The Sankhya Aphorisms of Kapila

Sacred-Texts Hindu Index The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila notes to the hypertext transcription

There are internal references to other parts of the text throughout, and all of these have been linked to allow for ease of navigation. In addition, every aphorism is preceded by a red asterisk link (i.e.: *), which is a self-referential anchor. This acts as a temporary bookmark, and by clicking on this anchor before following other links, you will be able to use your browser's back button to return directly to the aphorism that you were reading (and not to the beginning of the file) after following internal links. There are several places in the text where it was necessary to add matching brakets, quotation marks, and other punctuation that are missing in the original; these changes are not marked or otherwise noted. The same is true of the diacritical marks in some of the Indian words and names. Also, there was a list of corrections and additions printed at the end of the book. These have all been incorporated into this rescension where they emend the English. Some have been changed without further notice, and others have been added as additional footnotes. Added footnotes are referenced by asterisk instead of number, but all commentary (excepting that enclosed in braces, i.e.: { }, and the minor emendations mentioned above) was the work of the translator or the original editor. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Next THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA, WITH Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.

JAMES R. BALLANTYNE, LL. D., LATE PRINCIPAL OF THE BENARES COLLEGE. THIRD EDITION. LONDON: TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL. 1885. {reduced to HTML and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, January 2003} Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next p. i ADVERTISEMENT. THE present work, both in its Sanskrit portion and in its English, is an amended reprint of three volumes,1 published in India, which have already become very scarce. An abridged form of those volumes,2 which subsequently p. iv appeared, contains nothing of the Sanskrit original but the Aphorisms. While, in the following pages, all the corrections obtainable from the abridgment have been turned to account, an immense number of improved readings have been taken from another source. Three several times I carefully read Dr. Ballantyne's translation in as many different copies of it; entering suggestions, in the second copy, without reference to those which had been entered in the first, and similarly making independent suggestions in my third copy. All these1 were, on various occasions, submitted to Dr. Ballantyne; and such of them as did not meet his approval were crossed through. The residue, many more than a thousand, have been embodied p. v in the ensuing sheets, but are not indicated,1 as successively introduced. The renderings proposed in the footnotes are, for the most part, from among those which have recently occurred to me as eligible. That Dr. Ballantyne had any thought of reissuing, in whatever form, the volumes mentioned at the beginning of this Advertisement, I was unaware, till some years after he had made over the abridgment of them to Professor Cowell, for publication.2 Otherwise, I should have placed at his disposal the materials towards improvement of his second edition, which, at the cost of no slight drudgery, are here made available. The Sánkhya Aphorisms, in all the known commentaries on them, are exhibited word for word. The variants, now given, of the Aphorisms, afforded by accessible productions of that character, have been drawn from the works, of which only one has yet been printed, about to be specified:3 I. The Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, by Vijnána Bhikshu. Revelant particulars I have given elsewhere. My oldest MS. of it was transcribed in 1654. p. vi II. The Kápila-sánkhya-pravachana-sútra-vṛitti, by Aniruddha. Of this I have consulted, besides a MS. copied in 1818, formerly the property of Dr. Ballantyne, one which I procured to be copied, in 1855, from an old MS. without date. III. The Laghhu-sánkhya-sútra-vṛitti, by Nagesa. Of this I have two MSS., both undated. One of them is entire; but the other is defective by the three first Books. IV. The Sánkhya-pravachana-sútra-vṛitti-sára, by Vedánti Mahádeva. Here, again, only one of two MSS. which I possess is complete. The other, which breaks off in the midst of the comment on Book II., Aph. 15, is, in places, freely intetpolated from No. I. Neither of them has a date. Nearly all my longer annotations, and some of the shorter, were scrutinized, while in the rough, by the learned Professor Cowell, but for whose searching criticisms, which cannot be valued too highly, they would, in several instances, have been far less accurate than they now are. F. H. MARLESFORD, SUFFOLK, Aug. 28, 1884. Footnotes p. iii 1 Their titles here follow:

"The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary. Books II., III., & IV. In Sanskrit and English, Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P. (1st Edition, 550 Copies:— Price 12 annas.) Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Rev. L. G. HAY, Superintendent. 1854." "The Aphorisms of the Sánkhya Philosophy, by Kapila, with Illustrative Extracts from the Commentary by Vijnána-Bhikshu. Books V. & VI. Sanskrit and English. Translated by James R. Ballantyne, LL.D., Principal of the Govt. College, Benares. Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt. N. W. P . (1st Edition, 550 Copies:—Price 12 annas.) Allahabad: Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press. Rev. L. G. HAY, Sup't. 1856." 2 Occupying Fasciculi 32 and 81 of the New Series of the Bibliotheca Indica, issued in 1862 and 1865. The proof-sheets of only 32 pages of the whole, from the beginning, were read by Dr. Ballantyne; the rest, by Professor Cowell. The title of the abridged form runs: "The Sánkhya Aphorisms of Kapila, with Extracts from Vijnána Bhiks[h]u's Commentary," &c. But this is a misrepresentation, as regards Book I., which takes up 63 pages out of the total of 175. The expository matter in that Book is derived, very largely, from other commentators than Vijnána. p. iv Vedánti Mahádeva mainly supplies it at the outset, and, towards the end, well nigh exclusively, Aniruddha. Some share of it, however, will not be traced; it having been furnished by one of Dr. Ballantyne's pandits, whom I have repeatedly seen in the very act, as by his own acknowledgment, of preparing his elucidations. 1 Many of them, especially in Books II.-VI., rest on readings of the original preferable to those which had been accepted. Though not fully published till 1856, my edition of the Sánkkya-pravachana-bháshya, its preface alone excepted, was in print as early as 1853; and Dr. Ballantyne had a copy of it. A few arbitrarily chosen words apart, his text, after Book I., is borrowed from it throughout, but with no mention of the fact. My advice was unheeded, that he should profit by the copious emendations which I had amassed and digested from better manuscripts than those to which I at first had access. Greatly to his disservice, he would not be induced even to look at them. It faring the same with my typographical corrections, he has, here and there, reproduced errors, more or less gross, which might easily have been avoided. See, for specimens. pp. 197, 288, 357, 373, 374, 381, 390. p. v 1 Nor has attention been topically directed to sundry blemishes of idiom which have been removed; as, for example, by the substitution of 'unless' for 'without,' of 'in time' for 'through time,' of 'presently' for 'just,' and of 'between the two' for 'between both.' 2 "At the time of his departure from India, in 1860, Dr. Ballantyne left with me the MS. of his revised translation of the Sánkhya Aphorisms," "Notice," in the Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, No, 81. 3 For details respecting these commentaries and their authors, see my Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems, or my Preface to the Sánkhya-sára. p. vi 1 I once had a second copy of this very rare work, bearing no date, but most venerable in appearance. Like many of my manuscript treasures, it was lent, and never found its way back to me. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next PREFACE. THE great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary, the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible; they being designed, not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the obscurity which must needs attach to them, in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault. For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits in the Benares Sanskrit College having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Bráhmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve, further, the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East, as regards that of the West. These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion. J. R. B. BENARES COLLEGE, 5th January, 1852. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next THE SÁNKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA. BOOK I. a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila! b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]: The subject proposed. Aph. 1.* Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man. a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction; [the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one]. b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,—viz., (1) due to one's self (ádhyátmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ádhibhautika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ádhidaivika),—is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation (see Sáhitya-darpaṉa, § 2)]; because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case. A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means. c. But then, let it be that the above-mentionend cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i.e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]: The end is not to be attained by ordinary means. Aph. 2.* The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] cessation. a. 'The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned [§ 1. c.]. b. 'The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain. c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1. b.)]. d. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [§ 1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired. e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt he states [as follows]: The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means. Aph. 3.* [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain; just as one should eat, when there is hunger; and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision: This negation negatived. Aph. 4.* This [method of palliatives (§ 3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed]. a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,—i.e., even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art];—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul's aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises]. b. He mentions another proof [of his assertion]: Scriptural evidence in favour of this view. Aph. 5.* Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else. a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§ 1. c.]; since Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [i.e., of Liberation]; because the Scripture tells its preeminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text: 'There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul, [with the utter exclusion of pain].' b. But then [it may be suggested], when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies [as follows]: An objection met. Aph. 6.* And there is no difference between the two. a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 19. b.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place. b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential [§ 5. b.]: Liberation must be possible; else the means would not have been enjoined. Aph. 7.* There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially. a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is eseential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists. b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Íśwara-gítá,]: 'If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.' c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] 'Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, (§ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?' Therefore he declares [as follows]: Scripture would be nugatory, if pain were inevitable. Aph. 8.* Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity]. a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i.e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth]. b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows]: An impracticable injunction is no rule. Aph. 9.* There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction. a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning. b. Here he comes upon a doubt: A doubt whether the essential be not removable. Aph. 10.* If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus], such is the meaning [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply]. b. He declares [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised]: Decision that an essential property may be hidden, but not removed. Aph. 11.* Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible* power imperceptible]. a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]** something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogí, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c. b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, be rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.: Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part. Aph. 12.* Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage]. a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men, [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any]. Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause. Aph. 13.* Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason] a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? 'For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated, also. The soul is not kept in bondage by its being conditioned. Aph. 14.* Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body. a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different. b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares: The soul is absolute. Aph. 15.* Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute. a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned. The fruit of works belongs not to the soul. Aph. 16.* Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal,3 [if the case were as you imagine]. a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated, [through some acts of some one else]. b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate2 [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolutions [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul]. A doubt whether the bondage, also, belongs not to something else than the soul. c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]: Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong. Aph. 17.* If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience. a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflexion is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory]. b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakṛiti) is directly the cause of bondage: Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage. Aph. 18.* If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no;' [because] that, also, is a dependent thing. a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say 'no;' because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution, [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal]. b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhaná1 [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c. c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire; [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it]. d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]: What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul. Aph. 19.* [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence. a. Therefore,1 without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place. b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, ['not without']. For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential [§ 5. b.] nor adventitious [§ 11. b.]. c. In order that there may not be such an error as thot of the Vaiśeshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously, [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure]. d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul [is regarded as being affected by pain].' e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage, [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].* f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19. c.]. And now enough as to that point. g. Now he rejects [§ 18. d.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage, preferred by others: The Vedántic tenet on this point disputed. Aph. 20.* Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding. a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c., [§ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in § 19, of the received cause]. b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sára, § 20. b.)]; because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed. c. But, if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert], then he declares [as follows]: The Vedántí cannot evade the objection, without stultifying himself. Aph. 21.* If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta]. a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma* [see Nyáya Aphorisms I., § 31] of the unreality of Ignorance;' [and so you stultify yourself]. b. He states another objection: The Vedántí cannot evade the objection, without conceding a duality. Aph. 22.* And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing]. a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind. The Vedántí must not allege tha 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. Aph. 23.* If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism]. a. The meaning is: if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal, [like Plato's ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν: (see Vedánta-sára, § 21)]. There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal. Aph. 24.* [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal we say] 'no;' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.] a. That is to say: it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing,' &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. For, in the case of a dispute, it is neccssary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import. b. Again he ponders a doubt: A question whether the Vedántí is bound to avoid self-contradiction. Aph. 25.* [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.' a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeshikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyáyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see Vedánta-sára, § 21]; because this is established by proofs,' [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 35)]. b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories [see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 1]. c. He confutes [this pretence of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]: The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible. Aph. 26.* Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like. a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaiśeshika, § 25]; still, since being and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness: otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning. b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individuaily; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence2 of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]: The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected. Aph. 27.* [The bondage] thereof moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity. a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning. b. He states the reason of this [impossibility]: A thing cannot act where it is not. Aph. 28.* Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra. a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscibed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásaná) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth [to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-basket [to which they impart their odour.] b. By the word 'also' the absence or conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 10)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism]. c. Srughna and Páṭaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart. d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]: On the heretical view, the free soul would be equally liable to bondage. Aph. 29.* [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free]. a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning. b. Here he ponders a doubt: The heretic's attempted defence. Aph. 30.* If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism]. a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if [this be urged, then we look forward]. b. This he disputes, [as follows]: Each back must bear its own burden. Aph. 31.* They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time. a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning. b. He ponders a doubt: Whether merit may, or may not, be imputed. Aph. 32.* If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward]. a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiatc the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic]. b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact: This will not help the heretic's argument. Aph. 33.* [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c. a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of the son, by [means of the performance of]1 the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Bráhman would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact]. b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds]. c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] 'But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,' [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]: Whether bondage may not be momentary, and so require no cause. Aph. 34.* Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted]. a. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]: (1) Bondage, &c., is momentary; (2) Because it exists, (3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like. c. And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not extend unduly1 [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute; [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result' [§ 34]. d. He objects [to this heretical view]: The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary. Aph. 35.* No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition. a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under § 34. b.]. taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz.: (1) Bondage, &c., is permanent; (2) Because it exists, (3) [Everything that exists is permanent,] as a jar, or the like. That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning. Aph. 36.