, but it occurs again below, p. 36, in a similar connection, and there can be no doubt of its meaning. Trenckner translates it 'better than any one else.' 35:1 Dhamma-yûpam; with allusion to the sacred sacrificial post, which plays so great a part in Brahman ritual. 35:2 Literally 'with eighty thousand:' but this merely means to say, with a large (undefined) number. See the use of the phrase in the Nâlapâna Gâtaka (Fausböll, No. 20). 36:1 See above, p. 34, note 3. 36:2 The name itself, which means 'Chief of Nâga Snakes,' is p. 37 terrible enough, especially as the Nâgas were looked upon as supernatural beings. But it is no doubt also intended that the king had heard of his fame. 37:1 Mandala-mâla, that is a hall consisting only of a roof, supported by pillars which are connected by a dwarf wall two or three feet in height. The roof projects beyond the pillars, so that the space within is well shaded. it is a kind of open air drawing-room attached to most hermitages, and may be so small that it can be rightly rendered arbour (see above, p. 25), or sufficiently large to accommodate a considerable number. Usually of wood, sometimes of stone, it is always graceful in appearance and pleasant to use. It is mentioned in the corresponding passage of the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 10). 38:1 This again, like the passage at p. 8, is an echo of the Sâmañña Phala. (See D. 2, 10 of our forthcoming edition, or p. 116 of Grimblot.) 38:2 In the corresponding passage of the Sâmañña Phala Gîvaka points out the Buddha to Agâtasattu ( 11, Grimblot, p. 117). This would be in the memory of all his readers, and our author alters the story in this case to show how superior Milinda was to the royal interlocutor in the older dialogue. 39:1 See note on p. 1. This book closes in Hînati-kumburê's Simhalese version with the title 'Pûrwa Yoga yayi;' and is of course identical with the Pubba-yoga referred to above, p. 4, as the first division of the work. Next: Chapter 1 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Introduction Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 40

LAKKHANA PAÑHA. THE DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF ETHICAL QUALITIES.

1. [25] Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Nâgasena was, and addressed him with the greetings and compliments of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully apart. And Nâgasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart of the king was propitiated. And Milinda began by asking, 1'How is your Reverence known, and what, Sir, is your name?' 'I am known as Nâgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give such a name as Nâgasena, or Sûrasena, or Vîrasena, or Sîhasena, yet this, Sire,--Nâgasena and so on--is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter 2.' p. 41 Then Milinda called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness: 'This Nâgasena says there is no permanent individuality (no soul) implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him in that?' And turning to Nâgasena, he said: 'If, most reverend Nâgasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food and lodging and necessaries for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such things when given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is it who devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arahatship? And who is it who destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his own? who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a word) commits any one of the five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life 1? If that be so there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor causer of good or evil deeds 2; there is neither fruit nor result of good or evil Karma 3. [26]--If, most reverend Nâgasena, we are to think that were a man p. 42 to kill you there would be no murder 1, then it follows that there are no real masters or teachers in your Order, and that your ordinations are void.--You tell me that your brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing you as Nâgasena. Now what is that Nâgasena? Do you mean to say that the hair is Nâgasena?' 'I don't say that, great king.' 'Or the hairs on the body, perhaps?' 'Certainly not.' 'Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the fæces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all of these, that is Nâgasena 2?' And to each of these he answered no. 'Is it the outward form then (Rûpa) that is Nâgasena, or the sensations (Vedanâ), or the ideas (Saññâ), or the confections (the constituent elements of character, Samkhârâ), or the consciousness (Vigññâna), that is Nâgasena 3?' And to each of these also he answered no. p. 43 'Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Nâgasena?' 'No! great king.' 'But is there anything outside the five Skandhas that is Nâgasena?' And still he answered no. 'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena that we see before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth!' And the venerable Nâgasena said to Milinda the king: 'You, Sire, have been brought up in great luxury, as beseems your noble birth. If you were to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy ground, trampling under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard sand, your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, your mind would be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of bodily suffering. How then did you come, on foot, or in a chariot?' 'I did not come, Sir, on foot [27]. I came in a carriage.' 'Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. Is it the pole that is the chariot?' 'I did not say that.' 'Is it the axle that is the chariot?' 'Certainly not.' 'Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?' And to all these he still answered no. 'Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?' p. 44 'No, Sir.' 'But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?' And still he answered no. 'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no such thing as a chariot! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom then are you afraid that you speak untruth? And he called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness, saying: 'Milinda the king here has said that he came by carriage. But when asked in that case to explain what the carriage was, he is unable to establish what he averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in that?' When he had thus spoken the five hundred Yonakas shouted their applause, and said to the king: Now let your Majesty get out of that if you can?' And Milinda the king replied to Nâgasena, and said: 'I have spoken no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these things--the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad--that it comes under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of "chariot."' 'Very good! Your Majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of "chariot." And just even so it is on account of all those things you questioned me about--[28] the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five constituent elements of being--that I come under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of "Nâgasena." p. 45 [paragraph continues] For it was said, Sire, by our Sister Vagirâ in the presence of the Blessed One: '"Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of its various parts that the word 'chariot' is used, just so is it that when the Skandhas are there we talk of a 'being 1.'"' 'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha himself here he would approve your answer. Well done, well done, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 2. 'How many years seniority have you, Nâgasena?' 'Seven, your Majesty.' 'But how can you say it is your "seven?" Is it you who are "seven," or the number that is "seven?"' Now that moment the figure of the king, decked in all the finery of his royal ornaments, cast its shadow on the ground, and was reflected in a vessel of water. And Nâgasena asked him: 'Your figure, O king, is now shadowed upon the ground, and reflected in the water, how now, are you the king, or is the reflection the king?' 'I am the king, Nâgasena, but the shadow comes into existence because of me.' 'Just even so, O king, the number of the years is seven, I am not seven. But it is because of me, O king, that the number seven has come into existence; and it is mine in the same sense as the shadow is yours 2.' p. 46 'Most wonderful again, and strange, Nâgasena. Well has the question put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved!' ____________________ 3. The king said: 'Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?' 'If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (pandit), well; but if you will discuss as a king, no.' 'How is it then that scholars discuss?' 'When scholars talk a matter over one with another then is there a winding up 1, an unravelling; one or other is convicted of error 2, and he then acknowledges his mistake; [29] distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions 3; and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O king, discuss.' 'And how do kings discuss?' 'When a king, your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: "Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!" Thus, your Majesty, do kings discuss 4.' 'Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let your reverence talk unrestrainedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid!' p. 47 'Very good, your Majesty,' said Nâgasena, with thankfulness. 'Nâgasena, I have a question to ask you;' said the king. 'Pray ask it, Sire.' 'I have asked it, your Reverence.' 'That is answered already.' 'What have you answered?' 'To what, then, does your Majesty refer?' But Milinda the king thought: 'This Bhikkhu is a great scholar. He is quite capable of discussing things with me. And I shall have a number of points on which to question him, and before I can ask them all, the sun will set. It would be better to carry on the discussion at home to-morrow.' And he said to Devamantiya: 'You may let his reverence know that the discussion with the king shall be resumed to-morrow at the palace.' And so saying, he took leave of Nâgasena, and mounted his horse, and went away, muttering as he went, 'Nâgasena, Nâgasena!' And Devamantiya delivered his message to Nâgasena, who accepted the proposal with gladness. And early the next morning Devamantiya and Anantakâya and Mankura and Sabbadinna. went to the king, and said: 'Is his reverence, Nâgasena, to come, [30] Sire, to-day?' 'Yes, he is to come.' 'With how many of the brethren is he to come?' 'With as many as he likes.' And Sabbadinna said: 'Let him come with ten.' But the king repeated what he had said.. And on Sabbadinna reiterating his suggestion, the 'king rejoined: 'All this preparation has been made, and I say: p. 48 "Let him come with as many as he likes," yet Sabbadinna says: "Let him come with ten." Does he suppose we are not capable of feeding so many?' Then Sabbadinna was ashamed. ____________________ 4. And Devamantiya and Anantakâya and Mankura went to Nâgasena and told him what the king had said. And the venerable Nâgasena robed himself in the forenoon, and taking his bowl in his hand, went to Sâgala with the whole company of the brethren. And Anantakâya, as he walked beside Nâgasena, said: 'When, your reverence, I say, "Nâgasena," what is that Nâgasena?' The Elder replied: 'What do you think Nâgasena is?' 'The soul, the inner breath which comes and goes, that I suppose to be Nâgasena.' 'But if that breath having gone forth should not return, or having returned should not go forth, would the man be alive?' 'Certainly [31] not, Sir.' 'But those trumpeters, when they blow their trumpets, does their breath return again to them?' 'No, Sir, it does not.' 'Or those pipers, when they blow their pipes or horns, does their breath return again to them?' 'No, Sir.' 'Then why don't they die?' 'I am not capable of arguing with such a reasoner. Pray tell me, Sir, how the matter stands.' 'There is no soul in the breath. These inhalations and exhalations are merely constituent powers p. 49 of the bodily frame,' said the Elder. And he talked to him from the Abhidhamma 1 to such effect that 1 Anantakâya confessed himself as a supporter of the Order. ____________________ 5. And the venerable Nâgasena went to the king, and sat down on the seat prepared for him. And the king provided Nâgasena and his following with food, both hard and soft, as much as they required: and presented each brother with a suit of garments, and Nâgasena himself with a set of three robes. And then he said to him: 'Be pleased to keep your seat here, and with you ten of the brethren. Let the rest depart.' And when he saw that Nâgasena had finished his meal, he took a lower seat, and sat beside him, and said: 'What shall we discuss?' 'We want to arrive at truth. Let our discussion be about the truth.' And the king said: 'What is the object, Sir, of your 2 renunciation, and what the summum bonum at which you aim?' 'Why do you ask? Our renunciation is to the end that this sorrow may perish away, and that no further sorrow may arise; the complete passing away, without cleaving to the world, is our highest aim.' 'How now, Sir! Is it for such high reasons that all members of it have joined the Order?,' [32] 'Certainly not, Sire. Some for those reasons, p. 50 but some have left the world in terror at the tyranny of kings. Some have joined us to be safe from being robbed, some harassed by debt, and some perhaps to gain a livelihood.' 'But for what object, Sir, did you yourself join.' 'I was received into the Order when I was a mere boy, I knew not then the ultimate aim. But I thought: "They are wise scholars, these Buddhist Samanas, they will be able to teach me." And by them I have been taught; and now do I both know and understand what is at once the reason for, and the advantage of renunciation.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 6. The king said: 'Nâgasena, is there any one who after death is not reindividualised?' 'Some are so, and some not.' 'Who are they?' 'A sinful being is reindividualised, a sinless one is not.' 'Will you be reindividualised?' 'If when I die, I die with craving for existence in my heart, yes; but if not, no 1.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7. The king said: 'Nâgasena, he who escapes reindividualisation is it by reasoning that he escapes it?' 'Both by reasoning 2, your Majesty, and by wisdom 3, and by other good qualities.' 'But are not reasoning and wisdom surely much the same?' 'Certainly not. Reasoning is one thing, wisdom p. 51 another. Sheep and goats, oxen and buffaloes, camels and asses have reasoning, but wisdom they have not.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 8. The king said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning, and what of wisdom?' 'Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off 1.' 'But how is comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, and cutting off of wisdom? Give me an illustration.' 'You remember the barley reapers?' 'Yes, certainly.' [33] 'How do they reap the barley?' 'With the left hand they grasp the barley into a bunch, and taking the sickle into the right hand, they cut it off with that.' 'Just even, so, O king, does the recluse by his thinking grasp his mind, and by his wisdom cut off his failings. In this way is it that comprehension is the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 9. The king said: 'When you said just now, "And by other good qualities," to which did you refer?' p. 52 'Good conduct, great king, and faith, and perseverance, and mindfulness, and meditation 1. 'And what is the characteristic mark of good conduct?' 'It has as its characteristic that it is the basis of all good qualities. The five moral powers 2--faith, perseverance, mindfulness, meditation, and wisdom-; the seven conditions of Arahatship 3--self-possession, investigation of the Dhamma, perseverance, joy, calm, meditation, and equanimity--; the Path; readiness of memory (unbroken self-possession) 4; the four kinds of right exertion 5; the four constituent bases of extraordinary powers 6;the four stages of ecstasy 7; the eight forms of spiritual emancipation 8; the four modes of self-concentration 9; and the eight states of intense contemplation 10 have each and all of them good conduct (the observance of outward morality) as their basis. And to him who builds upon that foundation, O king, all these good conditions will not decrease 11.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as all those forms of animal and vegetable life which grow, develope, and mature, do so with the earth as their basis; just so does the recluse, who is devoted in effort, develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.' 'Give me a further illustration.' p. 53 'Just, O king, as all the occupations which involve bodily exertion are carried on in ultimate dependence upon the earth, just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.' [34] 'Give me a still better illustration.' 'Just, O king, as the architect of a city, when he wants to build one, first clears the site of the town, and then proceeds to get rid of all the stumps and thorny brakes, and thus makes it level, and only then does he lay out the streets and squares, and crossroads and market places, and so build the city; just so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue.' 'Can you give me one more simile?' 'Just, O king, as an acrobat 1, when he wants to exhibit his skill, first digs over the ground, and proceeds to get rid of all the stones and fragments of broken pottery, and thus to make it smooth, and only then, on soft earth, shows his tricks; just even so does the recluse develope in himself the five moral powers, and so on, by means of virtue, on the basis of virtue. For it has been said, Sire, by the Blessed One: "Virtue's the base on which the man who's wise Can train his heart, and make his wisdom grow. Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu, undeceived, Unravel all the tangled skein of life 2. p. 54 "This is the base--like the great earth to men-- And this the root of all increase in goodness, The starting-point of all the Buddhas' teaching, Virtue, to wit, on which true bliss depends 1." 'Well said, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 10 2. The king said, 'Venerable Nâgasena, what is the characteristic mark of faith?' 'Tranquillisation, O king, and aspiration 3.' 'And how is tranquillisation the mark of faith?' As faith, O king, springs up in the heart it breaks through the five hindrances--lust, malice, mental sloth, spiritual pride, and doubt--and the heart, free from these hindrances, [35] becomes clear, serene, untroubled.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as a suzerain king, when on the march with his fourfold army, might cross over a small stream, and the water, disturbed by the elephants and cavalry, the chariots and the bowmen, might become fouled, turbid 4, and muddy. And p. 55 when he was on the other side the monarch might give command to his attendants, saying: "Bring some water, my good men. I would fain drink." Now suppose the monarch had a water-clearing gem 1, and those men, in obedience to the order, were to throw the jewel into the water; then at once all the mud would precipitate itself, and the sandy atoms of shell and bits of water-plants would disappear, and the water would become clear, transparent, and serene, and they would then bring some of it to the monarch to drink. The water is the heart; the royal servants are the recluse; the mud, the sandy atoms, and the bits of water-plants are evil dispositions; and the water-cleansing gem is faith.' 'And how is aspiration the mark of faith?' 'In as much as the recluse, on perceiving how the hearts of others have been set free, aspires to enter as it were by a leap upon the fruit of the first stage, or of the second, or of the third in the Excellent Way, or to gain Arahatship itself, and thus applies himself to the attainment of what he has not reached, to the experience of what he has not yet felt, to the realisation of what he has not yet realised,--therefore is it that aspiration is the mark of faith.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as if a mighty storm [36] were to break upon a mountain top and pour out rain, the water would flow down according to the levels, and after filling up the crevices and chasms and gullies p. 56 of the hill, would empty itself into the brook below, so that the stream would rush along, overflowing both its banks. Now suppose a crowd of people, one after the other, were to come up, and being ignorant of the real breadth or depth of the water, were to stand fearful and hesitating on the brink. And suppose a certain man should arrive, who knowing exactly his own strength and power should gird himself firmly and, with a spring, land himself on the other side. Then the rest of the people, seeing him safe on the other side, would likewise cross. That is the kind of way in which the recluse, by faith 1, aspires to leap, as it were by a bound, into higher things. For this has been said, O king, by the Blessed One in the Samyutta Nikâya: "By faith he crosses over the stream, By earnestness the sea of life; By steadfastness all grief he stills, By wisdom is he purified 2." 'Well put, Nâgasena!' p. 57 11 1. The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of perseverance?' 'The rendering of support, O king, is the mark of perseverance 2. All those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Just as a man, if a house were falling, would make a prop for it of another post, and the house so supported would not fall; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Just as when a large army has broken up a small one, then the king of the latter would call to mind every possible ally and reinforce his small army 3, and by that means the small army might in its turn break up the large one; just so, O king, is the rendering of support the mark of perseverance, and all those good qualities which it supports do not fall away [37]. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "The persevering hearer of the noble truth, O Bhikkhus, puts away evil and cultivates goodness, puts away that which is wrong and developes in himself that which is right, and thus does he keep himself pure."' p. 58 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 12. The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of mindfulness 1?' 'Repetition, O king, and keeping up 2.' 'And how is repetition the mark of mindfulness?' 'As mindfulness, O king, springs up in his heart he repeats over the good and evil, right and wrong, slight and important, dark and light qualities, and those that resemble them, saying to himself: "These are the four modes of keeping oneself ready and mindful, these the four modes of spiritual effort, these the four bases of extraordinary powers, these the five organs of the moral sense, these the five mental powers, these the seven bases of Arahatship, these the eight divisions of the Excellent Way, this is serenity and this insight, this is wisdom and this emancipation 3." Thus does the recluse follow after p. 59 those qualities that are desirable, and not after those that are not; thus does he cultivate those which ought to be practised, and not those which ought not. That is how repetition is the mark of mindfulness.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the treasurer of the imperial sovran 1, who reminds his royal master early and late of his glory, saying: "So many are thy war elephants, O king, and so many thy cavalry 2, thy war chariots and thy bowmen, so much the quantity of thy money, and gold, and wealth, may your Majesty keep yourself in mind thereof.' 'And how, Sir, is keeping up a mark of mindfulness?' 'As mindfulness springs up in his heart, O king, he searches out the categories of good qualities and their opposites, saying to himself: "Such and such qualities are good, and such bad; [38] such and such qualities helpful, and such the reverse." Thus does the recluse make what is evil in himself to disappear, and keeps up what is good. That is how keeping up is the mark of mindfulness.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the confidential adviser of that imperial p. 60 sovran 1 who instructs him in good and evil, saying: "These things are bad for the king and these good, these helpful and these the reverse." And thus the king makes the evil in himself die out, and keeps up the good.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 13 2. The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of meditation 3? 'Being the leader, O king. All good qualities have meditation as their chief, they incline to it, lead up towards it, are as so many slopes up the side of the mountain of meditation.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'As all the rafters of the roof of a house, O king, go up to the apex, slope towards it, are joined on together at it, and the apex is acknowledged to be the top of all; so is the habit of meditation in its relation to other good qualities.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'It is like a king, your Majesty, when he goes down to battle with his army in its fourfold array. The whole army--elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and bowmen--would have him as their chief, their p. 61 lines would incline towards him, lead up to him, they would be so many mountain slopes, one above another, with him as their summit, round him they would all be ranged. [39] And it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One: "Cultivate in yourself, O Bhikkhus, the habit of meditation. He who is established therein knows things as they really are 1."' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 14. The king said: 'What, Nâgasena, is the characteristic mark of wisdom 2?' 'I have already told you, O king, how cutting off, severance, is its mark 3, but enlightenment is also its mark.' 'And how is enlightenment its mark?' 'When wisdom springs up in the heart, O king, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth 4, and it makes the Noble Truths plain. Thus does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in individuality), and the absence of any soul.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like a lamp, O king, which a man might introduce into a house in darkness. When the lamp had been brought in it would dispel the darkness, p. 62 cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly visible. Just so would wisdom in a man have such effects as were just now set forth.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 15. The king said: 'These qualities which are so different 1, Nâgasena, do they bring about one and the same result?' 'They do. The putting an end to evil dispositions.' 'How is that? Give me an illustration.' 'They are like the various parts of an army--elephants, cavalry, war chariots, and archers--who all work to one end, to wit: the conquest in battle of the opposing army.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' Here ends the First Chapter. Footnotes 40:1 There is a free translation of the Simhalese version of the following dialogues (down to the end of our 4) in Spence Hardy's 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 424-429. But it is very unreliable as a reproduction of either the Simhalese or the Pâli, and slurs over the doubtful passages. 40:2 Na puggalo upalabbhati. This thesis, that 'there is no individual,' is discussed at the opening of the Kathâ Vatthu (leaf ka of my MS.) Put into modern philosophical phraseology it amounts to saying that there is no permanent subject underlying the temporary phenomena visible in a man's individuality. But p. 41 I doubt whether, even in our author's time, the conception 'subject' was common ground, or that the word puggala had acquired that special connotation. 41:1 Pañkânantariya-kammam karoti. See my note on Kullavagga VII, 3, 9 ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. iii, p. 246, in the Sacred Books of the East). 41:2 This is no doubt said in these words with allusion to the opinion ascribed in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 17) to Pûrana Kassapa. 41:3 This is the opinion ascribed in identical words in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 23) to Agita of the garment of hair. 42:1 This is practically the same opinion as is ascribed in the Sâmañña Phala (D. II, 26) to Pakudha Kakkâyana. 42:2 This list of the thirty-two forms (âkâras) of organic matter in the human body occurs already in the Khuddaka Pâtha, 3. It is the standard list always used in similar connections; and is, no doubt, supposed to be exhaustive. There are sixteen (half as many) âkâras of the mind according to Dîpavamsa I, 42. 42:3 These are the five Skandhas, which include in them the whole bodily and mental constituents of any being. See p. 80. 45:1 From the Samyutta Nikâya V, 10, 6. 45:2 Hardy (p. 427, 4 of the first edition) has quite missed the point of this crux. 46:1 Âvethanam; not in Childers, but see Gâtaka II, 9; IV, 3831 384; and Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1887. 46:2 Niggâho karîyati, as for instance below, p. 142. 46:3 Pativiseso; not in Childers, but see again Gâtaka II, 9. 46:4 Hardy, loc. cit. 5, puts all this into the mouths of 'the priests.' 49:1 I venture to think it is incorrect to put a full stop, as Mr. Trenckner has done, after akâsi. 49:2 Plural. 'You members of the Buddhist Order.' The question is further elaborated below, III, 1, 3, and above, I, 38. 50:1 Repeated below, with an illustration, Chap. 2, 7, p. 76. 50:2 Yoniso manasikâra. 50:3 Paññâ. See pp. 59, 64, 128. 51:1 In the long list of the distinguishing characteristics of ethical qualities given by Buddhaghosa in the Sumangala, p. 63, pagânana is the mark of paññidriya, aviggâya akampiyam of paññabala, and tad-uttariyam of paññâ simply. He gives no 'mark' of yoniso manasikâra. 52:1 Sîlam, saddhâ, viriyam, sati, samâdhi. 52:2 Indriya-balâni. 52:3 Bogghangâ. 52:4 Satipatthâna. 52:5 Sammappadhâna. 52:6 Iddhipâda. 52:7 Ghâna. 52:8 Vimokhâ. 52:9 Samâdhi. 52:10 Samâpatti. 52:11 The above-mentioned meritorious conditions are those the sum of which make Arahatship. 53:1 Langhako, not in Childers; but compare Gâtaka I, 431, and below, pp. 191, 331 of the text. 53:2 This verse occurs twice in the Samyutta (I, 3, 3, and VII, 1, 6). 54:1 Vara-pâtimokkhiyo, a poetical expression found only in this passage, and of the exact connotation of which I am uncertain. It is not in Childers; and Hînati-kumburê gives no assistance. The whole line may mean, 'The scheme of a virtuous life as laid down in the most excellent Pâtimokkha.' See the use of Samyutta-Nikâya-vare below, p. 36 of the text. On the whole section compare M. P. S. I, 12. 54:2 This section is summarised in Hardy's 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 411, 412 (1st edition). 54:3 Sampasâdana and sampakkhandana. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., does not give faith in his list, but he gives the power of faith (saddhâ-bala), and as its 'mark' 'that it cannot be shaken by incredulity.' 54:4 Lulita, not in Childers; but compare Anguttara I, 55, and 'Book of the Great Decease,' IV, 26-32. 55:1 Udakappasâdako mani. Doubtless a magic gem is meant: with allusion particularly to the Wondrous Gem (the Mani-ratana) of the mythical King of Glory (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256). 56:1 In the Buddha, in the sufficiency of the Excellent Way he taught, and in the capacity of man to walk along it. It is spoken of slightingly (compared with Arahatship) in Mahâvagga V, 1, 21--in the Mahâparinibbâna Sutta VI, 9 (of Ânanda, who has faith, compared with the brethren, who have entered one or other of the stages of the Excellent Way)--and in Anguttara III, 21 (in comparison with intuitive insight and intellectual perception). For this last comparison see further the Puggala Paññatti III, 3. From these passages a fair idea of the Buddhist view of faith could be formed. Although the Buddhist faith and the Christian faith are in things contradictory, the two conditions of heart are strikingly similar both in origin and in consequence. 56:2 This verse is not yet reached in the Pâli Text Society's edition of the Samyutta, but it is found also in the Sutta Nipâta I, 10, 4. 57:1 This section is summarised by Hardy, loc. cit. p. 409. 57:2 Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., says that paggaha (tension) is the mark of viriyindriya. 57:3 Aññamaññam anusâreyya anupeseyya. This is the way in which Hînati-kumburê understands this doubtful passage. Hardy has bungled the whole simile. Both the words are new, and I am not sure that the first does not after all come from the root sar, to follow. 58:1 Sati, summarised in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 412. 58:2 Apilâpana and upaganhana, both new words. This definition is in keeping with the etymological meaning of the word sati, which is 'memory.' It is one of the most difficult words (in its secondary, ethical, and more usual meaning) in the whole Buddhist system of ethical psychology to translate, Hardy renders 'conscience,' which is certainly wrong; and Gogerly (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 144) has 'meditation,' which is equally wide of the mark. I have sometimes rendered it 'self-possession.' It means that activity of mind, constant presence of mind, wakefulness of heart, which is the foe of carelessness, inadvertence, self-forgetfulness. And it is a very constant theme of the Buddhist moralist. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., makes upatthâna, 'readiness,' its mark. 58:3 These are the various moral qualities and mental habits which together make up Arahatship, and may be said also to make up Buddhism (as the Buddha taught it). It was on these that he laid special stress, in his last address to the members of the Order, just before his death ('Book of the Great Decease,' III, 65, in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 60-63); and the details of them will be found in the note to that passage. 59:1 Kakkavattissa bhandâgâriko, no doubt with allusion to the gahapati-ratanam, one of the seven treasures of the mythical King of Glory (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 257). It is particularly interesting to me to find here the use of the word 'treasurer' instead of 'householder;' for it was in that exact sense that I had understood the word gahapati in that connection, at a time when, in the then state of Pâli scholarship, it seemed very bold to do so. 59:2 Literally 'horses.' The whole list is again a manifest allusion to the corresponding one in the Sutta of the Great King of Glory. 60:1 Parinâyaka, the seventh treasure of the King Of Glory. (Compare the 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 259.) It will be seen that our author is in substantial agreement with the older tradition, and does not, like the Lalita Vistara, understand under this officer a general. 60:2 Omitted by Hardy. 60:3 Samâdhi. Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 6,5, gives also 'being the chief' as its mark, but he previously (p. 64) gives avikkhepa, 'serenity,' as the mark of sammâ-samâdhi, and also (p. 63) of samâdhindriya, while 'being unshaken by spiritual pride' is his mark (p. 63) of Samâdhi-bala. 61:1 Samyutta Nikâya XXI, 5. 61:2 Paññâ. Hardy in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 414, 415, gives a jumble of this passage and several others. 61:3 See above, p. 51. 61:4 Vidamseti, not in Childers; but compare Theri Gâthâ, 74; Anguttara III, 103; and Gâtaka, III, 222. 62:1 That is, the five referred to above, p. 51, 9. Next: Chapter 2 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book I: The Secula... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 63

1. [40] The king said: 'He who is born, Nâgasena, does he remain the same or become another?' 'Neither the same nor another.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?' 'No. That child was one, I am another.' 'If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, no! nor teacher. You cannot have been taught either learning, or behaviour, or wisdom. What, great king! is the mother of the embryo in the first stage different from the mother of the embryo in the second stage, or the third, or the fourth 1? Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up man? Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished his schooling another? Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished by having his hands or feet cut off 2?' 'Certainly not. But what would you, Sir, say to that? ' The Elder replied: 'I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was a tender tiny baby, flat on my back. For all these states are included in one by means of this body.' 'Give me an illustration.' p. 64 'Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?' 'Yes, it might do so.' 'Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in the second?' 'No.' 'Or the same that burns in the second watch and in the third?' 'No.' 'Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another in the third?' 'No. The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.' 'Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness 1.' 'Give me a further illustration.' p. 65 'It is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then from butter to ghee. Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee?' 'Certainly not; but they are produced out of it.' 'Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained. One comes into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his self-consciousness.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 2 1. The king said: 'Is a man, Nâgasena, who will not be reborn, aware of the fact?' 'Yes, O king.' 'And how does he know it 'By the cessation of all that is cause, proximate or remote 2, of rebirth.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose a farmer, great king, had ploughed and sown and filled his granary; and then for a period should neither plough nor sow, but live on the p. 66 stored-up grain, or dispose of it in barter, or deal with it as he had need. Would the farmer be aware, great king, that his granary was not getting filled?' 'Yes, he ought to know it.' 'But how?' 'He would know that the cause, proximate and remote, of the filling of the granary had ceased.' 'Just so with the man you spoke of. By the cessation of all that leads to rebirth, he would be conscious of having escaped his liability to it.' 'Well explained, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 3 1. The king said: 'He who has intelligence, Nâgasena, has he also wisdom 2?' 'Yes, great king.' [42] 'What; are they both the same?' 'Yes.' 'Then would he, with his intelligence--which, you say, is the same as wisdom--be still in bewilderment or not?' 'In regard to some things, yes; in regard to others, no.' 'What would he be in bewilderment about?' 'He would still be in bewilderment as to those parts of learning he had not learnt, as to those countries he had not seen, and as to those names or terms he had not heard.' 'And wherein would he not be in bewilderment?' 'As regards that which has been accomplished by insight--(the perception, that is,) of the impermanence p. 67 of all beings, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the non-existence of any soul 1.' 'Then what would have become of his delusions on those points.' 'When intelligence has once arisen, that moment delusion has died away.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the lamp, which when a man has brought into a darkened room, then the darkness would vanish away, and light would appear.' 'And what, Nâgasena, on the other hand, has then become of his wisdom?' 'When the reasoning wisdom has effected that which it has to do, then the reasoning ceases to go on. But that which has been acquired by means of it remains--the knowledge, to wit, of the impermanence of every being, of the suffering inherent in individuality, and of the absence of any soul.' 'Give me an illustration, reverend Sir, of what you have last said.' 'It is as when a man wants, during the night, to send a letter, and after having his clerk called, has a lamp lit, and gets the letter written. Then, when that has been done, he extinguishes the lamp. But though the lamp had been put out the writing would still be there. Thus does reasoning cease, and knowledge remain.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'In Eastern districts [43] the peasants have a custom of arranging five pots full of water behind p. 68 each hut with the object of putting out at once any spark of fire that may be kindled. Suppose now the house had caught fire, and they had thrown those five potfulls of water over the hut, and the fire had gone out, would those peasants then think of still going on using the water-pots?' 'No, Sir, the water-pots would be done with. What would be the use of them (on that occasion) any more?' 'The five water-pots are the five organs of moral sense--faith, to wit, and perseverance in effort, and mindfulness, and meditation, and the reasoning wisdom. The peasantry are the recluse, who is devoted in effort 1; the fire is sinfulness. As the fire is put out by the water in the five pots, so is sinfulness extinguished by the five organs of moral sense, and when once extinguished it does not again arise 2.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'It is like a physician who goes to the sick man with the five kinds of drugs made from medicinal p. 69 roots 1, and grinding them up, gives him to drink, and thereby his sickness passes away. Would the physician in that case think of making any further use of the medicine?' 'Certainly not, the medicine has done its work. What would be the use of any more?' 'Just so, O king, when sinfulness is destroyed by the five moral powers, then reasoning ceases, but knowledge remains.' [44] 'Give me a further illustration.' 'It is like a warrior, at home in war, who takes five javelins and goes down to 'battle to conquer the foe. And when he has cast them the enemy is broken. There is no need for him to go on casting javelins any more.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 4. The king said: 'He who will not be reborn, Nâgasena, does he still feel any painful sensation?' The Elder replied: 'Some he feels and some not.' 'Which are they?' 'He may feel bodily pain, O king; but mental pain he would not.' 'How would that be so?' 'Because the causes, proximate or remote, of bodily pain still continue, he would be liable to it. But the causes, proximate or remote, of mental agony having ceased, he could not feel it. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "One kind of pain he suffers, bodily pain: but not mental."' 'Then why, Sir, does he not die?' 'The Arahat, O king, has need neither to curry p. 70 favour nor to bear malice. He shakes not down the unripe fruit, but awaits the full time of its maturity. For it has been said, O king, by the Elder, Sâriputta, the Commander of the faith [45]: "It is not death, it is not life I welcome; As the hireling his wage, so do I bide my time. It is not death, it is not life I want; Mindful and thoughtful do I bide my time 1."' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 5. The king said: 'Is a pleasant sensation, Nâgasena, good or evil or indifferent?' 'It may be any one of the three.' 'But surely, Sir, if good conditions are not painful, and painful ones not good, then there can arise no good condition that is at the same time painful 2.' 'Now, what do you think, great king? Suppose a man were to hold in one hand a red-hot ball of iron, and in the other a lump of icy snow, would they both hurt him?' 'Yes; they both would.' 'But are they both hot?' 'Certainly not.' 'But are they both cold?' 'No.' 'Then acknowledge yourself put in the wrong! If the heat hurts, and they are not both hot, the pain cannot come from the heat. If the cold hurts, p. 71 and they are not both cold, the pain cannot come from the cold. How then, O king, can they both hurt you, since they are not both hot, nor both cold, and (as one is hot and the other cold) the pain comes neither from the hot nor from the cold?' 'I am not equal to argument with you. Be so good, Sir, as to explain how the matter stands.' Then the Elder reasoned with king Milinda, persuading him by talk on the subject drawn from the Abhidhamma, such as: 'There are these six pleasures, O king, connected with life in the world, and these other six with renunciation. There are six griefs connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. There are six kinds of indifference to pleasure and to grief connected with life in the world, and six with renunciation. [46] Altogether there are thus six series of six, that is to say, thirty-six kinds of sensations in the present, and the like number in the past, and the like in the future. And adding all these up in one total we arrive at one hundred and eight kinds of sensation.' 'Well put, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 6 1. The king said: 'What is it, Nâgasena, that is reborn?' 'Name-and-form is reborn.' 'What, is it this same name-and-form that is reborn?' 'No: but by this name-and-form deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.' p. 72 'If that be so, Sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma 1?' The Elder replied: 'Yes, if it were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the owner of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and charge him with the crime. And the thief were to say: "Your Majesty! I have not taken away this man's mangoes. Those that he put in the ground are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished." How then? would he be guilty?' 'Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.' 'But on what ground?' 'Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which resulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).' 'Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'It is like rice or sugar so stolen, of which the same might be said as of the mango. [47] Or it is like the fire which a man, in the cold season, might kindle, and when he had warmed himself, leave still burning, and go away. Then if that fire were to set p. 73 another man's field on fire, and the owner of the field were to seize him, and bring him before the king, and charge him with the injury, and he were to say: "Your Majesty! It was not I who set this man's field on fire. The fire I left burning was a different one from that which burnt his field. I am not guilty." Now would the man, O king, be guilty?' 'Certainly, Sir.' 'But why?' 'Because, in spite of whatever he might say, he would be guilty in respect of the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one.' 'Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are done by this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its Karma).' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to take a lamp and go up into the top storey of his house, and there eat his meal. And the lamp blazing up were to set the thatch on fire, and from that the house should catch fire, and that house having caught fire the whole village should be burnt. And they should seize him and ask: "What, you fellow, did you set our village on fire for?" And he should reply: "I've not set your village on fire! The flame of the lamp, by the light of which I was eating, was one thing; the fire which burnt your village was another thing." Now if they, thus disputing, should go to law before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?' 'In the villagers' favour.' 'But why?' p. 74 'Because, Sir, in spite of whatever the man might say, the one fire was produced from the other.' 'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form, which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to choose a young girl in marriage, and give a price 1 for her and go away. [48] And she in due course should grow up to full age, and then another man were to pay a price for her and marry her. And when the first one had come back he should say: "Why, you fellow, have you carried off my wife?" And the other were to reply: "It's not your wife I have carried off! The little girl, the mere child, whom you chose in marriage and paid a price for is one; the girl grown up to full age whom I chose in marriage and paid a price for, is another." Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?' 'In favour of the first.' 'But why?' 'Because, in spite of whatever the second might say, the grown-up girl would have been derived from the other girl.' 'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form which has its end in death, and another name-and-form p. 75 which is reborn. But the second is the result of the first, and is therefore not set free from its evil deeds.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Suppose a man, O king, were to buy of a herdsman a vessel of milk, and go away leaving it in his charge, saying: "I will come for it to-morrow;" and the next day it were to become curds. And when the man should come and ask for it, then suppose the other were to offer him the curds, and he should say: "It was not curds I bought of you; give me my vessel of milk." And the other were to reply: "Without any fault of mine 1 your milk has turned to curds." Now if they, thus disputing, were to go to law about it before you, O king, in whose favour would you decide the case?' 'In favour of the herdsman.' 'But why?' 'Because, in spite of whatever the other might say, the curds were derived from the milk.' 'Just so, great king, it is one name-and-form that finds its end in death, and another that is reborn. But that other is the result of the first, and is therefore not thereby released from its evil deeds (its bad Karma).' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7 2. The king said: 'Will you, Nâgasena, be reborn?' p. 76 Nay, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, [49] I die with craving in my heart, I shall; but if not, not 1?' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to render service to the king 2: and the king, pleased with him, were to bestow an office upon him. And then that he, while living through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, should publicly declare that the king had repaid him naught. Now would that man, O king, be acting rightly?' 'Most certainly not.' 'Just so, great king, what is the use of asking that question again? Have I not already told you that if, when I die, I die with craving in my heart, I shall; and if not, not?' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.' ____________________ 8. The king said: 'You were talking just now of name-and-form. What does "name" mean in that expression, and what "form"?' 'Whatever is gross therein, that is "form": whatever is subtle, mental, that is "name."' 'Why is it, Nâgasena, that name is not reborn separately, or form separately?' 'These conditions, great king, are connected one with the other; and spring into being together.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'As a hen, great king, would not get a yoke or p. 77 an egg-shell separately, but both would arise in one, they two being intimately dependent one on the other; just so, if there were no name there would be no form. What is meant by name in that expression being intimately dependent on what is meant by form, they spring up together. And this is, through time immemorial, their nature 1.' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.' ____________________ 9. The king said: 'You speak, Nâgasena, of time immemorial. What does this word "time" mean?' 'Past time, O king, and present, and future.' 'But what? is there such a thing as time?' 'There is time which exists, and time which does not.' 'Which then exists, and which not?' [50] 'There are Confections (constituent potentialities of being) 2, O king, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be, or of having been dissolved, or altogether changed. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing p. 78 effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will be reborn, there time is. Where there are beings who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free (who, having attained Nirvâna in their present life, have come to the end of that life), there time is not--because of their having been quite set free 1.' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.' ____________________ Here ends the Second Chapter. Footnotes 63:1 On these four stages see Gâtaka IV, 496, and Samyutta X, 1, 3. 63:2 Hardy makes sad nonsense of all this. 64:1 Hardy (p. 429) renders this as follows: 'In the same way, great king, one being is conceived, another is born, another dies; when comprehended by the mind, it is like a thing that has no before, and no after; no preceding, no succeeding existence. Thus the being who is born does not continue the same, nor does he become another; the last winyâna, or consciousness, is thus united with the rest.' (!) He confesses himself in doubt as to the last few words, but is quite unconscious of having completely misinterpreted the whole paragraph. The meaning is really quite plain in both the Pâli and the Simhalese. A man, at any one moment, is precisely all that he is then conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious, is always changing; and is so different at death from what it was at birth that, in a certain sense, he is not the same at the one time as he was at the other. But there is a continuity in the whole series;--a continuity dependent p. 65 on the whole body. And this fits the simile, in which the lamp is the body, and the flame the changing self-consciousness; whereas it is impossible to make the simile fit the conclusion as rendered by Hardy. On the phrase apubbam akariyam see Dr. Morris's note at p. 101 of the Pâli Text Society's journal, 1887, and the passages he there quotes. 65:1 Omitted in Hardy. The correlative question is discussed below, III, 5, 8, p. 112. 65:2 That is to say, Tanhâ and Upâdâna. 66:1 Summarised in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 414. 66:2 Ñâna and paññâ. 67:1 That is, he might still be wrong on matters of mere worldly knowledge, but would be clear in his mind as to the fundamental truths of religion. Compare the analogous distinctions often drawn as to the inspiration of Scripture, or the infallibility of the Pope. 68:1 Yogâvakaro; one of the technical terms in constant use by our author, but not found in the Pâli Pitakas. Hardy renders it, 'who is seeking Nirvâna;' but though this may be suggested by the term, it is not its meaning. Literally it is 'he whose sphere, whose constant resort, is Yoga.' Now yoga is 'diligence, devotion, mental concentration;' and there is nothing to show that our author is using the word as an epithet of Arahatship. It seems to me, therefore, that the whole compound merely means one of those 'religious,' in the technical sense, who were also religious in the higher, more usual sense. It would thus be analogous to the phrase samgâmâvakaro, 'at home in war,' used of a war elephant in the Samgâmâvakara Gâtaka (Fausböll, II, 95), and of a soldier below, Mil. 44. 68:2 This must, I think, be understood in a modified sense, for the first of the four Great Exertions (Sammappadhânas) is the effort to prevent sinful conditions arising. 69:1 Pañka mûla bhessaggâni: not the five principal sorts of medicine mentioned by Childers. 70:1 These verses are nearly the same as those put in reverse order into Sâriputta's mouth in the Theri Gâthâ, 1003, 1002. And the first two lines, as Dr. Rost was good enough to point out to me, are identical (except as to a slight grammatical variation) with Manu V1, 45. 70:2 And the same, therefore, of pleasant sensations that are evil. 71:1 This dialogue is in Hardy, p. 429 (No. 7). 72:1 Repeated below, III, 5, 7, p. 112. 74:1 Sunkam datvâ. Literally 'paying a tax.' So early were early marriages! Compare Theri Gâthâ, 402. Hînati-kumburê, p. 58, has wtup dî, 'having provided her with means of subsistence.' But, of course, the Sunka must have been a price paid to the parents. 75:1 Agânato: there is an ambiguity here, as the word may mean 'to me not knowing it,' or 'to you not knowing it.' Hînati-kumburê takes the latter interpretation, and renders: 'O come! Do you not know that your milk has become curds?' (Embala, tâge kiri mawû bawa no dannehi dyi.) 75:2 Not in Hardy. 76:1 See above, Chapter i, 6, p. 50. 76:2 This simile, with a different conclusion, recurs below, II, 3, 10 (p. 93). 77:1 Evam etam dîgham addhânam sambhâvitam: which Hardy, p. 141, renders: 'They accompany each other (as to the species, but not as to the individual) during infinitude.' But even the Simhalese text cannot be made to mean this. 77:2 Samkhârâ. See the full list in my 'Buddhism,' pp. 91, 92 (a list, indeed, not found as yet in the Pitakas, and probably later, but yet founded on the older divisions, and explanatory of them). They are all those divisions into which existence (or the process of becoming and ceasing to be as Buddhism looks at it) should be divided, and are practically so many sorts of action (Karma). For the older divisions see the note at the passages quoted in 'Vinaya Texts,' I, 76. 78:1 Parinibbutattâ. Hardy renders this whole clause (the last lines): 'Nirvâna is attained, time is no longer.' But this is one of the endless confusions arising out of not knowing the distinction between Nirvâna and Parinirvâna. To a man who had 'attained Nirvâna' there would still be time as long as he was in the enjoyment of it, that is as long as he continued in his present (and last) existence. The Simhalese is perfectly clear. Next: Chapter 3 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 79

1. The king said: 'What is the root, Nâgasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time?' 'Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the Confections, by reason of the Confections consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense 1, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming birth, by reason of birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain, and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent.' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply! ____________________ 2. The king said: 'You say that the ultimate point of time is not apparent. Give me an illustration of that.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to plant in the ground a tiny seed, and that it were to come up as a shoot, and in due course grow, develope, and mature until it produced a fruit. [51] And then the man, taking a seed from that fruit, were again to plant it in the ground, and all should happen as before. Now would there be any end to this series?' Certainly not, Sir.' p. 80 'Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'The hen lays an egg. From the egg comes a hen. From the hen an egg. Is there any end to this series?' 'No.' 'Just so, O king, the ultimate point in the past of the whole of this time is not apparent.' 'Give me a further illustration.' Then the Elder drew a circle on the ground and asked the king: 'Is there any end to this circle?' 'No, it has no end.' 4 Well, that is like those circles spoken of by the Blessed One 1. "By reason of the eye and of forms there arises sight 2, when these three come together there is touch, by reason of touch sensation, by reason of sensation a longing (Tanhâ, thirst), by reason of the longing action (Karma), and from action eye is once more produced 3." Now is there any end to this series 'No.' p. 81 Then setting out a precisely corresponding circle of each of the other organs of sense (of the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind 1), he in each case put the same question. And the reply being always the same, he concluded: 'Just so, O king, the ultimate point of time in the past is not apparent.' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in reply.' ____________________ 3. The king said: 'When you say that the ultimate point is not apparent, what do you mean by "ultimate point"?' 'Of whatsoever time is past. It is the ultimate point of that, O king, that I speak of.' 'But, if so, when you say that it is not apparent, do you mean to say that of everything? Is the ultimate point of everything unknown?' 'Partly so, and partly not.' 'Then which is so, and which not?' 'Formerly, O king, everything in every form, everything in every mode, was ignorance. It is to us as if it were not. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is unknown. But that, which has not been, becomes; as soon as it has begun to become it dissolves away again. In reference to that the ultimate beginning is known 2.' [52] 'But, reverend Sir, if that which was not, becomes, and as soon as it has begun to become passes again p. 82 away, then surely, being thus cut off at both ends, it must be entirely destroyed 1?' 'Nay, surely, O king, if it be thus cut off at both ends, can it not at both ends be made to grow again 2?' 'Yes, it might. But that is not my question. Could it grow again from the point at which it was cut off?' 'Certainly.' 'Give me an illustration.' Then the Elder repeated the simile of the tree and the seed, and said that the Skandhas (the constituent elements of all life, organic and inorganic) were so many seeds, and the king confessed himself satisfied. ____________________ 4. The king said: 'Are there any Confections 3 which are produced?' 'Certainly.' 'Which are they?' 'Where there is an eye, and also forms, there is sight 4, where there is sight there is a contact through the eye, where there is contact through the eye there is a sensation, where there is sensation there is a longing 5, where there is longing there is a grasping 6, where there is grasping there is a becoming, p. 83 where there is becoming there is birth, and at birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair begin to be. Thus is the rise of the whole of this class of pain.--Where there is neither eye nor form there is no sight, where there is not sight there is no contact through the eye, where there is not contact there is no sensation, where there is not sensation there is no longing, where there is not longing there is no grasping, where there is not grasping there is no becoming, where there is not becoming there is no birth, and where there is not birth there is neither old age nor death nor grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. Thus is the ending of all this class of pain. 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 5. The king said: 'Are there any Confections (qualities) which spring into being without a gradual becoming?' 'No. They all have a gradual becoming.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Now what do you think, great king? Did this house in which you are sitting spring suddenly into being?' [53] 'Certainly not, Sir. There is nothing here which arose in that way. Each portion of it has had its gradual becoming--these beams had their becoming in the forest, and this clay in the earth, and by the moil and toil of women and of men 1 was this house produced.' p. 84 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection. which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'They are like all kinds of trees and plants which, when set in the ground, grow, develope, and mature, and then yield their fruits and flowers. The trees do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'They are like the pots of various kinds which a potter might form when he has dug up the clay out of the earth. The pots do not spring into being without a becoming. It is by a process of evolution that they become what they are. just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, there were no bridge of metal on a mandolin 1, no leather, no hollow space, no frame, no neck, no strings, no bow, and no human effort or exertion, would there be music?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But if all these things were there, would not there be a sound?' p. 85 'Of course there would.' 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, there were no fire-stick apparatus 1, no twirling-stick 1, and no cord for the twirling-stick, and no matrix 1, and no burnt rag for tinder, and no human effort and exertion, could there be fire by attrition?' 'Certainly not.' 'But if all these conditions were present, then might not fire appear?' 'Yes, certainly.' [54] 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me one more illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, there were no burning glass, and no heat of the sun, and no dried cow-dung for tinder, could there be fire?' 'Certainly not.' 'But where these things are present there fire might be struck, might it not?' 'Yes.' 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which p. 86 has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Give me another illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, there were no looking-glass, and no light, and no face in front of it, would there appear an image?' 'No.' 'But given these things, there might be a reflection?' 'Yes, Sir, there might.' 'Just so, great king, there is no Confection which has sprung into being without a gradual becoming. It is by a process of evolution that Confections come to be!' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 6. The king said: 'Is there, Nâgasena, such a thing as the soul 1?' 'What is this, O king, the soul (Vedagu)?' 'The living principle within 2 which sees forms through the eye, hears sounds through the ear, experiences tastes through the tongue, smells odours through the nose, feels touch through the body, and discerns things (conditions, "dhammâ") through the mind--just as we, sitting here in the palace, can look out of any window out of which we wish to look, the east window or the west, or the north or the south.' The Elder replied: 'I will tell you about the five p. 87 doors 1, great king. Listen, and give heed attentively. If the living principle within sees forms through the eye in the manner that you mention, [55] choosing its window as it likes, can it not then see forms not only through the eye, but also through each of the other five organs of sense? And in like manner can it not then as well hear sounds, and experience taste, and smell odours, and feel touch, and discern conditions through each of the other five organs of sense, besides the one you have in each case specified?' 'No, Sir.' 'Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately, the latter sense to the former organ, and so on. Now we, as we are seated here in the palace, with these windows all thrown open, and in full daylight, if we only stretch forth our heads, see all kinds of objects plainly. Can the living principle do the same when the doors of the eyes are thrown open? When the doors of the ear are thrown open, can it do so? Can it then not only hear sounds, but see sights, experience tastes, smell odours, feel touch, and discern conditions? And so with each of its windows?' 'No, Sir.' [56] 'Then these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately. Now again, great king, if Dinna here were to go outside and stand in the gateway, would you be aware that he had done so?' 'Yes, I should know it.' 'And if the same Dinna were to come back again, and stand before you, would you be aware of his having done so?' p. 88 'Yes, I should know it.' 'Well, great king, would the living principle within discern, in like manner, if anything possessing flavour were laid upon the tongue, its sourness, or its saltness, or its acidity, or its pungency, or its astringency, or its sweetness 1?' 'Yes, it would know it.' 'But when the flavour had passed into the stomach would it still discern these things?' 'Certainly not.' 'Then these powers are not united one to the other indiscriminately. Now suppose, O king, a man were to have a hundred vessels of honey brought and poured into one trough, and then, having had another man's mouth closed over and tied up, were to have him cast into the trough full of honey. Would he know whether that into which he had been thrown was sweet or whether it was not?' 'No, Sir.' 'But why not?' 'Because the honey could not get into his mouth.' 'Then, great king, these powers are not united one to another indiscriminately 2.' 'I am not capable of discussing with such a reasoner. Be pleased, Sir, to explain to me how the matter stands.' Then the Elder convinced Milinda the king with discourse drawn from the Abhidhamma, saying: 'It is by reason, O king, of the eye and of forms that sight arises, and those other conditions--contact, p. 89 sensation, idea, thought, abstraction, sense of vitality, and attention 1--arise each simultaneously with its predecessor. And a similar succession of cause and effect arises when each of the other five organs of sense is brought into play. [57] And so herein there is no such thing as soul (Vedagu) 2.' ____________________ 7. The king said: 'Does thought-perception 3 arise wherever sight arises 4?' 'Yes, O king, where the one is there is the other.' And which of the two arises first?' 'First sight, then thought.' 'Then does the sight issue, as it were, a command to thought, saying: "Do you spring up there where I have? or does thought issue command to sight, saying: Where you spring up there will I."' 'It is not so, great king. There is no intercourse between the one and the other.' 'Then how is it, Sir, that thought arises wherever sight does?' 'Because of there being a sloping down, and because of there being a door, and because of there being a habit 5, and because of there being an association.' 'How is that? Give me an illustration of mind arising where sight arises because of there being a sloping down.' 'Now what do you think, great king? When it rains 6, where will the water go to?' p. 90 'It will follow the slope of the ground.' 'And if it were to rain again, where would the water go to?' 'It would go the same way as the first water had gone.' 'What then? Does the first water issue, as it were, command to the second, saying: "Do you go where I have?" Or does the second issue command to the first, saying: "Whithersoever you go, thither will I"?' 'It is not so, Sir. There is no intercourse between the two. Each goes its way because of the slope of the ground.' 'Just so, great king, [58] is it by reason of the natural slope that where sight has arisen there also does thought arise. And neither does the sight-perception issue command to the mind-perception, saying: "Where I have arisen, there do thou also spring up;" nor does the mind-perception inform the sight-perception, saying: "Where thou hast arisen, there will I also spring up." There is no conversation, as it were, between them. All that happens, happens through natural slope.' 'Now give me an illustration of there being a door.' 'What do you think, great king? Suppose a king had a frontier city, and it was strongly defended with towers and bulwarks, and had only one gateway. If a man wanted to leave the city, how would he go out?' 'By the gate, certainly.' 'And if another man wanted to leave it, how would he go out?' 'The same way as the first.' 'What then? Would the first man tell the second: p. 91 [paragraph continues] "Mind you go out the same way as I do"? Or would the second tell the first: "The way you go out, I shall go out too"?' 'Certainly not, Sir. There would be no communication between them. They would go that way because that was the gate.' 'Just so, great king, with thought and sight.' 'Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit.' 'What do you think, great king? If one cart went ahead, which way would a second cart go?' 'The same as the first.' 'But would the first tell the second to go where it went, [59] or the second tell the first that it would go where it (the first) had gone?' 'No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.' 'Just so, great king, with sight and thought.' 'Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.' 'In the art of calculating by using the joints of the fingers as signs or marks 1, in the art of arithmetic pure and simple 2, in the art of estimating the probable p. 92 yield of growing crops 1, and in the art of writing, O king, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.' And in response to similar questions, the Elder declared that in the same way thought sprang up wherever there was hearing, or taste, or smell, or touch: that in each case it was subsequent to the other, but arose without communication from [60] the natural causes above set out. 8. The king said: 'Where thought (mental perception 2) is, Nâgasena, is there always sensation?' 'Yes, where thought arises there is contact, and there is sensation, and there is idea, and there is conceived intention, and there is reflection; and there is investigation 3.' ____________________ 9. 'Reverend Sir, what is the distinguishing characteristic of contact (Phassa)?' 'Touch 4, O king.' 'But give me an illustration.' 'It is as when two rams are butting together, O p. 93 king. The eye should be regarded as one of those two, the form (object) as the other, and the contact as the union of the two.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'It is as when two cymbals 1 are clashed together. The one is as the eye, the other as the object, and the junction of the two is like contact.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 10. 'Reverend Sir, what is the characteristic mark of sensation (Vedanâ)?' 'The being experienced, great king, and enjoyed 2.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of the man 3 on whom the king, pleased with a service he has rendered him, should bestow an office. He while living, through that appointment, in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think: "Formerly I did the king a service. For that the king, pleased with me, gave me this office. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations."--And it is like the case of the man [61] who having done good deeds is re-born, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy conditions of bliss in heaven. He, while living there in the full possession and enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, would think: "Formerly I must have done good deeds. It is on that account that I now experience such sensations." Thus is it, great king, that the being experienced and enjoyed is the characteristic mark of sensation.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' p. 94 11. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nâgasena, of idea (Saññâ)?' 'Recognition, O king 1. And what does he recognise?--blueness and yellowness and redness and whiteness and brownness.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the king's treasurer. O king, who when he sees, on entering the treasure, objects the property of the king, of all those colours, recognises (that they have such). Thus it is, great king, that recognition is the mark of idea.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nâgasena, of the conceived purpose (Ketanâ)?' 'The being conceived, O king, and the being prepared 2.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of a man, O king, who should prepare poison, and both drink of it himself, and give of it to others to drink. He himself would suffer pain, and so would they. In the same way some individual, having thought out with intention some evil deed, on the dissolution of the body after death, would be reborn into some unhappy state of woe in purgatory, and so also would those who followed his advice.--And it is like the case of a p. 95 man, O king, who should prepare a mixture of ghee, butter, oil, honey and molasses, and should both drink thereof himself and give of it to others to drink. He himself would have pleasure, and so would they. [62] In the same way some individual, having thought out with intention some good deed, will be reborn, on the dissolution of the body after death, into some happy state of bliss in heaven, and so also would those who follow his advice. Thus is it, great king, that the being conceived, and the being prepared, are marks of the conceived purpose.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 12. 'What, Nâgasena, is the distinguishing characteristic of perception (Viññâna)?' 'Recognition 1, great king.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of the guardian of a city who, when seated at the cross roads in the middle of the city, could see a man coming from the East, or the South, or the West, or the North. In the same way, O king, he knows an object which he sees with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells by his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognises by his mind. Thus is it, great king, that knowing is the mark of perception.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 13. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nâgasena, of reflection (Vitakka). p. 96 'The effecting of an aim 1.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of wood. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 14. 'What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nâgasena, of investigation (Vikâra)?' 'Threshing out again and again 2.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape [63], makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape 3. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great king, that threshing out again and again is the mark of investigation.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ Here ends the Third Chapter 4. Footnotes 79:1 Salâyatanâni, that is the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (as the organ of touch), and mind (or, as we should say, brain). 80:1 Hînati-kumburê applies this to the previous words (the circles of the chain of life quoted in 1 from the Mahâvagga I, 1, 2), and he is followed by Hardy, p. 434. Trenckner makes it apply to the following words, giving the reference to No. 18 in the Magghima Nikâya, and I think he is right. Whichever way it is taken, the result is much the same. 80:2 Kakkhu-viññâna. It is not clear from the terse phraseology of this passage whether this is supposed to he a subjective stage preliminary to the 'touch' (phasso), or whether it is inclusive of it. (Compare Dhamma Sangani, 589, 599, 620.) I am inclined to think it is the former. But if the latter be meant it might be rendered 'there arises that consciousness (of existence) which is dependent upon the eye.' See below, 4. 80:3 That is, another eye in another birth. 81:1 In the text the whole sentence is repeated of each. 81:2 That is, 'the beginning of each link in the chain--the beginning of each individuality--can be traced, but not the beginning of each chain. Each life is a link in a chain of lives, bound together by cause and effect, different, yet the same. There are an infinite number of such chains; and there is no reference in the discussion to any greater unity, or to any "ultimate point" of all the chains.' 82:1 That is, 'each individuality must be separate. The supposed chain does not really exist.' 82:2 There is an odd change of gender here. Possibly the word 'ignorance' has been dropped out. Trenckner says the passage is corrupt, and the Simhalese is so involved as to be unintelligible. 82:3 Sankhârâ, potentialities, possible forms, of sentient existence. 82:4 Kakkhu-viññâna. See note 2 above, p. 80. 82:5 Tanhâ, thirst. 82:6 Upâdâna, a stretching out towards a satisfaction of the longing, and therefore a craving for life, time, in which to satisfy it. 83:1 It is a small matter, but noteworthy, that the Buddhist texts always put the women first. 84:1 Vînâya pattam. I don't know what this is. The Simhalese merely repeats the words. 85:1 Arani, arani-potako, and uttarârani. The exact differentiation of these parts of the fire-stick apparatus is uncertain. The Simhalese throws no real light on them, as it translates them respectively yata lîya, 'under wood,' matu lîya, 'upper wood,' and uturu lîya, also 'upper wood.' This method of ignition was probably quite as strange to Hînati-kumburê as it is to us. 86:1 Vedagû, see below, III, 5, 6, p. 111, not found in this meaning in the Pitakas. 86:2 Abbhantare gîvo, also not found in this sense in the Pitakas. Attâ, rendered just above 'image' or 'reflection,' is the word used in them for soul. Hînati-kumburê renders this here by prâna gîwa, 'breath-soul.' See below, III, 7, 15, p. 132; and above, II, 4, p. 48; and II, 2, 6, p. 71. 87:1 It is odd he does not say six. 88:1 This list recurs below, II, 4, 1. 88:2 That is: 'Your "living principle within" cannot make use of whichever of its windows it pleases. And the simile of a man inside a house does not hold good of the soul.' See the end of II, 3, 16. 89:1 The last four are ketanâ, ekaggatâ, gîvitindriyam, and manasikâro; and in the Simhalese are simply repeated in their Simhalese form. 89:2 This conclusion is all wrong in Hardy, pp. 457, 458. 89:3 Mano-viññânam. 89:4 Kakkhu-viññânam. 89:5 Kinnattâ, which Hînati-kumburê renders purudu bwin. 89:6 Deve vassante: 'when the god rains.' 91:1 Muddâ. Hînati-kumburê is here a little fuller than Buddhaghosa at vol. i, p. 95 of the Sumangala. He says: yam se ngili purukhi alwâ gena saññâ kota kiyana hasta mudra sâstraya, 'the finger-ring art, so called from seizing on the joints of the fingers, and using them as signs.' 91:2 Gananâ. Hînati-kumburê says: akkhidra wu ganam sâstraya, 'the art of unbroken counting,' which is precisely Buddhaghosa's explanation (confirming the reading we have there adopted), and probably means arithmetic without the aids involved in the last phrase. We have here in that case an interesting peep into the p. 92 progress of arithmetical knowledge. When our author wrote, the old way of counting on the fingers was still in vogue, but the modern system was coming into general use. 92:1 Sankhâ, literally 'calculation,' but which Hardy amplifies into Kshetraya wriksha vilokaya kota phala pramânaya kiyannâwû samkhyâ sâstraya. 92:2 Mano-viññâna as all through the last section. The reader must not forget that mano is here strictly an organ of sense, on an exact level with eye, ear, tongue, &c. 92:3 Ketanâ, vitakko, and vikâro. See fuller further on, 11, 13, 14. 92:4 Phusana. So also Buddhaghosa at p. 63 of the Sumangala. 93:1 Sammâ, compare Theri Gâthâ, 893, 911. 93:2 Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., only gives the first of these. 93:3 See for a similar illustration above, II, 2, 7, p. 76. 94:1 So also Buddhaghosa, Sumangala, p. 63. 94:2 Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., gives no mark of Ketanâ, but he gives both it and the being prepared' as the marks of the Confections. It is not clear from the Milinda alone how to render the term Ketanâ, but I follow Anguttara III, 77 (where it is placed on a level with aspiration), and Dhamma Samgani 5 (where it is said to be born of the contact of mind, perception, and exertion). 95:1 Vigânana. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit., and below, III, 7, 15, p. 131. 96:1 Appanâ, which Hînati-kumburê renders pihitana. Buddhaghosa, p. 63, gives abhiniropana as its mark, which comes to much the same thing. 96:2 Anumaggana. So also Buddhaghosa, loc. cit. p. 63. The word is not in Childers, but see Morris in the journal of the Pâli Text Society, 1886, p. 118. 96:3 Anuravati anusandahati. Not in Childers. Hînati-kumburê says pasuwa anurâwanâ kere da anuwa pihitâ da. 96:4 The following two sections form an appendix to this chapter corresponding to that formed by the last three sections of Book III, Chapter 7. The numbering of the sections is therefore carried on in both cases. Next: Chapter 3 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 97

15. The king said: 'When those conditions (whose marks you have just specified) have run together, is it possible, by bending them apart one to one side and one to the other 1, to make the distinction between them clear, so that one can say:,' This is contact, and this sensation, and this idea, and this intention, and this perception, and this reflection, and this investigation 2"?' 'No: that cannot be done.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce, and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cummin seed 3, and pepper, and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: "Pick out for me the flavour of the curds, and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cummin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it." Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: "Here is the sourness, and here the saltness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness 4"?' p. 98 'No, that would not be possible [64]. But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.' 'And just so, great king, with respect to those conditions we were discussing.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 16. The Elder said: 'Is salt, O king, recognisable by the eye?' 'Yes, Sir, it is.' 'But be careful, O king.' 'Well then, Sir, is it perceptible by the tongue?' 'Yes, that is right.' 'But, Sir, is it only by the tongue that every kind of salt is distinguished?' 'Yes, every kind.' 'If that be so, Sir, why do bullocks bring whole cart-loads of it? Is it not salt and nothing else that ought to be so brought?' 'It is impossible to bring salt by itself. But all these conditions 1 have run together into one, and produced the distinctive thing called salt 2. (For instance): salt is heavy, too. But is it possible, O king, to weigh salt?' p. 99 'Certainly, Sir.' Nay, great king, it is not the salt you weigh, it is the weight.' 'You are ready, Nâgasena, in argument.' ____________________ Here ends the questioning of Nâgasena by Milinda 1. Footnotes 97:1 Vinibbhugitvâ vinibbhugitvâ. This question is identical with the one asked of the Buddha at Magghima Nikâya 43, p. 293. Compare also p. 233 and Tela Katâha Gâthâ 59. 97:2 This list differs from that in II, 3, 8, by the addition of viññâna. 97:3 Gîraka. Compare Gâtaka I, 244; II, 181, 363. Hînati-kumburê translates it by duru, and Hardy by "onions' (p. 439). 97:4 This is the same list as is found above, II, 3, 6; and below, III, 4, 2, and the items are not intended to correspond with the condiments in the list above. 98:1 Not saltness only, but white colour, &c. &c. 98:2 He means the king to draw the conclusion that that distinct thing is only recognisable by the tongue; so the senses are not interchangeable. In other words it is true that salt seems to be recognised by the sight, as when people load it into carts they do not stop to taste it. But what they see is not salt, what they weigh is not salt, it is whiteness and weight. And the fact of its being salt is an inference they draw. So, great king, your simile of the soul being inside the body, and using the five senses, as a man inside a house uses windows, does not hold good. See the conclusion above of II, 3, 6, p. 88. 99:1 This is again most odd. One would expect, 'Here ends the questioning as to characteristic signs.' See the note at the end of last chapter. Next: Chapter 4 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 100

VIMATI-KKHEDANA-PAÑHO. THE REMOVAL OF DIFFICULTIES.

1. [65] The king said: 'Are the five Âyatanas, Nâgasena, (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body,) produced by various actions, or by one action?' (that is, the result of various Karmas, or of one Karma.) 'By various actions, not by one.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Now, what do you think, O king? If I were to sow in one field five kinds of seed, would the produce of those various seeds be of different kinds?' 'Yes, certainly.' 'Well, just so with respect to the production of Âyatanas.' 'Very good, Nâgasena 2!' ____________________ 2. The king said: 'Why is it, Nâgasena, that all men are not alike, but some are short-lived and some long-lived, some sickly and some healthy, some ugly and some beautiful, some without influence and some of great power, some poor and some wealthy, some low born and some high born, some stupid and somewise?' p. 101 The Elder replied: 'Why is it that all vegetables are not alike, but some sour, and some salt, and some pungent, and some acid, and some astringent, and some sweet?' 'I fancy, Sir, it is because they come from different kinds of seeds.' 'And just so, great king, are the differences you have mentioned among men to be explained. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "Beings, O brahmin, have each their own Karma, are inheritors of Karma, belong to the tribe of their Karma, are relatives by Karma, have each their Karma as their protecting overlord. It is Karma that divides them up into low and high and the like divisions 1."' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 3. The king said: 'You told me, Nâgasena, that your renunciation was to the end that this sorrow might perish away, and no further sorrow might spring up 2.' [66] 'Yes, that is so.' 'But is that renunciation brought about by previous effort, or to be striven after now, in this present time?' The Elder replied: 'Effort is now concerned with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.' 'Give me an illustration 3.' p. 102 'Now what do you think, O king? Is it when you feel thirst that you would set to work to have a well or an artificial lake dug out, with the intention of getting some water to drink?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? Is it when you feel hungry that you set to work to have fields ploughed and seed planted and crops reaped with the intention of getting some food to eat?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? Is it when the battle is set in array against you that you set to work to have a moat dug, and a rampart put up, and a watch tower built, and a stronghold formed, and stores of food collected? Is it then that you would have yourself taught the management of elephants, or horsemanship, or the use of the chariot and the bow, or the art of fencing?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, is effort concerned now with what still remains to be done, former effort has accomplished what it had to do. For it has been thus said, O king, by the Blessed One: "Betimes let each wise man work out That which he sees to be his weal! Not with the carter's mode of thought, but firm p. 103 Let him, with resolution, step right out. As a carter who has left the smooth high road, And turned to byways rough, broods ill at ease 1-- (Like him who hazards all at dice, and fails)-- So the weak mind who still neglects the good, And follows after evil, grieves at heart, When fallen into the power of death, as he, The ruined gamester, in his hour of need 2." [67] 'Very good, Nâgasena. ____________________ 4. The king said: 'You (Buddhists 3) say thus: "The fire of purgatory is very much more fierce than an ordinary fire. A small stone cast into an ordinary fire may smoke for a day without being destroyed; but a rock as big as an upper chamber cast into the furnace of purgatory would be that moment destroyed." That is a statement I cannot believe. Now, on the other hand you say thus: "Whatsoever beings are there reborn, though they p. 104 burn for hundreds of thousands of years in purgatory, yet are they not destroyed." That too is a statement 1 don't believe.' The Elder said: 'Now what do you think, O king? Do not the females of sharks 1 and crocodiles and tortoises and peacocks and pigeons eat hard bits of stone and gravel?' 'Yes, Sir. They do.' 'What then? Are these hard things, when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed?' 'Yes, they are destroyed.' 'And the embryo that may be inside the same animals,--is that too destroyed?' 'Certainly not.' 'But why not.' 'I suppose, Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.' 'Just so, great king, it is through the influence of Karma that beings, though they have been for thousands of years in purgatory, are not destroyed. If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One: "He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted 2." 'Give me a further illustration.' p. 105 'Now what do you think, O king? Do not the females of lions and tigers and panthers and dogs eat hard bits of bone and flesh?' 'Yes, they eat such things.' 'What then? are such hard things, [68] when they have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, destroyed?' 'Yes, they are destroyed?' 'And the embryo that may be inside the same animals,--is that too destroyed?' 'Certainly not.' 'But why not?' 'I suppose, Sir, it escapes destruction by the influence of Karma.' 'Just so, great king, it is by the influence of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, are not destroyed.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? Do not the tender women--wives of the Yonakas, and nobles, and brahmins, and householders--eat hard cakes and meat. 'Yes, they eat such hard things.' 'And when those hard things have got into the stomach, into the interior of the abdomen, are not they destroyed?' 'Yes, they are.' 'But the children in their womb,--are they destroyed?' 'Certainly not.' 'And why not?' 'I suppose, Sir, they escape destruction by the influence of Karma?' 'Just so, great king, it is through the influence p. 106 of Karma that beings in purgatory, though they burn for thousands of years, yet are they not destroyed, If they are reborn there, there do they grow up, and there do they die. For this, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One: "He does not die until that evil Karma is exhausted."' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 5. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say that the world rests on water, the water on air, the air on space 1. This saying also I cannot believe.' Then the Elder brought water in a regulation water-pot 2, and convinced king Milinda, saying: 'As this water is supported by the atmosphere, so is that water supported by air.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 6. The king said: 'Is cessation Nirvâna 3? 'Yes, your Majesty' [69]. 'How is, that, Nâgasena?' 'All foolish individuals, O king, take pleasure in p. 107 the senses and in the objects of sense, find delight in them, continue to cleave to them 1. Hence are they carried down by that flood (of human passions), they are not set free from birth, old age, and death, from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair,--they are not set free, I say, from suffering. But the wise, O king, the disciple of the noble ones, neither takes pleasure in those things, nor finds delight in them, nor continues cleaving to them. And inasmuch as he does not, in him craving 2 ceases, and by the cessation of craving grasping 2 ceases, and by the cessation of grasping becoming 2 ceases, and when becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation birth, old age, and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. Thus is the cessation brought about the end of all that aggregation of pain. Thus is it that cessation is Nirvâna.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, do all men receive Nirvâna?' 'Not all, O king. But he who walks righteously, who admits those conditions which ought to be admitted, perceives clearly those conditions which ought to be clearly perceived, abandons those conditions which ought to be abandoned, practises himself in those conditions which ought to be practised, realises those conditions which ought to be realised--he receives Nirvâna.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' p. 108 8. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, does he who does not receive Nirvâna know how happy a state Nirvâna is 1?' 'Yes, he knows it.' 'But how can he know that without his receiving Nirvâna?' 'Now what do you think, O king? Do those whose hands and feet have not been cut off know how sad a thing it is to have them cut off?' 'Yes, Sir, that they know.' 'But how do they know it?' 'Well, by hearing the sound of the lamentation of those whose hands and feet have been cut off, they know it.' [70] 'Just so, great king, it is by hearing the glad words of those who have seen Nirvâna, that they who have not received it know how happy a state it is.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ Here ends the Fourth Chapter. Footnotes 100:1 The chapters go straight on because Books II and III are really only parts of one Book. See above, p. 4. 100:2 The meaning here is not easy to follow, as the word Âyatana is used either for the organs of sense, or for the objects of sense; and there is nothing in the context to show which is meant. Probably the idea is that good sight, hearing, &c. in one birth are each the result of a separate Karma in the last birth. But I am by no means sure of this, and the Simhalese (p. 76) is just as ambiguous as the Pâli. 101:1 Mr. Trenckner points out that this quotation is from the Magghima, No. 135. The doctrine is laid down frequently elsewhere also in the Pitakas. See, for instance, Anguttara IV, 97 (pp. 202-203 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 101:2 Above, II, 1, 5, p. 50, and compare I, 38. 101:3 These three illustrations recur (nearly) below, III, 7, 3, pp. 125-126. 103:1 Ghâyati. It is an odd coincidence that this word, which means either to burn or to meditate, according to the root from which it is derived, can be rendered here either 'burn' or 'brood' in English. In fact it is the second, not the first, root that is here intended, as is plain from such passages as Gâtaka III, 354, where the compound pagghâyati means 'to brood over a thing.' 103:2 Quoted from the Samyutta Nikâya II, 3, 2 (p. 57 in M. Feer's edition, published by the Pâli Text Society). The readings there differ slightly from those of our text here, and the verses are put into the mouth of Khema, the god, instead of being ascribed to the Buddha. Hînati-kumburê (p. 79) agrees with M. Léon Feer in reading mando for mano in the last line; and I have followed them in my translation. There are several stanzas in the Gâtaka book of carters lost in the desert, but there is nothing to identify any one of them with the story referred to. 103:3 'You' in the plural: that is, 'you Bhikkhus.' So also above, pp. 30, 50. 104:1 It may be noticed that the particular feminine forms chosen are in each case unusual, being in inî instead of the simple î. The first animal, the Makarinî, is said by Childers to be a mythical animal, but it is clear from Buddhaghosa on Kullavagga V, 1, 4, that an ordinary animal is meant, and that is so I think here, though the translation 'shark' is conjectural. 104:2 From Anguttara III, 35, 4 (p. 141 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 106:1 This is not a distinctively Buddhist belief. It was commonly held at the time by other teachers. Compare 'Book of the Great Decease,' III, 13 (in 'Buddhist Suttas,' Sacred Books of the East, vol. xi, p. 45). 106:2 Dhamma-karakena. The passages show that this was a pot so made, that no water could pass from it except through a filtering medium. When not being actually used the water was no doubt kept at a certain height in it by the pressure of the atmosphere. I do not know of any specimen preserved in our modern museums or figured on ancient bas-reliefs, and the exact shape is unknown. It must be different from the one represented in plate xlviii of Cunningham's 'Bhilsa Tope.' See Kullavagga V, 13, 1 (note); VI, 21, 3; XII, 2, 1; Mahâvamsa, p. 60. 106:3 Nirodho nibbânan ti. 107:1 Agghosâya titthanti. Compare Anguttara II, 4, 6, and Theri Gâthâ, 794. 107:2 Tanhâ, Upâdâna, Bhava. 108:1 The opposite point (whether he who has Nirvâna, knows that he has it) is discussed above, II, 2. Next: Chapter 5 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book II: The Disti... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 109

1. The king said: 'Have you, Nâgasena, seen the Buddha?' 'No, Sire.' 'Then have your teachers seen the Buddha?' 'No, Sire.' 'Then, venerable Nâgasena, there is no Buddha 1!' 'But, great king, have you seen the river Ûhâ in the Himâlaya mountains?' 'No, Sir.' 'Or has your father seen it?' 'No, Sir.' 'Then, your Majesty, is there therefore no such river?' 'It is there. Though neither I nor my father has seen it, it is nevertheless there.' 'Just so, great king, though neither I nor my teachers have seen the Blessed One, nevertheless there was such a person.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 2. The king said: 'Is the Buddha, Nâgasena, pre-eminent?' 'Yes, he is incomparable.' 'But how do you know of one you have never seen that he is pre-eminent.' 'Now what do you think, O king? They who have never seen the ocean would they know concerning p. 110 it: "Deep, unmeasurable, unfathomable is the mighty ocean. Into it do the five great rivers flow--the Ganges, the Jumna, the Akiravatî, the Sarabhû, and the Mahî--and yet is there in it no appearance of being more empty or more full!"?' 'Yes, they would know that.' 'Just so, great king, when I think of the mighty disciples who have passed away then do I know that the Buddha is incomparable.' [71] 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 3. The king said: 'Is it possible, Nâgasena, for others to know how incomparable the Buddha is?' 'Yes, they may know it.' 'But how can they?' 'Long, long ago, O king, there was a master of writing, by name Tissa the Elder, and many are the years gone by since he has died. How can people know of him?' 'By his writing, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, whosoever sees what the Truth 1 is, he sees what the Blessed One was, for the Truth was preached by the Blessed One.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 4. The king said: 'Have you, Nâgasena, seen what the Truth is?' 'Have not we disciples, O king, to conduct ourselves our lives long as under the eye of the Buddha, and under his command 2?' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' p. 111 5. The king said: 'Where there is no transmigration, Nâgasena, can there be rebirth?' 'Yes, there can.' 'But how can that be? Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp from another lamp, can it be said that the one transmigrates from, or to, the other?' 'Certainly not.' 'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Do you recollect, great king, having learnt, when you were a boy, some verse or other from your teacher?' 'Yes, I recollect that.' 'Well then, did that verse transmigrate from your teacher?' 'Certainly not.' 'Just so, great king, is rebirth without transmigration.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 6. The king said: 'Is there such a thing, Nâgasena, as the soul 1?' 'In the highest sense, O king, there is no such thing 2.' p. 112 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7. [72] The king said: 'Is there any being, Nâgasena, who transmigrates from this body to another?' 'No, there is not.' 'But if so, would it not get free from its evil deeds.' 'Yes, if it were not reborn; but if it were, no 1.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to steal another man's mangoes, would the thief deserve punishment?' 'Yes.' 'But he would not have stolen the mangoes the other set in the ground. Why would he deserve punishment?' 'Because those he stole were the result of those that were planted.' 'Just so, great king, this name-and-form commits deeds, either pure or impure, and by that Karma another name-and-form. is reborn. And therefore is it not set free from its evil deeds?' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 8. The king said: 'When deeds are committed, Nâgasena, by one name-and-form, what becomes of those deeds?' 'The deeds would follow it, O king, like a shadow that never leaves it 2.' 'Can any one point out those deeds, saying: "Here are those deeds, or there"?' 'No.' p. 113 'Give me an illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? Can any one point out the fruits which a tree has not yet produced, saying: "Here they are, or there"?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, so long as the continuity of life is not cut off, it is impossible to point out the deeds that are done.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 9. [73] The king said: 'Does he, Nâgasena, who is about to be reborn know that he will be born?' 'Yes, he knows it, O king.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose a farmer, O king, a householder, were to put seed in the ground, and it were to rain well, would he know that a crop would be produced.' 'Yes, he would know that.' 'Just so, great king, does he who is about to be reborn know 1 that he will be born.' 'Very good, Nâgasena 2!' ____________________ 10. The king said: 'Is there such a person as the Buddha, Nâgasena?' 'Yes.' 'Can he then, Nâgasena, be pointed out as being here or there?' 'The Blessed One, O king, has passed away by that kind of passing away in which nothing remains which could tend to the formation of another p. 114 individual 1. It is not possible to point out the Blessed One as being here or there.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Now what do you think, O king? When there is a great body of fire blazing, is it possible to point out any one flame that has gone out, that it is here or there?' 'No, Sir. That flame has ceased, it has vanished.' 'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him, that he is here or there. But in the body of his doctrine he can, O king, be pointed out. For the doctrine 2 was preached by the Blessed One?' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ Here ends the Fifth Chapter. Footnotes 109:1 This dialogue is so far identical with VI, 1, 1. It is a kind of parody on Gotama's own argument about the Brahmans and Brahma ('Have they seen God,' &c.) in the Tevigga Sutta I, 12-15, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 172-174. 110:1 Dhammam, here nearly = Buddhism. See below, III, 5, 10. 110:2 Mr. Trenckner thinks there is a lacuna here; and Hînati-kumburê's version perhaps supports this. He renders the passage,, How can a man use a path he does not know? And have not we p. 111 our lives long to conduct ourselves according to the Vinaya (the rules of the Order), which the Buddha preached, and which are called the eye of the Buddha, and according to the Sikkhâpada (ethics) which be laid down, and which are called his command?' But there are other passages, no less amplified in the Simhalese, where there is evidently no lacuna in the Pâli; and the passage may well have been meant as a kind of riddle, to which the Simhalese supplies the solution. 111:1 Vedagû. See above, II, 3, 6, p. 86 (note). 111:2 Mr. Trenckner thinks there is a lacuna here. The Simhalese follow the Pâli word for word. 112:1 This is an exact repetition of what we had above, II, 2, 6. 112:2 These last words are a quotation of those that recur at Samyutta III, 2, 10, 10, and Dhammapada, verse 2. 113:1 That is before he is born. 113:2 This is all very parallel to II, 2, 2. 114:1 Anupâdisesâya nibbânadhâtuyâ. 114:2 Dhamma. See above, III, 5, 3. Next: Chapter 6 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 115