* And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning. a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., '[All] this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?' The heretic's illustration is not a truth. Aph. 37.* And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact. a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary churacter does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§ 34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import. If things were momentary, there could be no relation of cause and effect. b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect; [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]: The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously. Aph. 38.* It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists. a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Nelther is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows]: A product cannot survive its substantial cause. Aph. 39.* Because, when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it]. a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its substantial cause, [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it]. b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]: The coexistence of substance and product is impossible, if things be momentary. Aph. 40.* Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.3 a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'4 The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and substance,1 are (1) concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,2 that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent,3 belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined]. b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies: Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument. Aph. 41.* If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause]. a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning. The question whether anything exists besides Thought. b. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists, except Thought, neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. Therefore it has no cause; nor it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]: We have the evidence of Intuition for the External, as well as for the Internal. Aph. 42.* Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external. a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition. b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies: The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism. Aph. 43.* Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all]. a. That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought. b. 'Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition: The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism. Aph. 44.* The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things. a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning. b. He rejects [this heretical view] Nihilism denied; as the indiscerptible is indestructible. Aph. 45.* This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons. a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion that a thing must needs be perishable, because it exists; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish. b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that 'the jar has passed away,' it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away. c. He states another objection [to the heretical view]: Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories. Aph. 46.* Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before]. a. This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one; because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b.]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration. viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought. viz. [as stated in § 42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import. b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],' this too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows]: The soul's aim is not annihilition Aph. 47.* In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim. a. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable]. b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside: It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage. Aph. 48.* Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result]. a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic [of discussion]. b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body. c. He states a reason for this: What is all-pervading does not change place. Aph. 49.* Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion] a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place]. b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like:1 [but] this conjecture he repels: Were the soul limited, it might be perishable. Aph. 50.* [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness]. a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable].* b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to the motion [of the soul, by showing that the motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]: Soul moves not, any more than Space. Aph. 51.* The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;1 as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar]. a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'2 the text3 regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved]';4 and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. b.),] belongs to Nature [see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. l.], from such maxims3 as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful; and it is wilful Nature that] in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import.2 b. It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works] in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover] does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom: The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit. Aph. 52.* Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto. a. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned by works.1 Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see § 16. a.)] is no property of the soul. b. But then [some one may say], 'Let it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen,' i.e., the merit [or demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;' whereupon he declares [as follows]: Else, bondage might cling even to the emancipated. Aph. 53.*4 If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul might extend unduly, even to the emancipated]. a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the emancipated, [for the same reasons as those stated under § 16. a.]. b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, [that any one of these should be the cause]: A single text of Scripture upsets, equally, all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage. Aph. 54.* And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point. a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of,] among which its essential character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul]:'2 such is the meaning. b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means, that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes. c. The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see § 7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul. d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows]: How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated. Aph. 55.* Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity, [in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated]. a. 'The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of Nature and of the soul; this conjunction, moreover, does not take place again 'through non-discrimination,' i.e., through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a level, [under the circumstances stated at § 54. c.]: such is the import. The true cause of bondage, in other words, non-discrimination. Aph. 56.* Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].2 a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it:] Non-discrimination is removable by discrimination alone. Aph. 56.* The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness. a. The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by this alone is 'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and not by works, or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone, [and by no other means]. b. 'But then [some one may say], if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body, &c.; and this is contrary to Scripture, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies: The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination. Aph. 57.* Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results]. a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an effect, [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause]. b. The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].* c. But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general,] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,' &c.]:' well, if any one says this, I reply, 'no;' because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., 'Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;' because no products, such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew, [any more than a gold-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials]. The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else. d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding,' &c., is [the primary cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because 'understanding' and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property], there is the removal of those, [i.e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property: and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding,' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product]. e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus ad infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it; or if it be supposed thut we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency,' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance1 thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one's self with Nature]; because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout, [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, 'which was first, the acorn, or the oak?' being a frivolous question]. f. But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discriminatian [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., 'The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].'3 This [charge of inconsistency] he repels: The bondage of the soul is merely verbal. Aph. 58.* It is merely verbal, and not a reality1 [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul]. a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i.e., it is vox et praeterea nihil; because is is merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under § 57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case. Whether Testimony, or Inference, without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage. b. But then, if bondage, &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies: The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony, or of Inference. Aph. 59.* Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by argument; as that of a person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition. a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in, along with 'argument'] 'testimony,' [or verbal authority, which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case]. b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, by inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of1 a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i.e., without [his] directly perceiving [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may conduce, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge; cannot supersede]. c. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in Aph. 56], viz., that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing [of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§ 59]: 'Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,' &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a direct perception of whiteness. d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here referred to]. e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramáṉa) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth: The evidence for things imperceptible. Aph. 60.* The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference; as that of fire [when not directly perceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c. a. That is to say: 'of things imperceptible,' i.e., of things not cognizable by the senses, e.g., Nature and the Soul, 'the knowledge,' i.e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is brought about by means of that instrument of right knowledge [which may be called] 'Inference' (anumána), [but which (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 5) is, more correctly, 'the recognition of a Sign']; as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality, where we cannot directly perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign,' occasioned by smoke, &c. b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is estalished by Revelation. But, since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded [in the Sánkhya system; as will be seen from Aph. 88 of this Book]. c. He [next] exbibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated: The twenty-five Realities enumerated. Aph. 61.* Nature (prakṛiti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankára); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five. a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness,' &c., is their being neither less nor more [one than another]; that is to say, the state of not being [developed into] an effect [in which one or other of them predominates]. And thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' (guṉa), distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning.3 b. These things, viz., 'Goodness,' &c., [though spoken of as the three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guṉa) in the Vaiśeshika sense of the word; because [the 'Qualities' of the Vaiśeshika system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.); while] these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force,1 Weight, &c.2 In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' (guṉa) is employed [as the name of the three things in question],3 because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the cords [which the word guṉa also signifies], viz., 'Mind,' &c., which consist of the three [so-called] 'Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.5 c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat), viz., the principle of Understanding, (buddhi), is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing. d. He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring [of the existence of these principles, the one from the other]: The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross.' Aph. 62.* [The knowledge of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.' a. 'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied, [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60]. b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gotama's 5th Aphorism,] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred, [the στοιχει̑α στοιχείων of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows: (1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtile Elements, or Atoms,] which have distinct qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; and so of the others]: (2) Because they are gross; (3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.; [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the others]. And thence that of Self-consciousness. Aph. 63.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,] from the external and internal [organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph. 62]. a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness. b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner: (1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness: (2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness: (3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e., is not a product of Self-consciousness]; as the Soul, [which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it]. c. But then, if it be thus [i.e., if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or 'Mind,' the first product of Nature' (see Aph. 61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases. And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case; because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that 'This is that same jar [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].' d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intellect'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases, on his beatification: but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]: e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c., [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiraṉyagarbha (see Vedánta-śara, § 62), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues]. And thence that of Intellect. Aph. 64.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63]. a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' (buddhi), the great 'inner organ' (antaẖkaraṉa), [hence] called 'the great one' (mahat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this [product, viz., Self-consciousness]. b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case,] is as follows: (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind]; (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and] (3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c. c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one, having first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, 'This is I,' or 'This ought to be done by me,' and so forth: so much is quite settled; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient,] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the cause; [nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in the cause of that product]. And thence that of Nature. Aph. 65.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from that ['Intellect,' § 64]. a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., the principle [of Intellect, termed], 'the Great one,' which is a product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as [its] cause. b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows: (1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness: (2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must, therefore, have arisen from something consisting of that which itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness; [and] (3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c. c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of Darkness.' d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is [the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause. e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned, [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products]: The argument for the existence of Soul. Aph. 66.* [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products]. a. 'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature,2 Mind, and so on [unlike soul, which is not made up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that soul exists: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism]. b. But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]: (1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the 'Great one,' with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself: (2) Because it is a combination [or compages]; (3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service]. c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakṛiti): Argument for the eternity of Nature. Aph. 67.* Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.3 a. Since 'the root' (múla), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three principles, [which, with soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,] 'has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhána), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be a regressus in infinitum, [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without end]. b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows]: The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debate the regressus in infinitum. Aph. 68.* Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the the name of 'Nature']. a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kṛiti); for this [word prakṛiti, usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning. b. But then [some Vedántí may object according to this view of matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out; for, in addition to2 the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] is the cause of Mind,3 another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára, § 21], presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]: Nature and Soul alike uncreated. Aph. 69.* Alike, in respect of Nature, [and of both Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].2 a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz.: 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.'* Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of,] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the Kaurma [Puráṉa], beginning, 'Of action [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the Yoga, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities, [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled ignorance]. b. Or [according to another, and more probable, interpretation of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning. c. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states [as follows]: All do not profit by the saving truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason. Aph. 70.* There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions. a. For those privileged [to enguge in the inquiry] are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha]. But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning. b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'; [the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements' (see § 61)]: By 'the Great one' is meant Mind. Aph. 71.* The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind. a. 'Mind' (manas). 'Mind' [is so called], because its function is 'thinking' (manana). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (niśchaya). That of which this is the function is 'intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product, that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning. The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind. Aph. 72.* 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.] a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist,' 'I do this, that, and the other thing'], is that which is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one' [§ 71]. b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the Ego, in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows]: All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness. Aph. 73.