1. The king said: 'Is the body, Nâgasena, dear to you recluses?' 'No, they love not the body.' 'Then why do you nourish it and lavish attention upon it?' 'In all the times and places, O king, that you have gone down to battle, did you never get wounded by an arrow?' 'Yes, that has happened to me.' 'In such cases, O king, [74] is not the wound anointed with salve, and smeared with oil, and bound up in a bandage.' 'Yes, such things are done to it.' 'What then? Is the wound dear to you that you treat it so tenderly, and lavish such attention upon it?' 'No, it is not dear to me in spite of all that, which is only done that the flesh may grow again.' 'Just so, great king, with the recluses and the body. Without cleaving to it do they bear about the body for the sake of righteousness of life. The body, O king, has been declared by the Blessed One to be like a wound. And therefore merely as a sore, and without cleaving to it, do the recluses bear about the, body. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "Covered with clammy skin, an impure thing and foul, Nine-apertured, it oozes, like a sore 1."' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' p. 116 2. The king said: 'Did the Buddha, Nâgasena, the omniscient one, foresee all things?' 'Yes. The Blessed One was not only omniscient. He foresaw all things.' 'Then why was it that he was in the habit only from time to time, and as occasion arose, of laying down rules for the members of the Order 1?' 'Is there any physician, O king, who knows all the medicinal drugs to be found on the earth?' 'Yes, there may be such a man.' 'Well, O king, does he give his decoctions to the patient to drink at a time when illness has already set in, or before that?' 'When the malady has arisen.' 'Just so, great king, the Blessed One, though he was omniscient and foresaw all things, laid down no rule at an unseasonable time, but only when need arose did he establish a regulation which his disciples were not to transgress as long as they lived.' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 3. [75] The king said: 'Is it true, Nâgasena, that the Buddha was endowed with the thirty-two bodily marks of a great man, and graced with the eighty subsidiary characteristics; that he was golden in colour with a skin like gold, and that there spread around him a glorious halo of a fathom's length?' 'Such, O king, was the Blessed One.' 'But were his parents like that?' 'No, they were not.' 'In that case you must say that he was born so. But surely a son is either like his mother, or those on p. 117 the mother's side, or he is like his father, or those on the father's side!' The Elder replied: 'Is there such a thing, O king, as a lotus flower with a hundred petals?' 'Yes, there is.' 'Where does it grow up?' 'It is produced in mud, and in water it comes to perfection 1.' 'But does the lotus resemble the mud of the lake, whence it springs up, either in colour, or in smell, or in taste?' 'Certainly not.' 'Then does it resemble the water?' 'Nor that either.' 'Just so, great king, is it that the Blessed One had the bodily signs and marks you have mentioned, though his parents had them not.' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 4. The king said: 'Was the Buddha, Nâgasena, pure in conduct (was he a Brahma-kârin)?' 'Yes, the Blessed One was pure.' 'Then, Nâgasena, it follows that he was a follower of Brahmâ 2.' p. 118 'Have you a state elephant, O king?' 'Certainly.' [76] 'Well now, does that elephant ever trumpet (literally "cry the heron's cry 1")?' 'Oh, yes.' 'But is he, then, on that account a follower of the herons?' 'Of course not.' 'Now tell me, great king, has Brahma wisdom (Buddhi), or has he not?' 'He is a being with wisdom.' 'Then (on your argument) he is surely a follower of Buddha 2.' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 5. The king said: 'Is ordination 3 a good thing?' 'Yes, a good thing and a beautiful.' 'But did the Buddha obtain it, or not?' 'Great king, when the Blessed One attained omniscience at the foot of the tree of Knowledge, that was to him an ordination. There was no conferring of ordination upon him at the hands of others--in the way that the Blessed One laid down regulations for his disciples, never to be transgressed by them their lives long 4!' 'Very true, Nâgasena!' p. 119 6. The king said: 'To which of these two, Nâgasena,--the man who weeps at the death of his mother, and the man who weeps out of love for the Truth (Dhamma),--are his tears a cure?' 'The tears of the one, O king, are stained and hot with the three fires of passion. The tears of the other are stainless and cool. Now there is cure in coolness and calm, but in heat and passion there can be no cure 1.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7. The king said: 'What is the distinction, Nâgasena, between him who is full of passion, and him who is void of passion?' 'The one is overpowered by craving, O king, and the other not.' 'But what does that mean?' 'The one is in want, O king, and the other not.' 'I look at it, Sir, in this way. He who has passion and he who has not--both of them alike--desire what is good to eat, either hard or soft. And neither of them desires what is wrong.' 'The lustful man, O king, in eating his food enjoys both the taste and the lust that arises from taste, [77] but the man free from lusts experiences the taste only, and not the lust arising therefrom.' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' p. 120 8. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, where does wisdom dwell?' 'Nowhere, O king.' 'Then, Sir, there is no such thing as wisdom.' 'Where does the wind dwell, O king?' 'Not anywhere, Sir.' 'So there is no such thing as wind.' 'Well answered, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 9. The king said: 'When you speak of transmigration 1, Nâgasena, what does that mean?' 'A being born here, O king, dies here. Having died here, it springs up elsewhere. Having been born there, there it dies. Having died there, it springs up elsewhere. That is what is meant by transmigration.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'It is like the case of a man who, after eating a mango, should set the seed in the ground. From that a great tree would be produced and give fruit. And there would be no end to the succession, in that way, of mango trees.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 10. The king said: 'By what, Nâgasena, does one recollect what is past and done long ago?' 'By memory.' 'But is it not by the mind 2, not by the memory 2, that we recollect?' 'Do you recollect any business, O king, that you have done and then forgotten?' 'Yes.' 'What then? Were you then without a mind?' p. 121 'No. But my memory failed me.' 'Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Very good, Nâgasena 1' ____________________ 11. The king said: 'Does memory, Nâgasena, always arise subjectively, [78] or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside 1?' 'Both the one and the other.' 'But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin, and never artificial?' 'If, O king, there were no artificial (imparted) memory, then artisans would have no need of practice, or art, or schooling, and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ Here ends the Sixth Chapter. Footnotes 115:1 I have not been able to trace this couplet. On the sentiment compare the eloquent words of the young wife at vol. i, p. 200 of my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' and Sutta Nipâta I, 11. 116:1 This is how Hînati-kumburê understands the passage. 117:1 Âsîyati. See Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1884, p. 72. 117:2 There is an untranslatable play here upon the name of the god, which is used in its sense of 'pure, best,' in the expression 'pure in conduct.' The first question really amounts to: Was the Buddha's conduct 'Brahma,' that is, 'best,' which has come to have the meaning 'pure' for the same reason that our expression 'a moral man' has often that particular connotation? It is quite true that the etymological meaning of the word is neither 'best' nor 'pure'; but when our author wrote the secondary sense had completely, in Pâli, driven out the etymological sense. 118:1 This technical term for an elephant's trumpeting is not infrequent. See, for instance, Gâtaka I, 50. 118:2 As a matter of fact Brahmâ, the nearest approach in the Indian thought of that time to our idea of God, is always represented, in Buddhism, as a good Buddhist, See, for instance, 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 116, and my note at p. 117. 118:3 'Upasampadâ. Admission to the higher grade in the Order. 118:4 Mr. Trenckner again suspects something dropped out in this reply. But the connection of ideas seems to me quite sufficient. p. 119 The Simhalese follows the Pâli, but that of course only shows that the text before the translator was here the same as in Mr. Trenckner's edition. 119:1 The point of this lies in the allusion to the coolness and calm of Nirvâna, or Arahatship, which is the dying out of the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion. The word used for coolness, Sîtala, is one of the many epithets of Arahatship. 120:1 Samsâra. 120:2 Kittena, no satiyâ. 121:1 I follow Hînati-kumburê's interpretation of the difficult words in the text, which Mr. Trenckner says is corrupt. Katumika is 'artificial,' like the Sanskrit kritrima. It has only been found as yet in our author. Next: Chapter 7 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 122

1. The king said: 'In how many ways, Nâgasena, does memory spring up?' 'In sixteen ways, O king. That is to say: by personal experience 1, as when the venerable Ânanda, or the devoted woman Khugguttarâ, or any others who had that power, called to mind their previous births--[79] or by outward aid 2, as when others continue to remind one who is by nature forgetful--or by the impression made by the greatness of some occasion 3, as kings remember their coronation day, or as we remember the day of our conversion-by the impression made by joy 4, as when one remembers that which gave him pleasure--or by the impression made by sorrow 5, as when one remembers that which pained him--or from similarity of appearance 6, as on seeing one like them we call to mind the mother or father or sister or brother, or on seeing a camel or an ox or an ass we call to mind others like them--or by difference of appearance 7, as when we remember that such and such a colour, sound, smell, taste, or touch belong to such and such a thing--or by the knowledge of speech 8, as when one who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others and then himself remembers--or by a sign 9, as when we recognise a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign-or from effort to recollect 10 as when one by p. 123 nature forgetful is made to recollect by being urged again and again: "try and think of it"--or by calculation 11, as when one knows by the training he has received in writing that such and such a letter ought to follow after such and such a one--or by arithmetic 12, as when accountants do big sums by their knowledge of figures--or by learning by heart 13, as the repeaters of the scriptures by their skill in learning by heart recollect so much--[80] or by meditation 14, as when a Bhikkhu calls to mind his temporary states in days gone by--by reference to a book 15, as when kings calling to mind a previous regulation, say: "Bring the book here," and remind themselves out of that--or by a pledge 16, as when at the sight of goods deposited a man recollects (the circumstances under which they were pledged)--or by association 17, as when one remembers a thing because one has seen it, or a sound because one has heard it, or an odour because one has smelt it, or a touch because one has felt it, or a concept because one has perceived it.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 2. The king said: 'Your people say, Nâgasena, that though a man should have lived a hundred p. 124 years an evil life, yet if, at the moment of death, thoughts of the Buddha should enter his mind, he will be reborn among the gods. This I don't believe. And thus do they also say: "By one case of destruction of life a man may be reborn in purgatory." That, too, I cannot believe.' 'But tell me, O king. Would even a tiny stone float on the water without a boat?' 'Certainly not.' 'Very well; but would not a hundred cart-loads of stones float on the water if they were loaded in a boat?' 'Yes, they would float right enough.' 'Well, good deeds are like the boat.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 3. The king said: 'Do you (recluses), Nâgasena, strive after the removal of past sorrow?' 'No.' 'What then? Is it future sorrow you strive to remove?' 'No.' 'Present sorrow, then?' [81] 'Not that either.' 'Then if it be neither past, nor future, nor present sorrow that you strive to remove, whereunto, is it that you strive?' 'What are you asking, O king? That this sorrow should cease and no other sorrow should arise--that is what we strive after.' 'But, Nâgasena, is there (now) such a thing as future sorrow?' 'No. I grant that.' 'Then you are mighty clever people to strive after the removal of that which does not exist!' p. 125 'Has it ever happened to you, O king, that rival kings rose up against you as enemies and opponents?' 'Yes, certainly.' 'Then you set to work, I suppose, to have moats dug, and ramparts thrown up, and watch towers erected, and strongholds built, and stores of food collected 1?' 'Not at all. All that had been prepared beforehand.' 'Or you had yourself trained in the management of war elephants, and in horsemanship, and in the use of the war chariot, and in archery and fencing?' 'Not at all. I had learnt all that before.' 'But why?' 'With the object of warding off future danger.' 'How so? Is there such a thing (now) as future danger?' 'No. I must grant that.' 'Then you kings are mighty clever people to trouble yourselves about the warding off of that which does not exist!' 'Give me a further illustration.' 'Tell me, O king. Is it when you are athirst that you set to work to have wells dug, or ponds hollowed out, or reservoirs formed, with the object of getting something to drink?' 'Certainly not. All that has been prepared beforehand.' 'But to what end?' 'With the object of preventing future thirst.' 'How so? Is there such a thing as future thirst?' p. 126 'No, Sir.' 'So you are mighty clever people, O king, [82] to take all that trouble to prevent the future thirst which all the time does not exist!' 'Give me a further illustration.' [Then the Elder referred, as before, to the means people always took of warding against future hunger, and the king expressed his pleasure at the way in which the puzzle had been solved.] ____________________ 4. The king said: 'How far is it, Nâgasena, from here to the Brahma world 1?' 'Very far is it, O king. If a rock, the size of an upper chamber, were to fall from there, it would take four months to reach the earth, though it came down eight-and-forty thousand leagues 2 each day and night.' 'Good, Nâgasena! Now do not your people say that a Bhikkhu, who has the power of Iddhi and the mastery over his mind 3, can vanish from Gambu-dîpa, and appear in the Brahma world, as quickly as a strong man could stretch forth his bent up arm, or bend it in again if it were stretched out? That is a saying I cannot believe. How is it possible that he could traverse so quickly so many hundreds of leagues?' The Elder replied: 'In what district, O king, were you born?' p. 127 'There is an island called Alasanda 1. It was there I was born.' 'And how far is Alasanda from here?' 'About two hundred leagues.' 'Do you know for certain of any business you once did there and now recollect?' 'Oh, yes.' 'So quickly, great king, have you gone about two hundred leagues.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 5. The king said: 'If one man, Nâgasena, were to die here and be reborn in the Brahma world, and another were to die here and be reborn in Kashmir, which of the two would arrive first?' 'Both together, O king.' Give me an illustration.' 'In what town [83], O king, were you born?' 'There is a village called Kalasi. It was there I was born.' 'And how far is Kalasi from here?' 'About two hundred leagues.' 'How far is Kashmir from here?' 'Twelve leagues.' 'Now, great king, think of Kalasi.' 'I have done so.' 'And now, think of Kashmir.' 'I have done so.' 'Well, which did you think of quickest?' 'Of each in the same time.' 'Just so, great king, would it take no longer to be reborn in the Brahma world than to be reborn in Kashmir. And tell me, O king. Suppose two p. 128 birds were flying, and one were to alight on a tall tree, and the other on a small shrub. If they settled both at the same moment, whose shadow would first fall to the ground?' 'The two shadows would fall together.' 'Just so, great king, in the case you put.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' 6. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, how many kinds of wisdom are there?' 'Seven, O king.' 'And by how many kinds of Wisdom does one become wise?' 'By one: that is to say by the kind of wisdom called "the investigation of the Truth 1."' 'Then why is it said there are seven?' 'Tell me, O king. Suppose a sword were lying in its sheath and not taken in the hand, could it cut off anything you wanted to cut off with it?' 'Certainly not.' 'Just so, great king, by the other kinds of wisdom can nothing be understood without investigation of the Truth.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 7. The king said: 'Which, Nâgasena, is there more of, merit or demerit?' 'Merit.' [84] 'But why?' 'He who does wrong, O king, comes to feel remorse, and acknowledges his evil-doing. So demerit does not increase. But he who does well feels no remorse, and feeling no remorse gladness will p. 129 spring up within him, and joy will arise to him thus gladdened, and so rejoicing all his frame will be at peace, and being thus at peace he will experience a blissful feeling of content, and in that bliss his heart will be at rest, and he whose heart is thus at rest knows things as they really are 1. For that reason merit increases. A man, for example, though his hands and feet are cut off, if he gave to the Blessed One merely a handful of lotuses, would not enter purgatory for ninety-one Kalpas. That is why I said, O king, that there is more merit than demerit.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 8. The king said: 'Whose, Nâgasena, is the greater demerit--his who sins consciously, or his who sins inadvertently?' 'He who sins inadvertently, O king, has the greater demerit.' 'In that case, reverend Sir, we shall punish doubly any of our family or our court who do wrong unintentionally.' 'But what do you think, O king? If one man were to seize hold intentionally of a fiery mass of metal glowing with heat, and another were to seize hold of it unintentionally, which would be more burnt?' 'The one who did not know what he was doing.' 'Well, it is just the same with the man who does wrong.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 9. The king said: 'Is there any one, Nâgasena, p. 130 who can go with this bodily frame to Uttara-kuru or to the Brahma world, or to any other of the four great continents (into which the world is divided)?' 'Yes, there are such people.' 'But how can they?' [85] 'Do you recollect, O king, having ever jumped a foot or two feet across the ground?' 'Yes, Nâgasena, I can jump twelve feet.' 'But how?' 'I fix my mind on the idea of alighting there, and at the moment of my determination my body comes to seem light to me.' 'Just so, O king, can the Bhikkhu, who has the power of Iddhi, and has the mastery over his mind, when he has made his mind rise up to the occasion, travel through the sky by means of his mind.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 10. The king said: 'Your people say there are bones even a hundred leagues long. Now there is no tree even one hundred leagues in length, how then can there be bones so long?' 'But tell me, O king. Have you not heard of fishes in the sea five hundred leagues in length?' 'Yes. I have heard of such.' 'If so, could they not have bones a hundred leagues long?' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 11. The king said: 'Your people, Nâgasena, say that it is possible to suppress the inhaling and exhaling (of one's breath).' 'Yes, that can be done.' 'But how?' p. 131 'Tell me, O king. Have you ever heard of a man snoring 1?' 'Yes.' 'Well, would not that sound stop if he bent his body?' 'Yes.' 'Then surely if that sound would stop at the mere bending of the body of one who is untrained alike in body, in conduct, in mind, and in wisdom--why should it not be possible for the breathing of one trained in all these respects, and who has besides reached up to the fourth stage of the ecstatic contemplation 2, to be suppressed?' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 12. The king said: 'There is the expression ocean, Nâgasena. Why is the water called ocean?' The Elder replied [86]: 'Because there is just as much salt as water, O king, and just as much water as salt, therefore is it called ocean 3.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 13. The king said: 'Why, Nâgasena, is the ocean all of one taste, the taste of salt?' p. 132 'Because the water in it has stood so long, therefore it is all of one taste, the taste of salt 1.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 14. The king said: 'Can even the most minute thing, Nâgasena, be divided?' 'Yes, it can.' 'And what, Sir, is the most minute of all things.' 'Truth (Dhamma), O king, is the most minute and subtle. But this is not true of all qualities (Dhammâ). Subtleness or the reverse are epithets of qualities. But whatever can be divided that can wisdom (Paññâ) divide, and there is no other quality which can divide wisdom.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 15. The king said: 'These three, Nâgasena,--perception, and reason, and the soul in a being,--are they all different both in letter and in essence, or the same in essence differing only in the letter?' 'Recognition, O king, is the mark of perception, and discrimination of reason 2, and there is no such thing as a soul in beings 3.' p. 133 'But if there be no such thing as a soul, what is it then which sees forms with the eye, and hears sounds with the ear, and smells odours with the nose, and tastes tastes with the tongue, and feels touch with the body, or perceives qualities with the mind?' The Elder replied: 'If there be a soul (distinct from the body) which does all this, then if the door of the eye were thrown down (if the eye were plucked out) could it stretch out its head, as it were, through the larger aperture and (with greater range) see forms much more clearly than before? Could one hear sounds better if the cars were torn away, or smell better if the nose were cut off, or taste better if the tongue were pulled out, or feel touch better if the body were destroyed?' [87] 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then there can be no soul inside the body.' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ 16. The Elder said: 'A hard thing there is, O king, which the Blessed One has done.' 'And what is that?' 'The fixing of all those mental conditions which depend on one organ of sense, telling us that such is contact, and such sensation, and such idea, and such intention, and such thought 1.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to wade down into the sea, and taking some water in the palm of his hand, were to taste it with his tongue. Would he p. 134 distinguish whether it were water from the Ganges, or from the Jumna, or from the Akiravatî, or from the Sarabhû, or from the Mahî?' 'Impossible, Sir.' 'More difficult than that, great king, is it to have distinguished between the mental conditions which follow on the exercise of any one of the organs of sense!' 'Very good, Nâgasena!' ____________________ Here ends the Seventh Chapter 1. ____________________ 17. The Elder said: 'Do you know, O king, what time it is now?' 'Yes, Sir, I know. The first watch of the night is now passed. The middle watch is now going on. The torches are lit. The four banners are ordered to be raised, and appropriate gifts to be issued to you from the treasury.' The Yonakas said: 'Very good, great king. Most able is the Bhikkhu.' 'Yes, my men. Most able is the Bhikkhu. Were the master like him and the pupil like me, [88] a clever scholar would not take long in getting at the truth.' Then the king, pleased with the explanations given of the questions he had put, had Nâgasena robed in an embroidered cloak worth a hundred thousand 2, and said to him: 'Venerable Nâgasena, I hereby order that you shall be provided with your daily meal for eight hundred days; and give you the p. 135 choice of anything in the palace that it is lawful for you to take.' And when the Elder refused, saying he had enough to live on, the king rejoined: 'I know, Sir, you have enough to live on. But you should both protect me and protect yourself--yourself from the possibility of a public rumour to the effect that you convinced me but received nothing from me, and me from the possibility of a public rumour that though I was convinced I would give nothing in acknowledgement.' 'Let it be as you wish, great king,' was the reply. Then the king said: 'As the lion, the king of beasts, when put into a cage, though it were of gold, would turn his face longingly to the outside; even so do I, though I dwell in the world, turn my thoughts longingly to the higher life of you recluses. But, Sir, if I were to give up the household life and renounce the world it would not be long I should have to live, so many are my foes.' Then the venerable Nâgasena, having thus solved the questions put by Milinda the king, arose from his seat and departed to the hermitage. ____________________ 18. Not long after Nâgasena had gone, Milinda the king thought over to himself whether he had propounded his questions rightly, and whether the replies had been properly made. And he came to the conclusion that to questions well put replies had been well given. And Nâgasena likewise, when he reached the hermitage, thought the matter over to himself, and concluded that to questions well put right replies had been given. Now Nâgasena robed himself early in the morning, and went with his bowl in his hand to the palace, p. 136 and sat down on the seat prepared for him. And Milinda saluted the venerable Nâgasena, [89] and sat down respectfully at his side, and said to him: 'Pray do not think, Sir, that I was kept awake all the rest of the night exulting in the thought of having questioned you. I was debating with myself as to whether I had asked aright, and had been rightly answered. And I concluded that I had.' And the Elder on his part said: 'Pray do not suppose, great king, that I passed the rest of the night rejoicing at having answered all you asked. I too was thinking over what had been said by us both. And I came to the result that you had questioned well, and that I had rightly answered.' Thus did these two great men congratulate each the other on what he had spoken well. ____________________ Here ends the answering of the problems of the questions of Milinda. Footnotes 122:1 Abhigânato. 122:2 Katumikâya. 122:3 Olârika-viññânato. 122:4 Hita-viññânato. 122:5 Ahita-viññânato. 122:6 Sabhâga-nimittato. 122:7 Visabhâga-nimittato. 122:8 Kathâbhiññânato. 122:9 Lakkhanato. 122:10 Saranato. 123:11 Muddâto (see above, p. 6). 123:12 Gananâto. 123:13 Dharanato. The noun dhâranakâ is only found here (where I follow the Simhalese interpretation) and at Gâtaka II, 203 (where it means 'debtor,' as in Sanskrit). 123:14 Bhâvanato. For a translation of the full text, here abridged in the text, see 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 215, 216 ( 17). 123:15 Potthaka-nibandhanato. 123:16 Upanikkhepato. 123:17 Anubhûtato, perhaps 'experience.' There are really seventeen, not sixteen, so some two must have been regarded by the author as forming one between them. These may be Nos. 1 and 14, or more likely Nos. 4 and 5. 125:1 All that follows only differs by slight additions from III, 4, 3 above, pp. 100-102. 126:1 One of the highest heavens. 126:2 Yogana, a league of seven miles. 126:3 Ketovasippatto, which Hînati-kumburê renders mano vasi prâpta wû. I know of no passage in the Pitakas where the phrase occurs in connection with Iddhi; but it is often used by our author. See, for instance, just below, III, 7, 9. 127:1 Alexandria (in Baktria) built on an island in the Indus. 128:1 Dhamma-vikaya-sambogghangena. 129:1 The above is a paragraph constantly recurring in the Pâli Pitakas. See, for instance, Dîgha II, 75; Anguttara III, 104; and Mahâvagga VIII, 15, 13 (where I have annotated the details). 131:1 Kâkakkhamâno. See Gâtaka I, 60, 24; 160, 18. Hînati-kumburê renders it 'sleeping with a snore (gorawamin) like the sound of crows (kâka).' 131:2 Ghâna. 131:3 Samudda. The answer (to give opportunity for which the question is invented) is a kind of punning etymology of this Pâli word for ocean. Our author seems to take it as meaning 'equal water-ness,' from sama and ud(aka). The real derivation is very different. It is from the root ud, which is allied to our 'Wet' and the Greek , and the prefix sam in the sense of completeness. It is difficult to reconcile the reply to this. There is a kind of conversation condemned in the Dîgha I, 1, 17, and elsewhere as samuddakkhâyika, which is explained in the Sumangala, p. 91, as deriving samudda from sa, 'with,' and mudda, 'a seal ring.' 132:1 In the same way the Buddhist religion (the Dhamma-Vinaya) is said in the Kullavagga IX, 1, 4, to be 'all of one taste, the taste of salvation, emancipation' (Vimutti). 132:2 So also above, II, 3, 12. Here the words are Vigânanalakkhanam viññânam, pagânanâ-lakkhana paññâ, which the Ceylon translator amplifies into 'As a peasant, on seeing grains of gold, would recognise them as valuable, so is it the characteristic of viññâna to recognise aramunu (objects of sense) when it sees them. As a goldsmith, on seeing grains of gold, would not only know they were valuable, but also discriminate their value (as large or small), so is it the characteristic of paññâ, not only to recognise, but also to discriminate between the objects of sense.' 132:3 See above, II, 3, 6, and II, 3, 16. Hînati-kumburê here renders p. 133 gîvo by the 'life (or perhaps living principle, gîvitâ) inside the forms produced out of the four elements.' 133:1 Phasso, vedanâ, saññâ, ketanâ, kittam. 134:1 See the note at the end of Book II, Chapter 3, 14. 134:2 That is kahâpanas, 'half-pennies.' Next: Chapter 1 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 137

MENDAKA-PAÑHO. THE SOLVING OF DILEMMAS.

1. Master of words and sophistry, clever and wise Milinda tried to test great Nâgasena's skill. Leaving him not 1, again and yet again, He questioned and cross-questioned him, until His own skill was proved foolishness. Then he became a student of the Holy Writ. All night, in secrecy, he pondered o'er The ninefold Scriptures, and therein he found Dilemmas hard to solve, and full of snares. And thus he thought: 'The conquering Buddha's words Are many-sided, some explanatory, Some spoken as occasion rose to speak, Some dealing fully with essential points. Through ignorance of what, each time, was meant There will be strife hereafter as to what The King of Righteousness has thus laid down In these diverse and subtle utterances. Let me now gain great Nâgasena's ear, And putting to him that which seems so strange And hard--yea contradictory--get him To solve it. So in future times, when men Begin to doubt, the light of his solutions Shall guide them, too, along the path of Truth.' p. 138 2. Now Milinda the king, when the night was turning into day, and the sun had risen, bathed, and with hands clasped and raised to his forehead, called to mind the Buddhas of the past, the present, and the future, and solemnly undertook the observance of the eightfold vow, saying to himself: 'For seven days from now will I do penance by taking upon myself the observance of the eight rules, and when my vow is accomplished will I go to the teacher and put to him, as questions, these dilemmas.' So Milinda, the king laid aside his usual dress, and put off his ornaments; and clad in yellow robes, with only a recluse's turban 1 on his head, in appearance like a hermit, did he carry out the eightfold abstinence, keeping in mind the vow--'For this seven days I am to decide no case at law. I am to harbour no lustful thought, no thought of ill-will, no thought tending to delusion. Towards all slaves, servants, and dependents I am to show a meek and lowly disposition. [91] I am to watch carefully over every bodily act, and over my six organs, of sense. And I am to fill my heart with thoughts of love towards all beings.' Keeping this eightfold vow, establishing his heart in this eightfold moral law, for seven days he went not forth. But as the night was passing into day, at sunrise of the eighth day, he took his breakfast early, and then with downcast eyes and measured words, gentle in manner, collected in thought, glad and pleased and rejoicing in heart, did he go to Nâgasena. And bowing down at his feet, he stood respectfully on one side, and said: 3. 'There is a certain matter, venerable Nâgasena, p. 139 that I desire to talk over with you alone. I wish no third person to be present. In some deserted spot, some secluded place in the forest, fit in all the eight respects for a recluse, there should this point of mine be put. And therein let there be nothing hid from me, nothing kept secret. I am now in a fit state to hear secret things when we are deep in consultation. And the meaning of what I say can be made clear by illustration. As it is to the broad earth, O Nâgasena, that it is right to entrust treasure when occasion arises for laying treasure by, so is it to me that it is right to entrust secret things when we are deep in consultation.' 4. Then having gone with the master to a secluded spot he further said: 'There are eight kinds of places, Nâgasena, which ought to be altogether avoided by a man who wants to consult. No wise man will talk a matter over in such places, or the matter falls to the ground and is brought to no conclusion. And what are the eight? Uneven ground, spots unsafe by fear of men, windy places, hiding spots, sacred places, high roads, light bambû bridges, and public bathing places.' The Elder asked: 'What is the objection to each of these?' The king replied: 'On uneven ground, Nâgasena, [92] the matter discussed becomes jerky, verbose, and diffuse, and comes to nothing. In unsafe places the mind is disturbed, and being disturbed does not follow the point clearly. In windy spots the voice is indistinct. In hiding places there are eavesdroppers. In sacred places the question discussed is apt to be diverted to the serious surroundings. On a high road it is apt to become frivolous, on a p. 140 bridge unsteady and wavering, at a public bathing place the discussion would be matter of common talk. Therefore is it said 1: "Uneven ground, unsafe and windy spots, And hiding places, and god-haunted shrines, High roads, and bridges, and all bathing ghâts-- These eight avoid when talking of high things."' ____________________ 5. 'There are eight kinds of people, Nâgasena, who when talking a matter over, spoil the discussion. And who are the eight? He who walks in lust, he who walks in ill-will, he who walks in delusion, he who walks in pride, the greedy man, the sluggard, the man of one idea, and the fool.' 'What is the objection to each of these?' asked the Elder. 'The first spoils the discussion by his lust, the next by his ill-will, the third by his delusions, the fourth by his pride, the fifth by his greed, the sixth by his sloth, the seventh by his narrowness, and the last by his folly. Therefore is it said: "The lustful, angry, or bewildered man, The proud, the greedy, or the slothful man, The man of one idea, and the poor fool-- These eight are spoilers of high argument."' ____________________ 6. 'There are nine kinds of people, Nâgasena, who let out a secret that has been talked over with them, and treasure it not up in their hearts. And who are the nine? The lustful man reveals it in obedience to some lust, the ill-tempered man in consequence p. 141 of some ill-will, the deluded man under some mistake. [93] The timid man reveals it through fear, and the man greedy for gain to get something out of it. A woman reveals it through infirmity, a drunkard in his eagerness for drink, a eunuch because of his imperfection, and a child through fickleness. Therefore is it said: "The lustful, angry, or bewildered man, The timid man, and he who seeks for gain, A woman, drunkard, eunuch, or a child-- These nine are fickle, wavering, and mean. When secret things are talked over to them They straightway become public property."' ____________________ 7. 'There are eight causes, Nâgasena, of the advance, the ripening of insight. And what are the eight? The advance of years, the growth of reputation, frequent questioning, association with teachers, one's own reflection, converse with the wise, cultivation of the loveable, and dwelling in a pleasant land. Therefore is it said: "By growth in reputation, and in years, By questioning, and by the master's aid, By thoughtfulness, and converse with the wise, By intercourse with men worthy of love, By residence within a pleasant spot-- By these nine is one's insight purified. They who have these, their wisdom grows 1."' ____________________ 8. 'This spot, Nâgasena, is free from the objections to talking matters over. And I am a model companion for any one desiring to do so. I can keep a p. 142 secret, and will keep yours as long as I live. In all the eight ways just described my insight has grown ripe. It would be hard to find such a pupil as you may have in me. [94] 'Now towards a pupil who conducts himself thus aright the teacher ought to conduct himself in accordance with the twenty-five virtues of a teacher. And what are the twenty-five? He must always and without fail keep guard over his pupil. He must let him know what to cultivate, and what to avoid; about what he should be earnest, and what he may neglect. He must instruct him as to sleep, and as to keeping himself in health, and as to what food he may take, and what reject. He should teach him discrimination 1 (in food), and share with him all that is put, as alms, into his own bowl. He should encourage him, saying: "Be not afraid. You will gain advantage (from what is here taught you)." He should advise him as to the people whose company he should keep, and as to the villages and Vihâras he should frequent. He should never indulge in (foolish) talk 2 with him. When he sees any defect in him he should easily pardon it. He should be zealous, he should teach nothing partially, keep nothing secret, and hold nothing back 3. He should look upon him in his heart as a son, saying to himself: "I have begotten him in p. 143 learning 1." He should strive to bring him forward, saying to himself: "How can I keep him from going back? "He should determine in himself to make him strong in knowledge, saying to himself: "I will make him mighty." He should love him, never desert him in necessity, never neglect him in anything he ought to do for him, always befriend him--so far as he can rightly do so 2--when he does wrong. These, Sir, are the twenty-five good qualities in a teacher. Treat me altogether in accordance therewith. Doubt, Lord, has overcome me. There are apparent contradictions in the word of the Conqueror. About them strife will hereafter arise, and in future times it will be hard to find a teacher with insight such as yours. Throw light for me on these dilemmas, to the downfall of the adversaries.' 9. Then the Elder agreed to what he had said, and in his turn set out the ten good qualities which ought to be found in a lay disciple: 'These ten, O king, are the virtues of a lay disciple. He suffers like pain and feels like joy as the Order does. He takes the Doctrine (Dhamma) as his master. He delights in giving so far as he is able to give. On seeing the religion (Dhamma) of the Conqueror decay, he does his best to revive it. He holds right views. Having no passion for excitement 3, he runs p. 144 not after any other teacher his life long. He keeps guard over himself in thought and deed. He delights in peace, is a lover of peace. He feels no jealousy, [95] and walks not in religion in a quarrelsome spirit. He takes his refuge in the Buddha, he takes his refuge in the Doctrine, he takes his refuge in the Order. These, great king, are the ten good qualities of a lay disciple. They exist all of them in you. Hence is it fit, and right, and becoming in you that, seeing the decay of the religion of the Conqueror, you desire its prosperity. I give you leave. Ask of me whatever you will.' ____________________ [Here ends the introduction to the solving of dilemmas.] ____________________ THE DILEMMAS. [ON HONOURS PAID TO THE BUDDHA.] 10. Then Milinda the king, having thus been granted leave, fell at the feet of the teacher, and raising his clasped hands to his forehead, said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, these leaders of other sects say thus: "If the Buddha accepts gifts he cannot have passed entirely away. He must be still in union with the world, having his being somewhere in it, in the world, a shareholder in the things of the world; and therefore any honour paid to him becomes empty and vain 1. On the other hand if he p. 145 be entirely passed away (from life), unattached to the world, escaped from all existence, then honours would not be offered to him. For he who is entirely set free accepts no honour, and any act done to him who accepts it not becomes empty and vain." This is a dilemma which has two horns. It is not a matter within the scope of those who have no mind 1, it is a question fit for the great. Tear asunder this net of heresy, put it on one side. To you has this puzzle been put. Give to the future sons of the Conqueror eyes wherewith to see the riddle to the confusion of their adversaries.' 'The Blessed One, O king,' replied the Elder, 'is entirely set free. And the Blessed One accepts no gift. Even at the foot of the Tree of Wisdom he abandoned all accepting of gifts, how much more then now when he has passed entirely away by that kind of passing away which leaves no root over (for the formation of a new existence). For this, O king, has been said by Sâriputta, the commander of the faith 2: "Though worshipped, these Unequalled Ones, alike By gods and men, unlike them all they heed Neither a gift nor worship. They accept It not, neither refuse it. Through the ages All Buddhas were so, so will ever be 3!"' p. 146 11. The king said: 'Venerable Nâgasena, a father may speak in praise of his son, or a son of his father. But that is no ground for putting the adversaries to shame. It is only an expression of their own belief, Come now! Explain this matter to me fully to the establishing of your own doctrine, [96] and to the unravelling of the net of the heretics.' The Elder replied: 'The Blessed One, O king, is entirely set free (from life). And the Blessed One accepts no gift. If gods or men put up a building to contain the jewel treasure of the relics of a Tathâgata who does not accept their gift, still by that homage paid to the attainment of the supreme good under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom do they themselves attain to one or other of the three glorious states 1. Suppose, O king, that though a great and glorious fire had been kindled, it should die out, would it then again accept any supply of dried grass or sticks?' 'Even as it burned, Sir, it could not be said to accept fuel, how much less when it had died away, and ceased to burn, could it, an unconscious thing, accept it?' 'And when that one mighty fire had ceased, and gone out, would the world be bereft of fire?' 'Certainly not. Dry wood is the seat, the basis of fire, and any men who want fire can, by the exertion of their own strength and power, such as resides in individual men, once more, by twirling the firestick, produce fire, and with that fire do any work for which fire is required.' p. 147 'Then that saying of the sectarians that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain" turns out to be false. As that great and glorious fire was set alight, even so, great king, was the Blessed One set alight in the glory of his Buddhahood over the ten thousand world systems. As it went out, so has he passed away into that kind of passing away in which no root remains. As the fire, when gone out, accepted no supply of fuel, just so, and for the good of the world, has his accepting of gifts ceased and determined. As men, when the fire is out, and has no further means of burning, then by their own strength and effort, such as resides in individual men, twirl the fire-stick and produce fire, and do any work for which fire is required--so do gods and men, though a Tathâgata has passed away and no longer accepts their gifts, yet put up a house for the jewel treasure of his relics, and doing homage to the attainment of supreme good under the form of the jewel treasure of his wisdom, they attain to one or other of the three glorious states. [97] Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.' 12. 'Now hear, too, another reason for the same thing. Suppose, O king, there were to arise a great and mighty wind, and that then it were to die away. Would that wind acquiesce in being produced again?' 'A wind that has died away can have no thought or idea of being reproduced. And why? Because the element wind is an unconscious thing.' 'Or even, O king, would the word "wind" be p. 148 still applicable to that wind, when it had so died away?' 'Certainly not, Sir. But fans and punkahs are means for the production of wind. Any men who are oppressed by heat, or tormented by fever, can by means of fans and punkahs, and by the exertion of their own strength and power, such as resides in individual men, produce a breeze, and by that wind allay their heat, or assuage their fever.' 'Then that saying of the sectarians that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain" turns out to be false. As the great and mighty wind which blew, even so, great king, has the Blessed One blown over the ten thousand world systems with the wind of his love, so cool, so sweet, so calm, so delicate. As it first blew, and then died away, so has the Blessed One, who once blew with the wind so cool, so sweet, so calm, so delicate, of his love, now passed away with that kind of passing away in which no root remains. As those men were oppressed by heat and tormented with fever, even so are gods and men tormented and oppressed with threefold fire and heat 1. As fans and punkahs are means of producing wind, so the relics and the jewel treasure of the wisdom of a Tathâgata are means of producing the threefold attainment. [98] And as men oppressed by heat and tormented by fever can by fans and punkahs produce a breeze, and thus allay the heat and assuage the fever, so can gods and men by offering reverence to the relics, and the p. 149 jewel treasure of the wisdom of a Tathâgata, though he has died away and accepts it not, cause goodness to arise within them, and by that goodness can assuage and can allay the fever and the torment of the threefold fire. Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.' 13. 'Now hear another reason. for the same thing. Suppose, O king, a man were to make a drum sound, and then that sound were to die away. Would that sound acquiesce in being produced again?' 'Certainly not, Sir. The sound has vanished. It can have no thought or idea of being reproduced. The sound of a drum when it has once been produced and died away, is altogether cut off. But, Sir, a drum is a means of producing sound. And any man, as need arises, can by the effort of power residing in himself, beat on that drum, and so produce a sound.' 'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One--except the teacher and the instruction he has left in his doctrine and discipline, and the jewel treasure of his relics whose value is derived from his righteousness, and contemplation, and wisdom, and emancipation, and insight given by the knowledge of emancipation--just so has he passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains. But the possibility of receiving the three attainments is not cut off because the Blessed One has passed away. Beings oppressed by the sorrow of becoming can, when they desire the attainments, still receive them by means of the jewel treasure of his relics and of his doctrine and discipline and teaching. Therefore is it, great king, that p. 150 all acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit. And this future possibility, great king, has been foreseen by the Blessed One, and spoken of, and declared, and made known, when he said: "It may be, Ânanda, that in some of you the thought may arise: [99] 'The word of the Master is ended. We have no Teacher more!' But it is not thus, Ânanda, that you should regard it. The Truth which I have preached to you, the Rules which I have laid down for the Order, let them, when I am gone, be the Teacher to you 1." So that because the Tathâgata has passed away and consents not thereto, that therefore any act done to him is empty and vain--this saying of the enemy is proved false. It is untrue, unjust, not according to fact, wrong, and perverse. It is the cause of sorrow, has sorrow as its fruit, and leads down the road to perdition!' 14. 'Now hear another reason for the same thing. Does the broad earth acquiesce, O king, in all kinds of seeds being planted all over it?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then how is it those seeds, planted without the earth's consent, do yet stand fast and firmly rooted, and expand into trees with great trunks and sap and branches, and bearing fruits and flowers?' 'Though the earth, Sir, gives no consent, yet it acts as a site for those seeds, as a means of their development. Planted on that site they grow, by p. 151 its means, into such great trees with branches, flowers, and fruit.' 'Then, great king, the sectaries are destroyed, defeated, proved wrong by their own words when they say that "an act done to him who accepts it not is empty and vain." As the broad earth, O king, is the Tathâgata, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme. Like it he accepts nothing. Like the seeds which through it attain to such developments are the gods and men who, through the jewel treasures of the relics and the wisdom of the Tathâgata--though he have passed away and consent not to it--being firmly rooted by the roots of merit, become like unto trees casting a goodly shade by means of the trunk of contemplation, the sap of true doctrine, and the branches of righteousness, and bearing the flowers of emancipation, and the fruits of Samanaship. [100] Therefore is it, great king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are still of value and bear fruit.' 15. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Do camels, buffaloes, asses, goats, oxen, or men acquiesce in the birth of worms inside them?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then how is it then, that without their consent worms are so born, and spread by rapid reproduction of sons and grandsons?' 'By the power of evil Karma, Sir.' 'Just so, great king, is it by the power of the relics and the wisdom of the Tathâgata, who has passed away and acquiesces in nothing, that an act done to him is of value and bears fruit.' p. 152 16. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Do men consent, O king, that the ninety-eight diseases should be produced in their bodies?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then how is it the diseases come?' 'By evil deeds done in former births.' 'But, great king, if evil deeds done in a former birth have to be suffered here and now, then both good and evil done here or done before has weight and bears fruit. Therefore is it that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not consenting, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.' 17. 'Now hear another and further reason for the same thing. Did you ever hear, O king, of the ogre named Nandaka, who, having laid hands upon the Elder Sâriputta, was swallowed up by the earth?' 'Yes, Sir, that is matter of common talk among men.' 'Well, did Sâriputta acquiesce in that?' [101] 'Though the world of gods and men, Sir, were to be destroyed, though the sun and moon were to fall upon the earth, though Sineru the king of mountains were to be dissolved, yet would not Sâriputta the Elder have consented to any pain being inflicted on a fellow creature. And why not? Because every condition of heart which could cause him to be angry or offended has been in him destroyed and rooted out. And as all cause thereof had thus been removed, Sir, therefore could not Sâriputta be angered even with those who sought to deprive him of his life.' p. 153 'But if Sâriputta, O king, did not consent to it, how was it that Nandaka was so swallowed up?' 'By the power of his evil deeds.' 'Then if so, great king, an act done to him who consents not is still of power and bears fruit. And if this is so of an evil deed, how much more of a good one? Therefore is it, O king, that acts done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not accepting them, are nevertheless of value and bear fruit.' 18. 'Now how many, O king, are those men who, in this life, have been swallowed up by the earth? Have you heard anything on that point?' 'Yes, Sir, I have heard how many there are.' 'Then tell me.' 'Kiñka the Brahmin woman, and Suppabuddha the Sâkyan, and Devadatta the Elder, and Nandaka the ogre, and Nanda the Brahman--these are the five people who were swallowed up by the earth.' 'And whom, O king, had they wronged?' 'The Blessed One and his disciples.' 'Then did the Blessed One or his disciples consent to their being so swallowed up?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Therefore is it, O king, that an act done to the Tathâgata, notwithstanding his having passed away and not consenting thereto, is nevertheless of value and bears fruit.' 'Well has this deep question been explained by you, venerable Nâgasena, and made clear. You have made the secret thing [102] plain, you have loosed the knot, you have made in the jungle an open space, the adversaries are overthrown, the wrong opinion has been proved false, the sectaries have been covered p. 154 with darkness when they met you, O best of all the leaders of schools!' ____________________ [Here ends the question as to not consenting to honours paid 1.] ____________________ [THE OMNISCIENCE OF THE BUDDHA.] 19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, was the Buddha omniscient?' 'Yes, O king, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually (consciously) present with him. The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection.' But if he did reflect he knew whatever he wanted to know 2. 'Then, Sir, the Buddha cannot have been omniscient, if his all-embracing knowledge was reached through investigation.' '[If so, great king, our Buddha's knowledge must have been less in degree of fineness than that of the other Buddhas. And that is a conclusion hard to draw. But let me explain a little further.] Suppose, O king, you had a hundred cart-loads of rice in the husk, and each cart-load was of seven ammanas 3 and a half. Would a man without consideration be able to tell you in a moment how many laks of grains there were in the whole 4?' p. 155 20. 'Now there are these, seven classes of minds. Those, great king, who are full of lust, ill-will, delusion, or wrong doing, who are untrained in the management of their body, or in conduct, or in thought, or in wisdom,--their thinking powers are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is it so? Because of the untrained condition of their minds. It is like the slow and heavy movements of a giant bambû--when it is being dragged along with its wide-spreading, extensive, overgrown, and interlaced vegetation, and with its branches intricately entangled one with the other. So slow and heavy are the movements of the minds of those men, O king. And why? Because of the intricate entanglements of wrong dispositions. This is the first class of minds.' 21. 'From it the second class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who have been converted, for whom the gates of purgatory are closed, who have attained to right views, who have grasped the doctrine of the Master--their thinking powers, so far as the three lower stages 1 are concerned, are brought quickly p. 156 into play, [103] and act with ease. But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those three stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a clean trunk as far as the third knot, but above that has its branches intricately, entangled. So far as regards the smooth trunk it would travel easily when dragged along, but it would stick obstinately as regards its upper branches. This is the second class of minds.' 22. 'From these the third class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Sakad Âgâmins 1, in whom lust, ill-will, and delusion are reduced to a minimum,--their thinking powers, so far as the five lower stages are concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those five stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a clean trunk as far as the fifth knot, but above that has its branches intricately entangled. So far as regards the smooth trunk it would travel easily when dragged along, but it would be moved with difficulty as far as its upper branches are concerned. This is the third class of minds.' p. 157 23. 'From these the fourth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Anâgâmins 1, who have completely got rid of the five lower fetters,--their thinking powers, so far as the ten stages 2 are concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. [104] But as regards the higher regions they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their minds having been made clear as regards those ten stages, and because of the failings (to be vanquished in the higher stages) still existing within them. It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has a smooth trunk as far as the tenth knot, but above that has its branches intricately entangled. This is the fourth class of minds.' 24. 'From these the fifth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Arahats, in whom the four Great Evils 3 have ceased, whose stains have been washed away, whose predispositions to evil 4 have been put aside, who have lived the life, and accomplished the task, and laid aside every burden, and reached up to that which is good, for whom the Fetter of the craving after any kind of future life has been broken to pieces 5, who have reached the higher insight 6, who are purified as regards all those conditions of heart in which a p. 158 hearer can be pure,--their thinking powers, as regards all that a disciple can be or do, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as to those things which are within the reach of the Pakkeka-Buddhas (of those who are Buddhas, but for themselves alone) they are brought into play with difficulty, and act slowly. And why is this so? Because of their having been made pure as regards all within the province of a hearer, but not as regards that within the reach of those who are Buddhas (though for themselves alone). It is like the movement of a giant bambû which has been pruned of the branches arising out of all its knots--and which, therefore, when dragged along moves quickly and with ease, because of its smoothness all along, and because of its being unencumbered with the jungly growth of vegetation. This is the fifth class of minds.' 25. [105] 'From these the sixth class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are Pakkeka-Buddhas, dependent on themselves alone, wanting no teacher, dwellers alone like the solitary horn of the rhinoceros, who so far as their own higher life is concerned, have pure hearts free from stain,--their thinking powers, so far as their own province is concerned, are brought quickly into play, and act with ease. But as regards all that is specially within the province of a perfect Buddha (one who is not only Buddha, that is enlightened, himself, but can lead others to the light) they are brought with difficulty into play, and move slowly. And why is this so? Because of their purity as regards all within their own province, and because of the immensity of the province of the omniscient Buddhas. It is like a man, O king, who would fearlessly cross, and at will, p. 159 by day or night, a shallow brook on his own property. But when he comes in sight of the mighty ocean, deep and wide and ever-moving, and sees no further shore to it, then would he stand hesitating and afraid, and make no effort even to get over it. And why? Because of his familiarity with his own, and because of the immensity of the sea. This is the sixth class of minds.' 26. 'From these the seventh class is to be distinguished. Those, O king, who are complete Buddhas 1, having all knowledge, bearing about in themselves the tenfold power (of the ten kinds of insight), confident in the four modes of just self-confidence, endowed with the eighteen characteristics of a Buddha, whose mastery knows no limit, from whose grasp nothing is hid,--their thinking powers are on every point brought quickly into play, and act with ease. Suppose, O king, a dart well burnished, free from rust, perfectly smooth, with a fine edge, straight, without a crook or a flaw in it, were to be set on a powerful crossbow. Would there be any clumsiness in its action, any retarding in its movement, if it were discharged by a powerful man against a piece of fine linen, or cotton stuff, or delicate woolwork?' 'Certainly not, Sir. And why? Because the stuff is so fine, and the dart so highly tempered, and the discharge so powerful.' [106] 'And just in the same way, great king, are the thinking powers of the Buddhas I have described brought quickly into play, and act with ease. p. 160 [paragraph continues] And why? Because of their being purified in every respect. This is the seventh class of minds.' 27. 'Now of these, O king, the last--the thinking powers of the omniscient Buddhas--altogether outclasses the other six, and is clear and active in its high quality that is beyond our ken. It is because the mind of the Blessed One is so clear and active that the Blessed One, great king, displays the double miracle. From that we may get to know, O king, how clear and active His mental powers are. And for those wonders there is no further reason that can be alleged. (Yet) those wonders, O king, [caused by means of the mind (alone) of the omniscient Buddhas 1] cannot be counted, or calculated, or divided, or separated, (For) the knowledge of the Blessed One, O king, is dependent upon reflection 2, and it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know. (But) it is as when a man passes something he already has in one hand to the other, or utters a sound when his mouth is open, or swallows some food that he has already in his mouth, or opens his eyes when they are shut, or shuts them when open, or stretches forth his arm when it is bent in, or bends it in when stretched out--more rapid than that, great king, and more easy in its action, is the all-embracing knowledge of the Blessed One, more rapid than that his reflection. And although it is by reflection that they know whatever they want to know, yet even when they p. 161 are not reflecting the Blessed Buddhas are not, even then, anything other than omniscient.' 'But, venerable Nâgasena, reflection is carried on for the purpose of seeking (that which is not clear when the reflection begins). Come now. Convince me in this matter by some reason.' 'Suppose, O king, there were a rich man, great in wealth and property--one who had stores of gold and silver and valuables, and stores of all kinds of wheat, one who had rice, and paddy, and barley, and dry grain, and oilseed, and beans, and peas, and every other edible seed, who had ghee, and oil, and butter, and milk, and curds, and honey, and sugar, and molasses, [107] all put away in store-rooms in jars, and pots, and pans, and every sort of vessel. Now if a traveller were to arrive, one worthy of hospitality, and expecting to be entertained; and all the prepared food in the house had been finished, and they were to get out of the jar some rice ready for cooking, and prepare a meal for him. Would that wealthy man merely by reason of the deficiency in eatable stuff at that unusual time be rightly called poor or needy?' 'Certainly not, Sir. Even in the palace of a mighty king of kings there might be no food ready out of time, how much less in the house of an ordinary man.' 'Just so, great king, with the all-embracing knowledge of a Tathâgata when reflection only is wanting; but which on reflection grasps whatever he wants. Now suppose, O king, there were a tree in full fruit, with its branches bending this way and that by the weight of the burden of the bunches of its fruit, but no single fruit had fallen from it. p. 162 [paragraph continues] Could that tree rightly, under the circumstances of the case, be called barren, merely because of the want of a fallen fruit?' 'No, Sir. For though the falling of the fruit is a condition precedent to its enjoyment, yet when it has fallen one can take as much as one likes.' 'Just so, great king, though reflection is a necessary condition of the knowledge of the Tathâgata, yet on reflection it perceives whatever he wants to know.' 'Does that happen always, Nâgasena, at the moment of reflection?' 'Yes, O king. just as when the mighty king of kings (the Kakkavatti) calling to mind his glorious wheel of victory wishes it to appear, and no sooner is it thought of than it appears--so does the knowledge of the Tathâgata follow continually on reflection.' 'Strong is the reason you give, Nâgasena, for the omniscience of the Buddha. I am convinced that that is so.' ____________________ [Here ends the question as to the omniscience of the Buddha being dependent on reflection 1.] ____________________ [WHY DEVADATTA WAS ADMITTED TO THE ORDER.] 28. 'Venerable Nâgasena, who was it that admitted Devadatta 2 to the Order?' p. 163 'Those six young nobles, O king, Bhaddiya and Anuruddha and Ânanda and Bhagu and Kimbila and Devadatta, [108] together with Upâli the barber as a seventh--they all, when the Master had attained to Buddhahood, left the Sâkya home out of the delight they felt in him, and following the Blessed One renounced the world 1. So the Blessed One admitted them all to the Order.' 'But was it not Devadatta who, after he had entered the Order, raised up a schism within it?' 'Yes. No layman can create a schism, nor a sister of the Order, nor one under preparatory instruction, nor a novice of either sex. It must be a Bhikkhu, under no disability, who is in full communion, and a co-resident 2.' 'And what Karma does a schismatical person gain?' 'A Karma that continues to act for a Kalpa (a very long period of time).' 'What then, Nâgasena! Was the Buddha aware that Devadatta after being admitted to the Order would raise up a schism, and having done so would suffer torment in purgatory for a Kalpa?' 'Yes, the Tathâgata, knew that.' 'But, Nâgasena, if that be so, then the statement that the Buddha was kind and pitiful, that he sought after the good of others, that he was the remover of that which works harm, the provider of that which works well to all beings--that statement must be wrong. If it be not so--if he knew not that Devadatta p. 164 after he had been admitted to the Order would stir up a schism--then he cannot have been omniscient. This other double-pointed dilemma is put to you. Unravel this tough skein, break up the argument of the adversaries. In future times it will be hard to find Bhikkhus like to you in wisdom. Herein then show your skill!' 29. 'The Blessed One, O king, was both full of mercy and had all knowledge. It was when the Blessed One in his mercy and wisdom considered the life history of Devadatta that he perceived how, having heaped up Karma on Karma, he would pass for an endless series of Kalpas from torment to torment, and from perdition to perdition. And the Blessed One knew also that the infinite Karma of that man would, because he had entered the Order, become finite, and the sorrow caused by the previous Karma would also therefore become limited. [109] But that if that foolish person were not to enter the Order then he would continue to heap up Karma which would endure for a Kalpa. And it was because he knew that that, in his mercy, he admitted him to the Order.' 'Then, Nâgasena, the Buddha first wounds a man and then pours oil on the wound, first throws a man down a precipice and then reaches out to him an assisting hand, first kills him and then seeks to give him life, first gives pain and then adds a subsequent joy to the pain he gave.' 'The Tathâgata, O king, wounds people but to their good, he casts people down but to their profit, he kills people but to their advantage. just as mothers and fathers, O king, hurt their children and even knock them down, thinking the while of their p. 165 good; so by whatsoever method an increase in the virtue of living things can be brought about, by that method does he contribute to their good. If Devadatta, O king, had not entered the Order, then as a layman he would have laid up much Karma leading to states of woe, and so passing for hundreds of thousands of Kalpas from torment to misery, and from one state of perdition to another, he would have suffered constant pain. It was knowing that, that in his mercy, the Blessed One admitted Devadatta to the Order. It was at the thought that by renouncing the world according to His doctrine Devadatta's sorrow would become finite that, in his mercy, he adopted that means of making his heavy sorrow light. 30. 'As a man of influence, O king, by the power of his wealth or reputation or prosperity or birth, when a grievous penalty has been imposed by, the king on some friend or relative of his, would get it made light by the ability arising from the trust reposed in him; [110] just so did the Blessed One, by admitting him to the Order, and by the efficacy of the influence of righteousness and meditation and wisdom and emancipation of heart, make light the heavy sorrow of Devadatta, who would have had to suffer many hundreds of thousands of Kalpas. As a clever physician and surgeon, O king, would make a grievous sickness light by the aid of a powerful medicinal drug, just so did the Blessed One, in his knowledge of the right means to an end, admit Devadatta to the Order and thus make his grievous pain light by the aid of the medicine of the Dhamma, strong by the power of mercy 1. Was then, O king, p. 166 the Blessed One guilty of any wrong in that he turned Devadatta from being a man of much sorrow into being a man of less sorrow?' 'No indeed, Sir. He committed no wrong, not even in the smallest degree 1.' 'Then accept this, great king, to the full as the reason for which the Blessed One admitted Devadatta to the Order.' 31. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, for the Blessed One's having admitted Devadatta. Suppose men were to seize and hurry before the king some wicked robber, saying: "This is the wicked robber, your Majesty. Inflict upon him such punishment as you think fit!" And thereupon the king were to say to them: "Take this robber then, my men, outside the town, and there on the place of execution cut off his head." And they in obedience to his orders were to take that man accordingly towards the place of execution. And some man who was high in office near the king, and of great reputation and wealth and property, whose word was held of weight 2, and whose influence was great, should see him. And he were to have pity on him, and were to say to those men: "Stay, good fellows. What good will cutting off his head do to you? Save him alive, and cut off only a hand or a foot. I will speak on his behalf to the king." And they at the word of that influential person were to do so. Now would the officer who had acted so towards him have been a benefactor to that robber?' p. 167 'He would have saved his life, Sir. And having done that, what would he not have done?' 'But would he have done no wrong on account of the pain the man suffered [111] when his hand or foot was cut off?' 'The pain the thief suffered, Sir, was his own fault. But the man who saved his life did him no harm.' 'Just so, great king, was it in his mercy that the Blessed One admitted Devadatta, with the knowledge that by that his sorrow would be mitigated.' 32. 'And Devadatta's sorrow, O king, was mitigated. For Devadatta at the moment of his death took refuge in Him for the rest of his existences when he said: "In him, who of the best is far the best 1, The god of gods, the guide of gods and men, Who see'th all, and bears the hundred marks Of goodness,--'tis in him I refuge take Through all the lives that I may have to live." 2'If you divide this Kalpa, O king, into six parts, it was at the end of the first part that Devadatta created schism in the Order. After he has suffered the other five in purgatory he will be released, and will become a Pakkeka-Buddha 3 under the name of Atthissara.' 'Great is the gift bestowed, Nâgasena, by the Blessed One on Devadatta. In that the Tathâgata p. 168 has caused him to attain to the state of a Pakkeka-Buddha, what has he not done for him?' 'But inasmuch as Devadatta, O king, having made a schism in the Order, suffers pain in purgatory, has not therefore the Blessed One done him wrong?' 'No, Sir. That is Devadatta's own fault; and the Blessed One who mitigated his suffering has done him no harm.' 'Then accept this, O king, to the full as the reason for the Blessed One admitting Devadatta to the Order. 33. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, for his having done so. [112] Suppose in treating a wound full of matter and blood, in whose grievous hollow the weapon which caused it remained, which stank of putrid flesh, and was made worse by the pain that varied with constantly changing symptoms, by variations in temperature, and by the union of the three humours,--windy, bilious, and phlegmatic 1,--an able physician and surgeon were to anoint it with a rough, sharp, bitter, stinging ointment, to the end that the inflammation should be allayed. And when the inflammation had gone down, and the wound had become sweet, suppose he were then to cut into it with a lancet, and burn it with caustic. And when he had cauterised it, suppose he were to prescribe an alkaline wash, and anoint it with some drug to the end that the wound might heal up, and the sick man recover his health--now tell me, O king, would it be out of cruelty that the surgeon thus smeared with ointment, and cut with the lancet, and cauterised p. 169 with the stick of caustic, and administered a salty wash?' 'Certainly not, Sir; it would be with kindness in his heart, and intent on the man's weal, that he would do all those things.' 'And the feelings of pain produced by his efforts to heal--would not the surgeon be guilty of any wrong in respect of them?' 'How so? Acting with kind intent and for the man's weal, how could he therein incur a wrong? It is of heavenly bliss rather that that kindly surgeon would be worthy.' 'Just so, great king, was it in his mercy that the Blessed One admitted Devadatta, to the end to release him from pain.' 34. 'Hear another and further reason, O king, why the Blessed One did so. Suppose a man had been pierced by a thorn. And another man with kindly intent and for his good were to cut round the place with another sharp thorn or with a lancet, and the blood flowing the while, were to extract that thorn. Now would it be out of cruelty that he acted so?' 'Certainly not, Sir. For he acted with kindly intent, and for the man's good. And if he had not done so the man might have died, or might have suffered such pain that he would have been nigh to death.' 'Just even so, great king, was it of his mercy that the Tathâgata admitted Devadatta, to the end to release him of his pain. If he had not done so [113] Devadatta would have suffered torment in purgatory through a succession of existences, through hundreds of thousands of Kalpas.' p. 170 'Yes, Nâgasena, the Tathâgata turned Devadatta, who was being carried down with the flood, with his head against the stream; he again pointed out the road to Devadatta when he was lost in the jungle; he gave a firm foothold to Devadatta when he was falling down the precipice: he restored Devadatta to peace when he was swallowed up of desolation. But the reason and the meaning of these things could no one have pointed out, Nâgasena, unless he were wise as you!' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma about Devadatta.] ____________________ [VESSANTARA'S EARTHQUAKE.] 35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said thus: "There are these eight causes, O Bhikkhus, proximate or remote, for a mighty earthquake 1." This is an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be, supplemented, a statement to which no gloss can be added. There can be no ninth reason for an earthquake. If there were, the Blessed One would have mentioned it. It, is because there is no other, that he left it unnoticed. But we find another, and a ninth reason, when we are told that on Vessantara's giving his mighty largesse the earth shook seven times 2. If, Nâgasena, there are eight causes for an earthquake, then what we hear of the earthquake at Vessantara's largesse is false. And if that is true, then the statement as to the eight p. 171 causes of earthquakes is false. This double-headed question, too, is subtle, hard to unravel, dark, and profound. It is now put to you. [114] No one of less knowledge can solve it, only one wise as you.' 36. 'The Blessed One made the statement you refer to, O king, and yet the earth shook seven times at Vessantara's largesse. But that was out of season, it was an isolated occurrence, it was not included in the eight usual causes, and was not therefore reckoned as one of them. just, O king, as there are three kinds of well-known rains reckoned in the world-that of the rainy season, that of the winter months, and that of the two months Âsâlha and Sâvana. If, besides these, any other rain falls, that is not reckoned among the usual rains, but is called "a rain out of season." And again, O king, just as there are five hundred rivers which flow down from the Himâlayas, but of these ten only are reckoned in enumerations of rivers--the Ganges, the Jumna, the Akiravatî, the Sarabhû, the Mahî, the Indus, the Sarasvatî, the Vetravatî, the Vîtamsâ, and the Kandabhâgâ--the others not being included in the catalogue because of their intermittent flow of water. And again, O king, just as there are a hundred or two of officers under the king, but only six of them are reckoned as officers of state--the commander-in-chief, the prime minister, and the chief judge, and the high treasurer, and the bearer of the sunshade of state, and the state sword-bearer. And why? Because of their royal prerogatives. The rest are not reckoned, they are all called simply officers. [115] Just as in all these cases, great king, the seven times repeated earthquake at the largesse of Vessantara was, as an isolated and extra p. 172 ordinary occurrence, and distinct from the eight usual ones, not reckoned among those eight causes.' 37. 'Now have you heard, O king, in the history of our faith of any act of devotion being done so as to receive its recompense even in this present life, the fame of which has reached up to the gods?' 'Yes, Lord, I have heard of such. There are seven cases of such actions.' 'Who were the people who did those things?' 'Sumana the garland maker, and Eka-sâtaka the brahman, and Punna the hired servant, and Mallikâ the queen, and the queen known as the mother of Gopâla, and Suppiyâ the devoted woman, and Punnâ the slave-girl. It was these seven who did acts of devotion which bare fruit even in this life, and the fame of which reached even to the gods.' 'And have you heard of others, O king, who, even in their human body, mounted up to the blessed abode of the great Thirty-three?' 'Yes, I have heard, too, of them.' 'And who were they?' 'Guttila the musician, and Sâdhîna the king, and king Nimi, and king Mandhâtâ--these four. Long ago was it done, this glorious deed and difficult.' 'But have you ever heard, O king, of the earth shaking, either now or in the past, and either once or twice or thrice, when a gift had been given?' 'No, Sir, that I have not heard of.' 'And I too, O king--though I have received the traditions, and been devoted to study, and to hearing the law, and to learning by heart, and to the acquirements of discipleship, and though I have been ready to learn, and to ask and to answer questions, and to sit at the feet of teachers--I too have never heard p. 173 of such a thing, except only in the case of the splendid gift of Vessantara the glorious king. And between the times of Kassapa the Blessed One, and of the Blessed One the Sâkya sage, there have rolled by hundreds of thousands of years, but in all that period I have heard of no such case. [116] It is at no common effort, O king, at no ordinary struggle, that the great earth is moved. It is when overborne by the weight of righteousness, overpowered by the burden of the goodness of acts which testify of absolute purity, that, unable to support it, the broad earth quakes and trembles and is moved. Then it is as when a wagon is overladen with a too heavy weight, and the nave and the spokes are split, and the axletree is broken in twain. Then it is as when the heavens, overspread with the waters of the tempest driven by the wind, and overweighted with the burden of the heaped-up rain-clouds, roar and creak and rage at the onset of the whirlwind. Thus was it, great king, that the broad earth, unable to support the unwonted burden of the heaped-up and wide-reaching force of king Vessantara's largesse, quaked and trembled and was moved. For the heart of king Vessantara was not turned in the way of lust, nor of ill-will, nor of dullness, nor of pride, nor of delusion, nor of sin, nor of disputation, nor of discontent, but it was turned mightily to generosity. And thinking: "Let all those who want, and who have not yet come, now arrive! Let all who come receive whate'er they want, and be filled with satisfaction!" it was on giving, ever and without end, that his mind was set. And on these ten conditions of heart, O king, was his mind too fixed--on self-control, and on inward calm, and on p. 174 long-suffering, and on self-restraint, and on temperance, and on voluntary subjugation to meritorious vows, and on freedom from all forms of wrath and cruelty, and on truthfulness, and on purity of heart. He had abandoned, O king, all seeking after the satisfaction of his animal lusts, he had overcome all craving after a future life, his strenuous effort was set only towards the higher life. He had given up, O king, the caring for himself, and devoted himself thenceforth to caring for others alone. His mind was fixed immovably on the thought: "How can I make all beings to be at peace, healthy, and wealthy, and long lived?" [117] And when, O king, he was giving things away, he gave not for the sake of rebirth in any glorious state, he gave not for the sake of wealth, nor of receiving gifts in return, nor of flattery, nor of long life for himself, nor of high birth, nor of happiness, nor of power, nor of fame, nor of offspring either of daughters or of sons--but it was for the sake of supreme wisdom and of the treasure thereof that he gave gifts so immense, so immeasurable, so unsurpassed. It was when he had attained to that supreme wisdom that he uttered the verse: "Gâli, my son, and the Black Antelope, My daughter, and my queen, my wife, Maddî, I gave them all away without a thought-- And 'twas for Buddhahood I did this thing 1."' 38. 'The angry man, O king, did the great king Vessantara conquer by mildness, and the wicked man by goodness, and the covetous by generosity, p. 175 and the speaker of falsehood by truth, and all evil did he overcome by righteousness 1. When he was thus giving away--he who was seeking after righteousness, who had made righteousness his aim--then were the great winds, on which the earth rests below, agitated by the full force of the power of the influence that resulted from his generosity, and little by little, one by one, the great winds began to blow confusedly, and up and down and towards each side the earth swayed, and the mighty trees rooted in the soil 2 began to totter, and masses of cloud were heaped together in the sky, and terrible winds arose laden with dust, and the heavens rushed together, and hurricanes blew with violent blasts, and a great and terrible mighty noise was given forth. And at the raging of those winds, the waters little by little began to move, and at the movement of the waters the great fish and the scaly creatures were disturbed, and the waves began to roll in double breakers, and the beings that dwell in the waters were seized with fear and as the breakers rushed together in pairs the roar of the ocean grew loud, and the spray was lashed into fury, and garlands of foam arose, and the great ocean opened to its depths, and the waters rushed hither and thither, the furious crests of their waves meeting this way and that; and the Asuras, and Garulas, and Yakkhas, and Nâgas 3 shook with fear, and thought in their alarm: "What now! How now! is the great ocean being turned upside down? " p. 176 and sought, with terrified hearts, for a way of escape. And as the water on which it rests 1 was troubled and agitated, then the broad earth began to shake, and with it the mountain ranges and the ocean depths, [118] and Sineru began to revolve, and its rocky mountain crest became twisted. And at the trembling of the earth, the serpents, and mungooses, and cats, and jackals, and boars, and deer, and birds became greatly distressed, and the Yakkhas of inferior power wept, while those of greater power were merry. 39. 'Just, O king, as when a huge and mighty cauldron 2 is placed in an oven full of water, and crowded with grains of rice, then the fire burning beneath heats first of all the cauldron, and when that has become hot the water begins to boil, and as the water boils the grains of rice are heated and dive hither and thither in the water, and a mass of bubbles arises, and a garland of foam is formed--just so, O king, king Vessantara gave away whatsoever is in the world considered most difficult to bestow, and by reason of the nature of his generosity the great winds beneath were unable to refrain from being agitated throughout, and on the great winds being thrown into confusion the waters were shaken, and on the waters being disturbed the broad earth trembled, and so then the winds and the waters and the earth became all three, as it were, of one accord by the immense and powerful influence that p. 177 resulted from that mighty giving. And there was never another giving, O king, which had such power as that generosity of the great king Vessantara. 40. 'And just, O king, as there are many gems of value found in the earth--the sapphire, and the great sapphire, and the wish-conferring gem, and the cat's eye, and the flax gem 1, and the Acacia gem 2, and the entrancing gem, and the favourite of the sun 3, and the favourite of the moon 4, and the crystal, and the kaggopakkamaka 5, and the topaz, and the ruby, and the Masâra stone 6--but the glorious gem of the king of kings is acknowledged to be the chief of all these and surpassing all, for the sheen of that jewel, O king, spreads round about for a league on every side 7--just so, O king, of all the gifts that p. 178 have ever been given upon earth, even the greatest and the most unsurpassed, that giving of the good king Vessantara is acknowledged to surpass them all. And it was on the giving of that gift, O king, that the broad earth shook seven times 1.' 41. 'A marvellous thing is it, Nâgasena, of the Buddhas, and a most wonderful, that the Tathâgata even when a Bodisat (in the course of becoming a Buddha) [119] was so unequalled in the world, so mild, so kind, and held before him aims so high, and endeavours so grand. You have made evident, Nâgasena, the might of the Bodisats, a most clear light have you cast upon the perfection of the Conquerors, you have shown how, in the whole world of gods and men, a Tathâgata, as he continues the practice of his noble life, is the highest and the best. Well spoken, venerable Nâgasena. The doctrine of the Conqueror has been exalted, the perfection of the Conqueror has been glorified, the knot of the arguments of the adversaries has been unravelled, the jar of the theories of the opponents has been broken in pieces, the dilemma so profound has been made clear, the jungle has been turned into open country, the children of the Conqueror have received the desire of their hearts 2. It is so, as you say, O best of the leaders of schools, and I accept that which you have said!' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the earthquake at Vessantara's gift.] ____________________ p. 179 [KING SIVI 1.] 42. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say thus: "King Sivi gave his eyes to the man who begged them of him, and when he had thus become blind, new eyes were given to him from heaven 2." This statement is unpalatable 3, it lays its speaker open to rebuke, it is faulty. For it is said in the Sutta: "When the cause has been utterly destroyed, when there is no longer any cause, any basis left, then the divine eye cannot arise 4." So if he gave his eyes away, the statement that he received new (divine) ones must be false: and if divine eyes arose to him; then the statement that he gave his eyes away must be false. This dilemma too is a double-pointed one, more knotty than a knot, more piercing than an arrow, more confusing than a jungle. It is now put to you. Rouse up in yourself the desire to, accomplish the task that is set to you, to the refutation of the adversaries!' p. 180 'King Sivi gave his eyes away, O king. Harbour no doubt on that point. And in stead thereof divine eyes were produced for him. Neither on that point should you harbour doubt.' 'But then, Nâgasena, can the divine eye arise when the cause of it has been utterly destroyed, when no cause for it, no basis, remains?' 'Certainly not, O king.' 'What then is the reason [120] by which in this case it arose, notwithstanding that its cause had been utterly destroyed, and no cause for it, no basis, remained. Come now. Convince me of the reason of this thing.' 43. 'What then, O king? Is there in the world such a thing as Truth, by the asseveration of which true believers can perform the Act of Truth 1?' 'Yes, Lord, there is. And by it true believers make the rain to fall, and fire to go out 2, and ward off the effects of poison, and accomplish many other things they want to do.' 'Then, great king, that fits the case, that meets it on all fours. It was by the power of Truth that those divine eyes were produced for Sivi the king. By the power of the Truth the divine eye arose when no other cause was present, for the Truth itself was, in that case, the cause of its production. Suppose, p. 181 [paragraph continues] O king, any Siddha (accomplished one 1) on intoning a charm 2, and saying: "Let a mighty rain now fall!" were to bring about a heavy rainfall by the intoning of his charm--would there in that case be any cause for rain accumulated in the sky by which the rain could be brought about?' 'No, Sir. The charm itself would be the cause.' 'Just so, great king, in the case put. There would be no ordinary cause. The Truth itself would be sufficient reason for the growth of the divine eye!' 44. 'Now suppose, O king, a Siddha were to intone a charm, and say: "Now let the mighty blazing, raging mass of fire go back!" and the moment the charm were repeated it were to retreat--would there be any cause laid by which would work that result?' 'No, Sir. The charm itself would be the cause.' 'Just so, great king, would there in our case be no ordinary cause. The power of the Truth would be sufficient cause in itself!' 45. 'Now suppose, O king, one of those Siddhas were to intone a charm, [121] and were then to say: "Let this malignant poison become as a healing drug!" and the moment the charm were repeated that would be so--would there be any cause in reserve for that effect to be produced?' 'Certainly not, Sir. The charm itself would cause the warding off of that malignant poison.' 'Just so, great king, without any ordinary cause the Truth itself was, in king Sivi's case, a sufficient reason for the reproduction of his eyes.' p. 182 46. 'Now there is no other cause, O king, for the attainment of the four Noble Truths. It is only by means of an Act of Truth that they are attained. In the land of China, O king, there is a king of China, who when he wants to charm the great ocean, performs at intervals of four months a solemn Act of Truth, and then on his royal chariot drawn by lions, he enters a league's distance into the great ocean. Then in front of the head of his chariot the mighty waves roll back, and when he returns they flow once more over the spot. But could the ocean be so drawn back by the ordinary bodily power of all gods and men combined?' 'Sir, even the water in a small tank could not be so made to retire, how much less the waters of the great ocean!' 'By this know then the force of Truth. There is no place to which it does not reach.' 47. 'When Asoka the righteous ruler, O king, as he stood one day at the city of Pâtaliputta in the midst of the townsfolk and the country people, of his officers and his servants, and his ministers of state, beheld the Ganges river as it rolled along filled up by freshets from the hills, full to the brim and overflowing--that mighty stream five hundred leagues in length, and a league in breadth--he said to his officers: "Is there any one, my good friends, who is able to make this great Ganges flow backwards and up stream?" '"Nay, Sire, impossible," said they. 'Now a certain courtesan, Bindumatî by name, was in the crowd there at the river side, [122] and she heard people repeat the question that the king had asked. Then she said to herself: "Here am I, a p. 183 harlot, in this city of Pâtaliputta, by the sale of my body do I gain my livelihood, I follow the meanest of vocations. Let the king behold the power of an Act of Truth performed even by such as I." And she performed an Act of Truth 1. And that moment the mighty Ganges, roaring and raging, rolled back, up stream, in the sight of all the people! 'Then when the king heard the din and the noise of the movement of the waves of the whirlpools of the mighty Ganges, amazed, and struck with awe and wonder, he said to his officers: "How is this, that the great Ganges is flowing backwards?" 'And they told him what had happened. Then filled with emotion the king went himself in haste and asked the courtesan: "Is it true what they say, that it is by your Act of Truth that this Ganges has been forced to flow backwards?" '"Yes, Sire," said she. 'And the king asked: "How have you such power in the matter? Or who is it who takes your words to heart (and carries them out)? By what authority is it that you, insignificant as you are 2, have been able to make this mighty river flow backwards?" 'And she replied: "It is by the power of Truth, great king." 'But the king said: "How can that power be in you--you, a woman of wicked and loose life, p. 184 devoid of virtue, under no restraint 1, sinful, who have overstepped all limits, and are full of transgression, and live on the plunder of fools? " '"It is true, O king, what you say. That is just the kind of creature I am. But even in such a one as I so great is the power of the Act of Truth that I could turn the whole world of gods and men upside down by it." 'Then the king said: "What is this Act of Truth? Come now, let me hear about it." '"Whosoever, O king, gives me gold--be he a noble or a brahman or a tradesman or a servant--I regard them all alike. When I see he is a noble I make no distinction in his favour. If I know him to be a slave I despise him not. Free alike from fawning and from dislike do I do service to him who has bought me. This, your Majesty, is the basis of the Act of Truth by the force of which I turned the Ganges back."' 48. 'Thus, O king, is it that there is nothing which those who are stedfast to the truth may not enjoy. And so king Sivi gave his eyes away to him who begged them of him, [123] and he received eyes from heaven, and that happened by his Act of Truth. But what is said in the Sutta that when the eye of flesh is destroyed, and the cause of it, the basis of it, is removed, then can no divine eye arise, that is only said of the eye, the insight, that arises out of contemplation. And thus, O king, should you take it.' 'Well said, Nâgasena! You have admirably p. 185 solved the dilemma I put to you; you have rightly explained the point in which I tried to prove you wrong; you have thoroughly overcome the adversary. The thing is so, and I accept it thus 1.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to king Sivi's Act of Truth.] ____________________ [THE DILEMMA AS TO CONCEPTION. 49. This dilemma goes into details which can be best consulted in the Pâli.] ____________________ [THE DURATION OF THE FAITH.] 55. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "But now the good law, Ânanda, will only stand fast for five hundred years 2." But on the other hand the Blessed One declared, just before p. 186 his death, in response to the question put by Subhadda the recluse: "But if in this system the brethren live the perfect life, then the world would not be bereft of Arahats 1." This last phrase is absolute, inclusive; it cannot be explained away. If the first of these statements be correct, the second is misleading, if the second be right the first must be false. [131] This too is a double-pointed question, more confused than the jungle, more powerful than a strong man, more knotty than a knot. It is now put to you. Show the extent of the power of your knowledge, like a leviathan in the midst of the sea.' 56. 'The Blessed One, O king, did make both those statements you have quoted. But they are different one from the other both in the spirit and in the letter. The one deals with the limit of the duration of the doctrine 2, the other with the practice of a religious life--two things widely distinct, as far removed one from the other as the zenith is from the surface of the earth, as heaven is from purgatory, as good is from evil, and as pleasure is from pain. But though that be so, yet lest your enquiry should be vain, I will expound the matter further in its essential connection.' 57. 'When the Blessed One said that the good law 3 would only endure for five hundred years, he said so declaring the time of its destruction, limiting the remainder of its existence. For he said: "The good law, Ânanda, would endure for a thousand years if no women had been admitted to the p. 187 [paragraph continues] Order. But now, Ânanda, it will only last five hundred years." But in so saying, O king, did the Blessed One either foretell the disappearance of the good law, or throw blame on the clear understanding thereof?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so. It was a declaration of injury done, an announcement of the limit of what remained. As when a man whose income had been diminished might announce publicly, making sure of what remained: "So much property have I lost; so much is still left"--[132] so did the Blessed One make known to gods and men what remained when he announced what had been lost by saying: "The good law will now, Ânanda, endure for five hundred years." In so saying he was fixing a limit to religion. But when in speaking to Subhadda, and by way of proclaiming who were the true Samanas, he said: "But if, in this system, the brethren live the perfect life, then the world would not be bereft of Arahats"--in so saying he was declaring in what religion consisted. You have confounded the limitation of a thing with the statement of what it is. But if you like I will tell you what the real connection between the two is. Listen carefully, and attend trustfully to what I say.' 58. 'Suppose, O king, there were a reservoir quite full of fresh cool water, overflowing at the brim, but limited in size and with an embankment running all round it. Now if, when the water had not abated in that tank, a mighty cloud were to rain down rain continually, and in addition, on to the water already in it, would the amount of water in the tank decrease or come to an end?' p. 188 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the Continual downpour of the rain.' 'Just so, O king, is the glorious reservoir of the good law of the teaching of the Conqueror ever full of the clear fresh cool water of the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, and continues overflowing all limits even to the very highest heaven of heavens. And if the children of the Buddha rain down into it continuously, and in addition, the rainfall of still further practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, then will it endure for long, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. This was the meaning of the Master's words when he said: "But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in perfectness of life, then will the world not be bereft of Arahats."' 59. 'Now suppose again, O king, that people were to continually supply a mighty fiery furnace with dried cow-dung, and dry sticks, and dry leaves--would that fire go out?' [133] 'No indeed, Sir. Rather would it blaze more fiercely, and burn more brightly.' 'Just so, O king, does the glorious teaching of the Conqueror blaze and shine over the ten thousand world systems by the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life. And if, O king, in addition to that, the children of the Buddha, devoting themselves to the five 1 kinds of spiritual exertion, continue zealous in effort--if cultivating a longing for the threefold discipline, they train themselves therein-- p. 189 if without ceasing they carry out to the full the conduct that is right, and absolutely avoid all that is wrong, and practise righteousness of life--then will this glorious doctrine of the Conqueror stand more and more stedfast as the years roll on, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. It was in reference to this, O king, that the Master spake when he said: "But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in perfectness of life, then will the world not be bereft of Arahats."' 60. 'Again, O king, suppose people were to continually polish with fine soft red powder a stainless mirror that was already bright and shining, well polished, smooth, and glossy, would dirt and dust and mud arise on its surface?' 'No indeed,--Sir. Rather would it become to a certainty even more stainless than before.' 'Just so, O king, is the glorious doctrine of the Conqueror stainless by nature, and altogether free from the dust and dirt of evil. And if the children of the Buddha cleanse it by the virtue arising from the shaking off, the eradication of evil, from the practice of duty and virtue and morality and purity of life, then will this glorious doctrine endure for long, and the world will not be bereft of Arahats. It was in reference to this that the Blessed One spake when he said: "But if, Subhadda, in this system the brethren continue in righteousness of life, then will not the world be bereft of Arahats." For the teaching of the Master, O king, has its root in conduct, has conduct as its essence, and stands fast so long as conduct does not decline 1.' p. 190 61. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when you speak of the disappearance of the good law, what do you mean by its disappearance?' 'There are three modes of the disappearance, O king, of a system of doctrine. And what are the three? The decline of attainment to an intellectual grasp of it, the decline of conduct in accordance with it, and the decline of its outward form 1. [134] When the attainment of it ceases, then even the man who conducts himself aright in it has no clear understanding of it. By the decline of conduct the promulgation of the rules of discipline ceases, only the outward form of the religion remains. When the outward form has ceased, the succession of the tradition is cut off. These are the three forms of the disappearance of a system of doctrine.' 'You have well explained, venerable Nâgasena, this dilemma so profound, and have made it plain. You have loosed the knot; you have destroyed the arguments of the adversary, broken them in pieces, proved them wrong--you, O best of the leaders of schools!' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the duration of the faith.] ____________________ [THE BUDDHA'S SINLESSNESS.] 62. 'Venerable Nâgasena, had the Blessed One, when he became a Buddha, burnt out all evil in himself, or was there still some evil remaining in him?' p. 191 'He had burnt out all evil. There was none left.' 'But how, Sir? Did not the Tathâgata get hurt in his body?' 'Yes, O king. At Râgagaha a splinter of rock pierced his foot 1, and once he suffered from dysentery 2, and once when the humours of his body were disturbed a purge was administered to him 3, and once when he was troubled with wind the Elder who waited on him (that is Ânanda) gave him hot water 4.' 'Then, Sir, if the Tathâgata, on his becoming a Buddha, has destroyed all evil in himself--this other statement that his foot was pierced by a splinter, that he had dysentery, and so on, must be false. But if they are true, then he cannot have been free from evil, for there is no pain without Karma. All pain has its root in Karma, it is on account of Karma that suffering arises 5. This double-headed dilemma is put to you, and you have to solve it.' 63. 'No, O king. It is not all suffering that has its root in Karma. There are eight causes by which sufferings arise, by which many beings suffer pain. And what are the eight? Superabundance of wind, [135] and of bile, and of phlegm, the union of these humours, variations in temperature, the avoiding of p. 192 dissimilarities, external agency, and Karma. From each of these there are some sufferings that arise, and these are the eight causes by which many beings suffer pain. And therein whosoever maintains that it is Karma that injures beings, and besides it there is no other reason for pain, his proposition is false.' 'But, Sir, all the other seven kinds of pain have each of them also Karma as its origin, for they are all produced by Karma.' 'If, O king, all diseases were really derived from Karma then there would be no characteristic marks by which they could be distinguished one from the other. When the wind is disturbed, it is so in one or other of ten ways--by cold, or by heat, or by hunger, or by thirst, or by over eating, or by standing too long, or by over exertion, or by walking too fast, or by medical treatment, or as the result of Karma. Of these ten, nine do not act in a past life or in a future life, but in one's present existence. Therefore it is not right to say that all pain is due to Karma. When the bile, O king, is deranged it is so in one or other of three ways--by cold, or by heat, or by improper food. When the phlegm is disturbed it is so by cold, or by heat, or by food and drink. When either of these three humours are disturbed or mixed, it brings about its own special, distinctive pain. Then there are the special pains arising from variations in temperature, avoidance of dissimilarities, and external agency 1. And there is the act that has Karma as its fruit, and the pain so brought about arising from the act done. So what p. 193 arises as the fruit of Karma is much less than that which arises from other causes. And the ignorant go too far [136] when they say that every pain is produced as the fruit of Karma. No one without a Buddha's insight can fix the extent of the action of Karma.' 64. 'Now when the Blessed One's foot was torn by a splinter of rock, the pain that followed was not produced by any other of the eight causes I have mentioned, but only by external agency. For Devadatta, O king, had harboured hatred against the Tathâgata during a succession of hundreds of thousands of births 1. It was in his hatred that he seized hold of a mighty mass of rock, and pushed it over with the hope that it would fall upon his head. But two other rocks came together, and intercepted it before it had reached the Tathâgata; and by the force of their impact a splinter was torn off, and fell upon the Blessed One's foot, and made it bleed. Now this pain must have been produced in the Blessed One either as the result of his own Karma, or of some one else's act. For beyond these two there can be no other kind of pain. It is as when a seed does not germinate--that must be due either to the badness of the soil, or to a defect in the seed. Or it is as when food is not digested--that must be due either to a defect in the stomach, or to the badness of the food.' 65. 'But although the Blessed One never suffered pain which was the result of his own Karma, or brought about the avoidance of dissimilarity 2, yet p. 194 he suffered pain from each of the other six causes. And by the pain he could suffer it was not possible to deprive him of life. There come to this body of ours, O king, compounded of the four elements 1, sensations desirable and the reverse, pleasant and unpleasant. Suppose, O king, a clod of earth were to be thrown into the air, and to fall again on to the ground. Would it be in consequence of any act it had previously done that it would so fall?' 'No, Sir. There is no reason in the broad earth by which it could experience the result of an act either good or evil. It would be by reason of a present cause [137] independent of Karma that the clod would fall to earth again.' 'Well, O king, the Tathâgata should be regarded as the broad earth. And as the clod would fall on it irrespective of any act done by it, so also was it irrespective of any act done by him that that splinter of rock fell upon his foot.' 66. 'Again, O king, men tear up and plough the earth. But is that a result of any act previously done?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Just so with the falling of that splinter. And the dysentery which attacked him was in the same way the result of no previous act, it arose from the union of the three humours. And whatsoever bodily disease fell upon him, that had its origin, not in Karma, but in one or other of the six causes referred to. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, by him who is above all gods, in the glorious collection called the Samyutta Nikâya in p. 195 the prose Sutta, called after Moliya Sîvaka: "There are certain pains which arise in the world, Sîvaka, from bilious humour. And you ought to know for a certainty which those are, for it is a matter of common knowledge in the world which they are. But those Samanas and Brahmans, Sîvaka, who are of the opinion and proclaim the view that whatsoever pleasure, or pain, or indifferent sensation, any man experiences, is always due to a previous act--they go beyond certainty, they go beyond knowledge, and therein do I say they are wrong. And so also of those pains which arise from the phlegmatic humour, or from the windy humour, or from the union of the three, or from variation in temperature, or from avoidance of dissimilarity, [138] or from external action, or as the result of Karma. In each case you should know for a certainty which those are, for it is a matter of common knowledge which they are. But those Samanas or Brahmans who are of the opinion or the view that whatsoever pleasure, or pain, or indifferent sensation, any man may experience, that is always due to a previous act--they go beyond certainty, they go beyond common knowledge. And therein do I say they are wrong." So, O king, it is not all pain that is the result of Karma. And you should accept as a fact that when the Blessed One became a Buddha he had burnt out all evil from within him.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! It is so; and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha's sinlessness.] p. 196 [ON THE ADVANTAGES OF MEDITATION 1.] 67. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say that everything which a Tathâgata has to accomplish that had the Blessed One already carried out when he sat at the foot of the Tree of Wisdom 2. There was then nothing that he had yet to do, nothing that he had to add to what he had already done. But then there is also talk of his having immediately afterwards remained plunged for three months in ecstatic contemplation 3. If the first statement be correct, then the second must be false. And if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. There is no need of any contemplation to him who has already accomplished his task. It is the man who still has something left to do, who has to think about it. [139] It is the sick man who has need of medicine, not the healthy; the hungry man who has need of food, not the man whose hunger is quenched. This too is a double-headed dilemma, and you have to solve it!' 68. 'Both statements, O king, are true. Contemplation p. 197 has many virtues. All the Tathâgatas attained, in contemplation, to Buddhahood, and practised it in the recollection of its good qualities. And they did so in the same way as a man who had received high office from a king would, in the recollection of its advantages, of the prosperity he enjoyed by means of it, remain constantly in attendance on that king--in the same way as a man who, having been afflicted and pained with a dire disease, and having recovered his health by the use of medicine, would use the same medicine again and again, calling to mind its virtue.' 69. 'And there are, O king, these twenty and eight good qualities of meditation in the perception of which the Tathâgatas devoted themselves to it. And which are they? Meditation preserves him who meditates, it gives him long life, and endows him with power, it cleanses him from faults, it removes from him any bad reputation giving him a good name, it destroys discontent in him filling him with content, it releases him from all fear endowing him with confidence, it removes sloth far from him filling him with zeal, it takes away lust and ill-will and dullness, it puts an end to pride, it breaks down all doubt, it makes his heart to be at peace, it softens his mind, [140] it makes him glad, it makes him grave, it gains him much advantage, it makes him worthy of reverence, it fills him with joy, it fills him with delight, it shows him the transitory nature of all compounded things, it puts an end to rebirth, it obtains for him all the benefits of renunciation. These, O king, are the twenty and eight virtues of meditation on the perception of which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. But it is because p. 198 the Tathâgatas, O king, long for the enjoyment of the bliss of attainment, of the joy of the tranquil state of Nirvâna, that they devote themselves to meditation, with their minds fixed on the end they aim at. 70. 'And there are four, reasons for which the Tathâgatas, O king, devote themselves to meditation. And what are the four? That they may dwell at ease, O king--and on account of the abundance of the advantages of meditation, advantages without drawback--and on account of its being the road to all noble things without exception-and because it has been praised and lauded and exalted and magnified by all the Buddhas. These are the reasons for which the Tathâgatas devote themselves to it. So it is not, great king, because they have anything left to do, or anything to add to what they have already accomplished, but because they have perceived how diversified are the advantages it possesses, that they devote themselves to meditation.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to meditation.] ____________________ [THE LIMIT OF THREE MONTHS.] 71. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "The Tathâgata, Ânanda, has thought out and thoroughly practised, developed, accumulated, and ascended to the very height of the four paths to saintship 1, and so mastered them as to be able to use them as a means of mental advancement, and as a basis for edification--and he therefore, Ânanda, p. 199 should he desire it, might remain alive for a Kalpa, or for that portion of a Kalpa which has yet to run 1." And again he said: "At the end of three months from this time the Tathâgata will die 2." If the first of these statements were true, then the limit of three months must have been false. If the second were true, [141] then the first must have been false. For the Tathâgatas boast not without an occasion, the Blessed Buddhas speak no misleading words, but they utter truth, and speak sincerely. This too is a double-headed dilemma, profound, subtle, hard to expound. It is now put to you. Tear in sunder this net of heresy, put it on one side, break in pieces the arguments of the adversary!' 72. 'Both these statements, O king, were made by the Blessed One. But Kalpa in that connection means the duration of a man's life. And the Blessed One, O king, was not exalting his own power when he said so, but he was exalting the power of Saintship. It was as if a king were possessed of a horse most swift of foot, who could run like the wind. And in order to exalt the power of his speed the king were to say in the presence of all his court-townsfolk and country folk, hired servants and men of war, brahmins, nobles, and officers: "If he wished it this noble steed of mine could cross the earth to its ocean boundary, and be back here again, in a moment 3!" p. 200 [paragraph continues] Now though he did not try to test the horse's speed in the presence of the court, yet it had that speed, and was, really able to go along over the earth to its ocean boundary in a moment. Just so, O king, the Blessed One spake as he did in praise of the power of saintship, and so spake seated in the midst of gods and men, and of the men of the threefold wisdom and the sixfold insight--the Arahats pure and free from stain--when he said: "The Tathâgata, Ânanda, has thought out and practised, developed, accumulated, and ascended to the very height of the four powers of saintship, and so mastered them as to be able to use them as a means of mental advancement, as a basis for edification. And he therefore, Ânanda, should he desire it, might remain alive for a Kalpa, or the part of a Kalpa that has yet to run." And there was that power, O king, in the Tathâgata, he could have remained alive for that time: and yet he did not show that power in the midst [142] of that assembly. The Blessed One, O king, is free from desire as respects all conditions of future life, and has condemned them all. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One: "Just, O Bhikkhus, as a very small quantity of excrement is of evil smell, so do I find no beauty in the very smallest degree of future life, not even in such for the time of the snapping of the fingers 1." Now would the Blessed One, O king, who thus looked upon all sorts and conditions of future life p. 201 as dung have nevertheless, simply because of his power of Iddhi, harboured a craving desire for future life?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then it must have been to exalt the power of Iddhi that he gave utterance to such a boast.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! It is so, and I accept it as you say. ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the three months.] ____________________ Here ends the First Chapter. Footnotes 137:1 Vasanto tassa khâyâya, literally 'abiding under his shadow.' Compare Gâtaka I, 91. 138:1 Patisîsakam. See Gâtaka II, 197. 140:1 It is not known where the verses here (or the others quoted in these two pages) are taken from. 141:1 Pabhiggati in the text appears not to be an old error. The Simhalese repeats it, but leaves it untranslated. 142:1 Viseso. It does not say in what, and the Simhalese simply repeats the word. 142:2 Sallâpo na kâtabbo. The Simhalese merely repeats the word, which is often used without any bad connotation. See, for instance, Gâtaka I, 112. 142:3 So that, in the author's opinion, there is no 'Esoteric Doctrine' in true Buddhism. See the note, below, on 1V, 4, 8. 143:1 So also in the Vinaya (Mahâvagga I, 2 5, 6). 143:2 In the well-known passage in the Vinaya in which the mutual duties of pupils and teachers are set out in full (Mahâvagga I, 25, 26, translated in the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, pp. 154 and foll.) there is a similar injunction (25, 22 = 26, 10) which throws light on the meaning of dhammena here. 143:3 Apagata-kotûhala-mangaliko. 'Laying aside the erroneous views and discipline called kotûhala and mangaliko,' says the Simhalese. 144:1 'Because honours should be paid, in the way of worship, to those who have so passed away, and to them only,' is the implied suggestion, as if it were common ground to the Buddhists and their opponents. But there is no such doctrine in the Pâli Pitakas, and could not be. The whole discussion breathes the spirit of a later time. 145:1 Apatta-mânâsanam. 'Of those who have not attained to the insight of the Arahats,' says the Simhalese by way of gloss. 145:2 This verse is not found in our printed texts. The Thera Gâthâ (981-1017) has preserved thirty-seven of the verses attributed to Sâriputta, but this is not one of them. 145:3 Hînati-kumburê, who quotes the Pâli verses, reads pûgayantâ, and sâdîyanti. 146:1 Tisso sampattiyo. That is, to another life as a man, or as a god, or to Arahatship here, on earth, in this birth. 148:1 That is, the three fires of lust, ill-will, and delusion, the going out of which is the state called, par excellence, 'the going out' (Nirvâna). 150:1 Book of the Great Decease, VI, 1, translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 112. 154:1 This title and the subsequent ones to the various questions are added from the Simhalese. They are probably the same titles as those referred to by Mr. Trenckner in his preface as being in his Burmese MS. 154:2 So again below, 27. 154:3 An ammana is about four bushels. 154:4 Mr. Trenckner has marked this passage as corrupt, and I do not pretend to understand it either. The Simhalese is also very p. 155 involved and confused. I have added the words in brackets from the Simhalese, and translated the rest according to the general sense of the Simhalese and the figures of the Pâli. Hardy gives his 'version' at p. 386 of the 'Manual of Buddhism.' It says, 'In one load of rice there are 63,660,000 grains. Each of these grains can be separately considered by Buddha in a moment of time. In that moment the seven-times gifted mind exercises this power.' The last sentence is a misunderstanding of the opening words of our next section (IV, i, 20). 155:1 That is, of the Excellent Way. They are the three Fetters--Delusion of self, Doubt, and Dependence on rites and ceremonies and outward morality--which the Sotâpanno has conquered, broken. 156:1 Disciples who will return only once to this world, there attain Arahatship, and therefore pass away. 157:1 Who will not return even once to this world, but attain Arahatship in heaven. 157:2 This is noteworthy, for their mind is not yet quite clear as regards the higher five stages. But it is on all fours with the last section. 157:3 Lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance. 157:4 Kilesâ. 157:5 Parikkîna-bhava-samyoganâ. 157:6 Patta-patisambhidâ. 159:1 That is as distinguished from the last--not only themselves enlightened, but able to teach, leaders of men. 160:1 There is surely something wrong here; either in the Pâli, or in my interpretation of it, which follows the Simhalese (p. 130). 160:2 Here the opening argument of 17 is again taken up. 162:1 At III, 6, 2 there is another problem raised as to the omniscience of the Buddha. 162:2 He is the Judas of the Buddhist story, who tried to have the Buddha killed, and to seduce his disciples from him. 163:1 Hînati-kumburê takes kulâ as an ablative. 163:2 These are all termini technici in Buddhist canon law. The meaning is that other divisions in the Order do not amount technically to schism. See the Kullavagga VII, 1, 27, &c. 165:1 Kâruññabalopatthaddha. Compare Gâtaka, vol. i, verse 267, and Sutta Vibhanga I, 10, 7. 166:1 Gaddûhanam pi. It is the Sanskrit dadrûghna. 166:2 Âdeyya-vakano. See my note, Kullavagga VI, 4, 8, and also Puggala Paññatti III, 12, and Pañka Gati Dîpana, 98. 167:1 Literally, 'is the best of these eight'--the eight being those walking in the Excellent Way, the four magga-samangino and the four phala-samangino. See Puggala Paññatti VIII, 1. 167:2 The Simhalese inserts a paragraph here not found in Mr. Trenckner's text. 167:3 See above, p. 158. 168:1 The interpretation of some of the medical terms in this paragraph is very uncertain. See pp. 134, 252, 304 of the text. 170:1 From the Book of the Great Decease, III, 13, translated at p. 45 of my 'Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi in this series. 170:2 See the Vessantara Gâtaka, and compare Gâtaka I, p. 74. 174:1 From the Kariyâ Pitaka I, ix, 52. See Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society, p. 81. 175:1 On this sentiment Mr. Trenckner calls attention to the analogous phrases at Dhammapada, verse 223. 175:2 Sînapattâ: which the Simhalese renders polo talehi kal gewî patra wtîmata pminiyâwu wrikshayo. 175:3 Fabulous beings supposed to occupy these fabulous waters. 176:1 This conception of the earth resting on water and the water on air is Indian, and forms no part of distinctively Buddhist teaching. 176:2 Mahati-mahâ-pariyogo; not in Childers nor in the Sanskrit Petersburg Dictionary. Hînati-kumburê renders it itâ mahat wu mahâ bhâganayak. 177:1 Ummâ-puppha; rendered diya-mendiri-pushpa in the Simhalese. Clough gives diyameneri as a plant 'commelina cucullata.' 177:2 2 Sirîsa-puppha; rendered mârâ-pushpa in the Simhalese, mârâ being the seed of the 'adenanthera pavonia.' 177:3 Suriya-kanto, which the Simhalese merely repeats. 177:4 Kanda-kanta; and so also in the Simhalese. These are mythic gems, supposed to be formed out of the rays of the sun and moon respectively, and visible only when they shine. 177:5 The Simhalese has kaggopakramaya, which is not in Clough. 177:6 Masâra-galla, which the Simhalese renders by masâra-galya, which Böhtlingk-Roth think is sapphire or smaragd, and Clough renders 'emerald,' and the commentary on the Abhidhâna Padîpikâ, quoted by Childers, says is a stone produced in the hill of Masâra (otherwise unknown). On similar lists of gems elsewhere see the Kullavagga IX, 1, 3, and my note at pp. 249, 250 of the 'Buddhist Suttas' (vol. xi of the 'Sacred Books of the East'). 177:7 So also in the Mahâ-Sudassana Sutta I, 32, translated in the 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256. Compare above, p. 35 of the text. 178:1 There is here a long paragraph in the Simhalese omitted in the Pâli. 178:2 Nibbâhana; rendered abhiwarddhiya in the Simhalese. 179:1 The story is given at length in the Sivi Gâtaka, No. 499 (vol. iv) pp. 401-412 of Professor Fausböll's edition). 179:2 There is nothing in the text of the Gâtaka (p. 410) of the new eyes being 'divine' or 'from heaven.' There new, ordinary eyes arose to him as the result of his virtue. 179:3 Sa-kasatam. 'Kasata cannot mean simply 'insipid' as Dr. Edward Müller suggests at p. 43 of his 'Pâli Grammar,' for it is opposed to dullness, insipidity (manda) at Anguttara II, 5, 5. It must mean there 'wrong, not only by omission, but by commission.' Compare its use in the Dhammapada Commentary, p. 275; Gâtaka I, 108, II, 97; and in the commentary on the Puggala IV, 24. Mr. Trenckner points out in his note that it is often written sakata, and is no doubt the same as the Sanskrit word so spelt, and given by Wilson. (It is not in Böhtlingk-Roth.) 179:4 I don't know which Sutta is referred to. 180:1 This paragraph is very different in the Simhalese, and much longer than the Pâli. 180:2 See the beautiful story of the Holy Quail (translated in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 302), where even so weak a creature as a baby quail is able, by such a mystic Act of Truth, to drive back the great and powerful Agni, the god of fire, whom the Brahmans so much feared and worshipped. 181:1 'One who knows a powerful charm (or perhaps Vedic verse, mantra),' says Hînati-kumburê. 181:2 Sakka, literally truth. (Satya-gâyanâ in the Simhalese.) 183:1 That is to say, in the words of the Quail story (loc. cit. p. 305), she 'called to mind the attributes of the Buddhas who had passed away, and made a solemn asseveration of the faith' that she had in the truth they had taught. 183:2 Anummatto, which the Simhalese translates as a feminine. 184:1 Khinnikâya. Compare Gâtaka II, 114, and the Sutta Vibhanga on Pâkittiya 26. 185:1 This idea of the power of an Act of Truth which Nâgasena here relies on is most interesting and curious. The exact time at which it was introduced into Buddhism is as yet unknown. It has not been found in the Pitakas themselves, and is probably an incorporation of an older, pre-Buddhistic, belief. The person carrying it out is supposed to have some goodness, to call that virtue (and perhaps, as in the case of the quail, the goodness of the Buddhas also) to mind, and then to wish something, and that thing, however difficult, and provided there is nothing cruel in it, then comes to pass. It is analogous to the mystic power supposed to reside in names. Childers very properly points out that we have a very remarkable instance of an Act of Truth (though a very un-Buddhistic one) in the Hebrew book of the Kings II. i. 10. 'And Elijah answered and said to the captain of fifty: "If I be a man of God, then let fire come down from heaven, and consume thee and thy fifty!" And there came down fire from heaven, and consumed him and his fifty.' A great point, both in this legend and in the story of the quail, is that the power of nature to be overcome is one looked upon by the Brahmans as divine. 185:2 Kullavagga X, 1, 6, translated in 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. iii, p. 325. 186:1 Book of the Great Decease, V, 62, translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 108. 186:2 Sâsana. 186:3 Saddhammo. 188:1 Pañka-padhânangani. This is curious. In the Pitakas there are four kinds only. 189:1 There is a paragraph here in the Simhalese not found in the Pâli. 190:1 Linga, possibly 'uniform.' Either the Order or the yellow robe, for instance, if the system were Buddhism. See below, IV, (?--JBH) 191:1 See Kullavagga VII, 3, 9. 191:2 See Mahâparinibbâna Sutta IV, 21. 191:3 Mahâvagga VIII, 1, 30-33. 191:4 This is, no doubt, the occurrence recounted in the Mahâvagga VI, 17, 1-4. Childers translates vâtâbâdha by 'rheumatism,' but I adhere here to the translation adopted there. It is said in the Mahâvagga that Ânanda gave him, not hot water, but gruel. But the two are very similar, and in the Theri Gâthâ 185, referring to the same event, it is hot water that is mentioned. 191:5 That is, there can be no suffering without sin. Compare the discussion in St. John's Gospel, ch. ix. 192:1 As was pointed out above, IV, 1, 33, many of these medical terms are very doubtful. 193:1 So below, IV, 3, 28. 193:2 Visama-parihâra-gâ both in the Simhalese and the Pâli. 194:1 Water, fire, air, and earth (âpo, tego, vayo, pathavî). 196:1 Patisallâna (not samâdhi), rendered throughout in the Simhalese by wiweka. 196:2 I have not been able to find this statement in any of the Pitaka texts. 196:3 Here again our author seems to be referring to a tradition later than the Pitakas. In the Mahâvagga (see our version in the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, pp. 74-81) there is mention only of four periods of seven days, and even during these not of patisallâna, but of samâdhi. The former of these two terms only occurs at the conclusion of the twenty-eight days (Mahâvagga I, 5, 2). Even in the later orthodox literature the period of meditation is still not three months, but only seven times seven days. See the passages quoted in Professor Oldenberg's note at p. 75 of the 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i. 198:1 Kattâro iddhi-pâdâ. 199:1 Mahâparinibbâna Sutta III, 60, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 57, 58. 199:2 Ibid. III, 63, translated loc. cit. p. 59. 199:3 So it is said of the 'Horse-treasure' of the Great King of Glory in the Mahâsudassana Sutta I, 29 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256), that 'it passed over along the broad earth to its very ocean boundary, and then returned again, in time for the p. 200 morning meal, to the royal city of Kusâvatî.' It is, of course, the sun horse which is meant. 200:1 I have not traced this quotation in the Pitakas, but it is probably there. Next: Chapter 2 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book III: The Remo... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 202

[THE ABOLITION OF REGULATIONS.] 1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "It is by insight, O Bhikkhus, that I preach the law, not without insight 1." On the other hand he said of the regulations of the Vinaya: "When I am gone, Ânanda, let the Order, if it should so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts 2." Were then these lesser and minor precepts wrongly laid down, or established in ignorance and without due cause, that the Blessed One allowed them to be revoked after his death? If the first statement had been true, the second would have been wrong. If the second statement were really made, [143] then the first was false. This too is a double-headed problem, fine, subtle, abstruse, deep, profound, and hard to expound. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 2. 'In both cases, O king, the Blessed One said as you have declared. But in the second case it was to test the Bhikkhus that he said it, to try whether, if leave were granted them, they would, after his death, revoke the lesser and minor regulations, or still adhere to them. It runs as if a p. 203 king of kings were to say to his sons: "This great country, my children, reaches to the sea on every side. It is a hard thing to maintain it with the forces we have at our disposal. So when I am gone you had better, my children, abandon the outlying districts along the border." Now would the princes, O king, on the death of their father, give up those outlying districts, provinces already in their power?' 'No indeed, Sir. Kings are grasping. The princes might, in the lust of power, subjugate an extent of country twice or thrice the size of what they had, but they would never give up what they already possessed.' 'Just so was it, O king, that the Tathâgata to test the Bhikkhus said: "When I am gone, Ânanda, let the Order, if it should so wish, abolish all the lesser and minor precepts." But the sons of the Buddha, O king, in their lust after the law, and for emancipation from sorrow, might keep two hundred and fifty regulations 1, but would never give up any one that had been laid down in ordinary course.' 3. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when the Blessed One referred to "lesser and minor precepts," this people might therein [144] be bewildered, and fall into doubt, and find matter for discussion, and be lost in hesitation, as to which were the lesser, and which the minor precepts.' 'The lesser errors in conduct 2, O king, are the lesser precepts, and the lesser errors in speech 3 are the minor precepts: and these two together make up therefore "the lesser and minor precepts." The p. 204 leading Elders too of old, O king, were in doubt about this matter, and they were not unanimous on the point at the Council held for the fixing of the text of the Scriptures 1. And the Blessed One foresaw that this problem would arise.' 'Then this dark saying of the Conquerors, Nâgasena, which has lain hid so long, has been now to-day uncovered in the face of the world, and made clear to all.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the revocation of rules.] ____________________ [ESOTERIC TEACHING.] 4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "In respect of the truths, Ânanda, the Tathâgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps something back 2." But on the other hand he made no reply to the question put by the son of the Mâlunkya woman 3. This problem, Nâgasena, will be one of two ends, on one of which it must rest, for he must have refrained from answering either out of ignorance, or out of wish to conceal something. If the first statement be true it must have been out of ignorance. But p. 205 if he knew, and still did not reply, then the first statement must be false. This too is a double-pointed dilemma. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 5. 'The Blessed One, O king, made that first statement to Ânanda, and he did not reply to Mâlunkya-putta's question. But that was neither out of ignorance, nor for the sake of concealing anything. There are four kinds of ways in which a problem may be explained. And which are the four? There is the problem to which an explanation can be given that shall be direct and final. There is the problem which can be answered by going into details. There is the problem which can be answered by asking another. And there is the problem which can be put on one side. 'And which, O king, is the problem to which a direct and final solution can be given? It is such as this--"Is form impermanent?" [145] "Is sensation impermanent?" "Is idea impermanent?" "Are the Confections impermanent?" "Is consciousness impermanent?" 'And which is the problem which can be answered by going into details? It is such as this--"Is form thus impermanent?" and so on. 'And which is the problem which can be answered by asking another? It is such as this--"What then? Can the eye perceive all things?" 'And which is the problem which can be put on one side? It is such as this--"Is the universe everlasting?" "Is it not everlasting?" "Has it an end?" "Has it no end?" "Is it both endless and unending?" "Is it neither the one nor the other?" "Are the soul and the body the same p. 206 thing?" "Is the soul distinct from the body?" "Does a Tathâgata exist after death?" "Does he not exist after death?" "Does he both exist and not exist after death?" "Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?" 'Now it was to such a question, one that ought to be put on one side, that the Blessed One gave no reply to Mâlunkya-putta. And why ought such a question to be put on one side? Because there is no reason or object for answering it. That is why it should be put aside. For the Blessed Buddhas lift not up their voice without a reason and without an object.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! Thus it is, and I accept it as you say?' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to keeping some things back 1.] ____________________ [DEATH.] 6. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One: "All men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death 2." But again he said: "The Arahat has passed beyond all fear 3." How then, Nâgasena? does the Arahat tremble with the fear of punishment? [146] Or are the beings in purgatory, when they are being burnt and boiled and scorched and tormented, afraid of that death which would release them from the burning fiery pit of that awful place of woe 4? If the Blessed One, Nâgasena, p. 207 really said that all men tremble at punishment, and all are afraid of death, then the statement that the Arahat has passed beyond fear must be false. But if that last statement is really by him, then the other must be false. This double-headed problem is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 7. 'It was not with regard to Arahats, O king, that the Blessed One spake when he said: "All men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death." The Arahat is an exception to that statement, for all cause for fear has been removed from the Arahat 1. He spoke of those beings in whom evil still existed, who are still infatuated with the delusion of self, who are still lifted up and cast down by pleasures and pains. To the Arahat, O king, rebirth in every state has been cut off, all the four kinds of future existence have been destroyed, every re-incarnation has been put an end to, the rafters 2 of the house of life have broken, and the whole house completely pulled down, the Confections have altogether lost their roots, good and evil have ceased, ignorance has been demolished, consciousness has no longer any seed (from which it could be renewed), all sin has been burnt away 3, and all worldly conditions have been overcome 4. Therefore is it that the Arahat is not made to tremble by any fear.' p. 208 8. 'Suppose, O king, a king had four chief ministers, faithful, famous, trustworthy, placed in high positions of authority. And the king, on some emergency arising, were to issue to them an order touching all the people in his realm, saying: "Let all now pay up a tax, and do you, as my four officers, carry out what is necessary in this emergency." Now tell me, O king, would the tremor which comes from fear of taxation arise in the hearts of those ministers?' 'No, Sir, it would not.' 'But why not?' 'They have been appointed by the king to high office. Taxation does not affect them, they are beyond taxation. It was the rest that the king referred to when he gave the order: [147] "Let all pay tax."' 'Just so, O king, is it with the statement that all men tremble at punishment, all are afraid of death. In that way is it that the Arahat is removed from every fear.' 9. 'But, Nâgasena, the word "all" is inclusive, none are left out when it is used. Give me a further reason to establish the point.' 'Suppose, O king, that in some village the lord of the village were to order the crier, saying: "Go, crier, bring all the villagers quickly together before me." And he in obedience to that order were to stand in the midst of the village and were thrice to call out: "Let all the villagers assemble at once in the presence of the lord!" And they should assemble in haste, and have an announcement made to the lord, saying: "All the villagers, Sire, have assembled. Do now whatsoever you require." Now when the lord, O king, is thus summoning all the heads of p. 209 houses, he issues his order to all the villagers, but it is not they who assemble in obedience to the order; it is the heads of houses. And the lord is satisfied therewith, knowing that such is the number of his villagers. There are many others who do not come--women and men, slave girls and slaves, hired workmen, servants, peasantry, sick people, oxen, buffaloes, sheep, and goats, and dogs--but all those do not count. It was with reference to the heads of houses that the order was issued in the words: "Let all assemble." just so, O king, it is not of Arahats that it was said that all are afraid of death. [148] The Arahat is not included in that statement, for the Arahat is one in whom there is no longer any cause that could give rise to fear.' 10. 'There is the non-inclusive expression, O king, whose meaning is non-inclusive, and the non-inclusive expression whose meaning is inclusive; there is the inclusive expression whose meaning is non-inclusive, and the inclusive expression whose meaning is inclusive. And the meaning, in each case, should be accepted accordingly. And there are five ways in which the meaning should be ascertained-by the connection, and by taste, and by the tradition of the teachers, and by the meaning, and by abundance of reasons. And herein "connection" means the meaning as seen in the Sutta itself, "taste" means that it is in accordance with other Suttas, "the tradition of the teachers" means what they hold, "the meaning" means what they think, and "abundance of reasons" means all these four combined 1.' p. 210 11. 'Very well, Nâgasena! I accept it as you say. The Arahat is an exception in this phrase, and it is the rest of beings who are full of fear. But those beings in purgatory, of whom I spoke, who are suffering painful, sharp, and severe agonies, who are tormented with burnings all over their bodies and limbs, whose mouths are full of lamentation, and cries for pity, and cries of weeping and wailing and woe, who are overcome with pains too sharp to be borne, who find no refuge nor protection nor help, who are afflicted beyond measure, who in the worst and lowest of conditions are still destined to a certainty to further pain, who are being burnt with hot, sharp, fierce, and cruel flames, who are giving utterance to mighty shouts and groans born of horror and fear, who are embraced by the garlands of flame which intertwine around them from all the six directions, and flash in fiery speed through a hundred leagues on every side--can those poor burning wretches be afraid of death?' 'Yes, they can.' 'But, venerable Nâgasena, is not purgatory a place of certain pain? And, if so, why should the beings in it be afraid of death, which would release them from that certain pain? What! Are they fond of purgatory?' 'No, indeed. They like it not. They long to be released from it. It is the power of death of which they are afraid.' 'Now this, Nâgasena, I cannot believe, that they, who want to be released, should be afraid of rebirth. p. 211 [paragraph continues] [149] They must surely, Nâgasena, rejoice at the prospect of the very condition that they long for. Convince me by some further reason 1.' 12. 'Death, great king, is a condition which those who have not seen the truth 2 are afraid of. About it this people is anxious and full of dread. Whosoever is afraid of a black snake, or an elephant or lion or tiger or leopard or bear or hyena or wild buffalo or gayal, or of fire or water, or of thorns or spikes or arrows, it is in each case of death that he is really in dread, and therefore afraid of them. This, O king, is the majesty of the essential nature of death. And all being not free from sin are in dread and quake before its majesty. In this sense it is that even the beings in purgatory, who long to be released from it, are afraid of death.' 13. 'Suppose, O king, a boil were to arise, full of matter, on a man's body, and he, in pain from that disease, and wanting to escape from the danger of it, were to call in a physician and surgeon. And the surgeon, accepting the call, were to make ready some means or other for the removal of his disease--were to have a lancet sharpened, or to have sticks put into the fire to be used as cauterisers, or to have something ground on a grindstone to be mixed in a salt lotion. Now would the patient begin to be in dread of the cutting of the sharp lancet, or of the burning of the pair of caustic sticks, or of the application of the stinging lotion?' 'Yes, he would.' p. 212 'But if the sick man, who wants to be free from his ailment, can fall into dread by the fear of pain, just so can the beings in purgatory, though they long to be released from it, fall into dread by the fear of death.' 14. 'And suppose, O king, a man who had committed an offence against the crown, when bound with a chain, and cast into a dungeon, were to long for release. And the ruler, wishing to release him, were to send for him. Now would not that man, who had thus offended, and knew it, be in dread [150] of the interview with the king?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'But if so, then can also the beings in purgatory, though they long to be released from it, yet be afraid of death.' 'Give me another illustration by which I may be able to harmonise 1 (this apparent discrepancy).' 'Suppose, O king, a man bitten by a poisonous snake should be afraid, and by the action of the poison should fall and struggle, and roll this way and that. And then that another man, by the repetition of a powerful charm, should compel that poisonous snake to approach to suck the poison back again 2. Now when the bitten man saw the poisonous snake coming to him, though for the object of curing him, would he not still be in dread of it?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Well, it is just so with the beings in purgatory. p. 213 [paragraph continues] Death is a thing disliked by all beings. And therefore are they in dread of it though they want to be released from purgatory.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the fear of death.] ____________________ [PIRIT.] 15. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: Not in the sky, not in the ocean's midst, Not in the most secluded mountain cleft, Not in the whole wide world is found the spot Where standing one could 'scape the snare of death 1." But on the other hand the Pirit service was promulgated by the Blessed One 2--that is to say, the Ratana Sutta and the Khanda-parittâ and the Mora-parittâ and the Dhagagga-parittâ [151] and the Âtânâtiya-parittâ and the Anguli-mala-parittâ. If, Nâgasena, a man can escape death's snare neither by going to heaven, nor by going into the midst of the sea, nor by going to the summits of lofty palaces, p. 214 nor to the caves or grottoes or declivities or clefts or holes in the mountains, then is the Pirit ceremony useless. But if by it there is a way of escape from death, then the statement in the verse I quoted is false. This too is a double-headed problem, more knotty than a knot. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 16. 'The Blessed One, O king, said the verse you have quoted, and he sanctioned Pirit 1. But that is only meant for those who have some portion of their life yet to run, who are of full age, and restrain themselves from the evils of Karma. And there is no ceremony or artificial means 2 for prolonging the life of one whose allotted span of existence has come to an end. just, O king, as with a dry and dead log of wood, dull 3, and sapless, out of which all life has departed, which has reached the end of its allotted period of life,--you might have thousands of pots of water poured over it, but it would never become fresh again or put forth sprouts or leaves. Just so there is no ceremony or artificial means, no medicine and no Pirit, which can prolong the life of one whose allotted period has come to an end. All the medicines in the world are useless, O king, to such a one, but Pirit is a protection and assistance to those who have a period yet to live, who are full of life, and restrain themselves from the evil of Karma. And it is for that use that Pirit was appointed by the p. 215 [paragraph continues] Blessed One. just, O king, as a husbandman guards the grain when it is ripe and dead and ready for harvesting from the influx of water, but makes it grow by giving it water when it is young, and dark in colour like a cloud, and full of life--just so, O king, should the Pirit ceremony be put aside and neglected in the case of one who has reached his allotted term of life, [152] but for those who have a period yet to run and are full of vigour, for them the medicine of Pirit may be repeated, and they will profit by its use.' 17. 'But, Nâgasena, if he who has a term of life yet to run will live, and he who has none will die, then medicine and Pirit are alike useless.' 'Have you ever seen, O king, a case of a disease being turned back by medicine?' 'Yes, several hundred times.' 'Then, O king, your statement as to the inefficiency of Pirit and medicine must be wrong.' 'I have seen, Nâgasena, doctors administer medicines by way of draughts or outward applications, and by that means the disease has been assuaged.' 'And when, O king, the voice of those who are repeating Pirit is heard, the tongue may be dried up, and the heart beat but faintly, and the throat be hoarse, but by that repetition all diseases are allayed, all calamities depart. Again, have you ever seen, O king, a man who has been bitten by a snake having the poison resorbed under a spell (by the snake who gave the bite 1) or destroyed (by an antidote) or having a lotion applied above or below the spot 2?' p. 216 'Yes, that is common custom to this day in the world.' 'Then what you said that Pirit and medicine are alike useless is wrong.. And when Pirit has been said over a man, a snake, ready to bite, will not bite him, but close his jaws--the club which robbers hold aloft to strike him with will never strike; they will let it drop, and treat him kindly--the enraged elephant rushing at him will suddenly stop--the burning fiery conflagration surging towards him will die out--the malignant poison he has eaten will become harmless, and turn to food--assassins who have come to slay him will become as the slaves who wait upon him--and the trap into which he has trodden will hold him not. 18. 'Again, have you never heard, O king, of that hunter who during seven hundred years failed to throw his net over the peacock who had taken Pirit, but snared him the very day [153] he omitted to do so 1?' 'Yes, I have heard of it. The fame of it has gone through all the world.' 'Then what you said about Pirit and medicine being alike useless must be wrong. And have you never heard of the Dânava 2 who, to guard his wife, p. 217 put her into a box, and swallowing it, carried her about in his stomach. And how a Vidyâdhara 1 entered his mouth, and played games with his wife. And how the Dânava when he became aware of it, vomited up the box, and opened it, and the moment he did so the Vidyâdhara escaped whither he would 2? 'Yes, I have heard that. The fame of it too has gone throughout the world.' 'Well, did not the Vidyâdhara escape capture by the power of Pirit?' 'Yes, that was so.' 'Then there must be power in Pirit. And have you heard of that other Vidyâdhara who got into the harem of the king of Benares, and committed adultery with the chief queen, and was caught, and then became invisible, and got away 3?' 'Yes, I heard that story.' 'Well, did not he too escape capture by the power of Pirit.' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Then, O king, there must be power in Pirit.' 19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, is Pirit a protection to everybody?' p. 218 'To some, not to others.' 'Then it is not always of use?' 'Does food keep all people alive?' 'Only some, not others.' 'But why not?' 'Inasmuch as some, eating too much of that same food, die of cholera.' 'So it does not keep all men alive?' 'There are two reasons which make it destroy life--over-indulgence in it, and weakness of digestion. And even life-giving food may be made poisonous by an evil spell.' 'Just so, O king, is Pirit a protection to some and not to others. And there are three reasons [154] for its failure--the obstruction of Karma, and of sin, and of unbelief. That Pirit which is a protection to beings loses its protecting power by acts done by those beings themselves. just, O king, as a mother lovingly nourishes the son who has entered her womb, and brings him forth with care 1. And after his birth she keeps him clean from dirt and stains and mucus, and anoints him with the best and most costly perfumes, and when others abuse or strike him she seizes them and, full of excitement, drags them before the lord of the place. But when her son is naughty, or comes in late, she strikes him with rods or clubs on her knee or with her hands. Now, that being so, would she get seized and dragged along, and have to appear before the lord?' 'No, Sir.' 'But why not?' p. 219 'Because the boy was in fault.' 'Just in the same way, O king, will Pirit which is a protection to beings, yet, by their own fault, turn against them.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! The problem has been solved, the jungle made clear, the darkness made light, the net of heresy unravelled--and by you, O best of the leaders of schools!' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to Pirit.] ____________________ [MÂRA, THE EVIL ONE.] 20. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say thus: "The Tathâgata was in the constant receipt of the things necessary for a recluse-robes, food, lodging, and the requisites for the sick." And again they say: "When the Tathâgata entered the Brahman village called the Five Sâla trees he received nothing, and had to return with his bowl as clean as before." If the first passage is true the second is false, and if the second passage is true [155] the first is false. This too is a double-headed problem, a mighty crux hard to unravel. It is now put to you. It is for you to solve it.' 21. 'Both statements are true, but when he received nothing that day, that was the work of Mâra, the evil one.' 'Then, Nâgasena, how was it that the merit laid up by the Blessed One through countless æons of time came to end that day? How was it that Mâra, who had only just been produced, could overcome the strength and influence of that merit? In that case, Nâgasena, the blame must fall in one of two p. 220 ways--either demerit must be more powerful than merit, or the power of Mâra be greater than that of the Buddha. The root of the tree must be heavier than the top of it, or the sinner stronger than he who has heaped up virtue.' 22. 'Great king, that is not enough to prove either the one or the other of your alternatives. Still a reason is certainly desirable in this matter. Suppose, O king, a man were to bring a complimentary present to a king of kings--honey or honeycomb or something of that kind. And the king's doorkeeper were to say to him: "This is the wrong time for visiting the king. So, my good fellow, take your present as quickly as ever you can, and go back before the king inflicts a fine upon you." And then that man, in dread and awe, should pick up his present, and return in great haste. Now would the king of kings, merely from the fact that the man brought his gift at the wrong time, be less powerful than the doorkeeper, or never receive a complimentary present any more?' 'No, Sir. The doorkeeper turned back the giver of that present out of the surliness of his nature, and one a hundred thousand times as valuable [156] might be brought in by some other device.' 'Just so, O king, it was out of the jealousy of his nature that Mâra, the evil one, possessed the Brahmans and householders at the Five Sâla trees. And hundreds of thousands of other deities came up to offer the Buddha the strength-giving ambrosia from heaven, and stood reverencing him with clasped hands and thinking to themselves that they would thus imbue him with vigour.' 23. 'That may be so, Nâgasena. The Blessed p. 221 [paragraph continues] One found it easy to get the four requisites of a recluse--he, the best in the world--and at the request of gods and men he enjoyed all the requisites. But still Mâra's intention to stop the supply of food to the Blessed One was so far carried out. Herein, Sir, my doubt is not removed. I am still in perplexity and hesitation about this. My mind is not clear how the Tathâgata, the Arahat, the supreme Buddha, the best of all the best in the world of gods and men, he who had so glorious a treasure of the merit of virtue, the unequalled one, unrivalled and peerless,--how so vile, mean, insignificant, sinful, and ignoble a being as Mâra could put any obstacle in the way of gifts to Him.' 24. 'There are four kinds, O king, of obstacles--the obstacle to a gift not intended for any particular person, to a gift set apart for some one, to the gift got ready, and to the enjoyment of a gift. And the first is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the actual gift of a thing put ready to be given away, but not with a view to or having seen any particular donee,--an obstacle raised, for instance, by saying: "What is the good of giving it away to any one else?" The second is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the actual gift of food intended to be prepared to be given to a person specified. The third is when any one puts an obstacle in the way when such a gift has been got ready, but not yet accepted. And the fourth is when any one puts an obstacle in the way of the enjoyment of a gift already given (and so the property of the donee).' 25. 'Now when Mâra, the evil one, possessed the p. 222 [paragraph continues] Brahmans and householders at the Five Sâla trees, the food in that case was neither the property of, nor got ready for, nor intended to be prepared specially for the Blessed One. [157] The obstacle was put in the way of some one who was yet to come, who had not arrived, and for whom no gift was intended. That was not against the Blessed One alone. But all who had gone out that day, and were coming to the village, failed to receive an alms. I know no one, O king, in the world of men and gods, no one among Mâras or Brahmas, no one of the class of Brahmans or recluses, who could put any obstacle in the way of an alms intended for, or got ready for, or already given to the Blessed One. And if any one, out of jealousy, were to raise up any obstacle in that case, then would his head split into a hundred or into a thousand pieces.' 26. 'There are four things, O king, connected with the Tathâgatas, to which no one can do any harm. And what are the four? To the alms intended for, and got ready for the Blessed One--to the halo of a fathom's length when it has once spread out from him-to the treasure of the knowledge of his omniscience--and to his life. All these things, O king, are one in essence--they are free from defect, immovable, unassailable by other beings, unchangeable by other circumstances 1. And Mâra, the evil one, lay in ambush, out of sight, when he possessed the Brahmans and householders at the Five Sâla trees. It was as when robbers, O king, p. 223 hiding out of sight in the inaccessible country over the border, beset the highways. But if the king caught sight of them, do you think those robbers would be safe?' 'No, Sir, he might have them cut into a hundred or a thousand pieces with an axe.' 'Well, just so it was, hiding out of sight, that Mâra possessed them. It was as when a married woman, in ambush, and out of sight, frequents the company of her paramour. [158] But if, O king, she were to carry on her intrigues in her husband's presence, do you think she would be safe?' 'No, Sir, he might slay her, or wound her, or put her in bonds, or reduce her to slavery.' 'Well. It was like that, hiding out of sight, that Mâra possessed them. But if, O king, he had raised any obstacle in the case of an alms intended for, got ready for, or in possession of the Blessed One, then his head would have split into a hundred or a thousand pieces.' 'That is so, Nâgasena. Mâra, the evil one, acted after the manner of robbers, he lay in ambush, possessing the Brahmans and householders of the Five Sâla trees. But if the same Mâra, the evil one, had interfered with any alms intended for, or made ready for the Blessed One, or with his partaking thereof, then would his head have been split into a hundred or a thousand pieces, or his bodily frame have been dissipated like a handful of chaff.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ Here ends the dilemma as to Mâra's interference with alms.] p. 224 [UNCONSCIOUS CRIME.] 2 7. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "Whosoever deprives a living being of life, without knowing that he does so, he accumulates very serious demerit 1." But on the other hand it was laid down by the Blessed One in the Vinaya: "There is no offence to him who acts in ignorance 2." If the first passage is correct, the other must be false; and if the second is right, the first must be wrong. This too is a double-pointed problem, hard to master, hard to overcome. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 28. 'Both the passages you quote, O king, were spoken by the Blessed One. But there is a difference between the sense of the two. And what is that difference? [159] There is a kind of offence which is committed without the co-operation of the mind 3, and there is another kind which has that co-operation. It was with respect to the first of the p. 225 two that the Blessed One said: "'There is no offence to him who acts in ignorance 1."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to sins in ignorance.] ____________________ [THE BUDDHA AND HIS FOLLOWERS.] 29. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "Now the Tathâgata thinks not, Ânanda, that is he who should lead the brotherhood, or that the Order is dependent upon him 2." But on the other hand when describing the virtues and the nature of Metteyya, the Blessed One, he said thus: "He will be the leader of a brotherhood several thousands in number, as I am now the leader of a brotherhood several hundreds in number 3." If the first statement be right, then the second is wrong. If the second passage is right, the first must be false. This too is a double-pointed problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 30. 'You quote both passages correctly, O king. But in the dilemma that you put the sense in the one passage is inclusive, in the other it is not. It is not the Tathâgata, O king, who seeks after a following, but the followers who seek after him. p. 226 [paragraph continues] [160] It is a mere commonly received opinion, O king, that "This is I," or "This is mine," it is not a transcendental truth 1. Attachment is a frame of mind put away by the Tathâgata, he has put away clinging, he is free from the delusion that "This is mine," he lives only to be a help to others 2. Just as the earth, O king, is a support to the beings in the world, and an asylum to them, and they depend upon it, but the broad earth has no longing after them in the idea that "These belong to me"--just so is the Tathâgata a support and an asylum to all beings, but has no longing after them in the idea that "These belong to me." And just as a mighty rain cloud, O king, pours out its rain, and gives nourishment to grass and trees, to cattle and to men, and maintains the lineage thereof, and all these creatures depend for their livelihood upon its rain, but the cloud has no feelings of longing in the idea that "These are mine"--just so does the Tathâgata give all beings to know what are good qualities and maintains them in goodness, and all beings have their life in him, but the Tathâgata has no feelings of longing in the idea that "These are mine." And why is it so? Because of his having abandoned all self-regard 3.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! The problem has been well solved by variety of examples. The jungle has been made open, the darkness has been turned p. 227 to light, the arguments of the adversaries have been broken down, insight has been awakened in the sons of the Conqueror. 1 ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha and his following.] ____________________ [SCHISM.] 31. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "The Tathâgata is a person whose following can never be broken up." And again they say: "At one stroke Devadatta seduced five hundred of the brethren 1." If the first be true the second is false, but if the second be correct then the first is wrong. [161] This too is a double-pointed problem, profound, hard to unravel, more knotty than a knot. By it these people are veiled, obstructed, hindered, shut in, and enveloped. Herein show your skill as against the arguments of the adversaries.' 32. 'Both statements, O king, are correct. But the latter is owing to the power of the breach maker. Where there is one to make the breach, a mother will be separated from her son, and the son will break with the mother, or the father with the son and the son with the father, or the brother from the sister and the sister from the brother, or friend from friend. A ship pieced together with timber of all sorts is broken up by the force of the violence of the waves, and a tree in full bearing and full of sap is broken down by the force of the violence of the wind, and gold of the finest sort is divided by p. 228 bronze. But it is not the intention of the wise, it is not the will of the Buddhas, it is not the desire of those who are learned that the following of the Tathâgata should be broken up. And there is a special sense in which it is said that that cannot be. It is an unheard-of thing, so far as I know, that his following could be broken up by anything done or taken, any unkindly word, any wrong action, any injustice, in all the conduct, wheresoever or whatsoever, of the Tathâgata himself. In that sense his following is invulnerable. And you yourself, do you know of any instance in all the ninefold word of the Buddha of anything done by a Bodisat which broke up the following of the Tathâgata?' 'No, Sir. Such a thing has never been seen or heard in the world. It is very good, Nâgasena, what you say: and I accept it so.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to schism.] ____________________ Here ends the Second Chapter. Footnotes 202:1 Not traced as yet. 202:2 Mahâparinibbâna Sutta VI, 3 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 112). The incident is referred to in the Kullavagga XI, x, 9, 10, and in his commentary on that passage Buddhaghosa mentions the discussion between Milinda and Nâgasena, and quotes it as an authority in support of his interpretation. 203:1 The regulations in the Pâtimokkha, which include all the most important ones, are only 220 in number. 203:2 Dukkatam. 203:3 Dubbhâsitam. 204:1 In the Kullavagga XI, 1, 10, it is one of the faults laid to Ânanda's charge, at the Council of Râgagaha, that he had not asked for a definition of these terms. 204:2 Mahâparinibbâna Sutta II, 32 (another passage from the same speech is quoted below, IV, 2, 29). 204:3 See the two Mâlunkya Suttantas in the Magghima Nikâya (vol. i, pp. 426-437 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pâli Text Society). With regard to the spelling of the name, which is doubtful, it may be noticed that Hînati-kumburê has Mâlunka throughout. 206:1 See my note below on IV, 4, 8. 206:2 Dhammapada 129. 206:3 Not traced in these words, but identical in meaning with Dhammapada 39. 206:4 Maha-nirayâ kavamânâ, I when they are on the point of passing away from it.' For in Buddhism the time comes to each p. 207 being in Niraya (often translated 'hell') when he will pass away from it. 207:1 That is from him who attained Nirvâna in this life. Compare 1 John iv. 18. 207:2 Phâsû for Phâsukâ. Compare Dhammapada 154, Manu VI, 79-81, and Sumangala, p. 16. 207:3 Hînati-kumburê adds 'by the fire of tapas.' 207:4 Eight are meant--gain, loss, fame, dishonour, praise, blame, pleasures, pains. 209:1 This is much more obscure in Pâli than in English. In the Pâli the names of each of the five methods are ambiguous. 'Connection,' for instance, is in Pâli âhakka-pada, which is only p. 210 found elsewhere (see Kullavagga VI, 4, 3, and my note there) as the name of a kind of chair. And there is similar ambiguity in the other words. 211:1 Kâranena, perhaps he means 'by an example.' 211:2 Adittha-sakkânam. It may also mean 'who have not perceived the (Four Noble) Truths.' 212:1 Okappeyyam. See the Old Commentary at Pâkittiya I, 2, 6. 212:2 On this belief the 69th Gâtaka is founded. See Fausböll, vol. i, pp. 310, 311 (where, as Mr. Trenckner points out, we must read in the verse the same word pakkâkam as we have here). 213:1 Either Dhammapada 127, which is the same except the last word (there 'an evil deed'), or Dhammapada 128, except the last line (which is there 'where standing death would not overtake one'). 213:2 This is a service used for the sick. Its use so far as the Pitakas are known has been nowhere laid down by the Buddha, or by words placed in his mouth. This is the oldest text in which the use of the service is referred to. But the word Parittâ (Pirit) is used in Kullavagga V, 6, of an asseveration of love for snakes, to be used as what is practically a charm against snake bite, and that is attributed to the Buddha. The particular Suttas and passages here referred to are all in the Pitakas. 214:1 See last note. Hînati-kumburê renders 'preached Pirit,' which is quite in accordance with the Pitakas, as the Suttas of which it is composed are placed in his mouth. 214:2 Upakkamo. Compare the use of the word at Kullavagga VII, 3, 10; Sumangala 69, 71. Utpatti-kramayek says the Simhalese. 214:3 Kolâpa. See Gâtaka III, 495, and the commentary there. 215:1 See above, IV, 2, 14. 215:2 All this sentence is doubtful. Dr. Morris has a learned note on the difficult words used (which only occur here) in the 'Journal p. 216 of the Pâli Text Society' for 1884, p. 87. Hînati-kumburê, p. 191, translates as follows: Mahâ ragâneni, wisha winâsa karannâwû mantra padayakin wishaya baswana laddâwû, wisha sanhinduwana laddâwû, ûrddhâdho bhâgayehi awushadha galayen temana laddâwû, nayaku wisin dashta karana laddâwû kisiwek topa wisin daknâ ladde dyi wikâla seka. 216:1 This is the Mora-Gâtaka, Nos. 159, 491, or (which is the same thing) the Mora-Parittâ. 216:2 An Asura, enemy of the gods, a Titan. Rakshasa says the Simhalese. 217:1 They are a kind of genii, with magical powers, who are attendants on the god Siva (and therefore, of course, enemies of the Dânavas). They are not mentioned in the Pitakas. 217:2 I don't know where this story comes from. It is not in the Pitakas anywhere. But Hînati-kumburê gives the fairy tale at full length, and in the course of it calls the Vidyâdharas by name Wâyassa-putra, 'Son of the Wind.' He quotes also a gâthâ which he places, not in the mouth of the Bodisat, but of Buddha himself. I cannot find the tale either in the Gâtaka book, as far as published by Professor Fausböll, or in the Kathâ Sarit Sâgara, though I have looked all through both. 217:3 See last note. 218:1 Upakârena, which the Simhalese repeats and construes with poseti. 222:1 Aphusâni kiriyâni, which I do not pretend to understand, and Mr. Trenckner says is unintelligible to him. Hînati-kumburê has: Anya kriyâwak no wdagannâ bwin apusana (sic) kriyâyo ya. 224:1 Not traced as yet, in so many words. And though there are several injunctions in the Vinaya against acts which might haply, though unknown to the doer, destroy life (such, for instance, as drinking water without the use of a strainer), when these are all subjects of special rule, and in each case there is an exception in favour of the Bhikkhu who acts in ignorance of there being living things which could be killed. (See, for instance, Pâkittiya 62, on the drinking of water.) 224:2 Agânantassa nâpatti. Pâkittiya LXI, 2, 3 (in the Old Commentary, not ascribed to the Buddha). 224:3 Saññâ-vimokkhâ. I am not sure of the exact meaning of this difficult compound, which has only been found in this passage. Hînati-kumburê (p. 199) has: Mahâ ragâneni, kittângayen abhâwayen midena bwin saññâ-wimoksha-namwû âpattit atteya, &c. (mid = muk). 225:1 The Simhalese has here a further page, giving examples of the two kinds of offences referred to, and drawing the conclusion for each. 225:2 Book of the Great Decease, II, 32 (translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 37), just after the passage quoted above, IV, 2, 4. 225:3 Not in any of the published texts. Metteyya is, of course, the Buddha to come, the expected messiah. 226:1 Sammuti .... na paramattho. 226:2 Upâdâya avassayo hoti. 226:3 Attânuditthiyâ pahînattâ. See the passages quoted by Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1886, pp. 113, 114. 227:1 Neither of these phrases is to be found in the published texts in these words. But the latter sums up the episode related in the Kullavagga VII. 4, 1. Next: Chapter 3 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 229

[PRECEDENCE OF THE DHARMA.] 1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "For it is the Dhamma, O Vâsettha, which is 'the best in the world 1,' as regards both what we now see, and what is yet to come 2." But again (according to your people) the devout layman who has entered the Excellent Way, for whom the possibility of rebirth in any place of woe has passed away, who has attained to insight, and to whom the doctrine is known, even such a one ought to salute and to rise from his seat in token of respect for, and to revere, any member of the Order, though a novice, and though he be unconverted 3. Now if the Dhamma be the best that rule of conduct is wrong, but if that be right then the first statement must be wrong. p. 230 [paragraph continues] This too is a double-pointed problem. It is now put to you, and you have to solve it.' [162] 2. 'The Blessed One said what you have quoted, and you have rightly described the rule of conduct. But there is a reason for that rule, and that is this. There are these twenty personal qualities, making up the Samanaship of a Samana, and these two outward signs 1, by reason of which the Samana is worthy of salutation, and of respect, and of reverence. And what are they? The best form of self-restraint, the highest kind of self-control 2, right conduct, calm manners 3, mastery over (his deeds and words 4), subjugation (of his senses 5), long-suffering 6, sympathy 7, p. 231 the practice of solitude 1, love of solitude 2, meditation 3, modesty and fear of doing wrong 4, zeal 5, earnestness 6, the taking upon himself of the precepts 7, recitation (of the Scriptures) 8, asking questions (of those wise in the Dhamma and Vinaya), rejoicing in the Sîlas and other (rules of morality), freedom from attachment (to the things of the world), fulfilment of the precepts--and the wearing of the yellow robe, and the being shaven. [163] In the practice of all these things does the member of the Order live. By being deficient in none of them, by being perfect in all, accomplished in all, endowed with all of them does he reach forward to the condition of Arahatship, to the condition of those who have nothing left to learn; he is marching towards the highest of all lands 9. Thus it is because he sees him to be in the company of the Worthy Ones (the Arahats) that the layman who has already entered on the Excellent Way thinks it worthy in him 10 to p. 232 reverence and to show respect to the Bhikkhu, though he may be, as yet, unconverted. It is because he sees him to be in the company of those in whom all evil has been destroyed, because he feels that he is not in such society 1, that the converted layman thinks it worthy of him to do reverence and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu. It is because he knows that he has joined the noblest brotherhood, and that he himself has reached no such state, that the converted layman holds it right to do reverence and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu--because he knows that he listens to the recitation of the Pâtimokkha, while he himself can not--because he knows that he receives men into the Order, and thus extends the teaching of the Conqueror, which he himself is incapable of doing--because he knows that he carries out innumerable precepts, which he himself cannot observe--because he knows that he wears the outward signs of Samanaship, and carries out the intention of the Buddha, while he himself is gone away far from that--because he knows that he, though he has given up his hair and beard, and is unanointed and wears no ornaments, yet is anointed with the perfume of righteousness, while he is himself addicted to jewelry and fine apparel--that the converted layman thinks it right to do reverence, and to show respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu.' 3. 'And moreover, O king, it is because he knows that not only are all these twenty personal qualities which go to make a Samana, and the two outward signs, found in the Bhikkhu, but that he carries them p. 233 on, and trains others in them, that the converted layman, realising that he has no part in that tradition 1, in that maintenance of the faith, thinks it right to reverence and to show respect to the converted Bhikkhu. [164] Just, O king, as a royal prince who learns his knowledge, and is taught the duties of a Khattiya, at the feet of the Brahman who acts as family chaplain 2, when after a time he is anointed king, pays, reverence and respect to his master in the thought of his being the teacher, and the carrier on of the traditions of the family, so is it right for the converted Bhikkhu to do reverence and to pay respect to the unconverted Bhikkhu.' 4. 'And moreover, O king, you may know by this fact the greatness and the peerless glory of the condition of the Bhikkhus--that if a layman, a disciple of the faith, who has entered upon the Excellent Way, should attain to the realisation of Arahatship, one of two results must happen to him, and there is no other--he must either die away on that very day, or take upon himself the condition of a Bhikkhu. For immovable, O king, is that state of renunciation, glorious, and most exalted--I mean the condition of being a member of the Order!' 'Venerable Nâgasena, this subtle problem has been thoroughly unravelled by your powerful and great wisdom. No one else could solve it so unless he were wise as you.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the precedence of the Dharma] p. 234 [THE HARM OF PREACHING.] 5. 'Venerable Nâgasena, you Bhikkhus say that the Tathâgata averts harm from all beings, and does them good 1. And again you say that when he was preaching the discourse based on the simile of the burning fire 2 hot blood was ejected from the mouths of about sixty Bhikkhus. By his delivery of that discourse he did those Bhikkhus harm and not good. So if the first statement is correct, the second is false; and if the second is correct, the first [165] is false. This too is a double-pointed problem put to you, which you have to solve.' 6. 'Both are true. What happened to them was not the Tathâgata's doing, but their own.' 'But, Nâgasena, if the Tathâgata had not delivered that discourse, then would they have vomited up hot blood?' 'No. When they took wrongly what he said, then was there a burning kindled within them, and hot blood was ejected from their mouths.' 'Then that must have happened, Nâgasena, through the act of the Tathâgata, it must have been the Tathâgata who was the chief cause 3 to destroy them. Suppose a serpent, Nâgasena, had crept into an anthill, and a man in want of earth were to break into the anthill, and take the earth of it away. And by his doing so the entrance-hole to the anthill p. 235 were closed up, and the snake were to die in consequence from want of air. Would not the serpent have been killed by that man's action?' 'Yes, O king.' 'Just so, Nâgasena, was the Tathâgata the prime cause of their destruction.' 7. 'When the Tathâgata delivered a discourse, O king, he never did so either in flattery or in malice. In freedom both from the one and from the other did he speak. And they who received it aright were made wise 1, but they who received it wrongly, fell. Just, O king, as when a man shakes a mango tree or a jambu tree or a mee tree 2, such of the fruits on it as are full of sap and strongly fastened to it remain undisturbed, but such as have rotten stalks, and are loosely attached, fall to the ground--[166] so was it with his preaching. It was, O king, as when a husbandman, wanting to grow a crop of wheat, ploughs the field, but by that ploughing many hundreds and thousands of blades of grass are killed--or it was as when men, for the sake of sweetness, crush sugarcane in a mill, and by their doing so such small creatures as pass into the mouth of the mill are crushed also--so was it that the Tathâgata making wise those whose minds were prepared, preached the Dhamma without flattery and without malice. And they who received it aright were made wise, but they who received it wrongly, fell.' 8. Then did not those Bhikkhus fall, Nâgasena, just because of that discourse?' p. 236 'How, then, could a carpenter by doing nothing to a piece of timber, and simply laying it by 1, make it straight and fit for use?' 'No, Sir. He would have to get rid of the bends out of it, if he wanted it straight and ready for use.' 'Just so, O king, the Tathâgata could not, by merely watching over his disciples, have opened the eyes of those who were ready to see. But by getting rid of those who took the word wrongly he saved those prepared to be saved. And it was by their own act and deed, O king, that the evil-minded fell; just as a plantain tree, or a bambû, or a she-mule are destroyed by that to which they themselves give birth 2. And just, O king, as it is by their own acts that robbers come to have their eyes plucked out, or to impalement, or to the scaffold, just so were the evil-minded destroyed by their own act, and fell from the teaching of the Conqueror.' 9. 'And so [167] with those sixty Bhikkhus, they fell neither by the act of the Tathâgata nor of any one else, but solely by their own deed 3. Suppose, O king, a man were to give ambrosia 4 to all the people, and they, eating of it, were to become healthy and long-lived and free from every bodily ill. But one man, on eating it, were by his own bad digestion, to p. 237 die. Would then, O king, the man who gave away the ambrosia be guilty therein of any offence?' 'No, Sir.' 'Just so, O king, does the Tathâgata present the gift of his ambrosia to the men and gods in the ten thousand world systems; and those beings who are capable of doing so are made wise by the nectar of his law, while they who are not are destroyed and fall. Food, O king, preserves the lives of all beings. But some who eat of it die of cholera 1. Is the man who feeds the hungry guilty therein of any offence?' 'No, Sir.' 'Just so, O king, does the Tathâgata present the gift of his ambrosia to the men and gods in the ten thousand world systems; and those beings who are capable of doing so are made wise by the nectar of his law, while they who are not are destroyed and fall.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma on the harm resulting from preaching.] ____________________ [THE SECRETS OF A TATHÂGATA.] 11. [This dilemma treats of one of the thirty bodily signs of a 'great man' (Mahâpurusha) supposed to be possessed by every Tathâgata, but as it deals with matters not usually spoken of in this century, it is best read in the original.] ____________________ [THE FOOLISH FELLOW.] 15. [170] 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Elder Sâriputta, the commander of the faith: "The p. 238 [paragraph continues] Tathâgata, brethren, is perfect in courtesy of speech. There is no fault of speech in the Tathâgata concerning which he should have to take care that no one else should know it 1." And on the other hand the Tathâgata, when promulgating the first Pârâgika on the occasion of the offence of Sudinna the Kalanda 2, addressed him with harsh words, calling him a useless fellow 3. And that Elder, on being so called, terrified with the fear of his teacher 4, and overcome with remorse, was unable to comprehend the Excellent Way 5. Now if the first statement be correct, the allegation that the Tathâgata called Sudinna the Kalanda a useless fellow must be false. But if that be true, then the first statement must be false. [171] This too is a double-pointed problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 16. 'What Sâriputta the Elder said is true, O king. And the Blessed One called Sudinna a useless fellow on that occasion. But that was not out of rudeness of disposition 6, it was merely pointing out the real nature (of his conduct) in a way that would do him no harm 7. And what herein is meant by p. 239 [paragraph continues] "pointing out the real nature." If any man, O king, in this birth does not attain to the perception of the Four Truths, then is his manhood (his being born as a man) in vain 1, but if he acts differently he will become different. Therefore is it that he is called a useless fellow 2. And so the Blessed One addressed Sudinna the Kalanda with words of truth, and not with words apart from the facts.' 17. 'But, Nâgasena, though a man in abusing another speaks the truth, still we should inflict a small 3 fine upon him. For he is guilty of an offence, inasmuch as he, although for something real, abused him by the use of words that might lead to a breach (of the peace) 4.' 'Have you ever heard, O king, of a people bowing down before, or rising up from their seats in respect for, or showing honour to, or bringing the complimentary presents (usually given to officials) to a criminal?' 'No, if a man have committed a crime of whatever sort or kind, if he be really worthy of reproof and punishment, they would rather behead him, or torture p. 240 him 1, or bind him with bonds, or put him to death, or deprive him of his goods 2.' 'Did then the Blessed One, O king, act with justice or not?' 'With justice, Sir, and in a most fit and proper way. And when, Nâgasena, they hear of it the world of men and gods will be made tender of conscience, and afraid of falling into sin, struck with awe at the sight of it, and still more so when they themselves associate with wrong-doers, or do wrong.' 18. [172] 'Now would a physician, O king, administer pleasant things as a medicine in a case where all the humours of the body were affected, and the whole frame was disorganised and full of disease?' 'No. Wishing to put an end to the disease he would give sharp and scarifying drugs.' 'In the same way, O king, the Tathâgata bestows admonition for the sake of suppressing all the diseases of sin. And the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, soften men and make them tender. Just as hot water, O king, softens and makes tender anything capable of being softened, so are the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, yet as full of benefit, and as full of pity as the words of a father would be to his children. Just, O king, as the drinking of evil-smelling decoctions, the swallowing of nasty drugs, destroys the weaknesses of men's bodies, so are the words of the Tathâgata even when stern, bringers of advantage and laden with pity. And p. 241 just, O king, as a ball of cotton falling on a man raises no bruise, so do the words of the Tathâgata, even when stern, do no harm.' 'Well have you made this problem clear by many a simile, Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [End of the dilemma as to the Buddha's harsh words to Sudinna.] ____________________ [THE TREE TALKING.] 19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Tathâgata said: "Brahman! why do you ask an unconscious thing, Which cannot hear you, how it does to-day? Active, intelligent, and full of life, How can you speak to this so senseless thing- This wild Palâsa tree 1?" [173] And on the other hand he said: "And thus the Aspen tree then made reply: 'I, Bhâradvâga, can speak too. Listen to me 2.'" 'Now if, Nâgasena, a tree is an unconscious thing, it must be false that the Aspen tree spoke to Bhâradvâga. But if that is true, it must be false to say that a tree is unconscious. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 20. The Master said, Nâgasena, that a tree is unconscious. And the Aspen tree conversed with Bhâradvâga. But that last is said, O king, by a common form of speech. For though a tree being unconscious cannot talk, yet the word "tree" is used p. 242 as a designation of the dryad who dwells therein, and in that sense that "the tree talks" is a well-known expression. just, O king, as a waggon laden with corn is called a corn-waggon. But it is not made of corn, it is made of wood, yet because of the corn being heaped up in it the people use the expression "corn-waggon." Or just, O king, as when a man is churning sour milk the common expression is that he is churning butter. But it is not butter that he is churning, but milk. Or just, O king, as when a man is making something that does not exist the common expression is that he is making that thing which all the while as yet is not, [174] but people talk of the work as accomplished before it is done. And the Tathâgata, when expounding the Dhamma, does so by means of the phraseology which is in common use among the people.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the talking tree.] ____________________ [THE BUDDHA'S LAST ILLNESS.] 21. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Elders who held the Recitation 1: "When he had eaten Kunda's alms, The coppersmith's,--thus have I heard,-- The Buddha felt that sickness dire, That sharp pain even unto death 2." p. 243 [paragraph continues] And afterwards the Blessed One said: "These two offerings of food, Ânanda, equal, of equal fruit, and of equal result, are of much greater fruit and much greater result than any others 1." Now if sharp sickness fell upon the Blessed One, Nâgasena, after he had partaken of Kunda's alms, and sharp pains arose within him even unto death, then that other statement must be wrong. But if that is right then the first must be wrong. How could that alms, Nâgasena, be of great fruit when it turned to poison, gave rise to disease, [175] put an end to the period of his then existence, took away his life? Explain this to me to the refutation of the adversaries. The people are in bewilderment about this, thinking that the dysentery must have been caused by his eating too much, out of greediness.' 22. 1 The Blessed One said, O king, that there were two almsgivings equal, of equal fruit, and equal result, and of much greater fruit, and much greater result than any others,--that which, when a Tathâgata has partaken of it, he attains to supreme and perfect Buddhahood (Enlightenment), and that when he has partaken of which, he passes away by that utter passing away in which nothing whatever remains behind 2. For that alms is full of virtue, full of advantage. The gods, O king, shouted in joy and gladness at the thought: "This is the last meal the Tathâgata will take," and communicated a divine power of nourishment to that tender p. 244 pork 1. And that was itself in good condition, light, pleasant, full of flavour, and good for digestion 2. It was not because of it that any sickness fell upon the Blessed One, but it was because of the extreme weakness of his body, and because of the period of life he had to live having been exhausted, that the disease arose, and grew worse and worse--just as when, O king, an ordinary fire is burning, if fresh fuel be supplied, it will burn up still more--or [176] as when a stream is flowing along as usual, if a p. 245 heavy rain falls, it will become a mighty river with a great rush of water--or as when the body is of its ordinary girth, if more food be eaten, it becomes broader than before. So this was not, O king, the fault of the food that was presented, and you can not impute any harm to it.' 23. 'But, venerable Nâgasena, why is it that those two gifts of food are so specially meritorious?' 'Because of the attainment of the exalted conditions which resulted from them 1.' 'Of what conditions, Nâgasena, are you speaking?' 'Of the attainment of the nine successive states which were passed through at first in one order, and then in the reverse order 2.' 'It was on two days, was it not, Nâgasena, that the Tathâgata attained to those conditions in the highest degree?' 'Yes, O king 3.' 'It is a most wonderful thing, Nâgasena, and a most strange, that of all the great and glorious gifts which were bestowed upon our Blessed One 4 not one can be compared with these two almsgivings. Most marvellous is it, that even as those p. 246 nine successive conditions are glorious, even so are those gifts made, by their glory, [177] of greater fruit, and of greater advantage than any others. Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say. ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha's last illness.] ____________________ [ADORATION OF RELICS.] 24. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Tathâgata said: "Hinder not yourselves, Ânanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathâgata 1." And on the other hand he said: "Honour that relic of him who is worthy of honour, Acting in that way you go from this world to heaven 2." 'Now if the first injunction was right the second must be wrong, and if the second is right the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 25. 'Both the passages you quote were spoken by the Blessed One. But it was not to all men, it was to the sons of the Conqueror 3 that it was said: "Hinder not yourselves, Ânanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathâgata 4". Paying reverence is not the work of the sons of the Conqueror, [178] but rather the grasping of the true nature of all p. 247 compounded things, the practice of thought, contemplation in accordance with the rules of Satipatthâna, the seizing of the real essence of all objects of thought, the struggle against evil, and devotion to their own (spiritual) good. These are things which the sons of the Conqueror ought to do, leaving to others, whether gods or men, the paying of reverence 1.' 26. 'And that is so, O king, just as it is the business of the princes of the earth to learn all about elephants, and horses, and chariots, and bows, and rapiers, and documents, and the law of property 2, to carry on the traditions of the Khattiya clans, and to fight themselves and to lead others in war, while husbandry, merchandise, and the care of cattle are the business of other folk, ordinary Vessas and Suddas.--Or just as the business of Brahmins and their sons is concerned with the Rig-veda, the Yagur-veda, the Sama-veda, the Atharva-veda, with the knowledge of lucky marks (on the body), of legends 3, Purânas, lexicography 4, prosody, phonology, verses. grammar, etymology, astrology, interpretation of omens, and of dreams, and of signs, study of the six Vedângas, of eclipses of the sun and moon, of the prognostications to be drawn from the flight of comets, the thunderings of the gods, the junctions of planets, the fall of meteors, earthquakes, conflagrations, and signs in the heavens and on the earth, the study of arithmetic, of casuistry, p. 248 of the interpretation of the omens to be drawn from dogs, and deer, and rats, and mixtures of liquids, and the sounds and cries of birds-while husbandry, merchandise, and the care of cattle are the business of other folk, ordinary Vessas and Suddas. So it was, O king, in the sense of "Devote not yourselves to such things as are not your business, but to such things as are so" that the Tathâgata was speaking [179] when he said: "Hinder not yourselves, Ânanda, by honouring the remains of the Tathâgata." And if, O king, he had not said so, then would the Bhikkhus have taken his bowl and his robe, and occupied themselves with paying reverence to the Buddha through them 1!' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to reverence to relics.] ____________________ [THE SPLINTER OF ROCK.] 27. 'Venerable Nâgasena, you Bhikkhus say that: "When the Blessed One walked along, the earth, unconscious though it is, filled up its deep places, and made its steep places plain 2." And on the other hand you say that a splinter of p. 249 rock grazed his foot 1. When that splinter was falling on his foot why did it not, then, turn aside? If it be true that the unconscious earth makes its deep places full and its steep places plain for him, then it must be untrue that the splinter of rock hurt his foot. But if the latter statement be true, then the first must be false. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 28. 'Both statements, O king, are true. But that splinter of rock did not fall of itself 2, it was cast down through the act of Devadatta. Through hundreds of thousands of existences, O king, had Devadatta borne a grudge against the Blessed One 3. It was through that hatred that he seized hold of a mighty mass of rock, and pushed it over with the hope that it would fall upon the Buddha's head. But two other rocks came together, and intercepted it before it reached the Tathâgata, and by the force of their impact a splinter was torn off, and fell in such a direction that it struck [180] the Blessed One's foot.' 29. 'But, Nâgasena, just as two rocks intercepted that mighty mass, so could the splinter have been intercepted.' 'But a thing intercepted, O king, can escape, slip through, or be lost--as water does, through the fingers, when it is taken into the hand--or milk, or buttermilk, or honey, or ghee, or oil, or fish curry, p. 250 or gravy--or as fine, subtle, minute, dusty grains of sand do, through the fingers, if you close your fist on them--or as rice will escape sometimes when you have taken it into your fingers, and are putting it into your mouth.' 30. 'Well, let that be so, Nâgasena. I admit that the rock was intercepted. But the splinter ought at least to have paid as much respect to the Buddha as the earth did.' 'There are these twelve kinds of persons, O king, who pay no respect--the lustful man in his lust, and the angry man in his malice, and the dull man in his stupidity, and the puffed-up man in his pride, and the bad man in his want of discrimination, and the obstinate man in his want of docility, and the mean man in his littleness, and the talkative man in his vanity, and the wicked man in his cruelty, and the wretched man in his misery, and the gambler [181] because he is overpowered by greed, and the busy man in his search after gain. But that splinter, just as it was broken off by the impact of the rocks, fell by chance 1 in such a direction that it struck against the foot of the Blessed One--just as fine, subtle, and minute grains of sand, when carried away by the force of the wind, are sprinkled down by chance in any direction they may happen to take. If the splinter, O king, had not been separated from the rock of which it formed a part, it too would have been intercepted by their meeting together. But, as it was, it was neither fixed on the earth, nor did it remain stationary in the air, but fell whithersoever p. 251 chance directed it, and happened to strike against the Blessed One's foot--just as dried leaves might fall if caught up in a whirlwind. And the real cause of its so striking against his foot was the sorrow-working deed 1 of that ungrateful, wicked, Devadatta.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the splinter grazing the Buddha's foot.] ____________________ [THE SAMANA.] 31. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "A man becomes a Samana by the destruction of the Âsavas 2." But on the other hand he said: "The man who has these dispositions four Is he whom the world knows as Samana 3." And in that passage these are the four dispositions referred to--long-suffering, temperance in food, renunciation 4, and the being without the attachments 5 (arising from lust, ill-will, and dulness). Now these four dispositions are equally found in those who are still defective, in whom [182] the p. 252 [paragraph continues] Âsavas have not yet been completely destroyed. So that if the first statement be correct, the second is wrong, and if the second be right the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 32. 'Both statements, O king, were made by the Blessed One. But the second was said of the characteristics of such and such men; the first is an inclusive statement--that all in whom the Âsavas are destroyed are Samanas. And moreover, of all those who are made perfect by the suppression of evil, if you take them in regular order one after the other, then the Samana in whom the Âsavas are destroyed is acknowledged to be the chief--just, O king, as of all flowers produced in the water or on the land, the double jasmine 1 is acknowledged to be the chief, all other kinds of flowers of whatever sort are merely flowers, and taking them in order it is the double jasmine that people most desire and like. Or just, O king, as of all kinds of grain, rice is acknowledged to be the chief, all other kinds of grain, of whatever sort, [183] are useful for food and for the support of the body, but if you take them in order, rice is acknowledged as the best.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to what constitutes a Samana.] ____________________ p. 253 [THE BUDDHA'S EXULTATION.] 33. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "If, O Bhikkhus, any one should speak in praise of me, or of our religion (Dhamma), or of the Order, you should not thereupon indulge in joy, or delight, or exultation of mind 1". And on the other hand the Tathâgata was so delighted, and pleased, and exultant at the deserved praise bestowed on him by Sela the Brahman, that he still further magnified his own goodness in that he said: "A king am I, Sela, the king supreme Of righteousness. The royal chariot wheel In righteousness do I set rolling on-- That wheel that no one can turn back again 2!" Now if the passage first quoted be right then must the second be wrong, but if that be right then must the first be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 34. [184] 'Both your quotations, O king, are correct. But the first passage was spoken by the Blessed One with the intention of setting forth truthfully, exactly, in accordance with reality, and fact, and p. 254 sense, the real nature, and essence, and characteristic marks of the Dhamma. And the second passage was not spoken for the sake of gain or fame, nor out of party spirit, nor in the lust of winning over men to become his followers. But it was in mercy and love, and with the welfare of others in view, conscious that thereby three hundred young Brahmans would attain to the knowledge of the truth, that he said: "A king am I, Sela, the king supreme of righteousness."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to exultation of mind.] ____________________ [KINDNESS AND PUNISHMENT.] 35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "Doing no injury to any one Dwell full of love and kindness in the world 1." And on the other hand he said: "Punish him who deserves punishment 2, favour him who is worthy of favour." [185] Now punishment, Nâgasena, means the cutting off of hands or feet, flogging 3, casting into bonds, torture 4, execution, degradation in rank 5. p. 255 [paragraph continues] Such a saying is therefore not worthy of the Blessed One, and he ought not to have made use of it. For if the first injunction be right then this must be wrong, and if this be right then the injunction to do no injury to any one, but to dwell full of love and kindness in the world, must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 36. 'The Blessed One, great king, gave both the commands you quote. As to the first, to do no injury to any one, but to live full of love and kindness in the world--that is a doctrine approved by all the Buddhas. And that verse is an injunction, an unfolding of the Dhamma, for the Dhamma has as its characteristic that it works no ill. And the saying is thus in thorough accord with it. But as to the second command you quote that is a special use of terms [which you have misunderstood. The real meaning of them is: "Subdue that which ought to be subdued, strive after, cultivate, favour what is worthy of effort, cultivation, and approval"]. The proud heart, great king, is to be subdued, and the lowly heart cultivated--the wicked heart to be subdued, and the good heart to be cultivated--carelessness of thought is to. be subdued, and exactness of thought to be cultivated--[186] he who is given over to wrong views is to be subdued, and he who has attained to right views is to be cultivated--he who is not noble 1 is to be subdued, and the noble one is p. 256 to be cultivated--the robber 1 is to be subdued, and the honest brother is to be cultivated.' 37. 'Let that be so, Nâgasena. But now, in that last word of yours, you have put yourself into my power, you have come round to the sense in which I put my question. For how, venerable Nâgasena, is the robber to be subdued by him who sets to work to subdue him?' 'Thus, great king--if deserving of rebuke let him be rebuked, if of a fine let him be fined, if of banishment let him be banished, if of death let him be put to death.' 'Is then, Nâgasena, the execution of robbers part of the doctrine laid down by the Tathâgatas?' 'Certainly not, O king.' 'Then why have the Tathâgatas laid down that the robber is to be taught better?' 'Whosoever, great king, may be put to death, he does not suffer execution by reason of the opinion put forth by the Tathâgatas. He suffers by reason of what he himself has done. But notwithstanding that the doctrine of the Dhamma has been taught (by the Buddhas) 2, would it be possible, great king, for a man who had done nothing wrong, and was walking innocently along the streets, to be seized and put to death by any wise person?' 'Certainly not.' p. 257 'But why?' 'Because of his innocence.' 'Just so, great king, since the thief is not put to death through the word of the Tathâgata, but only through his own act, how can any fault be rightly found on that account with the Teacher?' 'It could not be, Sir.' 'So you see the teaching of the Tathâgatas is a righteous teaching.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to kindness and punishment.] ____________________ [THE DISMISSAL OF THE ELDERS.] 38. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "Anger I harbour not, nor sulkiness 1." But on the other hand the Tathâgata dismissed the Elders Sâriputta and Moggallâna, together with the brethren who formed their company of disciples 2. p. 258 [paragraph continues] How now, Nâgasena, [187] was it in anger that the Tathâgata sent away 1 the disciples, or was it in pleasure? Be so good as to explain to me how this was 2. For if, Nâgasena, he dismissed them in anger, then had the Tathâgata not subdued all liability to anger in himself. But if it was in pleasure, then he did so ignorantly, and without due cause. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 39. 'The Blessed One did say, O king: "Anger I harbour not, nor sulkiness." And he did dismiss the Elders with their disciples. But that was not in anger. Suppose, O king, that a man were to stumble against some root, or stake, or stone, or potsherd, or on uneven ground, and fall upon the broad earth. Would it be that the broad earth, angry with him, had made him fall?' 'No, indeed, Sir. The broad earth feels neither anger against any man nor delight. It is altogether p. 259 free from ill-will, neither needs it to fawn on any one. It would be by reason of his own carelessness that that man stumbled and fell.' 'Just so, great king, do the Tathâgatas experience neither anger against, nor pride in any man. Altogether free are the Tathâgatas, the Arahat-Buddhas, alike from ill-will, and from the need to fawn on any one. And those disciples were sent away by reason of what they themselves had done. So also the great ocean endures not association with any corpse. Any dead body there may be in it that does it promptly cast up, and leave high and dry on the shore 1. But is it in anger that it casts it up?' 'Certainly not, Sir. The broad ocean feels neither anger against any, nor does it take delight in any. It seeks not in the least to please any, and is altogether free from the desire to harm.' 'Just so, great king, do the Tathâgatas feel neither anger against any man, nor do they place their faith in any man. The Tathâgatas, the Arahat-Buddhas, are quite set free from the desire either to gain the goodwill of any man, or to do him harm, And it was by reason of what they themselves had done that those disciples were sent away. Just as a man, great king, who stumbles against the ground is made to fall, so is he who stumbles in the excellent teaching of the Conqueror made to go away. just as a corpse in the great ocean is cast up, [188] so is he who stumbles in the excellent teaching of the Conqueror sent away. And when the Tathâgata sent those disciples away it was for their good, and their p. 260 gain, their happiness, and their purification, and in order that in that way they should be delivered from birth, old age, disease, and death.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the dismissal of the Elders.] ____________________ Here ends the Third Chapter. Footnotes 229:1 This is a quotation from a celebrated verse, which is, as it were, the national anthem of those who, in the struggle for religious and ceremonial supremacy between the Brahmans and the nobles, took the side of the nobles (the Khattiyas). As might be expected it is not seldom found in the Buddhist Suttas, and is often put in the mouth of the Buddha, the most distinguished of these Khattiyas who were transcendental rather than military. It runs: 'The Khattiya is the best in the world of those who observe the rules of exogamous marriage, but of the whole race of men and gods he who has wisdom and righteousness is the best.' See, for instance, the Ambattha Sutta, in the Dîgha Nikâya, and the Sumangala Vilâsinî on that passage. By 'best in the world' is meant 'entitled to take precedence before all others,' not best in the moral sense. 229:2 From the Aggañña Sutta in the Dîgha Nikâya. 229:3 I cannot give any authority for this, but it is no doubt correct Buddhism according to the spirit of the Pitakas. 230:1 Lingâni. See above, IV, 1, 61. 230:2 Aggo niyamo. Hînati-kumburê takes agga in the sense of Arahatship: 'Niwan dena pratipattiyen yukta bawa.' Niyama is a self-imposed vow. 230:3 Vihâra, which the Simhalese glosses by: 'Sansun iriyâpatha wiharanayen yukta bawa,' ('because he continues in the practice of tranquil deportment.') 230:4 Samyama. 'Kâya wâk samyamayen yukta bawa.' 230:5 Samvaro. 'Indriya samvarayen yukta bawa.' 230:6 Khanti, which the Simhalese repeats. 230:7 Sorakkam. 'Because he is docile and pleasant of speech,' says the Simhalese: 'Suwaka kîkaru bhâwayen yukta bawa.' It is an abstract noun formed from surata, and does not occur in Sanskrit, though Böhtlingk-Roth give one authority for it (under sauratya) from a Buddhist work, the Vyutpatti. It is one of the many instances in which the Buddhist ethics has put new and higher meaning into current phrases, for in Sanskrit literature surata (literally 'high pleasure') is used frequently enough, but almost without exception in an obscene sense. The commentary on Gâtaka III, 442 only repeats the word. It is there, as here, and in the Vyutpatti, and at Anguttara II, 15, 3, always allied with khanti. My translation follows Childers--(who probably follows Böhtlingk-Roth); but the Simhalese gloss here makes me very doubtful as to the exact connotation which the early Buddhists associated with 'high pleasure.' 231:1 Ekatta-kariyâ = Ekalâwa hsirîmen yukta bawa.' 231:2 Ekattâbhirati. 231:3 Patisallanam, not samâdhi. Kittekâgratâ says the Simhalese. 231:4 Hiri-otappam. 231:5 Viriyam, 'the zeal of the fourfold effort (pradhâna) towards the making of Arahatship,' is the Simhalese gloss. 231:6 Appamâdo, 'in the search for Arahatship,' says Hînati-kumburê. 231:7 Sikkha-samâdanam. 'Learning them, investigating their meaning, love of the virtuous law laid down in them,' expands Hînati-kumburê. 231:8 Uddero. There is a lacuna here in the Simhalese. It has nothing more till we come to the shaven head. 231:9 Amrita mahâ avakâsa bhûmiyata says the Simhalese (p. 205). 231:10 Arahati. I have endeavoured to imitate the play upon the words. 232:1 N'atthi me so samayo ti: E sâmâgrî lâbhaya mata ntyi sitâ. 233:1 Âgamo, which the Simhalese repeats. 233:2 Purohita, which the Simhalese repeats. 234:1 I cannot give chapter and verse for the words, but the sentiment is common enough. 234:2 This is not the Âditta-pariyâya given in the Mahâvagga I, 21, and the Aggikkhandûpama Sutta in the 7th Book of the Anguttara. 234:3 Adhikâra. Pradhâna is the Simhalese translation. 235:1 Bugghanti: unto Arahatship adds Hînati-kumburê. 235:2 Madhuka. See Gâtaka IV, 434. The Simhalese (p. 208) has mîgahak (Bassia Latifolia). 236:1 Rakkhanto, which Hînati-kumburê expands in the sense adopted above. 236:2 Plantains and bambûs die when they flower. And it was popular belief in India that she-mules always died if they foaled. See Kullavagga VI, 4, 3; VII, 2, 5; Vimâna Vatthu 43, 8; Samyutta Nikâya VI, 2, 2. 236:3 Hînati-kumburê here inserts a translation of the whole of the Sutta referred to. 236:4 Amatam, with reference, no doubt, to Arahatship, of which this is also an epithet. 237:1 Visûkikâya, which Hînati-kumburê renders: Agîrna wa wiwekâbâdhayen. So above, IV, 2, 18. 238:1 I don't know where such a phrase is put into Sâriputta's mouth: but a similar one, as Mr. Trenckner points out, is ascribed to the Buddha at Anguttara VII, 6, 5. 238:2 Kalanda-putto, where Kalanda (or Kalandaka as some MSS. of the Vinaya spell it) is the name of the clan (see Pârâgika I, 5, 1), not of the father. 238:3 See the whole speech at Pârâgika I, 5, 11. 238:4 Garuttâsena. Tâso is not in Childers, but occurs Gâtaka 177, 202. 238:5 There is nothing in the Vinaya account of this result. 238:6 Duttha-kittena, which Hînati-kumburê repeats. 238:7 Asârambhena yâthâva-lakkhanena. For yâthâva, which is not in Childers, see Buddhaghosa in the Sumangala Vilâsinî, p. 65, and Dhammapâla on Theri Gâthâ, 387. Hînati-kumburê p. 239 translates: Upadra karana sitakin ut no wanneya, swabhâwa lakshanayen maya ehi wadâla kisiwek t nam, ê swabhâwa lakshanaya maya. 239:1 Mogham. So at Gâtaka III, 24. 239:2 Mogha-puriso, the same word as I have translated elsewhere 'foolish fellow,' following Childers. But I never think that the word means always and only 'in vain, useless.' See Gâtaka I, 14; III, 24, 25; Sutta Nipâta III, 7, 20; Mahâvagga VIII, 1, 5; Kullavagga V, 1, 3; Anguttara II, 5, 10; Sumangala Vilâsinî, p. 55. 239:3 Literally, 'a fine of a kahâpana,' a copper coin worth in our money about a penny. See my 'Ancient Coins and Measures,' p. 3. 239:4 Visum vohâram âkaranto. The Simhalese (p. 224) has Wen wû wakana wû wyawahârayekin hsiremin. 240:1 Hananti. But himsât kereti says the Simhalese. 240:2 Gâpenti. Dr. Edward Müller thinks this a misprint for ghâpenti (Pâli Grammar, p. 37). Dhanaya hânayen nirddhanîka kereti is the Simhalese version. 241:1 Gâtaka III, 24. it is not the Tathâgata, but the Bodisat, who speaks. 241:2 Gâtaka IV, 210, where the verses are ascribed to the Buddha. 242:1 The Council of Râgagaha is meant, at which the Pitakas were recited. All the so-called Councils are exclusively 'Recitations' (Samgîtiyo) in Buddhist phraseology. But 'Council' is the best rendering of the word, as Recitation implies so much that would be unintelligible to the ordinary reader. 242:2 Book of the Great Decease, IV, 23. 243:1 Book of the Great Decease, IV, 57, but with a slightly different reading. 243:2 Book of the Great Decease, loc. cit. The Simhalese gives the whole context in full. 244:1 Sûkara-maddava. There is great doubt as to the exact meaning of this name of the last dish the Buddha partook of. Maddati is 'to rub,' or 'to press,' or 'to trample,' and just as 'pressed beef' is ambiguous, so is 'boar-pressed' or 'pork-tender' capable of various interpretations. The exegetical gloss as handed down in the Mahâ Vihâra in Anurâdhapure, Ceylon, in the now lost body of tradition called the Mahâ Atthakathâ, has been preserved by Dhammapâla in his comment on Udâna VIII, 5 (p. 81 of Dr, Steinthal's edition for the Pâli Text Society). It means, I think, 'Meat pervaded by the tenderness and niceness of boar's (flesh).' But that is itself ambiguous, and Dhammapâla adds that others say the word means not pork or meat at all, but 'the tender top sprout of the bambû plant after it has been trampled upon by swine'--others again that it means a kind of mushroom that grows in ground trodden under foot by swine--others again that it means only a particular kind of flavouring, or sauce. As Maddana is rendered by Childers 'withered,' I have translated it in my 'Buddhist Suttas' (pp. 71-73) 'dried boar's flesh.' But the fact is that the exact sense is not known. (Maddavâni pupphâni at Dhammapada 377 is 'withered flowers,' according to Fausböll. But it may be just as well 'tender flowers,' especially as Mârdava in Sanskrit always means 'tender, pitiful,' &c. This is the only passage where the word is known to occur in Pâli apart from those in which sûkara-maddava is mentioned.) The Simhalese here (p. 230) repeats the word and adds the gloss: E tarunu wû ûru mamsayehi. 244:2 Gatharaggi-tegassa hitam. On this curious old belief in an internal fire see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 260. 245:1 Dhammânumaggana-samâpatti-varena: which the Simhalese merely repeats. For Anumagganâ see the text above, p. 62, and Sumangala Vilâsinî, p. 65. 245:2 See the full description in the Book of the Great Decease, VI, 11-13. ('Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 115, 116.) The Simhalese is here greatly expanded (pp. 230-233). 245:3 So our author must have thought that the nine Anupubbavihâras occurred also after the alms given to Gotama before he sat under the Bo Tree, but I know of no passage in the Pitakas which would support this belief. Compare the note 2 in vol. i, p. 74 of the 'Vinaya Texts,' and the passages there quoted. 245:4 Buddha-khette dânam, 'gifts which had the Buddha as the field in which they were bestowed, or sown.' 246:1 Book of the Great Decease, V, 24. 246:2 Not found in any of the Pitaka texts as yet published. 246:3 Gina-puttânam. That is, the members of the Order. 246:4 Here again Hînati-kumburê goes into a long account of the attendant circumstances (pp. 2 33, 234). 247:1 This is really only an expansion and a modernisation of the context of the passage quoted. 247:2 Lekha-muddâ. See the note above on I, 1, 10. 247:3 Itihâsa, 'the Bhârata and the Râmâyana,' says the Simhalese. 247:4 'Of names of trees and so on,' says Hînati-kumburê. 248:1 This certainly looks as if our author did not know anything of the worship paid to the supposed bowl of the Buddha, or of the feast, the Patta-maha, held in its honour. The passage may therefore be used as an argument for the date of the book. Fâ-Hsien saw this bowl-worship in full force at Peshawar about 400 A. D. See Chapter xii of his travels (Dr. Legge's translation, pp. 35-37). 248:2 Not found as yet in the Pitakas. 249:1 Kullavagga VII, 3, 9. Compare the Samyutta Nikâya I, 4, 8; 1V, 2, 3 (pp. 27 and 110 of M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 249:2 Attaro dhammatâya. 249:3 So above, IV, 2, 64, and below, IV, 4, 41. 250:1 Animitta-kata-disâ, which the Simhalese (p. 238) merely repeats. 251:1 Dukkhânubhâvanâ--the sorrow being Devadatta's subsequent existence in purgatory. 251:2 That is 'of sensuality, individuality, delusion, and ignorance.' I don't know which is the passage referred to. 251:3 Also not traced as yet in the texts. 251:4 Vippahânâ, not in Childers, but see Sutta Nipâta V, 14. 4, 5. Hînati-kumburê (p. 239) renders it âlaya hrîma. 251:5 Âkinkañña, not having the three kiñkanas mentioned. Hînati-kumburê (p. 239) takes it to mean the practice of the Âkiñkâyatana meditation. But if so that would surely have been the word used. 252:1 Varsikâ (Dsaman mal, jasminum zambac). 253:1 From the Brahma-gâla Sutta in the Dîgha Nikâya (I, 1, 5). 253:2 From the Sela, Sutta in the Sutta Nipâta (III, 7, 7). Professor Fausböll in his translation of this stanza (at vol. x, p. 102 of the 'Sacred Books of the East') draws attention to the parallel at John xviii. 37. 'Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born. And for this cause came I into the world that I should bear witness unto the truth'--where 'truth,' if one translated the verse into Pâli, would be correctly rendered by Dhamma, 'righteousness, religion, truth, essential quality.' Professor Fausböll's version of the stanza runs: 'I am a king, O Sela, an incomparable religious (Dhamma-râga) king, with justice (Dhamma). I turn the wheel, a wheel that is irresistible.' 254:1 From the 521st Gâtaka. 254:2 The crux lies in the ambiguity of this phrase as will be seen below. 254:3 Vadha, which is ambiguous, and means also 'killing.' The Simhalese repeats the word. 254:4 Kâranâ, which Hînati-kumburê renders tlîmaya, 'flogging.' 254:5 Santati-vikopanam, literally 'breach of continuity.' Hînati-kumburê explains it to mean 'injury to the duration of life,' and this may be the author's meaning, as he is fond of heaping together a string of words, some of which mean the same thing. But as p. 255 santati means also 'lineage, descent,' the phrase may equally well refer to the sort of punishment I have ventured to put into the text. 255:1 Ariyo and anariyo used technically in the sense of one who has not, and one who has, entered upon the Noble Eightfold Path. 256:1 Coro probably here used figuratively of a member of the Order who is unworthy of it, and injures believing laymen. So the word is used, for instance, in the introductory story (in the Sutta Vibhanga) to the fourth Pârâgika--where four sorts of such religious 'robbers' are distinguished (compare our 'wolf in sheep's clothing'). But the king takes it literally. 256:2 The three words in brackets are Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 257:1 From the Dhaniya Sutta in the Sutta Nipâta (1, 2, 2). 257:2 The episode here referred to will be found in the Magghima Nikâya, No. 67. Hînati-kumburê gives it in full. The Buddha was staying at the Âmalakî garden near the Sâkya town called Kâtumâ. There the two elders with their attendant 500 disciples came to call upon him. 'The resident Bhikkhus received them with applause, and a great hubbub arose. The Buddha enquired what that noise was, like the chattering of fishermen when a net full of fishes was drawn to shore. Ânanda told him. Thereupon the Buddha called the brethren together, made a discourse to them on the advantages of quiet, and 'sent away' the visitors. They went to the public rest-house in the town. The town's folk enquired why, and p. 259 when they heard the reason, went to the Buddha, and obtained his forgiveness for the offending brethren. The incident is the basis of another question below, IV, 4, 41. 258:1 Panâmesi means, in the technical legal phraseology of the Buddhist canon law, 'formally dismissed, sent away, did not allow them any more to be his disciples,' On this technical meaning of the term, compare Mahâvagga I, 2, 27, and Kullavagga XII, 2, 3. (Childers does not give this use of the word.) But it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which the Buddha could so have dismissed his two principal disciples. So I think we must take the word in a less formal sense-such, for instance, as we find in Thera Gâthâ 511, 557. 258:2 Etam tâva gânâhi imam nâmâti. I follow Hînati-kumburê's rendering (p. 244) of this difficult phrase, according to which there ought to be a full stop in the text after panâmesi, and these words are supposed to be addressed to Nâgasena by Milinda. But I am not at all satisfied that he is right, and the text may be corrupt. 259:1 This supposed fact is already the ground of a comparison in the Kullavagga IX, 1, 3, 4 ('Vinaya Texts,' III, 303) Next: Chapter 4 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 261