* To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness]. a. 'To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others,2 the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements. b. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogma, that Nature is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as follows]: Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is, mediately, the cause of all other products. Aph. 74.* Moreover, mediately, through that [i.e., the 'Great one' (§ 71)] the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause [of all products]; as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.]. a. 'Moreover, mediately,' i.e., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, 'the first,' i.e., Nature, is the Cause of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately,] through 'the Great one' and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiśeshikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinatians of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning. b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this, he declares [as follows]: Why Nature is the sole cause. Aph. 75.* While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul,] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature]. a. That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, 'since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two. b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this, he says: Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms. Aph. 76.* What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]. a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning. b. He alleges Scripture in support of this: Scripture declares in favour of the theory. Aph. 77.* And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature]. a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in § 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, 'From Nature the world arises,' &c. b. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Aph. 78.* A thing is not made out of nothing. a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal: such is the meaning. b. Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]: Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal. Aph. 79.* It [the world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed]. a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, 'This world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition, if any one ever really had such,] it being an entity might be opposed. b. And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice, [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question, [that of the world regarded as a reality], there is not such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses]; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality. c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]: The product of something is something; and that of nothing, nothing. Aph. 80.* If it [the substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]? a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, 'this would be the case,' i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, 'because of union therewith,' i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its subatratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being [on that supposition,] necessarily a non-entity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case, [that it would be real]? b. But then [a follower of the Mímáṅsá may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let works alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies: Action cannot serve as a substratum. Aph. 81.* No; for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product]. a. Granting that 'the uneeen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product]: and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56,3 and § 83,] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul. b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies: Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances Aph. 82.* The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births. a. 'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; 'because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated [soul] is still liable to repetition of births,1 inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this, [which is gained through ritual observances]. b. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man: In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya. Aph. 83.* There is Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e. Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births. a. 'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., 'He does not return again,'4 &c. b. He states an objection to the opposite view: Pain can lead only to pain, not to liberation from it. Aph. 84.* From pain [occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water. a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion or water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness. b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c. To this he replies: The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works. Aph. 85.* [Liberation cannot arise from acts]; because whether the end be something desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory]. a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire, [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer], still, though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with repect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts, [which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by such means]; and Liberation comes through knowledge; so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause]. b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend,] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means], mundane life may return, were both on an equality, [we, whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory, and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies: The right means effect Liberation once for all. Aph. 86.* Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute:3 there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth]. a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see § 56,1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity, [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under § 85. b.]. b. It has been asserted [in § 61,] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities], and, since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by proof, therefore he displays this; [i.e., he shows what he means by proof]: What is meant by evidence. Aph. 87.* The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramá). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given 'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramáṉa)]. a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramátṛi); in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the ascertainment [or right comprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection 'of both,' i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramáṉa): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to beconsidered hereafter]: such is the meaning. b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination,' [which excludes doubt]. c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul [see § 87. a.], then the [proof, or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramáṉa). You are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately [the sources of right knowledge]. d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies: There are three kinds of evidence. Aph. 88.* Proof is of three kinds:1 there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs]. a. 'Proof is of three kinds;' that is to say, 'perception' (pratyaksha), 'the recognition of signs' (anumána), and 'testimony' (śabda), are the [three kinds of] proofs. b. But then [some one may incline to say], let 'comparison' [which is reckoned, in the Nyáya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in the Mímáṅsá], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if those [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof established, 'everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of more;' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out; because of the cumbrousness [that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is the meaning. c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: 'By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, &c.].' And 'Comparison,' and 'Tradition' (aitihya), and the like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' (anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception; [for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it]. d. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties [of proof, having already (§ 87) given the general definition]: Perception defined. Aph. 89.* Perception (pratyakska) is that discernment which, being in3 conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof. a. 'Being in conjunction,' [literally,] 'existing in conjunction;' 'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]; what 'discernment,' or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. b.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning. b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, 'no form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define: The definition not to be blamed, though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic. Aph. 90.* It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga]; because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception. a. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition]; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these; [because there is no intention to include them]. b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]: But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic. Aph. 91.* Or, there is no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.4 a. Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogí, also, shall be the thing to be defined; still there is no fault [in our definition, § 89]; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of the Yogí, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes, [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses]. b. Here the word rendered 'causal' (lína) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in § 89. b.]; for we, who assert that effects exist [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is possible. Objection, that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.' c. But then, [some one may say,] still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions; because, since these are from everlasting, they cannot result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies: That any 'Lord' exists is not proved. Aph. 92.* [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is not proved that there is a Lord (íśwara). a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied [from § 90]. b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with3 the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord,' but not the expression, 'because there is no Lord,' c. But, on the implication1 that there is a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, (§ 89),] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the 'Lord' may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source]. d. Having pondered the doubt, 'How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his existence]?' he states a dilemma which excludes [this]: A dilemma, to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.' Aph. 93.* [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the 'Lord,'] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other. a. The 'Lord' whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c.? Or is he in bondage through these? Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning. b. He explains this very point: The force of the dilemma. Aph. 94.* [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient. a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation, &c. [of this world]. b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies: The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.' Aph. 95.* [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord' are either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized3 [deities of the Hindu pantheon].4 a. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended, in the shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the 'Lord,' [as Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, i.e., absolute Soul in general; and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known3 Brahmá, Vishṉu, Śiva, or other non-eternal 'Lord;' since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense; [seeing that the Soul, in every combination, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so]. b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies: Soul, like the lode stone, acts not by resolve, but through proximity. Aph. 96.* The governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron]. a. If it were alleged that [its, Soul's] creativeness, or [its] governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under § 95. b.] would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sánkhyas,] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]; 'as is the case with the [lodestone] gem.' b. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] the 'Great one,' [or Mind, (see § 61. c.)]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Puráṉas1]: 'As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone,] stands void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency [seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition; [and it is] an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature].' d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]: In like manner, embodied souls do not energize. Aph. 97.* In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity]. a. 'The agency is solely through proximity:' so much is supplied [from § 96]. b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (see Vedánta-sára, § 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort; seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought. c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord,' through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies: How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them. Aph. 98.* The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authorative evidence]. a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiraṉyagarbha [i.e., Brahmá,] and others [viz., Vishṉu and Śiva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence [altogether indisputable].' b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term,—as the magnet may be said, is a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says: It is in the shape of the internal organ, that Nature affects Soul. Aph. 99.* The internal organ,1 through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet]. a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; 'just as the iron,' that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction]. b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference (anumána): Inference defined. Aph. 100.* The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference. a. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by 'connexion' (pratibandha) here being meant 'constant attendedness' (vyápti); and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle]. b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul; [whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see § 87. c.)] c. He [next] defines testimony (śabda): Valid testimony defined. Aph. 101.* Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence, is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed]. a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called,] 'knowledge by hearing' (śabda-bodha). b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence: Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth. Aph. 102.* Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the decaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made]. a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the other]: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such is the meaning. b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively: The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy. Aph. 103.* The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy. a. [Analogy (sámányato dṛishṭa) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when, for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning. b. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like; [has the characteristic properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like]. c. But, [as regards tht argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning. d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies: When it is that experience ceases. Aph. 104.* Experience [whether of pain or pleasure, ends with the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature]. a. By 'Thought' [we mean] soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92], surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case. b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreasonable,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies: The fruit of the action is not always the agent's. Aph. 105.* The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c. a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also. b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine, [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. b.]: To suppose that Soul acts and experiences is an error. Aph. 106.* Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion]. a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination;' that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit; [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure]. b. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106,] he states [as follows]: Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer. Aph. 107.* And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience]. a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], 'there is neither,' i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient. b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence: What is perceptible, under certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others. Aph. 108.* [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing]. a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c. What may prevent perception. b. [To explain the '&c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtilty, an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on. c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares: The subtility of Nature. Aph. 109.* Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility. a. 'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive. b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies: Nature inferred from the existence of productions. Aph. 110.* [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions. a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities; [(see § 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity]. b. Some [the Vedántís,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon: A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature, by the contradiction of dissentients. Aph. 111.* If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism]. a. 'Because of the the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas,] is not established. b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well,] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism]. c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]: Mutual denials settle nothing. Aph. 112.* Still, since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive]. a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion]. b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted; how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies: Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears. Aph. 113.* Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit]. a. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.], viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning. b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause, and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms]. c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently], or of what did not exist: What never existed will never exist. Aph. 114.* The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place. a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced. b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity: A product cannot be of nothing. Aph. 115.* Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist]. a. And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]: Else, anything might occur at any time, anywhere. Aph. 116.* Because everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the case] if materials could be dispensed with]. a. That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; 'everywhere,' i.e., in every place; 'always,' i.e., at all times. b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not [antecedently]: Effects preexist, potentially, in their causes. Aph. 117.* Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it]. a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since 'that which is competent,' viz., the cause, makes the product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning. b. He states another argument: The product is nothing else than the cause. Aph. 118.* And because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product]. a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning. b. He ponders a doubt:. A doubt whether that which is can be said to become. Aph. 119.* If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism]. a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming, the adjunction of arising, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] 'arising' [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning. b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]: Production is only manifestation; and so of the opposite. Aph. 120.* No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not]. a. 'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning. b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestness; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden, [and no longer appears as a pot]. c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c. d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity. e. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction?1 To this he replies: What is meant by destruction. Aph. 121.* Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced]. a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction,' and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction].4 b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλιγγενεσία] of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities. c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation, on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To this he replies: How manifestation may occur without being an entity. Aph. 122.* Because they seek each other reciprocally,3 as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity]. a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally]. b. He states another argument: The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted. Aph. 123.* Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.' a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.] If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also; [and thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c., is capable of being retorted]. b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually: The characters common to all products. Aph. 124.* [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent. a. 'Caused,' i.e. having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. 'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated. b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate (see § 61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies: The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature. Aph. 125.* There is the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied]. a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—' there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities,] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya]. b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature;' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all. c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree: The characters common to Nature and her products. Aph. 126.* Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property]. a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression '&c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning: b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature: In what the three Qualities differ. Aph. 127.* The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves]. a. 'Pleasantness,' i.e., Pleasure. By the expression '&c.' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i.e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the expression '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the expression '&c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism]. b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree: In what respects the Qualities agree, as well as differ. Aph. 128.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ. a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to call attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghutwa)] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e., through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul. b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,' &c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this: Proof that Mind &c. are products. Aph. 129.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like. a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the rest are products; because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul. b. He states another reason: A second proof. Aph. 130.* Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one]. a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are limited in measure; [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited]. b. He states another argument: A third proof. Aph. 131.* Because they conform [to Nature]. a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things: [and it is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause]. b. He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]: A fourth proof. Aph. 132.* And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught]. a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that they do]. b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products]. c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products]: Converse proof of the same. Aph. 133.* On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself]. a. Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul; [these two alone being non-products]. b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]: Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor non-product. Aph. 134.* If they were other than these two they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides soul and Nature]. a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i.e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i.e., in the shape of nonentity. b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies: What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects. Aph. 135.* The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it. a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen [into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it,' i.e., because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature, [i.e., Nature herself actually present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually present in the jar]. b. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle itself, the 'Great one' [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies: How Mind must have an antecedent. Aph. 136.* The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect. [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature]. a. 'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed lingin, since 'effect' has been termed linga]. b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]: Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all. Aph. 137.* There is no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source]. a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. 'Because of its effects,' that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,' i.e., that Nature is. b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]: It is not from any effect that Soul is inferred. Aph. 138.* [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute]. a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mímáṅsá creed, or good works, according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.' b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.' c. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies: Materialism scouted. Aph. 139.* Soul is something else than the body, &c. a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain. b. He propounds an argument in support of this: The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible. Aph. 140.* Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible]. a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus ad infinitum. b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptibleness,] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c. c. He elucidates this same point: Soul presents no indication of being material. Aph. 141.* [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c. a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,' &c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression '&c.' is meant, because the other characters of Nature, also, are not seen [in soul]. b. He states another argument: Another proof that Soul is not material. Aph. 142.* And [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature]. a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning. b. He states another argument: Another proof. Aph. 143.* [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer. a. It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism,] is made, because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it, [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § 58. a.)]. b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature; [since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this be replies: For Soul, not Nature, is Liberation wanted. Aph. 144.* [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not]. a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul. b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies: The nature of the Soul. Aph. 145.* Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest]. a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light. b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Bṛihadáraṉyaka Upanishad2]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?' c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its attribute. Thereby it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies: Soul has no quality Aph. 146.* It [Soul,] has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality. a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; [its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable]. b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, [i.e., in the view which he is contending against]: Scripture is higher evidence than supposed intuition. Aph. 147.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence or qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary]. a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'1 &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment]. b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i.e., soul's,] being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i.e., the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c., [in the soul]. Argument against the soul's being unintelligent. Aph. 148.* [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c. a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasanty.' By the expression '&c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included. b. The Vedántís say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:' 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti), i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows]: There is a multiplicity of souls. Aph. 149.* From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred]. a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i.e., from their being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all must be born, &c. b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others, [viz., of the Vedántís]: The view of the Vedánta on this point. Aph. 150.* [The Vedántís say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy]. a. As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];3—so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e., of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking [to say], 'The soul has perished.' [This, indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death? b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt [as to the point in question]: Refutation of the Vedánta on this point. Aph. 151.* The investment is different, [according to the Vedántís], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen]. a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity,] belongs, is not different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not;3 [the destruction of Devadatta, e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of in consistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántí may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,] are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion; [whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in conjunction with the stem]. b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies: The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open. Aph. 152.* Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sánkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad]. a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one, [i.e., as a monad]. b. [But, the Vedántí may contend,] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies: Imputation is not proof. Aph. 153.* Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity]. a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions]. b. [But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a second:'2 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'3 To this he replies: Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically. Aph. 154.* There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general]. a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the Oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus. By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning. b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies: The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom. Aph. 155.* Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3 a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground]. b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies: He jeers at the Vedántí Aph. 156.* No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive? a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning.' b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many: Scripture proof that Souls are many. Aph. 157.* Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense]. a. In the Puráṉas, &c., we hear, Vámadeva has been liberated,' 'Śuka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory. b. [But the Vedántí may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedántí flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya], To this he replies: As it has been, so will it be. Aph. 158.* Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore]. a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation [of all Souls, so as to leave a void]. b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]: The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever. Aph. 159.* As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things]. a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal. b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§ 157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the doubt2 is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void, [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sánkhya]. c. Now, [if the Vedántí says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:4 'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.' d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies: Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways. Aph. 160.* It [Soul,] is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].3 a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &c., [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.]. b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2 Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies: How Soul is a spectator. Aph. 161.* It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation]. a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place? b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies: The real condition of Soul. Aph. 162.* [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.5 a. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19]; because Pain and the rest are modifcations of Understanding, [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct]. Soul's indifference. Aph. 163.* And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike]. a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.] b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies: How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such. Aph. 164.* [Soul's fancy of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature],1 from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. a. [Its] 'being an agent,' i.e., Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,' 'through the influence' of Nature, [(see § 19,) of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification]. b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda: 'Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again'4]. c. So much, in this Commentary1 on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sánkhya system]. END OF BOOK I. Footnotes * Instead of 'indestructible' read 'impracticable.' ** Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. 3 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result.' For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53. with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151. of this Book. Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed. 2 Upádhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed. 1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed. 1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnána here supplies the comment. Ed. * 'That is to say,' &c., See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63. * Read, instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the dogma which you accept.' 2 Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed. 1 The brackets are of my inserting. Ed. 1 Vyabhichára is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed. 3 For vyabhichára, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed. 4 Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichára. Ed. 1 I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed. 2 The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singlar number; see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed. 3 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38. a, at p. 41, supra. Ed. 1 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed. * 'That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119. 1 Upádhi; often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' Ed. 2 Bhagavad-gítá, ii., 24. Ed. 3 'Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śruti and smṛiti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms; in wider acceptations, 'books of Scripture and of law,' &c. The first is 'revealed law,' the Vedas; the second, 'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed. 4 The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61. 2 For another rendering, see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 57. Ed. 1 Dr. Ballantyne should have taken 'unseen' and 'works' as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Ed. 4 Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed. 2 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed. 2 These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he republished the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed. [* Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. My copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Híránanda Chaube, who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corrpesonds to pp. 1-183, supra, in which additions, compressions, interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable frequency.] * For another rendering {of the text from § 56 b through § 57 b}, from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, & c., pp. 12, 13. 1 To render vásaná, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Ed. 3 Amṛitabindu Upanishad, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber's Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61, note 2. Ed. [* The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gauḍapáda's Máṇḍúkyopanishat-káriká. They are quoted and translated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190, where they are professedly taken, I cannot now say how tenably, from the Vivekachúḍámaṇi, which is credulously affiliated on Śankara Áchárya.] 1 Aniruddha has: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Ed. 1 Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr. Ballantyne had: 'That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul] is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case,' &c. Ed. 3 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed. 1 Balavattwa; for which I find the variant chalatwa, 'mobility.' Ed. 2 Read: 'Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.' Vaiśeshiká guṇah́ is equivalent to the viśesha-guṇáh́ in the original of Book V., 25. a. For the 'specific qualities,' see the Bháshá-parichchheda, st. 90. Ed. 3 For 'is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teshu), [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed. 5 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 43, 44. Ed. 2 Here indicated by the adjective avyakta, 'the indiscrete.' See Aph. 136 of this Book. Ed. 3 This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical principle, in the Sánkhya,] is rootless.' In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying that A = A. Ed. 2 Read 'in connexion with.' Ed. 3 Literally, instead of 'Mind,' the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed. 2 This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána, quoted and translated below, in b. The rendering now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz.: 'He meets a Vedántic objection.' Ed. * 'This Ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Vishṉu-puráṉa. 2 Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed. 3 It is the bracketed Aph. 56. at p. 58 supra, that is here referred to Ed. 4 Compare the Chhándogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed. 3 Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, adopted the genuine reading, instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation, which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most elegible. Ed. 1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed. 1 So reads Aniruddha; but Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence: 'That which is in the highest degree, productive thereof is proof, of three kinds.' Ed. 3 Aniruddha has 'determined by,' &c., instead of 'being in,' &c. Ed. 4 For the term atiśaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation,' vide infra, p. 115, note 4. Ed. 3 Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theism, as against the positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnána, here followed, then goes on to say: 'For, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been atheistic], it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of a Lord.' Ed. 1 Rather, 'the view being accepted' (abhyupagame): 3 In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed. 4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: According to this, the term íśwara, 'mighty one,' 'lord,' is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogí. Resolution, agentship, and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated; and such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by íśwara, 'a power.' Hence the expression, 'as it were liberated.' Also see, for atiśaya,—translated, above, 'transcendent faculties,'—Book IV., Aph. 24. Ed. 1 The translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed. [* The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4,of the Yoga-vásisṭha. For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 214.] 1 Aniruddha prefixes to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One.' Ed. 1 I have corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered an unwarranted reading, now replaced by one correlative to the end of the preceding Aphorism. Ed. 1 'If production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is destruction occasioned?' Aniruddha, here quoted. Ed. 4 'From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is the meaning of the word [náśa], and [such is] the particular action [which] it expresses.' This is from Aniruddha. Ed. 3 Translating the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anveshaṇá, inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively,' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnána explains anveshaṇá by anudhávana; and Vedánti Mahádeva has, in definition of it, the synonymons anusaraṇa. Ed. 2 This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva necessitate 'and because,' &c. Ed. 2 II., 4, 14,; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed. 1 Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, iv., 3, 16; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed. 3 Vide supra, p. 53, Aph. 51, &c. Ed. 3 Vide supra, p. 16, note 3. 2 Chhándogya Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word ### does not occur there. Ed. 3 Kaṭha Upanishad, iv., 11. Instead of ###, however, the correct reading is ###. Ed. 3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read ###; and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágeśa's explanation of it is as follows: ### The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage, or in other words, who is unable to discriminate, is the essential condition of souls multeity, a condition the reverse of the one before referred to, unity; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, thus undertood, must be assumed to proceed from a Vedántic disputant against the Sánkhya. Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by others, it is susceptible, with reference to the previous context, of a variety of renderings. Ed. 2 Anuyoga, here rendered 'doubt,' rather signifies 'difficulty raised,' 'question.' Ed. 4 The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained. Ed. 3 This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].' According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekarúpatwa) is predicable of it. Also see the commentaries on the Sánkhya-káriká, st. 19; and § 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed. 2 Vide supra, p. 56, § 54. a., and p. 165, § 148. Ed. 5 Vijnána says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither of those alluded to in Aph. 160. 1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words 'through,' &c. Ed. 4 These words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays (Prof. Cowell's edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, as a quotation, &c., in Váchaspati Miśra's Tattwa-kaumudí, near the beginning of the comment on st. 2 of the Sánkhya-káriká . . . . The words ### {?} are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chhándogya Upanishad. Colebrooke's 'thus' is unrepresented in the Sankrit as I find it. Ed. [* For emendations of sundry matters, see p. 429, note 4. 1 Aniruddha's is intended, though many passages in the preceding pages are from other commentaries. Ed. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next