[THE MURDER OF MOGGALLÂNA.] 1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "This is the chief, O Bhikkhus, of those of my disciples in the Order who are possessed of the power of Iddhi, I mean Moggallâna 1." But on the other hand they say his death took place by his being beaten to death with clubs, so that his skull was broken, and his bones ground to powder, and all his flesh and nerves bruised and pounded together 2. Now, Nâgasena, if the Elder, the great Moggallâna, had really attained to supremacy in the magical power of Iddhi, then it cannot be true that he was beaten to death with clubs 3. But if his death was on that wise, then the saying that he was chief of those possessed of Iddhi must be wrong. How could he who was not even able, by his power of Iddhi, to prevent his own murder, be worthy nevertheless to stand as succour to the world of gods and men? This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 2. 'The Blessed One did declare, O king, that Moggallâna was chief among the disciples in power p. 262 of Iddhi. And he was nevertheless beaten to death by clubs. But that was through his being then possessed by the still greater power of Karma 1.' 3. 'But, venerable Nâgasena, [189] are not both of these things appurtenant to him who has the power of Iddhi--that is the extent of his power, and the result of his Karma--both alike unthinkable? And cannot the unthinkable be held back by the unthinkable? Just, Sir, as those who want the fruits will knock a wood apple 2 down with a wood apple, or a mango with a mango, so ought not the unthinkable in like manner to be subject to restraint by the unthinkable?' 'Even among things beyond the reach of the imagination, great king, still one is in excess above the other, one more powerful than the other. Just, O king, as the monarchs of the world are alike in kind, but among them, so alike in kind, one may overcome the rest, and bring them under his command--just so among things beyond the grasp of the imagination is the productive effect of Karma by far the most powerful. It is precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all the rest, and has them under its rule; and no other influence is of any avail to the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end 3. It is as when, O king, any man has committed an offence against the law 4. p. 263 [paragraph continues] Neither his mother nor his father, neither his sisters nor his brother, neither his friends nor his intimate associates can protect him then. He has fallen therein under the power of the king who will issue his command respecting him. And why is that so? Because of the wrong that he has done. So is it precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all other influences, and has them under its command, and no other influence can avail the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end. It is as when a jungle fire has arisen on the earth, then can not even a thousand pots of water avail to put it out, but the conflagration overpowers all, and brings it under its control. And why is that so? Because of the fierceness of its heat. So is it precisely the effect of Karma which overcomes all other influences, and has them under its command; and no other influence can avail the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end. That is why the venerable one, great king, the great Moggallâna, when, at a time when he was possessed by Karma, he was being beaten to death with clubs, was yet unable to make use of his power of Iddhi 1.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the murder of Moggallâna.] p. 264 [ON SECRET DOCTRINE.] 4. [190] 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "The Dhamma and the Vinaya (Doctrine and Canon Law) proclaimed by the Tathâgata shine forth when they are displayed, and not when they are concealed 1." But on the other hand the recitation of the Pâtimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya Pitaka are closed and kept secret 2. So that if, Nâgasena, you (members of the Order) carried out what is just, and right, and held of faith in the teaching of the Conqueror then would the Vinaya shine forth as an open thing. And why would that be so? Because all the instruction therein, the discipline, the self-control, the regulations as to moral and virtuous conduct, are in their essence full of truth and righteousness, and redounding to emancipation of heart. But if the Blessed One really said that the Dhamma and Vinaya proclaimed by the Tathâgata shine forth when displayed and not when kept secret, then the saying that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya must be kept secret must be wrong. And if that be right, then the saying of the Blessed One must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 5. 'It was said, O king, by the Blessed One that the Dhamma and Vinaya proclaimed by the Tathâgata p. 265 shine forth when displayed, and not when kept secret. And on the other hand the recitation of the Pâtimokkha and the whole of the Vinaya Pitaka are kept close and secret 1. But this last is not the case as regards all men. They are only kept secret up to a certain limit. And the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is kept secret up to that certain limit on three grounds--firstly because that is the traditional custom 2 of previous Tathâgatas, secondly out of respect for the Truth (Dhamma), and thirdly out of respect for the position of a member of the Order 3.' 6. 'And as to the first it was the universal custom, O king, of previous Tathâgatas for the recitation of the Pâtimokkha to take place in the midst of the members of the Order only, to the exclusion of all others. Just, O king, as the Kshatriya secret formulas (of the nobles) are handed down among the nobles alone, and that this or that is so is common tradition among the nobles 4 of the world and kept secret from all others--[191] so was this the universal custom of previous Tathâgatas, that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha should take place among the p. 266 members of the Order only, and be kept secret from all others. And again, just as there are several classes of people, O king, known as distinct in the world---such as wrestlers, tumblers, jugglers, actors, ballet-dancers, and followers of the mystic cult of the sun and moon, of the goddess of fortune and other gods 1. And the secrets of each of these sects are handed on in the sect itself, and kept hidden from all others. just so with the universal custom of all the Tathâgatas that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha should take place before the members of the Order only, and be kept secret from all others. This is why the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, up to that extent, kept secret in accordance with the habit of previous Tathâgatas.' 7. 'And how is it that the Pâtimokkha is kept secret, up to that extent, out of reverence for the Dhamma? The Dhamma, great king, is venerable and weighty. He who has attained to proficiency in it may exhort another in this wise: "Let not this Dhamma so full of truth, so excellent, fall into the hands of those unversed in it, where it would be despised and contemned, treated shamefully, made a game of, and found fault with. Nor let it fall into the hands of the wicked who would deal with it in all respects as badly as they." It is thus, O king, that the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, up to that p. 267 extent, kept secret out of reverence for the Dhamma. For if not, then it would be like the best, most costly, and most rare red sandal wood of the finest kind, which when brought to Savara (that city of the outcast Kandâlas 1) is despised and contemned, treated shamefully, made game of, and found fault with.' 8. [192] 'And how is it that the Pâtimokkha is kept secret, up to that extent, out of reverence for the position of a member of the Order? The condition of a Bhikkhu, great king, is in glory beyond the reach of calculation by weight, or measure, or price. None can value it, weigh it, measure it. And the recitation of the Pâtimokkha, is carried on before the Bhikkhus alone, lest any one who has occupied that position should be brought down to a level with the men of the world. just, O king, as if there be any priceless thing, in vesture or floor covering, in elephants, chargers, or chariots, in gold or silver or jewels or pearls or women, or in unsurpassable strong drink 2, all such things are the appanage of kings--just so, O king, whatever is most priceless in the way of training, of the traditions of the Blessed One, of learning, of conduct, and of the virtues of righteousness and self-control--all these are the appanages of the Order of Bhikkhus. This is why the recitation of the Pâtimokkha is, to that extent, kept secret 3.' p. 268 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.) ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the secrecy in which the Vinaya is kept.] ____________________ [THE TWO KINDS OF FALSEHOOD.] 9. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One that a deliberate lie is an offence of the greatest kind (involving exclusion from the Order 1). p. 269 [paragraph continues] And again he said: "By a deliberate lie a Bhikkhu commits a minor offence, one that ought to be the subject of confession made before another (member of the Order) 1." Now, venerable Nâgasena, what is herein the distinction, what the reason, that by one lie a Bhikkhu is cast out of the Order, and by another he is guilty only of an offence that can be atoned for. If the first decision be right, then the second must be wrong; but if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 10. [193] 2'Both your quotations, O king, are correct 3. But a falsehood is a light or heavy offence according to the subject matter. For what do you think, great king? Suppose a man were to give another a slap with his hand, what punishment would you inflict upon him?' 'If the other refused to overlook the matter, then neither should we be able to pardon his assailant 4, but should mulct him in a penny or so 5.' 'But on the other hand, suppose it had been you p. 270 yourself that he had given the blow to, what would then be the punishment?' 'We should condemn him to have his hands cut off, and his feet cut off, and to be skinned alive 1, and we should confiscate all the goods in his house, and put to death all his family to the seventh generation on both sides.' 'But, great king, what is the distinction? Why is it that for one slap of the hand there should be a gentle fine of a penny, while for a slap given to you there should be so fearful a retribution?' 'Because of the difference in the person (assaulted).' 'Well! just so, great king, is a falsehood a light or a heavy offence according to the attendant circumstances.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the degree of offence in falsehood.] ____________________ [THE BODISAT'S CONSIDERATION.] 11. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One in the discourse on the essential conditions 2: "Long ago have his parents been destined for each Bodisat, and the kind of tree he is to select for his Bo tree, and the p. 271 [paragraph continues] Bhikkhus who are to be his two chief disciples, and the lad who is to be his son, and the member of the Order who is to be his special attendant." But on the other hand he said: "When yet in the condition of a god in the Tusita heaven the Bodisat makes the eight Great Investigations--he investigates the time (whether the right moment had come at which he ought to be re-born as a man), and the continent (in which his birth is to take place), and the country (where he is to be re-born), and the family (to which he is to belong), and the mother (who is to bear him), and the period (during which he was to remain in the womb), and the month (in which his birthday shall come), and his renunciation (when it shall be) 1. [194] Now, Nâgasena, before knowledge is ripe there is no understanding, but when it has reached its summit there is no longer any need to wait for thinking a matter over 1, for there is nothing outside the ken of the omniscient mind. Why then should the Bodisat investigate the time, thinking to himself: "In what moment shall I be born 2?" And for the same reason why should he investigate the family, thinking to himself: p. 272 [paragraph continues] "In what family shall I be born?" And if, Nâgasena, it is a settled matter who shall be the parents of the Bodisat, then it must be false that he "investigated the family." But if that be true, then must the other saying be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 12. 'It was both a settled matter, O king, who should be the parents of the Bodisat, and he did investigate into the question as to which family he was to be born into. But how did he do so? He thought over the matter as to whether his parents should be nobles or Brahmans. With respect to eight things, O king, should the future be investigated before it comes to pass. A merchant, O king, should investigate goods before he buys them--an elephant should try with its trunk a path it has not yet trod--a cartman should try a ford he has not yet crossed over--a pilot should test a shore he has not yet arrived at, and so guide the ship--a physician should find out the period of life which his patient has lasted 1 before he treats his disease--a traveller should test the stability of a bambû bridge 2before he mounts on to it--a Bhikkhu should find out how much time has yet to run before sun turn before he begins to eat his meal--and Bodisats, before they are born, should investigate the question whether it would be right for them to be born in the family of a noble or of a Brahman. p. 273 [paragraph continues] These are the eight occasions on which investigation ought to precede action.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the Bodisat's consideration.] ____________________ [ON SUICIDE.] 13. [195] 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "A brother is not, O Bhikkhus, to commit suicide. Whosoever does so shall be dealt with according to the law 1." And on the other hand you (members of the Order) say: "On whatsoever subject the Blessed One was addressing the disciples, he always, and with various similes, preached to them in order to bring about the destruction of birth, of old age, of disease, and of death. And whosoever overcame birth, old age, disease, and death, him did he honour with the highest praise 2." Now if the Blessed One forbade suicide that saying of yours must be wrong, but if not then the prohibition of suicide must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 14. 'The regulation you quote, O king, was laid down by the Blessed One, and yet is our saying you refer to true. And there is a reason for this, a p. 274 reason for which the Blessed One both prohibited (the destruction of life), and also (in another sense) instigated us to it.' 'What, Nâgasena, may that reason be?' 'The good man, O king, perfect in uprightness, is like a medicine to men 1 in being an antidote to the poison of evil, he is like water to men in laying the dust and the impurities of evil dispositions, he is like a jewel treasure to men in bestowing upon them all attainments in righteousness, he is like a boat to men inasmuch as he conveys them to the further shore of the four flooded streams (of lust, individuality, delusion, and ignorance) 2, he is like a caravan owner to men in that he brings them beyond the sandy desert of rebirths, he is like a mighty rain cloud to men in that he fills their hearts with satisfaction, he is like a teacher to men in that he trains them in all good, he is like a good guide to men in that he points out to them the path of peace. It was in order that so good a man as that, one whose good qualities are so many, so various, so immeasurable, [196] in order that so great a treasure mine of good things, so full of benefit to all beings, might not be done away with, that the Blessed One, O king, out of his mercy towards all beings, laid down that injunction, when he said: "A brother is not, O Bhikkhus, to commit suicide. Whosoever does so shall be dealt with according to the law." This is the reason for which the Blessed One prohibited (self-slaughter). And it was said, O king, p. 275 by the Elder Kumâra Kassapa, the eloquent, when he was describing to Pâyâsi the Râganya the other world: "So long as Samanas and Brahmans of uprightness of life, and beauty of character, continue to exist--however long that time may be--just so long do they conduct themselves to the advantage and happiness of the great masses of the people, to the good and the gain and the weal of gods and men 1!"' 15. 'And what is the reason for which the Blessed One instigated us (to put an end to life)? Birth, O king, is full of pain, and so is old age, and disease, and death. Sorrow is painful, and so is lamentation, and pain, and grief, and despair. Association with the unpleasant is painful, and separation from the pleasant 2. The death of a mother is painful, or of a father, or a brother, or a sister, or a son, or a wife, or of any relative. Painful is the ruin of one's family, and the suffering of disease, and the loss of wealth, and decline in goodness, and the loss of insight. p. 276 [paragraph continues] Painful is the fear produced by despots, or by robbers, or by enemies, or by famine, or by fire, or by flood, or by the tidal wave, or by earthquake, or by crocodiles or alligators. Painful is the fear of possible blame attaching to oneself, or to others, the fear of punishment, the fear of misfortune. Painful is the fear arising from shyness in the presence of assemblies of one's fellows, painful is anxiety as to one's means of livelihood, painful the foreboding of death. [197] Painful are (the punishments inflicted on criminals), such as being flogged with whips, or with sticks, or with split rods, having one's hands cut off, or one's feet, or one's hands and feet, or one's ears, or one's nose, or one's ears and nose. Painful are (the tortures inflicted on traitors)--being subjected to the Gruel Pot (that is, having boiling gruel poured into one's head from the top of which the skull bone has been removed 1)--or to the Chank Crown 2 (that is, having the scalp rubbed with gravel till it becomes smooth like a polished shell)--or to the Râhu's Mouth 3 (that is, having one's mouth held open by iron pins, and oil put in it, and a wick lighted therein)--or to the Fire Garland 4 or to the Hand Torch 5, (that is, being made a living torch, the whole body, or the arms only, being wrapped up in oily cloths, and set on fire)--or to the Snake Strips 6 (that is, being skinned in strips from the neck to the hips, so that the skin falls in strips round the legs)or to the Bark Dress 7 (that is, being skinned alive from the neck downwards, and having each strip of p. 277 skin as soon as removed tied to the hair, so that these strips form a veil around one)--or to the Spotted Antelope 1 (that is, having one's knees and elbows tied together, and being made to squat on a plate of iron under which a fire is lit)--or to the Flesh-hooks 2 (that is, being hung up on a row of iron hooks)--or to the Pennies 3 (that is, having bits cut out of the flesh, all over the body, of the size of pennies)--or to the Brine Slits 4 (that is, having cuts made all over one's body by means of knives or sharp points, and then having salt and caustic liquids poured over the wounds)--or to the Bar Turn 5 (that is, being transfixed to the ground by a bar of iron passing through the root of the ear, and then being dragged round and round by the leg)--or to the Straw Seat 6 (that is, being so beaten with clubs that p. 278 the bones are broken, and the body becomes like a heap of straw)--or to be anointed with boiling oil, or to be eaten by dogs, or to be impaled alive, or to be beheaded. Such and such, O king, are the manifold and various pains which a being caught in the whirlpool of births and rebirths has to endure. just, O king, as the water rained down upon the Himâlaya mountain flows, in its course along the Ganges, through and over rocks and pebbles and gravel, whirlpools and eddies and rapids 1, and the stumps and branches of trees which obstruct and oppose its passage,--just so has each being caught in the succession of births and rebirths to endure such and such manifold and various pains. Full of pain, then, is the continual succession of rebirths, a joy is it when that succession ends. And it was in pointing out the advantage of that end, the disaster involved in that succession, that the Blessed One, great king, instigated us to get beyond birth, and old age, and disease, and death by the realisation of the final end of that succession of rebirths. This is the sense, O king, which led the Blessed One to instigate us (to put an end to life).' 'Very good, Nâgasena! Well solved is the puzzle (I put), well set forth are the reasons (you alleged). That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to suicide.] ____________________ p. 279 [A LOVING DISPOSITION.] 16. [1981 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "Eleven advantages, O brethren, may be anticipated from practising, making a habit of, enlarging within one, using as a means of advancement, and as a basis of conduct, pursuing after, accumulating, and rising well up to the very heights of the emancipation of heart, arising from a feeling of love (towards all beings) 1. And what are these eleven? He who does so sleeps in peace, and in peace does he awake. He dreams no sinful dreams. He becomes dear to men, and to the beings who are not men 2. The gods watch over him. Neither fire, nor poison, nor sword works any harm to him. Quickly and easily does he become tranquillised. The aspect of his countenance is calm. Undismayed does he meet death, and should he not press through to the Supreme Condition (of Arahatship), then is he sure of rebirth in the Brahma world 3." But on the other hand you (members of p. 280 the Order) say that "Sâma the Prince, while dwelling in the cultivation of a loving disposition toward all beings, and when he was (in consequence thereof) wandering in the forest followed by a herd of deer, was hit by a poisoned arrow shot by Piliyakkha the king, and there, on the spot, fainted and fell 1." Now, venerable Nâgasena, if the passage I have quoted from the words of the Blessed One be right, then this statement of yours must be wrong. But if the story of Prince Sâma be right, then it cannot be true that neither fire, nor poison, nor sword can work harm to him who cultivates the habit of love to all beings. This too is a double-edged problem, so subtle, so abstruse, so delicate, and so profound, that the thought of having to solve it might well bring out sweat over the body even of the most subtle-minded of mortals. This problem is now put to you. Unravel this mighty knot 2. Throw light upon this matter 3 to the accomplishment of the desire of those sons of the Conqueror who shall arise hereafter 4.' 'The Blessed One spake, O king, as you have quoted. And Prince Sama dwelling in the cultivation of love, and thus followed by a herd of deer when he was wandering in the forest, was hit by the poisoned arrow shot by king Piliyakkha, and then and there fainted and fell. But there is a reason for that. [199] And what is the reason? Simply that those virtues (said in the passage you quoted p. 281 to be in the habit of love) are virtues not attached to the personality of the one who loves, but to the actual presence of the love that he has called up in his heart 1. And when Prince Sâma was upsetting the water-pot, that moment he lapsed from the actual feeling of love. At the moment, O king, in which an individual has realised the sense of love, that moment neither fire, nor poison, nor sword can do him harm. If any men bent on doing him an injury come up, they will not see him, neither will they have a chance of hurting him. But these virtues, O king, are not inherent in the individual, they are in the actual felt presence of the love that he is calling up in his heart.' 'Suppose, O king, a man were to take into his hand a Vanishing Root of supernatural power; and that, so long as it was actually in his hand, no other ordinary person would be able to see him. The virtue, then, would not be in the man. It would be in the root that such virtue would reside that an object in the very line of sight of ordinary mortals could, nevertheless, not be seen. just so, O king, is it with the virtue inherent in the felt presence of love that a man has called up in his heart.' 'Or it is like the case of a man [200] who has entered into a well-formed mighty cave. No storm of rain, however mightily it might pour down, would be able to wet him. But that would be by no virtue inherent p. 282 in the man. It would be a virtue inherent in the cave that so mighty a downpour of rain could not wet the man. And just so, O king, is it with the virtue inherent in the felt presence of love that a man has called up in his heart 1.' p. 283 'Most wonderful is it, Nâgasena, and most strange how the felt presence of love has the power of warding off all evil states of mind 1.' 'Yes! The practice of love is productive of all virtuous conditions of mind both in good (beings) and in evil ones. To all beings whatsoever, who are in the bonds of conscious existence 2, is this practice of love of great advantage, and therefore ought it to be sedulously cultivated.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the power of love.] ____________________ [DEVADATTA.] 17. 'Venerable Nâgasena, is the consequence the same to him who does good and to him who does evil, or is there any difference in the two cases?' 'There is a difference, O king, between good and evil. Good works have a happy result, and lead to Sagga 3, and evil works have an unhappy result, and lead to Niraya 4.' p. 284 'But, venerable Nâgasena, your people say that Devadatta was altogether wicked, full of wicked dispositions, and that the Bodisat 1 was altogether pure, full of pure dispositions 2. And yet Devadatta, through successive existences 3, was not only quite equal to the Bodisat, but even sometimes superior to him, both in reputation and in the number of his adherents. 18. 'Thus, Nâgasena, when Devadatta became the Purohita (family Brâhman, royal chaplain) of Brahmadatta, the king, in the city of Benares, then the Bodisat was a wretched Kandâla (outcast) 4 who knew by heart a magic spell. And by repeating his spell he produced mango fruits out of season 5. This p. 285 is one case in which the Bodisat was inferior to Devadatta in birth, [201] inferior to him in reputation.' 19. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, a mighty monarch of the earth 1, living in the enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, then the Bodisat was an elephant, decked with all manner of ornaments that the king might make use of them. And the king, being put out of temper at the sight of his graceful and pleasant style of pace and motion, said to the elephant trainer with the hope of bringing about the death of the elephant: "Trainer, this elephant has not been properly trained, make him perform the trick called 'Sky walking.'" In that case too the Bodisat was inferior to Devadatta,--was a mere foolish animal 2.' 20. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man who gained his living by winnowing grain 3, then p. 286 the Bodisat was a monkey called "the broad earth." Here again we have the difference between an animal and a man, and the Bodisat was inferior in birth to Devadatta 1.' 21. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, by name Sonuttara, a Nesâda (one of an outcast tribe of aborigines, who lived by hunting), and was of great strength and bodily power, like an elephant, then the Bodisat was the king of elephants under the name of the "Six-tusked." And in that birth, the hunter slew the elephant. In that case too Devadatta was the superior 2.' 22. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a wanderer in the woods, without a home, then the Bodisat was a bird, a partridge who knew the Vedic hymns. And in that birth too the woodman killed the bird. So in that case also Devadatta was the superior by birth 3.' 23. 'And again, when Devadatta became the king of Benares, by name Kalâbu, then the Bodisat was an ascetic who preached kindness to animals. And the king (who was fond of sport), enraged with the ascetic, had his hands and feet cut off like so many bambû sprouts 4. In that birth, too, Devadatta p. 287 was the superior, both in birth and in reputation among men.' 24. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a woodman, then the Bodisat was Nandiya the monkey king. And in that birth too the man killed the monkey, and his mother besides, and his younger brother. So in that case also it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth 1.' 25. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a naked ascetic, by name Kârambhiya, then the Bodisat was a snake king called "the Yellow one." So in that case too it was Devadatta [202] who was the superior in birth 2.' 26. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a crafty ascetic with long matted hair, then the Bodisat was a famous pig, by name "the Carpenter." So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth 3.' 27. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king among the Ketas, by name Sura Parikara 4, who had the power of travelling through the air at a level above men's heads 5, then the Bodisat was a Brahman p. 288 named Kapila. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth and in reputation.' 28. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, by name Sâma, then the Bodisat was a king among the deer, by name Ruru. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in birth 1.' 29. 'And again, when Devadatta became a man, a hunter wandering in the woods, then the Bodisat was a male elephant, and that hunter seven times broke off and took away the teeth of the elephant. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in respect of the class of beings into which he was born 2.' 30. 'And again, when Devadatta became a jackal who wanted to conquer the world 3, and brought the kings of all the countries in India under his control, then the Bodisat was a wise man, by name Vidhura. So in that case too it was Devadatta who was the superior in glory.' 31. 'And again, when Devadatta became the p. 289 elephant who destroyed the young of the Chinese partridge, then the Bodisat was also an elephant, the leader of his herd. So in that case they were both on a par 1.' 32. 'And again, when Devadatta became a, yakkha, by name Unrighteous, then the Bodisat too was a yakkha, by name Righteous. So in that case too they were both on a par 2.' 33. 'And again, when Devadatta became a sailor, the chief of five hundred families, then the Bodisat too was a sailor, the chief of five hundred families. So in that case too they were both on a par 3.' 34. 'And again, when Devadatta became a caravan leader, the lord of five hundred waggons, then the Bodisat too was a caravan leader, the lord of five hundred waggons. So in that case too they were both on a par 4.' 35. [203] 'And again, when Devadatta became a king of deer, by name Sâkha, then the Bodisat was a king of deer, by name Nigrodha. So in that case too they were both on a par 5.' 36. 'And again, when Devadatta became a commander-in-chief by name Sâkha, then the Bodisat p. 290 was a king, by name Nigrodha. So in that case too they were both on a par 1.' 37. 'And again, when Devadatta became a brahman, by name Khandahâla, then the Bodisat was a prince, by name Kanda. So in that case that Khandahâla was the superior 2.' 38. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, by name Brahmadatta, then the Bodisat was his son, the prince called Mahâ Paduma. In that case the king had his son cast down seven times, from the precipice from which robbers were thrown down. And inasmuch as fathers are superior to and above their sons, in that case too it was Devadatta was the superior 3.' 39. 'And again, when Devadatta became a king, by name Mahâ Patâpa, then the Bodisat was his son, Prince Dhamma-pâla; and that king had the hands and feet and head of his son cut off. So in that case too Devadatta was the superior 4.' 40. 'And now again, in this life, they were in the Sâkya clan, and the Bodisat became a Buddha, all wise, the leader of the world, and Devadatta having left the world to join the Order founded by Him who is above the god of gods, and having attained to the powers of Iddhi, was filled with lust to become himself the Buddha. Come now, most venerable Nâgasena! Is not all that I have said true, and just, and accurate?' p. 291 41. 'All the many things which you, great king, have now propounded, are so, and not otherwise.' 'Then, Nâgasena, unless black and white are the same in kind, it follows that good and evil bear equal fruit.' 'Nay, not so, great king! Good and evil have not the same result. Devadatta was opposed by everybody. No one was hostile to the Bodisat. And the hostility which Devadatta felt towards the Bodisat, that came to maturity and bore fruit in each successive birth. And so also as Devadatta, when he was established in lordship over the world, [204] was a protection to the poor, put up bridges and courts of justice and rest-houses for the people, and gave gifts according to his bent to Samanas and Brahmans, to the poor and needy and the wayfarers, it was by the result of that conduct that, from existence to existence, he came into the enjoyment of so much prosperity. For of whom, O king, can it be said that without generosity and self-restraint, without self-control and the observance of the Upasatha 1, he can reach prosperity? 'And when, O king, you say that Devadatta and the Bodisat accompanied one another in the passage from birth to birth, that meeting together of theirs took place not, only at the end of a hundred, or a thousand, or a hundred thousand births, but was in fact constantly and frequently taking place through an immeasurable period of time 2. For you should regard that matter in the light of the comparison drawn by the Blessed One between the case of the p. 292 purblind tortoise and the attainment of the condition of a human being. And it was not only with Devadatta that such union took place. Sâriputta the Elder also, O king, was through thousands of births the father, or the grandfather, or the uncle 1, or the brother, or the son, or the nephew, or the friend of the Bodisat; and the Bodisat was the father, or the grandfather, or the uncle, or the brother, or the son, or the nephew, or the friend of Sâriputta the Elder. 'All beings in fact, O king, who, in various forms as creatures, are carried down the stream of transmigration, meet, as they are whirled along in it, both with pleasant companions and with disagreeable ones-just as water whirled along in a stream meets with pure and impure substances, with the beautiful and with the ugly. 'And when, O king, Devadatta as the god, had been himself Unrighteous, and had led others into unrighteousness of life, he was burnt in purgatory for an immeasurable period of time 2. [205] But the Bodisat, who, as the god, had been himself Righteous, and had led others into righteousness of life, lived in all the bliss of heaven for a like immeasurable period of time. And whilst in this life, Devadatta, who had plotted injury against the Buddha, and had created a schism in the Order, was swallowed up by the earth, the Tathâgata, p. 293 knowing all that can be known, arrived at the insight of Buddhahood 1, and was completely set free (from the necessity of becoming) by the destruction of all that leads to re-existence.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say 2.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to Devadatta's superiority to the Bodisat in previous births.] p. 294 [WOMEN'S WHILES.] 42. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: With opportunity, and secrecy, And the right woo'r, all women will go wrong-- Aye, failing others, with a cripple even 1." But on the other hand it is said: "Mahosadha's wife, Amarâ, when left behind in the village while her husband was away on a journey, remained alone and in privacy, and regarding her husband as a man would regard his sovran lord, she refused to do wrong, even when tempted with a thousand pieces 2." Now if the first of these passages be correct, the second must be wrong; and if the second be right, [206] the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 43. 'It is so said, O king, as you have quoted, touching the conduct of Amarâ, Mahosadha's wife. But the question is would she have done wrong, on receipt of those thousand pieces, with the right man: or would she not have done so, if she had had the opportunity, and the certainty of secrecy, and a suitable wooer? Now, on considering the matter, that lady Amarâ was not certain of any of these p. 295 things. Through her fear of censure in this world the opportunity seemed to her not fit, and through her fear of the sufferings of purgatory in the next world. And because she knew how bitter is the fruit of wrong-doing, and because she did not wish to lose her loved one, and because of the high esteem in which she held her husband, and because she honoured goodness, and despised ignobleness of life, and because she did not want to break with her customary mode of life--for all these reasons the opportunity seemed to her not fit. 'And, further, she refused to do wrong because, on consideration, she was not sure of keeping the thing secret from the world. [207] For even could she have kept it secret from men, yet she could not have concealed it from spirits 1--even could she have kept it secret from spirits, yet she could not have concealed it from those recluses who have the power of knowing the thoughts of others-even could she have kept it secret from them, yet she could not have concealed it from those of the gods who can read the hearts of men--even could she have kept it secret from the gods, yet she could not have escaped, herself, from the knowledge of her sin--even could she have remained ignorant of it herself, yet she could not have kept it secret from (the law of the result which follows on) unrighteousness 2. Such were the p. 296 various reasons which led her to abstain from doing wrong because she could not be sure of secrecy. 'And, further, she refused to do wrong because, on consideration, she found no right wooer. Mahosadha the wise, O king, was endowed with the eight and twenty qualities. And which are those twenty-eight? He was brave, O king, and full of modesty, and ashamed to do wrong, he had many adherents, and many friends, he was forgiving, he was upright in life, he was truthful, he was pure in word, and deed and heart 1, he was free from malice, he was not puffed up, he felt no jealousy 2, he was full of energy, he strove after all good things 3, he was popular with all men, he was generous, he was friendly 4, he was humble in disposition, he was free from guile, he was free from deceit, he was full of insight, he was of high reputation, he had much knowledge, he sought after the good of those dependent on him, his praise was in all men's mouths, great was his wealth, and great his fame. Such were the twenty-eight qualities, O king, with which 'Mahosadha, the wise, was endowed. And it was because she found no wooer like unto him that she did no wrong 5.' p. 297 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the wickedness of women 1.] ____________________ [ON THE FEARLESSNESS OF THE ARAHATS.] 44. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "The Arahats have laid aside all fear and trembling 2." But on the other hand when, in the city of Râgagaha, they saw Dhana-pâlaka, the man-slaying elephant, bearing down upon the Blessed p. 298 [paragraph continues] One, all the five hundred Arahats forsook the Conqueror and fled, one only excepted, Ânanda the Elder 1. Now how was it, Nâgasena? Did those Arahats run away from fear--or did they run away willing to let the Blessed One be destroyed, and thinking: "(Our conduct) will be clear (to him) from the way in which he himself will act 2," [208] or did they run away with the hope of watching the immense and unequalled mighty power which the Tathâgata would exhibit? If, Nâgasena, what the p. 299 [paragraph continues] Blessed One said as to the Arahats being devoid of fear be true, then this story must be false. But if the story be true, then the statement that the Arahats have put away fear and trembling must be false. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 45. 'The Blessed One did say, O king, that Arahats have put away all fear and trembling, and five hundred Arahats, save only Ânanda, did, as you say, run away when the elephant Dhana-pâlaka bore down upon the Tathâgata that day in Râgagaha. But that was neither out of fear, nor from willingness to let the Blessed One be destroyed. For the cause by which Arahats could be made to fear or tremble has been destroyed in them, and therefore are they free from fear or trembling. Is the broad earth, O king, afraid at people digging into it, or breaking it up, or at having to bear the weight of the mighty oceans and the peaked mountain ranges?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not?' 'Because there is no cause in the broad earth which could produce fear or trembling.' 'Just so, O king. And neither is there any such cause in Arahats. And would a mountain peak be afraid of being split up, or broken down, or made to fall, or burnt with fire?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not?' [209] 'The cause of fear or trembling does not exist within it.' 'And just so, O king, with Arahats. If all the creatures of various outward form in the whole p. 300 universe 1 were, together, to attack one Arahat in order to put him to fear, yet would they bring about no variation in his heart. And why? Because there is neither condition nor cause for fear (in him, whence fear could arise). Rather, O king, was it these considerations that arose in the minds of those Arahats: "To-day when the best of the best of men, the hero among conquerors, has entered into the famous city, Dhana-pâlaka the elephant will rush down the street. But to a certainty the brother who is his special attendant will not forsake him who is above the god of gods. But if we should not go away, then neither will the goodness of Ânanda be made manifest, nor will the elephant actually approach 2 the Tathâgata. Let us then withdraw. Thus will great masses of the people attain to emancipation from the bonds of evil, and the goodness of Ânanda be made manifest." It was on the realisation of the fact that those advantages would arise from their doing so, that the Arahats withdrew to every side.' 'Well, Nâgasena, have you solved the puzzle. That is so. The Arahats feared not, nor did they tremble. But for the advantages that they foresaw they withdrew on every side.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the panic of the Arahats.] p. 301 [ON CAUSING THE OMNISCIENT ONE TO CHANGE HIS MIND.] 46. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say that the Tathâgata is all wise 1. And on the other hand they say: "When the company of the members of the Order presided over by Sâriputta and Moggallâna had been dismissed by the Blessed One 2, then the Sâkyas of Kâtumâ and Brahmâ Sabanipati, by means of the parables of the seed and of the calf, gained the Buddha over, and obtained his forgiveness, and made him see the thing in the right light 3." Now how was that, Nâgasena? Were those two parables unknown to him that he should be [210] appeased and gained over to their side, and brought to see the matter in a new light? But if he did not already know them, then, Nâgasena, he was not all-wise. If he did know them, then he must have dismissed those brethren rudely and violently 4 in order to try them; and therein is his unkindness made manifest. This too is a double-edged problem now put to you, and you have to solve it.' 47. 'The Tathâgata, O king, was all-wise, and yet, pleased at those parables, he was gained over by them, he granted pardon to the brethren he had sent p. 302 away, and he saw the matter in the light (in which the intercessors on their behalf wished him to see it). For the Tathâgata, O king, is lord of the Scriptures. It was with parables that had been first preached by the Tathâgata himself 1 that they conciliated him, pleased him, gained him over, and it was on being thus gained over that he signified his approval (of what they had said). It was, O king, as when a wife conciliates, and pleases, and gains over her husband by means of things that belong to the husband himself; and the husband signifies his approval thereof. Or it was, O king, as when the royal barber conciliates and pleases and gains over the king when he dresses the king's head with the golden comb 2 which belongs to the king himself, and the king then signifies his approval thereof, Or it was, O king, as when an attendant novice, when he serves his teacher with the food given in alms which his teacher has himself brought home, conciliates him and pleases him and gains him over, and the teacher then signifies his approval thereof.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________ [Here ends the problem as to the all-wise Buddha being gained over by intercession 3.] ____________________ Here ends the Fourth Chapter. Footnotes 261:1 From the Anguttara Nikâya I, xiv, i (page 23 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 261:2 Parikatto, which the Simhalese version renders garhâ wemin. 261:3 'By robbers,' adds Hînati-kumburê, so there is no question of martyrdom. 262:1 Kammâdhigahitenâpi, which the Simhalese merely repeats. Compare the use of adhiganhâti at Anguttara Nikâya V, 31 (adhiganhâti tam tena, 'surpasses him in that'), and see below. 262:2 Kapittham (Feronia Elephantum), which the Simhalese renders Diwul gedi. 262:3 'No good action has an opportunity at the time when evil Karma is in possession of a man,' says Hînati-kumburê (p. 250). 262:4 Pakarane aparagghati, literally 'against the book,' the book p. 263 of the law being, no doubt, understood. But the Simhalese has against any one.' 263:1 Iddhiyâ samannâhâro nâho si. See the use of this word, which is not in Childers, at p. 123 of the Sumangala (on Dîgha 153, 24). The Simhalese goes on to much greater length than the Pâli, giving the full religious life history of the famous disciple (pp. 250, 251). 264:1 From the Anguttara Nikâya III, 124 (vol. i, p. 283 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 264:2 In the Vinaya (Mahâvagga II, 16, 8) it is laid down that the Pâtimokkha (the rules of the Order) is not to be recited before laymen. I know of no passage in the Pitakas which says that it, or the Vinaya, is to be kept secret. 265:1 This is, so far as I know, the earliest mention of this being the case. There is nothing in the Pâtimokkha itself (see my translation of this list of offences against the rules of the Order in vol. i of the 'Vinaya Texts' in the S. B. E.) as to its recitation taking place in secret, and nothing in the Vinaya as to its being kept secret. But the regulations in the Vinaya as to the recitation of the Pâtimokkha forbade the actual presence of any one not a member of the Order, and as a matter of fact any one not such a member is excluded in practice during its recitation now in Ceylon. But it would be no offence in a layman to read the Vinaya, and learned laymen who have left the Order still do so. 265:2 Vamsa (repeated in the Simhalese). 265:3 Bhikkhu-bhûmiyâ (also repeated in the Simhalese, p. 252). 265:4 Khattiyânam (but the Simhalese has Sakyayangê). 266:1 There are twenty classes of these people mentioned in the text, and the meaning of most of the names is obscure. The Simhalese simply repeats them all, adding only the word bhaktiyo, 'believers in,' to the names of the various divinities. The classing together of jugglers, ballet-dancers, and followers of the numerous mystic cults, so numerous in India, is thoroughly Buddhistic, and quite in the vein of Gotama himself--as, for instance, in the Mahâ Sîla (see my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 196). 267:1 Added from the Simhalese. 267:2 Niggita-kamma-surâ, rendered in the Simhalese (p. 254), gaya-grihita-kritya-surâ-pânayen. 267:3 It will be noticed that there is no mention here (in a connection where, if it had then existed, it would almost certainly have been referred to) of any Esoteric Buddhism. So above, at p. 268 IV, 1, 8, it is stated that a good Buddhist teacher should keep nothing secret from his pupil. And even in so old a text as the 'Book of the Great Decease' (Chap. II, 32, p. 36 of my translation in the Buddhist Suttas'), it is said of the Buddha himself that he had 'no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps some things back.' This passage is itself quoted above at IV, 2, 4, as the basis of one of Milinda's questions; and is entirely accepted by Nâgasena, that is, by our author. The fact is that there has never been any such thing as esoteric teaching in Buddhism, and that the modern so called esoteric Buddhism is neither esoteric nor Buddhism. Its tenets, so far as they are Indian at all, are perfectly accessible, are well known to all those who choose to study the books of Indian mysticism, and are Hindu, not Buddhist. They are, indeed, quite contradictory to Buddhism, of which the authors of what they ignorantly call Esoteric Buddhism know but very little--that little being only a portion of those beliefs which have been common ground to all religious teachers in India. If one doctrine--more than any other--is distinctive of Buddhism, it is the ignoring, in ethics, of the time-honoured belief in a soul--that is, in the old sense, in a separate creature inside the body, which flies out of it, like a bird out of a cage, when the body dies. Yet the Theosophists, who believe, I am told, in seven souls inside each human body (which would be worse according to true Buddhism than seven devils), still venture to call themselves Buddhists, and do not see the absurdity of their position! 268:1 Sampagâna-musâvâda pârâgikâ. This is curious as according to the Pâtimokkha it is Pâkittiya, not Pârâgikâ. Compare Pârâgikâ 4 with Pâkittiya 1. ('Vinaya Texts,' S. B. E., vol. iii, pp. 5 and 32.) 269:1 I cannot trace these identical words in the Pitaka texts. But the general sense of them is exactly in agreement with the first Pâkittiya rule. 269:2 Hînati-kumburê here inserts a summary of the Introductory Story (in the Sutta Vibhanga) to the 4th Pârâgikâ. All this (pp. 254-256) stands in his version for lines 1-3 on p. 193 of the Pâli text. 269:3 The Pâli repeats them word for word. As I have pointed out above, they are not really correct. 269:4 So Hînati-kumburê, who must have had a different reading, and I think a better one, before him. 269:5 A kahâpana. See the discussion of the value of this coin in my 'Ancient Coins and Measures,' pp. 3, 4. 270:1 Yâva sîsam kalîrakkheggam khedipeyyâma, which the Simhalese merely repeats. It is literally 'We should have him "bambû-sprout-cut" up to his head.' What this technical term may mean is not exactly known--possibly having slits the shape of a bambû sprout cut all over his body. 270:2 Dhammatâ-dhamma-pariyâye. I don't know where this is to be found. 271:1 These eight Investigations (Vilokanâni) have not yet been found in the Pitaka texts. But, when relating the birth of the historical Buddha, the Gâtaka commentary (vol. i, p. 48, of Professor Fausböll's edition) mentions the first six of them (substituting okâsa for desa), and calls them, oddly enough, the Five Great Investigations. In the corresponding passage in the Lalita Vistara only the first four are mentioned. The last two of the above eight seem very forced. 271:2 Nimesantaram na âgameti, for which Hînati-kumburê (p. 256 at the end) has nivesantara. Neither word occurs elsewhere. 272:1 Âyum oloketvâ, which the Simhalese (p. 257) repeats. This implied meaning is doubtful. 272:2 Uttara-setu, a word which does not occur elsewhere. Hînati-kumburê renders it He-danda, which Clough explains as a footbridge usually made of a single tree. 273:1 Literally 'is not to throw himself down,' and I think 'from a precipice' is to be understood, especially as the nearest approach to the words quoted, that is the passage in the Sutta Vibhanga on the 3rd Pârâgika (III, 5, 13), has that meaning. 273:2 Here again the passage referred to is not known. 274:1 Sattânam, in which gods are included. 274:2 The four oghas; also called Âsavas. The former term is used of them objectively, the latter subjectively. 275:1 This Kumâra Kassapa is said at Anguttara I, xiv, 3 to have been the most eloquent of the early disciples. Another eloquent little outburst of his is preserved for us in verses 201 and 202 of the Therâ Gâthâ. 'O for the Buddhas, and their doctrines! O for the achievements of our Master! Thereby may the disciple realise the Truth. Through countless æons of time has Selfness followed on Selfness. But this one is now the last. This aggregation (of mental and material qualities which forms me now again into an individuality) is at last the end, the end of the coming and going of births and deaths. There will be no rebirth for me!' But where the verses are so full of allusions to the deepest Buddhist psychology, it is impossible to reproduce in English the vigour of the original Pâli. Selfness (Sakkâya) is the condition of being a separate individual. 275:2 All this is from the celebrated discourse, the 'Foundation of the Kingdom of Righteousness' (in 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 148). 276:1 Bilanga-thâlikam. 276:2 Sankha-mundikam. 276:3 Râhu-mukham. 276:4 Goti-mâlakam. 276:5 Hattha-paggotikam. 276:6 Eraka-vattikam. 276:7 Kîraka-vâsikam. 277:1 Eneyyakam. 277:2 Balisa-mamsikam (so the Simhalese, Mr. Trenckner reads Balisa). 277:3 Kahâpanakam. 277:4 Khârâpatikkhakam. 277:5 Paligha-parivattikam. 277:6 Palâla-pîthakam. I follow throughout Hînati-kumburê's interpretation (pp. 260, 261) of these pretty names, which could be well matched in the West. That some Indian kings were cruel in the extreme is no doubt true. But it must not be supposed that this list gives the names of well-known punishments. It is merely a string of technical terms which is repeated by rote whenever tortures have to be specified. And the meaning of its terms was most likely unknown to the very people who so used them. For the whole list (which is taken by our author from the Pâli Pitakas) is explained by Buddhaghosa in his commentary, the Manoratha Pûranî, on Anguttara III, 1, 1, as edited by Dr. Morris at pp. 113, 114 of the first edition of his Anguttara for the Pâli Text Society, 1884. But Buddhaghosa's explanations differ from Hînati-kumburê's in several details; and to nearly half the names he gives alternative meanings, quite contradictory to those that he gives first. So the list had its origin some centuries (say 400-500) B.C., and was certainly p. 278 not understood in the fifth century A. D.; and was probably therefore unintelligible also, at least in part, to our author. 278:1 Ûmika-vanka-kadika. I don't pretend to understand this last word. Dr. Morris, at p. 92 of the 1 Pâli Text Society's journal' for 1884, suggests velika. Perhaps it was simply adika after all, with or without m euphonic. 279:1 This same string of words, except the first, is used of the Iddhi-pâdas in the Book of the Great Decease, III, 3 (p. 40 of vol. xi of the S. B. E). The words 'towards all beings' are not in the text. But this is the meaning of the phrase used, and not love to men only, as would be understood if they were not inserted in the translation. 279:2 Amanussa. This means, not the gods, but the various spirits on the earth, nayads, dryads, fairies, &c. &c. As here, so again below, IV, 4, 41, the amanussâ are opposed to the devatâ, mentioned in the next clause here. In older texts the devatâ include the amanussâ. 279:3 From the Anguttara Nikâya, Ekâdasa Nipâta; quoted in full, with the context, in the Introductory Story to the 169th Gâtaka (vol. ii, pp. 60, 61 of Professor Fausböll's edition). 280:1 Mr. Trenckner points out that this story is given in the 540th Gâtaka. 280:2 See p. 105 of the text. 280:3 Kakkhum dehi. So also p. 95 of the text. 280:4 Nibbâhana; not in Childers, but see p. 119 of the text. 281:1 Bhânanâ is really more than 'cultivation.' It is the actual, present, felt sense of the particular moral state that is being cultivated (in this case, of love). I have elsewhere rendered it 'meditation': but as the ethical doctrine, and practice, are alike unknown to us, we have no word that exactly reproduces the connotation of the Pâli phrase. 282:1 This is no quibble. The early Buddhists did believe in the power of a subjective love over external circumstances. It is true that the best known instances in which this power is represented as having been actually exercised, are instances of the power of love over the hearts of other beings, and hence, indirectly, over their actions. Thus when Devadatta had had the fierce, manslaying elephant Nâlâgiri let loose against the Buddha (Kullavagga VII, 3, 11, 12), Gotama is said to have permeated him with his love, and the elephant then went up to him only to salute him, and allowed himself to be stroked, and did no harm. And when the five disciples had intended, when he went to Benares, to show him no respect, the Buddha, in like manner, is said to have 'concentrated that feeling of his love which was able to pervade generally all beings in earth and heaven,' and to have 'directed it specially towards them.' Then 'the sense of his love diffused itself through their hearts. And as he came nearer and nearer, unable any longer to adhere to their resolve, they rose from their seats, and bowed down before him, and welcomed him with every mark of reverence and of respect' ('Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, p. 112). And when he wished to convert Roga the Mallian, the Buddha is said, in like manner, to have 'suffused him with the feeling of his love.' And then Roga, 'overcome by the Blessed One by the sense of his love--just as a young calf follows the kine, so did he go from apartment to apartment' seeking the Blessed One (Mahâvagga VI, 36, 4). And again, when the Bhikkhus told the Buddha of a brother having been killed by a snake-bite, he is represented (in the Kullavagga V, 6) to have said: 'Now surely that brother had not let his love flow out over the four royal kinds of serpents. Had he done so, he would not have died of the bite of a snake.' And then he is said to have enjoined the use of a poem of love to snakes (set out in the text quoted) as a safeguard against snake-bite. This goes really much further than the other instances, but no case is given of that safeguard having been actually used successfully. And I know of no case in the Pâli Pitakas of the felt presence p. 283 of the feeling of love being said to have actually counteracted either fire, or poison, or sword. It is noteworthy that the Simhalese inserts here six pages (265-271) of matter not found in the Pâli. But as it gives at length the story of Prince Sâma, it is taken, I presume, from the Gâtaka book. 283:1 This is something quite different from what was said before. 283:2 Ye viññana-baddhâ, sabbesam, which the Simhalese takes as a gloss on 'good and evil ones,' and renders viññâna prati wû da. But I prefer Mr. Trenckner's punctuation. 283:3 That is to a temporary life in heaven. 283:4 That is to life in a temporary hell (or purgatory). 284:1 Bodhi-satto (Wisdom-Child). The individual who (through virtue practised in successive lives) was becoming the Buddha. 284:2 'Wicked' and 'pure' are in the Pâli kanhe and sukka, literally, 'dark' and light.' The only other passage I recollect where these names of colours are used in an ethical sense is the 87th verse of the Dhammapada. Professor Max Müller there renders: 'A wise man should leave the dark state (of ordinary life), and follow the bright state (of the Bhikshu),' (S. B. E., Vol. X, p. 26.) But the words should certainly be translated: 'A wise man should put away wicked dispositions, and cultivate purity of heart.' Bhâvetha could never refer to adopting or following any outward profession. It is exclusively used of the practice, cultivation, of inward feelings. And the commentary, which is quoted by Professor Fausböll, takes the passage in the Dhammapada in that sense, just as Hînati-kumburê (p. 271) does here. 284:3 Bhave bhave, which would be more accurately rendered 'in the course of his gradual becoming.' 284:4 Kavaka-kandâla. The Kandâlas are a well-known caste still existing in India--if indeed that can rightly be called a caste which is beneath all others. Khavaka is not in Childers, but is applied below (p. 256 of our text) to Mâra, the Buddhist Satan. See also the next note. 284:5 This is not a summary of the 309th Gâtaka, for it differs from that story as published by Professor Fausböll (vol. iii, pp. p. 285 217-30), and also from the older and shorter version contained in the Old Commentary on the Pâtimokkha (on the 69th Sakhiya, Vinaya IV, pp. 203, 204). [The name of that story in Professor Fausböll's edition is Khavaka-Gâtaka, but throughout the story itself the word Kandâla is used in the passages corresponding to those in which Professor Fausböll has Khapaka (sic),--a coincidence which throws light on our author, Khavaka-kandâla.] The story here referred to is the Amba Gâtaka (No. 474) in which the word Khavaka does not occur. 285:1 'Of Magadha,' says Hînati-kumburê (p. 272). 285:2 This is the 122nd Gâtaka, there called the Dummedha Gâtaka. The king has the elephant taken to the top of the Vepulla mountain outside Râgagaha. Then having made him stand first on three feet, then on two, then on one, he demands of the trainer to make him stand in the air. Then the elephant flies away to Benares! 285:3 Pavane natthâyiko. But as Hînati-kumburê renders all this: 'a farmer in Benares who gained his living by husbandry,' I would suggest pavanena tthâyiko as the right reading. 286:1 I cannot unfortunately trace this story among the Gâtakas. 286:2 I do not know which Gâtaka is here referred to. 286:3 This must be the 438th Gâtaka, there called the Tittira Gâtaka. In the summary Devadatta is identified with the hypocritical ascetic who killed and ate the wise partridge. 286:4 This is the 313th Gâtaka, there called the Khanti-vadi Gâtaka. The royal sportsman has first the skin, and then the hands and feet of the sage cut off to alter his opinions. But the sage simply says that his love to animals is not in his skin, or in his limbs, but in his heart. Then the earth swallows up the cruel monarch, and the citizens bury the body of the sage with all honour. In the summary Kalâbu, the king, is identified with Devadatta. 287:1 This is the 222nd Gâtaka, there called the Kûla Nandiya Gâtaka. 287:2 This is probably the 518th Gâtaka. See Mr. Trenckner's note. 287:3 This must be the 492nd Gâtaka, the Takkha-sûkara Gâtaka, in which the hero is a learned pig who helps the carpenter in his work, and the villain of the story is a hypocrite ascetic with matted hair. But it should be added that though in the summary (Fausböll, vol. iv, p. 350) Devadatta is identified with the ascetic, the Bodisat is identified, not with the learned pig, but with the dryad. 287:4 He is called Upakara both in the 422nd Gâtaka (of which this is a summary) and in the Sumangala (p. 258). The Gâtaka (III, 454) also gives a third variation, Apakara. 287:5 Purisamatto gagane vehâsangamo. The Gâtaka says simply uparikaro, which must mean about the same. 288:1 This must be the 482nd Gâtaka. It is true that the man is there called Mahâ Dhanaka (Fausböll, vol. iii, p. 255), and the Bodisat is not specially named Ruru, nor is he a king of the herd, but is only a stag of the kind of deer called Ruru, who alone. But a comparison of the poetical version of the same story in the Kariyâ Pitaka II, 6 (p. 87 of Dr. Morris's edition for the Pâli Text Society) shows that the same story is here referred to. 288:2 This is the 72nd Gâtaka, the Sîlava Nâga Gâtaka. (Fausböll, vol. i, p. 319.) 288:3 Khattiya-dhammo; literally, 'who had the nature of a Kshatriya.' This expression is not found in the Gâtaka referred to, No. 241 (Vol. ii, p. 242 and foll. in Professor Fausböll's edition), and the Bodisat is there called purdhita not pandita, and his name is not given as Vidhura. The jackal also came to grief in his attempt to conquer Benares. But there is no doubt as to that story, the Sabba Dâtha Gâtaka being the one here quoted. 289:1 This is the 357th Gâtaka (Fausböll, vol. iii, pp. 174) and which is one of those illustrated on the Bharhut Tope (Cunningham, Plate 109). 289:2 In the Gâtaka text (No. 457, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 100 and foll.), there are both devaputtâ, 'gods,' not yakkhâ. This is by no means the only instance of the term yakkha being used of gods. 289:3 I cannot trace this story in the printed text of the Gâtakas. 289:4 This is the Apannaka Gâtaka (No. i, vol. i, pp. 98 and foll. in Professor Fausböll's edition), translated in the 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, pp. 138-145. 289:5 The Nigrodha Miga Gâtaka (No. 12, vol. i, pp. 145 and foll. in Fausböll), translated in 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, pp. 198 and following. 290:1 The Nigrodha Gâtaka (No. 445, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 37 and foll.). 290:2 I cannot trace this story among the published Gâtakas. 290:3 This is the Mahâ Paduma Gâtaka (No. 472, Fausböll, vol. iv, pp. 187-195). It was a case of Joseph and Potiphar's wife. 290:4 This tragical story is No. 358 in the Gâtaka collection (Fausböll, vol. iii, pp. 177-182). 291:1 The Buddhist Sabbath, on which see my 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 139-141. 291:2 So also above, IV, 2, 64, and IV, 3, 28. 292:1 That is 'father's younger brother.' The Pâli has no word for uncle generally, the whole scheme of relationship being different from ours, and the various sorts of uncles having, in the Pâli scheme, different and distinct names. 292:2 'Fifty-seven kotis and sixty hundreds of thousands of years,' says the text, with touching accuracy. 293:1 So Hînati-kumburê, who takes sabbadhamme as accusative to bugghitvâ, and understands the phrase as above translated. 293:2 This discussion is very interesting, both as a specimen of casuistry, and as an exposition of orthodox Buddhist belief. And it is full of suggestion if taken as a statement of the kind of reason which led the Buddhist editors of the earlier folk-lore to identify Devadatta with the characters referred to by king Milinda. But the facts are that those editors, in using the old stories and legends for their ethical purposes, always identified Devadatta with the cruel person in the story, and paid no heed to the question whether be was superior or not in birth or in the consideration of the world, to the person they identified with the Bodisat. In searching through the four volumes of the published Gâtakas, and the proof-sheets of the fifth volume with which Professor Fausböll has favoured me, for the purpose of tracing the stories referred to by our author, I find that Devadatta appears in sixty-four of them, and that in almost every one of these sixty-four he is either superior in birth, or equal to the character identified with the Bodisat. This is not surprising, for it is not unusually the superiors in birth who are guilty of the kind of cruelty and wickedness which the Buddhist editors would ascribe to Devadatta. So that our author, had he chosen to do so, might have adduced many other instances of a similar kind to those he actually quotes. I add in an appendix the full list of the Devadatta stories in the Gâtakas. It is clear our author had before him a version of the Gâtaka book slightly different from our own, as will be seen from the cases pointed out in the notes in which, as to names or details, the story known to him differs from the printed text. And also that here (as at III, 6, 2) he would have been able to solve his own dilemma much better if he had known more of the history of those sacred books on the words of which it is based. 294:1 It is not meant that men would not. But that is too clear to be even worthy of mention, whereas with regard to women the question is worth discussion. Our author is mistaken in ascribing this verse to the Buddha. It is only found (as has been pointed out by Mr. Trenckner) in a Gâtaka story, No. 536, and is a specimen, not of Buddhist teaching, but of Indian folk-lore. There is a very similar sentiment in Gâtaka, No. 62 (vol. i, p. 289). 294:2 This story will be found in the Ummagga Gâtaka, No. 546. 295:1 Fairies, nayad, dryads, &c. &c.--not gods. 295:2 Adhammena raho na labheyya. I am in great doubt as to the real meaning of these words, which Hînati-kumburê (p. 286) renders merely adharmayen rahasak no labannê. They look very much like a kind of personification of Karma. The phrase is really very parallel to the saying in Numbers xxxii. 23, 'Be sure your sin will find you out'--namely, in its results--and is as true ethically as it is difficult grammatically. 296:1 Sokeyya-sampanno, which Hînati-kumburê renders suvaka gunayen samanwibawa: that is, 'compliant, attentive to what is said.' But I prefer to take the expression in the sense explained at length in Anguttara III, 119. See also Gâtaka I, 214; Milinda, p. 115. 296:2 Anusuyyako. See Gâtaka II, 192, and Milinda, p. 94. 296:3 Âyûhako. Hînati-kumburê (p. 286) renders this word, which is only found here, by Dhana piris rs kirîm tteya, 'one who has heaped up goods and men.' But see Milinda, p. 181, and Dr. Morris in the Pâli Text Society's journals for 1885 and 1886. 296:4 Sakhilo, 'kindly in speech,' says the Simhalese. 296:5 This is all very well, but it does not confirm, it explains away, the supposed quotation from the Buddha's words. 297:1 The position of women in India, at the time when Buddhism arose, was, theoretically, very low. The folk tales are full of stories turning on the wiles of women, and the Hindoo law-books seem never tired of the theme of her uncleanness, her weakness, and her wickedness. But, except in matters of property, the bark was I think worse than the bite. Among the people, in the homes of the peasantry, the philippics of the Brahmin priests were not much regarded, and the women led lives as pleasant as those of their male relations, and shared in such mental and physical advantages as their male relations enjoyed. The influence of Buddhism must have been felt in two directions. In the first place the importance attached to the celibate life must have encouraged the kind of view taken of women among Catholics in mediaeval times (the Brahmin view being much akin to those that were promulgated by Luther). On the other hand the fact that women were admitted to the Order, and that the still higher aim of Arahatship was held to be attainable by them, must have helped to encourage a high esteem for women. We have many instances of women who were credited with the insight of Arahatship. A whole treatise in the Buddhist sacred books, the Theri Gâtha, is devoted to hymns and poems ascribed to them, and many of these reach a very high level of intelligent and spiritual emotion. 297:2 I do not know the exact passage referred to, but there are many of similar tendency in the sacred books. See, for instance, Dhammapada, verses 39, 188, 214, 351, and 385; and Sutta Nipâta, verses 15, 70, 212, 621, and 965. 298:1 Here again we have a variation between our author's words and those of the Pitakas. In the Kullavagga VII, 3, 11, 12 (translated in pp. 247-250 of vol. iii of the 'Vinaya Texts' in the 'Sacred Books of the East'), we have the oldest versions of this story; and there the elephant is called, not Dhana-pâlaka, but Nâlâgiri, and the number of attendant disciples (who are not called Arahats) is not given as five hundred. The Buddha is simply said to have entered Râgagaha 'with a number of Bhikkhus.' Nothing also is said, either of their running away, or of Ânanda's remaining behind. It is, no doubt, an easily explicable and very pretty alteration of the story, which exhibits Ânanda, the beloved disciple, as acting in this way. But it is none the less an alteration. It should be added that Nâlâgiri (it should be Nâlâgiri) in the Vinaya text is a personal name of the elephant, but may be derived from its place of origin. (See the references to a famous elephant named Nâlâgiri in the Megha Dûta and Nadâgiri in the Kathâ Sarit Sâgara XI, 42, XII, 10, XIII, 7, 29. But Pânini VI, 3, 117, gives the latter as the name of a mountain.) So while there may be a variation in the legend, it may also be that we have only two names for the same elephant, just as one might speak of the Shetland pony (named) Brownie. And the stanza quoted below (p. 410 of the Pâli text) shows that the name Dhana-pâlaka was given already in older texts to the Nâlâgiri elephant. 298:2 Paññâyissati sakena kammena, 'It will be plain to the Buddha (that is, he will be able to judge of our motives) from his own kindness and goodness,' according to the Simhalese (p. 287). But the expression is a very strange one, and perhaps, after all, it merely means, 'The matter will turn out according to his Karma.' 300:1 Literally, 'In the hundreds of thousands of world systems.' 300:2 Atthânam-anavakâsataya, Because of the absence of condition and opportunity.' 301:1 This question is also discussed above, III, 6, 2. 301:2 This episode has already been referred to above, and will be found set out in full in the Kâtumâ Sutta, No. 67, in the Magghima Nikâya (pp. 456-462 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 301:3 Nigghattam akamsu. Compare Gâtaka, vol. i, p. 495. 301:4 Okassa pasayha, which the Simhalese (p. 289) renders âkaddhanaya kola abhibhavanaya karanâ. See Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1887, p. 148. 302:1 This is quite correct. They are in the fourth book of the Anguttara Sutta, No. 13. 302:2 Panaka, a word only found in this passage. Hînati-kumburê (p. 280 at the end) renders it ran panâwen. 302:3 Other cruxes arising out of the dogma of the Buddha's omniscience are discussed above, III, 6, 2. Next: Devadatta in the Gâtakas Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Book VI: The Solvi... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda (SBE35): Appendix: Devadatt... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. xi INTRODUCTION. I HAVE first to notice a few points as to the history of the Milinda book which have either come to light since the former Introduction was written, or which I then omitted to notice. Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio in his Catalogue of Chinese Buddhist Books 1 mentions a Chinese book called Nâ-sien Pikhiu Kin (that is 'The Book of the Bhikshu Nâgasena' Sûtra) 2. I have been so fortunate as to receive detailed information about this book both from Dr. Serge d'Oldenbourg in St. Petersburg and from M. Sylvain Lévi in Paris. Professor Serge d'Oldenbourg forwarded to me, in the spring of 1892, a translation into English (which he himself had been kind enough to make) from a translation into Russian by Mr. Ivanovsky, of the Chinese Introduction, and of various episodes in the Chinese which seemed to differ from the Pâli. This very valuable aid to the interpretation of the Milinda, which the unselfish courtesy of these two Russian scholars intended thus to place at my disposal, was most unfortunately lost in the post; and I have only been able to gather from a personal interview with Professor d'Oldenbourg that the Introduction was a sort of Gâtaka story in which the Buddha appeared as a white elephant 3. By a curious coincidence this regrettable loss has been p. xii since made good by the work of two French scholars. Mons. Sylvain Lévi forwarded to the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, held in London in the autumn of 1892, a careful study on the subject by M. Edouard Specht, preceded by an introductory essay by himself. It appears from this paper, which excited much interest when it was read, that there are, not one, but two separate and distinct works extant in China under the name of Nâ-sien Pikhiu Kin, the one inserted in the Korean collection made in that country in 1010 A.D., and the other printed in the collection of Buddhist books published under the Sung in 1239. Neither the date nor the author of either version seems to be known, but Mr. Bunyiu Nanjio states of his work, which is probably one of the two, that it was composed between 317 and 420 A.D. 1 The Korean book gives much less of the matter contained in our books II and III than the later work in the Sung collection, the former containing only 13,752 characters while the latter has 22,657. In the matter of the order of the questions also the later of the two Chinese books follows much more closely the order found in the present translation than does the work found in the Korean collection. This paper has since been published in the Proceedings of the Congress 2, and it gives translations of several episodes on questions in which the Chinese is said to throw light on the Pâli. Both M. Specht and M. Sylvain Lévi seem to think that the two Chinese books were translations of older recensions of the work than the one preserved in Pâli. This argument does not seem to me, as at present advised, at all certain. It by no means follows that a shorter recension, merely because it is shorter, must necessarily be older than a longer one. It is quite as possible that the longer one gave rise to the shorter ones. p. xiii [paragraph continues] The story of a discussion between Nâgasena and Milinda is no doubt, if the arguments in the Introduction to Part I are of any avail, an historical romance with an ethical tendency. In constant repetition, after it had become popular, it is precisely those parts which do not appeal so easily to the popular ear (because they deal, not with ordinary puzzles, but with dilemmas or with the higher mysteries of Arahatship), that would be naturally omitted. I do not go so far as to say that it must have been so. But I venture to think that for a critical judgment as to the comparative dates of the three works on the same subject, now known to exist, we must wait till translations of the whole of the two independent Chinese versions are before us. And further that the arguments must then turn on quite other considerations than the very ambiguous conclusions to be drawn merely from the length or shortness of the different treatment in each case. It is very much to be hoped therefore that M. Specht will soon give us complete versions of the two Chinese works in question. At present it can only be said that we have a very pretty puzzle propounded to us, a puzzle much more difficult to solve than those which king Milinda put to Nâgasena the sage. If the shorter version (or rather paraphrase, for it does not seem to be a version at all in our modern sense)--that from the Korea--be really the original, how comes it that the other Chinese book, included in a collection made two centuries later, should happen to differ from it in the precise parts in which it, the supposed original, differs from the Pâli? Surely the only probable hypothesis would be that of the Chinese books, both working on the same original, the later is more exact than the earlier: and that we simply have here one more instance of an already well-known characteristic of Chinese reproductions of Indian books--namely, that the later version is more accurate than the older one. The later a Chinese 'translation' the better, in the few cases where comparison is possible, it has proved to be (that is, the nearer to our idea of what a translation should be); p. xiv and Tibetan versions are better, as a rule, than the best of the Chinese. Since the publication of this very interesting paper, M. Sylvain Lévi has had the great kindness to send me an advance proof of a more complete paper, to be published in Paris, in which M. Specht and himself have made a detailed analysis of the three versions, setting out over against the English translation of each question (as contained in the first volume of the present work) the translations of it as they appear in each of the Chinese versions. I have not been able by a study of this analysis to add anything to the admirable summary of the conclusions as to the relations of these two books to one another and to the Pâli which are given by M. Specht in his article in the Proceedings of the Ninth Congress. The later version is throughout much nearer to the Pâli; but neither of the two give more than a small portion of it, the earlier does not seem to go much further than our Volume I, page 99 (just where the Pâli has the remark, 'Here end the questions of king Milinda'), and the later, though it goes beyond this point, apparently stops at Volume I, page 114. These details are of importance for the decision of the critical question of the history of the Milinda. The book starts with an elaborate and very skilful introduction, giving first an account of the way in which Nâgasena and Milinda had met in a previous birth, then the life history, in order, of each of them in this birth, then the account of how they met. Throughout the whole story the attention is constantly directed to the very great ability of the two disputants, and to the fact that they had been specially prepared through their whole existence for this great encounter, which was to be of the first importance for religion and for the world. This introductory story occupies in my translation thirty-nine pages. Is it likely that so stately an entrance hall should have really been built to lead only into one or two small rooms?--to two chapters occupying only sixty pages more? Is it not more probable that the original architect had a better sense of proportion? As an Introduction to the book as we have it in these p. xv volumes the story told in those thirty-nine pages is very much in place; as an Introduction to the first two chapters only, or to the first two and a portion of the third, it is quite incongruous. And accordingly we find in the very beginning of the Introduction a kind of table of contents in which the shape of the whole book, as we have it here, is foreshadowed in detail, and in due proportion. This will have to be taken into account when, with full translations of the two Chinese books before us, we shall have to consider whether they are really copies of the original statue, or whether they are interesting fragments. I ought not to close this reference to the labours of MM. Lévi and Specht without calling attention to a slip of the pen in one expression used by M. Sylvain Lévi regarding the Milinda 1. He says, 'La science ne connaissait jusqu'ici de cet ouvrage qu'un texte écrit en Pâli et incorporé dans le canon Singhalais?' Now there is, accurately speaking, no such thing as a Sinhalese canon of the Buddhist Scriptures, any more than there is a French or an English canon of the Christian Scriptures. The canon of the three Pitakas, settled in the valley of the Ganges (probably at Patna in the time of Asoka), has been adhered to, it is true, in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. But it cannot properly be called either a Ceylonese or a Burmese or a Siamese canon. In that canon the Milinda was never incorporated. And not only so, but the expression used clearly implies that there is some other canon. Now there has never been any other canon of the Buddhist Scriptures besides this one of the three Pitakas. Many Buddhist books, not incorporated in the canon, have been composed in different languages--Pâli, Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese, Sinhalese, Burmese, Siamese, &c.--but no new canon, in the European meaning of the phrase, has ever been formed. One meets occasionally, no doubt, in European books on Buddhism allusions or references to a later canon p. xvi supposed to have been settled at the Council of Kanishka. The, blunder originated, I believe, with Mr. Beal. But in the only account of that Council which we possess, that of Yuan Thsang 1, there is no mention at all of any new canon having been settled. The account is long and detailed. An occurrence of so extreme an importance would scarcely have escaped the notice of the Chinese writer. But throughout the account the canonicity of the three Pitakas is simply taken for granted. The members of the Council were chosen exclusively from those who knew the three Pitakas, and the work they performed was the composition of three books--the Upadesa, the Vinaya Vibhâshâ, and the Abhidharma Vibhâshâ. The words which follow in the Chinese have been differently interpreted by the European translators. Julien says: 'They (the members of the Council) thoroughly explained the three Pitakas, and thus placed them above all the books of antiquity 2.' Beal, on the other hand, renders: 'Which (namely, which three books) thoroughly explained the three Pitakas. There was no work of antiquity to be compared with (placed above) their productions 3.' It is immaterial which version best conveys the meaning of the original. They both clearly show that, in the view of Yuan Thsang, the Council of Kanishka did not establish any new canon. Since that time the rulers of China, Japan, and Tibet have from time to time published collections of Buddhist books. But none of these collections even purports to be a canon of the Scriptures. They contain works of very various, and some quite modern, ages and authors: and can no more be regarded as a canon of the Buddhist Scriptures than Migne's voluminous collection of Christian books can be called a new canon of the Christian Scriptures. p. xvii This was already pointed out in my little manual, 'Buddhism,' published in 1877, and it is a pity that references in subsequent books to a supposed canon settled at Kanishka's Council have still perpetuated the blunder. M. Sylvain Lévi, for whose genius and scholarship I have the profoundest respect, does not actually say that there was such a canon; but his words must lead readers, ignorant of the facts, to imply that there was one. I have also to add that M. Barth has called attention 1 to the fact that M. Sylvain Lévi has added another service to those already mentioned as rendered by him to the interpretation of the Milinda, by a discussion of the reference to our book in the Abhidharma-kosa-vyâkhyâ, referred to in my previous Introduction, p. xxvi. This discussion was published in a periodical I have not seen 2. But it seems that M. Lévi, with the help of two Chinese translations, has been able to show that the citation is not only in the commentary, but also in the text, of Vasubandhu's work. M. Léon Feer has been kind enough to send me the actual words of the reference, and they will be found published in the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society' for 1991, p. 476. Professor Serge d'Oldenbourg has also been good enough to point out to me that the two Cambridge MSS. of Kshemendra's Bodhisattvâvadâna-kalpalatâ read Milinda (not Millinda as given by Râjendra Lâl Mitra 3) as the name of the king referred to in the 57th Avadâna, the Stûpâvadâna. I had not noticed this reference to the character in our historical romance. It comes in quite incidentally, the Buddha prophesying to Indra that a king Milinda would erect a stûpa at Pâtaligrâma. There is no allusion to our book, and the passage is only interesting as showing that the memory of king Milinda still survived in India at the time when Kshemendra wrote in the eleventh century A.D. Another reference to one of the characters in the Milinda p. xviii which has Come to notice since the publication of part i, is in the closing words of the Attha-Sâlinî-Atthayoganâ (a tikâ on Buddhaghosa's first work, his commentary on the Dhamma Sangani), which was written in Siam after the twelfth century by Ñânakitti, and edited in 1890 at Galle, by Paññâsekhara Unnânsê. On page 265 we read: Vattaniya-senâsane ti Viñghâtaviyam Vattaniya-senâsane. Tena vuttam Mahâvamse: Assagutta-mahâthero pabhinna-Patisambhido Satthi-bhikkhû sahassâni Viñghattaviyam âdiya Vattaniya-senâsanâ nabhasâ tattha-m-otarîti. 'The words Vattaniya-senâsane mean, "in the Vattaniya Hermitage in the Vindhya Desert." Therefore it is said in the Mahâvamsa: '"The great Thera Assagutta, who knew so well the Patisambhidâ, bringing sixty thousand brethren from the Vattaniya Hermitage in the Vindhya Desert through the sky, descended there."' This quotation is very interesting. It follows that in the original text of the Attha Sâlinî there is something about the Vattaniya Hermitage. And also that the author of this Tîkâ must have had before him some text of our Mahâvamsa differing from ours, or perhaps some other Mahâvamsa. For the lines quoted do not occur in our text. The nearest approach to them is one line in the description of the assembly that came together at the consecration of the Mahâ Thûpa at Anurâdhapura in the year 157 B.C. It runs 1: Viñghâtavi-Vattaniya-senasânâ 2 tu Uttaro Thero, satthi-sahassâni bhikkhû âdâya âgamâ. 'The thera Uttara came up bringing with him sixty thousand Bhikshus from the Vattaniya Hermitage [not Uttania Temple as Turnour translates] in the Vindhya Desert.' The resemblance of the passages is striking. But all p. xix that can be concluded is that the author of our Mahâvamsa, Mahânâma, who wrote in the middle of the fifth century, knew of the Vattaniya Hermitage; and that the author of the text quoted by Ñânakitti (in a passage probably describing the same event) mentions an Assagutta as having come to the festival from his hermitage at Vattaniya. Both these references are entirely legendary. In order to magnify the importance of the great festival held in Ceylon on the occasion referred to, it is related that certain famous members of the Buddhist order came, attended by many followers, through the sky, to take part in the ceremony. A comparison of this list with the previous list, also given in the Mahâvamsa 1, of the missionaries sent out nearly a hundred years before, by Asoka, will show that the names in the second list are in great part an echo of those in the first. But in selecting well-known names, Mahânâma in his second, fabulous, list has, according to the published text, also included that of the Vattaniya Hermitage, and, according to the new verse in the other text, has associated with that place the name of Assagutta, not found elsewhere except in the Milinda. In that book the residence of Assagutta is not specified--it is his friend Rohana who lives at the Vattaniya, and the locality of the Vattaniya is not specified--it would seem from the statement at I, 25 (part i, p. 20 of this translation) that it was a day's journey from 'the Guarded Slope,' that is, in the Himâlayas. But geographical allusions are apt to be misleading when the talk is of Bhikshus who could fly through the air. And it seems the most probable explanation that the authors of these verses, in adopting these names, had the Milinda story in their mind. [Turnour's reading of the name as Uttara, and not Assagutta, is confirmed by the Dîpavamsa, chap. XIX, verses 4-6, where all the fourteen names of the visitors from India are given (without any details as to the districts whence they came), and the corresponding name is also Uttara there.] p. xx The above sets out all the new information I have been able to glean about the Milinda since the publication of the Introduction to the first volume of this translation. I had hoped in this Introduction to discuss the doctrines, as apart from the historical and geographical allusions, of our author--comparing his standpoint with that of the earliest Buddhists, set out in the four great Nikâyas, with that of later books contained in the Pitakas, and with that of still later works not included in the canon at all. I have to express my regret that a long and serious illness, culminating in a serious accident that was very nearly a fatal one, has deprived me altogether of the power of work, and not only prevented me from carrying out this perhaps too ambitious design, but has so long delayed the writing of this Introduction. Only one of the preliminary habours to the intended Introduction was completed. I read through the Kathâ Vatthu, which has not yet been edited, with a view of ascertaining whether, at the time when that book was written, that is, in the time of Asoka, the kind of questions agitating the Buddhist community bore any relation to the kind of questions discussed by the: author of our Milinda. As is well known, the Kathâ Vatthu sets out a number of points on which the orthodox school, that of the Thera-vâdins, differed in Asoka's time from the other seventeen schools (afterwards called collectively the Hînayâna) which had sprung up among the Buddhists between the time of the Buddha and that of Asoka. I published in the 'Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society' for 1892 a statement, both in the original Pâli and in English, of all the points thus discussed by the author of the Kathâ Vatthu, Moggali-putta Tissa Thera, giving (from the commentary) the names of the various schools against whom, in each instance, his remarks were directed. It is now possible to judge from this analysis of the questions proposed, what were the subjects on which differences obtained among the early Buddhists. There are a number of points raised in Tissa's discussions which are also discussed by the author of the Milinda. In every p. xxi instance the two authors agree in their views, Nâgasena in the Milinda always advocating the opinion which Tissa puts forward as that of the Thera-vâdins. This is especially the case with those points which Moggali-putta Tissa thinks of so much importance that he discusses them at much greater length than the others. His first chapter, for instance, by far the longest in his book, is on the question whether, in the high and truest sense of the word, there can be said to be a 'soul' 1. It is precisely this question which forms also the subject of the very first discussion between Milinda and Nâgasena, the conversation leading up to the celebrated simile of the chariot by which Nâgasena apparently convinces Milinda of the truth of the orthodox Buddhist view that there is really no such thing as a 'soul' in the ordinary sense 2. On leaving the sage, the king returns to his palace, and the next day the officer who escorts Nâgasena there to renew the discussion, occupies the time to raise again the same question, and is answered by the simile of the musicians 3. Not content with these two expositions of this important doctrine, the author of the Milinda returns again soon afterwards to the same point, which he illustrates by the simile of the palace 4, and further on in the book he takes occasion to discuss and refute the commonly held opinion that there is a soul in inanimate things, such as water 5. It cannot be doubted that the authors of the Kathâ Vatthu and the Milinda were perfectly justified in putting this crucial question in the very forefront of their discussion--just as the Buddha himself, as is well known, made it the subject of the very first discourse he addressed to his earliest converted followers, the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, included both in the Vinaya and in the Anguttara Nikâya 6. The history of ideas about the 'soul' has yet to be p. xxii written. But the outlines of it are pretty well established, and there is nothing to show that the Indian notions on the subject, apart perhaps from the subsidiary beliefs in Karma and transmigration, were materially different from those obtaining elsewhere. Already in prehistoric times the ancestors of the Indian peoples, whether Aryan by race or not, had come to believe, probably through the influence of dreams, in the existence inside each man of a subtle image of the man himself. This weird and intangible form left the body during sleep, and at death it continued in some way to live. It was a crude hypothesis found useful to explain the phenomena of dreams, of motion, and of life. And it was applied very indiscriminately to the allied phenomena in external things--the apparent life and motion, not only of animals, but also of plants and rivers, of winds and celestial bodies, being explained by the hypothesis of a soul within them. The varying conditions and appearances of the external world gave rise to the various powers and qualities ascribed to these external souls, and hence to whole systems of polytheism and mythology. And just as the gods, which never had any existence except in the ideas of their worshippers, were born and grew and changed and passed away with those ideas, so also the hypothesis of internal souls had, no less in India than elsewhere, a continual change, a continual development--and this not only as to ideas on the nature and origin of the internal human souls, but as to their relation to the external souls or gods. And when speculation, which loved to busy itself with these mysterious and fanciful hypotheses, had learnt to conjecture a unity behind the variety of external spirits, the relation of men's souls to the one great first cause, to God, became the subject of endless discussions, of varying views invented to harmonise with varying preconceived conceptions. When Buddhism arose these hypotheses as to 'souls,' internal and external, formed the basis of all the widely differing, and very living and earnest, religious and philosophical speculations in the valley of the Ganges, where there then obtained that marvellous freedom of thought p. xxiii on all such subjects which has been throughout its history a distinguishing characteristic of the Indian people. Now there is one work, of more importance than any other in Buddhism, the collection of the Dialogues of Gotama the Buddha, brought together in the Dîgha and Magghima Nikâyas. It contains the views of the Buddha set out, as they appeared to his very earliest disciples, in a series of 185 conversational discourses, which will some day come to hold a place, in the history of human thought, akin to that held by the Dialogues of Plato. Is it a mere chance, or is it the actual result of the necessities of the case, that this question of 'souls' is put into the forefront of this collection, just as it is the point treated first and at the greatest length in the Kathâ Vatthu, and put first also in the Milinda? The first of these 185 dialogues is the Brahmagâla Suttanta, the discourse called the Perfect Net, the net whose meshes are so fine that no folly of superstition, however subtle, can slip through--the clearing away of the rubbish before the foundations are laid for the new palace of good sense. In it are set out sixty-two varieties of existing hypotheses, and after each and all of them has been rejected, the doctrine of Arahatship is put forward as the right solution. The sixty-two heresies are as follows: 1-4. SASSATA-VÂDÂ. People who, either from meditation of three degrees, or fourthly through logic and reasoning, have come to believe that both the external world as a whole, and individual souls, are eternal. 5-8. EKAKKA-SASSATIKÂ. People who, in four ways, hold that some souls are eternal, while others are not. a. Those who hold that God is eternal, but not the individual souls. b. Those who hold that all the gods are eternal, but not the individual souls. c. Those who hold that certain illustrious gods are eternal, but not the human souls. p. xxiv d. Those who hold that while the bodily forms are not eternal, there is a subtle something, called Heart or Mind, or Consciousness, which is. 9-12. ANTÂNTIKÂ. People who chop logic about finity and infinity. a. Those who hold the world to be finite. b. Those who hold it to be infinite. c. Those who hold it to be both. d. Those who hold it to be neither. 13-16. AMARA-VIKKHEPIKÂ. People who equivocate about virtue and vice-- a. From the fear that if they express a decided opinion grief at possible mistake will injure them. b. That they may form attachments which will injure them. c. That they may be unable to answer skilful disputants. d. From dullness and stupidity. 17, 18. ADHIKKA-SAMUPPANIKÂ. People who think that the origin of things can be explained without a cause. 19-50. UDDHAMA-ÂGHATANIKÂ. People who believe in the future existence of human souls. a. Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death. b. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an unconscious existence after death. c. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an existence between consciousness and unconsciousness after death. 51-57. UKKHEDA-VÂDâ. People who teach the doctrine that there is a soul, but that it will cease to exist on the death of the body here, or at the end of a next life, or of further lives in higher and ever higher states of being. 58-62. DITTHA-DHAMMIKA-NIBBÂNA-VÂDÂ. People who hold that there is a soul, and that it can attain to perfect bliss in this present world, or in whatever world it happens to be-- p. xxv a. By a full, complete, and perfect enjoyment of the five senses. b. By an enquiring mental abstraction (the First Dhyâna). c. By undisturbed mental bliss, untarnished by enquiry (the Second Dhyâna). d. By mental peace, free alike from joy and pain and enquiry (the Third Dhyâna). e. By this mental peace plus a sense of purity (the Fourth Dhyâna). Professor Garbe, in his just published 'Sankhya Philosophie 1,' holds that the first persons attacked in this list are the followers of the Sânkhya. The double view of the Sassata-vâdâ is no doubt the basis of the Sânkhya system. But the system contains much more, and it would be safer to say that we have here a warning against the philosophical view which afterwards developed into the Sânkhya, or rather which became afterwards a fundamental part of the Sânkhya. The Vedânta, in either of its forms, is not, it will be noticed, referred to in any one of the sixty-two divisions; but philosophical views forming part of the Vedânta may be traced in Nos. 5, 8, 10, 20, &c. The scheme is not intended as a refutation of the views, as a whole, held by any special school or individual, but as a statement of erroneous views on two special points, namely, the soul and the world. However this may be, we find an ample justification in this comprehensive and systematic condemnation of all current or possible forms of the soul-theory for the prominence which the author of the Milinda gives to the subject. The other points on which the Milinda may be compared with the Kathâ Vatthu will need less comment. The discussion in the Milinda as to the manner in which the Divine Eye can arise in a man 2, is a reminiscence of the question raised in the Kathâ Vatthu III, 7 as to whether the eye of flesh can, through strength of dhamma, grow into the Divine Eye. The discussion in the Milinda as to p. xxvi how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahat, can enter the Order 1, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarâpathakâ, in the Kathâ Vatthu IV, i. Our Milinda ascribes the verses, 'Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith,' &c., to the Buddha 2. In the note on that passage I had pointed out that they are ascribed, not to the Buddha, but to Abhibhû in certain Pitaka texts, and to the Buddha himself only in late Sanskrit works. In the exposition of Kathâ Vatthu II, 3 the verses are also ascribed to the Buddha. The proposition in the Kathâ Vatthu II, 8 that the Buddha, in the ordinary affairs of life, was not transcendental, agrees with Nâgasena's argument in the Milinda, part ii, pp. 8-12. The discussion in the Milinda as to whether an Arahat can be thoughtless or guilty of an offence 3 is foreshadowed by the similar points raised in the Kathâ Vatthu I, 2; II, 1, 2, and VIII, 11. And the two dilemmas, Nos. 65 and 66, especially as to the cause of space, may be compared with the discussion in Kathâ Vatthu VI, 6, as to whether space is self-existent. The general result of a comparison between these two very interesting books of controversial apologetics seems to me to be that the differences between them are just such as one might expect (a) from the difference of date, and (b) from the fact that the controversy in the older book is carried on against members of the same communion, whereas in the Milinda we have a defence of Buddhism as against the outsider. The Kathâ Vatthu takes almost the whole of the conclusions reached in the Milinda for granted, and goes on to discuss further questions on points of detail. It does not give a description of Arahatship in glowing terms, but discusses minor points as to whether the realisation of Arahatship includes the Fruits of the three lower paths 4, or whether all the qualities of an Arahat are free from the Âsavas 5, or whether the knowledge of his p. xxvii emancipation alone makes a man an Arahat 1, or whether the breaking of the Fetters constitutes Arahatship, and whether the insight into Arahatship suffices to break all the Fetters 2, and so on. The discussion of these details gives no opportunity for the enthusiastic eloquence of the author of our Milinda, and the very fact of his eloquence argues a later date. But there can be no doubt as to the superiority of his style. And I still adhere to the opinions expressed in the former Introduction that the work, as it stands in the Pâli, is of its kind (that is, as a book of apologetic controversy) the best in point of style that had then been written in any country; and that it is the masterpiece of Indian prose. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