a. The subject-matter [of the Institute] has been set forth [in Book I.]. Now, in order to prove that it is not the Soul that undergoes the alterations [observable in the course of things], he will tell, very diffusely, in the Second Book, how the creation is formed out of the Primal Principle. There, too, the nature of the products of Nature is to be declared fully, with a view to the very clear discrimination of Soul from these. Therefore, according to [the verses],1 b. 'Whoso rightly knows its changes, and the Primal Agent [Nature], and soul, the eternal, he, thirsting no more, is emancipated,' c. we remark, that, with reference to the character, &c., of Emancipation, all the three [things mentioned in these verses] require to be known. And here, in the first place, with advertence to the consideration, that, if Nature, which is unintelligent, were to create without a motive, we should find even the emancipated one bound, he states the motive for the creation of the world: The motive for creation. Aph. 1.* Of Nature [the agency, or the being a maker, is] for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated, or else for [the removal of] itself. a. The expression 'the being a maker' is borrowed from the last aphorism of the preceding Book. Nature makes the world for the sake of removing the pain, which is [really] a shadow [Book I., § 58], belonging to the Soul, which is, in its very nature, free from the bonds of pain; or [to explain it otherwise,] for the sake of removing pain [connected] by means of but a shadowy link; or [on the other hand,] it is 'for the sake of itself,' that is to say, for the sake of removing the actually real pain [which consists] of itself. b. Although experience [of good and ill], also, as well as Emancipation, is a motive for creation, yet Emancipation alone is mentioned, inasmuch as it is the principal one. c. But then, if creation were for the sake of Emancipation, then, since Emancipation might take place through creation once for all, there would not be creation again and again; to which he replies:3 Successive creation why. Aph. 2.* Because this [Emancipation] is [only] of him that is void of passion. a. Emancipation does not take place through creation once for all; but it is [the lot only] of him that has been extremely tormented many times by the various pain of birth, death, sickness, &c.; and, therefore, [successive creation goes on] because Emancipation actually occurs in the case only of him in whom complete dispassion has arisen through the knowledge of the distinctness of Nature and Soul: such is the meaning. b. He tells the reason why dispassion does not take place through creation once for all: Force of the foregoing reason. Aph. 3.* It is not effected by the mere hearing; because of the forcibleness of the impressions4 from eternity. a. Even the hearing [of Scripture, in which the distinctness of Nature from Soul is enounced,] comes [not to all alike, but only] through the merit of acts done in many births, [or successive lives]. Even then dispassion is not established through the mere hearing, but through direct cognition; and direct cognition does not take place suddenly, because of the forcibleness of false impressions that have existed from eternity, but [the required direct cognition takes place] through the completion of Concentration; and there is an abundance of obstacles to Concentration [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II]: therefore, only after many births do dispassion and Emancipation take place at any time of any one at all: such is the meaning. b. He states another reason for the continuous flow of creation: Another reason for continuous creation. Aph. 4.* Or as people have, severally, many dependants. a. As householders have, severally, many who are dependent upon them, according to the distinctions of wife, children, &c., so, also, the Qualities, viz., Goodness, &c., [Book I., § 61. b.] have to emancipate innumerable Souls, severally. Therefore, however many Souls may have been emancipated, the onflow of creation takes place for the emancipation of other Souls; for Souls are [in number,] without end: such is the meaning. And so the Yoga aphorism [Book II., § 22] says: 'Though it have ceased to be, in respect of him that has done the work, it has not [absolutely] ceased to be; because it is common to others besides him.' b. But then why is it asserted that Nature alone creates, when, by the text, 'From that or this Soul proceeded the Ether,'2 &c., it is proved that Soul, also, creates? To this he replies: Nature, not Soul, creates. Aph. 5.* And, since it [the character of creator,] belongs, really, to Nature, it follows that it is fictitiously attributed to Soul. a. And, since Nature's character of creator is decided to be real, there is, really, in the Scriptures, only a fictitious [or figurative] attribution of creativeness to Soul. b. But then, if it be thus, how is it laid down that Nature's creativeness, moreover, is real; since we are told [in Scripture,] that creation, moreover, is on a level with a dream? To this he replies: The reality of Nature's creativeness. Aph. 6.* Since it is proved from the products. a. That is to say: because the real creative character of Nature is established just 'from the products,' viz., by that evidence [see Book I., § 110,] which acquaints us with the subject [in which the creative character inheres]; for products are real, inasmuch as they produce impressions and exhibit acts. [The reality of eternal things is established here, just as it is by Locke, who says: 'I think God has given me assurance enough as to the existence of things without me; since, by their different application, I can produce, in myself, both pleasure and pain (artha), which is one great concernment of my present state.' These existing products being admitted, the Sánkhya argues that they must have a cause; and, as this cause means neither more nor less than something creative, whatever proves the existence of the cause proves, at the same time, its creative character.] b. But then [it may be said], on the alternative [see § 1] that Nature works for herself, she must energize with reference to the emancipated Soul, also. To this he replies: Who escape nature. Aph. 7.* The rule is with reference to one knowing; just as escape from a thorn. a. The word chetana here means 'one knowing;' because the derivation is from chit, 'to be conscious'. As one and the same thorn is not a cause of pain to him who, being 'one knowing,' i.e., aware of it, escapes from that same, but actually is so in respect of others; so Nature, also, is escaped by 'one knowing,' one aware, one who has accomplished the matter: to him it does not consist of pain; but to others, who are not knowing, it actually is a cause of pain: such is the 'rule,' meaning, the distribution. Hence, also, of Nature, which is, by its own nature, bound [inasmuch as it consists of bonds], the self-emancipation is possible; so that it does not energize with reference to the emancipated Soul [§ 6. b.]. b. But then [suggests some one], what was said [at § 5], that, in respect of Soul, the creative character is only fictitiously attributed, this is not proper; because it is fitting, that, by the conjunction of Nature, Soul, also, should be modified into Mind, &c.; for a modification of wood, &c., resembling earth, &c., through the conjunction of earth, &c., is seen: to which he replies: Soul not creative, though associated with what is so. Aph. 8.* Even though there be conjunction [of Soul] with the other [viz., Nature], this [power of giving rise to products] does not exist in it immediately; just like the burning action of iron. a. Even though there be conjunction with Nature, there belongs to Soul no creativeness, 'immediately,' i.e., directly. An illustration of this is, 'like the burning action of iron:' as iron does not possess, directly, a burning Power; but this is only fictitiously attributed to it, being through the fire conjoined with it: such is the meaning. But, in the example just mentioned, it is admitted that there is an alteration of both; for this is proved by sense-evidence: but, in the instance under doubt, since the case is accounted for by the modification of one only, there is cumbrousness in postulating the modification of both; because, otherwise, by the conjunction of the China-rose, it might be held that the colour of the crystal was changed. b. It has already been stated [§ 1] that the fruit of creation is emancipation. Now he states the principal occasional cause of creation: Creation when. Aph. 9.* When there is passion, or dispassion, there is concentration, [in the latter case, and] creation, [in the former]. a. When there is passion, there is creation; and, when there is dispassion, there is 'concentration,' i.e., the abiding [of Soul] in its own nature [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 32]; in short, emancipation, or the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle [Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 22]: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that Passion is the cause of creation; because of their being3 simultaneously present or absent. b. After this he begins to state the manner of creation: Order of creation. Aph. 10.* In the order [see § 12. b.] of Mind, &c., [is the creation] of the five elements, [or of the material world]. a. 'Creation' is supplied from the preceding aphorism. b. He mentions a distinction [between these successively creative energies and the primal one]: Nature's products not for themselves. Aph. 11.* Since creation is for the sake of Soul the origination of these [products of Nature] is not for their own sake. a. 'Of these,' i.e., of Mind, &c., since the creativeness is 'for the sake of Soul,' i.e., for the sake of the emancipation of Soul, the 'origination,' i.e., the creativeness, is not for the sake of themselves; since, inasmuch as they are perishable, they [unlike Nature, (see § 1)] are not susceptible of emancipation: such is the meaning. b. He declares the creation of limited space and time: Relative time and space whence. Aph. 12.* [Relative] Space and Time [arise] from the Ether, &c. a. The Space and Time which are eternal [and absolute], being the source of the Ether, are, really, sorts of qualities of Nature: therefore it is consistent that Space and Time should be all-pervading. But the Space and Time which are limited arise from the Ether, through the conjunction of this or that limiting object: such is the meaning. By the expression '&c.,' [in the aphorism,] is meant 'from the apprehending of this or that limiting object.' b. Now he exhibits, in their order, through their nature and their habits, the things mentioned [in § 10] as 'in the order of Mind, &c.': Mind or Intellect defined. Aph. 13.* Intellect is judgment. a. 'Intellect' is a synonym of 'the Great Principle' [or Mind (see Book I., § 71)]; and 'judgment,' called [also] ascertainment, is its peculiar modification: such is the meaning. But they are set forth as identical, because a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible.1 And it is to be understood, that this Intellect is 'Great,' because it pervades all effects other than itself, and because it is of great power. b. He mentions other properties, also, of the Great Principle: Products of intellect. Aph. 14.* Merit, &c., are products of it. a. The meaning is, that Merit, Knowledge, Dispassion, and Supernatural Power, moreover, are formed out of intellect, not formed of self-consciousness (ahankára), &c.; because intellect alone [and not self-consciousness,] is a product of superlative Purity, [without admixture of Passion and Darkness]. b. But then, if it be thus, how can the prevalence of demerit, in the portions of intellect lodged in men, cattle, &c., be accounted for? To this he replies: Opposite products of intellect. Aph. 15.* The Great one [intellect,] becomes reversed through tincture.2 a. That same 'Great one,' i.e., the Great Principle [or intellect], through being tinged with Passion and Darkness, also becomes 'reversed' [see § 14. a.], i.e., vile, with the properties of Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and want of Supernatural Power: such is the meaning. b. Having characterized the Great Principle, he defines its product, Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness. Aph. 16.* Self-consciousness is a conceit. a. 'Self-consciousness' is what makes the Ego, as a potter [makes a pot]; the thing [called] the internal* instrument (antaẖ-karaṉa): and this, inasmuch as a property and that of which it is the property are indivisible, is spoken of as 'a conceit,'1 [viz., of personality], in order to acquaint us that this is its peculiar modification. Only when a thing has been determined by intellect [i.e., by an act of judgment (see § 13. a.)], do the making of an Ego and the making of a Meum take place. b. He mentions the product of Self-consciousness, which has arrived in order: Product of Self-consciousness. Aph. 17.* The product of it [viz., of Self-consciousness,] is the eleven [organs], and the five Subtile Elements. a. The meaning is, that the eleven organs, with the five Subtile Elements, viz., Sound, &c., are the product of Self-consciousness. b. Among these, moreover, he mentions a distinction: The Mind whence. Aph. 18.* The eleventh, consisting of [the principle of] Purity, proceeds from modified Self-consciousness. a. The 'eleventh,' i.e., the completer of the eleven, viz., Mind, [or the 'internal organ,'—which is not to be confounded with 'the Great one,' called also Intellect and Mind,—alone,] among the set consisting of sixteen [§ 17], consists of Purity; therefore it is produced from Self-consciousness 'modified,' i.e., pure: such is the meaning. And hence, too, it is to be reckoned that the ten organs are from the Passionate Self-consciousness; and the Subtile Elements, from the Dark Self-consciousness. b. He exhibits the eleven organs: Of the Organs. Aph. 19.* Along with the organs of action and the organs of understanding another is the eleventh. a. The organs of action are five, viz., the vocal organ, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the generative organ; and, the organs of understanding are five, those called the organs of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Along with these ten, 'another,' viz., Mind, is 'the eleventh,' i.e., is the eleventh organ: such is the meaning. b. He refutes the opinion that the Organs are formed of the Elements: The Nyáya view rejected. Aph. 20.* They [the organs,] are not formed of the Elements; because there is Scripture for [their] being formed of Self-consciousness. a. Supply 'the organs.' b. Pondering a doubt, he says: A text explained. Aph. 21.* The Scripture regarding absorption into deities is not [declaratory] of an originator. a. That Scripture which there is about absorption into deities is not 'of an originator,' that is to say, it does not refer to an originator; because [although a thing, e.g., a jar, when it ceases to be a jar, is usually spoken of as being resolved into its originator, viz., into earth, yet] we see the absorption of a drop of water into what, nevertheless, is not its originator, viz., the ground; [and such is the absorption into a deity from whom the Mind absorbed did not originally emanate]. b. Some say that the Mind, included among the organs, is eternal. He repels this: No organ eternal. Aph. 22.* [None of the organs is eternal, as some hold the Mind to be;] because we have Scripture for their beginning to be, and because we see their destruction. a. All these organs, without exception, have a beginning; for the Scripture says, 'From this are produced the vital air, the mind, and all the organs;'2 &c., and because we are certified of their destruction by the fact that, in the conditions of being aged, &c., the mind, also, like the sight and the rest, decays, &c.: such is the meaning. b. He rebuts the atheistical opinion that the sense [for example,] is merely the set of eye-balls, [&c.]: The Sense not to be confounded with its site. Aph. 23.* The Sense is supersensuous; [it being the notion] of mistaken persons [that the Sense exists] in [identity with] its site. a. Every Sense is supersensuous, and not perceptible; but only in the opinion of mistaken persons does the Sense exist 'in its site,' e.g., [Sight,] in the eye-ball, in the condition of identity [with the eye-ball]: such is the meaning. The correct reading is: '[The sense is something supersensuous; to confound it with] the site, [is a mistake].' b. He rebuts the opinion that one single Sense, through diversity of powers, performs various offices: All the organs are not one organ. Aph. 24.* Moreover, a difference being established if a difference of powers be [conceded], there is not a oneness [of the organs]. a. Even by the admission that a diversity of powers belongs to one single organ, the diversity of organs is established; because the powers are, assuredly, organs; therefore, there is not a singleness of organ: such is the meaning. b. But then [it may be said], there is something unphilosophical in supposing various kinds of organs to arise from one single Self-consciousness. To this he replies: Theoretical considerations cannot upset facts. Aph. 25.* A theoretical discordance is not [of any weight,] in the case of what is matter of ocular evidence. a. This is simple. b. He tells us that, of the single leading organ, the Mind, the other ten are kinds of powers: Diversified operation of Mind. Aph. 26.* The Mind identifies itself with both a. That is to say: the Mind identifies itself with the organs of intellection and of action. b. Of his own accord, he explains the meaning of the expression 'identifies itself with both:' How this happens. Aph. 27.* By reason of the varieties of transformation of [which] the Qualities [are susceptible], there is a diversity [of their product, the Mind,] according to circumstances. a. As one single man supports a variety of characters, through the force of association,—being, through association with his beloved, a lover; through association with one indifferent, indifferent; and, through association with some other, something other,—so the Mind, also, through association with the organ of vision, or any other, becomes various, from its becoming one with the organ of vision, or any other; by its being [thereby] distinguished by the modification of seeing, or the like. The argument in support of this is, 'of the Qualities,' &c.; the meaning being, because of the adaptability of the Qualities, Goodness, &c., to varieties of transformation. b. He mentions the object of the organs of intellection and of action: What the organs deal with. Aph. 28.* Of both [sets of organs the object is that list of things], beginning with Colour, and ending with the dirt of Taste. a.. The 'dirt' of the tastes of food, &c., means ordure, &c., [into which the food, consisting of the quality Taste, &c., is partly transformed]. b. Of what Soul (indra), through what service, these are termed Organs (indriya), both these things he tells us: The Organs and their possessors. Aph. 29.* The being the seer, &c., belongs to the Soul; the instrumentality belongs to the Organs. a. For, as a king, even without himself energizing, becomes a warrior through his instrument, his army, by directing this by orders simply, so the Soul, though quiescent, through all the organs, of vision, &c., becomes a seer, a speaker, and a judger, and the like, merely through the proximity called 'Conjunction;' because it moves these, as the lodestone [does the iron, without exerting any effort]. b. Now he mentions the special modifications of the triad of internal organs: Difference in the internal organs. Aph. 30.* Of the three [internal organs] there is a diversity among themselves. a. The aspect of Intellect is attention1; of Self-consciousness, conceit [of personality]; of the Mind, decision and doubt. b. He mentions, also, a common aspect of the three: A character common to the three. Aph. 31.* The five airs, viz., Breath, &c., are the modifications, in common, of the [three internal] instruments. a. That is to say: the five, in the shape of Breath, &c., which are familiarly known as 'airs', because of their circulating as the air does, these [animal spirits] are the joint or common 'modification,' or kinds of altered form, 'of the instruments,' i.e., of the triad of internal instruments. b. The opinion is not ours, as it is that of the Vaiśeshikas, that the modifications of the organs take place successively only, and not simultaneously. So he says: Sense-impressions, &c., not excusively successive. Aph. 32.* The modifications of the organs take place successively and simultaneously. a. This is simple. b. Lumping the modifications of the understanding, with a view to showing how they are the cause of the world, he, in the first place, exhibits [them]: The ideas which constitute the world. Aph. 33.* The modifications [of the understanding, which are to be shown to be the cause of the world, and] which are of five kinds, are [some of them,] painful and [others,] not painful.4 a. That the modifications are of five sorts is declared by Patanjali's aphorism, [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 62] b. He acquaints [us] with the nature of Soul: Soul's relation thereto. Aph. 34.* On the cessation thereof [viz., of mundane influences], its tincture4 ceasing, it [Soul,] abides in itself. a. That is to say: during the state of repose of these modifications, it [the Soul], the reflexion of these having ceased, is abiding in itself; being, at other times, also, as it were, in isolation, [though seemingly not so]. And to this effect there is a triad of Aphorisms of the Yoga, [viz., Book I., §§ 2, 3, and 46]. b. He explains this by an illustration: This illustrated. Aph. 35.