May, 1894. Footnotes xi:1 Called on the title-page 'Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka.' But this must surely be a mistake. It includes a number of works which are not translations at all, and translations of a large number of others which do not belong to the Pitakas. xi:2 No. 1358 in the Catalogue. Translated under the Eastern Tsin Dynasty, 317-420. xi:3 As there is nothing about this curious Introduction in either of M. Specht's papers to be mentioned immediately, it seems possible that there are really three Chinese books on the same subject. xii:1 It would be very interesting to have this point decided; namely, whether the volume in the India Office Library is identical with either of the two very different books in Paris. If not, we have, then, still another Chinese book on Milinda. xii:2 Vol. i. pp. 520-529. xv:1 'Transactions of the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists,' vol. i, p. 518. xvi:1 Julien's translation, vol. i, pp. 173-178, and Mr. Beal's own translation, i, 147-157. There are two or three incidental references to the Council in other works. See my 'Buddhism,' p. 239. xvi:2 St. Julien, 'Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhistes,' vol. i, pp. 177, 178. xvi:3 Beal, 'Buddhist Records of the Western World,' vol. i, p. 155. xvii:1 In the 'Revue de l'Histoire des Religions' for 1893 (which has only just reached me), p. 258. xvii:2 The 'Comptes rendus des Séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres,' 1893, p. 232. xvii:3 'Nepalese Buddhist Literature,' p. 60. xviii:1 Chapter XXIX, p. 171, of Turnour's edition. xviii:2 Turnour has Vattaniyâ-senâsanu. xix:1 Turnour, pp. 1-73 xxi:1 Kathâ Vatthu I, 1. xxi:2 Milinda, i, pp. 40-41. xxi:3 Milinda, i, p. 48. xxi:4 Milinda, i, pp. 86-89. xxi:5 Milinda, ii, pp. 85-87. xxi:6 Vinaya Texts (S. B. E. XIII), part i, pp. 100, 101, and Anguttara Nikâya. xxv:1 Introduction, p. 57. xxv:2 Milinda, i, pp. 179-185. xxvi:1 Milinda, ii, pp. 96-98 (compare 57-59). xxvi:2 Milinda, ii, p. 60. xxvi:3 Milinda, ii, pp. 98 foll. xxvi:4 Kathâ Vatthu IV, 9. xxvi:5 Kathâ Vatthu IV, 3. xxvii:1 Kathâ Vatthu V, 1. xxvii:2 Kathâ Vatthu V, 10, and X, 1. Next: Chapter 5 Sacred Texts | Buddhism

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Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 1 THE QUESTIONS OF KING MILINDA. BOOK IV. THE SOLVING OF DILEMMAS.

[DILEMMA THE FORTY-FIRST. ON DWELLING-PLACES.] 1. [211] 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: In friendship of the world anxiety is born, In household life distraction's dust springs up, The state set free from home and friendship's ties, That, and that only, is the recluse's aim 1." p. 2 'But on the other hand he said: "Let therefore the wise man, Regarding his own weal, Have pleasant dwelling-places built, And lodge there learned men 1." Now, venerable Nâgasena, if the former of these two passages was really spoken by the Tathâgata, then the second must be wrong. But if the Tathâgata really said: "Have pleasant dwelling-places built," then the former statement must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 2. [212] 'Both the passages you have quoted, O king, were spoken by the Tathâgata. And the former is a statement as to the nature of things, an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be supplemented to it, or to be added to it in the way of gloss 2, as to what is seemly and appropriate and proper for a recluse, and as to the mode of life which a recluse should adopt, the path he should walk along, and the practice he should follow. For just, O king, as a deer in the forest, wandering in the woods, sleeps wherever he desires, having no home and no p. 3 dwelling-place, so also should the recluse be of opinion that "In friendship of the world anxiety is born, In household life distraction's dust springs up." 3. 'But when the Blessed One said: "Have pleasant dwelling-places built, And lodge there learned men," that was said with respect to two matters only. And what are those two? The gift of a dwelling-place (Wihâra) has been praised and approved, esteemed and highly spoken of, by all the Buddhas. And those who have made such a gift shall be delivered from rebirth, old age, and death. This is the first of the advantages in the gift of a dwelling-place. And again, if there be a common dwelling place (a Wihâra) the sisters of the Order will have a clearly ascertained place of rendezvous, and those who wish to visit (the brethren of the Order) 1 will find it an easy matter to do so. Whereas if there were no homes for the members of the Order it would be difficult to visit them. This is the second of the advantages in the gift of a dwelling-place (a Wihâra). It was with reference to these two matters only that it was said by the Blessed One: "Have pleasant dwelling-places built, And lodge there learned men." [213] 'And it does not follow from that that the sons of the Buddha 2 should harbour longings after the household life.' p. 4 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to dwelling-places.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FORTY-SECOND. MODERATION IN FOOD.] 4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed) when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach 1." But on the other hand he said: Now there were several days, Udâyin, on which I ate out of this bowl when it was full to the brim, and ate even more 2." 'Now if the first rule be true, then the second statement must be false. But if the statement be true, then the rule first quoted must be wrong. . p. 5 This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 5. 'Both the passages you have quoted, O king, were spoken by the Blessed One. But the former passage [214] is a statement as to the nature of things, an inclusive statement, a statement which leaves no room for anything to be supplemented to it, or added to it in the way of gloss, a statement of what is true and real and in accordance with the facts, and that cannot be proved wrong, a declaration made by the prophets, and sages, and teachers, and Arahats, and by the Buddhas who are wise for themselves alone (Pakkeka-Buddhas), a declaration made by the Conquerors, and by the All-wise Ones, a declaration made too by the Tathâgata, the Arahat, the Supreme Buddha himself. He who has no self-control as regards the stomach, O king, will destroy living creatures, will take possession of what has not been given to him, will be unchaste, will speak lies, will drink strong drink, will put his mother or his father to death, will slay an Arahat, will create a schism in the Order, will even with malice aforethought wound a Tathâgata. Was it not, O king, when without restraint as to his stomach, that Devadatta by breaking up the Order, heaped up for himself karma that would endure for a kalpa 1? It was on calling to mind this, O king, and many other things of the same kind, that the Blessed One declared: Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed) p. 6 when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach." 6. 'And he who has self-control as regards the stomach gains a clear insight into the Four Truths, realises the Four Fruits of the life of renunciation 1, and attains to mastery over the Four Discriminations 2, the Eight Attainments 3, and the Six Modes of Higher Knowledge 4, and fulfils all that goes to constitute the life of the recluse. Did not the parrot fledgling, O king, by self-restraint as to his stomach, cause the very heaven of the great Thirty-Three to shake, and bring down Sakka, the king of the gods, to wait upon him 5? It was on calling to mind this, O king, and many other things of a similar kind, that the Blessed One declared: "Be not remiss as to (the rules to be observed) when standing up (to beg for food). Be restrained in (matters relating to) the stomach." 7. 'But when, O king, the Blessed One said: "Now there were several days, Udâyi, on which I ate out of this bowl when it was full to the brim, and ate even more," that was said by him who had completed his task, who had finished all that he had to do, who had accomplished the end he set before him, who had overcome every obstruction, by the self-dependent 6 Tathâgata himself about himself. p. 7 [paragraph continues] Just, O king, as it is desirable that a sick man to whom an emetic, or a purge, or a clyster has been administered, should be treated with a tonic; [215] just so, O king, should the man who is full of evil, and who has not perceived the Four Truths, adopt the practice of restraint in the matter of eating. But just, O king, as there is no necessity of polishing, and rubbing down 1, and purifying a diamond gem of great brilliancy, of the finest water, and of natural purity; just so, O king, is there no restraint as to what actions he should perform, on the Tathâgata, on him who hath attained to perfection in all that lies within the scope of a Buddha 2.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to restraint in eating.] p. 8 [DILEMMA THE FORTY-THIRD. BAKKULA'S SUPERIORITY TO THE BUDDHA.] 8. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice 1, pure-handed at every time; this body that I bear with me is my last, I am the supreme Healer and Physician 2." 'But on the other hand the Blessed One said: "The chief, O brethren, among those who are disciples of mine, in the matter of bodily health, is Bakkula 3." 'Now it is well known that diseases arose several times in the body of the Blessed One. So that if, Nâgasena, the Tathâgata was supreme, then the statement he made about Bakkula's bodily health must be wrong. But if the Elder named Bakkula was really chief among those who were healthy, then that statement which I first quoted must be p. 9 wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 9. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct 1. But what the Blessed One said about Bakkula was said of those disciples who had learnt by heart the sacred words, and studied them, and handed down the tradition, which in reference to the characteristics (each of them in some one point) had in addition to those which were found in him himself 2. [216] For there were certain of the disciples of the Blessed One, O king, who were "meditators on foot," spending a whole day and night in walking up and down in meditation. But the Blessed One was in the habit of spending the day and night in meditation, not only walking up and down but also sitting and lying down. So such, O king, of the disciples as were "meditators on foot 3" surpassed him in that particular. And there were certain of the disciples of the Blessed One, O king, who were "eaters at one sitting," who would not, even to save their lives, take more than one meal a day. But the p. 10 [paragraph continues] Blessed One was in the habit of taking a second, or even a third. So such, O king, of the disciples as were "eaters at one sitting" surpassed him in that particular. And in a similar way, O king, a number of different things have been told, each one of one or other of the disciples. But the Blessed One, O king, surpassed them all in respect of uprightness, and of power of meditation, and of wisdom, and of emancipation, and of that insight which arises out of the knowledge of emancipation, and in all that lies within the scope of a Buddha. It was with reference to that, O king, that he said: "A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice, pure-handed at every time; this body that I bear with me is my last, I am the supreme Healer and Physician." 10. 'Now one man, O king, may be of good birth, and another may be wealthy, and another full of wisdom, and another well educated, and another brave, and another adroit; but a king, surpassing all these, is reckoned supreme. just in that way, O king, is the Blessed One the highest, the most worthy of respect, the best of all beings. And in so far as the venerable Bakkula was healthy in body, that was by reason of an aspiration (he had formed in a previous birth) 1. For, O king, when Anoma-dassî, the Blessed One, was afflicted with a disease, with wind in his stomach, and again when Vipassî, the Blessed One, and sixty-eight thousand of his disciples, were afflicted with a disease, with greenness of blood 2, he, p. 11 being at those times an ascetic, had cured that disease with various medicines, and attained (thereby) to such healthiness of body (in this life) that it was said of him: "The chief, O brethren, among those who are disciples of mine, in the matter of bodily health, is Bakkula." 11. 'But the Blessed One, O king, whether he be suffering, or not suffering from disease; whether he have taken, or not taken, upon himself the observance p. 12 of special vows 1,--there is no being like unto the Blessed One. [217] For this, O king, has been said by the Blessed One, the god of gods, in the most excellent Samyutta Nikâya 2: "Whatsoever beings, O brethren, there may be whether without feet, or bipeds, or four-footed things, whether with a body, or without a body, whether conscious or unconscious, or neither conscious nor not--the Tathâgata is acknowledged to be the chief of all, the Arahat, the Buddha Supreme."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say 3.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the superiority of Bakkula to the Buddha.] p. 13 [DILEMMA, THE FORTY-FOURTH. THE ORIGINALITY OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING.] 12. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme 1, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown 2." 'But on the other hand he said: "Now I perceived, O brethren, the ancient way, the ancient path, along which the previous Buddhas walked 2." 'If, Nâgasena, the Tathâgata be the discoverer of a way not previously found out, then it must be wrong that it was an ancient way that he perceived, an ancient path along which previous Buddhas walked. But if the way he perceived were an ancient way, then the statement that it was unknown must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 13. 'Both the quotations you make, O king, are accurate. And both the statements so made are correct. When the previous Tathâgatas, O king, had disappeared, then, there being no teacher left, their way too disappeared. And it was that way--though then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, no longer passable, quite lost to view--[218] that the Tathâgata, having gained a p. 14 thorough knowledge of it, saw by the eye of his wisdom 1, (and knew it) as the way that previous Buddhas trod. And therefore is it that he said: "Now I perceived, O brethren, the ancient way, the ancient path along which previous Buddhas walked." 'And it was a way which--there being, through the disappearance of previous Tathâgatas, no teacher left--was a way then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, and lost to view, that the Tathâgata made now passable again. And therefore is it that he said: "The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown." 14. 'Suppose, O king, that on the disappearance of a sovran overlord, the mystic Gem of Sovranty lay concealed in a cleft on the mountain peak, and that on another sovran overlord arriving at his supreme dignity, it should appear to him. Would you then say, O king, that the Gem was produced by him 2?' 'Certainly not, Sir! The Gem would be in its original condition. But it has received, as it were, a new birth through him.' 'Just so, O king, is it that the Blessed One, gaining a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of' p. 15 his wisdom, brought back to life and made passable again the most excellent eightfold way in its original condition as when it was walked along by the previous Tathâgatas,--though that way, when there was no teacher more, had become broken up, had crumbled away, had gone to ruin, was closed in, and lost to view. And therefore is it that he said: "The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown." 15. 'It is, O king, as when a mother brings forth from her womb the child that is already there, and the saying is that the mother has given birth to the child. Just so, O king, did the Tathâgata, having gained a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of his wisdom, bring into life, and make passable again, a way that was already there, though then broken up, crumbled away, gone to ruin, closed in, and lost to view. 'It is as when some man or other finds a thing that has been lost, and the people use the phrase: "He has brought it back to life." [219] And it is as when a man clears away the jungle, and sets free 1 a piece of land, and the people use the phrase: "That is his land." But that land is not made by him. It is because he has brought the land into use that he is called the owner of the land. Just so, O king, did the Tathâgata, having gained a thorough knowledge of it by the eye of his wisdom, bring back to life, and make passable again, a way that was already there, though then broken up, crumbled p. 16 away, gone to ruin, closed in, no longer passable, and lost to view. And therefore is it that he said: "The Tathâgata, O brethren, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, is the discoverer of a way that was unknown."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the way of Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FORTY-FIFTH. THE BUDDHA'S KINDNESS.] 16. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "Already in former births when I was a man had I acquired the habit of inflicting no hurt on living beings 1." But on the other hand it is said 2: When he was Lomasa Kassapa, the Rishi, he had hundreds of living creatures slain and offered the great sacrifice, the 'Drink of Triumph 3.'" p. 17 'Now, Nâgasena, if it is true what the Buddha said, that, in his former births as a man, he inflicted no hurt on living beings, then the saying that, as Lomasa Kassapa, he had hundreds of living creatures slain must be false. But if he had, then the saying that he inflicted no hurt on living beings must be false. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 17. 'The Blessed One did say, O king, that already in former births, when he was a man, he had acquired the habit of inflicting no hurt on living beings. And Lomasa Kassapa, the Rishi, did have hundreds of living creatures slain, and offered the great sacrifice, the "Drink of Triumph." [220] But that was done when he was out of his mind through lust, and not when he was conscious of what he was doing.' 'There are these eight classes of men, Nâgasena, who kill living beings--the lustful man through his lust, and the cruel man through his anger, and the dull man through his stupidity, and the proud man through his pride, and the avaricious man through his greed, and the needy man for the sake of a livelihood, and the fool in joke, and the king in the way of punishment. These, Nâgasena, are the eight classes of men who, kill living beings. The Bodisat, venerable Nâgasena, must have been acting in accordance with his natural disposition when he did so.' 'No, it was not, O king, an act natural to him that the Bodisat did then. If the Bodisat had been led, by natural inclination, to offer the great sacrifice, he would not have uttered the verse: p. 18 "Not the whole world, Sayha, the ocean girt, With all the seas and hills that girdle it, Would I desire to have, along with shame 1." 'But though, O king, the Bodisat had said that, yet at the very sight of Kandavatî (Moon-face), the princess 2, he went out of his mind and lost command of himself through love. And it was when thus out of his mind, confused and agitated, that he, with his thoughts all perplexed, scattered and wandering, thus offered the great sacrifice, the "Drink of Triumph,"--and mighty was the outpour of blood from the necks of the slaughtered beasts! 'Just, O king, as a madman, when out of his senses, will step into a fiery furnace, and take hold of an infuriated venomous snake, and go up to a rogue elephant, and plunge forwards into great waters, the further shore of which he cannot see, and trample through dirty pools and muddy places 3, and rush into thorny brakes, and fall down precipices, and feed himself on filth, and go naked through the streets, and do many other things improper to be done--just so was it, O king, that at the very sight of Kandavatî, the princess, the Bodisat went out of his mind, and then only acted as I have said 4. 18. [221] 'Now an evil act done, O king, by one out of his mind, is even in this present world not considered as a grievous offence, nor is it so in p. 19 respect of the fruit that it brings about in a future life. Suppose, O king, that a madman had been guilty of a capital offence, what punishment would you inflict upon him?' 'What punishment is due to a madman? We should order him to be beaten and set free. That is all the punishment he would have.' 'So then, O king, there is no punishment according to the offence of a madman. It follows that there is no sin in the act done by a madman, it is a pardonable act. And just so, O king, is it with respect to Lomasa Kassapa, the Rishi, who at the mere sight of Kandavatî, the princess, went out of his mind, and lost command of himself through love. It was when thus out of his mind, confused and agitated, that he, with his thoughts all perplexed, scattered and wandering, thus offered the great sacrifice, the "Drink of Triumph,"--and mighty was the outpour of blood from the necks of the slaughtered beasts! But when he returned again to his natural state, and recovered his presence of mind, then did he again renounce the world, and having regained the five powers of insight, became assured of rebirth in the Brahmâ world.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma about Lomasa Kassapa 1.] ____________________________ p. 20 [DILEMMA THE FORTY-SIXTH. THE MOCKING OF THE BUDDHA.] 19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One of Six-tusks, the elephant king, "When he sought to slay him, and had reached him with his trunk, He perceived the yellow robe, the badge of a recluse, Then, though smarting with the pain, the thought possessed his heart,-- 'He who wears the outward garb the Arahats wear Must be scatheless held, and sacred, by the good 1.'" 'But on the other hand it is said: "When he was Gotipâla, the young Brahman, he reviled and abused Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, with vile and bitter words, calling him a shaveling and a good-for-nothing monk 2." 'Now if, Nâgasena, the Bodisat, even when he was an animal, respected the yellow robe, [222] then the statement that as Gotipâla, a Brahman, he reviled and abused the Blessed One of that time, must be false. But if as a Brahman, he reviled and abused the Blessed One, the statement that when he was Six-tusks, the elephant king, he respected the yellow robe, must be false. If when the Bodisat was an animal, though he was suffering severe and cruel and bitter pain, he respected the yellow robe p. 21 which the hunter had put on, how was it that when he was a man, a man arrived at discretion, with all his knowledge mature, he did not pay reverence, on seeing him, to Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, one endowed with the ten powers, the leader of the world, the highest of the high, round whom effulgence spread a fathom on every side, and who was clad in most excellent and precious and delicate Benares cloth made into yellow robes? This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 20. 'The verse you have quoted, O king, was spoken by the Blessed One. And Kassapa the Blessed One, the Arahat, the Buddha supreme, was abused and reviled by Gotipâla the young Brahman with vile and bitter words, with the epithets of shaveling and good-for-nothing monk. But that was owing to his birth and family surroundings. For Gotipâla, O king, was descended from a family of unbelievers, men void of faith. His mother and father, his sisters and brothers, the bondswomen and bondsmen, the hired servants and dependents in the house, were worshippers of Brahmâ, reverers of Brahmâ; and harbouring the idea that Brahmans were the highest and most honourable among men, they reviled and loathed those others who had renounced the world. It was through hearing what they said that Gotipâla, when invited by Ghatîkâra the potter to visit the teacher, replied: "What's the good to you of visiting that shaveling, that good-for-nothing monk?" [223] 21. 'Just, O king, as even nectar when mixed with poison will turn sour, just as the coolest water in contact with fire will become warm, so was p. 22 it that Gotipâla, the young Brahman, having been born and brought up in a family of unbelievers, men void of faith, thus reviled and abused the Tathâgata after the manner of his kind. And just, O king, as a flaming and burning mighty fire, if, even when at the height of its glory, it should come into contact with water, would cool down, with its splendour and glory spoilt, and turn to cinders, black as rotten blighted 1 fruits-just so, O king, Gotipâla, full as he was of merit and faith, mighty as was the glory of his knowledge, yet when reborn into a family of unbelievers, of men void of faith, he became, as it were, blind, and reviled and abused the Tathâgata. But when he had gone to him, and had come to know the virtues of the Buddhas which he had, then did he become as his hired servant; and having renounced the world and entered the Order under the system of the Conqueror, he gained the fivefold power of insight, and the eightfold power of ecstatic meditation, and became assured of rebirth into the Brahmâ heaven.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma about Gotipâla.] p. 23 [DILEMMA THE FORTY-SEVENTH. THE HELPLESSNESS OF A BUDDHA.] 22. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too has been said by the Blessed One: "Ghatîkâra the potter's dwelling-place remained, the whole of it, for three months open to the sky, and no rain fell upon it 1." 'But on the other hand it is said: "Rain fell on the hut of Kassapa the Tathâgata 1." 'How was it, venerable Nâgasena, that the hut of a Tathâgata, the roots of whose merits were so widely spread 2, got wet? One would think that a Tathâgata should have the power to prevent that. If, Nâgasena, Ghatîkâra the potter's dwelling was kept dry when it was open to the sky, it cannot be true that a Tathâgata's hut got wet. But if it did, then it must be false that the potter's dwelling was kept dry. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 23. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct. [224] Ghatîkâra the potter was a good man, beautiful in character, deeply rooted in merit, who supported his old and blind mother and father. And when he was absent, the people, without so much as asking his leave, took away the thatch from his dwelling to roof in with it the hut of the Tathâgata. Then, unmoved and unshaken at his thatch being thus removed, but filled rather p. 24 with a well-grounded and great joy the like of which cannot be found, an immeasurable bliss sprang up in his heart at the thought: "May the Blessed One, the chief of the world, have full confidence in me." And thereby did he obtain merit which brought forth its good result even in this present life. 24. 'And the Tathâgata, O king, was not disturbed by that temporary inconvenience (of the falling rain). Just, O king, as Sineru, the king of the mountains, moves not, neither is shaken, by the onslaught of innumerable gales 1--just as the mighty ocean, the home of the great waters, is not filled up, neither is disturbed at all, by the inflow of innumerable great rivers--just so, O king, is a Tathâgata unmoved at temporary inconvenience. 'And that the rain fell upon the Tathâgata's hut happened out of consideration for the great masses of the people. For there are two circumstances, O king, which prevent the Tathâgatas from themselves supplying (by creative power) any requisite of which they may be in need 2. And what are the two? Men and gods, by supplying the requisites of a Buddha on the ground that he is a teacher worthy of gifts, will thereby be set free from rebirth in states of woe. And lest others should find fault, saying: "They seek their livelihood by the working of miracles." If, O king, Sakka had kept that hut dry, or even Brahmâ himself, even then that action would have been faulty, wrong, and worthy of censure. For people might then say: "These Buddhas by p. 25 their dexterity 1 befool and lord it over the world." That is the reason why such action would have been better left undone. The Tathâgatas, O king, do not ask for any advantage; and it is because they ask for nothing that they are held blameless.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma about Ghatîkâra the potter.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FORTY-EIGHTH. WHY GOTAMA CLAIMED TO BE A BRAHMAN.] [225] 25. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One: "A Brahman am I, O brethren, devoted to self-sacrifice 2." 'But on the other hand he declared: "A king am I, Sela 3." 'If, Nâgasena, the Blessed One were a Brahman, then he must have spoken falsely when he said he was a king. But if he were a king, then he must have spoken falsely when he said he was a Brahman. He must have been either a Khattiya or a Brahman. For he could not have belonged, in the same birth, to two castes. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' p. 26 26. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are correct. But there is good reason why the Tathâgata, should have been both Brahman and also king.' 'Pray what, Nâgasena, can be that reason?' 'Because all evil qualities, not productive of merit, are in the Tathâgata suppressed, abandoned, put away, dispelled, rooted out, destroyed, come to an end, gone out, and ceased, therefore is it that the Tathâgata is called a Brahman 1. A Brahman 2, O king, means one who has passed beyond hesitation, perplexity, and doubt. And it is because the Tathâgata has done all this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who has escaped from every sort and class of becoming, who is entirely set free from evil and from stain, who is dependent on himself 3, and it is because the Tathâgata is all of these things, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who cultivates within himself the highest and best of the excellent and supreme p. 27 conditions of heart 1. And it is because the Tathâgata does this that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who carries on the line of the tradition of the ancient instructions concerning the learning and the teaching of sacred writ, concerning the acceptance of gifts, concerning subjugation of the senses, self-control in conduct, and performance of duty. And it is because the Tathâgata carries on the line of the tradition of the ancient rules enjoined by the Conquerors 2 regarding all these things, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. [226] A Brahman, O king, means one who enjoys the supreme bliss of the ecstatic meditation. And it is because the Tathâgata does this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. A Brahman, O king, means one who knows the course and revolution of births in all forms of existence. And it is because the Tathâgata knows this, that therefore also is he called a Brahman. The appellation "Brahman," O king, was not given to the Blessed One by his mother, nor his father, not by his brother, nor his sister, not by his friends, nor his relations, not by spiritual teachers of any sort, no, not by the gods. It is by reason of their emancipation that this is the name of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones. From the moment when, under the Tree of Wisdom, they had overthrown the armies of the Evil One, had suppressed in themselves all evil qualities not productive of merit, and had attained to the knowledge of the Omniscient p. 28 [paragraph continues] Ones, it was from the acquisition of this insight, the appearance in them of this enlightenment, that this true designation became applied to them,--the name of "Brahman." And that is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a Brahman 1.' 27. 'Then what is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king?' 'A king means, O king, one who rules and guides the world, and the Blessed One rules in righteousness over the ten thousand world systems, he guides the whole world with its men and gods, its evil spirits and its good ones 2, and its teachers, whether Samanas or Brahmans. That is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king means, O king, one who, exalted above all ordinary men, making those related to him rejoice, and those opposed to him mourn; raises aloft the Sunshade of Sovranty, of pure and stainless white, with its handle of firm hard wood 3, and its many hundred ribs 4,--the symbol of his mighty fame and glory. And the Blessed One, O king, making the army of the Evil One, those given over to false doctrine, mourn; filling the hearts of those, among gods or men, devoted to sound doctrine, with joy; [227] raises aloft over the ten thousand world systems the Sunshade of his Sovranty, pure and stainless in the whiteness of emancipation, p. 29 with its hundreds of ribs fashioned out of the highest wisdom, with its handle firm and strong through long suffering,--the symbol of his mighty fame and glory. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who is held worthy of homage by the multitudes who approach him, who come into his presence. And the Blessed One, O king, is held worthy of homage by multitudes of beings, whether gods or men, who approach him, who come into his presence. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who, when pleased with a strenuous servant, gladdens his heart by bestowing upon him, at his own good pleasure, any costly gift the officer may choose 1. And the Blessed One, O king, when pleased with any one who has been strenuous in word or deed or thought, gladdens his heart by bestowing upon him, as a selected gift, the supreme deliverance from all sorrow,--far beyond all material gifts 2. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who censures, fines 3, or executes the man who transgresses p. 30 the royal commands. And so, O king, the man who, in shamelessness or discontent, transgresses the command of the Blessed One, as laid down in the rules of his Order, that man, despised, disgraced and censured, is expelled from the religion of the Conqueror. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. A king is one who in his turn proclaiming laws and regulations according to the instructions laid down in succession by the righteous kings of ancient times, and thus carrying on his rule in righteousness, becomes beloved and dear to the people, desired in the world, and by the force of his righteousness establishes his dynasty long in the land. And the Blessed One, O king, proclaiming in his turn laws and regulations according to the instructions laid down in succession by the Buddhas of ancient times, and thus in righteousness being teacher of the world,--he too is beloved and dear to both gods and men, desired by them, and by the force of his righteousness he makes his religion last long in the land. That too is the reason why the Tathâgata is called a king. 'Thus, O king, so many are the reasons why the Tathâgata should be both Brahman and also king, that the ablest of the brethren could scarcely in an æon enumerate them all. Why then should I dilate any further? Accept what I have said only in brief.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha belonging to two castes.] p. 31 [DILEMMA THE FORTY-NINTH. GIFTS TO THE BUDDHA.] [228] 28. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it has been said by the Blessed One: "Gifts chaunted for in sacred hymns Are gifts I must not take. All those who see into the Truth Do this their practice make. The Buddhas all refused to chaunt for wage; This was their conduct still Whene'er the Truth prevailed Through every age 1." 'But on the other hand the Blessed One, when preaching the Truth, or talking of it, was in the habit of beginning with the so-called "preliminary discourse," in which giving has the first place, and goodness only the second 2. So that when gods and men heard this discourse of the Blessed One, the lord of the whole world, they prepared and gave gifts, and the disciples partook of the alms thus brought about. Now if, Nâgasena, it be true what the Blessed One said, that he accepted no gifts earned by the chaunting of sacred words, then it was wrong that the Blessed One put giving thus p. 32 into the foreground. But if he did rightly in so emphasizing the giving of gifts, then it is not true that he accepted no gifts earned by the utterance of sacred words. And why so? Because if any one worthy of offerings should praise to the laity the good results to them of the bestowal of alms, they, hearing that discourse, and pleased with it, will proceed to give alms again and again. And then, whosoever enjoy that gift, they are really enjoying that which has been earned by the utterance of sacred words. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 29. 'The stanza you quote, O king, was spoken by the Blessed One. And yet he used to put the giving of alms into the forefront of his discourse. But this is the custom of all the Tathâgatas--first by discourse on almsgiving to make the hearts of hearers inclined towards it, and then afterwards to urge them to righteousness. This is as when men, O king, give first of all to young children things to play with--[229] such as toy ploughs 1, tip-cat sticks 2, toy wind-mills 3, measures made of leaves 4, toy carts, p. 33 and bows and arrows--and afterwards appoint to each his separate task. Or it is as when a physician first causes his patients to drink oil for four or five days in order to strengthen them, and to soften their bodies; and then afterwards administers a purge. The supporters of the faith, O king, the lordly givers, have their hearts thus softened, made tender, affected. Thereby do they cross over to the further shore of the ocean of transmigration by the aid of the boat of their gifts, by the support of the causeway of their gifts. And (the Buddha), by this (method in his teaching), is not guilty of "intimation 1."' 30. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when you say "intimation" what are these intimations?' 'There are two sorts, O king, of intimation--bodily and verbal. And there is one bodily intimation which is wrong, and one that is not; and there is one verbal intimation which is wrong, and one that is not. Which is the bodily intimation which is wrong? Suppose any member of the Order, in going his rounds for alms, should, when choosing a spot to stand on, stand where there is no room 2, that is a bodily intimation which is wrong. The true members of the Order will not accept any alms so asked for, and the individual who thus acts is despised, looked down upon, not respected, held blameworthy, disregarded, not well thought of, in the religion of the Noble Ones; he is reckoned as p. 34 one of those who have broken their (vows as to) means of livelihood. And again, O king, suppose any member of the Order, in going his round for alms, should stand where there is no room, and stretch out his neck like a peacock on the gaze, in the hope: "Thus will the folk see me"--that too is a bodily intimation which is wrong. True brethren will not accept an alms so asked for, and he who thus acts is regarded like the last. And again, O king, suppose any member of the Order should make a sign with his jaw, or with his eyebrow, or with his finger--[230] that too is a bodily intimation which is wrong. True brethren will not accept an alms so asked for, and he who thus acts is regarded the same way. 31. 'And which is the bodily intimation which is not wrong? If a brother, on going his round for alms, be self-possessed, tranquil, conscious of his acts; if he stand, wherever he may go, in the kind of spot that is lawful; if he stand still where there are people desirous to give, and where they are not so desirous, if he pass on 1 ;--that is a bodily intimation which is not wrong. Of an alms so stood for the true members of the Order will partake; and the individual who thus asks is, in the religion of the Noble Ones, praised, thought highly of, esteemed, and reckoned among those whose behaviour is without guile, whose mode of livelihood is pure. For thus has it been said by the Blessed One, the god over all gods: "The truly wise beg not, for Arahats scorn to beg. p. 35 The good stand for their alms, thus only do they beg 1." 32. 'Which is the verbal intimation which is wrong? In case, O king, a brother intimate his wish for a number of things, requisites of a member of the Order--robes and bowls and bedding and medicine for the sick--that is a verbal intimation which is wrong. Things so asked for the true members of the Order (Ariyâ) will not accept; and in the religion of the Noble Ones the individual who acts thus is despised, looked down upon, not respected, held blameworthy, disregarded, not well thought of--reckoned rather as one who has broken his (vows as to) means of livelihood. And again, O king, in case a brother should, in the hearing of others, speak thus: "I am in want of such and such a thing;" and in consequence of that saying being heard by the others he should then get that thing--that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last. And again, O king, in case a brother, dilating in his talk 2, give the people about him to understand: "Thus and thus should gifts be given to the Bhikkhus," p. 36 and in case they, on hearing that saying, should bring forth from their store anything so referred to--that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last. [231] For when Sâriputta, the Elder, O king, being ill in the night-time, after the sun had set, and being questioned by Moggallâna, the Elder, as to what medicine would do him good, broke silence; and through that breach of silence obtained the medicine--did not Sâriputta then, saying to himself: "This medicine has come through breach of silence; let not my (adherence to the rules regarding) livelihood be broken," reject that medicine, and use it not 1? So that too is a verbal intimation which is wrong. True members of the Order will not use a thing so obtained, and he who acts thus is regarded like the last. 33. 'And what is the verbal intimation which is right? Suppose a brother, O king, when there is necessity for it, should intimate among families either related to him, or which had invited him to spend the season of Was with him 2, that he is in want of medicines--this is a verbal intimation which is not wrong. True members of the Order will partake of things so asked for; and the individual who acts thus is, in the religion of the Noble Ones, praised, thought highly of, esteemed, reckoned among those whose mode of livelihood is pure, p. 37 approved of the Tathâgatas, the Arahats, the Supreme Buddhas. And the alms that the Tathâgata, O king, refused to accept of Kasî-Bhâradvâga, the Brahman 1, that was presented for the sake of testing him with an intricate puzzle which he would have to unwind 2, for the sake of pulling him away, of convicting him of error, of making him acknowledge himself in the wrong. Therefore was it that the Tathâgata refused that alms, and would not partake thereof.' 34. 'Nâgasena, was it always, whenever the Tathâgata was eating, that the gods infused the Sap of Life from heaven into the contents of his bowl, or was it only into those two dishes--the tender boar's flesh, and the rice porridge boiled in milk--that they infused it 3? 'Whenever he was eating, O king, and into each morsel of food as he picked it up--just as the royal cook takes the sauce and pours it over each morsel in the dish while the king is partaking of it 4. [232] And so at Verañgâ, when the Tathâgata was eating the cakes 5 made of dried barley, the gods moistened each one with the Sap of Life, as they placed it p. 38 near him 1. And thus was the body of the Tathâgata fully refreshed.' 'Great indeed was the good fortune, Nâgasena, of those gods that they were ever and always so zealous in their care for the body of the Tathâgata! Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the Buddha's mode of livelihood.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FIFTIETH. ON THE BUDDHA'S AFTER-DOUBT 2.] 35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "The Tathâgata gradually, through millions of years, through æon after æon 3, brought his omniscient wisdom to perfection for the sake of the salvation of the great masses of the people 4." 'But on the other hand (they say) 5: "Just after he had attained to omniscience his p. 39 heart inclined, not to the proclamation of the Truth, but to rest in peace." 'So that, Nâgasena, just as if an archer, or an archer's pupil, who had practised archery for many days with the object of fighting, should, when the day of the great battle had come, draw back--just so did the Tathâgata, who through countless ages had gradually matured his omniscience for the sake of bringing safe to the shore (of salvation) the great masses of the people, turn back, on the day when that omniscience had been reached, from proclaiming the Truth. just as if a wrestler who through many days had practised wrestling should, when the day of the wrestling match 1 had come, draw back--just so did the Tathâgata, who through countless ages had gradually matured his omniscience for the sake of bringing safe to the shore (of salvation) the great masses of the people, turn back, on the day when that omniscience had been reached, from proclaiming the Truth. 'Now was it from fear, Nâgasena, that the Tathâgata drew back, or was it from inability to preach 2, or was it from weakness, or was it because he had not, after all, attained to omniscience? [233] What was the reason of this? Tell me, I pray, the reason, that my doubts may be removed. For if for so long a time he had perfected his wisdom with the object of saving the people, then the statement that he hesitated to announce the Truth must be wrong. But if that be true, then the other statement must be false. This too is a double-edged problem, p. 40 now put to you,--a problem profound, a knot hard to unravel,--which you have to solve.' 36. 'The statements in both the passages you quote, O king, are correct. But that his heart inclined, not to the preaching of the truth, but to inaction, was because he saw, on the one hand, how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine 1, how hard to grasp and understand, how subtle, how difficult to penetrate into; and, on the other, how devoted beings are to the satisfaction of their lusts, how firmly possessed by false notions of Individualism 2. And so (he wavered) at the thought: "Whom shall I teach? And how can I teach him?"--his mind being directed to the idea of the powers of penetration which beings possessed. 'Just, O king, as an able physician, when called in to a patient suffering from a complication of diseases, might reflect: "What can be the treatment, what the drug, by which this man's sickness can be allayed?"--just so, O king, when the Tathâgata called to mind how afflicted were the people by all the kinds of malady which arise from sin, and how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine, how subtle, and how difficult to grasp, then at the thought: "Whom can I teach? And how shall I teach him?" did his heart incline rather to inaction than to preaching--[234] his mind being directed to the powers of penetration which beings possessed. 'And just, O king, as a king, of royal blood, an anointed monarch, when he calls to mind the many p. 41 people who gain their livelihood in dependence on the king--the sentries and the body-guard, the retinue of courtiers, the trading folk, the soldiers and the royal messengers, the ministers and the nobles 1--might be exercised at the thought: "How now, in what way, shall I be able to conciliate them all?"--just so when the Tathâgata called to mind how profound and abstruse was the Doctrine, how subtle, and how difficult to grasp, and how devoted beings were to the satisfaction of their lusts, how firmly possessed by false notions of Individualism, then at the thought: "Whom shall I teach? And how shall I teach him?" did his heart incline rather to inaction than to preaching--his mind being directed to the powers of penetration which beings possessed. 37. 'And this, too, is an inherent necessity in all Tathâgatas that it should be on the request of Brahmâ that they should proclaim the Dhamma. And what is the reason for that? All men in those times, with the ascetics and the monks, the wandering teachers and the Brahmans, were worshippers of Brahmâ, reverers of Brahmâ, placed their reliance on Brahmâ. And therefore, at the thought: "When so powerful and glorious, so famous and renowned, so high and mighty a one has shown himself inclined (to the Dhamma), then will the whole world of gods and men become inclined to it, hold it fitting, have faith in it"--on this ground, O king, the Tathâgatas preached the Dhamma when requested to do so by Brahmâ. For just, O king, as what a sovran or a minister of state shows homage to, or offers worship to, that will the rest of mankind, on p. 42 the ground of the homage of so powerful a personage, show homage to and worship--just so, O king, when Brahmâ had paid homage to the Tathâgatas, so would the whole world of gods and men. For the world, O king, is a reverer of what is revered. And that is why Brahmâ asks of all Tathâgatas that they should make known the Doctrine, and why, on so being asked, they make it known 1.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! The puzzle has been well unravelled, most able has been your exposition. That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the Buddha's hesitation to make the Doctrine known.] ____________________________ Here ends the Fifth Chapter. Footnotes 1:1 This is the opening verse of the Muni Sutta (in the Sutta Nipâta I, 12). It is quoted again below, p. 385 of the Pâli text. The second line is, in the original, enigmatically terse, and runs simply, 'From a home dust arises.' This Fausböll renders (in the S. B. E., vol. x, part ii, p. 33), 'From household life arises defilement,' the word for dust (rago) being often used figuratively in the sense of something that disfigures, is out of place in the higher life. It is the distracting effect of household cares that the recluse has to fear. 2:1 This is a very famous verse, found first in the Vinaya (Kullavagga VI, 1, 5), and quoted in the Introduction to the Gâtakas (Fausböll, vol. i, p. 93; compare vol. iv., p. 354), translated in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' vol. i, p. 132. Hînati-kumburê adds the context: 'Then shall they preach to him the Truth, The Truth dispelling every grief, Which Truth when here a man perceives, He's freed from stains, and dies away.' 2:2 On these expressions compare above, p. 170 (p. 113 of the text). 3:1 The words in brackets are added from Hînati-kumburê 3:2 That is, the members of the Order. 4:1 This verse has not yet been traced. The first half of it occurs in a different connection at Dhammapada, verse 168, which I have rendered (at 'Buddhism,' p. 65), 'Rise up and loiter not!' without any reference at all to food. This was in accordance with the view taken of the passage, both by Prof. Fausböll, who renders it (p. 31 of his edition of the Pâli), 'Surgat, ne sit socors,' and by Prof. Max Müller, who renders it (S. B. E, vol. x, part i, p. 47), 'Rouse thyself, do not be idle!' And I still think (especially noting such passages as Dhammapada, verses 231, 232, and the verse quoted in the Commentary, p. 126 of Fausböll, from Gâtaka IV, 496, &c.) that this was the original meaning in that connection. But here the words must clearly be taken as referring to food, and it is very remarkable that the commentator on the Dhammapada (see p. 335 of Fausböll's edition) takes them in that sense also even in the other connection. It is a striking instance of the way in which commentators impart a purely technical sense into a general ethical precept. 4:2 From the Mahâ Udâyi Sutta (Magghima Nikâya, No. 77 5:1 See above, p. 164 (p. 109 of the Pâli text). These passages show that Dr. Morris's note in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society.' 1885, requires modification. See also below, IV, 8, 88, and the passages quoted by him in the 'Journal' for 1886. 6:1 Sâmañña. 6:2 Patisambhidâ. 6:3 Samâpatti. 6:4 Abhiññâ. 6:5 This story will be found in the two Suka Gâtakas (Nos. 429 and 430 in Fausböll). I had not succeeded in tracing it when the list at vol. i, p. xxvi, was drawn up; it should therefore be added there. 6:6 Sayambhunâ, 'whose knowledge is not derived from anyone else.' (Sayambhu-ñâna-wû says Hînati-kumburê.) Burnouf's proposition ('Lotus,' p. 336) to take it in the sense of 'who has no other substratum or raison d'être than himself' cannot be accepted, in spite of Childers's approbation. 7:1 Nighamsanâ. Compare the use of nighamsati at Kullavagga V, 27, 2. 7:2 This is much more than a mere injunction not to gild refined gold. It comes very near to the enunciation of the dangerous doctrine that the holy man is above the law, and that nothing he does can be wrong. It is curious how frequently one finds this proposition cropping up in the most unexpected places, and the history of religious belief is full of instances of its pernicious effect on the most promising movements. When one considers the great influence of our author's work, it becomes especially interesting to note how the doctrine has never, among the orthodox Buddhists, who read the Pâli Scriptures, been extended from the Buddha himself to his followers, and from moderation in food to matters of more vital import in the life of a church. And this is the more remarkable as the Tantra works of the corrupt Buddhism of Nepal and Tibet show how fatal has been the result of the doctrine among those Buddhists who had lost the guiding support of the older Scriptures. 8:1 Yâkayogo. See Sutta Nipâta III, 5, 1; Anguttara Nikâya III, 79, 2; and below, p. 225 (of the Pâli text). 8:2 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas, and the context is therefore unknown. But the word Brahman must of course be applied to the Buddha here in the sense, not of one belonging to the Brahman caste, but of Arahat. Hînati-kumburê adds, as a gloss, bâhita-pâpa-brâhmanayek, 'brahman because he has suppressed evil in himself.' On this explanation see my note to the forty-eighth dilemma, which is devoted to the discussion of this difficulty. On the Buddha as the Great Physician see Sutta Nipâta III, 7, 13; Magghima Nikâya I, 429; Sumangala Vilâsinî, 67, 255; and Milinda, pp. 110, 169 (of the Pâli text). 8:3 Anguttara Nikâya I, 14, 4. The reading adopted by our author agrees with that of the Simhalese MSS. put by Dr. Morris into the text. 9:1 Here, as always, they are repeated in full in the text. 9:2 This passage is very ambiguous. Hînati-kumburê renders it: 'with reference to what was found in himself, and besides that (with reference) to the disciples who had learnt &c. . . . . tradition.' He translates agamânam and the two following words, as relative compounds, by agama-dhâri-wû, &c., and in this I have followed him. But he supplies an 'and' after the last, thus taking them as accusatives in dependence on sandhâya, and that cannot be right. It seems forced to separate bâhirânam so much from the other genitives with which it stands in the text, and yet it is so impossible to make sense of the passage in any other way, that one would like to know the readings of all the MSS. 9:3 'Kakkhupâla and others' adds Hînati-kumburê. (For the story of Kakkhupâla, see the commentary on the Dhammapada, verse 1.) 10:1 See, for other instances of such aspirations, above, vol. i, p. 5. 10:2 Tina-pupphaka-roga. There is a flower called tina-puppha, and this may be a skin disease named after it. But pupphaka at Gâtaka III, 541, means blood, and the disease may p. 11 be so called because the blood was turned by it to the colour of grass (tina). Hînati-kumburê (who gives these legends of the previous births of Bakkula at much greater length, adding others from the time of the Buddhas Padumuttara and Kassapa, and giving the story also of his present birth) says that the disease arose from contact with wind which had been poisoned through blowing over a Upas tree (p. 296 of the Simhalese version). But he does not explain the name of the disease, which occurs only here. In his present birth Bakkula is said to have been born at Kosâmbî, in a wealthy family. His mother, understanding that to bathe a new-born child in the Jumna would ensure him a long life, took him down to the river. Whilst he was there being bathed, a huge fish swallowed him. But the fish, caught at Benares, was sold to a wealthy but childless man there, and on being cut open, the babe was found in it unhurt. The mother hearing the news of this marvel, went in great state and with haste to Benares and claimed the child. Thereupon an interesting lawsuit arose, and the king of Benares, thinking it unjust to deprive the purchaser of a fish of anything inside it, and also unjust to deprive a mother of her child, decided that the child belonged equally to both. So he became the heir of both families, and was therefore called Bak-kula, 'the two-family-one' (Bak = Ba = Dvâ). On the real derivation of Bakkula, see Dr. Morris in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1886, pp. 94-99. We need not quarrel with a false etymology which shows us so clearly the origin of the legend. Then Bakkula enjoys great prosperity in the orthodox three palaces, and at eighty years of age, being still in vigorous health, enters the Order. 12:1 The Dhutangas, enumerated below, p. 351 (of the Pâli text). 12:2 Samyutta Nikâya XLIV, 103. 12:3 This piece of casuistry is not so entirely at variance with the context of the second passage (quoted from the Anguttara I, 14) as would seem at first sight. The answer practically amounts to this, that though each of many disciples may be superior to the Buddha in certain bodily qualities, or even in the special vows known as Dhutangas, yet he surpasses them in the 'weightier matters of the law.' It is true that one of the instances given, that of the thâna-kankamikâ, is not included in the list of Dhutangas, and in the long enumeration in the Anguttara of those of the disciples who were 'chief' in any way, 'weightier matters of the law' are not overlooked. But 'meditation on foot' is of the same nature as the acknowledged Dhutangas, and none of the five special points in which Nâgasena places especially the superiority of the Buddha (uprightness, &c.), is mentioned in the Anguttara. Nevertheless the logical reply to the problem proposed would have been that in the Anguttara the superiority spoken of is over other disciples, and not over the Buddha. 13:1 Supreme, that is, in comparison with the Pakkeka Buddhas, 'Buddhas for themselves alone:' whereas the 'altogether Buddha' can not only see the truth for himself, but also persuade others of it. 13:2 These two quotations are from the Samyutta Nikâya XXI, 58 and X, 2, 65, says Mr. Trenckner, but I cannot trace them in M. Feer's edition. 14:1 'The wisdom arising from the perception of the Four Noble Truths' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 14:2 The wondrous Gem-treasure of the king of kings (theVeluriya, etymologically the same as beryl, but probably meaning cat's-eye) is supposed, like the other mystic treasures, to come to him of its own accord, on his becoming sovran overlord. See my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 256 (S. B. E., vol. xi). 15:1 Nîharati. Âvaranaya kara ganneya says Hînati-kumburê. 16:1 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. 16:2 The identical words are not found, but they are a summary of the Lomasa Kassapa Gâtaka (No. 433 in Prof. Fausböll's edition, and see especially vol. iii, p. 517, line 25). 16:3 Vâgapeyya, which Professor Fausböll (loc. cit., p. 518) spells vâkapeyya, and a Burmese MS. he quotes spells vâdhapeyya (characteristically enough,--the scribe not understanding the word, and thinking it must have been derived from vadha, makes what he thinks must be a correction). The Sanskrit form of the word is vâkapêya, the drink or draught of battle or victory, name of that one of the seven Soma sacrifices which a king offered when desirous of attaining to sovran overlordship. In the allied legend p. 17 of king Lomapâda's sacrifice (Râmâyana I, 8, 11 foll.) it is the asva-medha, the horse sacrifice, which is offered. 18:1 This verse is found not only in the 433rd Gâtaka (loc. cit.), but also in the Sayha Gâtaka, No. 310, a shorter recension of the same story. 18:2 Hînati-kumburê here summarises the whole story. 18:3 Kandanikâ and oligalla. See Anguttara III, 57, 1; Magghima I, 11, 448; Thera Gâthâ 567; Kullavagga V, 17, 1. Hînati-kumburê spells the second word with an ordinary l." 18:4 The text repeats the last paragraph. 19:1 It is very instructive to notice the way in which our author looks upon the historical Buddha and the various heroes of the Gâtaka Stories as so absolutely identical that he feels obliged to defend the conduct of all the 'types' as earnestly as he would that of the Buddha himself. There is no such conception in the Pitakas, and the whole tone of our author's argument reveals the lateness of his date as compared with the Pitakas. 20:1 From the Khaddanta Gâtaka, No. 514 (Fausböll, vol. v, p. 49); with which compare the Kâsâva Gâtaka, No. 221 (vol. ii, p. 196). 20:2 'This has not been found in these words, but Mr. Trenckner refers to Magghima Nikâya, No. 81. Compare also Gâtaka I, 43. 22:1 Niggundi, which Hînati-kumburê merely repeats. See Gâtaka III, 348; IV, 456; Dhammapada Commentary, p. 209; Anguttara IV, 199; and Dr. Morris's restoration of Dîpavamsa XII, 32, in the Introduction to vol. ii of his Anguttara. 23:1 Both these quotations are from the Magghima, Nikâya, No. 31 (the Ghatîkâra Suttanta). 23:2 Ussanna-kusala-mûla. See Gâtaka I, 145. 24:1 Aneka-sata-sahassa-vâta-sampahârena. Perhaps 'by the battle (raging round it) of innumerable gales,' the onslaught of the winds being not against it, but against one another. 24:2 Literally 'from receiving any self-created requisite.' 25:1 Vibhûsam katvâ. Daksha-kriyâ kota says Hînati-kumburê. The expression has not been found elsewhere. 25:2 This passage has already been quoted above (IV, 4, 55). It has not been traced in the Pitakas. 25:3 These words from the Sela Sutta (Sutta Nipâta III, 7, 7) have also been already discussed above (IV, 3, 33, 34). 26:1 This argument is based on the false etymology that brâhmano = bâhita-pâpo ('he in whom evil is suppressed'), adopted by Hînati-kumburê above at IV, 4, 55. Buddhaghosa, in the Sumangala, p. 244, has another derivation: Brahmam anatîti brâhmano. As Brahmam has not been found elsewhere except as the accusative of Brahmâ the name of the god, and as anati only occurs in this passage, it might be contended that Buddhaghosa means an 'invoker of Brahmâ.' But I think he is correct in his etymology, and intends to interpret the word Brahman as 'intoner of prayer.' 26:2 The Arahat-Brahman says Hînati-kumburê. 26:3 Asahâyo, literally 'has no friend.' I am not sure that I have rightly understood this term, which I have not found elsewhere applied to the Arahat. Hînati-kumburê merely repeats the word. 27:1 Dibba-vihâro; rendered divya-viharana by Hînati-kumburê. It cannot mean here 'state of being a deva in the kamaloka' as rendered by Childers. 27:2 That is, of course, the previous Buddhas. 28:1 This is a striking instance of argument in a circle. The word Brahman is first interpreted in its technical Buddhist sense of Arahat, and then the Buddha, as Arahat, is called a Brahman. The only paragraph based on the real transition of meaning in the term is that referring to the holding up of tradition. 28:2 Samârakam sabrahmakam, 'with its Mâras and Brahmas.' 28:3 Aratu, says Hînati-kumburê; that is wood from the heart of the tree. 28:4 Salâkâ, which Hînati-kumburê repeats, adding 'of the highest wisdom.' 29:1 Varitam varam. 'A gift appropriate to the service approved of' says Hînati-kumburê. And the word is not in Childers. But compare the use of varam varati at Gâtaka III, 493. 29:2 Asesa-kâma-varena, for which Hînati-kumburê has asesa-kâmâvakarayem. Mr. Trenckner adds a ka, which, as being entirely superfluous, he puts in brackets. There can be but little doubt that the corrected reading is asesa-kâmâvakarena, and that the literal rendering would be I gladdens him by that which has left in it nothing connected with (life in) the world of sense; to wit, deliverance from all sorrow' (that is deliverance from samsara). Parimutti, which I have not found in the Pitakas, and which is not in Childers, occurs above (p. 112 of the Pâli text) in the same connection. 29:3 Gâpeti. See my notes above on vol. i, p. 2 40, and below on VII, 5, 10. The Simhalese has here dhana-dânaya karanneya, where dânaya must be gâni. 31:1 This stanza occurs no less than five times in those portions of the Pitakas already published. See Sutta Nipâta I, 4, 6 and III, 4, 2 7, and Samyutta Nikâya VII, 1, 8, VII, 1, 9, and VII, 2, 1. The rhythm of the Pâli is strikingly beautiful, and is quite spoilt in the rendering. 31:2 See, for instance, Dîgha Nikâya V, 28; Mahâvagga I, 7, 5 and 10; V, X, 9; VI, 26, 8; and Kullavagga VI, 4, 5. As there is a doubt about the spelling, Fausböll at Gâtaka I, 8, and I, 30, and our MSS. of the Dîgha reading ânupubbi-kathâ, whereas Childers and Oldenberg read ânupubbi-kathâ, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the Simhalese has the short a. 32:1 All these articles are mentioned in the Dîgha Nikâya I, r, 14. Buddhaghosa explains the first word (vankakam) as toy ploughs. Hoops the Indian children do not have, probably for want of suitable roads. 32:2 Ghatikam, which is, according to Buddhaghosa, a game played by striking a short stick with a long one; and according to Hînati-kumburê the game called in Simhalese kalli. Clough has this word, but simply explains it as a game so called. 32:3 Kingulakam, which is, according to Buddhaghosa, a little wheel made of cocoa-nut leaves, which is set turning by the impact of the wind. Hînati-kumburê says 'an mbaruwa (twirling thing) made of cocoa-nut leaves.' 32:4 Pattâlhakam. Buddhaghosa and the Simhalese agree in rendering this 'toy measures.' 33:1 Viññatti. It is a breach of rules for a member of the Order to ask, in words, for an alms. For a Buddha to lay stress, in a discourse, on the advantages of almsgiving does not, Nâgasena means, make him guilty of this offence. 33:2 And thus cause an obstruction, and attract attention to the fact that he is there. I do not know of any such prohibition in the Vinaya. 34:1 The author has Kullavagga VIII, 5, 2 in his mind, where the signs (of their being willing or not) are specified. 35:1 From Gâtaka III, 354. The words are there ascribed, not to the Buddha but to the Bodisat in the story. The word translated Arahats is Ariyâ, which is taken here, as elsewhere, as a dissyllable, and pronounced Aryâ. It is the same as our word Aryans, and is rendered above Noble Ones. I do not think that it is applied exclusively to Arahats. 35:2 Vakî-vipphârena. The expression has not been found elsewhere, nor is it in Childers. The Simhalese has: 'dilating on the words obtaining in this religion.' I presume it means, that not content with praising almsgiving in general, he particularises. Compare Mahâvagga VI, 37. 36:1 'This story has not yet been traced; but the Simhalese (p. 317) gives it at great length. 36:2 Ñâti-pavâritesu kulesu. Compare Pâkittiya 39 ('Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, p. 39). 37:1 See Sutta Nipâta I, 4. The Simhalese always has a long î in Kasî. 37:2 Âyethana. Compare the use of all these terms above, II, 1, 3 (vol. i, p. 46). 37:3 There is nothing about this infusion of the Sap of Life (dibbam ogam) in the published texts of the Pitakas. But it is mentioned in the account in the Gâtaka Commentary of the second meal referred to ('Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 92). The other is, of course, the Buddha's last meal, 'Book of the Great Decease,' IV, 14-23 (in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. V-73). 37:4 Hînati-kumburê gives here a great deal of additional matter (pp. 314-324). 37:5 Pulake; which the Simhalese renders peti. 38:1 I am not sure what meal is here referred to. The Buddha is twice said to have taken meals at Verañgâ (in the Sutta Vibhanga, pp. 6, 11; Pârâgika I, 2 and I, 4). In neither case is there any mention of these cakes. But the former of the two may be the one referred to, as it took place in a time of drought. 38:2 Compare my manual 'Buddhism,' p. 41. 38:3 Literally 'through four Asankheyyas and a lak of Kappas.' 38:4 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas, and the word samuddharanâ (rendered 'salvation') does not occur elsewhere in published texts. It means literally 'bringing safe to shore.' Compare samuddhata at Saddhammopâyana 143 in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1887, p. 44. 38:5 See 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. i, p. 85, and Samyutta Nikâya VI, i. The words are very slightly different. 39:1 Compare Sumangala Vilâsinî, p. 85. 39:2 Apâkatatâya, not found elsewhere. I follow the Simhalese, which has bna kiyanta no dnena bwin. 40:1 'Of Arahatship' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 40:2 Sakkâya-ditthi. The belief in being, instead of in becoming; the belief in the permanence of individuality. See my 'Hibbert Lectures,' pp. 211-214. 41:1 On this list see below, IV, 6, 11. 42:1 Hînati-kumburê here gives a page of description--not found in the Pâli--of the episode of Brahmâ's request to the Buddha. The oldest account of this episode has been already translated in vol. xiii of the 'Sacred Books of the East,' in 'Vinaya Texts,' part i, pp. 84-88. 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[DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FIRST. CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS AS TO THE BUDDHA'S TEACHER.] 1. [235] 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too has been said by the Blessed One: "I have no teacher, and the man Equal to me does not exist. No rival to me can be found In the whole world of gods and men 1." 'But on the other hand he said: "Thus then, O brethren, Âlâra Kâlâma, when he was my teacher and I was his pupil, placed me on an equality with himself, and honoured me with exceeding great honour 2." p. 44 'Now if the former of these statements be right, then the second must be wrong. But if the second be right, then the first must be wrong. This too is a double-edged problem, now put to you, which you have to solve.' 2. 'Both the quotations you have made, O king, are accurate. But when he spoke of Âlâra Kâlâma as his teacher, that was a statement made with reference to the fact of his having been his teacher while he (Gotama) was still a Bodisat and before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood; and there were five such teachers, O king, under whose tuition the Bodisat spent his time in various places--his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. And who were these five? 3. 'Those eight Brahmans who, just after the birth of the Bodisat, took note of the marks on his body--[236] Râma, and Dhaga, and Lakkhana, and Mantî 1, and Yañña 2, and Suyâma, and Subhoga 3, and Sudatta 4--they who then made known his future glory, and marked him out as one to be carefully guarded-these were first his teachers 5. p. 45 'And again, O king, the Brahman Sabbamitta of distinguished descent, who was of high lineage in the land of Udikka 1, a philologist and grammarian, well read in the six Vedangas 2, whom Suddhodana the king, the Bodisat's father, sent for, and having poured out the water of dedication from a golden vase, handed over the boy to his charge, to be taught--this was his second teacher 3. 'And again, O king, the god who raised the agitation in the Bodisat's heart, at the sound of whose speech the Bodisat, moved and anxious, that very moment went out from the world in his Great Renunciation--this was his third teacher 4. p. 46 'And again, O king, Âlâra Kâlâma--he was his fourth teacher. 'And again, O king, Uddaka the son of Râma--he was his fifth teacher. 'These, O king, are the five who were his teachers when he was still a Bodisat, before he had attained to insight and to Buddhahood. But they were teachers in worldly wisdom. And in this Doctrine that is transcendental, in the penetrating into the wisdom of the omniscient ones--in that there is no one who is above the Tathâgata to teach him. Self-dependent for his knowledge is the Tathâgata, without a master, and that is why it was said by the Tathâgata: "I have no teacher, and the man Equal to me does not exist. No rival to me can be found In the whole world of gods and men."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Buddha's teachers.] p. 47 [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SECOND. WHY MUST THERE BE ONLY ONE BUDDHA AT A TIME?] 4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this too was said by the Blessed One: "This is an impossibility, an occurrence for which there can be no cause, that in one world two Arahat Buddhas supreme should arise at one and the same time [237]--such a thing can in no wise be 1." 'But, Nâgasena, when they are preaching, all the Tathâgatas preach (the Doctrine as to) the thirty-seven constituent elements of insight 2; when they are talking, it is of the Four Noble Truths that they talk; when they are instructing, it is in the three Trainings 3 that they instruct; when they are teaching, it is the practice of zeal 4 that they teach. If, Nâgasena, the preaching of all the Tathâgatas is one, and their talk of the same thing, and their training the same, and their teaching one, why then should not two Tathâgatas arise at the same time? Already by the appearance of one Buddha has this world become flooded with light. If there should be a second Buddha the world would be still more illuminated by the glory of them both. When they were exhorting two Tathâgatas would exhort at ease; when they were instructing two Tathâgatas would instruct at ease. Tell me the reason of this, that I may put away my doubt.' p. 48 5. 'This world system, O king, is a one-Buddha-supporting world; that is, it can bear the virtue of only a single Tathâgata. If a second Tathâgata were to arise the world could not bear him, it would shake and tremble, it would bend, this way and that, it would disperse, scatter into pieces, dissolve, be utterly destroyed. just as a boat, O king, might be able to carry one passenger across. Then, when one man had got on board, it would be well trimmed and able to bear his weight 1. But if a second man were to come like to the first in age and caste and strength and size and stoutness of body and build of frame, and he too should get on board the boat--would that boat be able, O king, to carry them both? 'Certainly not, Sir! it would shake and tremble; it would bend, this way and that; it would break into pieces, be shattered, dissolved, and utterly destroyed; it would sink into the waves.' 'Just so, O king, with this world, if a second Tathâgata were to appear. Or suppose, O king, that a man [238] had eaten as much food as he wanted, even so that he had filled himself with nourishment up to the throat, and he--thus satiated 2, regaled, filled with good cheer, with no room left for more, drowsy and stiff as a stick one cannot bend--were again to eat as much food as he had eaten before--would such a man, O king, then be at ease?' 'Certainly not, Sir! If he were to eat again, but once more, he would die.' p. 49 'Well, no more could this world bear a second Tathâgata, than that man could bear a second meal.' 6. 'But how is that, Nâgasena? Would the earth tremble at a too great weight of goodness?' 'Suppose, O king, there were two carts quite filled with precious things up to the top 1, and people were to take the things from the one cart and pile them up on the other, would that one be able to carry the weight of both?' 'Certainly not, Sir! The nave of its wheels would split, and the spokes would break, and the circumference would fall to pieces, and the axle-tree would break in twain 2.' 'But how is that, O king? Would the cart come to pieces owing to the too great weight of goods?' 'Yes, it would.' 7. 'Well, just so, O king, would the earth tremble owing to the too great weight of goodness. But that argument has been adduced to make the power of the Buddhas known 3. Hear another fitting reason why two Buddhas could not appear at the same p. 50 time. If, O king, two Buddhas were to arise together, then would disputes arise between their followers, and at the words: "Your Buddha, our Buddha," they would divide off into two parties--just as would the followers of two rival powerful ministers of state. This is the other [239] reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time. 8. 'Hear a further reason, O king, why two Buddhas could not appear at the same time. If that were so, then the passage (of Scripture) that the Buddha is the chief would become false, and the passage that the Buddha takes precedence of all would become false, and the passage that the Buddha is the best of all would become false. And so all those passages where the Buddha is said to be the most excellent, the most exalted, the highest of all, the peerless one, without an equal, the matchless one, who hath neither counterpart nor rival--all would be proved false. Accept this reason too as in truth a reason why two Buddhas cannot arise at once. 9. 'But besides that, O king, this is a natural characteristic of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, that one Buddha only should arise in the world. And why? By reason of the greatness of the virtue of the all-knowing Buddhas. Of other things also, whatever is mighty in the world is singular. The broad earth is great, O king, and it is only one. The ocean is mighty, and it is only one. Sineru, the king of the mountains, is great; and it is only one. Space is mighty, and it is only one. Sakka (the king of the gods) is great, and he is only one. Mara (the Evil One, Death) is great, and he is only one. Mahâ-Brahmâ is mighty, and he is only one. p. 51 [paragraph continues] A Tathâgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme, is great, and he is alone in the world. Wherever any one of these spring up, then there is no room for a second. And therefore, O king, is it that only one Tathâgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme, can appear at one time in the world.' 'Well has the puzzle, Nâgasena, been discussed by simile adduced and reason given. Even an unintelligent man on hearing this would be satisfied; how much rather one great in wisdom as myself. Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say. ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to why there should be only one Buddha at a time in the world.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-THIRD. WHY SHOULD GIFTS BE GIVEN TO THE ORDER RATHER THAN TO THE BUDDHA?] [240] 10. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said to his mother's sister 1, Mahâ-Pagâpatî the Gotamî, when she was about to give him a cloth wrapper for use in the rainy season 2: "Give it, O Gotamâ, to the Order. If the Order is presented by you with it, then will you have paid homage: thereby alike to the Order and to me 3." 'But what, Nâgasena? Is not the Tathâgata of p. 52 greater weight and importance, and more worthy of gifts than even the jewel treasure of the Order, that the Tathâgata should have told his aunt, when about to present him with a wrapper for the rainy season which she herself had carded and pressed and beaten and cut and woven 1, to give it to the Order! If, Nâgasena, the Tathâgata were really higher and greater and more excellent than the Order, then he would have known that a gift given to him would be most meritorious, and therefore would not have told her to give it to the Order. But inasmuch as the Tathâgata, Nâgasena, puts himself not in the way of gifts to himself, gives no occasion for such gifts, you see that he then told his aunt to give that wrapper rather to the Order.' 11. 'The quotation you make, O king, is correct, and the Blessed One did so direct his aunt's gifts 2. But that was not because an act of reverence paid to himself would bear no fruit, or because he was unworthy to receive gifts, but it was out of kindness and mercy that he, thinking: "Thus will the Order in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;" magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: "Give it, O Gotamî, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me." Just as a father, O king, while he is yet alive, exalts in the midst of the assembly of ministers, soldiers, and royal messengers, of p. 53 sentries, body guards, and courtiers 1--yea, in the presence of the king himself--the virtues which his son really possesses, thinking: "If established here he will be honoured of the people in times to come;" so was it out of mercy and kindness that the Tathâgata, thinking: "Thus will the Order, in times to come, when I am gone, be highly thought of;" magnified the excellence which the Order really had, in that he said: "Give it, O Gotamî, to the Order. If you present the Order with it, thus will you have paid homage alike to the Order and to me." 12. [241] 'And by the mere gift of a wrapper for the rainy season, the Order, O king, did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata. just, O king, as when parents anoint their children with perfumes, rub them, bathe them, or shampoo them 2, does the son by that mere service of theirs become greater than, or superior to, his parents?' 'Certainly not, sir! Parents deal with their children as they will, whether the children like it or not 3. And therefore do they anoint them with perfumes, shampoo, or bathe them.' 'And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata merely by the fact of that gift; and although the Tathâgata, whether the Order liked it or not, told his aunt to give the wrapper to the Order. 13. 'Or suppose, O king, some man should bring a complimentary present to a king, and the king should present that gift to some one else--to a soldier or a p. 54 messenger, to a general or a chaplain,--would that man become greater than, or superior to, the king, merely by the fact that it was he who got the present 1?' 'Certainly not, Sir! That man receives his wage from the king, from the king he gains his livelihood; it was the king who, having placed him in that office, gave him the present.' 'And just so, O king, the Order did not become greater than, or superior to, the Tathâgata merely by the fact of that gift. The Order is, as it were, the hired servant of the Tathâgata, and gains its livelihood through the Tathâgata. And it was the Tathâgata who, having placed it in that position, caused the gift to be given it. 14. 'And further the Tathâgata, O king, thought thus: "The Order is by its very nature worthy of gifts. I will therefore have this thing, my property though it be, presented to it," and so he had the wrapper given to the Order. For the Tathâgata, O king, magnifies not the offering of gifts to himself, but rather to whomsoever in the world is worthy of having gifts presented to him. For this was said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods, in the most excellent Magghima Nikâya, [242] in the religious discourse entitled Dhamma-dâyâda, when he was exalting the attainment of being content with little: "He would become the first of my Bhikkhus, the most worthy of presents and of praise 2." 15. 'And there is not, O king, in the three worlds p. 55 any being whatever more worthy of gifts, greater or more exalted or better, than the Tathâgata. It is the Tathâgata who was greatest and highest and best. As it was said, O king, by Mânava-gâmika the god, in the most excellent Samyutta Nikâya, as he stood before the Blessed One in the midst of the assembly of gods and men: Of all the Râgagaha hills Mount Vipula's acknowledged chief, Of the Himalayas Mount White, of planetary orbs the sun, The ocean of all waters, of constellations bright the moon 1-- In all the world of gods and men the Buddha's the acknowledged Lord 2!" And those verses of Mânava the god, O king, were well sung, not wrongly sung, well spoken, not wrongly spoken, and approved by the Blessed One 3. And was it not said by Sâriputta, the Commander of the faith: "There is but one Confession, one true Faith, One Adoration of clasped hands stretched forth --That paid to Him who routs the Evil One, And helps us cross the ocean of our ills 4!" p. 56 'And it was said by the Blessed One himself, the god over all gods: "There is one being, O brethren, who is born into the world for the good and for the weal of the great multitudes, out of mercy to the world, for the advantage and the good and the weal of gods and men. And what is that being? A Tathâgata, an Arahat Buddha supreme 1."' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the precedence of the Order over the Buddha.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FOURTH. IS IT MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO BE A LAYMAN, OR TO ENTER THE ORDER?] 16. 'Venerable Nâgasena, it was said by the Blessed One: "I would magnify, O brethren, the Supreme Attainment 2 either in a layman or in a recluse. Whether he be a layman., O brethren, or a recluse, the man who has reached the Supreme Attainment p. 57 shall overcome all the difficulties inherent therein, shall win his way even to the excellent condition of Arahatship 1." [243] 'Now, Nâgasena, if a layman, clad in white robes, enjoying the pleasures of sense, dwelling in a habitation encumbered with wife and children 2, making constant use of the sandal wood of Benares 3, of garlands and perfumes and unguents, accepting gold and silver, wearing a turban inlaid with jewels and gold, can, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship--and if a recluse, with his shaven head and yellow robes, dependent for his livelihood on the alms of other men, perfectly fulfilling the fourfold code of morality 4, taking upon himself and carrying out the hundred and fifty precepts 5, conducting p. 58 himself according to the thirteen extra vows 1 without omitting any one of them, can also, having reached the Supreme Attainment, win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship--then, Sir, what is the distinction between the layman and the recluse? Your austerity is without effect, your renunciation is useless, your observance of the precepts is barren, your taking of the extra vows is vain. What is the good of your therein heaping up woes to yourselves, if thus in comfort the condition of bliss can be reached?' 17. 'The words you ascribe to the Blessed One, O king, are rightly quoted. And that is even so. It is the man who has reached to the Supreme Attainment who bears the palm. If the recluse, O king, because he knows that he is a recluse, should neglect the Attainments, then is he far from the fruits of renunciation, far from Arahatship--how much more if a layman, still wearing the habit of the world, should do so! But whether he be a layman, O king, or a recluse, he who attains to the supreme insight, to the supreme conduct of life, he too will win his way to the excellent condition of Arahatship. 18. 'But nevertheless, O king, it is the recluse who is the lord and master of the fruit of renunciation. And renunciation of the world, O king, is full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate. just, O king, as no man can put a measure, in wealth, on the p. 59 value of a wish-conferring gem, [244] Saying: "Such and such is the price of the gem"--just so, O king, is the renunciation of the world full of gain, many and immeasurable are its advantages, its profit can no man calculate--no more, O king, than he could count the number of the waves in the great ocean, and say: "So and so many are the waves in the sea!" 19. 'Whatsoever the recluse, O king, may have yet to do, all that doth he accomplish straightway, without delay. And why is that? The recluse, O king, is content with little, joyful in heart, detached from the world, apart from society, earnest in zeal, without a home, without a dwelling-place, righteous in conduct, in action without guile, skilled in duty and in the attainments--that is why whatsoever may lie before him yet to do, that can he accomplish straightway, without delay--just as, the flight of your javelin 1, O king, is rapid because it is of pure metal, smooth, and burnished, and straight, and without a stain.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the recluse having no advantages over the layman.] p. 60 [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-FIFTH. ASCETICISM.] 20. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when the Bodisat was practising austerity 1, then there was found no other exertion the like of his, no such power, no such battling against evil, no such putting to rout of the armies of the Evil One, no such abstinence in food, no such austerity of life. But finding no satisfaction in strife like that, he abandoned that idea, saying: "Not even by this cruel asceticism am I reaching the peculiar faculty, beyond the power of man, arising from insight into the knowledge of that which is fit and noble 2. May there not be now some other way to wisdom 3?" 'But then, when weary of that path he had by another way attained to omniscience, he, on the other hand, thus again exhorted and instructed his disciple in that path (he had left, saying): [245] "Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith The Buddhas taught devote yourselves with zeal. As a strong elephant a house of reeds, Shake down the armies of the Evil One 4. p. 61 'Now what, Nâgasena, is the reason that the Tathâgata exhorted and led his disciples to that path which he had himself abandoned, which he loathed?' 21. 'Both then also, O king, and now too, that is still the only path. And it is along that path that the Bodisat attained to Buddhahood. Although the Bodisat, O king, exerting himself strenuously, reduced the food he took till he had decreased it to nothing at all 1, and by that disuse of food he became weak in mind, yet when he returned little by little to the use of solid food, it was by that path that before long he attained to Buddhahood. And that only has been the path along which all the Tathâgatas reached to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. Just as food is the support of all beings, as it is in dependence on food that all beings live at ease, just so is that the path of all the Tathâgatas to the attainment of the insight of omniscience. The fault was not, O king, in the exertion, was not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathâgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself (of austerity) was always ready for use. 22. 'Suppose, O king, that a man should follow a path in great haste, and by that haste his sides p. 62 should give way 1, or he should fall a cripple on the ground, unable to move, would there then be any fault, O king, in the broad earth that that man's sides had given way?' 'Certainly not, Sir! The great earth is always ready. How should it be in fault? The fault was in the man's own zeal which made him fail.' 'And just even so, O king, the fault was not in the exertion, not in the power, not in the battle waged against evil, that the Tathâgata did not then, at once, attain to Buddhahood. But the fault was in the disuse of food, and the path itself was always ready--[246] just as if a man should wear a robe, and never have it washed, the fault would not be in the water, which would always be ready for use, but in the man himself. That is why the Tathâgata exhorted and led his disciples along that very path. For that path, O king, is always ready, always right.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the path.] ____________________________ p. 63 [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SIXTH. THE BACKSLIDERS.] 23. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this doctrine of the Tathâgatas is mighty, essentially true, precious, excellent, noble, peerless, pure and stainless, clear and faultless. It is not right to admit a layman who is merely a disciple 1 into the Order. He should be instructed as a layman still, till he have attained to the Fruit of the First Path 2, and then be admitted. And why is this? When these men, still being evil, have been admitted into a religion so pure, they give it up, and return again to the lower state 3, and by their backsliding the people is led to think: "Vain must be this religion of the Samana Gotama, which these men have given up." This is the reason for what I say.' 24. 'Suppose, O king, there were a bathing tank 4, full of pure clear cold water. And some man, dirty, covered with stains and mud, should come there, and without bathing in it should turn back again, still dirty as before. Now in that matter whom would the people blame, the dirty man, or the bathing tank?' 'The dirty man, Sir, would the people blame, p. 64 saying: "This fellow came to the bathing tank, and has gone back as dirty as before. How could the bathing tank, of itself, cleanse a man who did not care to bathe? What fault is there in the tank?"' 'Just so, O king, [247] has the Tathâgata constructed a bathing tank full of the excellent waters of emancipation 1,--the bath of the good law. Whosoever of conscious discerning beings are polluted with the stains of sin, they, bathing in it, can wash away all their sins. And if any one, having gone to that bathing tank of the good law, should not bathe in it, but turn back polluted as before, and return again to the lower state, it is him the people would blame, and say: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cleanse him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?" 25. 'Or suppose, O king, that a man afflicted with dire disease should visit a physician skilled in diagnosis 2, knowing an efficacious and lasting method of cure, and that that man should then not let himself be treated, but go back again as ill as before. Now therein whom would the people blame, the sick man or the doctor?' It is the sick man, Sir, they would blame, saying: p. 65 [paragraph continues] "How could the physician, of himself, cure this man, who would not let himself be treated? What fault is there in the doctor?"' 'Just so, O king, has the Tathâgata deposited in the casket of his religion the ambrosial medicine (of Nirvâna) which is able to entirely suppress all the sickness of sin, thinking: "May all those of conscious sentient beings who are afflicted with the sickness of sin drink of this ambrosia, and so allay all their disease." And if any one, without drinking the ambrosia, should turn back again with the evil still within him, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, cure him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?" 126. 'Or suppose, O king, a starving man were to attend at a place where a mighty largesse of food 2 given for charity was being distributed, and then should go away again, still starving, without eating anything. Whom then would the people blame, the starving man, or the feast of piety?' 'It is the starving man, Sir, they would blame, saying: [248] "This fellow, though tormented with hunger, still when the feast of piety was provided for him, partook of nothing, and went back as hungry as before. How could the meal, of which he p. 66 would not eat, enter, of itself, into his mouth? What fault is there in the food? "' 'Just so, O king, has the Tathâgata placed the most excellent, good, auspicious, delicate ambrosial food, surpassing sweet, of the realisation of the impermanency of all things 1, into the casket of his religion, thinking: "May all those of conscious sentient beings who feel within them the torment of sin 2, whose hearts are deadened by cravings, feeding upon this food, allay every longing that they have for future life in any form, in any world." And if any one, without enjoying this food, should turn back, still dominated by his cravings, and return once more to the lower state, it is he whom the people will blame, saying: "This man entered religion according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, and finding no resting-place within it, has returned again to the lower state. How could the religion of the Conquerors, of itself, purify him who would not regulate his life in accordance with it? What fault is there in the system?"' 27. 'If the Tathâgata, O king, had let a householder be received into the Order only after he had been trained in the first stage of the Excellent Way, then would renunciation of the world no longer indeed be said to avail for the putting away of evil qualities, for purification of heart--then would there be no longer any use in renunciation. It would be as if a man were to have a bathing tank excavated p. 67 by the labour of hundreds (of workpeople 1), and were then to have a public announcement made: "Let no one who is dirty go down into this tank! Let only those whose dust and dirt have been washed away, who are purified and stainless, go down into this tank!" Now would that bath, O king, be of any use to those thus purified and stainless? 'Certainly not, Sir! The advantage they would have sought in going into the bath they would have already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the bath be to them then?' 'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata ordained that only laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantage they seek in it have been already gained. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then? 28. 'Or suppose, O king, that a physician, a true follower of the sages of old 2, one who carries (in his memory) the ancient traditions and verses 3, a practical man 4, skilled in diagnosis, and master of an efficacious and lasting system of treatment, who had collected (from medicinal herbs) a medicine able to cure every disease, were to have it announced: [249] "Let none, Sirs, who are ill come to visit me! Let the p. 68 healthy and the strong visit me!" Now, would then, O king, those men free from illness and disease, healthy and jubilant, get what they wanted from that physician?' 'Certainly not, Sir! What men want from a physician, that would they have already obtained otherwise. What use would the physician be to them?' 'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata ordained that only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, then would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them then? 29. 'Or suppose, O king, that some had had many hundreds of dishes of boiled milk-rice prepared 1, and were to have it announced to those about him: 'Let not, Sirs, any hungry man approach to this feast of charity. Let those who have well fed, the satisfied, refreshed, and satiated 2, those who have regaled themselves, and are filled with good cheer,--let them come to the feast." Now would any advantage, O king, be derived from the feast by those men thus well fed, satisfied, refreshed, satiated, regaled, and filled with good cheer?' 'Certainly not, Sir! The very advantage they would seek in going to the feast, that would they have already attained elsewhere. What good would the feast be to them?' 'Just so, O king, had the Tathâgata, ordained that p. 69 only those laymen who had already entered the first stage of the Excellent Way should be received into the Order, thus would the advantages they seek in it have been already gained elsewhere. Of what use would the renunciation be to them? 30. 'But notwithstanding that, O king, they who return to the lower state manifest thereby five immeasurably good qualities in the religion of the Conquerors. And what are the five? They show how glorious is the state (which those have reached who have entered the Order), how purified it is from every stain, how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together (with the good), how difficult it is to realise (its glory), how many are the restraints to be observed within it. 31. 'And how do they show the mighty glory of that state? just, O king, as if a man, poor, and of low birth, without distinction 1, deficient in wisdom, were to come into possession of a great and mighty kingdom, it would not be long before he would be overthrown, utterly destroyed 2, and deprived of his glory. For he would be unable to support his dignity. [250] And why so? Because of the greatness thereof. just so is it, O king, that whosoever are without distinction, have acquired no merit, and are devoid of wisdom, when they renounce the world according to the religion of the Conquerors, then, unable to bear that most excellent renunciation, overthrown, fallen, and deprived of their glory, they return to the lower state. For they are unable to p. 70 carry out the doctrine of the Conquerors. And why so? Because of the exalted nature of the condition which that doctrine brings about. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the mighty glory of that state. 32. 'And how do they show how purified that state is from every stain? just, O king, as water, when it has fallen upon a lotus, flows away, disperses, scatters, disappears, adheres not to it. And why so? Because of the lotus being pure from any spot. Just so, O king, when whosoever are deceitful, tricky, crafty, treacherous, holders of lawless opinions, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they disperse, and scatter, and fall from that pure and stainless, clear and faultless 1, most high and excellent religion, and finding no standing-place in it, adhering no longer to it, they return to the lower state. And why so? Because the religion of the Conquerors has been purified from every stain. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the purity of that state from every stain. 33. 'And how do they show how impossible it is for the sinful to dwell within it together with the good? just, O king, as the great ocean does not tolerate the continuance in it of a dead corpse 2, but whatever corpse may be in the sea, that does it bring quickly to the shore, and cast it out on to the dry land. And why so? Because the ocean is p. 71 the abode of mighty creatures. Just so, O king, when whosoever are sinful, foolish, with their zeal evaporated, distressed, impure, and bad, have been admitted into the religion of the Conquerors, it is not long before they abandon that religion, and dwelling no longer in it--the abode of the mighty, the Arahats, purified, and free from the Great Evils 1--they return to the lower state. And why so? Because it is impossible for the wicked to dwell in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the impossibility of the sinful to abide within it together with the good. 34. 'And how do they show how difficult a state it is to grasp? just, O king, as archers who are clumsy, untrained, ignorant, and bereft of skill, are incapable of high feats of archery, such as hairsplitting 2, but miss the object, and shoot beyond the mark. And why so? Because of the fineness and minuteness of the horse-hair. [251] just so, O king, when foolish, stupid, imbecile 3, dull, slow-minded p. 72 fellows renounce the world according to the doctrine of the Conquerors, then they, unable to grasp the exquisitely fine and subtle distinctions of the Four Truths, missing them, going beyond them, turn back before long to the lower state. And why so? Because it is so difficult to penetrate into the finenesses and subtleties of the Truths. This is how they show forth the difficulty of its realisation. 35. 'And how do they show how many are the restraints to be observed within it? just, O king, as a man who had gone to a place where a mighty battle was going on, when, surrounded on all sides by the forces of the enemy, he sees the armed hosts crowding in upon him, will give way, turn back, and take to flight. And why so? Out of fear lest he should not be saved in the midst of so hot a fight. Just so, O king, when whosoever are wicked 1, unrestrained, shameless, foolish, full of ill-will, fickle, unsteady, mean and stupid, renounce the world under the system of the Conquerors, then they, unable to carry out the manifold precepts, give way, turn back, and take to flight, and so before long return to the lower state. And why so? Because of the multiform nature of the restraints to be observed in the religion of the Conquerors. Thus is it, O king, that they show forth the manifoldness of the restraints to be observed. p. 73 36. 'As on that best of flowering shrubs, O king, the double jasmine 1, there may be flowers that have been pierced by insects, and their tender stalks being cut to pieces, they may occasionally fall down. But by their having fallen is not the jasmine bush disgraced. For the flowers that still remain upon it pervade every direction with their exquisite perfume. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors, return again to the lower state, are, like jasmine flowers bitten by the insects and deprived of their colour and their smell, colourless as it were in their behaviour, and incapable of development. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the members of the Order who remain in the religion pervade the world of gods and men with the exquisite perfume of their right conduct. 37. 'Among rice plants that are healthy [252] and ruddy there may spring up a kind of rice plant called Karumbhaka 2, and that may occasionally fade. But by its fading are not the red rice plants disgraced. For those that remain become the food of kings. Just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like Karumbhaka plants among the red rice, may grow not, nor attain development, and may even occasionally relapse into the lower state. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame, p. 74 for the brethren that remain stedfast become fitted even for Arahatship. 38. 'On one side, O king, of a wish conferring gem a roughness 1 may arise. But by the appearance of that roughness is not the gem disgraced. For the purity that remains in the gem fills the people with gladness. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they may be rough ones and fallen ones in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame, for the brethren who remain stedfast are the cause of joy springing up in the hearts of gods and men. 39. 'Even red sandal wood of the purest sort, O king, may become in some portion of it rotten and scentless. But thereby is not the sandal wood disgraced. For that portion which remains wholesome and sweet scatters and diffuses its perfume all around. And just so, O king, whosoever having renounced the world under the system of the Conquerors return again to the lower state, they, like the rotten part of the sandal wood, may be as it were thrown away in the religion. But by their backsliding is not the religion of the Conquerors put to shame. For the brethren who remain stedfast pervade, with the sandal wood perfume of their right conduct, the world of gods and men.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! By one appropriate simile after another, by one correct analogy after another have you most excellently made clear the p. 75 faultlessness of the system of the Conquerors, and shown it free from blame. And even those who have lapsed make evident how excellent that system is.' ____________________________ (Here ends the dilemma as to those who have lapsed.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-SEVENTH. WHY HAVE ARAHATS NO POWER OVER THEIR BODIES?] 40. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your (members of the Order) say: [253] "There is one kind of pain only which an Arahat suffers, bodily pain, that is, and not mental 1." 'How is this, Nâgasena? The Arahat keeps his mind going by means of the body. Has the Arahat no lordship, no mastery, no power over the body?' 'No, he has not, O king.' 'That, Sir, is not right that over the body, by which he keeps his mind going, he should have neither lordship, nor mastery, nor power. Even a bird, Sir, is lord and master and ruler over the nest in which he dwells.' 41. 'There are these ten qualities, O king, inherent in the body, which run after it, as it were, and accompany it from existence to existence 2. And what are the ten? Cold and heat, hunger and thirst, p. 76 the necessity of voiding excreta, fatigue and sleepiness, old age, disease, and death. And in respect thereof, the Arahat is without lordship, without mastery, without power.' 'Venerable Nâgasena, what is the reason why the commands of the Arahat have no power over his body, neither has he any mastery over it? Tell me that. 'Just, O king, as whatever beings are dependent on the land, they all walk, and dwell, and carry on their business in dependence upon it. But do their commands have force, does their mastery extend over it?' 'Certainly not, Sir!' 'Just so, O king, the Arahat keeps his mind going through the body. And yet his commands have no authority over it, nor power.' 42. 'Venerable Nâgasena, why is it that the ordinary man suffers both bodily and mental pain?' 'By reason, O king, of the untrained state of his mind. just, O king, as an ox when trembling with starvation might be tied up with a weak and fragile and tiny rope of grass or creeper. But if the ox were excited 1 then would he escape, dragging the fastening with him. Just so, O king, when pain comes upon him whose mind is untrained, then is his mind excited, and the mind so excited bends his body this way and that and makes it grovel on the ground, [254] and he, being thus untrained in mind, trembles 2 and cries, and gives forth terrible p. 77 groans. This is why the ordinary man, O king, suffers pain as well in body as in mind.' 43. 'Then why, Sir, does the Arahat only suffer one kind of pain--bodily, that is, and not mental?' 'The mind of the Arahat, O king, is trained, well practised, tamed, brought into subjection, and obedient, and it hearkens to his word. When affected with feelings of pain, he grasps firmly the idea of the impermanence of all things, so ties his mind as it were to the post of contemplation, and his mind, bound to the post of contemplation, remains unmoved, unshaken, becomes stedfast, wanders not--though his body the while may bend this way and that and roll in agony by the disturbing influence of the pain. This is why it is only one kind of pain that the Arahat suffers--bodily pain, that is, and not mental.' 44., Venerable Nâgasena, that verily is a most marvellous thing that when the body is trembling the mind should not be shaken. Give me a reason for that.' 'Suppose, O king, there were a noble tree, mighty in trunk and branches and leaves. And when agitated by the force of the wind its branches should wave. Would the trunk also move 'Certainly not, Sir!' 'Well, O king, the mind of the Arahat is as the trunk of that noble tree.' ' 1Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange! p. 78 [paragraph continues] Never before have I seen a lamp of the law that burned thus brightly through all time.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the Arahat's power over his body.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-EIGHTH. THE LAYMAN'S SIN.] 45. [255] 'Venerable Nâgasena, suppose a layman had been guilty of a Pârâgika offence 1, and some time after should enter the Order. And neither he himself should be aware that when still a layman he had so been guilty, nor should any one else inform him, saying: "When a layman you were guilty of such an offence." Now if he were to devote himself to the attainment of Arahatship 2, would he be able so to comprehend the Truth as to succeed in entering upon the Excellent Way?' 'No, O king, he would not.' 'But why not, Sir?' 'That, in him, which might have been the cause of his grasping the Truth has been, in him, destroyed. No comprehension can therefore take place.' 46. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "To him who is aware (of an offence) there comes p. 79 remorse. When remorse has arisen there is an obstruction in the heart. To him whose heart is obstructed there is no comprehension of the Truth 1." 'Why should there then be no such comprehension to one not aware of his offence, feeling no remorse, remaining with a quiet heart. This dilemma touches on two irreconcilable statements. Think well before you solve it.' 47. 'Would selected seed 2, O king, successfully sown in a well-ploughed, well-watered, fertile soil, come to maturity?' 'Certainly, Sir!' 'But would the same seed grow on the surface of a thick slab of rock?' 'Of course not.' 'Why then should the same seed grow in the mud, and not on the rock?' 'Because on the rock the cause for its growth does not exist. Seeds cannot grow without a cause.' 'Just so, O king, the cause by reason of which his comprehension of the Truth (his conversion) might have been brought about, has been rooted out in him. Conversion cannot take place without a cause.' 48. '[Give me, Sir, another simile 3.'] 'Well, O king, will sticks and clods and cudgels 4 p. 80 and clubs find a resting-place in the air, in the same way as they do on the ground?' 'No, Sir.' 'But what is the reason why they come to rest on the earth, when they will not stand in the air?' 'There is no cause in the air for their stability, and without a cause they will [256] not stand.' 'Just so, O king, by that fault of his the cause for his conversion has been removed. And without a cause there can be no conversion. Now will fire, O king, burn in water in the same way as it will on land?' 'No, Sir.' 'But why not?' 'Because in water the conditions precedent for burning do not exist. And there can be no burning without them.' 'Just so, O king, are the conditions precedent to conversion destroyed in him by that offence of his. And when the conditions which would bring it about are destroyed there can be no conversion.' 49. 'Venerable Nâgasena, think over this matter once more. I am not yet convinced about it. Persuade me by some reason how such obstruction can occur in the case of one not aware of his offence, and feeling therefore no remorse.' 'Would the Halâhala 1 poison, O king, if eaten by p. 81 a man who did not know he had eaten it, take away his life?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Just so, O king, is there an obstruction to his comprehension of the Truth, who, without being aware of it, has committed a sin. And would fire, O king, burn a man who walked into it unawares?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Well, just so in the case you put. Or would a venomous snake, if it bit a man without his knowing it, kill him?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Well, just so in the case you put. And is it not true that Samana Kolañña, the king of Kalinga,--when surrounded by the seven treasures of a sovereign overlord he went mounted on his state elephant to pay a visit to his relatives,--was not able to pass the Tree of Wisdom, though he was not aware that it was there 1? Well, of the same kind is the reason why one who has committed an offence, even though he know it not, is nevertheless incapable of rising to the knowledge of the Truth.' 'Verily, Nâgasena, this must be the word of the Conqueror. To find any fault with it were vain. And this (explanation of yours) must be the meaning of it. I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma of the layman's sin.] p. 82 [DILEMMA THE FIFTY-NINTH. THE GUILTY RECLUSE.] 50. [257] 'Venerable Nâgasena, what is the distinction, what the difference, between a layman who has done wrong, and a Samana (member of the Order) who has done wrong? Will they both be reborn in like condition? Will the like retribution happen to both? Or is there any difference?' 'There are, O king, ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samana, distinguishing him from the guilty layman. And besides that, in ten ways does the Samana purify the gifts that may be given him. 51. 'And what are the ten qualities which abound in the guilty Samana, distinguishing him from the guilty layman? The guilty Samana, O king, is full of reverence for the Buddha, for the Law, for the Order, and for his fellow-disciples; he exerts himself in putting questions about, and in recitation of (the sacred texts); he is devoted to learning, though he has done wrong. Then, O king, the guilty one entering the assembly, enters it decently clad, he guards himself alike in body and mind through fear of rebuke, his mind is set upon exerting himself (towards the attainment of Arahatship), he is of the companionship of the brethren. And even, O king, if he does wrong he lives discreetly. just, O king, as a married woman sins only in secret and in privacy, so does the guilty Samana walk discreetly in his wrongdoing. These are the ten qualities, O king, found in the guilty Samana, distinguishing him from the guilty layman. 52. 'And what are the ten ways in which, besides, p. 83 he purifies a gift given to him? He purifies it in that he wears an invulnerable coat of mail 1; in that he is shorn in the fashion of the characteristic mark of renunciation used by the seers of old 2; in that he is one who is included in the multitude of the brethren; in that he has taken his refuge in the Buddha, the Law, and the Order; in that he dwells in a lonely spot suitable for the exertion (after Arahatship); in that he seeks after the treasure of the teaching of the Conquerors; in that he preaches the most excellent law (Dhamma); in that his final destiny is to be reborn in the island of truth 3; in that he is possessed of an honest belief that the Buddha is the chief of all beings; in that he has taken upon himself the keeping of the Uposatha day. These, O king, are the ten ways in which, besides, he purifies a gift given to him. 53. [258] 'Even, O king, when thoroughly fallen, a guilty Samana yet sanctifies the gifts of the supporters of the faith--just as water, however thick, will wash away slush and mud and dirt and stains--just as hot, and even boiling water will put a mighty blazing fire out--just as food, however nasty, will allay the faintness of hunger. For thus, O king, hath it been said by the god over all gods in the most excellent Magghima Nikâya in the chapter "On gifts 4:" p. 84 "Whene'er a good man, with believing heart, Presents what he hath earned in righteousness To th' unrighteous,--in full confidence On the great fruit to follow the good act-- Such gift is, by the giver, sanctified."' 'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange! We asked you a mere ordinary question, and you, expounding it with reasons and with similes, have filled, as it were, the hearer with the sweet taste of the nectar (of Nirvâna 1). just as a cook, or a cook's apprentice, taking a piece of ordinary nutmeg, will, treating it with various ingredients, prepare a dish for a king--so, Nâgasena, when we asked you an ordinary question, have you, expounding it with reasons and similes, filled the hearer with the sweet taste of the nectar of Nirvâna.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the guilty recluse.] p. 85 [DILEMMA THE SIXTIETH. THE SOUL IN WATER.] 54. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this water when boiling over the fire gives forth many a sound, hissing and simmering 1. Is then, Nâgasena, the water alive? Is it shouting at play? [259] or is it crying out at the torment inflicted on it?' 'It is not alive, O king, there is no soul or being in water. It is by reason of the greatness of the shock of the heat of the fire that it gives forth sounds, hissing and simmering.' 'Now, venerable Nâgasena, there are false teachers who on the ground that the water is alive reject the use of cold water, and warming the water feed themselves on tepid foods of various kinds 2. 'These men find fault with you and revile you, saying: "The Sakyaputtiya Samanas do injury to the souls of one function 3." Dispel, remove, get rid of this their censure and blame.' 55. 'The water is not alive, O king. Neither is there therein either soul or being. And it is the p. 86 great shock of the heat of the fire that makes it sound, hissing and simmering. It is like the water in holes in the ground, in ponds and pools and lakes, in reservoirs, in crevices and chasms, in wells, in low-lying places, and in lotus-tanks 1, which before the mighty onset of the hot winds 2 is so deeply affected that it vanishes away. But does the water in that case, O king, give forth many a sound, hissing and simmering?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But, if it were alive, the water would then also make some sound. Know therefore, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the greatness of the shock of the heat of the water that makes it give forth sounds. 56. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. If water, O king, with grains of rice in it, is put in a vessel and covered up, but not placed over the fireplace, would it then give forth sound?' 'No, Sir. It would remain quiet and unmoved.' 'But if you were to put the same water, just as it is in the vessel, over a fireplace 3, and then light up the fire, would the water remain quiet and motionless?' p. 87 'Certainly not, Sir. It would move and be agitated, become perturbed and all in commotion, waves would arise in it, it would rush up and down and in every direction [260], it would roll up and boil over 1, and a garland of foam would be formed above it.' p. 88 'But why so, O king, when water in its ordinary state remains quiet and motionless?' 'It is because of the powerful impulse of the heat of the fire that the water, usually so still, gives forth many a sound, bubbling and hissing.' 'Then thereby know, O king, that there is no soul in water, neither being; and that it is the strong heat of the fire that causes it to make sounds. 57. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. Is there not water to be found in every house put into water-pots with their mouths closed up?' 'Yes, Sir.' 'Well, does that water move, is it agitated, perturbed, in commotion, does it form into waves, does it rush up and down and in every direction, does it roll up and roll over 1, is it covered with foam?' 'No! That water is in its ordinary state. It remains still and quiet.' 'But have you ever heard that all this is true of the water in the great ocean? and that rearing up 2 it breaks against the strand with a mighty roar?' 'Yes, I have both heard of it, and have seen it myself--how the water in the great ocean lifts itself up a hundred, two hundred, cubits high, towards the sky.' 'But why, whereas water in its ordinary state remains motionless and still, does the water in the ocean both move and roar?' 'That is by reason of the mighty force of the p. 89 onset of the wind, whereas the water in the water-jars neither moves nor makes any noise, because nothing shakes it.' 'Well, the sounds given forth by boiling water are the result, in a similar way, [261] of the great heat of the fire.' 58. 'Do not people cover over the dried-up mouth of a drum 1 with dried cow-leather?' 'Yes, they do.' 'Well, is there any soul or being, O king, in a drum?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Then how is it that a drum makes sounds?' 'By the action or effort of a woman or a man.' 'Well, just as that is why the drum sounds, so is it by the effect of the heat of the fire that the water sounds. And for this reason also you might know, O king, that there is no soul, neither being, in water; and that it is the heat of the fire which causes it to make sounds 2. 59. 'And I, too, O king, have something yet further to ask of you--thus shall this puzzle be thoroughly threshed out. How is it? Is it true of every kind of vessel that water heated in it makes noises, or only of some kinds of vessels?' 'Not of all, Sir. Only of some.' 'But then you have yourself, O king, abandoned the position you took up. You have come over to my side-that there is no soul, neither being, in water. For only if it made noises in whatever p. 90 vessel it were heated could it be right to say that it had a soul. There cannot be two kinds of water--that which speaks, as it were, which is alive, and that which does not speak, and does not live. If all water were alive, then that which the great elephants, when they are in rut, suck up in their trunks, and pour out over their towering frames, or putting into their mouths take right into their stomachs--that water, too, when crushed flat between their teeth, would make a sound. And great ships, a hundred cubits long, heavily laden, full of hundreds of packages of goods, pass over the sea--the water crushed by them, too, would make sounds. [262] And mighty fish, leviathans with bodies hundreds of leagues long 1, since they dwell in the great ocean, immersed in the depths of it, must, so living in it, be constantly taking into their mouths and spouting out the ocean--and that water, too, crushed between their gills or in their stomach, would make sounds. But as, even when tormented with the grinding and crushing of all such mighty things, the water gives no sound, therefore, O king, you may take it that there is no soul, neither being, in water.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! With fitting discrimination has the puzzle put to you 2 been solved. just, Nâgasena, as a gem of inestimable value which had come into the hands of an able master goldsmith, clever and well trained, would meet with due appreciation, estimation, and praise-just as a rare pearl p. 91 at the hands of a dealer in pearls, a fine piece of woven stuff at the hands of a cloth merchant 1, or red sandal wood at the hands of a perfumer--just so in that way has this puzzle put to you been solved with the discrimination it deserved.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the water-life.] ____________________________ Here ends the Sixth Chapter 2. Footnotes 43:1 This verse is found three times in the Pitakas--in the Mahâvagga I, 6, 8, in the Ariya-pariyesana Sutta (Magghima Nikâya I, 171), and in the Angulimâla Sutta (Magghima Nikâya, No. 86). It occurs with other stanzas of a similar tendency, and many of the lines in those stanzas are repeated, but with variations and in a different order, by the author of the Lalita Vistara (pp. 526, 527 of Râgendra Lâl Mitra's edition). One verse is found there in two detached lines which run thus in the Sanskrit:-- Âkâryyo na hi me kaskit, sadriso me na vidyate and Sadevâsuragandharvvo nâsti me pratipudgalah. Hînati-kumburê renders patipuggalo, not by 'rival,' but by superior.' 43:2 Mr. Trenckner has pointed out that this quotation is found in two Suttas, Nos. 85 and 100 in the Magghima Nikâya. 44:1 Hînati-kumburê reads Gâtimantî. It may be noted that Hardy (Manual of Buddhism, p. 149), who omits Yañña, gives Gâti and Manta as two separate names, and spells the last two names Bhoga Sudanta. 44:2 So also the Simhalese, p. 329. But the Gâtaka Commentary (verse 270 at vol. i, p. 50) has kondañña. 44:3 The Gâtaka Introduction (loc. cit.) has Bhoga. The Simhalese has Subhoga. 44:4 Hînati-kumburê agrees here with Hardy in reading Sudanta. 44:5 This episode has not been traced in the Pitakas. The Simhalese here gives also the detail of the one and two fingers, found in the Gâtaka, and translated in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 72. 45:1 In the North-West. See Gâtaka I, 140, &c. 45:2 Khalangavantam. These are phonetics, prosody, grammar, exegesis, astronomy, and ritual. I was wrong in taking Childers's interpretation of this word at 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. 72. 45:3 This episode is also not in the Pitakas. On onogeti see Mahâvagga I, 22, 18. Sabbamitra is given in the Thera Gâthâ, I, 150, as the name of a Thera, and in the Divyâvadana, p. 420, as the name of Asoka's herald or court crier. 45:4 There is nothing about any such devatâ in the Pitakas. Hînati-kumburê takes it to mean the god who took the outward appearance of the four visions-an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and a recluse. But in that story--which is not related in the Pitakas of the Buddha, though it is referred to in connection with him at Buddhavamsa XXVI, p. 16--the god does not speak. The only god whose words are said, in any of the later Pâli legends, to have agitated the Bodisat's heart at that moment, was the Evil One himself; and that only in one version of the legend, the Pâli authority for which I cannot give. It is in Hardy's 'Manual,' p. 157, where the speech of the Evil One, placed at Gâtaka I, 63 at a later time, is said to have been made at the moment of the Renunciation. Even if it be not a mere blunder of Hardy's to put it at that time, still it cannot be the speech referred to by our author. For the startling doctrine that the Evil One himself was one of the Bodisat's teachers would never have been smuggled in, as it were, by concealing the identity of the spirit referred to under p. 46 the generic term of devatâ, Now in the Fo-pan-hin-tsi-kin (Nanjio, No. 680), a Chinese work of the beginning of the seventh century A. D., we find in the sixteenth kwuen or chapter (if one may trust the abstract given in Beal's 'Romantic Legend,' p. 131) that a Devaputra named Tsao-ping is said to have spoken to the Bodisat at the moment of the Renunciation. It is scarcely open to doubt that our author had in his mind an earlier form of that episode. But if so it is the only proved case of his having Sanskrit, and not Pâli works, as his authority. 47:1 Anguttara Nikâya I, 15, 10. 47:2 These divisions of the seven 'Jewels of the Law' of Arahatship are set out in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 62-63. 47:3 Adhisîla, adhikitta, and adhipaññâ. 47:4 Appamâda. 48:1 Samupâdikâ, for which the Simhalese has sama bara wannîya, usûlana sulu wannîya. 48:2 Dhâto; not in Childers, but see Gâtaka II, 247, Mahâvagga VI, 25, 1, and below, IV, 6, 29. 49:1 Literally 'mouth.' I presume a small uncovered bullock cart is meant, like that figured in Plate 57 in Cunningham's 'Bharhut Tope.' The chariot on the other hand is of the shape given in Plates 3, 34, 35 of Fergusson's 'Tree and Serpent Worship.' The usual form of the bullock cart has also a hood, or cover, as clearly shown in Fergusson's Plate No. 65, and Cunningham's Plate No. 34. But the one here referred to cannot have had the cover over it, for then the supposition that more goods were piled on to it, when full, would be an impossible one. I know of no other passage where the mukha, literally 'mouth,' of a cart is mentioned, and I may possibly be wrong in rendering it 'top.' 49:2 This simile has already been used in the Vessantara Dilemma above, I, 173. 49:3 Our author himself here confesses that his thoughts are more on edification than on logic. 51:1 There is no general word in Pâli for aunt or uncle. There are separate expressions for each of the degrees of relationship expressed by those words in English-mother's brother, father's sister, &c. 51:2 Vassika-sâtikâ. See the note at 'Vinaya Texts,' vol. ii, p. 225 (Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvii). 51:3 From the Ganta Sutta (Magghima Nikâya, No. 142). See Mr. Trenckner's note. 52:1 The translation of these five technical terms of cloth-making is doubtful. The Simhalese (p. 335) has piñgana, sindina, pothita, katina, wiyana. 52:2 The Simhalese (p. 335) here gives at length the story of Pagâpatî's gift, at the time when Gotama returned, as the Buddha, to Kapilavatthu. 53:1 On this list see above, p. 234 of the Pâli text (IV, 5, 36). 53:2 On these words compare Anguttara Nikâya II, 4, 2. 53:3 Akâmakaranîyâ. Compare Vimâna Vatthu X, 6 and Dîgha Nikâya II, 46. 54:1 The same simile has already occurred, vol. i, p. 220 (IV, 2, 22). 54:2 Magghima Nikâya, vol. i, p. 13 (in Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 55:1 This must have been composed after the moon god had become established in belief as the husband, or lord, of the Nakshatras, or lunar mansions. For it cannot, of course, be intended that the moon is itself a constellation. 55:2 Samyutta, Nikâya III, 2, 10 (vol. i, p. 67 of the Pâli Text Society's edition). 55:3 These phrases of approval are commonly used in the Pitakas of words uttered by any one whose sayings would not, of themselves, carry weight. So in the Dîgha III, 1, 28 and in the Magghima I, 385. 55:4 This verse has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. In p. 56 the Thera Gâthâ we have a collection of verses ascribed to Sâriputta, but this is not one of them. The literal translation is: 'There is but one feeling of faith, but one taking of refuge, but one stretching forth of the hands; (with joined palms, in adoration--that paid) to the Buddha, who puts to rout the armies of the Evil One, and is able to make (us) cross (the ocean of continual becomings).' The taking of refuge meant is the confession, the repetition of which characterises a man as a Buddhist--'I take my refuge in the Buddha, &c.' 56:1 Anguttara Nikâya I, 13, 1. 56:2 That is, of insight and of the: practice of right conduct. 57:1 Samyutta Nikâya XLIV, 24, says Mr. Trenckner. The passage has not yet been reached in M. Léon Feer's edition for the Pâli Text Society. Hînati-kumburê (p. 341) renders ñâya by nirwâna. 57:2 Literally 'a bed encumbered, &c.' See below, p. 348 of the Pâli text, where the question, as here, is whether such a layman can attain to the Nirvâna of Arahatship. 57:3 So the Buddha says of himself (Anguttara Nikâya III, 38), that, in the days when he was a layman, he never used any sandal wood except that from Benares. 57:4 I don't know what these four Sîlakkhandhas are. Morality is described in the Pitakas as threefold, fivefold, or tenfold, according as the Sîlas, in three divisions (as translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' vol. xi of the 'Sacred Books of the East,' pp. 189-200), are referred to; or the first five, or the whole ten, of the moral precepts (the Buddhist Ten Commandments) set out in my 'Buddhism,' p. 160. This reference to four divisions of the moral code is foreign to the Pitakas, at least as we yet know them. 57:5 The Diyaddhesu sikkhâpada-satesu. It is clear from the Anguttara Nikâya III, 83 that the precepts referred to are those of the Pâtimokkha (translated by me at the beginning of 'Vinaya p. 58 Texts,' vol. xvii of the 'Sacred Books of the East'), notwithstanding the fact that the actual number of these rules is 227. 58:1 The Dhutangas: see above, IV, 5, 10, and the enumeration below at the translation of p. 351 of the Pâli text. 59:1 Nârâka. As Childers expresses a doubt as to the character of this weapon, I would refer to the Magghima I, 429, Gâtaka III, 322, and Milinda, pp. 105, 418 (of Mr. Trenckner's text). 60:1 See 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' pp. 90, 91; and Magghima Nikâya I, 240-246. 60:2 Alamariya-dassana-ñâna-visesam. I am not sure of the exact meaning of this compound. For alamariya the Simhalese has here (p. 343) sarvagñatâ, and renders the whole 'do I arrive at a superhuman condition, at the distinctive faculty which is able to see into omniscience,' and on IV, 8, 21 it gives a slightly different but practically identical rendering, 'I shall not reach that superhuman condition which can distinguish or which suffices for insight into the supreme omniscience.' 60:3 That is the wisdom of Buddhahood. The passage is from the Magghima Nikâya I, 246 (quoted also below, IV, 8, 21). 60:4 This is a very famous stanza. It is put into the mouth of p. 61 Abhibhû at Thera Gâthâ, verse 256, and in the Samyutta Nikâya VI, 2, 4, 18 and 23; and also, in its Sanskrit form, into the mouth of the Buddha at the Divyâvadana, p. 300, and into the mouth of the gods at ibid. p. 569. It is possibly another instance of our author having Sanskrit, and not Pâli, authorities in his mind, that he ascribes it here to the Buddha, and not to Abhibhû, the Elder. 61:1 The Simhalese has here six pages of description of the austerities not found in the Pâli text. 62:1 Pakkha-hato: should become like one whose two hands are ruined' says the Simhalese here (p. 349), but at p. 411 (on p. 276 of the Pâli) it translates the same term, 'whose hands and feet are broken.' It is literally 'should become side-destroyed,' and may mean paralysed. 63:1 Tâvatakam. I take this word, in the sense of 'mere,' as an accusative in agreement with gihim (see the use of the word at pp. 107, 115, 241 of the Pâli text), and not as an accusative of motion, 'into so great a sâsanam.' 63:2 That is till he be converted, till he has 'entered the stream.' See 'Buddhism,' p. 101. 63:3 That is, of a layman. 63:4 Talâka, which Childers wrongly renders 'pond, pool, lake.' It is always an artificial tank, reservoir. See Kullavagga X, 1, 6; Gâtaka I, 239; Milinda, pp. 66, 81, 296. 64:1 'Vimutti: of the nectar of the Nirvâna which is the highest fruit of Arahatship' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 64:2 Roguppatti-kusalam: 'skilled in the threefold origin of disease' says the Simhalese (p. 351). See also pp. 248, 272 of the Pâli text. 65:1 The Simhalese (p. 352) inserts here 'Give me, Sir, I pray you, another simile,' and then goes on 'Then suppose, O king, &c.' 65:2 Bhatta, perhaps rice, as the food par excellence. 66:1 Kayâgata-sati: literally 'intentness of mind on (the truth relating to) bodies.' 66:2 Kilesa-kilant-agghattâ. Compare khâtagghattam, Gâtaka I, 345. 67:1 Stonemasons and sculptors are implied as well as navvies. Compare my note at 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 262. 67:2 Sabhâva-isi-bhattiko. Compare Siva-bhattiko (Saivite) at Mahâvamsa, chapter 93, line 17. In râga-bhattiko (above, p. 142 of the Pâli text) the connotation is different. The Simhalese (p. 353) repeats the phrase. 67:3 Suta-manta-dharo, which the Simhalese repeats. 67:4 Atakkiko: 'without the theories (vitarka) resorted to by those ignorant of the practice of medicine' says Hînati-kumburê. 68:1 As Agâtasattu is said to have done for Devadatta at Gâtaka I, 186. 68:2 See above, IV, 6, 5. 69:1 Nibbisesa, not in Childers; but see, for instance, Gâtaka II, 32. 69:2 Paridhamsati. Compare below, IV, 7, 8 (p. 265 of the Pâli). 70:1 Nikkantaka-pandara: literally 'thornless and yellow-white.' The second of these epithets of the religion (sâsana) is applied to it above, IV, 6, 23 (p. 250 of the Pâli). The Simhalese merely repeats them. 70:2 On this curious belief see the note above on IV, 3, 39 (p. 187 of the Pâli). 71:1 They are lust, dulness, delusion, and ignorance. 71:2 Vâlaggavedham, 'hair-splitting;' which is also used in the Pitakas in the secondary sense we too have given to it. 71:3 Elamûga, supposed to mean literally 'deaf and dumb;' but often (if not always) used in this secondary sense. See Gâtaka I, 247, 248 (where both MSS. read elamûga), and Magghima Nikâya I, 20 (where Mr. Trenckner has an interesting note). In both places the fifth century commentators explain the word by lâla-nukha, 'drivelling,' supposing it to be derived from elâ, saliva,' and mûkha, 'mouth.' This is certainly wrong, for the last part of the compound is mûka, dumb.' The fact is that the word was a puzzle, even then. The meaning assigned to it by both Pâli and Sanskrit lexicographers of 'deaf and dumb' has not yet been confirmed by a single passage either in Pâli or Sanskrit. And as eda, 'sheep,' is common in both, in its longer form of edaka, elaka, the compound probably meant originally 'as dumb p. 72 as a sheep,' which would be a quite satisfactory basis for the secondary sense of 'imbecile,' in which alone it can be traced in Pâli. For the Sanskrit form edamûka Böhtlingk-Roth give only lexicographers as authority. So elâ, 'saliva,' is in Pâli only a lexicographer's word, and may have been invented to explain elamûga, and anelagalâ vâkâ, as at Sumangala, p. 282. 72:1 Pâkata. Hînati-kumburê says (p. 356) pâpakalâwû, which suggests a different reading. 73:1 Vassikâ. So also above, IV, 3, 32 (p. 183 of the Pâli). 73:2 A yellowish white kâwalu sort' says Hînati-kumburê, and Clough renders kâwalu by 'a species of panic grass' (panicum glaucum). The word has only been found in this passage. 74:1 Kakkasam. The Simhalese (p. 357) has left out this clause, evidently by mistake only. 75:1 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. An almost identical phrase has already been quoted, as said by the Buddha himself, at II, 1, 4 (p. 44 of the Pâli). 75:2 Bhave bhave anuparivattanti. See IV, 4, 41 (p. 204 Of the Pâli). 76:1 Parikupati, not in Childers; but see above, IV, 1, 38 (p. 118 of the Pâli). 76:2 Tasati. Mr. Trenckner points out (p. 431) that two MSS p. 77 read rasati and one sarati. The Simhalese rendering (p. 359), bhaya wanneya, confirms the reading he has adopted. 77:1 The Simhalese (p. 360) has four lines here that are not in the Pâli. 78:1 This, for a member of the Order, would be either unchastity, theft, murder, or putting forward false claims to extraordinary holiness. See 'Vinaya Texts,' part i, pp. 3-5. But Hînati-kumburê takes the word Pârâgika here in the sense of matricide, parricide, injuring a Bo Tree, murder of an Arahat, wounding a Tathâgata, or rape of a nun. 78:2 Tathattâya. Rahat phala pinisa pilipadane wî nam, says the Simhalese (p. 361). 79:1 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. 79:2 Sâradam bîgam. 'Seed which will give sâra.' It has nothing to do with sâradam, autumn.' See Samyutta Nikâya XXII, 24. 79:3 Added from the Simhalese (p. 362). It is not in the Pâli. 79:4 Lakuta, not in Childers. But see below (p. 301 of the Pâli text). It is probably the same Dravidian word as appears in the Sanskrit dictionaries as laguda. 80:1 There is a curious confusion about this word. It is found in post-Buddhistic Sanskrit in the sense of a particular sort of strong poison, and in this sense it occurs also in the Gâtaka Commentary I, 271; III, 103; and in the Tela-katâha-gâthâ, verse 82. In none of these passages is the nature of the poison at all explained; it is taken for granted as a well-known powerful poison. But above (p. 122 of the Pâli), and at Gâtaka I, 47, 48, it is used in p. 81 the sense of kolâhala, 'noise' (compare the Sanskrit halahalâ, used as a cry or call). In this sense it is probably a mere imitation of the supposed sound. In the sense of poison its derivation is doubtful. 81:1 This must be the incident referred to at Gâtaka IV, 232, though the name of the king is given (on the previous page) simply as Kâlingo and not as Samana-kolañño. 83:1 'The threefold robes, the Arahad-dhaga, for the suppression of all evil, worn by all the Buddhas' adds the Simhalese (p. 364). Compare above, vol. i, p. 190. 83:2 The Rishis; 'who were gaining the Swarga-moksha' adds the Simhalese. (It was before the days of Arahatship.) 83:3 Dhamma-dîpa, that is to reach Arahatship, Nirvâna. Compare the Gâtaka stanza, IV, 121, verse 3. 83:4 The Dakkhinâ Vibhanga, No. 12 in the Vibhanga Vagga, No. 142 in the whole Nikâya. 84:1 Amata-madhuram savanûpagam akâsi. Hînati-kumburê (p. 365) understands this differently, and has apparently read amatam madhuram. For he translates 'filled the hearer with the taste of Nirvâna, and adorned the least of the people with the ear-ring of Arahatship.' It is difficult to see where he finds 'the least of the people,' and there is no authority for rendering savanûpagam by 'ear-ring.' Amata as an epithet of the state of mind called by Western writers Nirvâna (which is only one of many names applied in the Buddhist books themselves to Arahatship) has nothing to do with immortality. As this wrong notion of the use of the word has led to much confusion, I have considered in an appendix all the passages in which the epithet occurs. 85:1 Kikkitâyati kitikitâyati. The English words entirely fail in representing the sound of these striking words (in which the k is pronounced as ch). They recur Mahâvagga VI, 26, 7 and Puggala Paññatti 3, 14. 85:2 Vekatika-vekatikam. Hînati-kumburê renders this by hunu-hunuyem, and hunu is the Pâli unha. But the expression may be compared with vikata, filth' (used for food), at Mahâvagga VI, 14, 6. On the belief of the Gains in the 'waterlife,' see the Âyâranga Sutta I, 1, 3 (in vol. xxii of the S. B. E., p. 5). 85:3 Ekindriyam gîvam. The belief in such a soul is to be understood as held by the teachers referred to, not by Buddhists. Hînati-kumburê's translation implies that the one function meant is prâna. Compare the heretical opinions described in the Dîgha II, 20, and 26. 86:1 This list recurs in almost identical terms below, p. 296 (of the Pâli text). See also above, II, 1, 10, (vol. 1, p. 55). 86:2 Vâtâtapa, not 'heat and wind' as Böhtlingk-Roth understand it in their rendering of vâtâtapika. See Vinaya Texts,' III, 159 and Samyutta XXII, 12. 86:3 Uddhane. This word is always rendered 'oven' in the dictionaries. But I doubt whether there were ovens at all, in our sense, in those times, and in any case, the word certainly means a fireplace made of bits of brick between which the wood for the fire is laid. We must imagine the bricks to be laid, as a general rule, in a triangle. I have often seen both Simhalese peasants, and Tamils from the Madras Presidency, boiling their rice in the open over such extemporised fireplaces in pots either placed on the p. 87 bricks, or more usually suspended from three sticks meeting above the centre of the space between the bricks. That this, and this only, is the sense in which the word is used in Pâli is clear from a comparison of the passages in which it is used, though of course in huts the fireplace, though of the same kind, would be a more permanent structure. I have not traced the word in the Pitakas. In the Gâtaka Commentary I, 68 we find that smoke usually rises uddhanato. This it would not do from an oven. At Gâtaka I, 33 and Dhammapada Commentary 176 uddhane âropetvâ must mean 'lifted up on to' not 'put into.' At Gâtaka I, 346 the speaker says he will take the uddhana-kapallâni, and the rice with ingredients for the curry, up on to the flat roof of the house, and there cook and eat them. These are the bits of brick to make, not an oven, but a fireplace of. At Gâtaka II, 133 the husband wrings the neck of the parrot (the parrot of the Arabian Nights, chap. 2, I may add) and throws it uddhanantaresu 'into the space (between the bricks) of the fireplace.' At Gâtaka III, 178 and Dhammapada Commentary 263 we hear of meat boiled on the uddhana. In the Rasavâhini (quoted in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1884, p. 53) the context shows that a fireplace or hearth, not an oven, is meant. Finally above (p. 118 of the Pâli) we hear of a cauldron being mounted on to an uddhana, and the fire being lighted under it. The derivation is uncertain. The Sanskrit lexicographers give various forms of the word--always with the meaning 'oven'--uddhâna, udvâna, uddhmâna (this last probably influenced by a supposition that the word was connected with dham). The Simhalese is uduna, and though 'fireplace' is better than 'oven,' we have really no corresponding word in English. The gypsies, who are Indian in origin, should have a name for it. But I only find in their vocabularies yogongo-tan, which means simply aggithâna. 87:1 Uttarati patarati. 'Itirenneya ptirenneya' says the Simhalese. 88:1 Uttarati patarati, the second of which the Simhalese (p. 368) omits here. See p. 117 of the Pâli. 88:2 Ussakkitvâ, 'continually pumping up,' says the Simhalese. 89:1 Bheri-pokkharam, which the Simhalese renders bheri-mukha. Compare Vimâna Vatthu 18, 10, where pokkhara is a sort of drum. 89:2 A similar analogy has been used above, vol. i, p. 48. 90:1 Their names are given. On this belief see above, III, 7, 10 (vol. i, p. 130) and Kullavagga IX, 1, 3. 90:2 Desâgato, 'based on the teaching of the Omniscient One,' says Hînati-kumburê, who therefore apparently read desanâgato. 91:1 Dussika, a word only found, so far as I know, here and below at V, 4 (p. 331 of the Pâli), where see the note. 91:2 Sakala-gana mano-mandanîyya-wû sri-saddharmâ-dâsayehi shatwana vargaya nimiyeya, says the Simhalese. Next: Chapter 7 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next p. 92

[DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FIRST. THE OBSTACLES.] 1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Blessed One said: "Live, O brethren, devoted to and taking delight in that which has no Papañkas (none of those states of mind which delay or obstruct a man in his spiritual growth 1)." 'What is that which has no Papañkas?' 'The fruit of Conversion has no Papañkas, O king, the fruit of that stage of the Path in which those live who will be only once, or not all reborn, the fruit of Arahatship has no Papañkas.' 'But if that be so, Nâgasena, [263] then why do the brethren concern themselves with recitation of, with asking questions about the discourses, and the pieces in mixed prose and verse, and the expositions, and the poems, and the outbursts of emotion, and the passages beginning "Thus he said," and the birth-stories, and the tales of wonder, and the extended treatises 2? Why do they trouble themselves about new buildings 3 about gifts and offerings to the order?' p. 93 2. 'They who do all these things, O king, are working towards attainment of freedom from the Papañkas, (that is of Arahatship 1). For whereas, O king, all those of the brethren who are pure by nature, those upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth 2, can (get rid of the Papañkas, can) become Arahats, in a moment--those on the other hand whose minds are much darkened by evil 3 can only become Arahats by such means as these. 3. 'Just, O king, as while one man who has sown a field and got the seed to grow can, by the exertion of his own power, and without any rampart or fence, reap the crop--whereas another man when he has got the seed to grow must go into the woods, and cut down sticks and branches and make a fence of them, and thus only reap the crop--in the same way those who are pure by nature, upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, can, in a moment, become Arahats, like the man who gathers the crop without a fence. But those, on the other hand, whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only become Arahats by such means as these--like the man who can only reap his crop if he builds the fence. 4. 'Or just, O king, as there might be a bunch of fruits on the summit of a lofty mango tree. Then p. 94 whoever possesses the power of Iddhi could take those fruits 1, but whoever had not, he would have first to cut sticks and creepers and construct a ladder, and by its means climb up the tree and so get at the fruit. In the same way those who are by nature pure, and upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, may attain, in a moment, to Arahatship, like the man getting the fruit by the power of Iddhi. But those, on the other hand, whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only become Arahats by such means as these, like the man who only gets the fruit by means of the ladder he has made. 5. [264] 'Or just, O king, as while one man who is clever in business will go alone to his lord and conclude any business he has to do, another man, rich though he may be, must by his riches bring others to his service, and by their help get the business done--and it is for the business' sake that he has to seek after them. In the same way those who are by nature pure, upon whose hearts an impression has been left by good deeds done in a former birth, may reach, in a moment, to the attainment of the Six Transcendent Qualities 2, like the man who does the business alone by himself Whereas those brethren whose minds are darkened by the evil they have done can only by such means as these realise the gains of renunciation, like the man who through others' help brings his business to the desired end. p. 95 6. 'For recitation is of great good, O king, and asking questions, and superintending building work, and seeing to gifts and offerings is of great good--each of them to one or other of the spiritual objects which the brethren seek to obtain. just, O king, as there might be some one of the ministers or soldiers or messengers or sentries or body-guards or attendants who was especially serviceable and useful to the king, but when he had any business given him to do they would all help him--just so are all these things of assistance when those objects have to be attained. When all men, O king, shall have become by nature pure, then will there be nothing left for a teacher 1 to accomplish. But so long as there is still need of discipleship 2, so long will even such a man, O king, as the Elder Sâriputta himself (though he had attained to the summit of wisdom by reason of his having been, through countless ages, deeply rooted in merit), yet find it impossible, without discipleship, to attain to Arahatship 3. Therefore is it, O king, that hearing (the Scriptures) is of use, and recitation of them, and asking questions about them. And therefore is it that those also who are addicted to p. 96 these things, becoming free from the obstacles thereto, attain to Arahatship 1.' 'Right well have you made me understand this puzzle, Nâgasena. That is so, and I accept it as you say. ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the obstacles.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SECOND. THE LAY ARAHAT.] 7. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "Whosoever has attained, as a layman, to Arahatship, one of two conditions are possible to him, and no other--either that very day he enters the Order, or he dies away, for beyond that day he cannot last 2." [265] 'Now if, Nâgasena, he could not, on that day, procure a teacher or preceptor, or a bowl and set of robes 3, would he then, being an Arahat, admit himself, or would he live over the day, or would some other Arahat suddenly appear by the power of Iddhi and admit him, or would he die away?' 'He could not, O king, because he is an Arahat, admit himself. For any one admitting himself to p. 97 the Order is guilty of theft 1. And he could not last beyond that day. Whether another Arahat should happen, or not, to arrive, on that very day would he die away.' 'Then, Nâgasena, by whatever means attained, the holy condition of Arahatship is thereby also lost, for destruction of life is involved in it.' 8. 'It is the condition of laymanship which is at fault, O king. In that faulty condition, and by reason of the weakness of the condition itself, the layman who, as such, has attained to Arahatship must either, that very day, enter the Order or die away. That is not the fault of Arahatship, O king. It is laymanship that is at fault, through not being strong enough. 'Just, O king, as food, that guards the growth and protects the life of all beings, will, through indigestion, take away the life of one whose stomach is unequal to it, whose internal fire is low and weak--just so if a layman attains Arahatship when in that condition unequal to it, then by reason of the weakness of the condition he must, that very day, either enter the Order or die away. 'Or just, O king, as a tiny blade of grass when a heavy rock is placed upon it will, through its weakness, break off and give way--just so when a layman attains Arahatship, then, unable to support Arahatship in that condition, he must, that very day, either enter the Order or die away. 'Or just, O king, as a poor weak fellow of low birth and little ability, if he came into possession of p. 98 a great and mighty kingdom, would be unable to support the dignity of it 1--just so if a layman attains to Arahatship, then is he unable, in that condition, to support it. [266] And that is the reason why he must, on that very day, either enter the Order or die away.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the lay Arahat.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA TEE SIXTY-THIRD. THE FAULTS OF THE ARAHAT.] 9. 'Venerable Nâgasena, can an Arahat be thoughtless 2?' 'The Arahats, O king, have put thoughtlessness far from them. They are never inadvertent.' 'But can an Arahat be guilty of an offence?' 'Yes, O king.' 'In what respect?' 'In the construction of his cell 3, or in his intercourse (with the other sex) 4, or in imagining the wrong time (for the midday meal) to be the right p. 99 time 1, or when he has been invited (to a meal 2) forgetting the invitation, or in taking to be "left over 3" food which has not been left over.' 'But, venerable Nâgasena, your people say: "Those who commit offences do so from one of two reasons, either out of carelessness or out of ignorance 4." 'Now, is the Arahat careless that he commits offences?' 'No, O king.' 'Then if the Arahat commits offences, and yet is not careless, he must be capable of thoughtlessness.' 'He is not capable of thoughtlessness, and yet the Arahat may be guilty of offences.' 'Convince me then by a reason. What is the reason of this?' 10. 'There are two kinds of sins, O king--those which are a breach of the ordinary moral law, and those which are a breach of the Rules (of the Order). And what is a breach of the ordinary moral law? The ten modes of evil action 5 (killing, theft, p. 100 unchastity, lying, slander, harsh language, frivolous talk, covetousness, malice, and false doctrine). These things are against the moral law. And what is a breach of the Rules? Whatever is held in the world as unfitting and improper for Samanas, but is not wrong for laymen--things concerning which the Blessed One laid down rules for his disciples, not to be transgressed by them their lives long. Eating after sunturn, O king, is not wrong to those in the world, but is wrong to those in the religion (the Order) of the Conquerors. Doing injury to trees and shrubs is no offence in the eyes of the world, but it is wrong in the religion. The habit of sporting in the water is no offence to a layman, but it is wrong in the religion. And many other things of a similar kind, O king, are right in the world, but wrong in the religion of the Conquerors. This is what I mean by a breach of the Rules. Now the Arahat (he in whom the Great Evils are destroyed) is incapable of sinning against whatever is moral law, but he may unawares be guilty of an offence against the rules of the Order. [267] It is not within the province of every Arahat to know everything, nor indeed in his power. He may be ignorant of the personal or family name of some woman or some man. He may be ignorant of some road over the earth. But every Arahat would know about emancipation, and the Arahat gifted with the six modes of transcendental knowledge 1 would know what lies within their scope, and an omniscient Tathâgata, O king, would know all things.' p. 101 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the faults of the Arahat.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FOURTH. WHAT IS, BUT NOT IN THE WORLD. 11. 'Venerable Nâgasena, there are to be seen in the world Buddhas, and Pakkeka-Buddhas, and disciples of the Tathâgatas, and sovran overlords, and kings over one country, and gods and men;--we find rich and poor, happy and miserable;--we find men who have become women, and women who have become men--there are good deeds and evil, and beings experiencing the result of their virtue or their vice;--we find creatures born from eggs, and in the water, and in sediment, or springing into life by the mere apparitional birth; creatures without feet, bipeds and quadrupeds, and creatures with many feet;--we find Yakkhas and Rakkhasas, and Kumbhandas, and Asuras, and Dânavas, and Gandhabbas, and Petas and Pisâkas, and Kinnaras, and Mahoragas, and Nâgas and Supannas 1, and magicians and sorcerers;--there are elephants, and horses, and cattle, and buffaloes, and camels, and asses, and goats, and sheep, and deer, and swine, and lions, and tigers, and leopards, and bears, and wolves, and hyenas, and dogs, and jackals, and many kinds of birds;--there is gold and silver, and the pearl, and p. 102 the diamond, and the chauk, and rock, and coral, and the ruby, and the Masâra stone, and the cat's-eye, and crystal, and quartz, and iron ore 1, and copper, and brass 2, and bronze;--there is flax, and silk, and cotton, and hemp 3, and wool;--there is rice, and paddy, and barley, and millet, and kudrûsa grain, and beans 4, and wheat, and oilseed, and vetches;--there are perfumes prepared from roots, and sap, and pith, and bark, and [268] leaves, and flowers, and fruit, and of all other sorts;--we find grass, and creepers, and shrubs, and trees, and medicinal herbs, and forests, and rivers, and mountains, and seas, and fish, and tortoises,--all is in the world. Tell me, Sir, what there is, then, which is not in the world.' 12. 'There are three things, O king, which you cannot find in the world. And what are the three? That which, whether conscious or unconscious, is not subject to decay and death--that you will not find. That quality of anything, (organic or inorganic), which is not impermanent--that you will not find. And in the highest sense there is no such thing as being possessed of being 5.' p. 103 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the puzzle as to what is not in the world.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-FIFTH. THINGS WITHOUT A CAUSE.] 13. 'Venerable Nâgasena, there are found beings in the world who have come into existence through Karma, and others who are the result of a cause, and others produced by the seasons 1. Tell me--is there any thing that does not fall under any one of these three heads?' ' There are two such things, O king. And what are the two? Space, O king, and Nirvâna.' 'Now do not spoil the word of the Conquerors, Nâgasena, nor answer a question without knowing what you say!' 'What, pray, is it I have said, O king, that you should address me thus?' 'Venerable Nâgasena, that is right what you said in respect of space. But with hundreds of reasons p. 104 did the Blessed One proclaim to his disciples the way to the realisation of Nirvâna. And yet you say that Nirvâna is not the result of any cause!' 'No doubt, O king, the Blessed One gave hundreds of reasons for our entering on the way to the realisation of Nirvâna. But he never told us of a cause out of which Nirvâna could be said to be produced.' 14. 'Now in this, Nâgasena, we have passed from darkness into greater darkness, [269] from a jungle into a denser jungle, from a thicket into a deeper thicket--inasmuch as you say there is a cause for the realisation of Nirvâna, but no cause from which it can arise. If, Nâgasena, there be a cause of the realisation of Nirvâna, then we must expect to find a cause of the origin of Nirvâna. just, Nâgasena, as because the son has a father, therefore we ought to expect that that father had a father--or because the pupil has a teacher, therefore we ought to expect that the teacher had a teacher--or because the plant came from a seed, therefore we ought to expect that the seed too had come from a seed 1--just so, Nâgasena, if there be a reason for the realisation of Nirvâna, we ought to expect that there is a reason too for its origin,--just as if we saw the top of a tree, or of a creeper, we should conclude that it had a middle part, and a root.' 'Nirvâna, O king, is unproduceable, and no cause for its origin has been declared.' 'Come now, Nâgasena, give me a reason for this. Convince me by argument, so that I may know how p. 105 it is that while there is a cause that will bring about the realisation of Nirvâna, there is no cause that will bring about Nirvâna itself.' 15. 'Then, O king, give ear attentively, and listen well, and I will tell you what the reason is. Could a man, O king, by his ordinary power, go up from hence to the Himâlaya, the king of mountains?' 'Yes, Sir, he could.' 'But could a man, by his ordinary power, bring the Himâlaya mountains here?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Well! therefore is it that while a cause for the realisation of Nirvâna can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And could a man, O king, by his ordinary power cross over the great ocean in a ship, and so go to the further shore of it?' 'Yes, Sir, he could.' 'But could a man [270] by his ordinary power bring the further shore of the ocean here?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Well! so is it that while a cause for the realisation of Nirvâna can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And why not? Because Nirvâna is not put together of any qualities.' 16. 'What, Sir! is it not put together?' 'No, O king. It is uncompounded, not made of anything. Of Nirvâna, O king, it cannot be said that it has been produced, or not been produced, or that it can be produced 1, that it is past or future or present, that it is perceptible by the eye or the ear or the nose or the tongue, or by the sense of touch.' 'But if so, Nâgasena, then you are only showing p. 106 us how Nirvâna is a condition that does not exist 1. There can be no such thing as Nirvâna.' 'Nirvâna exists, O king. And it is perceptible to the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles 2, free from low cravings, that disciple of the Noble Ones who has fully attained can see Nirvâna.' 17. 'Then what, Sir, is Nirvâna? Such a Nirvâna (I mean) as can be explained by similes 3. Convince me by argument how far the fact of its existence can be explained by similes.' 'Is there such a thing, O king, as wind?' 'Yes, of course.' 'Show it me then, I pray you, O king--whether by its colour, or its form, whether as thin or thick, or short or long!' 'But wind, Nâgasena, cannot be pointed out in that way 4. It is not of such a nature that it can be taken into the hand or squeezed. But it exists all the same.' 'If you can't show me the wind, then there can't be such a thing.' 'But I know there is, Nâgasena. That wind p. 107 exists I am convinced 1, [271] though I cannot show it you.' 'Well! just so, O king, does Nirvâna exist, though it cannot be shown to you in colour or in form 2.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SIXTH. MODES OF PRODUCTION.] 18. 'Venerable Nâgasena, what are they who are said, in this connection, to be "Karma-born," and "cause-born," and "season-born"? And what is it that is none of these?' 'All beings, O king, who are conscious, are Karma-born (spring into existence as the result of Karma). Fire, and all things growing out of seeds, are cause-born (the result of a pre-existing material cause). The earth, and the hills, water, and wind--all these are season-born (depend for their existence on reasons connected with weather). Space and Nirvâna exist independently alike of Karma, and cause, p. 108 and seasons. Of Nirvâna, O king, it cannot be said that it is Karma-born or cause-born or season-born; that it has been, or has not been, or can be produced, that it is past or future or present, that it is perceptible by the eye or the nose or the ear or the tongue or by the sense of touch. But it is perceptible, O king, by the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles, free from low cravings, that disciple of the Noble Ones who has fully attained can see Nirvâna.' 'Well has this delightful puzzle, venerable Nâgasena, been examined into, cleared of doubt, brought into certitude. My perplexity has been put an end to as soon as I consulted you, O best of the best of the leaders of schools!' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to modes of production.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-SEVENTH. DEAD DEMONS.] 19. 'Venerable Nâgasena, are there such things as demons (Yakkhâ) in the world?' 'Yes, O king.' 'Do they ever leave that condition' (fall out of that phase of existence)? 'Yes, they do.' 'But, if so, why is it that the remains of those dead Yakkhas are never found, nor any odour of their corpses smelt? ' '[272] Their remains are found, O king, and an odour does arise from their dead bodies. The remains of bad Yakkhas can be seen in the form of p. 109 worms and beetles and ants and moths and snakes and scorpions and centipedes, and birds and wild beasts.' 'Who else, O Nâgasena, could have solved this puzzle except one as wise as you!' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to dead demons.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-EIGHTH. THE METHOD OF PROMULGATING THE RULES.] 20. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those who were teachers of the doctors in times gone by--Nârada 1, and Dhammantari 2, and Angîrasa 3, and Kapila 4, and Kandaraggisâma, and Atula, and Pubba Kakkâyana 5--all these teachers knowing thoroughly, and of themselves, and without any omission, the rise of disease and its cause and nature and progress and cure and treatment and management 6--each of them composed his treatise en bloc, taking time by the forelock, and pointing out that in such and such a body such and such a disease would arise. Now no one of these p. 110 was omniscient. Why then did not the Tathâgata, who was omniscient, and who knew by his insight of a Buddha what would happen in the future, determining in advance that for such and such an occasion such and such a rule would be required, lay down the whole code of rules at once; instead of laying them down to his disciples from time to time as each occasion arose, when the disgrace (of the wrong act) had been already noised abroad, when the evil was already wide spread and grown great, when the people were already filled with indignation 1?' 21. 'The Tathâgata, O king, knew very well that in fulness of time the whole of the hundred and fifty Rules 2 would have to be laid down to those men. But the Tathâgata, O king, thought thus: "If I were to lay down the whole of the hundred and fifty Rules at once the people would be filled with fear [273], those of them who were willing to enter the Order would refrain from doing so, saying, 'How much is there here to be observed! how difficult a thing is it to enter religion according to the system of the Samana Gotama'--they would not trust my words, and through their want of faith they would be liable to rebirth in states of woe. As occasion arises therefore, illustrating it with a religious discourse, will I lay down, when the evil has become manifest, each Rule."' 'A wonderful thing is it in the Buddhas, Nâgasena, and a most marvellous that the omniscience of the Tathâgata should be so great. That is just so, p. 111 venerable Nâgasena. This matter was well understood by the Tathâgata--how that hearing that so much was to be observed, men 1 would have been so filled with fear that not a single one would have entered religion according to the system of the Conquerors. That is so, and I accept it as you say 2.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the method in which the Rules were laid down.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SIXTY-NINTH. THE HEAT OF THE SUN] 22. 'Venerable Nâgasena, does this sun always burn fiercely, or are there times when it shines with diminished heat?' 'It always burns fiercely, O king, never gently.' 'But if that be so, how is it that the heat of the sun is sometimes fierce, and sometimes not 3?' 23. 'There are four derangements 4, O king, which happen to the sun, and affected by one or other of these its heat is allayed. And what are the four? The clouds, O king, and fog 5, and p. 112 smoke 1, and eclipses 2--these are the four derangements which happen to the sun, and it is when affected by one or other of these that its heat is allayed.' 'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange [274] that even the sun, so transcendent in glory, should suffer from derangement-how much more then other, lesser, creatures. No one else could have made this explanation except one wise like you!' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the heat of the sun.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTIETH. THE SEASONS.] 24. 'Venerable Nâgasena, why is it that the heat of the sun is more fierce in winter than in summer?' 'In the hot season, O king, dust is blown up 3 into clouds, and pollen 4 agitated by the winds rises up into the sky, and clouds multiply in the heavens, and gales blow with exceeding force. All these crowded and heaped together shut off the rays of the sun, and so in the hot season the heat of the sun is diminished. But in the cold season, O king, the earth below is at rest, the rains above are p. 113 in reserve 1, the dust is quiet, the pollen wanders gently through the air, the sky is free from clouds, and very gently do the breezes blow. Since all these have ceased to act the rays of the sun become clear, and freed from every obstruction the sun's heat glows and burns. This, O king, is the reason why the heat of the sun is more fierce in winter than in summer. 'So it is when set free from the obstacles besetting it that the sun burns fiercely, which it cannot do when the rains and so on are present with it.' ['Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say 2.'] ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma of the seasons 3.] ____________________________ Here ends the Seventh Chapter 4. p. 114 Footnotes 92:1 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. 92:2 These are the well-known navangâni, the nine divisions into which the Scriptures are divided. See Magghima Nikâya I, 133; Anguttara Nikâya IV, 6, &c. 92:3 Navakammena palibugghanti. The Simhalese adds khanda-phulla-patisamkharanayen, 'repairing dilapidations.' 93:1 This is (very properly) added in the Simhalese, for the two are practically identical. Hereafter it throughout renders nippapañko hoti by 'become an Arahat.' 93:2 Vâsita-vâsanâ. See above, vol. i, p. 18. 93:3 Mahârâgakkhâ, 'evil done both in this and in former births' is here to be understood. 94:1 By the simple process of going through the air to the top of the tree. 94:2 Chasu abhiññâsu vasîbhâvam pâpunanti. 95:1 'Who is a Buddha' adds Hînati-kumburê (p. 372). 95:2 Savanena, literally 'bearing.' 95:3 Âsavakkhayam, literally 'to the destruction of the Âsavas;' that is, of the Great Evils, which are lust, dulness, becoming, and ignorance. Mr. Trenckner marks this passage as corrupt, but Hînati-kumburê seems to have had the same reading before him as Mr. Trenckner has selected from his MSS., except that he has not had any mark of punctuation after the word hoti. The particular occasion on which Sâriputta became finally free from the Âsavas is related in the Dîgha-nakha Suttanta, No. 74 in the Magghima Nikâya (vol. i, p. 50 of Mr. Trenckner's edition for the Pâli Text Society). 96:1 Literally 'therefore is it that recitation, &c., is a condition free from the obstacles, and unmade' (the Unmade being also one of the many epithets of Arahatship). 96:2 This passage has not yet been traced in the Pitakas. 96:3 All these are necessary to one who is a candidate for admission to the Order--the teacher and preceptor being, as it were, his proposer and seconder; and no one being admitted who is not already provided with a bowl and a set of robes. 97:1 'Inasmuch as he would be taking a dress to which he was not entitled' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 98:1 We have had the same simile above, IV, 6, 30. 98:2 Compare the note on Kullavagga V, 9, 5. 98:3 Which must not exceed certain dimensions, &c. See the 6th Samghâdisesa ('Vinaya Texts,' I, pp. 8, 9). 98:4 Sañkaritte. Perhaps only the 5th Samghâdisesa (loc. cit.) is here referred to, but Hînati-kumburê (p. 375) takes it in a much more extended sense, as referring to all the restrictions, as to time and place, &c., laid down for the guidance of the brethren in their relations with women. 99:1 It is curious that the well-known rule as to not eating solid food after sunturn at noon is not expressly stated in the Pâtimokkha, or indeed anywhere in the Vinaya. But it is often implied. See, for instance, the 37th Pâkittiya Rule; Mahâvagga VI, 19, 2; VI, 33, 2; VI, 40, 3; Kullavagga V, 25, &c. 99:2 See the Pâkittiya Rules, Nos. 32 and 46. 99:3 A Bhikkhu may not, except for certain special reasons, such as sickness, either keep or eat food which has been left over after the principal meal. See the 35th Pâkittiya Rule. Hînati-kumburê (pp. 374-376) goes at great length into the full meaning of these five technical terms of the Buddhist Canon Law, giving examples under each. 99:4 Not traced as yet. 'Ignorance of the Sikshâpadas' says the Simhalese (p. 376). 99:5 Dasa akusala-kamma-pathâ. See Childers sub voce. 100:1 Chalabhiñño--which every Arahat is not. 101:1 Fairies and goblins of various degrees and powers, most of them not mentioned in the Pitakas. 102:1 Kâla-loha, 'black metal' (not found in the Pitakas). 102:2 Vatta-loha, 'round metal.' I can only guess what this is. The Simhalese has simply wataloha, which is equally unintelligible. The word occurs again below (p. 331 of the Pâli), and Hînati-kumburê there renders it tti, which is a particular kind of brazen vessel. 102:3 Two kinds are mentioned, sâna and bhanga. I don't know the difference between them. The Simhalese has sana and bankâlpê. 102:4 Three kinds of Phaseoli are mentioned, Varaka, Mugga, and Mâsa. 102:5 Paramatthena sattûpaladdhi natthi. It is very curious p. 103 that both here, and in the analogous phrase at III, 5, 6 (p. 71 of the Pâli), Hînati-kumburê should merely repeat the words in the text. Both of these curt summaries of the deepest Buddhist doctrine were probably as ambiguous to him as they are to us. The literal translation of the phrase here would be, 'In the highest sense there is no acquisition of a being.' As in Buddhism being cannot strictly be predicated of any thing, or of any god or animal or man,--each is really only becoming--the sense probably meant must be very nearly as I have ventured to render. 103:1 Utu-nibbattâ; which the Simhalese repeats. See the next dilemma on 'Karma-born, cause-born, and season-born.' 104:1 Compare the argument based above, II, 3, 2, on this and similar series. 105:1 The Simhalese is here (p. 381) expanded. 106:1 Natthidhammam nibbânam upadisatha. Compare the use of atthi-dhammam nibbânam, at p. 316 (of the Pâli). I take the compound to mean either 'has the quality (or condition) of not existing,' or 'is a condition that is not.' And the latter is more in harmony with the analogous phrase atthisattâ devâ (p. 3, 7 of the Pâli) since that can only mean 'gods, which are beings that are.' 106:2 Lust, malice, pride, sloth, and doubt. 106:3 Hînati-kumburê puts the stop, not after nibbânam as Mr. Trenckner does, but after opammehi. 106:4 On the connotation of upadassayitum, see pp. 316, 347, of the Pâli. 107:1 Me hadaye anupavittham, literally 'has entered into my heart.' But Hînati-kumburê takes vâto atthîti as dependent on gânâmi, and renders these three words by 'it (the wind) has entered into my heart,' and then adds, by way of gloss, 'and has struck against my body, and travels through the sky.' In another passage below, IV, 8, 65 (p. 317 of the Pâli), this same word anupavittham recurs in a clause the sense of which is doubtful; and there Hînati-kumburê explains it quite differently. It looks very much as if we had here an idiom peculiar to our author; but one cannot of course be sure on any such point till the Pitakas are all published. 107:2 The same simile is used below, p. 317 (of the Pâli). 109:1 No doubt the celebrated Devârshi is meant, though it is odd to find him in a list of physicians. 109:2 In Sanskrit Dhanvantarî, the physician of the gods. He is mentioned in the Gâtaka IV, 496, with Bhoga and Vetaranî, as a well-known physician of old famous for the cure of snake-bite. 109:3 The connection of Angîrasa with the physicians is due to the charms against disease to be found in the Atharva-veda. 109:4 Kapila is known in the Brahman literature as a teacher of Philosophy rather than of medicine. 109:5 Probably 'the Eastern Kakkâyana,' but nothing is known of these last three names. Hînati-kumburê calls all seven 'Rishis.' 109:6 Siddhâsiddham, for which Hînati-kumburê (p. 385), who merely repeats all the other terms, has sâdhyâsâdhya. 110:1 This question has already been discussed above, III, 6, 2 (I, 116). 110:2 The rules of the Pâtimokkha are 227 in number, but without the Sekhiyas they are 152. 111:1 Sattâ, literally 'beings,' but that means human beings, men and women, as no others (gods, Nâgas, animals, &c.) were admitted to the Order. See Mahâvagga I. 63; I, 76, 1; Kullavagga X, 117, 1. 111:2 In the Introductory Stories to the Rules it is often stated, how, when a Bhikkhu had done some act, the people were indignant, the brethren heard that and reported the matter to the Blessed One, who then, and then only, laid down the Rule prohibiting that act. But these Introductory Stories are really later than the Rules. 111:3 Here Hînati-kumburê (pp. 386-7) goes into great details, giving instances, and quoting verses. 111:4 Rogâ, literally 'diseases.' 111:5 Mahikâ. Childers gives frost as the only meaning of this word. 112:1 Megho, literally 'rain-cloud.' But clouds of smoke are meant, as is clear from the parallel passage loc. cit. which has dhumarago, but see Kullavagga XII, 1, 3 (from which the whole section IV, 7, 23 is derived). 112:2 Râhu. 112:3 Anupahatam. Compare Dr. Morris's note in the Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1884, p. 75, on Therâ Gâthâ 625. 112:4 Renû. Perhaps this should again be rendered dust. See the verse at Gâtaka I, 117 (which is nearly the same as Divyâvadâna, p. 491). 113:1 Mahâ-megho upatthito hoti, which is very ambiguous. The Simhalese (p. 389) has mahâ meghaya patan-gannâ-lada wanneya. 113:2 Inserted from Hînati-kumburê. 113:3 There is great uncertainty at present as to the views held, first in the Pitakas and later in the Commentaries, regarding the calculation of time and the division of years into months and seasons. Our author here seems to regard the year as divided into two seasons only, Hemanta and Gimha. But Hemanta is usually supposed to last only from the 1st November (that is the middle of Kattika) to the beginning of March (that is the middle of Phagguni), Gimhâna for the next four months (March 1st--June 30th), and Vassâna the remaining four (July-October)--the year being thus divided into three equal cold. hot, and rainy seasons. At Mahâvagga VIII, 24, 3 there is a division of the year into unequal dry and wet seasons (utu and vassâna), and at Gâtaka I, 86 it is said that vasanta-samayo begins when hemanta ends at the full moon of Phagguni. As our author places the characteristic events of the rainy season in the hot season, he cannot have had the division into three seasons in his mind. 113:4 'Of the excellent Saddharmâdâsa' says the Simhalese. Next: Chapter 8 Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... » Sacred Texts Buddhism Milinda Index Previous Next

[DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FIRST. VESSANTARA'S GIVING 1.] 1. 'Venerable Nâgasena, do all the Bodisats give away their wives and children, or was it only Vessantara the king who did so?' 'All of them do so, not Vessantara only.' [275] 'Do they then give them away with their own consent?' 'The wife, O king, was a consenting party. But the children, by reason of their tender age, lamented. Had they thoroughly understood, they too would have approved.' 'A hard thing, Nâgasena, was it that the Bodisat carried out, in that he gave away his own children, his only ones, dearly beloved, into slavery to the Brahman. And this second action was harder still, that he bound his own children, his only ones, and dearly beloved, young and tender though they were, with the jungle rope, and then, when he saw them being dragged along 2 by the Brahman,--their hands p. 115 bruised by the creeper,--yet could look on at the sight. And this third action was even harder still, that when his boy ran back to him, after loosing the bonds by his own exertion, then he bound him again with the jungle rope and again gave him away. And this fourth action was even harder still, that when the children, weeping, cried: "Father dear, this ogre is leading us away to eat us!" he should have appeased them by saying: "Don't be afraid." And this fifth action was even harder still, that when the prince, Gâli, fell weeping at his feet, and besought him, saying: "Be satisfied, father dear, only keep Kanhâginâ (his little sister). I will go away with the ogre. Let him eat me!"--that even then he would not yield. And this sixth action was even harder still, that when the boy Gâli, lamenting, exclaimed: "Have you a heart of stone then, father, that you can look upon us, miserable, being led away by the ogre into the dense and haunted jungle, and not call us back?"--that he still had no pity. And this seventh action was even harder still, that when his children were thus led away to nameless horrors until they passed gradually to their bitter fate 1, out of sight--that then his heart did not break, utterly break! What, pray, has the man who seeks to gain merit to do with bringing sorrow on others! Should he not rather give himself away?' 2. 'It is because what he did, O king, was so p. 116 difficult, that the sound of the fame of the Bodisat was spread abroad among gods and men through the ten thousand world systems--[276] that the gods exalt him in heaven; and the Titans in the Titan-world, and the Garudas in their abodes, and the Nâgas in the Nâga-world, and the Yakshas where they dwell--that through the ages the reputation of this his glory has been handed down by successive tradition--till now, to-day, it has reached to this meeting of ours, at which we sitting are, forsooth, disparaging and casting a slur on that gift 1, debating whether it were well given or ill! But that high praise, O king, shows forth the ten great qualities of the intelligent, and wise, and able, and subtle-minded Bodisats. And what are the ten? Freedom from greed, the not clinging (to any worldly aim), self-sacrifice, renunciation, the never turning back again (to the lower state), the equal delicacy and greatness, the incomprehensibility, the rarity, and the peerlessness of Buddhahood. In all these respects is it that the fame of that giving shows forth the great qualities of the Bodisats.' 3. 'What, venerable Nâgasena? he who gives gifts in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others--does that giving of his bring forth fruit in happiness, does it lead to rebirth in states of bliss?' 'Yes, O king. What can be said (to the contrary)?' 'I pray you, Nâgasena, give me a reason for this.' 'Suppose, O king, there were some virtuous Samana or Brahman, of high character, and he were p. 117 paralysed, or a cripple 1, or suffering from some disease or other, and some man desirous of merit were to have him put into a carriage, and taken to the place he wished to go to. Would happiness accrue to that man by reason thereof, would that be an act leading to rebirth in states of bliss?' 'Yes, Sir. What can be said (to the contrary)? That man would thereby acquire a trained elephant, or a riding-horse, or a bullock-carriage, on land a land-vehicle and on water a water-vehicle, in heaven a vehicle of the gods 2 and on earth one that men could use,--from birth to birth there would accrue to him that which in each would be appropriate and fit,--and joys appropriate would come to him, and he would pass from state to state of bliss, and by the efficacy of that act mounting on the vehicle of Iddhi he would arrive at the longed-for goal, the city of Nirvâna itself.' 'But then, O king, a gift given in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others does bring forth fruit in happiness, does lead to rebirth in states of bliss [277],--inasmuch as that man by putting the cart-bullocks to pain would attain such bliss. 4. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing. Suppose some monarch were to raise from his subjects a righteous tax, and then by the issue of a command were to bestow thereout a gift, would that monarch, O king, enjoy any happiness on that account, would that be a gift leading to rebirth in states of bliss p. 118 'Certainly, Sir. What can be said against it? On that account the monarch would receive a hundred thousandfold, he might become a king of kings, a god above the gods, or Brahmâ lord of the Brahmâ gods, or a chief among the Samanas, or a leader of the Brahmans, or the most excellent among the Arahats.' 'Then, O king, a gift given in such a way as to bring sorrow upon others does bring forth fruit in happiness, does lead to rebirth in states of bliss--inasmuch as that monarch by giving as a gift what was gained by harassing his people with taxation would enjoy such exceeding fame and glory.' 5. 'But, venerable Nâgasena, what was given by Vessantara the king was an excessive gift; in that he gave his own wife as wife to another man, and his own children, his only ones, into slavery to a Brahman. And excessive giving is by the wise in the world held worthy of censure and of blame. Just, Nâgasena, as under too much weight the axle-tree of a cart would break, or a ship would sink, as his food would disagree with him who ate too much, or the crops would be ruined by too heavy rain, or bankruptcy would follow too lavish generosity, or fever would come from too much heat, or a man would go mad from excessive lust, or become guilty of an offence through excessive anger, or fall into sin through excessive stupidity, or into the power of robbers through too much avarice, or be ruined by needless fear, or as a river would overflow through excessive inflow, or a thunderbolt fall through too much wind, or porridge boil over through too hot a fire, or a man who wandered p. 119 about too much 1 would not live long-just, so, Nâgasena, is excessive giving held by the wise in the world as worthy of censure and of blame. And as king Vessantara's gift was excessive [278] no good result could be expected from it.' 6. 'Giving exceedingly 2, O king, is praised, applauded, and approved by the wise in the world; and they who give away anything as a gift just as it may occur to them 3, acquire fame in the world as very generous givers. Just, O king, as when a man has taken hold of a wild root which by its extraordinary virtues is divine, that moment he becomes invisible even to those standing within arm's length--just as a medicinal herb by the exceeding power of its nature will utterly kill pain, and put an end to disease--just as fire burns by its exceeding heat, and water puts that fire out by its exceeding cold--just as by its exceeding purity a lotus remains undefiled by water or by mud--just as a (magic) gem by the extraordinary virtue inherent in it procures the granting of every wish--just as lightning by its marvellous quick sharpness cleaves asunder even the diamonds, pearls, and crystals--just as the earth by its exceeding size can support men, and snakes, and wild beasts, and birds, and the waters, p. 120 and rocks, and hills, and trees--just as the ocean by its exceeding greatness can never be quite filled--just as Sineru by its mighty weight remains immoveable, and space by the greatness of its wide extent is infinite, and the sun by its mighty glory dissipates the darkness--just as the lion in the greatness of its lineage is free from fear--just as a wrestler in the greatness of his might easily lifts up his foe-just as a king by the excellence of his justice becomes overlord, and a Bhikkhu by reason of his very righteousness becomes an object of reverence to Nâgas, and Yakshas, and men, and Mâras--just as a Buddha by the excellence of his supremacy is peerless--just so, O king, is exceeding generosity praised, applauded, and approved by the wise in the world; and they who give away anything as a gift, just as it may occur to them, acquire in the world the fame of being nobly generous. And by his mighty giving Vessantara the king, O king, was praised, and lauded, and exalted, and magnified, and famous throughout the ten thousand world systems, and by reason, too, of that mighty giving is it that he, the king Vessantara, has, now in our days, become the Buddha, the chief of gods and men. 7. 'And now, O king, tell me--is there anything in the world which should be withheld as a gift, and not bestowed, when one worthy of a gift, one to whom it is one's duty to give 1, is there?' p. 121 'There are ten sorts of gifts, Nâgasena, in the world that are commonly disapproved of as gifts. And what are the ten? Strong drink, Nâgasena, and festivals in high places 1, and women, and buffaloes, and suggestive [279] paintings 2, and weapons, and poison, and chains, and fowls, and swine, and false weights and measures. All these, Nâgasena, are disapproved of in the world as gifts, and those who give such presents become liable to rebirth in states of woe.' 'I did not ask you, O king, what kinds of gifts are not approved of. But this, O king, I asked: "Is there anything in the world which ought to be withheld, and not bestowed as a gift, if one worthy of a gift were present?"' 'No, Sir. When faith arises in their hearts some give food to those worthy of gifts, and some give clothes, and some give bedding, and some give dwellings, and some give mats or robes, and some give slave girls or slaves, and some give fields or premises, and some give bipeds or quadrupeds, and p. 122 some give a hundred 1 or a thousand or a hundred thousand, and some give the kingdom itself, and some give away even their own life.' 'But then, O king, if some give away even their own lives, why do you so violently attack 2 Vessantara, that king of givers, for the virtuous bestowal of his child and wife? Is there not a general practice in the world, an acknowledged custom, according to which it is allowable for a father who has fallen into debt, or lost his livelihood, to deposit 3 his son in pledge, or sell him?' 'Yes, that is so.' 'Well, in accordance therewith was it that Vessantara, O king, in suffering and distress at not having obtained the insight of the Omniscient Ones, pledged and sold his wife and children for that spiritual treasure. So that he gave away what other people had given away, he did what other people had done. Why then do you, O king, so violently attack him, the king of givers?' p. 123 8. 'Venerable Nâgasena, I don't blame him for giving, but for not having made a barter 1 with the beggar, and given away himself rather, instead of his wife and children.' [280] 'That, O king, would be an act of a wrong doer, to give himself when he was asked for his wife and children. For the thing asked for, whatever it is, is that which ought to be given. And such is the practice of the good. Suppose, O king, a man were to ask that water should be brought, would any one who then brought him food have done what he wanted?' 'No, Sir. The man who should have given what he first asked to be brought would have done what he wanted.' 'Just so, O king, when the Brahman asked Vessantara the king for his wife and children, it was his wife and children that he gave. If the Brahman, O king, had asked for Vessantara's body, then would Vessantara have not saved his body, he would neither have trembled nor been stained (by the love of self), but would have given away and abandoned his own body. If, O king, any one had come up to Vessantara the king, and asked of him, saying: "Become my slave," then would he have given away and abandoned his own self, and in so giving would he have felt no pain. 9. 'Now the life of king Vessantara, O king, was a good thing shared in by many--just as meats when cooked are shared in by many, or as a tree covered with fruit is shared in by many flocks of p. 124 birds. And why so? Because he had said to himself: "Thus acting may I attain to Buddhahood." As a man in need, O king, who is wandering about in his search after wealth, will have to pass along goat-tracks, and through jungles full of stakes and sticks 1, and doing merchandise by sea and land, will devote his actions, words, and thoughts to the attainment of wealth--just so, O king, did Vessantara, the king of givers, who was longing for the treasure of Buddhahood, for the attainment of the insight of the Omniscient Ones, by offering up to anyone who begged of him his property and his corn, his slave girls and his slaves, his riding animals and carriages, all that he possessed, his wife and children and himself, seek after the Supreme Enlightenment. Just, O king, as an official who is anxious for the seal 2, and for the office of the custody thereof [281], will exert himself to the attainment of the seal by sacrificing everything in his house--property and corn, gold and silver, everything--just so, O king, did Vessantara, the king of givers, by giving away all that he had, inside his house and out 3, by giving even his life for others, seek after the Supreme Enlightenment. 10. 'And further, O king, Vessantara, the king of givers, thought thus: "It is by giving to him precisely what he asks for, that I shall be of service p. 125 to the Brahman:" and therefore did he bestow upon him his wife and children. It was not, O king, out of dislike to them that he gave them away, not because he did not care to see them more, not because he considered them an encumbrance or thought he could no longer support them, not (in annoyance) with the wish of being relieved of what was not pleasant to him--but because the jewel treasure of omniscience was dear to him, for the sake of the insight of the Omniscient Ones, did he bestow that glorious gift,--immeasurable, magnificent, unsurpassed--of what was near and dear to him, greatly beloved, cherished as his own life, his own children and his wife! For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god of gods, in the Kariyâ Pitaka 1: "'Twas not through hatred 2 of my children sweet, 'Twas not through hatred of my queen, Maddî, Thraller of hearts 3--not that I loved them less-- But Buddhahood more, that I renounced them all." p. 126 'Now at that time, O king, Vessantara, when he had given away his wife and children, entered the leaf hut, and sat down there. And heavy grief fell upon him distressed by his exceeding love for them, and his very heart 1 became hot, and hot breath, too much to find its way through the nose, came and went through his mouth, and tears rolled in drops of blood from his eyes. Such was the grief, O king, with which Vessantara gave to the Brahman his wife and children in the thought that his practice of giving should not be broken in upon. But there were two reasons, O king, why he thus gave them away. What are those two? That his practice of giving should not be interrupted was one; the other was that as a result of his so doing his children, distressed by living with him only on wild roots and fruits, should eventually be set free by their new master. [282] For Vessantara knew, O king: "No one is capable of keeping my children as slaves. Their grandfather will ransom the children, and so they will come back to me." These are the two reasons why he gave his children away to the Brahman. 12. 'And further, O king, Vessantara knew: "This Brahman is worn out, aged, well stricken in years, weak and broken, leaning on a stick, he has drawn near the end of his days, his merit is small, he will not be capable of keeping my children as p. 127 slaves." Would a man be able, O king, by his ordinary power, to seize the moon and the sun 1, p. 128 mighty and powerful as they are, keeping them in a basket or a box, to use them, deprived of their light, as plates?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Neither, O king, could any one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, who were to the world like the moon and the sun in glory. 13. 'And hear another reason, O king, for the same thing 1. That wondrous gem, O king of a sovran overlord, bright and beautiful, with its eight facets so well cut, four cubits in thickness, and in circumference 2 as the nave of a cart-wheel, could no man, wrapping it up in a cloth and putting it into a basket, keep and use as a hone 3 to grind his scissors 4 upon. And neither, O king, could any one soever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, like to the jewels of the lord of the world in glory. 14. 'And hear, O king, another reason. just as the elephant king Uposatha 5, gentle and handsome, eight cubits in height and nine in girth and length, showing the signs of rut in three places on his body, all white, sevenfold firm 6, could never by any one p. 129 be covered up with a saucer 1 or a winnowing fan 1, could never be put into a cowpen like a calf, or made use of as one [283]; just so could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, who were, in the world, like Uposatha the elephant king. 15. 'And hear, O king, another reason. Just, O king, as the mighty ocean is great in length and breadth, and deep, not to be measured, and hard to cross, impossible to fathom or to cover up, and no one could close it in and make use of it as a single ferry, just so could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, as esteemed in the world as the mighty ocean. 16. 'And hear another reason, O king. Just as the Himâlaya, the king of the mountains, five leagues high, and three thousand leagues in extent at the circumference, with its ranges of eight and forty thousand peaks, the source of five hundred rivers, the dwelling-place of multitudes of mighty--creatures 2, the producer of manifold perfumes, enriched with hundreds of magical drugs, is seen to rise aloft, like a cloud, in the centre (of the earth); like it, O king, could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of Vessantara, as esteemed in the world as Himâlaya, the mountain king. 'And hear another reason, O king. Just as a p. 130 mighty bonfire burning on a mountain top would be visible afar off in the darkness and the gloom of night, so was Vessantara the king well known among men, and therefore could no one whatever keep in use, as his slaves, the children of so distinguished a man--for just as at the time of the flowering of the Nâga trees 1 in the Himâlaya mountains, when the soft winds (of spring) 2 are blowing, the perfume of the flowers is wafted for ten leagues, or for twelve [284], so was the sound of the fame of king Vessantara noised abroad, and the sweet perfume of his righteousness wafted along for thousands of leagues, even up to the abodes of the Akanittha, (the highest of all) gods, passing on its way the dwelling places of the gods and Asuras, of the Garudas and Gandhabbas, of the Yakshas and Râkshasas, of the Mahoragas and Kinnaras, and of Indra the monarch of the gods 3! Therefore is it that no one could keep his children as slaves. p. 131 17. 'And the young prince Gâli, O king, was instructed by his father, Vessantara, in these words: "When your grandfather, my child, shall ransom you with wealth that he gives to the Brahman, let him buy you back for a thousand ounces of gold 1, and when he ransoms your sister Kanhâginâ let him buy her back for a hundred slaves and a hundred slave girls and a hundred elephants and a hundred horses and a hundred cows and a hundred buffaloes and a hundred ounces of gold. And if, my child, your grandfather should take you out of the hands of the Brahman by word of command, or by force, paying nothing, then obey not the words of your grandfather, but remain still in subjection 2 to the Brahman." Such was his instruction as he sent him away. And young Gâli went accordingly, and when asked by his grandfather, said: As worth a thousand ounces, Sir, My father gave me to this man; As worth a hundred elephants, He gave the girl Kanhâginâ."' 'Well has this puzzle, Nâgasena, been unravelled, well has the net of heresy been torn to pieces, well has the argument of the adversaries been overcome and your own doctrine been made evident, well has the letter (of the Scriptures) been maintained while p. 132 you have thus explained its spirit! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to Vessantara's gift of his wife and children.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SECOND. PENANCE.] 18. 'Venerable Nâgasena, did all the Bodisats go through a period of penance, or only Gotama?' 'Not all, O king, but Gotama did.' 'Venerable Nâgasena, if that be so, it is not right that there should be a difference between Bodisat and Bodisat.' [285] 'There are four matters, O king, in which there is such difference. And what are the four? There is a difference as to the kind of family (in which they are born 1), there is a difference as to their place in the period (which has elapsed since the succession of Buddhas began 2), there p. 133 is a difference as to the length of their individual lives 1, there is a difference as to their individual size 2. In these four respects, O king, there is a difference between Bodisat and Bodisat. But there is no difference between any of the Buddhas, who are alike in bodily beauty 3, in goodness of character, in power of contemplation and of reasoning, in emancipation, in the insight arising from the knowledge of emancipation, in p. 134 the four bases of confidence 1, in the ten powers of a Tathâgata 2, in the sixfold special p. 135 knowledge 1, in the fourteenfold knowledge of Buddha 2, in the eighteen characteristics of a Buddha 3--in a word, in all the qualities of a Buddha. For all the Buddhas are exactly alike in all the Buddha-qualities.' 'But if, Nâgasena, that be so, what is the reason that it was only the Gotama Bodisat who carried out the penance?' 'Gotama the Bodisat had gone forth from the world, O king, when his knowledge 4 was immature, and his wisdom was immature. And it was when he was bringing that immature knowledge to maturity that he carried out the penance.' 19. 'Why then, Nâgasena, was it that he thus went forth with knowledge and with wisdom immatured? Why did he not first mature his knowledge, and then, with his knowledge matured, renounce the world?' 'When the Bodisat, O king, saw the women of his harem all in disorder 5, then did he become disgusted, p. 136 and in him thus disgusted discontent sprang up. And on perceiving that his heart was filled with discontent, a certain god of those that wait on Death (Mâra) thought: "This now is the time to dispel that discontent of his heart," and standing in the air he gave utterance to these words: "O honourable one! O fortunate one! Be not thou distressed. On the seventh day from this the heavenly treasure of the Wheel shall appear to thee, with its thousand spokes, its tire, and its nave, complete and perfect; and the other treasures, those that walk on earth and those that travel through the sky, shall come to thee of their own accord; and the words of command of thy mouth shall bear sway over the four great continents and the two thousand dependent isles; and thou shalt have above a thousand sons, heroes mighty in strength to the crushing out of the armies of the foe; and with those sons surrounding thee thou, master of the Seven Treasures, shalt rule the world!" [286] But even as if a bar of iron, heated the livelong day and glowing throughout, had entered the orifice of his ear, so was it that those words, O king, entered the ear of the Bodisat. And to the natural distress he already felt there was added, by that utterance of the god, a further emotion, anxiety, and fear. just as a mighty fiery furnace, were fresh fuel thrown on it, would the more furiously burn--just as the broad earth, by nature moist, and already swampy through the water dripping on it from the vegetation and the grass that have arisen on it, would become more muddy still when a great rain cloud had poured out rain upon it--so to the distress that he already felt there was p. 137 added, by that utterance of the god, a further emotion, anxiety, and fear.' 20. 'But tell me, Nâgasena, if the heavenly Wheel-treasure had, on the seventh day, appeared to the Bodisat, would he, the Wheel having appeared, have been turned back from his purpose?' 'No Wheel-treasure appeared, O king, on the seventh day to the Bodisat. For rather that was a lie that was told by that god with the object of tempting him. And even had it appeared, yet would not the Bodisat have turned aside. And why not? Because the Bodisat, O king, had firmly grasped (the facts of) the impermanence (of all things, of) the suffering (inherent in existence as an individual, of) the absence of a soul (in any being made up of the five Skandhas), and had thus arrived at the destruction of the attachment (to individuality which arises from lust, or from heresy, or from dependence upon outward acts, or from delusions as to the possession of a permanent soul) 1. The water, O king, which flows into the river Ganges from the Anottata lake, and from the Ganges river into the great ocean, and from the great ocean into the openings into the p. 138 regions under the earth 1--would that water, after it had once entered that opening, turn back and flow again into the great ocean, and from the great ocean into the Ganges river, and from the Ganges river into the Anottata lake?' [287] 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'In the same way, O king, it was for the sake of that last existence of his that the Bodisat had matured merit through the immeasurable aeons of the past. He had now reached that last birth, the knowledge of the Buddhas had grown mature in him, in six years he would become a Buddha, all-knowing, the highest being in the world. Would then the Bodisat, for the sake of the Wheel-treasure, turn back?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'No! Though the great earth, O king, with all its peaks and mountain ranges, should turn back, yet the Bodisat would not before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the water of the Ganges should flow backwards up the stream, yet the Bodisat would not turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the mighty ocean with its immeasurable waters 2 should dry up like the water in the footprint of a cow 3, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though Sineru, the king of the mountains, p. 139 should split up into a hundred or a thousand fragments, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the sun and moon with all the stars should fall, like a clod, upon the ground, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood. Though the expanse of heaven should be rolled up like a mat, yet would not the Bodisat turn back before he had attained to Buddhahood! And why not? Because he had torn asunder every bond.' 21. 'Venerable Nâgasena, how many bonds are there in the world?' 'There are these ten bonds in the world, O king, bound by which men renounce not the world, or turn back again to it. And what are the ten? A mother, O king, is often a bond, and a father, and a wife, and children, and relations, and friends, and wealth, and easy income, [288] and sovranty, and the five pleasures of sense. These are the ten bonds common in the world, bonds bound by which men renounce not the world or turn back to it. And all these bonds had the Bodisat, O king, burst through. And therefore could he not, O king, turn back.' 22. 'Venerable Nâgasena, if the Bodisat, on discontent arising in his heart at the words of the god, though his knowledge (of the four Truths) was yet imperfect, and his insight of a Buddha not mature, did nevertheless go forth into renunciation of the world, of what advantage was penance to him then? Ought he not rather, awaiting the maturity of his knowledge, to have lived in the enjoyment of all (suitable) foods?' 'There are, O king, these ten sorts of individuals who are despised and contemned in the world, p. 140 thought shameful, looked down upon, held blameworthy, treated with contumely, not loved. And what are the ten? A woman without a husband, O king, and a weak creature, and one without friends or relatives, and a glutton, and one dwelling in a disreputable family, and the friend of sinners, and he whose wealth has been dissipated, and he who has no character, and he who has no occupation 1, and he who has no means. These are the ten despised and contemned in the world, thought shameful, looked down upon, held blameworthy, treated with contumely, not loved 2. It was on calling these conditions to mind, O king, that this idea occurred to the Bodisat: "Let me not incur blame among gods and men as being without occupation or without means! Let me as a master in action, held in respect by reason of action, one having the supremacy which arises from action, one whose conduct is based upon action, one who carries action (into every concern of life) 3, one who has his dwelling in action, be constant in earnestness 4." That was the spirit, O king, in which the Bodisat, when he was bringing his knowledge to maturity, undertook the practice of penance.' 23. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the Bodisat, when he was undergoing penance, said thus to himself: p. 141 [289] "But it is not by this penance severe that I shall reach the peculiar faculty of the insight arising from the knowledge of that which is fit and noble--that insight beyond the powers of ordinary men, May there not be now some other way to the wisdom (of Buddhahood) 1?" 'Was then the Bodisat, at that time, confused in his mind about the way 2?' 'There are twenty-five qualities, O king, which are causes of weakness of mind, weakened by which the mind cannot successfully be devoted to the destruction of the Âsavas (the Great Evils--lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance) 3. And what are the twenty-five? Anger, O king, and enmity, and hypocrisy 4, and conceit 5, and envy, and avarice, and deceit 6, p. 142 and treachery, and obstinacy 1, and perverseness 2, and pride, and vainglory, and the intoxication (of exalted ideas about birth or health or wealth), and negligence in (well-doing), and intellectual inertness or bodily sloth 3, and drowsiness 4, and idleness, and friendship with sinners, and forms, and sounds, and odours, and tastes, and sensations of touch, and hunger, and thirst 5, and discontent 6. These are the p. 143 twenty-five qualities, O king, which are causes of weakness of mind, weakened by which the mind cannot successfully be devoted to the destruction of the Âsavas. (And of these it was) hunger and thirst, O king, which had then seized hold of the body 1 of the Bodisat. And his body being thus, as it were, "possessed," his mind was not rightly devoted to the destruction of the Âsavas. Now the Bodisat, O king, through the immeasurable æons of the past, had followed after the perception of the Four Noble Truths through all of his successive births. Is it then possible that in his last existence, in the birth in which that perception was to arise, there should be any confusion in his mind as to the way? But nevertheless there arose, O king, in the Bodisat's mind the thought: "May there not now be some other way to the wisdom (of a Buddha)?" And already before that, O king, when he was only one month old, when his father the Sakya was at work (ploughing), the Bodisat, placed in his sacred cot for coolness under the shade of the Gambu tree, sat up crosslegged, and putting away passion, free from all evil conditions of heart, he entered into and remained in the first Ghâna--a state of joy and ease, born of seclusion, full of reflection, full of investigation, [290] and so into the second, and so into the third, and so into the fourth Ghâna 2.' p. 144 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say. It was whilst he was bringing his knowledge to maturity that the Bodisat underwent the penance.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the penance undergone by the Bodisat.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-THIRD. VIRTUE STRONGER THAN VICE.] 24. 'Venerable Nâgasena, which is the more powerful, virtue or vice?' 'Virtue, O king 1.' 'That is a saying, Nâgasena, which I cannot believe-that virtue is more powerful than vice. For there are to be seen here (in the world) men who destroy living creatures, who take to themselves what has not been given, who walk in evil in their lusts, who speak lies, who commit gang robberies on whole villages, who are highwaymen, sharpers, and swindlers, and these all according to their crime suffer the cutting off of their hands, or their feet, or their hands and feet, or their ears, or p. 145 their nose, or their ears and nose, or the Gruel Pot, or the Chank Crown, or the Râhu's Mouth, or the Fire Garland, or the Hand Torch, or the Snake Strips, or the Bark Dress, or the Spotted Antelope, or the Flesh Hooks, or the Penny Cuts, or the Brine Slits, or the Bar Turn, or the Straw Seat, or they are anointed with boiling oil, or eaten by dogs, or are impaled alive, or are beheaded with a sword 1. Some of them sin one night and that night experience the fruit of their sin, some sinning by night experience the next day, some sinning one day experience that day, some sinning by day experience that night, some experience when two days or three have elapsed. But all experience in this present visible world the result of their iniquity. And is there any one, Nâgasena, who from having provided a meal with all its accessories 2 for one, or two, or three, or four, or five, or ten, or a hundred, or a thousand (members of the Order), has enjoyed in this present visible world wealth or fame or happiness--(is there any one who) from righteousness of life, or from observance of the Uposatha, (has received bliss even in this life 3)?' 25. 'There are [291], O king, four men who by giving gifts, and by the practice of uprightness, and by the keeping of Uposatha, even in their earthly bodies attained to glory in Tidasapura (the city of the gods).' p. 146 'And who, Sir, were they 1?' 'Mandhâtâ the king, and Nimi the king, and Sâdhîna the king, and Guttila the musician 2.' 'Venerable Nâgasena, this happened thousands of births ago, and is beyond the ken of either of us two. Give me, if you can, some examples from that period (of the world) which is now elapsing in which the Blessed One has been alive.' 'In this present period, O king, the slave Punnaka, on giving a meal to Sâriputta the Elder, attained that day to the dignity of a treasurer (Setthi), and he is now generally known as Punnaka the Setthi. The queen, the mother of Gopâla, who (being the daughter of poor peasant folk) sold her hair for eight pennies, and therewith gave a meal to Mahâ Kakkâyana the Elder and his seven companions, became that very day the chief queen of king Udena. Suppiyâ, the believing woman, cut flesh from her own thigh to provide broth 3 for a sick Bhikkhu, and on the very next day the wound closed up, and the place became cured, with skin grown over it. Mallikâ, the queen who (when a poor flower girl) gave the last night's gruel (she had reserved for her own dinner) to the Blessed One, became that very day the chief queen of the king of Kosala 4. Sumana, the garland maker, when he had p. 147 presented to the Blessed One eight bunches of jessamine flowers, came that very day into great prosperity. Eka-sâtaka the Brahman, who gave to the Blessed One his only garment, received that very day the office of Sabbatthaka (Minister in general) 1. All these, O king, came into the enjoyment of wealth and glory in their then existing lives.' 'So then, Nâgasena, with all your searching and enquiry you have only found six cases 2?' 'That is so, O king.' 26. 'Then it is vice, Nâgasena, and not virtue which is the more powerful. For on one day alone I have seen ten men expiating their crimes by being impaled alive, and thirty even, and forty, and fifty, [292], and a hundred, and a thousand. And further, there was Bhaddasâla, the soldier in the service of the royal family of Nanda 3, and he waged war against king Kandagutta 4. Now in that war, Nâgasena, there were eighty Corpse Dances. For they say that when one great Head Holocaust has taken place (by which is meant the slaughter of ten thousand elephants, and a lac of horses, and five thousand charioteers, and a hundred kotis of soldiers on foot), then the headless corpses arise and dance in frenzy over the battle-field. And all the men p. 148 thus slain came to destruction through the fruit of the Karma of their evil deeds 1. And therefore, too, do I say, Nâgasena, that vice is more powerful than virtue. And have you heard, Nâgasena, that in all this dispensation (since the time of Gotama the Buddha) the giving by the Kosala king has been unequalled?' 'Yes, I have heard so, O king.' 'But did he, Nâgasena, on account of his having given gifts so unequalled, receive in this present life wealth, or glory, or happiness?' 'No, O king, he did not.' 'Then, in that case, surely, Nâgasena, vice is more powerful than virtue?' 27. 'Vice, O king, by reason of its meanness, dies quickly away. But virtue, by reason of its grandeur, takes a long time to die. And this can be further examined into by a metaphor. just, O king, as in the West Country 2 the kind of corn called Kumuda-bhandikâ, ripening quickly and being garnered in a month, is called Mâsalu (got in a month) 3, but the rices only come to perfection in six months or five. What then is the difference, what the distinction herein between Kumuda-bhandikâ and rice? 'The one is a mean plant, O king, the other a grand one. The rices are worthy of kings, meet for p. 149 the king's table; the other is the food of servants and of slaves. [293] 'Just so, O king, it is by reason of its meanness that vice dies quickly away. But virtue, by its grandeur, takes a long time to die.' 28. 'But, Nâgasena, it is just those things which come most quickly to their end which are in the world considered the most powerful. And so still vice must be the more powerful, not virtue. just, Nâgasena, as the strong man who, when he enters into a terrible battle, is able the most quickly to get hold of his enemies' heads under his armpit 1, and dragging them along to bring them prisoners to his lord, that is the champion who is regarded, in the world, as the ablest hero--just as that surgeon who is able the most quickly to extract the dart, and allay the disease, is considered the most clever--just as the accountant who is able with the greatest speed to make his calculations, and with most rapidity to show the result, is considered the cleverest counter--just as the wrestler who is able the most quickly to lift his opponent up, and make him fall flat on his back, is considered the ablest hero--just so, Nâgasena, it is that one of these two things--virtue and vice--which most quickly reaches its end that is, in the world, the more powerful of the two.' 'The Karma of both the two, O king, will be made evident in future births; but vice besides that will by reason of its guilt be made evident at once, and in this present life. The rulers (Kshatriyas) p. 150 of old, O king, established this decree: "Whosoever takes life shall be subject to a fine, and whosoever takes to himself what has not been given, and whosoever commits adultery,, and whosoever speaks lies, and whosoever is a dacoit, and whosoever is a highwayman, and whosoever cheats and swindles. Such men shall be liable to be fined or beaten or mutilated or broken 1 or executed." And in pursuance thereof they held repeated enquiry, and then adjudged one or other punishment accordingly. But, O king, has there ever been by any one a decree promulgated: "Whosoever gives gifts, or observes a virtuous life, or keeps Uposatha, to him shall wealth be given, or honours?" And do they make continued enquiry, and bestow wealth or honours accordingly, as they do stripes or bonds upon a thief?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Well, if they did so then would virtue too be made evident even in this life. [294] But as they neither make such enquiry concerning givers, nor bestow wealth and honours upon them, therefore is virtue not manifested now. And this is the reason, O king, why vice is made known in this life, whereas he (the giver) receives the more abundantly in the lives to come. And therefore it is virtue which, through the destructions brought about by Karma, is by far the more powerful of the two 2.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! Only by one wise as you could this puzzle have been so well solved. p. 151 [paragraph continues] The problem put by me in worldly sense have you in transcendental sense made clear.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to virtue and vice.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FOURTH. OFFERINGS TO THE DEAD.] 29. 'Venerable Nâgasena, these givers when they bestow their offerings, devote them specifically to former (relatives) now departed 1, saying: "May this gift benefit such and such." Now do they (the dead) derive any benefit therefrom?' 'Some do, O king, and some do not.' 'Which then are they that do, and which do not?' 'Those who have been reborn in purgatory, O king, do not; nor those reborn in heaven; nor those reborn as animals. And of those reborn as Pretas three kinds do not-the Vantâsikâ (who feed on vomit), the Khuppipâsino (who hunger and thirst.), the Nigghâma-tanhikâ (who are consumed by thirst). But the Paradattûpagîvino (who live on the gifts of others) they do derive profit, and those who bear them in remembrance do so too.' 'Then, Nâgasena, offerings given by the givers have run to waste 2, and are fruitless, since those p. 152 for whose benefit they are given derive no profit therefrom.' 'No, O king. They run not to waste, neither are fruitless. The givers themselves derive profit from them.' 'Then convince me of this by a simile.' 'Suppose, O king, people were to get ready fish and meat and strong drinks and rice and cakes, and make a visit on a family related to them. If their relatives should not accept their complimentary present, would that present be wasted or fruitless?' No, Sir, it would go to the owners of it.' 'Well, just so the givers themselves derive the profit. Or just, O king, [295] as if a man were to enter an inner chamber, and there were no exit in front of him, how would he get out?' 'By the way he entered.' 'Well, just so the givers themselves derive the profit.' 30. 'Let that pass, Nâgasena. That is so, and I accept it as you say. We will not dispute your argument. But, venerable Nâgasena, if the offerings made by such givers do advantage certain of the departed, and they do reap the result of the gifts, then if a man who destroys living creatures and drinks blood and is of cruel heart, were after committing murder or any other dreadful act, to dedicate it to the departed, saying: "May the result of this act of mine accrue to the departed"--would it then be transferred to them?' 'No, O king.' 'But what is the reason, what is the cause, that a good deed can accrue to them, and not an evil one?' p. 153 'This is really not a question you should ask, O king. Ask me no foolish question, O king, in the idea that an answer will be forthcoming. You will be asking me next why space is boundless, why the Ganges does not flow up stream, why men and birds are bipeds, and the animals quadrupeds!' 'It is not to annoy you that I ask this question, Nâgasena, but for the sake of resolving a doubt. There are many people in the world who are left-handed or squint 1. I put that question to you, thinking: "Why should not also these unlucky ones have a chance 2 of bettering themselves?"' 'An evil deed, O king, cannot be shared with one who has not done it, and has not consented to it. People convey water long distances by an aqueduct. But could they in the same way remove a great mountain of solid rock?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Well, just in that way can a good deed be shared, but a bad one cannot. And one can light a lamp with oil, but could one in the same way, O king, light it with water?' [296] 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'Well, so is it that a good deed can be shared, but not an evil one. And husbandmen take water from a reservoir to bring their crops to maturity, but could they for the same purpose, O king, take water from the sea?' p. 154 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'So again is it that though a good deed can be shared, an evil one cannot.' 31. 'But, venerable Nâgasena, why is that? Convince me of this by a reason. I am not blind, or unobservant. I shall understand when I have heard.' 'Vice, O king, is a mean thing, virtue is great and grand. By its meanness vice affects 1 only the doer, but virtue by its grandeur overspreads the whole world of gods and men.' 'Show me this by a metaphor.' 'Were a tiny drop of water to fall on the ground, O king, would it flow on over ten leagues or twelve?' 'Certainly not. It would only have effect 2 on that very spot of ground on which it fell.' 'But why so?' 'Because o its minuteness.' 'Just so, O king, is vice minute. And by reason of its littleness it affects the doer only, and cannot possibly be shared. But if a mighty rain cloud were to pour out rain satisfying the surface of the earth, would that water spread round about?' 'Certainly, Sir. That thunderstorm would fill up the depressions in the ground and the pools and ponds, and the gullies and crevices and chasms, and the lakes and reservoirs and wells and lotus-tanks, and the water would spread abroad for ten leagues or for twelve 3.' p. 155 'But why so, O king?' 'Because of the greatness of the storm.' 'Just so, O king, is virtue great. And by reason of its abundance it can be shared by gods and men. 'Venerable Nâgasena, why is it that vice is so limited, [297] and virtue so much more wide-reaching?' 'Whosoever, O king, in this world gives gifts, and lives in righteousness, and keeps Uposatha 1, he, glad, right glad, joyful, cheerful, happy, becomes filled with a sweet sense of trust and bliss, and bliss ruling in his heart his goodness grows still more and more abundantly. Like a deep pool of clear water, O king, and into which on one side the spring pours, while on the other the water flows away; so as it flows away it comes again, and there can be no failure there--so, O king, does his goodness grow more and more abundantly. If even through a hundred years, O king, a man were to keep on transferring 2 to others (the merit of) any good he p. 156 had done, the more he gave it away the more would his goodness grow, and he would still be able to share it with whomsoever he would. This, O king, is the reason why virtue is so much the greater of the two. 32. 'But on doing evil, O king, a man becomes filled with remorse 1, and the heart of him who feels remorse cannot get away (from the thought of the evil he has done), it is forcibly bent back on it, thrown back on it, obtains no peace 2; miserable, burning, abandoned of hope, he wastes away, and gaining no relief from depression 3, he is, as it were, possessed with his woe! just, O king, as a drop of water, falling on a dry river bed with its mighty sandbanks rising and falling in undulations along its crooked and shifty course, gains not in volume, but is swallowed up on the very spot where it fell, just so, O king, is a man, when he has done wrong, overcome with remorse, and the heart of him who feels remorse cannot get away from the thought of the evil he has done, it is forcibly bent back on it, thrown back on it, obtains no peace; miserable, burning, abandoned of hope, he wastes away, and gaining no release from his depression, he is, as it p. 157 were, swallowed up of his woe. This is the reason, O king, why vice is so mean.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to virtue and vice.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-FIFTH. DREAMS.] 33. 'Venerable Nâgasena, men and women in this world see dreams pleasant and evil, things they have seen before and things they have not, things they have done before and things they have not, [298] dreams peaceful and terrible, dreams of matters near to them and distant from them, full of many shapes and innumerable colours. What is this that men call a dream, and who is it who dreams it?' 'It is a suggestion 1, O king, coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream. And there are six kinds of people who see dreams--the man who is of a windy humour 2, or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, the man who dreams dreams by the influence of a god, the man who does so by the influence of his own habits, and the man who does so in the way of prognostication 3. And p. 158 of these, O king, only the last kind of dreams is true; all the rest are false.' 34. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when a man dreams a dream that is a prognostication, how is it? Does his own mind set out itself to seek the omen, or does the prognostication come of its own accord into the path of his mind, or does some one else come and tell him of it?' 'His own mind does not itself seek the omen, neither does any one else come and tell him of it. The prognostication comes of its own accord into his mind. It is like the case of a looking-glass, which does not go anywhere to seek for the reflection; neither does any one else come and put the reflection on to the looking-glass. But the object reflected comes from somewhere or other across the sphere over which the reflecting power of the looking-glass extends.' 35. 'Venerable Nâgasena, does the same mind which sees the dream also know: "Such and such a result, auspicious or terrible, will follow?"' 'No, that is not so, O king. After the omen has occurred he tells others, and then they explain the meaning of it.' 'Come, now, Nâgasena, give me a simile to explain this.' 'It is like the marks, O king, and pimples, and cutaneous eruptions which arise on a man's body to his profit or loss, to his fame or dishonour, to his praise or blame, to his happiness or woe. [299] Do p. 159 in that case the pimples come because they know: "Such and such is the event which we shall bring about?"' 'Certainly not, Sir. But according to the place on which the pimples have arisen, the fortune-tellers, making their observations, give decision, saying: Such and such will be the result."' 'Well, in the same way, O king, it is not the same mind which dreams the dream which also knows: "Such and such a result, conspicuous or terrible, will follow." But after the omen has occurred he tells others, and they then explain the meaning of it.' 36. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?' 'Neither the one, O king; nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become light 1, and he is not yet fully conscious 2, in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into the Bhavanga) 3, and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not 4 has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and p. 160 a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the mirror, O king, are you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind. Or again, O king, just as the glory of a sun veiled in fog is imperceptible, as its rays, though they do exist, are unable to pierce through, and as when its rays act not there is no light, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the sun, O king, are you to regard the body, as the veil of fog sleep, [300] as the rays the mind. 37. 'Under two conditions, O king, is the mind inactive though the body is there--when a man being in deep sleep the mind has returned into itself, and when the man has fallen into a trance 1. The mind of a man who is awake, O king, is excited, open, clear, untrammelled, and no prognostication occurs to one whose mind is so. Just, O king, as men seeking concealment avoid the man who is open, candid, unoccupied, and unreserved,--just so is it that the divine intention is not manifested to the wakeful man, and the man who is awake therefore sees no dream. Or again, O king, just as the qualities which lead to wisdom are found not in that brother whose mode of livelihood and conduct are wrong, who is the friend of sinners, wicked, insolent, devoid p. 161 of zeal,--just so is it that the divine intention is not manifested to the wakeful man, and the man who is awake, therefore, sees no dream.' 38. 'Venerable Nâgasena, is there a beginning, a middle, and an end in sleep?' 'Yes, O king, there is.' 'Which then is the beginning, which the middle, and which the end?' 'The feeling of oppression and inability 1 in the body, O king, of weakness, slackness, inertness--that is the beginning of sleep. The light "monkey's sleep" in which a man still guards his scattered thoughts 2--that is the middle of sleep. When the mind has entered into itself--that is the end of sleep. And it is in the middle stage, O king, in the "monkey's sleep" that dreams are dreamt. Just, O king, as when a man self-restrained with collected thoughts, stedfast in the faith, unshaken in wisdom, plunges deep into the woods far from the sound of strife, and thinks over some subtle matter, he there, tranquil and at peace, will master the meaning of it--just so a man still watchful, not fallen into sleep, but dozing in a "monkey's sleep," will dream a dream. [301] As the sound of strife, so, O king, are you to regard wakefulness, and as the lonely wood the "monkey's sleep." And as that man avoiding the sound of strife, keeping out of sleep, remaining in the middle stage, will master the meaning of that subtle matter, so the still watchful man, not fallen into sleep, but dozing in a "monkey's sleep," will dream a dream.' p. 162 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to dreams 1.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SIXTH. PREMATURE DEATH.] 39. 'Venerable Nâgasena, when beings die, do they all die in fullness of time, or do some die out of due season?' 'There is such a thing, O king, as death at the due time, and such a thing as premature death.' 'Then who are they whose decease is at the due time, and who are they whose decease is premature?' 'Have you ever noticed, O king, in the case of mango trees or Gambu trees or other fruit-bearing trees, that their fruits fall both when they are ripe and when they are not ripe?' 'Yes, I have.' 'Well, those fallen fruits, do they all fall at the due time, or do some fall prematurely?' 'Such of those fruits, Nâgasena, as are ripe and mature 2 when they fall, fall in fullness of time. But of the rest some fall because they are bored into by worms, some because they are knocked down by a p. 163 long stick, some because they are blown down by the wind, some because they have become rotten--and all these fall out of due season 1.' 'Just so, O king, those men who die of the effect of old age, they die in fullness of time. But of the rest some die of the dire effect of the Karma (of evil deeds), some of excessive journeying 2, some of excessive activity.' 40. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those who die of Karma, or of journeying, or of activity, or of old age, they all die in fullness of time: and even he who dies in the womb, that is his appointed time, so that he too dies in fullness of time; and so of him who dies in the birth chamber [302], or when he is a month old, or at any age up to a hundred years. It is always his appointed time, and it is in the fullness of time that he dies. So, Nâgasena, there is no such thing as death out of due season. For all who die, die at the appointed time.' 'There are seven kinds of persons, O king, who, there being still a portion of their appointed age to run, die out of time. And which are the seven? The starving man, O king, who can get no food, whose inwards are consumed 3--and the thirsty man who can get no water, whose heart is dried up--and the man bitten by a snake, who, when consumed by the fierce energy of poison, can find no cure and he who has taken poison, and when all his limbs are p. 164 burning, is unable to procure medicine--and one fallen into fire, who when he is aflame, can find no means of putting out the fire--and he who having fallen into water can find no firm ground to stand on--and the man wounded by a dart, who in his illness can find no surgeon--all these seven, there being still a portion of their appointed time to run, die out of due season. And herein (in all these seven cases) I declare that they are all of one nature 1. In eight ways, O king, does the death of mortals take place--through excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, through the adverse union of these three, through variations in temperature, through inequality in protection, through (medical) treatment, and through the working of Karma 2. And of these, O king, it is only death by the working of Karma that is death at the due season, all the rest are cases of death out of due season. For it is said: "By hunger, thirst, by poison, and by bites, Burnt, drowned, or slain, men out of time do die; By the three humours, and by three combined, By heats, by inequalities, by aids, By all these seven men die out of time 3." 41. [303] 'But there are some men, O king, who die through the working of some evil deed or other they have committed in a former birth. And of p. 165 these, O king, whosoever has starved others to death, after having been himself through many hundreds of thousands of years tormented by hunger, famished, exhausted, emaciated, and withered of heart, dried up, wasted away, heated, and all on fire within, will, either as youth or man or old man, die of hunger too. And that death will be to him a death at the appointed time 1. Whosoever has put others to death by thirst, after having through many hundreds of thousands of years become a Preta consumed by thirst, thin and miserable, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of thirst. And that death will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by having them bitten by snakes, will, after wandering through many hundreds of thousands of years from existence to existence, in which he is constantly bitten by boa constrictors and black snakes, himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of snake bite. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by poison will, after existing for many hundreds of thousands of years with burning limbs and broken body, and exhaling the odour of a corpse, himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die of poison. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by fire, he having wandered from purgatory 2 to purgatory, from one mass of burning charcoal to p. 166 another, with burning and tortured limbs, for many hundreds of thousands of years, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, be burnt to death. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by drowning, he having suffered many hundreds of thousands of years as a being disabled, ruined, broken, weak in limb, and anxious in heart, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, die by drowning. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time. Whosoever has put others to death by the sword, [304] he having suffered for many hundreds of thousands of years (in repeated births as an animal) from cuts and wounds and blows and bruises, or (when born as a man) ever destroyed by weapons 1, will himself too, either as youth or man or old man, perish by the sword. And that will be to him a death at the appointed time.' 42. 'Venerable Nâgasena, the death out of due time that you also speak of--come now, tell me the reason for that.' 'As a great and mighty fire, O king, on to which dry grass and sticks and branches and leaves have been heaped, will nevertheless, when this its food has been consumed, die out by the exhaustion of the fuel. Yet such a fire is said to have gone out in fullness of time, without any calamity or accident (having happened to it). Just so, O king, the man who, when he has lived many thousands of days, when he is old and stricken in years, dies at last of p. 167 old age, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, is said to have reached death in the fullness of time. But if there were a great and mighty fire, O king, on to which dry grass and sticks and branches and leaves had been heaped, then if a mighty rain cloud were to pour out rain upon it, and it were thus to be put out, even before the fuel was consumed, could it be said, O king, that that great fire had gone out in fullness of time?' 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein would the second fire differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'The second one, Sir, which suffered from the onset of the rain--that fire would have gone out before its time.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 43. 'Or again, O king, it is like a mighty storm cloud which, rising up into the heavens, should pour out rain, filling the valleys and the plains. That cloud would be said to have rained without calamity or accident. Just so, O king, the man who after having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have p. 168 reached death in the fullness of time. [305] But if, O king, a mighty storm cloud were to rise up into the heavens, and as it did so were to be dissipated by a mighty wind, could it be said, O king, that that cloud had perished in due time?' 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein would the second cloud differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'The second one, Sir, which suffered from the onset of the whirlwind, would have been dissipated before its time.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 44. 'Or again, O king, it is like a powerful and deadly snake, which being angered should bite a man, and to him that poison, no impediment and no accident happening to it, should bring death. That poison would be said, without impediment or accident, to have reached its aim. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, he is said to have reached, unimpeded and uninterrupted, to the goal of his life, to have died in the fullness of time. But if a snake charmer were to give a drug to the man while he was suffering from p. 169 the bite, and thus get rid of the poison, could it be said that the poison was removed in the fullness of time?' 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein, O king, would the second poison differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'The second one, Sir, which was acted upon by the introduction of the drug, would have been removed before its end was attained.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 45. 'Or again, O king, it is like the arrow discharged by an archer. [306] If that arrow should go to the very end of the line of the path along which it was natural for it to go, then it would be said to have reached that aim, without let or hindrance. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, unimpeded and uninterrupted, in the fullness of time. But if, at the moment when the archer was discharging the arrow, some one should catch hold of it, could that arrow be said to have reached the end of the line of the path along which it was shot?' p. 170 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein, O king, would the second arrow differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'By the seizure which intervened, Sir, the course of the second arrow was arrested.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 46. 'Or again, O king, it is like the brazen vessel which a man should strike. And by his striking thereof a note should be produced, and sound to the very end of the line of the path along which it was its nature to sound. It would then be said to have reached that aim without let or hindrance. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, without let or hindrance, in the fullness of time. But if a man were to strike a brazen vessel, and by his striking thereof a note should be produced, but some one, before it had reached any distance, were to touch the vessel, and at his touching thereof the sound should cease, could then that sound be said to have reached the end of the line of the path along which it was its nature to sound 'No, Sir, it could not.' p. 171 'But wherein, O king, would the second sound differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'By the touching which intervened, Sir, that sound was suppressed 1.' [307] 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 47. 'Or again, O king, it is like the corn seed which had sprung up well in the field, and by means of a plentiful downpour of rain had become well laden far and wide 2 with many seeds, and had survived in safety to the time of standing crops, that corn would be said to have reached, without let or hindrance, to its due season. Just so, O king, the man who, having lived long, dies at last, when he is old and well stricken in years, without any calamity or accident having happened to him, of old age, is said to have reached death, without let or hindrance, in the fullness of time. But if that corn, after it had sprung up well in the field, should, deprived of water, die, could it be said to have reached its due season?' p. 172 'No, Sir, it could not.' 'But wherein, O king, would the second crop differ, in its nature, from the first?' 'Oppressed by the heat which intervened, that crop, Sir, perished.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 48. 'And have you ever heard, O king, of a young crop that, after it had come to ear, worms sprung up and destroyed down to the roots?' 'We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.' 'Well, O king, was that crop destroyed in season, or out of season?' 'Out of season, Sir. For surely if worms had not destroyed the crop it would have survived to harvest time.' 'What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?' 'That is so, Sir.' [308] 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in p. 173 temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time. 49. 'And have you ever heard, O king, of a crop that had grown, and was bent down by the weight of the grains of corn, the ears having duly formed 1, when a so-called Karaka rain (hail-storm) 2 falling on it, destroyed it?' 'We have both heard of such a thing, Sir, and have seen it, too.' 'Well, O king! would you say the crop was destroyed in season or out of season?' 'Out of season, Sir. For if the hail-storm had not come the crop would have lasted to harvest time.' 'What then, O king! on a disaster intervening the crop is lost, but if no injury is done it, it survives to the harvest?' 'That is so, Sir.' 'Just so, O king, whosoever dies before his time does so in consequence of suffering from the attack of some disease,--from excess of windy humour, or of bilious humour, or of phlegmatic humour, or from the union of the three, or from variations in temperature, or from inequality in protection, or from treatment, or from hunger, or from thirst, or from fire, or from water, or from the sword. This, O p. 174 king, is the reason why there is such a thing as dying before one's time.' 50. 'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, most strange! Right well have you explained, by reason and by simile, how it is that people die before their time. That there is such a thing as premature death have you made clear and plain and evident 1. A thoughtless man even, Nâgasena, a puzzle-headed fellow, could by any one of your comparisons have come to the conclusion that premature deaths do occur;--[309] how much more an able man! I was convinced already, Sir, by the first of your similes, that such deaths happen, but nevertheless, out of the wish to hear still further and further solutions, I would not give in.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to premature deaths.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH. WONDERS AT THE GRAVE.] 51. 'Venerable Nâgasena, are there wonders at the Ketiyas (the mounds raised over the ashes) of all who have passed entirely away (of all the Arahats deceased) 2? 'Of some, O king, but not of others.' 'But of which, Sir, is this the case, and of which not?' p. 175 'It is by the stedfast resolve, O king, of three kinds of people, that wonders take place at the Ketiya of some person deceased who has been entirely set free. And who are the three? In the first place, O king, an Arahat, when still alive, may, out of pity for gods and men, make the resolve: "Let there be such and such wonders at my Ketiya 1." Then, by reason of his resolve, wonders happen there. Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of an Arahat at the Ketiya of one entirely set free. 'And again, O king, the gods, out of pity for men, show wonders at the Ketiya of one who has been entirely set free, thinking: "By this wonder may the true faith remain always established on the earth, and may mankind, believing, grow in grace!" Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of a god at the Ketiya of one entirely set free. 'And again, O king, some woman or some man of believing heart, able, intelligent, wise, endowed with insight, may deliberately take perfumes, or a garland, or a cloth, and place it on the Ketiya, making the resolve: "May such and such a wonder take place!" Thus is it that wonders occur by the resolve of human beings at the Ketiya of one entirely set free. 52. 'These, O king, are the three kinds of people by whose stedfast resolve wonders take place at the Ketiyas of Arahats deceased. And if there has been no such resolve, O king, by one of these, then p. 176 is there no wonder at the Ketiya even of one whose Âsavas had been destroyed, who had attained to the sixfold insight, who was master of himself. And if there be no such wonder, then, O king, [310] one should call to mind the purity of conduct one has seen 1, and draw in trusting faith the conclusion: "Verily, this child of the Buddhas has been entirely set free!"' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to wonders at the grave.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH. CONVERSION AND CONDUCT.] 53. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those who regulate their lives aright--do they all attain to insight into the Truth, or are there some of them who do not?' 'Some do, O king, and some do not.' 'Then which do, Sir, and which do not?' 'He who is born as an animal, O king, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth, nor he who is born in p. 177 the Preta world, nor he who holds wrong views, nor the deceitful man, nor he who has slain his mother, or his father, or an Arahat, nor he who has raised up a schism in the Order, nor he who has shed a Buddha's blood, nor he who has furtively attached himself to the Order 1, nor he who has become a pervert 2, nor he who has violated a sister of the Order, nor he who, having been guilty of one or other of the thirteen grievous offences 3, has not been rehabilitated, nor a eunuch, nor an hermaphrodite--and whosoever is a human child under seven years of age, even though he regulate his life aright, will not attain to insight into the Truth. To these sixteen individuals there is no attainment of insight, O king, even though they regulate their life aright.' 54. 'Venerable Nâgasena, there may or may not be a possibility of insight to the fifteen you have first singled out for opposition 4. But what is the reason why an infant, one under seven years of age, should not, even though he regulate his life aright, attain to insight? Therein there is still a puzzle left. For is it not admitted that in a child there is not passion, neither malice, nor dullness, nor pride, nor heresy, nor discontent, nor lustful thoughts? Being undefiled by sin, that which we call an infant is fit and ready (to the attainment p. 178 even of Arahatship--how much more) 1 is he worthy to penetrate at a glance into the four truths!' 'The following is the reason, O king, for my saying [311] that an infant, even though he regulate his life aright, cannot attain to insight. If, O king, one under seven years of age could feel passion about things exciting to passion, could go wrong in things leading to iniquity, could be befooled in matters that mislead, could be maddened as to things that infatuate, could understand a heresy, could distinguish between content and discontent, could think out virtue and vice, then might insight be possible to him. But the mind of one under seven years of age, O king, is powerless and weak, mean, small, slight, obscure, and dull, whereas the essential principle of Nirvâna is transcendental, important, weighty, wide-reaching, and extensive. Therefore is it, O king, that the infant, with so imperfect a mind, is unable to grasp an idea so great. It is like the case of Sineru, O king, the king of the mountains, heavy and ponderous, wide-reaching and mighty as it is,--could now a man, by his ordinary strength and power and energy, root that mountain up 2?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not?' 'Because of the weakness of the man, and because of the mightiness of Sineru, the mountain king.' p. 179 'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvâna 1.' 55. 'And again, it is like the broad earth, O king, long and wide, great in expanse and extension, large and mighty--would now a tiny drop of water be able to wet and turn to mud that broad earth 2?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the minuteness of the drop of water, and because of the greatness of the broad earth.' 'Just so, O king, is the relation of the infant's mind to Nirvâna. [312] 56. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were weak and powerless, minute, tiny, limited, and dull fire--would it be possible, with so insignificant a fire, to overcome darkness and make light appear over the whole world of gods and men?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the dullness of the fire, and because of the greatness of the world.' 'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull; it is veiled, moreover, with the thick darkness of ignorance. Hard would it be, therefore, for it to shine forth with the light of knowledge. And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, to one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment of insight into the Truth. p. 180 57. 'Or again, O king, suppose there were a Sâlaka 1, minute in the measure of its body, and rendered lean by disease, and it on seeing an elephant king, which showed the signs of rut in three places, and was nine cubits in length, and three in breadth, and ten in girth, and seven in height 2, coming to its lair, were to begin to drag the elephant towards it with the view of swallowing it--now would the Sâlaka, O king, be able to do 3?' 'Certainly not, Sir.' 'But why not, O king?' 'Because of the minuteness of the Sâlaka's body, and because of the magnitude of the elephant king.' 'Just so, O king, the mind of one under seven years of age is powerless and weak, limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull. Grand and transcendental is the ambrosial essence of Nirvâna 4. With that mind so powerless and weak, so limited, insignificant, obscure, and dull, he cannot penetrate into the grand and transcendental essence of Nirvâna. p. 181 And that is the reason, O king, why to an infant, one under seven years of age, even though he order his conduct aright, there can be no attainment to insight of the Truth.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma on conversion and conduct.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE SEVENTY-NINTH. THE PAIN OF NIRVÂNA 1.] [313] 58. 'Venerable Nâgasena, how is it? Is Nirvâna all bliss, or is it partly pain. 2? p. 182 'Nirvâna is all bliss, O king. There is no intermingling of pain in it.' 'That, Sir, is a saying we cannot believe--that Nirvâna is all bliss. On this point, Nâgasena, we maintain that Nirvâna must be alloyed with pain. And there is a reason for our adopting that view. What is that reason? Those, Nâgasena, who seek after Nirvâna are seen to practise exertion and application both of body and of mind, restraint in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and eating, suppression of sleep, subjugation of the organs of sense, renunciation of wealth and corn, of dear relatives and friends. But all those who are joyful and happy in the world take delight in, are devoted to, the five pleasures of sense--they practise and delight their eyes in many kinds of pleasurable forms, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their ears in many kinds of pleasurable sounds of revelry and song, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their sense of smell with many kinds of perfumes of flowers, and fruits, and leaves, and bark, and roots, and sap, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their tongue with many kinds of pleasurable tastes of hard foods and of soft, of syrups, drinks, and beverages, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their sense of touch with many kinds of pleasurable feelings, tender and delicate, exquisite and soft, such as at any time they like the best--they practise and delight their minds with many sorts of conceptions and ideas, pure and impure, good and bad, such as at any time they like the best. You, on the other hand, put a stop to and destroy, p. 183 maim and mangle, put a drag on and restrain the development of your eye, and ear, and nose, and tongue, and body, and mind. Therefore is your body afflicted and your mind afflicted too, and your body being afflicted you feel bodily discomfort and pain, and your minds being afflicted you feel mental discomfort too and pain. Did not even Mâgandiya, the ascetic, find fault with the Blessed One, and say 1: [314] "The Samana Gotama is a destroyer of increase 2?"' 59. 'Nirvâna, O king, has no pain in it. It is bliss unalloyed. When you, O king, maintain that Nirvâna is painful, that which you call "painful" is not Nirvâna. It is the preliminary stage to the realisation of Nirvâna, it is the process of seeking after Nirvâna. Nirvâna itself is bliss pure and simple, there is no pain mixed with it. And I will give you an explanation of this. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of sovranty which kings enjoy?' 'Most certainly.' 'And is there no pain, O king, mingled with that bliss?' 'No, Sir.' 'But surely then, O king, why is it that when their frontier provinces have broken out in revolt, the kings, to the end that they may bring the inhabitants of those provinces into subjection again, leave their homes, attended by their ministers and chiefs, their p. 184 soldiers and their guards, and marching over ground even and uneven, tormented the while by gnats and mosquitoes and hot winds, engage in fierce fights, and suffer the presentiment of death?' 'That, venerable Nâgasena, is not what is called the bliss of sovranty. It is only the preliminary stage in the pursuit of that bliss. It is after they have thus, in pain, sought after sovranty, that they enjoy the bliss thereof. And thus that bliss, Nâgasena, is itself unmixed with pain, for the bliss of sovranty is one thing, and the pain another.' 'Just so, O king, is Nirvâna all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâna afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâna, that they enjoy the Nirvâna which is bliss unalloyed--as kings do the bliss of sovranty after their foes have been put down. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâna is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâna is one thing, and the pain another. [315] 60. 'And hear another explanation, O king, of the same thing. Is there such a thing, O king, as the bliss of knowledge which those teachers have who have passed through their course?' 'Yes, Sir, there is.' 'Well, is that bliss of knowledge alloyed with pain?' 'No.' 'What then, O king, is the good of their afflicting p. 185 themselves by bowing down before and standing up in the presence of their teachers; by drawing water, and sweeping out the cell, and placing tooth-sticks and washing-water ready; by living upon scraps left over; by doing service in shampooing, and bathing, and washing of the feet; by suppressing their own will, and acting according to the will of others; by sleeping in discomfort, and feeding on distasteful food?' 'That, Nâgasena, is not the bliss of knowledge, it is a preliminary stage in the pursuit thereof. It is after the teachers have, in pain, sought after knowledge, that they enjoy its bliss. Thus is it, Nâgasena, that the bliss of knowledge is unalloyed with pain. For that bliss of knowledge is one thing, and the pain another.' 'Just so, O king, is Nirvâna all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. Those who are in quest of Nirvâna afflict their minds and bodies it is true, restrain themselves in standing, walking, sitting, lying, and in food, suppress their sleep, keep their senses in subjection, abandon their very body and their life. But it is after they have thus, in pain, sought after Nirvâna, that they enjoy the Nirvâna which is bliss unalloyed--as teachers do the bliss of knowledge. Thus is it, O king, that Nirvâna is all bliss, and there is no pain mingled with it. For Nirvâna is one thing, and the pain another.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the dilemma as to the pain of Nirvâna.] p. 186 [DILEMMA THE EIGHTIETH. THE OUTWARD FORM OF NIRVÂNA.] 61. 'Venerable Nâgasena, this Nirvâna that you are always talking of--can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument, the form, or figure, or duration 1, or measure of it?' [316] 'Nirvâna, O king, has nothing similar to it. By no metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument can its form, or figure, or duration, or measure be made clear.' 'That I cannot believe, Nâgasena,--that of Nirvâna, which really after all is a condition that exists 2, it should be so impossible in any way to make us understand either the form, or figure, or duration, or measure! Give me some explanation of this.' 62. 'Very well, O king, I will do so. Is there such a thing, O king, as the great ocean?' 'Yes, the ocean exists.' 'Well, suppose some one were to ask you, saying: "How much water is there, your majesty, in the sea, and how many are the creatures that dwell therein?" When that question had been put, how would you answer him?' 'I should reply thus to such a question: "My good fellow! this is an unaskable thing that you ask me. No one ought to ask such a question. It p. 187 is a point that should be left alone. The physicists 1 have never examined into the ocean in that way. And no one can measure the water there, or count the creatures who dwell therein." Thus, Sir, should I make reply.' 63. 'But why, O king, would you make such a reply about the ocean which, after all, is really an existing condition of things 2. Ought you not rather to count and tell him, saying: "So and so much is the water in the sea, and so and so many are the creatures that dwell therein?"' 'That would be impossible, Sir. The question is beyond one's power.' 'As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the measure of the water in the sea, or the number of the creatures dwelling therein, though after all the sea exists, so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to tell the form, or figure, or duration, or measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist. [317] And even, O king, if one of magical powers, master over mind, were to be able to count the water and the creatures in the sea, even he could not tell the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna. 64. 'And hear another explanation of the same thing, O king. Are there, O king, among the gods certain of them called "The Formless Ones 3? p. 188 'Yes, Sir. I have heard there are such.' 'Well, O king, can you make clear by metaphor, or explanation, or reason, or argument the form, or figure, or duration 1, or size of these gods, the "Formless Ones?"' 'No, I cannot.' 'Then, O king, there are none.' 'The Formless Ones, Sir, do exist; and yet it is impossible in any of the ways you suggest to explain either their form or figure, either their duration or their size.' 'As impossible as it is, O king, to tell the form or figure, the duration or the size of the gods called "Formless Ones," though they after all are beings that exist 2, so impossible is it in any of the ways you suggest to explain the form or the figure, the duration or the measure of Nirvâna, though after all it is a condition that does exist.' 65. 'Venerable Nâgasena, I will grant you that Nirvâna is bliss unalloyed, and yet that is impossible to make clear, either by simile or explanation, by reason or by argument, either its form or its figure, either its duration or its size. But is there no quality of Nirvâna which is inherent also in other p. 189 things 1, and is such that it can be made evident by metaphor 2?' 'Though there is nothing as to its form which can be so explained, there is something, O king, as to its qualities which can.' [318] 'O happy word, Nâgasena! Speak then, quickly, that I may have an explanation of even one point in the characteristics of Nirvâna. Appease the fever of my heart. Allay it by the cool sweet breezes of your words!' 'There is one quality of the lotus, O king, inherent in Nirvâna, and two qualities of water, and three of medicine, and four of the ocean, and five of food, and ten of space, and three of the wish-conferring gem, and three of red sandal wood, and three of the froth of ghee, and five of a mountain peak.' 66. 'Venerable Nâgasena, that one quality of the lotus which you said was inherent in Nirvâna,--which is that?' 'As the lotus, O king, is untarnished by the water 3, so is Nirvâna untarnished by any evil dispositions. This is the one quality of the lotus inherent in Nirvâna.' p. 190 67. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those two qualities of water which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As water, O king, is cool and assuages heat, so also is Nirvâna cool, and assuages the fever arising from all evil dispositions. This is the first quality of water inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as water allays the thirst of men and beasts when they are exhausted and anxious, craving for drink, and tormented by thirst, so does Nirvâna allay the thirst of the craving after lusts, the craving after future life, and the craving after worldly prosperity 1. This is the second quality of water inherent in Nirvâna.' 68. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of medicine, which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' [319] 'As medicine, O king, is the refuge of beings tormented by poison, so is Nirvâna the refuge of beings tormented with the poison of evil dispositions. This is the first quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as medicine puts an end to diseases, so does Nirvâna put an end to griefs. This is the second quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as medicine is ambrosia 2, so also is Nirvâna ambrosia. This is the third quality of medicine inherent in Nirvâna.' p. 191 69. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those four qualities of the ocean which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As the ocean, O king, is free from (empty of) corpses 1, so also is Nirvâna free from (empty of) the dead bodies of all evil dispositions 2. This, O king, is the first quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is mighty and boundless, and fills not with all the rivers that flow in to it; so is Nirvâna mighty and boundless, and fills not with all beings (who enter in to it). This is the second quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is the abode of mighty creatures, so is Nirvâna the abode of great men--Arahats, in whom the Great Evils and all stains have been destroyed, endowed with power, masters of themselves. This is the third quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the ocean is all in blossom 3, as it were, with the innumerable and various and fine flowers of the ripple of its waves, so is Nirvâna all in blossom, as it were, with the innumerable and p. 192 various and fine flowers of purity, of knowledge, and of emancipation. This is the fourth quality of the ocean inherent in Nirvâna.' [320] 70. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of food which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As food, O king, is the support of the life of all beings, so is Nirvâna, when it has been realised, the support of life, for it puts an end to old age and death. This is the first quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food increases the strength of all beings, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, increase the power of Iddhi of all beings. This is the second quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food is the source of the beauty of all beings, so is Nirvâna, when it has been realised, the source to all beings of the beauty of holiness. This is the third quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food puts a stop to suffering in all beings, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, put a stop in all beings to the suffering arising from every evil disposition. This is the fourth quality of food inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as food overcomes in all beings the weakness of hunger, so does Nirvâna, when it has been realised, overcome in all beings the weakness which arises from hunger and every sort of pain. This is the fifth quality of food inherent in Nirvâna.' 71. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those ten qualities of space which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As space, O king, neither is born nor grows old, neither dies nor passes away nor is reborn (has p. 193 a future life to spring up into), as it is incompressible, cannot be carried off by thieves, rests on nothing, is the sphere in which birds fly, is unobstructed, and is infinite; [321] so, O king, Nirvâna is not born, neither does it grow old, it dies not, it passes not away, it has no rebirth (no future life to spring up into), it is unconquerable, thieves carry it not off, it is not attached to anything 1, it is the sphere in which Arahats move, nothing can obstruct it, and it is infinite. These are the ten qualities of space inherent in Nirvâna.' 72. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the wish-conferring gem which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As the wishing-gem, O king, satisfies every desire, so also does Nirvâna. This is the first quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem causes delight, so also does Nirvâna. This is the second quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as the wishing-gem is full of lustre, so also is Nirvâna. This is the third quality of the wishing-gem inherent in Nirvâna.' 73. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of red sandal wood which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' p. 194 'As red sandal wood, O king, is hard to get, so is Nirvâna hard to attain to. This is the first quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is unequalled in the beauty of its perfume, so is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as red sandal wood is praised by all the good, so is Nirvâna praised by all the Noble Ones. This is the third quality of red sandal wood inherent in Nirvâna.' 74. [322] 'Venerable Nâgasena, those three qualities of the skimmings of ghee 1 which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As ghee is beautiful in colour, O king, so also is Nirvâna beautiful in righteousness. This is the first quality of the ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant perfume, so also has Nirvâna the pleasant perfume of righteousness. This is the second quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as ghee has a pleasant taste, so also has Nirvâna. This is the third quality of ghee inherent in Nirvâna.' 75. 'Venerable Nâgasena, those five qualities of a mountain peak which you said were inherent in Nirvâna,--which are they?' 'As a mountain peak is very lofty, so also is Nirvâna very exalted. This is the first quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is immoveable, so also is Nirvâna. This is the second quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, p. 195 as a mountain peak is inaccessible, so also is Nirvâna inaccessible to all evil dispositions. This is the third quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is a place where no plants can grow, so also is Nirvâna a condition in which no evil dispositions can grow. This is the fourth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna. And again, O king, as a mountain peak is free alike from desire to please and from resentment, so also is Nirvâna. This is the fifth quality of a mountain peak inherent in Nirvâna.' [323] 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the form of Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-FIRST. THE TIME OF NIRVANA.] 76. 'Venerable Nâgasena, your people say 1: "Nirvâna is not past, nor future, nor present, nor produced, nor not produced, nor producible 2." 'In that case, Nâgasena, does the man who, having ordered his life aright, realises Nirvâna, realise something already produced, or does he himself produce it first, and then realise it?' 'Neither the one, O king, nor the other. And nevertheless, O king, that principle of Nirvâna (nibbâna-dhâtu) which he, so ordering his life aright, realises--that exists.' p. 196 'Do not, venerable Nâgasena, clear up this puzzle by making it dark! Make it open and plain as you elucidate it. With a will, strenuous in endeavour, pour out upon it all that has been taught you. It is a point on which this people is bewildered, plunged into perplexity, lost in doubt. Dissipate this guilty uncertainty; it pierces like a dart 1!' 77. 'That principle of Nirvâna, O king, so peaceful, so blissful, so delicate, exists. And it is that which he who orders his life aright, grasping the idea of all things (of the Confections, Samkhâras) according to the teachings of the Conquerors, realises by his wisdom--even as a pupil, by his knowledge, makes himself, according to the instruction of his teacher, master of an art. 'And if you ask: "How is Nirvâna to be known 2?" it is by freedom from distress and danger, by confidence, by peace, by calm, by bliss, by happiness, by delicacy, by purity, by freshness 3. 78. 'Just, O king, as a man being burnt in a blazing fiery furnace heaped up with many faggots of dry sticks, when he has freed himself from it by p. 197 a violent effort, and escaped into a cool place, [324] would experience supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, in which the burning heat of the threefold fire (of lust, malice, and delusion) 1 has all gone out. As the furnace, O king, so should you regard this threefold fire, as the man fallen into the fire the man who is ordering his life aright, as the cool place Nirvâna. 79. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen into a pit full of the dead bodies of snakes and dogs and men, of ordure, and of refuse, when, finding himself in the midst of it entangled in the hair of the corpses, he had by a violent effort escaped into a place where no dead bodies were, would experience supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, from which the corpses of all evil dispositions have been removed 2. As a corpse, O king, so should you regard the four pleasures of sense, as the man fallen among corpses the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place free from corpses Nirvâna. 80. 'Or again, O king, as a man (fallen among enemies with drawn swords in their hands) 3, quaking with fear and terror, agitated and upset in mind, when with a violent effort he has freed himself from them, and escaped into a strong refuge, a firm place of security, experiences supreme bliss--just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, p. 198 in which fear and terror have been put away. As the terror, O king, so should you regard the anxiety which arises again and again on account of birth, old age, disease, and death, as the terrified man the man who is ordering his life aright, as the place of refuge Nirvâna. 81. 'Or again, O king, as a man fallen on a spot filthy with dirt, and slime, and mud, when with a violent effort he has got rid of the mud, and escaped to a clean and spotless place, would experience supreme bliss-just so whosoever orders his life aright, he by his careful thinking will realise the supreme bliss of Nirvâna, from which the stains and mud of evil dispositions have been removed. As the mud, O king, [325] so should you regard income, and honour, and praise 1, as the man fallen into the mud the man who is ordering his life aright, as the clean and spotless place Nirvâna. 82. 'And if again you should ask: "How does he who orders his life aright realise that Nirvâna?" (I should reply), He, O king, who orders his life aright grasps the truth as to the development of all things 2, and when he is doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or the middle, or the end, anything worthy of being laid hold of (as lasting satisfaction) 3. As a man, O king, if a mass of iron p. 199 had been heated the livelong day 1, and were all glowing, scorching, and red hot, would find no spot on it, whether at one end or in the middle or at the other end, fit to be taken hold of--just so, O king, he who orders his life aright grasps the truth of the development of things, and in doing so he perceives therein birth, he perceives old age, he perceives disease, he perceives death. But he perceives not therein either happiness or bliss, he perceives not therein, whether in the beginning, or in the middle, or in the end, anything fit to be taken hold of (as a lasting satisfaction). 83. 'And discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body 2, and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated lives 3. As if a man had fallen into a burning and blazing mighty fiery furnace, and saw no refuge from it, no way of escape, he would, hopeless, be weary of the fire--just so, O king, discontent arises in his mind when he thus finds nothing fit to be relied on as a lasting satisfaction, and a fever takes possession of his body, and without a refuge or protection, hopeless, he becomes weary of repeated births. 84. 'And in the mind of him who thus perceives p. 200 the insecurity of transitory life, (of starting afresh ha innumerable births) 1 the thought arises: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, of despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet-the cessation of all these conditions 2, the getting rid of all these defects 3 (of lusts, of evil, and of Karma), the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâna!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming, and then has he found peace, [326] then does he exult and rejoice 4 at the thought: "A refuge have I gained at last!" Just, O king, as a man who, venturing into a strange land, has lost his way, on becoming aware of a path, free from jungle, that will lead him home, bounds forward along it, contented in mind, exulting and rejoicing at the thought: "I have found the way at last!"--just so in him who thus perceives the insecurity of transitory births there arises the thought: "All on fire is this endless becoming, burning, and blazing! Full of pain is it, and despair! If only one could reach a state in which there were no becoming, there would there be calm, that would be sweet-the cessation of all these conditions, the getting rid of all these defects, the end of cravings, the absence of passion, peace, Nirvâna!" And therewith does his mind leap forward into that state in which there is no becoming, p. 201 and then has he found peace, then does he exult and rejoice at the thought: "A refuge have I found at last!" And he strives with might and main along that path, searches it out, accustoms himself thoroughly to it, to that end does he make firm his self-possession, to that end does he hold fast in effort, to that end does he remain stedfast in love (toward all beings in all the worlds), and still to that does he direct his mind again and again, until gone far beyond the transitory, he gains the Real, the highest fruit (of Arahatship) 1. And when he has gained that, O king, the man who has ordered his life aright has realised, (seen face to face,) Nirvâna 2!' 'Very good, Nâgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem as to the time of Nirvâna 3.] p. 202 [DILEMMA THE EIGHTY-SECOND. THE PLACE OF NIRVANA.] 85. 'Venerable Nâgasena, does there exist the spot--either in the direction of the East, or of the South, or of the West, or of the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon-where Nirvâna is stored up 1?' 'There is no spot, O king,--either in the East, or the South, or in the West, or the North, either above, or below, or on the horizon--where Nirvâna is.' 'But if so, Nâgasena, then neither can Nirvâna exist, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain. And I will give you an explanation of this. Just, Sir, as there are on the earth fields in which crops can be grown, flowers from which perfumes come, bushes on which flowers can grow, trees on which fruits can ripen, mines from which gems can be dug, so that whosoever desires any of these things can go there and get it--just so, Nâgasena, if [327] Nirvâna exists one must expect there to be some place, where it is produced 2. But since there is not, therefore I declare that there can be no Nirvâna, and those who realise it, their realisation is vain.' 86. 'There is no spot, O king, where Nirvâna is p. 203 situate, and yet Nirvâna is, and he who orders his life right will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna. Just as fire exists, and yet there is no place where fire (by itself) is stored up. But if a man rubs two sticks together the fire comes;--just so, O king, Nirvâna exists, though there is no spot where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna. 87. 'Or again, O king, just as there are the seven treasures of the king of kings--the treasure of the wheel, and the treasure of the elephant, and the treasure of the horse, and the treasure of the gem, and the treasure of the woman, and the treasure of the finance minister, and the treasure of the adviser. But there is no spot where these treasures are laid up. When a sovran conducts himself aright they appear to him of their own accord 1--just so, O king, Nirvâna, exists, though there is no place where it is stored up. And he who orders his life aright will, by careful attention, realise Nirvâna.' 88. 'Venerable Nâgasena, let it be granted that there is no place where Nirvâna, is stored up. But is there any place on which a man may stand and, ordering his life aright, realise Nirvâna?' 'Yes, O king, there is such a place.' 'Which then, Nâgasena, is that place 'Virtue, O king, is the place. For if grounded in virtue, and careful in attention--whether in the land of the Scythians 2 or the Greeks, whether in China or p. 204 [paragraph continues] Tartary 1, whether in Alexandria 2 or in Nikumba, whether in Benares or in Kosala, whether in Kashmir or in Gandhâra 3, whether on a mountain top 4 or in the highest heavens 5--wheresoever he may be, the man who orders his life aright will realise Nirvâna. [328] Just, O king, as the man who has eyes wherever he may be--in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, in China or in Tartary, in Alexandria, Nikumba, Benares, or Kosala, in Kashmir or in Gandhâra, on a mountain top or in the highest heavens--will be able to behold the expanse of heaven and to see the horizon facing him--just so, O king, will he who orders his conduct aright and is careful in attention--whether in the land of the Scythians or the Greeks, whether in China or Tartary, whether in Alexandria, or Benares, or Kosala, or Nikumba, whether in Kashmir or in Gandhâra, whether on a mountain top or in the highest heavens--wheresoever he may be, attain to the realisation of Nirvâna.' 'Very good, Nâgasena! You have preached to me of Nirvâna, and of the realisation thereof, you have set forth the advantages of virtue, you have explained the supreme attainment, you have raised aloft the standard of the Truth, you have established the eye of Truth, you have shown how right means adopted by those of high aims will be neither p. 205 barren nor unfruitful. That is so, and I accept it as you say 1.' ____________________________ [Here ends the problem of the place of Nirvâna.] ____________________________ [Here ends the Eighth Chapter 2.] Footnotes 114:1 We have seen above, IV, 1, 41 (1, 178), how Hînati-kumburê expanded the story of Vessantara, which had aroused also in our author a greater enthusiasm than any of the many other subjects that he treats. Here too the Simhalese translator fairly runs riot over the 'mighty giving of the glorious king,' and expands the ten pages of the Pâli into thirty-three pages of his version (pp. 389-421), whereas usually one page of the Simhalese covers very nearly a page of the Pâli. 114:2 Anumaggiyante. See Mr. Trenckner's note. But the p. 115 Simhalese (p. 390) has at mardanaya kota welannawun dka. 115:1 Rûlarûlassa bhîmabhîmassa. The Simhalese (p. 390) omits these words, giving other details in place of them, and as they occur only here I am not sure of their meaning. 116:1 Vikittentâ vikopentâ. Hînati-kumburê (p. 410) has 'angrily finding fault with.' Compare above, vikopanâ, at p. 266 (of the Pâli). 117:1 Pakkha-hato vâ pîtha-sappî vâ. See the note above on IV, 6, 22. 117:2 Devayâna, on which compare Sutta Nipâta, verse 139 (Vasala Sutta 24). 119:1 Atisañkârena, which the Simhalese merely repeats. The meaning is doubtful. The use of sañkâra at Gâtaka II, 112 has suggested the above rendering. 119:2 The whole of this answer turns on the ambiguity of the prefix ati, which may mean either 'very much' or 'too much.' 119:3 'Yâdisam kîdisam. The meaning of this idiom cannot be controlled by parallel passages, as I know of none. Hînati-kumburê (pp. 412-413) construes yâdisam as an accusative dependent on atidânadâyî; 'Those who give away anything as a gift, acquire fame in the world as exceeding givers of that.' 120:1 Dakkhineyya. We have no word in English to express the full meaning of this word. It was an idea that was common ground to our Buddhist apologist, and to the Brahman opponents whom he always has in view, that there were certain people to whom gifts ought to be given, and the being worthy was one of the conditions precedent to belonging to this class. Of course the p. 121 Brahmans held that to be a Brahman was another condition, but the Buddhist, who inherited the idea from them, had discarded this part of the conception. See, for the Brahman view, Eggeling's Satapatha-Brâhmana II, 114, 344. 121:1 Samagga-dânam. Childers under samaggâ gives only the meaning 'assembly,' but it is clear from Kullavagga V, 26; VI, 2, 7; the Sutta Vibhanga II, 267, and Sumangala I, 84, that the word, at least as a masculine (which it is here), has the technical sense of one of those orgies in high places which were common in so many parts of the world in very early times, and were due in India to Kolarian influences. The giving' (dâna) of such a samagga would doubtless mean the providing of the necessary food, seats, cushions, &c. 121:2 Kitta-kammam. See my note on Patibhâna-kittam at 'Vinaya Texts,' III, 172. 122:1 I.e. pieces of money, which it would be against the rules for a member of the Buddhist Order to accept. But the donees in all these cases are not necessarily Buddhists. 122:2 Paripâtesi, not in Childers; but see Gâtaka II, 208; and below, p. 367 (of the Pâli text). Hînati-kumburê has here nindâ karanne, and just below apasâdanaya karanne. 122:3 Âvapitum, not in Childers. Dr. Morris, in the 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society' for 1886, p. 157, compares the Sanskrit root vyap, but this does not help us much. Hînati-kumburê (p. 414) has 'an tneka paye hinduwannata,' which means, I think, 'to deposit as a pledge in some place or other.' At all events pa, the ordinary word now in use in Ceylon courts for 'bail,' may very well be actually derived from vâpa. And the passage at Gâtaka I, 321 is an exact parallel to our phrase here, for there the Bodisat, when an elephant, gives away his teeth and tusks as vâpana for the insight of the Omniscient Ones. 123:1 Niminitvâ, also not in Childers; but see Gâtaka III, 63, 221. 124:1 Agapatham sankupatham vettapatham gakkhati. Hînati-kumburê, at p. 416, repeats the words with a gloss on the two last words, which I have followed. 124:2 Mudda-kâmo; mudra-nam ganam perekkuwa, says Hînati-kumburê, p. 416. 124:3 Bâhirabbhantaram dhanam datvâ. I am not sure that I have rightly understood this phrase, which the Simhalese merely repeats. 125:1 Kariyâ Pitaka I, 9, 53. 125:2 Dessa, that is dreshya, from dvish. Compare diso, 'an enemy.' It occurs also at Kariyâ Pitaka I, 4, 7; 5, 3; 8, 16 (quoted Gâtaka IV, 406); II, 4, 11; III, 1, 6 (quoted Gâtaka I, 46); III, 2, 16; 3, 10; 6, 18. The effect of the use of this rare poetical word is lost in the English version. 125:3 Maddî and Kanhâginâ, the names of Vessantara's wife and daughter, mean respectively 'enthraller (of men's minds),' and 'the dark conquerors (of hearts).' As Vessantara is used in the Magghima (I, 386, line 5) as an adjective, not a name, and is applied to the Buddha, it too must have a special meaning. But it can scarcely be connected with Vaisya, while we have a very famous epithet in vaisvânara, so often applied to the sacred fire as 'common good to all men.' The insertion of the t would explain the shortening of the â, and though there seems to be no sufficient reason for any alteration at all of the older term, this is p. 126 probably the real derivation of Vessantara. And the whole legend may well be due to previous stories of the world-wide beneficence of Agni Vaisvânara, or of the sun as Vaisvânara. 126:1 Hadaya-vatthu, like a broth-pot foaming over,' is Hînati-kumburê's explanation of this phrase (pena ngena mas sliyak men hridaya wastuwa, p. 417). 127:1 Kandima-suriye. We should say 'the sun and the moon,' and I cannot think the difference of phraseology is entirely without significance. While the Brahmans put their own caste and order first, the Buddhist texts talk of 'Samanas and Brahmans,' 'Khattiyas and Brahmans.' This has, and no doubt rightly, been held significant of the opinion of the authors. Why should the fact of their always referring, in similar compounds, to the moon before the sun, and to women before men, be less so? Now it is almost always taken for granted that the Buddhists were reformers, as opposed to the Brahmans, who wanted to run still in the ancient grooves. But there is another side of the question that has been entirely overlooked. There is ample evidence in their literature that (at least in certain directions, more especially of religious thought) the Brahmans had been constantly progressive, and their Brâhmanas are really the result of reform following on reform. To use a parallel drawn from modern politics, Buddhists are to Brahmans much more like Socialists to Liberals than like Liberals to Conservatives. The Brahmans had worked out in their minds no new complete system, and when they reformed they left the roots of the old order of things in the ground. But in the momentous change from matriarchate to patriarchate they threw all their power and influence on the side of the newer conception. And when, like Kronos to Jupiter, the old gods gave place to the new, it was they who worked out the newer set of ideas--more especially heaven or sun-worship as against moon-worship and all that it involved. We must not forget that a change of dynasty, or of precedence, among the gods was of more importance to men in those times than a change of dynasty among earthly kings. And though the Buddhists it is true, as we ourselves now, cared for none of these things, and were busied with other discussions than the precedence of the sun and moon, they quite quietly and naturally, when they had to choose, adopted the form of words which did not imply an acceptance of the Brahman position, whose system in other matters they were trying, if not to storm, at least to turn. We are here in the midst of questions too vast to be discussed with profit in a note. But Buddhism certainly arose among those sections of the community least influenced by the reforms the Brahmans supported. And there is evidence, in the precedence the p. 127 Buddhists gave to women and to the moon, that the older ideas had not, even then, died out. 128:1 These words are repeated before each of the following similes. 128:2 Parinâha, which Childers is wrong in rendering 'breadth,' when not qualified by âyâma (wata ttâwû, says the Simhalese, p. 418). 128:3 Nisâna; karagal, says Hînati-kumburê. 128:4 Satthaka, see Kullavagga V, 11, 1. 128:5 The mythic fairy elephant of the Kakkavatti (not a snake king as Prof. E. Müller has it, 'Journal of the Pâli Text Society,' 1888, p. 16). See my note at 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 254. 128:6 Sattappatthito. The Simhalese merely repeats this ambiguous word (compare IV, 8, 57). 129:1 Suppena vâ sarâvena vâ. Hînati-kumburê renders the first of these words by kullaka, which is a winnowing-basket; and the second by malâwaka, which I do not understand. But the use of sarâva at Gâtaka I, 8, 14 and Sumangala I, 298 seems to me to confirm Childers's rendering. 129:2 Mahâbhûta: 'Yakshas' says Hînati-kumburê, p. 419. Compare above, p. 250 (of the Pâli). 130:1 Nâga-puppha-samaye. Hînati-kumburê says, 'at the time when the Nâ trees bloom.' The Nâ or Nâga is the Mesua ferea, whose lovely flowers, like those of the Champak, are still in special request for laying before the images of the Buddha in Buddhist temples. I am told that these so-called flowers are not flowers at all, botanically speaking, but young shoots. But it is one of the most beautiful sights in a Ceylon landscape to see this splendid forest tree, lofty and wide-spreading as it is, one mass of what look like red blossoms from crown to root. For at the 'bloom time' it casts all its green leaves, and has the appearance of a scarlet bell. No wonder that this was thought supernatural, and that the tree should be called the Nâga tree. Its timber is so valuable that in Anglo-Indian the tree is called the 'Iron-wood' tree. But it may be regretted that the commercial spirit of the European has substituted this hard name for the 'Fairy tree' of the native languages. 130:2 Ugu-vâta, which the Simhalese repeats. 130:3 Compare vol. i, pp. 38, 175. 131:1 Nikkha-sahassam. See my 'Ancient Coins and Measures,' pp. 6, 14; Samyutta Nikâya II, 3, 9, 3, 9 (Gâtaka I, 375, IV, 97; Anguttara III, 73, 3). 131:2 Anuyâyino. Not found elsewhere, and not in Childers. But anuyâyati occurs below (p. 391 of the text) and an ânuyâyin at Sutta Nipâta V, 7, 3, 4 and Tela-katâha-gâthâ 25 (compare 41). Hînati-kumburê (p. 470) has anuwa hsirew. 132:1 Kula-vemattatâ. Those Bodisats who are to become Buddhas in their then lives may be born either in a Brahman or in a Kshatriya family, but in no other. 132:2 Addhâna-vemattatâ, which is ambiguous, as 'period-difference' may mean different things according to the interpretation given to 'period.' Now the Bodisat theory has never been thoroughly worked out in detail. It is clear from the statements given in pp. 38-58 of my 'Buddhist Birth Stories' that the Bodisat who became Gotama the Buddha was held to have been in existence throughout the whole period in which the former twenty-four Buddhas appeared, and this is probably the 'period' intended. Hînati-kumburê's version (p. 421) is as ambiguous as the Pâli. Spence Hardy gives at p. 87 of his 'Manual of Buddhism' what purports to be a translation of our passage. But it is only a loose paraphrase, and he interprets this 'period-difference' as simply p. 133 identical with the next one in the list, the 'length-of-life-difference'--which must be wrong. It must be remembered that the Bodisats referred to throughout this dilemma are exclusively men--not those mentioned in the Gâtakas (who are all Bodisats of the historical Buddha), but only those Bodisats who became Buddhas in the same life--that is, the Buddhas themselves before they reached Buddhahood. 133:1 Âyu-vemattatâ. This may be due to either of two causes--in the first place they may be born as creatures whose allotted period of life varies. Thus the Bodisat was twenty times Sakka, the king of the gods; and his life would then have lasted hundreds of thousands of years. But he was 106 times an animal of some kind, and then his life would have been of course much shorter. Again, in his births as a man (more than 350 times, see the table in my 'Buddhist Birth Stories,' p. ci), the average duration of men's lives will have varied, according to Buddhist theory, from many centuries down to only a few years. It is in this second sense only that (with Hînati-kumburê) we must suppose the phrase âyu-vemattatâ to be used--thus excluding all the Bodisats except such as were men. But in the Gâtaka stories the average age of man is (with one or two exceptions) normal. 133:2 Pamâna-vemattatâ, which we must also understand to refer only to the varying average size of mankind, which, according to Buddhist theory, is very great at the commencement, and very small at the close, of a Kalpa. For it is only the men-Bodisats, and only in each series the last man-Bodisat (just before he became 'Buddha'), concerning whom this question of penance could arise. 133:3 Rûpe, which the Simhalese repeats (p. 422), and which cannot here mean bodily form only. 134:1 Katu-vesâragge. They are the confidence that no one--Samana or Brahman, God or Mâra--can reprove him by saying: (1) 'The qualities which you maintain to be those of a Buddha have not been attained by you;' or (2) 'The Great Evils which you maintain to have ceased in an Arahat have not ceased in you;' or (3) 'The qualities which you say are dangerous (in the higher life) are not really dangerous to one who practises them;' or (4) 'The aim which you held before others in preaching your Dhamma will not lead him who follows it to the destruction of sorrow.' The list will be found in the Anguttara Nikâya IV, 8 (where it is probably a quotation from one of the conversational Suttas). But the punctuation in Dr. Morris's edition should be corrected by putting full stops after each viharâmi. Childers gives a different explanation under vesâragga, but his interpretation must be altered to that here given, which is the only correct one. 134:2 These have not been found in any Pitaka text, but Burnouf gives them in a note to the 'Lotus de la Bonne Loi' (p. 781) from the Ginâlankâra. He says the expression dasabalo is found as applied to the Buddha 'à chaque instant dans les textes,' but this is not the case, so far at least as the older texts are concerned. In one of the old verses preserved at the Mahâvagga I, 22, 13, and quoted in the Gâtaka (vol. i, p. 84), dasabalo occurs as an epithet of the Buddha, but among the numerous epithets applied in the Buddhavamsa to the various Buddhas the term does not occur, nor have I been able to find it in the published portions of any of the great Nikâyas. (Ten Nâga-balas are ascribed to the Buddha in Buddhavamsa, p. 39, but these seem to be different.) Buddha-rakkhita, the author of the Ginâlankâra, probably lived at about the eleventh or twelfth century A.D., and Hardy's paraphrase of his interpretations (in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' pp. 380, 381) is throughout inaccurate. As therefore it is precisely the growth of ideas about the Buddha that is of prime importance in the history of Buddhism, I give here Buddha-rakkhita's explanation, adding the Sanskrit names as given in the Mahâvyutpatti, 8:-- 1. Thanâthana-ñâna-balam Sthânasthâna-gñâna-balam (1) 2. Sabbatha-gâminî-patipadâ Karma-vipâka (5) 3. Aneka-dhâtu-nânâ-dhâtu Nânâdhimukti (4) 4. Sattânam nânâdhimuttikatâ Nânâdhatu (3) p. 135 5. Vipâka-vemattatâ Indriya-parâpara (7) 6. Samkilesa-vodâna-vatthu Sarvatra-gâminî-pratipad (2) 7. Indriya-paropariya Samkilesa-vyavadâna-vyutthâna (6) 8. Pubbe-nivâsânussate Purva-nivasânusmriti (8) 9. Dibba-kakkhu Kyut-utpatti (9) 10. Asava-kkhaya Âsrava-kshaya (10) Some of these terms are found in the Dharma-sangraha, Anecdota Oxoniensia, vol. i, part 5, pp. 16, 51. 135:1 Kha-asâdhârana-ñâna, not yet found elsewhere. 135:2 Possibly the above ten with four others. 135:3 The details of these eighteen are given by Spence Hardy in the 'Manual of Buddhism,' p. 381, but he does not mention his authority. Hînati-kumburê (p. 422) merely repeats the Pâli. 135:4 'Of the four Truths' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 135:5 See Gâtaka I, 61. But the whole episode is told in the Pitakas, not of the Bodisat, but of Yasa (Mahâvagga I, 7). 137:1 Upâdânakkhayam patto. Childers says that the destruction of these upâdânas 'constitutes Arahatship.' I know of no authority for this, and it is incompatible with the Buddhist theory of Arahatship that any Arahat should go through such a period of penance as our author supposes the Bodisat to have done after he had reached this 'destruction of the upâdânas.' The perception of the first of the above facts, the impermanence of all things and beings (anikkam), constitute indeed the 'entrance upon the path' (see above, p. 25), and of course the upâdânas are destroyed in every Arahat, but that is very different from Childers's conclusion, which would make the terms convertible. 138:1 Pâtâla-mukham, which the Simhalese repeats. There is a similar sequence in the Samyutta I, 5, 4. 138:2 Aparimita-gala-dharo. Hînati-kumburê, p. 424, has dhârî, which may either be the same in meaning as dharo, or refer to the dhârâ, the streams of water. 138:3 Gopade; not in Childers, but compare Gopadaka, 'puddle,' in a similar connection at Sumangala Vilâsinî I, 147 (where one MS. reads Gopade). 140:1 Kamma is here explained by Hînati-kumburê by karmânta ('such as husbandry or merchandise'). 140:2 On this list of epithets compare above, p. 229 (of the Pâli). 140:3 Kamma-dhoreyyo. The latter word is not in Childers. Hînati-kumburê (p. 427) has karmayama usulannâ wû. It is the Sanskrit dhaureya, and the whole might be rendered 'like a beast of burden whose load is action.' 140:4 Appamâdo--that constant theme of praise and exhortation in the early Buddhist books. 141:1 These words, already quoted above, IV, 6, 20 (p. 244 of the Pâli), are put into the mouth of the Bodisat, after the conclusion of the 'penance,' in the Mahâ Sakkaka Sutta (M. I, 246), which is the chief Pitaka text on the penance (the Dukkha-kârikâ). The Simhalese version here (p. 427) has already been given in the note on the former passage. 141:2 The way to Buddhahood (not the way to Arahatship). This is Hînati-kumburê's explanation, which agrees with the context. 141:3 It will be noticed that (the destruction of the Âsavas being Arahatship, not Buddhahood) this is really no reply. 141:4 Makkho, 'depreciation of the good qualities of others,' says Hînati-kumburê, pp. 427, 564. But the use of the word at Gâtaka I, 385; Mahâvagga I, 15, 4; Kullavagga III, 34, 2; Magghima Nikâya I, 15, shows that concealing one's own faults is rather the meaning. 141:5 Pâlâso; not in Childers. But see Anguttara Nikâya II, 6, 12; Puggala Paññatti II, 2; Magghima Nikâya I, 15, &c. This and the last are usually mentioned together (see for instance below, VII, 2, 18), and the contrast is 'concealing the faults one has, and laying claim to virtues one has not.' 141:6 Mâyâ. It is noteworthy that this famous word, which plays so great a part in the later philosophies, and which is often supposed p. 142 to express a fundamental conception of the Buddhists, has not yet been traced, and will probably never be found, in the Pitakas, in any other than this subordinate and purely ethical sense. So when Mr. Gough in his 'Philosophy of the Upanishads' says, p. 186, that 'pessimism, metempsychosis, and mâyâ (the primitive world fiction) are retained in Buddhism' he is as wrong about mâyâ as he is about metempsychosis. He is evidently still under the delusion that Buddhism teaches the transmigration of souls, and that it has inherited from such schoolmen as Sankarâkârya the theory of the mâyâ. This is as funny as the astounding blindness which makes him say (pp. 267, 268) 'there is no quest of verity of an active law of righteousness (in Buddhism), but only a yearning after a lapse into the void'(!). The converse proposition would be nearer to the actual fact, and the Buddhist Aviggâ is quite different from the Mâyâ of the later Vedântists. How absolutely different is the world in which the thoughts of a Buddhist would move is shown by Hînati-kumburê's gloss: 'The mâyâ of concealing faults one has' (tamâge ti aguna samgawana mâyâ). 142:1 Thambho (not 'stupor,' as Childers has it). 'That obstinacy of mind (dridhawû sit ti bawa) which will not bend to the exhortation of the great,' says the Simhalese. 142:2 Sârambho; not merely 'clamour, angry talk,' as Childers has it. See the commentary on the word sârambhî at Gâtaka III, 259, with which Hînati-kumburê here agrees. 'Contrariness' would be perhaps a better rendering. 142:3 Thînamiddham; so Hînati-kumburê (but he takes them as two). 142:4 Tandî, as Hînati-kumburê reads (for Mr. Trenckner's nandî). 142:5 Khudâ pipâsâ, which must be taken separately to make up the twenty-five. The Simhalese takes them as two. 142:6 Arati, which the Simhalese (taking thîna and middha separately) omits. 143:1 Pariyâdiyimsu; literally 'were suffused as to the body of' (Hînati-kumburê has sarîrayehi vyâpta wû). The passive forms of this verb are always difficult to translate. See above, p. 254, and below, pp. 296, 297 (of the Pâli), and Kullavagga VI, 2, 6; VII, 2, 1. 143:2 This passage follows in the Mahâ Sakkaka Sutta immediately after the passage quoted above (Magghima Nikâya I, 246), and the p. 143 incident is also related at Gâtaka I, 57. But in both these books there is reference only to the first--not to the second, third, and fourth Ghânas. As this is therefore only another instance of the difference between the Pitakas and the more advanced views of our author, I have not translated the remaining Ghânas. As will be seen from the version of them in my 'Buddhist Suttas from the Pâli' (S. B. E., vol. xi, p. 272), the idea that a mere baby could have practised these higher meditations would only become possible after the Buddha theory had been much more developed than it is in the Pitakas. 144:1 Kusalam. So it has been already laid down at III, 7, 7 (pp. 83, 84 of the Pâli), that merit (puññam) is more than demerit. 145:1 This is a repetition of the list given above (I, 276-278), where the technical terms are explained. Compare Mr. William Andrews's book, 'Punishments in the Olden Time.' 145:2 Saparivâram dânam. Pirikara-sahita-wû mahâ dan dî, says the Simhalese, p. 430. 145:3 The words in brackets are supplied from Hînati-kumburê. 146:1 The king himself has already mentioned them, in reverse order, above, I, 172. 146:2 The legends will be found in full in the Gâtaka stories numbered respectively, in Professor Fausböll's edition, 258, 533, 494, and 243. 146:3 Patikkhâdaniyam. See the note on Mahâvagga VI, 23) where this curious story is given in full. 146:4 See Gâtaka III, 495, 496 for this story. Âbhidosikam is not in Childers, but see the Sutta Vibhanga, Pârâgika I, 5, 6. 147:1 'Received from the king the great honour (sammâna) called sabbatthaka,' says Hînati-kumburê, p. 431. But we find a particular office so called at Gâtaka II, 57. (It is true the reading there is sabbatthaka, but Mr. Trenckner's reading is doubtless preferable.) 147:2 All these cases have already been referred to above, I, 172. 147:3 'Nandagutta of the Brahman caste,' says the Simhalese, p. 431. 147:4 Descended from the Sâkya race,' adds Hînati-kumburê. 148:1 The Pâli being otherwise unintelligible, the above version has been expanded in accordance with the Simhalese interpretation. Kavandha as a living headless trunk occurs already in the Sutta Vibhanga, Pârâgika IV, 9, 3. 148:2 Aparante. This may mean merely the western country (as at Gâtaka I, 98), or may be a specific place name as Aparântika is in the 'Indian Antiquary,' VII, 263. 148:3 So the Simhalese, which seems to follow a slightly different reading. 149:1 Upakakkhake. The word is not in the: Pâli dictionaries, but I follow Hînati-kumburê, p. 432, who renders it Kisilla, and the context at the parallel passage, Gâtaka I, 63 (see also Gâtaka I, 158, and the Sutta Vibhanga II, 260). 150:1 Bhettabbo, 'have their arms or legs broken.' 150:2 In this sentence the translation follows Hînati-kumburê, who has apparently had a different, and fuller, reading before him. 151:1 Petâ; which are not ghosts, disembodied 'souls,' but new beings whose link of connection with the departed is, 'not soul,' but Karma. 151:2 Vissotam, from sru. The Simhalese, p. 434, has âsthâna gata wanneya (for asthâna). 153:1 Vâmagâhino vikakkhukâ. Neither of these words are in the dictionaries. Hînati-kumburê, p. 436, says, 'who spoil what they take hold of, and whose eyes have lost their cunning.' 153:2 Otâra, which the Simhalese renders awakâsaya; and in that sense the word is used at Magghima Nikâya I, 334. 154:1 Pariyâdiyati. See the note above at IV, 8, 23. 154:2 A similar metaphor is used below, IV, 8, 55 (p. 311 of the Pâli). 154:3 This long list is made up of the two given above at pp. 35, p. 155 259 of the Pâli (Paragraphs II, 1, 10 and IV, 6, 55 of the translation). 155:1 The Buddhist Sabbath. See 'Buddhism,' pp. 140, 141. 155:2 Âvaggeya, which the Simhalese, p. 437, merely repeats, is ambiguous (literally cause to bend towards'). Compare Gâtaka I, 74, 89, 108, 171 11, 243. In most places the meaning 'bend back or towards' comes to have the secondary sense of 'reflect.' But throughout this discussion there is an underlying reference to a very beautiful Buddhist conception that a man can transfer to others the merit of any good deed he has done. Thus at the end of a palm-leaf manuscript the copyist often adds the pious wish: 'May the merit of my having made this copy redound to the advantage of all men,' or words to that effect. And the preceding metaphor would seem to show that this must be the secondary sense here attached to I causing to bend towards;'--the more he p. 156 spends (as it were) his virtue, the more remains, just as however much the water flows away from the spring, still quite as much remains, and he can still share with others that which is left. The doctrine of imputed righteousness is not confined to Buddhists, but the Buddhist theory is really quite different from the corresponding Western ideas, even from the Catholic doctrine of the transference of the righteousness of saints. 156:1 So already above, III, 7, 7 (I, 128). 156:2 Patilîyati patikutati pativattati na sampasârîyati. None of these words are in the dictionaries. 156:3 Na parivaddhate; literally 'is not dilated.' 157:1 Nimittam, aramunuwa in the Simhalese, p. 438. 157:2 Vâtiko, which Childers renders wrongly rheumatic. Wâta prakriti wâ, says the Simhalese, p. 438. 157:3 The Simhalese gives the different kinds of dreams seen by each of these six--the first dreams of journeys through space, the second of fire and conflagrations, the third of water, the fourth p. 158 of good or bad things according as the god is kindly or malignant, the fifth of what he has himself seen or heard, and the last of his future gain or loss. 159:1 Okkante middhe; 'like a monkey's sleep,' says Hînati-kumburê. 159:2 On bhavanga compare Abhidhammattha Sangaha III, 8. 159:3 'Like a bird that has re-entered its nest' is Hînati-kumburê's gloss. 159:4 Appativigânantassa, 'does not know the distinctions between bliss and woe (sukha dukkha vibhâga),' says the Simhalese, p. 440. 160:1 Nirodha, which the Simhalese repeats. Probably the fourth Ghâna is here referred to. 161:1 Onâho pariyoniho, 'obstruction, covering.' See the Tevigga Sutta, 58. 161:2 Vokinnakamsaggati. 'Destroys sleep by scattered thoughts,' says the Simhalese, p. 441. 162:1 It is not known whether the whole of this theory of dreams is taken from the Pitakas, or whether it is an expansion of views there suggested. But the germs of the theory are certainly in the Pitakas. Thus the Buddha is made at Magghima Nikâya I, 249, 250 to say of himself that in his midday sleep be was neither stupefied nor the contrary (neither sammûlho nor asammûlho), which comes very near to the 'monkey's sleep' referred to throughout this dilemma. 162:2 Vilînani, wilikun wû says Hînati-kumburê (p. 442). 163:1 This simile has already been used above, IV, 3, 7 (I, 235). 163:2 Gati-patibâlhâ, gamana bâhulyatâwen says the Simhalese. 163:3 Upahat-abbhantaro, 'whose interior is burnt by the fierceness of the stomach fire' (gatharâgni-gahani), says Hînati-kumburê, p. 443. 164:1 Hînati-kumburê had apparently a different reading (perhaps ekamse na vadâmi). For he translates, p. 444, 'In this death I do not say that there is one cause.' 164:2 As was noticed above on p. 112 (of the Pâli), some of these medical terms are very uncertain, and the Simhalese gives no help. 164:3 Not traced in the Pitakas. 165:1 Sâmâyiko, 'timely,' but Childers says 'temporary,' and we have had the word above (p. 22 of the Pâli) in the sense of' religious.' The Simhalese, p. 445, repeats the word. 165:2 Yama-visaya, 'abode of the god of death.' 166:1 Sarnâhato. Compare above, pp. 181, 254 of the Pâli, and Magghima Nikâya I, 337. 171:1 Uparato, for which Hînati-kumburê, p. 449, has upahata wîyyi. 171:2 Otaka-vitaka-âkinna. Ghanayawû patalawû âkîrnnawû says the Simhalese. 173:1 Mañgarita-patte, which the Simhalese renders karal patra ttâwû. 173:2 Karaka-vassam is pâsâna-warsha in the Simhalese. If karaka originally meant 'hard shell,' it could have reached its ordinary meaning of 'water-pot,' from the fact that an empty half of a cocoa-nut shell is the most common form of cup. 174:1 Vibhûtam katam is rendered prasiddha karana laddeya in the Simhalese, p. 451. 174:2 Parinibbutânam. The words in brackets are Hînati-kumburê's gloss, 'Of all who have been entirely set free' is an alternative, and perhaps a better, rendering. 175:1 Mr. Trenckner prints evam-nâma as qualifying Ketiya. The Simhalese, p. 451, takes it as I have rendered. 176:1 These words are very ambiguous, and unfortunately the Simhalese (p. 452), though much expanded, is equally so. The kind of wonder referred to throughout the dilemma is also doubtful. The only one of the kind mentioned, so far as I know, in the Pitakas is that referred to in the 'Book of the Great Decease,' V, 26, where the placing of garlands on a Ketiya produces calm in the heart. But it is difficult to believe that our author had merely a spiritual experience of this kind in his thoughts. The whole discussion points rather to the late date at which he wrote. 177:1 Theyya-samvâsaka. See Mahâvagga I, 69, 4. 177:2 Titthiya-pakkantaka, 'gone over to the Titthiyas.' 177:3 Garukâpatti, which Hînati-kumburê takes to be equivalent to the Samghâdisesa offences. This is doubtless correct, and the use of the phrase in that sense is a sign of our author's later date. 177:4 Viruddhâ, 'placed in a class' (woedrum wû), says the Simhalese, p. 453. It is literally 'opposed,' and the idiom is curious. 178:1 The words in brackets are added from the Simhalese. 178:2 Similar metaphors have already been used in the 71st Dilemma (p. 283 of the Pâli) and in the 74th Dilemma (p. 295 of the Pâli). 179:1 In the text the whole comparison is repeated. 179:2 For a similar metaphor see above, IV, 8, 31 (p. 296 of the Pâli). 180:1 It is unknown what this kimi (insect, vermin, small creature) is, and it is not mentioned elsewhere. Susruta mentions a sârikâmukha insect, and as in one rare word at least, which the Pâli translator did not sufficiently understand to restore to the ordinary Pâli form (kalasi for karisi, see above, I, xxiii), we find la stood in our author's dialect for ri, there may be some connection between the two. It would be particularly interesting to be able to determine the species and habitat of this creature, as it might throw some light on the district in which our author flourished. 180:2 These measurements differ slightly from those given above, IV, 8, 14 (p. 282 of the Pâli), for a fine elephant. 180:3 Compare the tale of the frog who wanted to swallow the bull in Æsop's fables (not yet traced in the Gâtakas). Is the Sâlaka a kind of frog, much smaller than ours? 180:4 So Hînati-kumburê, p. 455. 181:1 The following pages will seem only so much verbiage, and will convey no idea to a European reader, unless he realises that the Nirvâna discussed is of course not a salvation to be enjoyed by a 'soul' after death, and in some other world; but a state of mind to be realised and enjoyed by a man here, on this earth, in this life, and in this life only. Though I had pointed this out already in 1876 the animistic interpretation of Nirvâna is still the prevalent one, and still continues to lead to endless confusion. Why is it then, the reader may ask, that our author does not contradict the Christian interpretation of the Buddhist summum bonum in so many words? Simply because it never occurred to him as possible. It was probably even as inconceivable to him as the Buddhist interpretation of it seems to be to most Western writers. 181:2 This dilemma and the next have been translated into French in the 'Revue de l'histoire des Religions' for 1885 (vol. xi, pp. 336 and following). The author's name being given as Mr. Lewis da Sylva, of Colombo, the article as it stands is presumably a translation into French, made in Paris, of Mr. da Sylva's version in English from the Simhalese, which may account for the fact that there is scarcely a sentence which is not misleading. 183:1 In the Mâgandiya Sutta, No. 75 in the Magghima Nikâya, where the speech will be found at I, 502. 183:2 Bhûtahakke. See Mr. Trenckner's valuable note. Hînati-kumburê, p. 456, quotes the Pâli, reading Bhûtahu, and rendering it 'anabhiwriddhi-karanayek. 186:1 So the Pâli (vayam). But the Simhalese has wâsaya, 'dwelling-place,' throughout 56 and 57. 186:2 Atthi-dhammassa nibbânassa. The Simhalese, p. 459, translates 'the form, &c., of the quality (dharma) of Nirvâna'--as if the Pâli were nibbâna-dhammassa. But see next page, note 2. 187:1 Lokakkhâyikâ, 'those who have in former days enquired into and described the world,' says the Simhalese. 187:2 Atthidhammassa again, which Hînati-kumburê now renders ti swabhawawû. 'Pourquoi réponds-tu ainsi au sujet de l'état naturel du grand océan,' says the French. (Compare above, p. 270 of the Pâli.) 187:3 Arûpakâyikâ. It is very odd that Hînati-kumburê takes the word here, and in the answer, as a feminine singular, and still p. 188 more so that the French translation takes it throughout as a masculine singular. But the Simhalese throughout the sequel treats it properly as a plural nominative; and there can be little doubt that the inhabitants, or some of the inhabitants, of the 'Formless Realm,' the Arâpâvakara or Arûpa-brahma-loka, are referred to. But this name is different from those given to any of these gods in Childers, and I cannot trace it in the Pitakas as applied to any of them. 188:1 I follow the Pâli, which still has vayam. The Simhalese has here and below winâsaya. 188:2 Atthisattanam yeva, which the Simhalese, p. 460, represents merely by ttâwû. 189:1 Aññehi anupavittham; 'not previously explained by others,' says Hînati-kumburê. Neither rendering is altogether satisfactory. Perhaps 'of which you have been convinced by others,' in agreement with the use of the word above, p. 270 of the Pâli. 189:2 In the French of Mr. da Sylva this sentence runs (p. 342): 'Mais vénérable, n'y a-t-il pas une vertu du Nirvâna dont on puisse percevoir quelque ressemblance.' 189:3 That is, no drop of water adheres to the lotus, though it is surrounded by water and water may fall on it. For instances of the frequent similes drawn from this fact see below, V, 14; and Dhammapada 401; Sutta Nipâta II, 14, 17; III, 9, 3 2; IV, 6, 9. The French translation is: 'de même que le lotus élève fièrement sa tête au-dessus de l'eau' (!). 190:1 On these fundamental conceptions see my notes in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 148, 149, where it is shown that the' three cravings' which end in Nirvâna are pretty much the same as the lust of the flesh, theism, and materialism. 190:2 Amata, the translation of which word by 'immortality' has given rise to so much confusion. So the French here says 'la médecine a le pouvoir de combattre la mort,' which is nearly as bad. See the Appendix. 191:1 See on this belief above, IV, 3, 39 (I, 269). 191:2 The word used here for free, empty (suñña), has again given rise to the most odd misconceptions. As Nirvâna is hence called Sunyatâ, 'emptiness,' Christian writers (taking Nirvâna as a name for some kind of future life) have very naturally thought, in trying to fasten some meaning upon emptiness in a future life, that it must mean 'annihilation of a soul,' and have labelled Buddhism as Nihilism! The real meaning is really very simple, and entirely ethical (not metaphysical or animistic): 'Men may rise on stepping stones Of their dead selves to higher things.' See below, IV, 8, 78, for a metaphor founded on a similar idea. 191:3 Samkusumito, only found here. Compare 'garlands, vitvam,' 175, 176. 193:1 Anissitam, so below, p. 351 of the Pâli, the dhutangam is said to be anissitam. The translation is difficult. In our passage here Hînati-kumburê (p. 464) renders it, as applied both to space and to Nirvâna, by 'having no âsrawa.' Below, as applied to the vows (dhutangas), he renders it (p. 512) by 'unconnected with craving' (trishnânisrita). 'Self-dependent' or 'untarnished (by reliance on external things') would suit the context in all three passages. 194:1 This is butter made of buffaloes' milk, and is highly esteemed in India. 195:1 Not yet traced in the Pitakas. 195:2 'By the action of Karma as a pre-existing cause' is to be understood. 196:1 Bhind' etam anto-dosa-sallam; break and take away the dart of the guilt (dosa) of that doubt which has arisen in my inmost being (satana),' says Hînati-kumburê. It is literally 'break this dart of guilt within.' The meaning is clear enough (except as to whether the guilt is the speaker's or 'this people's'). To break a dart in a wound would be no kindness, and that cannot have been the author's idea. To bring out the meaning one must amplify a little, and I should have followed the Simhalese had it not seemed preferable to leave the personality of the guilty one as ambiguous in the translation as in the text. 196:2 Hînati-kumburê, p. 467, does actually put these words into Nâgasena's mouth. 196:3 Sîtalato, literally 'by cold.' See the note above on III, 6, 6 (I, 119). 197:1 Râga, dosa, moha. 197:2 Compare above, IV, 8, 69, and the note there. 197:3 The words in brackets are added from the Simhalese, p. 467. 198:1 So also at Gâtaka IV, 222 (verse 48). 198:2 Samkhârânam parattam sammasati. Compare Dhammapada, verse 374. 198:3 Gayhûpagam; so the Simhalese. 199:1 Divasa-santatta. So Hînati-kumburê, and compare Magghima Nikâya I, 4 5 3, and Gâtaka IV, 118 (where the reading is diva-santatta). See also above, p. 46 of the Pâli. 199:2 For dâho okkamati, Hînati-kumburê may have had a different reading. He renders dahadiya selawenneya, 'sweat shapes' (sic for forms'). 199:3 Bhavesu; literally 'of becomings' ('in any of the three worlds,' adds the Simhalese). 200:1 Pavatte. I have included Hînati-kumburê's explanation of this word, for which there is no equivalent in English. 200:2 Samkhâra, samkhâra-dharmayangê says the Simhalese. 200:3 Upadhi; the Simhalese (p. 470) has simply klesayan. 200:4 Pahamsîyati kuhûyati, both words only found here. 201:1 Appavattam okkamati, Aprawrittiya yayi kiyana lada Arhat-phalayata pminenneya, says Hînati-kumburê. 201:2 This paragraph is an excellent example of the difficulty of doing anything like justice in translations to the most instructive and valuable passages in our Buddhist texts. It is in the Pâli full of eloquence, and even in the Simhalese, though there too much expanded, it is powerful and striking. To a Buddhist it must have been inspiring and touching to the last degree, carefully led up to, as it is, with masterly skill, by our author. But it is so full of terms untranslateable into English, and with difficulty even comprehensible to minds saturated with Western ideas, that every translation must be inadequate, and any attempt to reproduce the real beauty of its style must be a failure. 201:3 How almost impossible it is for a reader with pre-conceived delusions to grasp the plain sense of such passages may be seen from the strange note which the French translator has added at the end of this clear and eloquent description. He says, 'La conclusion de ce Jâtaka (sic!) paraît être que le dévot bouddhiste peut p. 202 atteindre Nirvâna dans cette vie même. Il est fâcheux que l'auteur ne se soit pas expliqué plus catégoriquement sur cette question intéressante' (!). 202:1 Sannihitam perhaps 'is situate.' Hînati-kumburê has pihitiye, 'can be got.' 202:2 Ikkhitabbo. See above, p. 269 of the Pâli. 203:1 This is stated in regard to each of the seven in the standard passage on these seven treasures, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 251-259. 203:2 Sakâ. Hînati-kumburê has sadly blundered over this, to him, strange word. He actually translates it 'one's own.' 204:1 Vilâta, the Simhalese has Milâta. 204:2 That is Alexandria on the Indus. See the Introduction to the first part, p. xxiii. 204:3 All these names are discussed, ibid. pp. xliii, xliv. 204:4 Naga-muddham. Hînati-kumburê understands this as the top of Mount Meru, Sakka's heaven. 204:5 Brahma-loke. 205:1 In the Simhalese, pp. 472, 473, this last paragraph is much expanded. 205:2 The Simhalese has Sakala-gana-mano-nandanîyawû me Srî-saddharmâdâsayehi ataweni wargaya nimiyeya. Next: Book V: The Problem of Inference Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... 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THE PROBLEM OF INFERENCE. [329] 1. Now Milinda the king went up to the place where Nâgasena was, and bowed down before him, and took his seat on one side. And when so seated he, longing to know, to hear, and to remember, and longing to make the light of knowledge arise and to break in pieces his ignorance, roused up in himself courage and zeal, and, full of self-possession and thoughtfulness, spake thus to Nâgasena: 2. 'Venerable Nâgasena, tell me, have you ever seen the Buddha 1?' 'No, O king.' 'Then have your teachers ever seen the Buddha?' 'No, Sire.' 'So you say, venerable Nâgasena, that you have never seen the Buddha, and that your teachers have never seen the Buddha. Therefore, Nâgasena, the Buddha did not exist. There is no clear evidence, in that case, of a Buddha.' 'But did those Kshatriyas of old exist, who were the founders of the line of kings from which you come?' 'Certainly, Sir. How can there be any doubt about that?' 'Well, O king. Have you ever seen them?' 'No, Sir.' p. 207 'And those who instructed you--the family chaplains, and officers of the staff, and those who lay down the law, and ministers of state--have they ever seen those Kshatriyas of old?' 'No, Sir.' 'If then neither have you seen them, nor your teachers, where are they? There is no clear evidence, in that case, of those Kshatriyas of old!' 3. 'But, Nâgasena, the royal insignia they used are still to be seen--[330] the white sunshade of state, and the crown, and the slippers, and the fan with the yak's tail, and the sword of state, and the priceless throne--and by these can we know and believe that the Kshatriyas of old lived once.' 'Just so, O king, can we know that Blessed One and believe in him. For there is a reason for our knowledge and belief that the Blessed One was. And what is that reason?--The royal insignia used by that Blessed One, by him of knowledge and insight, the Arahat, the Buddha Supreme, are still to be seen-the four Means of keeping oneself ready and mindful, and the fourfold Great Struggle, and the four steps to Iddhi, and the five Organs of the moral sense, and the five moral Powers, and the seven forms of the wisdom of the Arahats, and the Noble Eightfold Path 1--and by these can the whole p. 208 world of gods and men know and believe that that Blessed One existed once. By this reason, on this ground, by this argument, through this inference, can it be known that the Blessed One lived. He who, himself set free in that bless'd state In which the Upadhis have ceased to be, --Lusts, sin, and Karma,--has brought safe ashore, Saved from the sea of woe, great multitudes-- Only by inference can it be known That he, the best of men, existed once 1."' 4. 'Venerable Nâgasena, give me an illustration.' 'Just, O king, as the architect of a City 2, when he wants to build one, would first search out a pleasant spot of ground, with which no fault can be found, even, with no hills or gullies in it, free from rough ground and rocks, not open to the danger of attack. And then, when he has made plain any rough places there may still be on it, he would clear it thoroughly of all stumps and stakes, and would proceed to build there a city fine and regular, measured out into suitable quarters 3, with trenches and ramparts thrown up around it 4, with strong gateways, watch-towers, and battlements, with wide squares and open places and junctions (where two roads meet) and cross-ways (where four p. 209 roads meet) 1, with cleanly and even high roads 2, with regular lines of open shops (bazaars), well provided with parks, and gardens, and lakes, and lotus-ponds, and wells, adorned with many kinds of temples to the gods, free from every fault. And then when the city stood there in all its glory, he would go away to some other land. And in course of time that city might become mighty and prosperous, filled with stores of food, [331] peaceful, glorious, happy, free from distress and calamity, the meeting-place of all sorts and conditions of men. Then nobles and brahmans, merchants and work-people; soldiers mounted on elephants, and on horses, and on chariots; infantry, and bowmen, and swordsmen; standard-bearers, officers, and camp-followers 3; highborn warriors whose delight is in war, fighting champions, men mighty as elephants, heroes, men who fight in buckskin 4, devoted fighting-men born of slaves in great houses or of the privates in the royal army 5; troops of professional wrestlers 6; p. 210 cooks and curry makers, barbers and bathing attendants, smiths and florists, workers in gold and silver and lead and tin and copper and brass 1 and iron, and jewellers; messengers; potters, salt gatherers 2, tanners, carriage builders, carvers in ivory 3, rope makers, comb makers, cotton-thread spinners, basket makers, bow manufacturers, bowstring makers, arrow fletchers, painters, dye manufacturers, dyers, weavers, tailors, assayers of gold 4, cloth merchants 5, dealers in perfumes, grass cutters ` hewers of wood, hired servants 6, people who live by gathering flowers and fruits and roots in the woods, hawkers of boiled rice, sellers of cakes, fishmongers, butchers, dealers in strong drinks, play actors, dancers, acrobats 7, conjurors, professional bards 8, wrestlers p. 211 [paragraph continues] (boxers), corpse burners, casters out of rotten flowers 1, savages 2, wild men of the woods 3, prostitutes, swingers and jumpers 4, and the slave girls of bullies--people of many countries, people from Scythia, Bactria, China, and Vilâta; people of Uggeni, of Bhârukakkha, of Benares, of Kosala, and of the border lands; people from Magadha, and Sâketa, and Surattha, and the West; from Kotumbara and Madhura, from Alexandria, Kashmîr, and Gandhâra 5,--all these coming to take up their residence there, and finding the new city to be regular, faultless, perfect, and pleasant, would know: "Able indeed must that architect have been by whom this city was built!" 5. 'Just so, O king that Blessed One, peerless, unequalled, unapproached, incomparable, admirable beyond all measure by weight or calculation, of infinite virtue, full of virtue and perfection, boundless in wisdom and glory and zeal and power, who, when he had attained to the summit of all the perfections p. 212 of the Buddhas, [332] overthrew Mâra and all his hosts,--he, bursting asunder the net of heresy, and casting aside ignorance, and causing wisdom to arise, and bearing aloft the torch of Truth, reached forward to Buddhahood itself, and so, unconquered and unconquerable in the fight, built this city of Righteousness. And the Blessed One's City of Righteousness, O king, has righteousness for its rampart, and fear of sin for its moat, and knowledge for the battlement over its city gate, and zeal for the watch-tower above that, and faith for the pillars at its base, and mindfulness for the watchman at the gate, and wisdom for the terrace above, and the Suttantas for its market-place, and the Abhidhamma for its cross-ways, and the Vinaya (the Canon Law) for its judgment hall, and constant self-possession for its chief street. And in that street, O king, these bazaars are open--a flower bazaar, and a fruit bazaar, and an antidote bazaar, and a medicine bazaar, and an ambrosia bazaar, and a bazaar for precious stones, and a bazaar for all manner of merchandise.' 6. 'But what, venerable Nâgasena, is the flower bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'There are certain subjects for meditation, O king, that have been made known by the Blessed One, by him of knowledge and insight, by the Arahat, the Buddha Supreme. And they are these. The idea of the impermanence (of every thing and of every being), the idea of the absence of any abiding principle (any soul in any thing or any being), the idea of the impurity and the idea of the danger connected with the body, the idea of getting rid of evil dispositions, the idea of freedom from passion, the idea of peace, the idea of dissatisfaction with the p. 213 things of the world, the idea of the transitory nature of all conditions, the idea of ecstatic trance, the ideas of a corpse in the various stages of decay, the ideas of a place of execution in all its various horrors, the idea of love to all beings, the idea of pity for all beings, the idea of sympathy with all beings, the idea of equanimity in all the changing circumstances of life, the idea of death, and the idea of the body 1. These, O king, are the subjects for meditation prescribed by the Blessed One. And of these, whoever, longing to be delivered from old age and death, takes any one as the subject of his meditation, by that meditation does he become set free from passion, set free from malice, set free from dullness, set free from pride, set free from wrong views, by that does he cross the ocean of Samsâra, and stem the torrent of cravings, and cleanse himself of the threefold stain 2, and destroy within himself all evil; and so, entering that glorious city, spotless and stainless, pure and white, [333] ageless and deathless, where all is security and calm and bliss--the city of Nirvâna--he emancipates his mind in Arahatship! And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of flowers." "Take with you Karma as the price, And go ye up to that bazaar, Buy there an object for your thought, Emancipate yourselves. Be free 3!"' p. 214 7. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the perfume bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'There are certain categories of virtue, O king, that have been made known by the Blessed One, and anointed by the perfume of that righteousness the children of the Blessed One fill with the fumes of the fragrant incense of the perfume of goodness the whole world of gods and men, in every direction, and to windward and to leeward, continuing to pervade it again and yet again. And which are those categories? The virtue of taking refuge 1, p. 215 the virtue that is fivefold and eightfold and tenfold 1, and the virtue of self-restraint tabulated in the five recitations that compose the Pâtimokkha 2. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of perfumes." For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods: "No flower's scent can go against the wind, Not sandal wood's, nor musk's, nor jasmine flower's: But the sweet perfume of the good doth go Against the wind, and the good man pervades, On every side, the sweetness of his life 3." "Red sandal wood, musk, and the lotus, and jasmine-- The perfume of goodness surpasseth them all. Abundant the sweet scent of musk and of sandal wood-- Still stronger, the scent of the good mounts to heaven 4!"' 8. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the fruit bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'Certain fruits have been made known, O king, by the Blessed One. And they are these:--The fruit of the first stage of the Excellent Way (conversion), p. 216 and of the second stage, and of the third stage, and of the fourth (Arahatship) 1,--the fruit of the attainment of emptiness 2--the fruit of the attainment of the absence of the three signs (of an unconverted life, lust, malice, and dullness)--and the truth of the attainment of that state in which no low aspirations survive. [334] And whosoever desires any one of these, he gives his Karma as the price, and buys the fruit he longs for--either conversion or any other. 9. 'Just, O king, as any man who has a mango-tree bearing fruit all the year round, he does not knock down the fruits until buyers come. But when a buyer has come, and the fruit-grower has taken the price, then he says: "Come, my good man, this tree is always in bearing (it has therefore fruits in all stages of growth), take from it the kind of fruit you prefer, whether unripe, or decayed 3, or hairy 4, or sour, or ripe 5." And the buyer, for the price paid, takes the kind he likes the best-if that be unripe fruit then he takes that, if it be decayed fruit then that, if it be hairy fruit then that, if it be sour fruit then that, if it be ripe fruit then he takes a ripe one. Just so, O king, whosoever desires any one of those other fruits, he gives his Karma as the price, and buys the fruit he longs for- p. 217 either conversion or any other. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of fruits." "Men give their Karma as the price, And buy the fruit ambrosia; And happiness is theirs, and peace, Who've bought the fruit ambrosia 1." 10. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the antidote bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'Certain drugs, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One; drugs by which the Blessed One delivers the whole world of gods and men from the poison of evil dispositions. And what are these drugs? The four Noble Truths made known by the Blessed One, that is to say, the truth as to sorrow, and the truth as to the origin of sorrow, and the truth as to the cessation of sorrow, and the truth as to that path which leads to the cessation of sorrow 2. And whosoever, longing for the highest insight (the insight of Arahatship) 3, hear this doctrine of the four truths, they are set quite free from rebirth, [335] they are set quite free from old age, they are set quite free from death, they are set quite free from grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of antidotes." p. 218 "Of all the drugs, in all the world, The antidotes of poison dire, Not one equals that Doctrine sweet. Drink that, O brethren. Drink and live 1!"' 11. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the medicine bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'Certain medicines, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One, medicines by which he cures the whole world of gods and men. And they are these:--"The four Means of keeping oneself ready and mindful, and the fourfold Great Struggle, and the four Steps to Iddhi, and the five Organs of the moral sense, and the five moral Powers, and the seven Forms of the Wisdom of the Arahats, and the Noble Eightfold Path 2." By these medicines the Blessed One purges men of wrong views, purges them of low aspirations, purges them of evil speaking, purges them of evil deeds, purges them of evil modes of livelihood, purges them of wrong endeavours, purges them of evil thoughts, purges them of erroneous meditation; and he gives emetics to the vomiting up of lusts, and of malice, and of dullness, and of doubt, and of self-righteousness, and of sloth of body and inertness of mind, and of shamelessness and hardness of heart, and of all evil. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of medicine." Of all the medicines found in all the world, Many in number, various in their powers, Not one equals this medicine of the Truth. Drink that, O brethren. Drink, and drinking, live! p. 219 For having drunk that medicine of the Truth, Ye shall have past beyond old age and death, And--evil, lusts, and Karma rooted out-- Thoughtful and seeing, ye shall be at rest 1!"' 12. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the ambrosia bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'An ambrosia, O king, has been made known by the Blessed One, that ambrosia with which he besprinkles the whole world of gods and men--as men anoint a king on his coronation day--[336] and men and gods, when sprinkled with that ambrosia, are set free from rebirths, old age, disease, and death, from grief, and lamentation, and pain, and sorrow, and despair. And what is that ambrosia? That meditation which consists in active attention to, and leads to a true grasp of, the real conditions of corporeal things 2. For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One, the god over all gods: "They, O brethren, feed on ambrosia who feed on active attention directed to corporeal things 3." This, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's ambrosia bazaar." p. 220 "He saw mankind afflicted with disease, He opened freely his ambrosia shop; Go, then, O brethren, give your Karma for it, And buy, and feed on, that ambrosial food 1."' 13. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the jewel bazaar of the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'Certain jewels, O king, have been made known by the Blessed One, and adorned with those jewels the children of the Blessed One shine forth in splendour, illuminating the whole world of gods and men, brightening it in its heights, in its depths, from horizon to horizon, with a brilliant glory. And those jewels are these--the jewel of right conduct, and the jewel of meditation, and the jewel of knowledge, and the jewel of emancipation, and the jewel of the insight which arises from the assurance of emancipation, and the jewel of discrimination, and the jewel of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats 2. 14. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of right conduct 3? The right conduct which follows on self-restraint according to the rules of the Pâtimokkha, the right conduct which follows on p. 221 restraint of the bodily organs and the mind 1, the right conduct which results from a pure means of livelihood, the right conduct in relation to the four requisites of a recluse 2, the right conduct presented in the Short, and Middle, and Long Summonses 3, the right conduct of those who are walking in the Path, and the right conduct of those who have attained each of the various fruits thereof (beginning at conversion and ending at Arahatship) 4. And all the beings in the world, O king, gods 5 and men, and the Mâras too (the spirits of evil), and the Brahmas (the very highest of the gods), and Samanas and Brahmans are filled with longing and desire for a man who wears, as his ornament, this jewel of right conduct. And the Bhikkhu, O king, who puts it on shines forth in glory all around, upwards and downwards, and from side to side, surpassing in lustre all the jewels to be found from the Waveless Deep 6, below to the highest heavens above, excelling them all, overwhelming them all. Such, O king, are the jewels of right conduct set out for sale in the Blessed One's bazaar of gems. And this is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of righteousness." p. 222 "Such are the virtues sold in that bazaar, The shop of the Enlightened One, the Blest; Pay Karma as the price, O ye ill-clad! Buy, and put on, these lustrous Buddha-gems!" [337] 15. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of meditation? The meditation that consists of specific conceptions, and of investigation regarding them 1;--the meditation that consists of reflection only, specific conceptions being lost sight of 2;--the meditation that continues after specific conceptions and reflection on them have both ceased 3;--the meditation that is void (of lusts, evil dispositions, and Karma);--the meditation from which three signs (of an unconverted life-lust, malice, and dullness) are absent;--the meditation in which no low aspirations remain 4. And when a Bhikkhu, O king, has put on this jewel of meditation (Samâdhi), then ideas of lust, and ideas of anger, and ideas of cruelty, and all the various bad thoughts that have their basis in the evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, adhesion to wrong views, and doubt--all these, since they come into contact with meditation, flow off from him, disperse, and are dispelled, they stay not with him, adhere not to him. just, O king, as when water has fallen on a lotus leaf it flows off from it, is dispersed and scattered p. 223 away, stays not on it, adheres not to it 1--so when a Bhikkhu has put on this jewel of meditation, then ideas of lust, and ideas of anger, and ideas of cruelty, and all the various bad thoughts that have their basis in the evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, obstinacy in wrong views, and doubt--these all, as soon as they come in contact with meditation, flow off, disperse, and are dispelled, stay not with him, adhere not to him. And why not? Because of the exceeding purity of the habit of meditation. This, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of meditation," and such are the jewels of meditation set out for sale in the Blessed One's bazaar of gems. "Bad thoughts can ne'er arise beneath the brow Encircled by this coronet of gems. It charms away perplexed and wandering thought. Make it your own, buy it, put on the crown!" 16. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of knowledge? That knowledge by which the disciple of the noble ones knows thoroughly what is virtue, and what is not; what is blameworthy, and what is not; what should be made a habit of, and what should not; what is mean, and what is exalted; [338] what is dark, and what is light, and what is both dark and light;--the knowledge by which he truly knows what sorrow is, and what the origin of sorrow is, and what the cessation of sorrow is, and what is the path that leads thereto. This, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of knowledge." p. 224 "He who has knowledge as his jewelled wreath, Will not continue long in outward form 1. Soon will he reach Nirvâna, in rebirth In any world 2 no longer take delight! 17. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of emancipation? Arahatship is called the jewel of emancipation, and the Bhikkhu who has reached Arahatship is said to have decked himself with the jewel of emancipation. And just as a man, O king, who is decorated with ornaments made of strings of pearls, of diamonds and gold and corals; whose limbs are anointed with akalu 3, and with frankincense 4, and with Talis 5, and with red sandal wood; who is adorned with a garland of Ironwood blossoms, and Rottleria flowers, and flowers from the Sal tree, and the Salala 6, and the champak, and yellow jasmines 7, and Atimuttaka flowers 8, and p. 225 trumpet flowers, and lotuses, and white and Arabian jasmines 1--just as, with all this finery of garlands and perfumes and jewelry, he would outshine all other men, overwhelming them with brilliant glory and splendour--just so, O king, does he who has attained to Arahatship, he in whom the Great Evils (lusts, and becoming, delusion, and ignorance) are rooted out, he who has put on the diadem of emancipation of heart, just so does he outshine all other Bhikkhus from the lowest in attainment up to those even who are themselves emancipated 2, overwhelming them in brilliant glory and splendour. And why is that so? Because, O king, there is one diadem that is the chief of all, and that is this diadem of emancipation of heart! And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of emancipation." "All the people that dwell in a house look up To their Lord when he wears his crown of gems-- The wide world of the gods and of men looks up To the wearer of Freedom's diadem!" 18. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of the insight that follows on the assurance of emancipation? The knowledge arising out of looking back over the course 3--that knowledge by p. 226 which the disciple who is walking along the Excellent Way passes, from time to time, both the Way itself and the Fruits thereof up to Nirvâna, in review, and is aware what evil dispositions he has got rid of, and what evil dispositions remain to be conquered--that is what [339] is called "The jewel of the assurance that follows on the knowledge of emancipation." "The knowledge by which the Noble Ones know The stages they've passed, and the road yet untrod;-- Strive, O ye sons of the Conqueror, strive That jewel--'Assurance'--yourselves to obtain!" 19. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of discrimination? The discrimination of the sense of, and the discrimination of the deeper truths underlying the sense of the sacred writ, and the discrimination of philological peculiarities, and the discrimination of correct and ready exposition 1. And the Bhikkhu, O king, who is adorned with these four jewels of discrimination, whatsoever company he enters into, whether of nobles, or brahmans, or merchants, or workpeople, enters it in confidence, neither put out nor shy; undaunted and undismayed, he enters the assembly without excitement or fear. just, O king, as a warrior, a hero in the fight, when accoutred in all his harness p. 227 of war 1, goes down undismayed to the battle, in the confident thought: "If the enemy should remain afar off I can knock them down with my arrows, should they come thence towards me I can hit them with my javelins, should they come yet nearer I can reach them with my spear, should they come right up I can cleave them in two with my sabre 2, should they come to close quarters I can pierce them through and through with my dagger 3"--just so, O king, does the Bhikkhu, when he wears the fourfold jewel of discernment, enter any assembly undismayed, in the confident thought: "Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of the sense, I shall be able to explain it, comparing sense with sense, explanation with explanation, reason with reason, argument with argument 4--and thus shall I resolve his doubts, p. 228 dispel his perplexity, and delight him by my exposition of the problem raised. Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on discrimination of the deeper truths, I shall be able to explain it by comparing truth with truth, and the various aspects and phases of Arahatship each with each 1, [340] and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the problem raised. Should any one put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of philological peculiarities, I shall be able to explain it by comparing derivation with derivation 2, and word with word, and particle with particle, and letter with letter, and one modification of a letter by contact (sandhi) with another, and consonant with consonant, and vowel with vowel, and accent (intonation) with accent, and quantity with quantity, and rule with rule, and idiom with idiom;--and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the problem raised. Should anyone put to me a puzzle turning on the discrimination of expositions, I shall be able to explain it by comparing metaphor with metaphor, and characteristic with characteristic 3, and sentiment with sentiment--and thus his doubts too shall I be able to resolve, and, dispelling his perplexity, to delight him with my exposition of the p. 229 problem raised. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of discrimination." First buy the jewel of discrimination, Then cut 1 it with your knowledge and your skill; So, free from all anxiety and fear, Shall you illuminate both earth and heaven! 20. 'And what, O king, is the Blessed One's jewel of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats? It is self-possession, and investigation of the system of doctrine, and zeal, and joy, and tranquillity, and contemplation, and equanimity 2. And the Bhikkhu, O king, who is adorned with this sevenfold jewel of the divisions of the higher wisdom 3 shines forth over the whole world of gods and men, brightens it, illuminates it, and dispersing the darkness makes the light arise. This, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's jewel of the sevenfold wisdom." "The gods and men in reverence stand up To him who wears this wisdom-diadem. Show your good actions then,--that is the price,-- And buy, and wear, this wisdom-diadem!"' [341] 21. 'And what, venerable Nâgasena, is the bazaar for all manner of merchandise set up by the Blessed One, the Buddha?' 'The Blessed One's bazaar for all manner of p. 230 merchandise, O king, is the ninefold word of the Buddha; and the relics remaining of his body, and of the things he used; and the sacred mounds (Ketiyâni, Dâgabas) erected over them 1; and the jewel of his Order. And in that bazaar there are set out by the Blessed One the attainment (in a future birth) of high lineage, and of wealth, and of long life, and of good health, and of beauty, and of wisdom, and of worldly glory, and of heavenly glory, and of Nirvâna. And of these all they who desire either the one or the other, give Karma as the price, and so buy whichever glory they desire. And some buy with it a vow of right conduct, and some by observance of the Uposatha day, and so on down to the smallest Karma-price they buy the various glories from the greatest to the least. just, O king, as in a trader's shop, oil, seed, and peas and beans can be either taken in barter for a small quantity of rice or peas or beans, or bought for a small price decreasing in order according to requirement--just so, O king, in the Blessed One's bazaar for all manner of merchandise advantages are to be bought for Karma according to requirement. And this, O king, is what is called "The Blessed One's bazaar of all manner of merchandise." "Long life, good health, beauty, rebirth in heaven, High birth, Nirvâna-all are found for sale-- There to be bought for Karma, great or small-- In the great Conqueror's world-famed bazaar. Come; show your faith, O brethren, as the price, Buy and enjoy such goods as you prefer 2!" p. 231 22. 'And the inhabitants that dwell in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness, O king, are such as these: Masters in the Suttantas, and masters in the Vinaya, and masters in the Abhidhamma; preachers of the faith; repeaters of the Gâtakas, and repeaters of the Dîgha, and repeaters of the Magghima, [342] and repeaters of the Samyutta, and repeaters of the Anguttara, and repeaters of the Khuddaka Nikâya;--men endowed with right conduct, men accomplished in meditation, men full of knowledge, men taking delight in contemplation of the sevenfold wisdom of the Arahats, men of insight 1;--men who frequent the woods for meditation, or sit at the roots of trees, or dwell in the open air, or sleep on heaps of straw, or live near cemeteries, or lie not down to sleep,--men who have entered the Excellent Way 2, men who have attained one or more of the four fruits thereof, men who are still learners (have not yet reached Arahatship, but are close upon it), men enjoying the Fruits, that is, either Sotâpannas, or Sakadâgâmins, or Anâgâmins, or Arahats;--men of the threefold wisdom 3, men of the sixfold transcendental wisdom 4, men of the power of Iddhi, men who have reached perfection in knowledge, men p. 232 skilled in the maintenance of constant self-possession, in the Great Struggle, in the Steps to Iddhi, in the Organs of their moral sense, in the sevenfold wisdom, in the Excellent Way, in Ghâna, in Vimokkha, and in the attainment of the exalted and tranquil bliss that is independent of form or the absence of form--yea! like a forest full of bamboos, full of reeds, that City of Righteousness has been ever crowded and frequented by such Arahats as these! For it is said 1: (1) "Men devoid of passion, and of malice, and of dullness, men in whom the Great Evils (lust, becoming, delusion, and ignorance) are not, men who have neither craving thirst, nor grasping desires,--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (2) "Men whose home is the forest, men who have taken on themselves the extra vows, men full of joy, men who are wearing rough garments, men rejoicing in solitude, heroes--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (3) "Men who sleep sitting, or on any sleeping-place that comes, or spend their time standing or walking up and down in meditation, men who clad themselves in cast-off raiment--all these dwell in the City of Righteousness. (4) "Men wearing the full set of three robes, tranquil, with a skin for the fourth, who rejoice in taking but one meal each day, the wise-these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (5) "The earnest and prudent, heroes who feed on little and know no greed, content whether they receive an alms or receive it not-these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. p. 233 (6) "The meditative, delighting in Ghâna, heroes of tranquil minds, and stedfast, looking forward to Nirvâna--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (7) "Men walking in the path, and standing in the fruits thereof, those who have attained some fruits thereof but are yet learners as to the last, whose hope is directed to the utmost goal--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (8) "Those who have entered the stream, and those who, free from stains, will only be reborn once more on earth, those who will never return again, and Arahats--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (9) "Those skilled in the means of attaining undisturbed self-possession, and rejoicing in contemplation on the sevenfold wisdom, those who are full of insight, and bear the words of the Dharma in their hearts--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. [343] (10) "Those skilled in the Steps to Iddhi, and rejoicing in the meditations of Samâdhi, those who are devoted to the Great Struggle--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (11) "Those perfect in the sixfold wisdom of the Abhiññâs, delighting in the sphere that is theirs by rightful inheritance 1, those having the power of flying through the air--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (12) "Those of downcast eyes, and measured speech, the doors of whose senses are guarded, who p. 234 are self-restrained, who are well trained according to the supreme Dhamma--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness. (13) "Those of the threefold wisdom, and of the sixfold wisdom, those who have become perfect in Iddhi and perfect in knowledge--these are they who dwell in the City of Righteousness." 23. 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who carry in their hearts the words of the excellent knowledge that is immeasurable, who are free from bonds, whose goodness and fame and power and glory no man can weigh, who (in imitation of their Master) 1 keep the royal chariot-wheel of the kingdom of righteousness rolling on, who have reached perfection in knowledge-such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The Commanders of the Faith in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus, who have the power of Iddhi, who have learned the discriminations 2, who are full of confidence, who travel through the air, who are hard to oppose, hard to overcome, who can move without support, who can shake the broad earth and the waters on which it rests, who can touch the sun and the moon, who are skilful in transforming themselves and in making stedfast resolutions and high aspirations, who are perfect in Iddhi--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The royal chaplains in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have taken upon themselves the extra vows, p. 235 who desire little and are content, who would loathe any breach of the regulations as to the manner of seeking an alms 1, and beg straight on from hut to hut, as a bee smells flower after flower 2, and then go away into the loneliness of the woods, those who are indifferent as to their body and as to life, those who have attained to Arahatship, those who place the highest value on the virtues of the practice of the extra vows--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The judges in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are pure and stainless, in whom no evil dispositions are left, who, skilful in the knowledge of the fall and rise of beings 3, have perfected themselves in the Divine Eye--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The givers of light 4 in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus [344] who are learned in the traditions, who hand on what has been handed down, the repeaters of the Discourses, and of the Canon Law, and of the tables of contents, those who are skilled in the exact determination of letters into surds and sonants, into p. 236 longs and short, as to lightness and heaviness 1, those who know by heart the ninefold word--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The peace officers 2 in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are learned in the Vinaya (Rules of the Order, Canon Law), wise in the Vinaya, skilled in detecting the source of offences. 3, skilled in deciding whether any act is an offence or not, whether an offence is grievous or slight, whether it can be atoned for or not, skilled in deciding questions as to the rise, the acknowledgment, the absolution, or the confession of an offence 4; as to the suspension, or the restoration, or the defence of an offender 5, who are perfect Masters in the Vinaya--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "The Rûpa-dakshas 6 in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who wear on their brows the lotus garland of that noble Emancipation, who have attained to that p. 237 highest and best and most exceeding excellent of all conditions, who are loved and longed for by the great multitudes--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Flower-sellers in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have penetrated to the comprehension of the four Truths, and have seen them with their eyes, who are wise in the teaching, who have passed beyond doubt as to the four fruits of Samanaship, who having attained to the bliss thereof, share those fruits with others who have entered the paths 1--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Fruit-dealers in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who, being anointed with that most excellent perfume of right conduct, are gifted with many and various virtues, and are able to dispel the bad odour of sin and evil dispositions--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Perfume dealers in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus whose delight is in the Dhamma, and whose converse is pleasant, who find exceeding joy in the higher subtleties of the Dharma and the Vinaya 2, who either in the forest, or at the foot of trees, or in empty p. 238 places, drink the sweet sap of the Dharma, who plunging themselves, as it were, in body, speech, and mind into the sweet juice 1 of the Dharma, excel in expounding it, in seeking and in detecting the deeper truths in the various doctrines, who--wheresoever and whensoever the discourse is of wishing for little, of contentment, of solitude, of retirement, of the exertion in zeal, of right conduct, of meditation, of knowledge, of emancipation, of the insight arising from the assurance of emancipation[345] thither do they repair, and drink in the sweet savour of that discourse-such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Thirsty and drunkards in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are addicted to the habit of wakefulness from the first watch of the night to the last, who spend day and night in sitting, standing, or walking up and down in meditation, who, addicted to the habit of contemplation, are devoted to their own advancement by the suppressing of evil dispositions--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Watchmen in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who in the spirit and in the letter, in its arguments and explanations, in its reasons and examples, teach and repeat, utter forth and recapitulate the ninefold word of the Buddha-such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Lawyers (dealers in Dharma 2) in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." p. 239 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who are wealthy and rich in the wealth of the treasures of the Doctrine, in the wealth of the traditions, and the text, and the learning thereof, who comprehend the signs, and vowels, and consonants thereof, in all their details, pervading all directions with their knowledge--such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Bankers of the Dhamma 1 in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 'And furthermore, O king, those of the Bhikkhus who have penetrated to the sublimer teaching, who understand exposition and the divisions of objects of meditation to be practised, who are perfect in all the subtler points of training 2--Such Bhikkhus are called, O king, "Distinguished masters of law in the Blessed One's City of Righteousness." 24. 'Thus well planned out, O king, is the Blessed One's City of Righteousness, thus well built, thus well appointed, thus well provisioned, thus well established, thus well guarded, thus well protected, thus impregnable by enemies or foes. And by this explanation, O king, by this argument, by this reason, you may by inference know that the Blessed One did once exist. (I) "As when they see a pleasant city, well planned out, Men know, by inference, how great the founder was; So when they see our Lord's 'City of Righteousness' They know, by inference, that he did once exist. p. 240 [346] (2) "As men, seeing its waves, can judge, by inference, The great extent and power of the world-embracing sea; So may they judge the Buddha when they see the waves That he set rolling through the world of gods and men-- He who, unconquered in the fight, allays all griefs, Who rooted out, in his own heart, Craving's dread power, And set his followers free from the whirlpool of rebirths-- 'Far as the waves of the Good-Law extend and roll, So great, so mighty, must our Lord, the Buddha, be.' (3) "As men, seeing its mighty peaks that tower aloft, Can judge, by inference, Himâlaya's wondrous height; So when they see the Buddha's Mount-of-Righteousness-- Stedfast, unshaken by fierce passion's stormy blasts, Towering aloft in wondrous heights of calm and peace, Where lusts, evil, and Karma cannot breathe or live,-- They draw the inference: 'Great as this mountain high That mighty Hero's power upon whose word it stands.' p. 241 (4) "As men, seeing the footprint of an elephant king, Can judge, by inference: 'How great his size must be!' So when they see the footprint of the elephant of men, Buddha, the wise, upon the path that men have trod, They know, by inference: 'How glorious Buddha was 1!' (5) As when they see all living things crouching in fear, Men know: ''Tis the roar of the king of the beasts that frightens them.' So, seeing other teachers break and fly in fear, They know: ''Tis a king of the truth hath uttered words sublime!' (6) Seeing the earth smiling, well watered, green with grass, Men say: 'A great and pleasant rain hath fallen fast.' So when they see this multitude rejoicing, peaceful, blest, Men may infer: 'How sweet the rain that stilled their hearts!' (7) Seeing the wide earth soaked, boggy, a marsh of mud, Men say: 'Mighty the mass of waters broken loose. p. 242 So, when they see this mighty host, that once were dazed With the mud of sin, swept down in Dhamma's stream, and left In the wide sea of the Good-Law, some here, some there, All, gods and men alike, plunged in ambrosial waves, They may infer, and say: 'How great that Dhamma is!' (8) [347] "As when men, travelling, feel a glorious perfume sweet Pervading all the country side, and gladdening them, infer at once, 'Surely, 'tis giant forest trees are flowering now!' So, conscious of this perfume sweet of righteousness That now pervades the earth and heavens, they may infer: 'A Buddha, infinitely great, must once have lived!'" 25. 'And it would be possible, O king, to show forth the Buddha's greatness, by a hundred or a thousand such examples, such reasons, such arguments, such metaphors. just, O king, as a clever garland maker will, from one heap of all kinds of flowers, both following the instruction of his teacher, and also using his own individuality as a man, make many variegated and beautiful bouquets,--just so, O king, that Blessed One is, as it were, an infinite, immeasurable, heap of variegated flowers of virtue. And I now, a garland maker, as it were in the p. 243 church of the Conqueror, stringing those flowers together,--both following the path of our teachers of old, and also using such power of wisdom as in me is,--could show forth by inference the power of the Buddha in innumerable similes. But you, on the other hand, must show a desire to hear them 1.' 'Hard would it be, Nâgasena, for any other men thus to have shown by inference, drawn from such examples, the power of the Buddha. I am filled with satisfaction, venerable Nâgasena, at your so perfectly varied exposition of this problem.' ____________________________ Here ends the problem of Inference 2. ____________________________ Footnotes 206:1 A similar question has been already asked above, III, 5, 1 109). 207:1 These are the famous thirty-five constituent qualities that make up Arahatship (that is, that state of mind which, from another point of view and by another of its numerous names, is also called Nirvâna). They formed the subject of the last discourse delivered by Gotama before his death to his disciples ('Book of the Great Decease,' III, 61), and on my translation of that passage ('Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 60-63) I have added a note giving all the details. It is perhaps worthy of remark that both here and twice else p. 208 where, at pp. 37, 335 (of the Pâli), our author reverses the order of Nos. 4 and 5--the five moral Powers and the five Organs (of the higher sense)--which are really only the same mental qualities looked at from two different points of view. 208:1 These verses have not been traced as yet in the Pitakas. 208:2 There is another parable of the architect above, p. 34 of the Pâli (I, 53 of the translation). 208:3 Bhâgaso mitam, an expression constantly recurring. 208:4 Ukkinna. See Gâtaka IV, 106. 209:1 According to the dictionaries each of those four words (kakkara, katukka, sandhi, and singhâtaka) means either a square, or a place where four roads meet. The Simhalese has âpana-katushka-sandhi ti, omitting the last and certainly inexact in its rendering of the first word. Sandhi I have only met with here in this sense. 209:2 Râga-maggam; literally 'the king's highways,' which also only occurs here. 209:3 For pinda-dâvikâ Hînati-kumburê (who at p. 475 gives the Pâli of all this) reads pinda-dayakâ. 209:4 Vammino yodhino. But both Hînati-kumburê here, and the parallel passage in the Samañña Phala Sutta (D. II, 14), read Kamma-yodhino. 209:5 For Bhatti-putta Hînati-kumburê reads Bhata-puttâ. 209:6 These two (Bhatti-putta and Malla-ganâ) are omitted in the Dîgha. 210:1 Vattakârâ. See the note above on IV, 7, 11 (p. 267 of the Pâli). 210:2 Lonakârâ, 'salt makers.' But Hînati-kumburê reads lohakârâ and translates lokuruwo, 'workers in metal.' 210:3 'Dantakârâ, which in the Simhalese is simply repeated. There is no such word in Clough. 210:4 Heraññikâ. Childers says 'royal treasurer,' and Hînati-kumburê 'coiners of silver mâsakas' (ran masu tanannoya), but Subhûti (in his Simhalese gloss on Abhidhâna Padîpikâ, verse 343) renders it 'judgers of gold' (ran balannâ); and that this is right is shown by the context in the passage of the Sumangala Vilâsinî (p. 315), where the probably identical word heññaka is used. 210:5 Dussika. Hînati-kumburê renders this word here by pili welendo, 'cloth-sellers,' but above (p. 262 of the Pâli) by sâyam kârako, 'dice manufacturers.' 210:6 It is instructive that men working for hire are put here among the lowest sort of work-people, while the slave born in the house stands in the best company. 210:7 Langhakâ. Pinum kârayo, 'turners of summersets' in the Simhalese. See Gâtaka I, 431, and above, pp. 31, 191 of the Pâli. 210:8 Vetâlikâ. Vetâliyehi mangalâshtaka kiyannâwû in p. 211 the Simhalese (Wandi-bhattayo according to Subhûti on Abhidhâna Padîpikâ 369). 211:1 Pupphakkhadakâ. A well-known low caste whose duty it was to remove flowers offered on the shrines of the gods after they had faded. At Thera Gâthâ, verse 620, this is called one of the meanest of occupations. 211:2 Venâ. Hînati-kumburê has 'lute makers,' but this must be wrong. 211:3 The Simhalese says simply Weddahs (Wddas), the well-known interesting wild men of Ceylon. 211:4 Lâsikâ, 'those,' says the Simhalese, 'who as if intoxicated with joy jump about and leap and dance.' But I think it is connected with the ancient usages to which the lascivious swinging of the Saivites and Vallabhâkâryas owes its origin. 211:5 On all these names see the Introduction to part I, pp. xliii, xliv. Aparântaka and Pâtheyyaka might there have been added, as well as puratthimo ganapado (from p. 42). 213:1 Hînati-kumburê devotes a paragraph to each of these subjects for meditation. 213:2 Of râga, dosa, and moha. 213:3 This stanza has not yet been found in the Pitakas. In the first line it does not seem quite clear at first sight why Karma, of all things, should be the price. That Indian word being too p. 214 full of meaning to be translateable, is necessarily retained, and hence the phrase 'taking Karma as the price' may convey no meaning at all. If so, in trying to escape Scylla the unhappy translator has fallen into Charybdis. But it must mean one of two things, either something to be abandoned, given up; or something good which the buyer possesses, and may exchange for the good he wants to buy. If our author means the first it must be Karma (as one of the Upadhis), as a basis for continued individuality, and be much the same as egoism. If he means the other, then Karma, though standing alone, must be here used in the sense of kusala-kamma, good Karma, that is, the effect of good deeds done in a former life. Now our author never elsewhere uses kamma, without any qualifying adjective, in the sense of good Karma. On pp. 7, 20, 67, 108 foll., 134, 151, 189, 302 of the Pâli the unqualified word means throughout bad Karma, the effect of bad deeds done in a former birth. In a few passages it is used of former deeds in a way that apparently includes both good and bad. See especially pp. 3, 10, 146, 268. Now a buyer, in the case put, could not give up either the bad or the good deeds he had already done in a former life--that would be beyond his power. He could only offer, in exchange for the good he wanted to buy, good Karma (that is, in the sense of good deeds) either in the present, or in the immediate future. Below, V, 21 (p. 341 of the Pâli), will be found instances given by our author himself. It is forced, no doubt, to call this 'a price,' but it is probably the sense intended, and so Hînati-kumburê takes it. 214:1 Taking the threefold refuge in the Buddha, the Doctrine (Dharma), and the Order. 215:1 These are respectively the first five, the first eight, and the whole ten, of the Precepts set out in my 'Buddhism,' p. 160. 215:2 The whole of this text is translated in vol. xiii of the 'Sacred Books of the East.' The sîlas here enumerated are only the lower morality. The higher ethics come below in 12. 215:3 From Anguttara Nikâya III, 79. The verse is quoted in the Dhammapada, verse 54, and also in the Gâtaka Book, III, 291. 215:4 It is not known where these lines originally stood. But they are quoted in the Dhammapada, verses 55, 56, and also in the Gâtaka Book loc. cit., and in the Sumangala Vilâsinî, p. 56. 216:1 The details of these 'fruits' will be found in 'Buddhism,' pp. 108-110. 216:2 As to in respect of what, see the note above on IV, 8, 69 (p. 219 of the Pâli). 216:3 Dovilam, nilâta says the Simhalese, p. 484. 216:4 Kesika. Hînati-kumburê merely repeats this word. 216:5 The mango is used in all stages--when ripe for eating, and for pickles, curries, &c., in other stages. 217:1 These lines have not been traced as yet in the Pitakas, and are probably not meant as a quotation. 'Ambrosia' is of course the ambrosia of Arahatship. 217:2 For the full text of these 'Truths' see 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 148-150. 217:3 Aññâ. The Simhalese, p. 486, has awabodhaya. The word is rare, but it occurs at Gâtaka I, 140; II, 333; and at Dhammapada, verses 57, 96, always in this sense. 218:1 Not traced as yet. 218:2 See the note above on V, 3 (p. 330 of the Pâli). 219:1 Nibbutâ, with allusion to the freedom and calm of Nirvâna. The verses have not been traced as yet in the Pitakas. 219:2 Kâya-gatâ-sati-bhavanâ, where each term really requires a long commentary. 219:3 It will be noticed that Nâgasena is here really going an inch beyond his text. In that text (which has not been traced) amata, ambrosia, means no doubt as elsewhere, the ambrosia of Nirvâna. And the text does not say that the active attention and the ambrosia are the same, but only that they who feed on the one feed also on the other. Even if we translate 'are feeding' instead of 'feed' (which is grammatically possible) a similar argument would hold good. But though it is impossible to say for certain, without knowing the context of the passage, the rendering above is more in accord with Pâli usage, and more likely therefore to be right. 220:1 Not traced as yet. All these stanzas seem to belong together, and will doubtless be found in the same Sutta or poem. 220:2 These seven jewels (or treasures, ratanâni) of the Buddha are intended of course to correspond to the seven treasures (also ratanâni) of the king of kings (the kakkavattî). They are different from the seven Treasures of the Noble Ones' (Ariyadhanâni) which are ethical qualities, whereas these jewels are means to the attainment of Arahatship. 220:3 Sîla, a most difficult word to translate, as it includes so much that in English would be expressed by the varying phrases: goodness, virtue, righteousness, uprightness, morality, &c. 221:1 Indriya; no doubt here the six organs, that is the usual five, and bhavango or mano as the sixth. 221:2 Clothing, food., lodging, and medicine for the sick. 221:3 Translated in 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 189-200. 221:4 What we have here are the two higher stages of the three into which Buddhist ethics naturally falls. The morality of laymen has been included above, V, 7, where it already passes over into that of the ordinary, unconverted member of the Order. Here we begin with that, starting with the last item of the previous list, and go on, through the sîlas, to the highest ethics of Arahatship. 221:5 The devas, those gods dwelling in Sakka's heaven, and, I think, the devatâs also (fairies, nyads, dryads, &c.). 221:6 Avîki, the lowest of the purgatories. 222:1 I think the first Ghâna (see 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 272) is meant. 222:2 Apparently the passage over from the first to the second Ghâna. 222:3 But insight, and the resulting bliss, remain. Compare above, II, 2, 3 (I, 67). 222:4 Compare above, V, 8, on the last three. 223:1 See the note upon IV, 8, 65. 224:1 Bhavo here equal to pañka skandha, according to Hînati-kumburê, p. 491. 224:2 Bhave, here tri-widha-bhawa in the Simhalese. 224:3 Akalu; only found here. The Simhalese has agaru kalu, and agaru according to Clough is Dalbergia. 224:4 Tagara. Agil tuwaralâ, 'logwood frankincense.' 224:5 Tâlîsaka. Clough says the Talis tree is Flacourtia cataphracta. 224:6 Not in the Pâli dictionaries. But it is mentioned in Buddhavamsa II, 51 (there spelt salala). This verse is quoted at Gâtaka I, 13, verse 51, and the word is there spelt salala. The Simhalese has salala, and the Sanskrit lexicons have sarala. Clough identifies it, no doubt wrongly, with the last, the Anglo-Indian Hal tree, which the botanists call the Shorea robusta. 224:7 Yûthikâ; sînidda, says Hînati-kumburê, p. 492, and Clough thinks this is oleander. But Böhtlingk-Roth say a sort of jasmine, Jasminum auriculatum. 224:8 Yohombu in the Simhalese. Clough says this is a creeper called Borago Zeylanica. But does that grow in the North-West of India? According to Böhtlingk-Roth, Atimuttaka is the p. 225 name of three plants, one of which is the Gaertnera Racemosa, much cultivated for the beauty and perfume of its flowers. 225:1 The last four are the Pâtalî, Uppala, Vassika, and Mallikâ, all of which are well known. Our author's flora and fauna are so numerous that one ought, if one had the necessary knowledge, to be able to draw conclusions as to his own 'habitat.' 225:2 On the use of upâdây' upâdâya see above, p. 182, and below, p. 341 of the Pâli. 225:3 Pakkavekkhana-ñânam. That is, in looking back over the p. 226 course he has followed along the Excellent Way, he becomes conscious of having got beyond each of the obstacles (the Samyoganas) that can beset him. It is the doctrine of 'final assurance' from the Buddhist point of view. Compare ñânadassana at Dîgha II, 83. 226:1 1 Patisambhidâ. Hînati-kumburê merely repeats the ambiguous technical terms of the Pâli. Childers, sub voce, gives the various interpretations of other authorities. Compare above, I, 29, 34) 36. The third and fourth seem to me to be doubtful. 227:1 Pañkâvudho; literally 'with the five weapons on.' The expression is not infrequent; compare pañkâvudha-sannaddha, used of a hunter, at Gâtaka III, 467; IV, 283, 437; and sannaddha-pañkâvudhâ, used of sailors fighting, at Gâtaka IV, 160. But it is quite possible that weapons different from those here described are there meant, as they are not suited, for instance, to the hunter. 227:2 Hînati-kumburê translates this weapon (mandalagga) simply by kaduwa, sword; but 'bent blade' must mean a sabre. 227:3 Khurikâ. Childers has only 'knife.' The Simhalese, p. 493, has kirisaya, which is not in Clough, but is doubtless the Malay kreese. These five weapons are not mentioned elsewhere, and as three of the five words are rare, are probably those in special use in the country where our author lived. In this respect it is noteworthy that the Sanskrit kshurikâ is only mentioned, according to Böhtlingk-Roth, in the Râga Taranginî of Kashmir, and in the title of a late Upanishad. We shall therefore scarcely go far wrong if we understand by our author's khurikâ the famous Afghan knife. 227:4 Arthayen arthaya galapâ, &c., says the Simhalese. He p. 228 will reply by adducing parallel passages, much in the style of modern scholarship. 228:1 He gives the principal ones, as set out in his previous arguments. 228:2 Nirutti. Hînati-kumburê unfortunately simply repeats all these technical terms. 228:3 Lakkhana. As for instance above, I. 51-62. 229:1 Phaseyya; literally 'he who having bought patisambhidâ shall touch it with his ñâna.' The Simhalese, p. 494, has sparsakota, which does not help us. 229:2 The Simhalese again only repeats these seven technical terms, except the second Dhamma-vikaya, which it renders by pragñâ. 229:3 Bodhi. Childers says, 'the supreme knowledge of a Buddha.' But this is wrong, as is evident even from the context here. The whole exposition is of Arahatship, not Buddhahood. 230:1 Hînati-kumburê, characteristically enough for a Ceylon man, adds, 'and the Footprint and the Bo-tree.' 230:2 The first line only of these verses is in the Samyutta III, 2, 7. 231:1 Vipassakâ, not necessarily the insight of the Arahats, as Childers says. We have seen Vipassanâ ascribed above, p. 16 (of the Pâli), to a Sotâpanno. 231:2 Patipannakâ; so the Simhalese, p. 496 (but see otherwise below, V, 21, p. 344 of the Pâli). 231:3 Teviggâ, having the pubbe-nivâsânussati-ñâna, the ketopa-riya-ñâna, and the âsavânam khaya-ñâna. See Dîgha Nikâya II, 91-94 and 97. 231:4 These are the last three, and besides them the so-called Divine Eye, and Divine Ear, and also the power of Iddhi. See Dîgha Nikâya II, 87-90, 95-96. 232:1 It is not known in what text. 233:1 Pettike gokare ratâ. That is in the four Sati-patthânas. See the passage quoted below at VII, 1, 7, p. 368 of the Pâli. 234:1 Anuppavattakâ. See below, p. 363 of the Pâli. 234:2 See above, V, 19. 235:1 Importunity, or even attracting attention in any way. See above, p. 229 of the Pâli. 235:2 Compare Sigalovâda Sutta, p. 365, and Dhammapada, verse 49: 'As a bee, injuring not the flower or its colour or its scent, flies away, taking the nectar, so let a sage go through the village.' 235:3 That is the fall of beings from one state of existence--their death in that state in other words--and their rise, their rebirth, in another. 235:4 Gotaka, as a city official, is something akin to torchbearer, lamplighter. 236:1 These are six out of the ten divisions of Vyañgana-vuddhi, mentioned in the verse at Sumangala Vilâsinî I, 177. Hînati-kumburê, p. 501, merely repeats the words. 236:2 Dhamma-rakkhâ, 'dharmikawû âraksha-grahanayehi niyuktawû' in the Simhalese. 236:3 Nidâna-pathana-kusalâ; 'Âpatti gena hra dkwîmehi dakshawû,' says the Simhalese. 236:4 One word, vutthâna, is here doubtful. 236:5 See Mahâvagga IX, 4, 9. 10, &c. 236:6 Literally 'skilled in form, shape, beauty.' The Simhalese repeats this ambiguous expression, adding the qualification amâtyayo, 'ministers, officials.' One would think that these would have been the judges, but our author has already made the Arahats the judges in his Dhamma-nagara. This only leaves him some minor official post to give away to those learned in Canon Law, and he has chosen one as unintelligible in Ceylon as it is to me. 237:1 Patipannâ, which Hînati-kumburê takes here to mean Arahats, but see the note above, V, 20 (p. 341 of the Pâli). 237:2 Abhidhamme abhivinaye. A phrase very instructive as to the correct rendering of the much misunderstood word abhidhamma. As I pointed out already in the 'Hibbert Lectures' for 1881, it is a blunder to translate it, as is usually done, by 'metaphysics.' The whole context is taken from the Sangîti Sutta. 238:1 'The ambrosia of the Saddharma,' says Hînati-kumburê, p. 502. 238:2 Dhammâpanikâ. The Simhalese has Dhârmikâpanikayo. 239:1 Dhamma-setthino, which the Simhalese repeats. 239:2 Adhisîla, adhikitta, and adhipaññâ, says Hînati-kumburê. 241:1 It is perhaps such poetical figures as this that have afforded foundation for the legend of Buddha's footprint. 243:1 The Simhalese is here much expanded. 243:2 Mr. Trenckner reads 'Anumâna pañham,' the Simhalese has 'Mahâ Anumâna Prasnayayi.' Next: Book VI: The Dhutangas Sacred Texts | Buddhism « Previous: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book IV. The Solv... Index Next: The Questions of King Milinda, Part II: Book VI: The Dhut... »