* And as [by] a flower, the gem. a. The 'and' implies that this is the reason [of what was asserted in the preceding aphorism]; the meaning being, as the gem [is tinged, apparently,] by a flower. As the gem called rock-crystal, by reason of a flower of the Hibiscus, becomes red, not abiding in its own state, and, on the removal thereof, becomes colourless, abiding in its own state, in like manner [is the Soul apparently tinged by the adjunction of the Qualities]. b. But then [it may be asked], by whose effort does the aggregate of the organs come into operation; since Soul is motionless, and since it is denied3 that there is any Lord [or Demiurgus]? To this he replies: What moves the Organs to operate. Aph. 36.* The Organs also arise, for the sake of Soul from the development of desert. a. The meaning is, that, just as Nature energizes 'for the sake of Soul,' so 'the Organs also arise;' i.e., the energizing of the Organs is just in consequence of the development of the deserts of the soul: [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 13. b.]. And the desert belongs entirely to the investment; [the Soul not really possessing either merit or demerit]. b. He mentions an instance of a thing's spontaneously energizing for the sake of another: An illustration. Aph. 37.* As the cow for the calf. a. As the cow, for the sake of the calf, quite spontaneously secretes milk, and awaits no other effort, just so, for the sake of the master, Soul, the Organs energize quite spontaneously: such is the meaning. And it is seen, that, out of profound sleep, the understanding of its own accord wakes up. b. With reference to the question, how many Organs there are, external and internal combined, he says: The number of the Organs. Aph. 38.* Organ is of thirteen sorts, through division of the subordinates. a. The triad of internal organs, and the ten external organs, combined, are thirteen. He says 'sorts,' in order to declare that, of these, moreover, there is an infinity, through [their] distinction into individuals. He says 'through division of the subordinates,' with a reference to the fact, that it is understanding which is the principal organ; the meaning being, because the organs [or functions,] of the single organ, called understanding, are more than one. b. But then, since understanding [it seems,] alone is the principal instrument in furnishing its object [of emancipation] to Soul, and the instrumentality of the others is secondary, in this case what is [meant by] secondariness?1 [Why are they said to be instrumental at all?] In regard to this he says: Efficiency of the Organs whence. Aph. 39.* Because the quality of being most efficient is conjoined with the organs; as in the case of an axe. a. The quality of the [principal] organ, the understanding, in the shape of being most efficient on behalf of soul, exists, derivatively, in the [other derivative] organs. Therefore it is made out that an organ is of thirteen kinds: such is the connexion with the preceding aphorism: b. 'As in the case of an axe.' As, although the blow itself, since it is this that puts an end to our non-possession of the result, is the principal efficient in the cutting, yet the axe, also, is an efficient, because of its close proximity to the quality of being the principal efficient, so [here, also]: such is the meaning. He does not here say that Self-consciousness is secondarily efficient, meaning to imply that it is one with the internal organ.* c. Specifying the precise state of the case in regard to the condition of secondary and principal, he says: Preeminent efficiency of Mind illustrated. Aph. 40.* Among the two [the external and the internal organs], the principal is Mind; just as, in the world, among troops of dependants. a. 'Among the two,' viz., the external and the internal, 'Mind,' i.e., understanding, simply, is 'the principal,' i.e., chief; in short, is the immediate cause; because it is that which furnishes Soul with its end; just as, among troops of dependants, some one single person is the prime minister of the king; and the others, governors of towns, &c., are his subordinates: such is the meaning. b. Here the word 'Mind' does not mean the third internal organ, [(§ 30. a.) but Intellect, or 'the Great One.'] c. He tells, in three aphorisms, the reasons why Intellect [or understanding] is the principal: A reason why Understanding is the principal. Aph. 41.* [And Intellect is the principal, or immediate and direct, efficient in Soul's emancipation;] because there is no wandering away. a. That is to say: because it [understanding,] pervades all the organs; or because there is no result apart from it. Another reason. Aph. 42.* So, too, because it [the understanding,] is the depository of all self-continuant impressions. a. Understanding alone is the depository of all self-continuant impressions, and not the Sight, &c., or Self-conconsciousness, or the Mind; else it could not happen that things formerly seen, and heard, &c., would be remembered by the blind, and deaf, &c. Another reason. Aph. 43.* And because we infer this [its preeminence] by reason of its meditating. a. That is to say: and because we infer its preeminence, 'by reason of its meditating,' i.e., its modification in the shape of meditation. For the modification of thought called 'meditation' is the noblest of all the modifications [incident to Soul, or pure Thought, whose blessedness, or state of emancipation, it is to have no modification at all]; and the Understanding itself which, as being the depository thereof, is, further, named Thought [chitta, from the same root as chintá1], is nobler than the organs whose modifications are other than this: such is the meaning. b. But then, suppose that the modification 'meditation' belongs only to the Soul, [suggests some one]. To this he replies: Meditation not essential to Soul. Aph. 44.* It cannot be of its own nature. a. That is to say: meditation cannot belong to Soul essentially; because of the immobility [of Soul; whereas 'meditation' is an effort]. b. But then, if thus the preeminence belongs to understanding alone, how was it said before [at § 26,] that it is the Mind that takes the nature of both [sets of organs, in apparent contradiction to the view propounded at § 39]? To this he replies: An organ may be, relatively, principal, or secondary. Aph. 45.* The condition [as regards Soul's instruments,] of secondary and principal is relative; because of the difference of function. a. In respect to the difference of function, the condition, as secondary, or principal, of the instruments [of Soul] is relative. In the operations of the Sight, &c., the Mind is principal; and, in the operation of the Mind, Self-consciousness, and, in the operation or Self-consciousness, Intellect, is principal [or precedent]. b. But then, what is the cause of this arrangement; viz., that, of this [or that] Soul, this [or that] Intellect, alone, and not another Intellect, is the instrument? With reference to this, he says: Every one reaps as he has sowed. Aph. 46.* The energizing [of this or that Intellect] is for the sake of this [or that Soul]; because of [its] having been purchased by the works [or deserts] of this [or that Soul]; just as in the world. a. The meaning is, that, 'the energizing,' i.e., all operation, of the instrument is for the sake of this [or that] Soul; because of [its] having been purchased by this [or that] Soul's works [or deserts]; just as in the world. As, in the world [or in ordinary affairs], whatever axe, or the like, has been purchased by the act, e.g., of buying, by whatever man, the operation of that [axe, or the like], such as cleaving, is only for the sake of that man [who purchased it]: such is the meaning. The import is, that therefrom is the distributive allotment of instruments [inquired about under § 45. b.] b. Although there is no act in Soul, because it is immovable, still, since it is the means of Soul's experience, it is called the act of Soul; just like the victories, &c., of a king [which are, really, the acts of his servants]; because of Soul's being the owner [of the results of acts; as the king is of the results of the actions of his troops]. c. In order to make clear the chiefship of Intellect, he sums up, [as follows]: Summing up. Aph. 47.* Admitting that they [the various instruments of Soul, all] equally act, the preeminence belongs to Intellect; just as in the world, just as in the world. a. Although the action of all the instruments is the same, in being for the sake of Soul, still the preeminence belongs to Intellect alone: just as in the world. The meaning is, because it is just as the preeminence, in the world, belongs to the prime minister, among the rulers of towns, and the rest, even although there be no difference so far as regards their being [all alike workers] for the sake of the king. Therefore, in all the Institutes, Intellect alone is celebrated as 'the Great One.' The repetition [viz., 'just as in the world, just as in the world,'] implies the completion of the Book. b. So much for [this abstract of] the Second Book, on the Products of Nature, in the commentary, on Kapila's Declaration of the Sánkhya, composed by the venerable Vijnána Áchárya. END OF BOOK II. Footnotes 1 Here add, 'in the Moksha-dharma, &c.'; and read, instead of 'we remark . . . . Emancipation,' 'there is the declaration that.' The verses quoted are from the Mahábhárata, xii., 7879, and occur in Chap. ccxvi., in the Section entitled Moksha-dharma. Ed. 3 For another rendering of the original of a., b., and c., see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 62. Ed. 4 Vásaná. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 2 Taittiríya Upanishad, ii., 1. But read: 'From this, from this same self.' &c. Ed. 2 Vide infra, p. 211, note 6. Ed. 3 'Simultaneously,' &c., is to render anwayavyatirekau, on which vide supra, p. 43, note 2. Ed. 1 See, for a different rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45. Ed. 2 I.e., 'influence.' Ed. 1 For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 45. Ed. * 'An internal' is better. 2 Muṇḍaka Upanishad, ii., i., 3. Ed. 1 Adkyavasáya, rendered 'ascertainment' and 'judgment' at pp. 156 and 196, supra. Also see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 46. Ed. 4 Literally the same words are found in the Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 5. Ed. 2 Namely: 'Evidence, misprision, chimera, unconsciousness, memory.' Ed. 4 I.e., 'influence', as in Aph. 15. at p. 198, supra. Ed. 6 'Concentration (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.' 'Then [i.e., at the time of Concentration,] it [the Soul,] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectacle].' 'At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the Soul,] is in the same form as the modifications [of the internal organ].' Dr. Ballantyne's translation is here quoted. Ed. 3 'Demurred to' is preferable. Vide supra, p. 112. Ed. 1 Instead of 'in this case,' &c., read, 'what is the character of these [i.e., organs]? Ed. * Instead of 'it is one with the internal organ,' read 'the internal organ is really one.' The implication is, that buddhi, ahankára, and manas really make one whole, called manas, in the wider sense of that term. 1 The two words are, respectively, from chit and chint, which are cognate. Ed. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next

a. In the next place, the gross product of Nature, viz., the great elements and the dyad of bodies, is to be described; and, after that, the going into various wombs, and the like; [this description being given] with a view to that less perfect degree of dispassionateness which is the cause of one's engaging upon the means of knowledge; and, after that, with a view to perfect freedom from passion, all the means of knowledge are to be told: so the Third [Book] commences: The elements whence. Aph. 1.* The origination of the diversified [world of sense] is from that which has no difference. a. '[Which] has no difference,' i.e., that in which there exists not a distinction, in the shape of calmness, fierceness, dulness, &c., viz., the Subtile Elements, called 'the five somethings, simply;' from this [set of five] is the origination of 'the diversified,' [so called] from their possessing a difference, in the shape of the calm, &c., viz., the gross, the great Elements: such is the meaning. For, the fact of consisting of pleasure, or the like, in the shape of the calm, and the rest, is manifested, in the degrees of greater, and less, &c., in the gross Elements only, not in the Subtile; because these, since they have but the one form of the calm, are manifest to the concentrated, [practitioners of meditation, but to no others]. b. So then, having stated, by composing the preceding Book, the origin of the twenty-three Principles, he states the origination, therefrom, of the dyad of bodies: The Body whence. Aph. 2.* Therefrom, of the Body. a. 'Therefrom,' i.e., from the twenty-three Principles, there is the origination of the pair of Bodies, the Gross [Body] and the Subtile: such is the meaning. b. Now he proves that mundane existence could not be accounted for otherwise than on the ground of the twenty-three Principles. Mundane existence whence. Aph. 3.* From the seed thereof is mundane existence. a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the Body; 'from the seed,' i.e., from the Subtile one, as its cause, in the shape of the twenty-three Principles, is 'mundane existence,' i.e., do the going and coming of Soul take place; for it is impossible that, of itself, there should be a going, &c., of that which, in virtue of [its] all-pervadingness, is immovable: such is the meaning. For Soul, being conditioned by the twenty-three Principles, only by means of that investment migrates from Body to Body, with a view to experiencing the fruits of previous works. b. He states, also, the limit of mundane existence. Mundane existence till when. Aph. 4.* And, till there is discrimination, there is the energizing of these, which have no differences. a. The meaning is, that, of all Souls whatever, void of the differences of being Lord, or not Lord, &c., [though, seemingly, possessed of such differences,] 'energizing,' i.e., mundane existence, is inevitable, even till there is discrimination [of Soul from its seeming investments]; and it does not continue after that. b. He states the reason of this: The reason of this. Aph. 5.* Because of [the necessity of] the other's experiencing. a. The meaning is: because of the necessity that the other, i.e., that that very [Soul], which does not discriminate, should experience the fruit of its own [reputed] acts. b. He states, that, even while there is a Body, during the time of mundane existence, fruition [really] is not: Soul's bondage only seeming. Aph. 6.* It [Soul,] is now quite free from both. a. 'Now,' i.e., during the time of mundane existence. Soul is quite free 'from both,' i.e., from the pairs, viz., cold and heat, pleasure and pain, &c.: such is the meaning. b. He next proceeds to describe, separately, the dyad of Bodies: The Gross and the Subtile Bodies distinguished. Aph. 7.* The Gross [Body] usually arises from father and mother; the other one is not so. a. The Gross one arises from father and mother, 'usually,' i.e., for the most part; for there is mention also of a Gross Body not born of a womb: and 'the other,' i.e., the Subtile Body, is 'not so,' i.e., does not arise from a father and mother; because it arises from creation, &c.: such is the meaning. b. He decides [the question], through disguise by which one of the Bodies, Gross and Subtile, the conjunction of the pairs [pleasure and pain, &c.,] with Soul takes place. Which of the bodies is the cause of Soul's bondage. Aph. 8.* To that which arose antecedently it belongs to be that whose result is this; because it is to the one that there belongs fruition, not to the other. a. 'To be that whose result is this,' i.e., to have pleasure and pain as its effect [reflected in Soul], belongs to that Subtile Body alone whose origin was 'antecedent,' i.e., at the commencement of the creation [or annus magnus]. Why? Because the fruition of what is called pleasure and pain belongs only to 'the one,' i.e., the Subtile Body, but not to 'the other,' i.e., the Gross Body; because all are agreed that there is neither pleasure nor pain, &c., in a body of earth: such is the meaning. b. He tells the nature of the Subtile Body just mentioned: The Subtile Body how constituted. Aph. 9.* The seventeen, as one, are the Subtile Body. a. The Subtile Body, further, through its being container and contained, is twofold. Here the seventeen, [presently mentioned,] mingled, are the Subtile Body; and that, at the beginning of a creation, is but one, in the shape of an aggregate; [as the forest, the aggregate of many trees, is but one]: such is the meaning. The seventeen are the eleven organs, the five Subtile Elements, and Understanding. Self-consciousness is included under Understanding. b. But [one may ask,] if the Subtile Body be one, how can there be diverse experiences accordingly as Souls are [numerically] distinct, [one from another]? To this he replies: How there come to be individuals. Aph. 10.* There is distinction of individuals, through diversity of desert. a. Although, at the beginmng of the creation [or annus magnus], there was but one Subtile Body, in the shape of that investment [of Soul (see Vedánta-sára, § 62.) named] Hiraṉyagarbha, still, subsequently, moreover, there becomes a division of it into individuals,—a plurality, partitively, in the shape of individuals;—as, at present, there is, of the one Subtile Body of a father, a plurality, partitively, in the shape of the Subtile Body of son, daughter, &c. He tells the cause of this, saying, 'through diversity of desert;' meaning, through actions, &c., which are causes of the experiences of other animal souls.3 b. But then, on this showing, since the Subtile one alone, from its being the site of fruition, is [what ought to be denoted by the term] Body, how is the term Body applied to the Gross one? To this he replies: Why the Gross Body is called a Body. Aph. 11.* From its being applied to it, [viz., to the Subtile one], it is applied to the Body, which is the tabernacle of the abiding thereof. a. But then, what proof is there of another body,—other than the one consisting of the six sheaths,—serving as a tabernacle for the Subtile Body? With reference to this, he says: The Subtile Body dependent on the Gross Body. Aph. 12.* Not independently [can the Subtile Body exist], without that [Gross Body]; just like a shadow and a picture. a. That is to say: the Subtile Body does not stand independently, 'without that,' i.e., without a support; as a shadow, or as a picture, does not stand without a support. And so, having abandoned a Gross Body, in order to go to another world, it is settled that the Subtile Body takes another body, to serve as its tabernacle: such is the import. b. But then [it may be said], of the Subtile Body, since it is limited substance, as the Air, or the like, let the Ether [or Space], without [its] being attached [to anything], be the site: it is purposeless to suppose [its] attachment to anything else. To this he replies: For it must have a material support. Aph. 13.* No, even though it be limited; because of [its] association with masses; just like the sun. a. Though it be limited, it does not abide independently, without association; for, since, just like the sun, it consists of light, it is inferred to be associated with a mass: such is the meaning, All lights, the sun and the rest, are seen only under the circumstances of association [of the luminiferous imponderable] with earthy subtances; and the Subtile Body consists of 'Purity,' which is Light: therefore it must be associated with the Elements. b. He determines the magnitude of the Subtile Body: Size of the Subtile Body. Aph. 14.* It is of atomic magnitude; for there is a Scripture for its acting. a. 'It,' the Subtile Body, is 'of atomic magnitude,' i.e., limited, but not absolutely an atom; because it is declared to have parts. Wherefore? 'For there is Scripture for its acting;' i.e., because there is Scripture about its acting. When a thing is all-prevading, it cannot act; [action being motion]. But the proper reading is, 'because there is Scripture for its moving.' b. He states another argument for its being limited: Another proof of this. Aph. 15.* And because there is Scripture for its being formed of food. a. That is to say: it, viz., the Subtile Body, cannot be all-pervading; because there is a Scripture for its being partially formed of food; for, if it were all-pervading, it would be eternal. Although Mind, &c., are not formed of the Elements, still it is to be understood that they are spoken of as formed of food, &c.; because they are filled with homogeneous particles, through contact with food; [as the light of a lamp is supplied by contact with the oil]. b. For what purpose is the mundane existence, the migrating from one body to another [Gross] body, of Subtile Bodies, which are unintelligent? With reference to this, he says: Why the Subtile Body migrates. Aph. 16.* The mundane existence of is for the sake of Soul; just like a king's cooks. a. That is to say: as the cooks of a king frequent the kitchens for the sake of the king, so the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. b. The Subtile Body has been discussed in respect of all its peculiarities. He now likewise discusses the Gross Body, also: The Gross Body whence. Aph. 17.* The Body consists of the five elements. a. That is to say: the Body is a modification of the five elements mingled. b. He mentions another opinion: Another opinion. Aph. 18.* Some say it consists of four elements. a. This [is alleged] with the import that the Ether does not originate [anything]. Another opinion. Aph. 19.* Others say that it consists of one element. a. The import is, that the body is of Earth only, and the other elements are merely supporters. Or 'of one element' means, of one or other element: [see the Rosicrucian doctrine in the Tarka-sangraha, § 13., &c]. b. He tells us what is proved by the fact that the Body consists of the Elements: Intellect not the result of organization. Aph. 20.* Intellect is not natural [a natural result of organization]; because it is not found in them severally. a. That is to say: since we do not find intellect in the separated Elements, intellect is not natural to the Body,— which consiste of the Elements,—but is adventitious. b. He states another refutation [of the notion that Intellect is a property of the Body]: A further argument. Aph. 21.* And [if the Body had intellect natural to it,] there would not be the death, &c., of anything. a. That is to say: and, if the Body had intellect natural to it, there would not be the death, the profound sleep, &c., 'of anything,' of all things. For death, profound sleep, &c., imply the body's being non-intelligent; and this, if it were, by its own nature, intelligent, would not take place; because the essential nature of a thing remains as long as the thing remains. b. Pondering a doubt, as to the assertion [in § 20], viz., 'because it is not found in them severally,' he repels it: An illustrative objection disposed of. Aph. 22.* If [you say that Intellect results from organization, and that] it is like the power of something intoxicating, [the ingredients of which, separately, have no intoxicating power, we reply, that] this might arise, on conjunction, if we had seen, in each [element, something conducive to the result]. a. But then, as an intoxicating power, though not residing in the substances severally, resides in the mixed substance, so may Intellect, also, be; if any one say this, it is not so. If it had been seen in each [constituent], its appearance in the compound might have had place; but, in the case in question, it is not the case that it is seen in each. Therefore, in the illustration [of something intoxicating resulting from mixture], it being established, by the Institutes, &c., that there is, in each ingredient, a subtile tendency to intoxicate, it is settled only that, at the time when these combine, there will be a manifestation of the [latent] power of intoxicating; but, in the thing illustrated, it is not established, by any proof whatsoever, that there is intelligence, in a subtile [or undeveloped] state, in the elements separately: such is the meaning. b. It was stated [§ 16,] that the Subtile Bodies transmigrate for the sake of Soul. In regard to this, he tells, in two aphorisms, by what operation, dependent on the birth of the Subtile Bodies, which means their transmigrations into Gross Bodies, what aims of Soul are accomplished: Purpose of the Subtile Body's taking a gross one. Aph. 23.* From knowledge [acquired during mundane existence, comes] salvation, [Soul's chief end]. a. That is to say: by the transmigration of the Subtile Body, through birth, there takes place the direct operation of discrimination [between Soul and Non-soul]; [and] thence, in the shape of emancipation, Soul's [chief] End. Bondage whence. Aph. 24.* Bondage [which may be viewed as one of the ends which Soul could arrive at only through the Subtile Body,] is from Misconception. a. Through the transmigration of the subtile body, from misconception, there is that [less worthy] end of soul, in the shape of bondage, consisting of pleasure and pain: such is the meaning. b. Liberation and Bondage, [resulting] from knowledge and misconception [respectively], have been mentioned. Of these, in the first place, he explains Liberation [arising] from knowledge: Knowledge has neither cooperator nor substitute, in liberating Soul. Aph. 25.* Since this [viz., knowledge,] is the precise cause [of liberation], there is neither association [of anything else with it, e.g., good works,] nor alternativeness, [e.g., of good works, in its stead]. a. In respect of there being neither association nor alternativeness, he states an illustration: This illustrated. Aph. 26.* The emancipation of Soul does not depend on both [knowledge and works, or the like]; as [any end that one aims at is not obtained] from dreams and from the waking state, [together, or alternatively, which are, severally,] illusory and not illusory. a. But, even if it be so, [some one may say,] there may be association, or alternativeness, of knowledge of the truth with that knowledge which is termed Worship of [the One, all-constitutive, divine] Soul; since there is no illusoriness in this object of Worship. To this he replies: Man's conception of the All is faulty. Aph. 27.* Even of that other it is not complete. a. Even of 'that other,' i.e., of the [just-mentioned] object of worship, the non-illusoriness is not complete; because imaginary things, also, enter into [our conception of, and overlie, and disguise,] the object of worship, the [One, all-constitutive] Soul: such is the meaning. b. He states in what part [of it] is the illusoriness of the [object of] Worship, [just referred to]: Where the fault applies. Aph. 28.* Moreover, it is in what is fancied that it is thus [illusory]. a. That is to say: 'moreover, it is thus,' i.e., moreover, there is illusoriness, in that portion of the thing meditated which [portion of it] is fancied by the Mind, [while it does not exist in reality]; for, the object of worship having been declared in such texts as, 'All this, indeed, is Brahma,'3 the illusoriness belongs entirely to that portion [of the impure conception of 'the All' which presents itself, to the undiscriminating, under the aspect] of the world. b. Then what profit is there in Worship? With reference to this, he declares [as follows]: The fruit of Worship. Aph. 29.* From the achievement of [the worship termed] meditation there is, to the pure [Soul], all [power]; like Nature. a. Through the effecting of the worship which is termed meditation, there becomes, to the 'pure,' i.e., the sinless, Soul, all power; as belongs to Nature: such is the meaning. That is to say: as Nature creates, sustains, and destroys, so also the Purity of the understanding of the worshipper, by instigating Nature, creates, &c. [But this is not Liberation, or Soul's chief end.] b. It has been settled that Knowledge alone is the means of Liberation. Now he mentions the means of Knowledge: Removal of obstacles to knowledge. Aph. 30.* Meditation is [the cause of] the removal of Desire. a. That is to say: Meditation is the cause of the removal of that affection of the mind by objects, which is a hinderer of knowledge. b. With advertence to the fact that knowledge arises from the effectuation of Meditation, and not from merely commencing upon it, he characterizes the effectuation of Meditation: Meditation at what point perfected. Aph. 31.* It [Meditation,] is perfected by the repelling of the modifications [of the Mind, which ought to be abstracted from all thoughts of anything]. a. He mentions also the means of Meditation: Practices conducive to meditation. Aph. 32.* This [Meditation,] is perfected by Restraint, Postures, and one's Duties. a. That is to say: Meditation results from the triad, which shall be mentioned, viz., Restraint, &c. b. By means of a triad of aphorisms he characterizes, in order, Restraint, &c.: Restraint of the breath. Aph. 33.* Restraint [of the breath] is by means of expulsion and retention.3 a. That it is 'of the breath' is gathered from the notoriousness [of its being so]. b. He characterizes Postures, which come next in order: Postures. Aph. 34.* Steady and [promoting]* ease is a [suitable] Posture. a. That is to say: that is a Posture which, being steady, is a cause of pleasure; such as the crossing of the arms. b. He characterizes one's Duty: One's duty. Aph. 35.* One's Duty is the performance of the actions prescribed for one's religious order. a. Simple. Knowledge by Concentrantion how attained. Aph. 36.* Through Dispassion and Practice. a. Simply through mere Practice, in the shape of Meditation, accompanied by Dispassion, Knowledge, with its instrument, Concentration, takes place in the case of those who are most competent [to engage in the matter]: such is the meaning. Thus has liberation through knowledge been expounded. b. After this, the cause of Bondage, viz., Misconception, declared in [the assertion,] 'Bondage is from Misconception,' [§ 24], is to be expounded. Here he first states the nature of Misconception: Misconception defined. Aph. 37.* The kinds of Misconception are five. a. That is to say: the subdivisions of Misconception, which is the cause of Bondage, are Ignorance, Egoism, Desire, Aversion, and Fear of Dissolution; the five mentioned in the Yoga, [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book II., § 32]. b. Having stated the nature of Misconception, he states also the nature of its cause, viz., Disability: The varieties of Disability. Aph. 38.* But Disability is of twenty-eight sorts.5 a. Simple; [as explained in the Yoga]. b. In a couple of aphorisms he mentions [those] two. Acquiescence and Perfection, on the prevention of which come two sorts of Disability of the Understanding: Acquiescence. Aph. 39.* Acquiescence is of nine sorts. a. He will, himself, explain how it is of nine sorts. Perfections. Aph. 40.* Perfection is of eight sorts. a. This, also, he will, himself, explain. b. Of the aforesaid, viz., Misconception, Disability, Acquiescence, and Perfection, since there may be a desire to know the particulars, there is, in order, a quaternion of aphorisms: Their subdivisions. Aph. 41.* The subdivisions [of Misconception] are as [declared] aforetime. a. The subdivisions of Misconception, which, in a general way, have been stated as five, are to be understood to be particularized 'as aforetime,' i.e., just as they have been declared by preceding teachers: they are not explained here, for fear of prolixity: such is the meaning. Of this further. Aph. 42.* So of the other [viz., Disability]. a. That is to say: 'so,' i.e., just as aforetime [§ 41], the divisions 'of the other,' viz., of Disability, also, which are twenty-eight, are to be understood, as regards their particularities. Acquiescence divided. Aph. 43.* Acquiescence is ninefold, through the divisions of 'the internal and the rest.' a. This aphorism is explained by a memorial verse [No. 502]. Perfection divided. Aph. 44.* Through Reasoning, &c., [which are its subdivisions,] Perfection [is eightfold]. a. That is to say: Perfection is of eight kinds, through its divisions, viz., Reasoning, &c. This aphorism, also, 'has been explained in a memorial verse,' [No. 514]. b. But then, how is it said that Perfection consists only of 'Reasoning, &c.,' seeing that it is determined, in all the Institutes, that the eight Perfections, viz., [the capacity of assuming] atomic bulk, &c., result from recitations, austerity, meditation, &c.? To this he replies: The enumeration defended. Aph. 45.* Not from any other [than what we have just stated does real Perfection arise; because what does arise therefrom, e.g., from austerities, is] without abandonment of something else, [viz., Misconception]. a. 'From any other,' i.e., from anything. different from the pentad, 'Reasoning, &c.,' e.g., from Austerity, &c., there is no real Perfection. Why? 'Without abandonment of something else;' i.e., because that Perfection [which you choose to call such] takes place positively without abandonment of something else, i.e., of Misconception: therefore [that Perception], since it is no antagonist to mundane existence, is only a semblance of a Perfection, and not a real Perfection: such is the meaning. b. Now the individuated creation, which was mentioned concisely in the assertion, 'There is distinction of individuals through diversity of desert,' [§ 10], is set forth diffusely: The creation viewed in its parts. Aph. 46.* [The creation is that] of which the subdivisions are the demons, &c. a. Supply, such is that creation, of which 'the subdivisions,' the included divisions, are the demons, &c. This is explained in a memorial verse, [No. 533]. b. He states that the aforesaid subdivided creation, also, is for the sake of Soul: This creation, also, for Soul's sake. Aph. 47.* From Brahmá down to a post, for its [Soul's,] sake is creation, till there be discrimination [between Soul and Nature]. a. He mentions, further, the division of the subdivided creation, in three aphorisms: The celestial world. Aph. 48.* Aloft, it [the creation,] abounds in [the quality of] Purity. a. That is to say: 'aloft,' above the world of mortals, the creation has chiefly [the Quality of] Purity. The infernal world. Aph. 49.* Beneath, it [the creation,] abounds in Darkness. a. 'Beneath,' that is to say, under the world of mortals. The world of mortals. Aph. 50.* In the midst, it [the creation,] abounds in Passion. a. 'In the midst,' that is to say, in the world of mortals. b. But then, for what reason are there, from one single Nature, creations diverse in having, affluently, purity and the rest? With reference to this, he says: Why Nature operates diversely. Aph. 51.* By reason of diversity of desert is Nature's [diverse] behaviour; like a born-slave. a. Just by reason of diverse desert is the behaviour of Nature, as asserted, in the shape of diversity of operation. An illustration of the diversity is [offered in the example], 'like a born-slave.' That is to say: as, of him who is a slave from the embryo-state upwards, there are, through the aptitude arising from the habit3 of being a dependant, various sorts of behaviour, i.e., of service, for the sake of his master, so [does Nature serve soul in various ways]. b. But then, if the creation aloft is abundant in Purity [the element of joy], since Soul's object is really thereby effected, what need is there of Liberation? To this he replies: Why Heaven is to be shunned. Aph. 52.* Even there there is return [to miserable states of existence]: it is to be shunned, by reason of the successive subjections to birth, [from which the inhabitants of Heaven enjoy no immunity]. a. Moreover: Transitoriness of heavenly bliss. Aph. 53.* Alike [belongs to all] the sorrow produced by decay and death. a. Common to all alike, those that are aloft and those beneath, beginning with Brahmá and ending with a stock, is the 'sorrow produced by decay and death'; therefore, moreover, it [heaven,] is to be shunned: such is the meaning. b. What need of more? The end is not effected by absorption into the cause, either; as he tells us: Absorption into Nature ineffectual. Aph. 54.* Not by absorption into the cause is there accomplishment of the end; because, as in the case of one who has dived, there is a rising again. a. In the absence of knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature], when indifference towards Mind, &c., has resulted from worship of Nature, then absorption into Nature takes place; for it is declared: 'Through Dispassion there is absorption into Nature.' Even through this, i.e., the absorption into the cause, the end is not gained; 'because there is a rising again; as in the case of one who has dived.' As a man who has dived under water rises again, exactly so do Souls which have been absorbed into Nature reappear, [at the commencement of a new annus magnus], in the condition of Lords; because it is impossible that one's Faults should be consumed, without a familiarity with the distinction [between Soul and Nature], in consequence of the reappearance of Passion, by reason of the non-destruction of habits,1 &c.: such is the meaning. b. But then, the cause is not by anyone caused to act. Being independent, then, why does she [Nature,] make that grief-occasioning resurrection of her own worshipper? To this he replies: Nature free to act, yet guided by an end. Aph. 55.* Though she be not constrained to act, yet this is fitting; because of her being devoted to another. a. Though Nature is 'not constrained to act,' not instigated, not subject to the will of another, yet 'this is fitting;' it is proper that he who is absorbed in her should rise again. Why? 'Because of her being devoted to another;' i.e., because she seeks Soul's end. The meaning is that he who is absorbed in her is again raised up, by Nature, for the sake of Soul's end, which consists in knowledge of the distinction [between Nature and Soul]. And Soul's end, and the like, are not constrainers of Nature, but occasions for the energizing of her whose very being is to energize; so that there is nothing detracted from her independence. b. He mentions, further, a proof that Soul rises from absorption into Nature: The gain of absorption into Nature. Aph. 56.* [He who is absorbed into Nature must rise again;] for he becomes omniscient and omnipotent [in a subsequent creation]. a. For 'he,' viz., he who, in a previous creation, was absorbed into the Cause, in a subsequent creation becomes 'omniscient and omnipotent;' the Lord, the First Spirit. b. But then, if that be so, it is impossible to deny2 a Lord, [which, nevertheless, the Sánkhyas seem to do]. To this he replies. In what sense there is a Lord. Aph. 57.* The existence of such a Lord is a settled point. a. It is quite agreed, by all, that there is an emergent Lord, he who had been absorbed into Nature; for the ground of dispute [between Sánkhyas and the rest,] is altogether about an eternal Lord: such is the meaning. b. He expounds diffusely the motive for Nature's creating, which was mentioned only indicatorily in the first aphorism of the Second Book: Nature's disinterestedness. Aph. 58.* Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous;—for she is not the experiencer;—like a cart's carrying saffron [for the sake of its master]. a. But then, it is quite impossible that Nature, being unintelligent, should be, spontaneously, a creator; for we see that a cart, or the like, operates only by reason of the efforts of another. To this he replies: Nature's spontaneous action illustrated. Aph. 59.* Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts; as is the case with milk. a. That is to say: as milk, without reference to men's efforts, quite of itself changes into the form of curd, so Nature, although she be unintelligent, changes into the form of Mind, &c., even without the efforts of any other. b. This is not rendered tautological by this aphorism, 'As the cow for the calf,' [Book II., § 37]; because there the question was only of the operation of instruments, and because cows are intelligent. c. By means of the exhibition of another illustration, he mentions the cause of the thing asserted as aforesaid: Another illustration. Aph. 60.* Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings]—for we see them—of Time, &c. a. Or as is the case with the acts [or on-goings,] of Time, &c., the spontaneous action of Nature is proved from what is seen. The action of Time, for example, takes place quite spontaneously, in the shape of one season's now departing and another's coming on: let the behaviour of Nature, also, be thus; for the supposition conforms to observed facts: such is the meaning. b. But, still, a senseless Nature would never energize, or would energize the wrong way; because of there being [in her case,] no such communing as, 'This is my means of producing experience, &c.' To this he replies: Nature acts from habit. Aph. 61.* From her own nature she acts, not from thought; like a servant. a. That is to say: as, in the case of an excellent servant, naturally, just from habit,2 the appointed and necessary service of the master is engaged in, and not with a view to his own enjoyment, just so does Nature energize from habit alone. Or through the influence of Desert. Aph. 62.* Or from attraction by Deserts, which have been from eternity. a. Here the word 'or' is for connecting [this aphorism with the preceding one]. Since Desert has been from eternity, therefore, moreover, through attraction by Deserts, the energizing of Nature is necessary and rightly distributed: such is the meaning.3 b. It being thus settled, then, that Nature is creative for the sake of another, he tells us, in the following section,4 that, on the completion of that other's purpose, Liberation takes place through Nature's quite spontaneously ceasing to act: Nature desists when the end is gained. Aph. 63.* From discriminative knowledge there is a cessation of Nature's creating; as is the case with a cook, when the cooking has been performed. a. When Soul's aim has been accomplished, by means of indifference to all else, through discriminative knowledge of Soul, Nature's creating ceases; as, when the cooking is completed, the labour of the cook ceases: such is the meaning. b. But, at that rate, since Nature's creating ceases through the production of discriminative knowledge in the case of a single Soul, we should find all liberated. To this he replies: Liberation of one involves not that of all. Aph. 64.* Another remains like another, through her fault. a. But 'another,' i.e., one devoid of discriminative knowledge, remains 'like another,' i.e., just like one bound by Nature. Why? 'Through her fault,' i.e., through the fault which may be described as her not accomplishing that soul's aim: such is the meaning. b. He mentions the fruit of Nature's ceasing to act: Liberation constists of what. Aph. 65.* [The fruit of Nature's ceasing to act], the solitariness of both [Nature and Soul], or [which comes to the same thing,] of either, is liberation. a. 'Of both,' i.e., of Nature and Soul, the 'solitariness,' i.e., the being alone, the mutual disjunction, in short, this is liberation. b. But then, how would Nature, having attained indifference, through the mood in the shape of discrimination, on the liberation of a single Soul, again engage in creation, for the sake of another Soul? And you are not to say that this is no objection, because Nature consists of different portions, [it is not another Nature, but the same]; because we see, that, even out of the [mortal] constituents of the liberated person, viz., his dust, &c., things are created for the experience of another. To this he replies: How Nature affects one, and not the other. Aph. 66.* Moreover, [when Nature has left off distressing the emancipated,] she does not desist, in regard to her creative influence on another; as is the case with the snake, [which ceases to be a terror,] in respect of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope [which another mistakes for a snake].5 a. Nature, though, in respect of one Soul, she have desisted, in consequence of discriminative knowledge, does not desist as regards her creative influence on another Soul, but does create in respect of that one; as the snake [so to speak,] does not produce fear, &c., in the case of him who is aware of the truth in regard to the rope, but does produce it, in respect of him who is ignorant [that what he looks upon is a rope, and not a snake]: such is the meaning. And Nature is likened to a snake, because of her disguising Soul, which is likened to a rope. Certain unintelligent persons, calling themselves Vedántís, having quite failed to understand that such is the drift of such examples as those of the rope, the snake, &c., suppose that Nature is an absolute nothing, or something merely imaginary. The matters of Scripture and of the legal institutes are to be elucidated by means of this [or that] example offered by the Sánkhyas, who assert the reality of Nature: it is not the case that the matter is simply established to be as is the example; [the analogy of which is not to be overstrained, as if the cases were parallel throughout]. Another consideration why Nature should act. Aph. 67.* And from connexion with Desert, which is the cause. a. 'Desert,' which is the cause of creation, in consequence of the conjunction of this, also, she creates, for the sake of another Soul [than the emancipated one]: such is the meaning. b. But then, since all Souls are alike indifferent, inasmuch as they do not desire [Nature's interference], what is it that here determines Nature to act only in regard to this one, and to desist in regard to that one? And Desert is not the determiner; because here, too, there is nothing to determine of which Soul what is the Desert; [Desert being inferrible only from, and, therefore, not cognizable antecendently to, its fruits]. To this he replies: Nature's selection how determined. Aph. 68.* Though there is [on Soul's part, this] indifference, yet want of discrimination is the cause of Nature's service. a. That is to say: although Souls are indifferent, yet Nature, just through [her own] non-discrimination, saying, 'This is my master,' 'This is I myself,' serves Souls, [towards their eventual emancipation], by creation, &c. And so, to what Soul, not having discriminated herself [therefrom], she has the habit1 of showing herself, in respect just of that one does Nature energize; and this it is that determines her: such is the import. b. Since it is her nature to energize, how can she desist, even when discrimination has taken place? To this he replies: Nature energizes only till the end is attained. Aph. 69.* Like a dancer does she, though she had been energizing, desist; because of the end's having been attained. a. Nature's disposition to energize is only for the sake of Soul, and not universally. Therefore is it fitting that Nature should desist, though she has been energizing, when the end has been attained, in the shape of the effectuation of Soul's aim; as a dancer, who has been performing, with the view of exhibiting a dance to the spectators, desists, on the accomplishment of this: such is the meaning. b. He states another reason for the cessation: This illustrated. Aph. 70.* Moreover, when her fault is known, Nature does not approach [Soul]; like a woman of good family. a. That is to say: Nature, moreover, ashamed at Soul's having seen her fault,—in her transformations, and her taking the shape of pain, &c.,—does not again approach Soul; 'like a woman of good family;' i.e., as a [frail] woman of good family, ashamed at ascertaining that her fault has been seen by her husband, does not approach her husband.2 b. But then, if Nature's energizing be for the sake of Soul, Soul must be altered by Bondage and Liberation, [and not remain the unalterable entity which you allege it to be]. To this he replies: Soul's relation to Bondage. Aph. 71.* Bondage and Liberation do not actually belong to Soul, [and would not even appear to do so,] but for non-discrimination. a. Bondage and Liberation, consisting in the conjunction of Pain, and its disjunction, do not 'actually,' i.e., really, belong to Soul; but, in the way mentioned in the fourth aphorism, they result only from non-discrimination: such is the meaning. b. But, in reality, Bondage and Liberation, as declared, belong to Nature alone: so he asserts: Bondage is really Nature's. Aph. 72.* They really belong to Nature, through consociation; like a beast. a. Bondage and Liberation, through Pain, really belong to Nature,2 'through consociation,' i.e., through her being hampered by the habits, &c., which are the causes of Pain; as a beast, through its being hampered by a rope, experiences Bondage and Liberation: such is the meaning. b. Here, by what causes is there Bondage? Or by what is there Liberation? To this he replies: How Nature binds and liberates herself. Aph. 73.* In seven ways does Nature bind herself; like the silk-worm: in one way does she liberate herself. a. By Merit, Dispassion, Supernatural Power, Demerit, Ignorance, Non-dispassion, and Want of Power, viz., by habits, causes of Pain, in the shape of these seven, 'does Nature bind herself' with Pain; 'like the silk-worm;' i.e., as the worm that makes the cocoon binds itself by means of the dwelling which itself constructs. And that same Nature liberates herself from Pain 'in one way,' i.e., by Knowledge alone: such is the meaning. b. But then, that which you assert, viz., that Bondage and Liberation result from Non-discrimination alone, is improper; because Non-discrimination can neither be quitted nor assumed, and because, in the world, Pain, and its negative, Pleasure, &c., can, themselves, be neither quitted nor assumed: otherwise, [if you still insist on retaining the opinion objected to], there is disparagement of sense-evidence. Having pondered this, he himself [not leaving it to a commentator,] explains what was asserted in the fourth aphorism: An objection met. Aph. 74.* Non-discrimination is the cause [not the thing itself]; [so that] there is no disparagement of sense-evidence. a. What was asserted before was this, that Non-discrimination is only the occasion of Bondage and Liberation in souls, and not that Non-discrimination itself is these two; therefore 'there is no disparagement of sense-evidence;' [for, though we see that Pain and Pleasure cannot be directly assumed or quitted, yet we also see that causes of them can be assumed or quitted]: such is the meaning. b. He mentions, among the means conducive to Discrimination, Study, which is the essence of them: Means of Discrimination. Aph. 75.* Discrimination is perfected through abandonment [of everything], expressed by a 'No, No,' through study of the [twenty-five] Principles. a. Discrimination is effected through study of the Principles, in the shape of abandoning, by a 'No, No,' in regard to things unintelligent, ending with Nature, the conceit [that Nature, or any of her products, is Soul]. All the others [enumerated in the list of means] are only supplemental to Study: such is the meaning. b. He states a speciality in regard to the perfecting of Discrimination: The means not efficacious everywhere. Aph. 76.* Through the difference of those competent [to engage in the matter at all], there is no necessity [that each and every one should at once be successful]. a. Since there is a division, among those competent, into the sluggish, &c., though study be made, there is no certainty that, in this very birth, Discrimination will be accomplished: such is the meaning. Therefore, every one should, by strenuousness in study, acquire for himself the highest degree of competency: such is the import. b. He states that Liberation takes place solely through the effecting of Discrimination, and not otherwise: Imperfect Discrimination inefficacious. Aph. 77.* Since what [Pain] has been repelled returns again, there comes, even from medium [but imperfect,] Discrimination, experience, [which it is desired to get entirely rid of]. a. But sluggish Discrimination [lower even than the middling variety], antecedently to direct intuition, consists only of Hearing, Pondering, and Meditating: such is the division [of Discrimination]. Of Liberation during life. Aph. 78.* And he who, living, is liberated. a. That is to say: he, also, who, while living, is liberated is just in the condition of medium Discrimination. b. He adduces evidence for there being some one liberated, though still living: Proof that this may be. Aph. 79.* It is proved by the fact of instructed and instructor. a. That is to say: it is proved that there are such as are liberated during life, by the mention, in the Institutes, on the subject of Discrimination, of the relation of preceptor and pupil; i.e., because it is only one liberated during life that can be an instructor [in this matter]. Further proof. Aph. 80.* And there is Scripture.2 a. There is also Scripture for there being persons liberated during life. b. But then, merely through hearing, too, one might become [qualified to be] an instructor. To this he replies: A suggestion repelled. Aph. 81.* [And not through merely hearing is one qualified to become an instructor]: otherwise, there were blind tradition. a. That is to say: otherwise, since even a person of sluggish Discrimination [but who, yet, had heard,] would be an instructor, we should have a blind handing down [of doctrines which would speedily become corrupted or lost]. b. But then, when, through Knowledge, one's works [which are the cause of mundane existence,] have perished how can there [still] be life? To this he replies: How life is compatible with Liberation. Aph. 82.* Possessed of a body, [the emancipated sage goes on living]; like the whirling of a wheel. a. Even on the cessation of the action of the potter, the wheel, of itself, revolves for some time, in consequence of the motal inertia resulting from the previous action. So, after knowledge, though actions do not arise, yet, through the [self-continuant] action of antecedent acts, possessing an energizing body, he remains living, yet liberated;2 [and, if he did not, but if every one who gained true knowledge were, on gaining it, to disappear, true knowledge would cease to be handed down orally; and Kapila, probably, did not contemplate books, or did not think these a secure depository of the doctrine]: such is the meaning. b. But then, since the continuance1 of experience, &c., is put an end to by that 'Meditation with distinct recognition of the object,' which [see Yoga Aphorisms, Book I., § 17,2] is the cause of knowledge, how can one retain a body? To this he replies: Difficulty of shuffling off this mortal coil. Aph. 83.* This [retention of a body] is occasioned by the least vestige of impression. a. That is to say: the retention of a body is caused by even the least remains of those impressions4 of objects which are the causes of having a body. b. He recapitulates the sense of the declarations of the Institute: Recapitulation. Aph. 84.* That which was to be done has been done, when entire Cessation of Pain has resulted from Discrimination; not otherwise, not otherwise. a. So much for the Third Book, on Dispassion. END OF BOOK III. Footnotes 3 See, for another rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 36. Ed. 3 Chhándogya Upanishad, iii., xiv., 1. Ed. 3 Aniruddha and Vedántí Mahádeva transpose Aphorisms 33 and 34. Ed. * Remove the brackets which enclose 'promoting.' Compare {Book VI., Aph. 24}. 2 The five are there called 'afflictions' (kleśa). Ed. 5 See, for these, Dr. Ballantyne's edition of the Tattwa-samása, § 63. Ed. 2 Quoted below, from the Sánkhya-káriká, with Mr. John Davies's translation: 'Nine varieties of acquiescence are set forth; four internal, named from Nature, means, time, and fortune; five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense. Ed. 4 Here appended, with Mr. Davies's translation: 'The eight perfections (or means of acquiring perfection) are reasoning (úha), word or oral instruction (śabda), study or reading (adhya-yana), the suppression of the three kinds of pain, acquisition of friends, and liberality (dána). The three fore-mentioned (conditions) are checks to perfection.' Ed. 3 It here follows, with the translation of Mr. Davies: 'The divine class has eight varieties; the animal, five. Mankind is single in its class. This is, in summary, the world (sarga, emanation,) of living things.' Ed. 3 Vásaná. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 1 To render sanskára. Ed. 2 Pratishedha, on which vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed. 2 As here, so again just below, this word renders sanskára. Ed. 3 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 36. Ed. 4 Read, instead of 'in the following section,' 'by an enunciation.' Ed. 5 Of this Aphorism, and of the comment on it, MSS. of Vijnána's treatise afford a much better text than that here reprinted. In one of its more approved forms, that which Vijnána seems to elect, the original enunciation runs thus: 'Furthermore, she [Nature,] does not give over effecting creation, with reference to another, [i.e., another soul than that of the spiritual sage, though she creates for such a sage no longer; and she acts, in so doing,] analogously to a snake, with reference to him who is unenlightened as to the real character of the rope' [which is mistaken for it; this illusory snake keeping him constantly in a state of alarm, though it ceases to affect him who has discovered that it is nothing more formidable than a yard or two of twisted hemp]. More closely, so far as regards the construction of the original: 'Furthermore, in like manner as a snake goes on influencing him who . . . . . [Nature persists] in effecting creation.' &c. That uparága, as embodied in the expression sṛishṭyuparága, signifies 'causing,' 'effecting,' in the view of both Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva, who define it by karaṇa. The Aphorism in question, mainly as just exhibited, together with preferable deviations from the comment as given by Dr. Ballantyne, will be found at p. 13 of the variants appended to my edition of the Sánkkya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed. 1 Vásaná. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 61. 2 Read: 'Bondage and Liberation belong to Nature alone; because to it, in truth, belongs misery.' Ed. 2 None of the commentators but Vijnána recognizes an Aphorism in these words; and it is very doubtful whether even he does so. Ed. 2 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 31. Ed. 1 Vásaná. Vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 2 Which here follows, with Dr. Ballantyne's translation: '[Meditation, of the kind called] that in which there is distinct recognition [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) argumentation (vitarka). (2) deliberation (vichára), (3) beatitude (ánanda), and (4) egotism (asmitá).' Ed. 4 This is to render the technicality sanskára. Ed. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next

Now, by means of a collection of narratives, recognized in the Institutes, the means of discriminative knowledge are to be displayed: so, for this purpose the Fourth Book is commenced. Soul set right by hearing the truth. Aph. 1.* As in the case of the king's son, from instruction as to the truth [comes discrimination between soul and Nature]. a. 'Discrimination' is supplied from the concluding aphorism of the preceding section. The meaning is: as, in the case of the king's son, discrimination is produced by instruction as to the truth. The story, here, is as follows: A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the [unlucky] star of the tenth portion2 [of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the idea, that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he is alive, a certain minister informs him: 'Thou art not a forester; thou art a king's son.' As he, immediately, having abandoned the idean of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, 'I am a king,' so, too, it [the Soul], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art [thyself,] a portion thereof,' having abandoned the idea of its being Nature [or of being something material or phenomenal], rests simply upon its own nature, saying, 'Since I am the son of Brahmá, I am, myself, Brahmá, and not something mundane, different therefrom:' such is the meaning. b. He exhibits another story, to prove that even women, Śúdras, &c., may gain the [one desirable] end, through a Bráhman, by hearing the instructions of a Bráhman: Even when the instruction is not addressed to the hearer. Aph. 2.* As in the case of the goblin, even when the instruction was for the sake of another, [the chance hearer may be benefited]. a. That is to say: though the instruction in regard to the truth was being delivered, by the venerable Kṛishṉa, for Arjuna's benefit, knowledge of the distinction [between Soul and Nature] was produced in the case of a goblin standing near [and overhearing the discourse]: and so it may happen in the case of others, too. b. And, if knowledge is not produced from once instructing, then a repetition of the instruction is to be made; to which effect he adduces another story: Necessity of inculcation. Aph. 3.* Repetition [is to be made], if not, from once instructing, [the end be gained]. a. That is to say: a repetition of instruction, also, is to be made; because, in the Chhándogya [Upanishad],1 and the like; there is mention of Áruṉi, and others, as having more than once instructed Śwetaketu and others. b. With a view to the removal of desire, he sets forth, with an illustration, the fragility, &c., of Soul's accompaniments: Transitoriness of mundane things. Aph. 4.* As in the case of father and son; since both are seen; [to one, to die, and the other, to be born]. a. That is to say: Discrimination takes place, through dispassion, in consequence of its being inferred, in respect of one's own self, also, that there is death and birth; since these are seen in the case of father and son. This has been stated as follows: 'The coming into being, and the departure, of Soul [entangled in Nature],1 may be inferred from [the case of] father and son.' b. He next explains, by illustrative stories, the subservients to the perfecting of knowledge in him in whom knowledge has arisen, and who is devoid of passion: Voluntary abandonment distinguished from involuntary. Aph. 5.* One experiences pleasure or pain [alternatively], from [voluntary] abandonment or [forcible] separation; as in the case of a hawk. a. That is to say: since people become happy by the abandonment of things, and unhappy by [forcible] separation from them, acceptance of them ought not to be made; 'as in the case of a hawk.'4 For a hawk, when he has food [before him], if he be driven away5 by any one, is grieved at being separated from the food; [but] if, of his own accord, he leaves it, then he is free from grief. How Soul ought to abandon Nature. Aph. 6.* As in the case of a snake and its skin. a. That is to say: as a snake readily abandons its old skin, from knowing that it ought to be quitted, just so he who desires liberation should abandon Nature, experienced through a long period, and effete, when he knows that it ought to be quitted. Thus it has been said: 'As a snake . . . its old skin,' &c. b. And, when abandoned, he should not again accept Nature and the rest. So, in regard to this, he says: Its resumption prohibited. Aph. 7.* Or as an amputated hand. a. As no one takes back again an amputated hand, just so this [Nature], when abandoned, he should not readmit: such is the meaning. The word 'Or' is used in the sense of moreover;' [the import of the conjunction being superadditive, not alternative]. Duty to be sacrificed to salvation. Aph. 8.* What is not a means [of liberation is] not to be thought about, [as this conduces only] to bondage; as in the case of Bharata. a. That which is not an immediate cause of Discrimination, even though it may be a duty, still is 'not to be thought about;' i.e., intention of the mind towards the performance thereof is not to be made; since it tends to Bondage, from its making us forget Discrimination. 'As in the case of Bharata:' that is to say, as was the case with the royal sage Bharata's cherishing Dínánátha's1 fawn, though [this was] in accordance with duty. Company to be avoided. Aph. 9.* From [association with] many there is obstruction to concentration, through passion, &c.; as in the case of a girl's shells.4 a. Association is not to be made with many; because, when there is association with many, there is disturbance, through the manifestation of Passion, &c., which destroys concentration; as a jingling is produced by the mutual contact of the shells on a girl's wrist: such is the meaning. Even that of one. Aph. 10.* Just so, from [the company of] two, also. a. Just so, even from two there is obstruction to concentration; therefore one ought to abide quite alone: such is the meaning. Blessedness of those who expect nothing. Aph. 11.* He who is without hope is happy; like Pingalá.3 a. Having abandoned hope, let a man become possessed of the happiness called contentment; 'like Pingalá;' that is to say, as the courtesan called Pingalá, desiring a lover, having found no lover, being despondent, became happy, when she had left off hoping. b. But then, granting that Pain may cease, on the cessation of hope, yet how can there be happiness, in the absence of causes thereof? It is replied: That natural happiness, resulting from the predominance of Purity in the mind, which remains obscured by hope, itself resumes its influence, on the departure of hope; as is the case with the coolness of water which [supposed natural coolness] had been hindered [from manifesting itself,] by heat: there is not, in this case, any need of means. And it is laid down that precisely this is happiness of Soul. c. Since it is an obstructer of Concentration, exertion with a view to experience is not to be made, since this will be effected quite otherwise; as he states: Exertion needless. Aph. 12.* [One may be happy,] even without exertion; like a serpent happy in another's house. a. Supply, 'he may be happy.' The rest is simple. So it has been said:1 'The building of a house is, assuredly, painful, and in no way pleasant. A serpent, having entered the dwelling made by another [e.g., a rat], does find confort.' b.From Institutes, and from preceptors, only the essence is to be accepted; since, otherwise, it may be impossible to concentrate the attention, from there being, by reason of implications,3 discussions, &c., discrepancies in declared unessential parts, and from the multiplicity of topics. So he says: A bee-like eclecticism recommended. Aph. 13.* Though he devote himself to many Institutes and teachers, a taking of the essence [is to be made]; as is the case with the bee. a. Supply 'is to be made.' The rest is simple. Thus it has been said: 'From small Institutes, and from great, the intelligent man should take, from all quarters, the essence; as the bee does from the flowers.' b. Be the other means what they may, the direct possession of Discrimination is to be effected only by intentness, through maintaining Meditation; as he tells us: Intentness on one object. Aph. 14.* The Meditation is not interrupted of him whose mind is intent on one object; like the maker of arrows.3 a. As, in the case of a maker of arrows, with his mind intent solely on the making of an arrow, the exclusion of other thoughts is not interrupted even by a king's passing at his side, so, too, of him whose mind is intent on one point there is in no way an 'interruption of meditation,' i.e., a failure to exclude other thoughts. Rules not to be transgressed with impunity. Aph. 15.* Through transgression of the enjoined rules there is failure in the aim; as in the world. a. Whatever rule, for the practisers of Concentration, has been laid down in the Institutes, if it be transgressed, then the end, viz., the effecting of knowledge, is not attained. 'As in the world.' That is to say: just as, in ordinary life, if the enjoined procedures, &c., in regard to a medicine, or the like, be neglected, this or that effect thereof will not be obtained. b. He states, further, that, if the rules be forgotten, the end will not be gained: Rules must not be forgotten. Aph. 16.* Moreover, if they be forgotten; as in the case of the female frog. a. This is plain. And the story of the female frog is this: A certain king, having gone to hunt, saw a beautiful damsel in the forest. And she, being solicited in marriage by the king, made this stipulation: 'When water shall be shown to me by thee, then I must depart.' But, on one occasion, when wearied with sport, she asked the king, 'Where is water?' The king, too, forgetting his agreement, showed her the water. Then she, having become the she-frog Kámarúpiṇí,2 daughter of the king of the frogs, entered the water. And then the king, though he sought her with nets, &c., did not regain her. b. He mentions a story with reference to the necessity of reflecting on the words of the teacher, as well as hearing them: Reflexion necessary, as well as hearing. Aph. 17.* Not even though instruction be heard is the end gained, without reflexion; as in the case of Virochana.4 a. By 'reflexion' is meant such consideration as determines the import of the teacher's words. Without this, though the instruction be heard, knowledge of the truth does not necessarily follow; for it is written, that, though hearing the instruction of Prajápati, Virochana, as between Indra and Virochana, wanted discrimination, from want of reflexion: Of this further. Aph. 18.* Of those two, it [reflexion,] was seen in the case of Indra [only]. a. Of those two who are mentioned, [indicated] by the expression 'of those two,' reflexion [was seen, &c.]. And, as between those two, viz., Indra and Virochana, reflexion was seen in the case of Indra: such is the meaning. b. And he tells us, that, by him who desires to understand thoroughly, attendance on the teacher should be practised for a long time: The process requires time. Aph. 19.* Having performed reverence, the duties of a student, and attendance, one has success after a long time; as in his case. a. 'As in his case.' That is to say: as in the case of Indra, so in the case of another, too, only after having practised, under a preceptor, reverence, study of the Vedas, service, &c., is there 'success,' i.e., the revelation of truth; not otherwise. The time for the process may embrace successive states of being. Aph. 20.* There is no determination of the time; as in the Case of Vámadeva.3 a. In the arising of knowledge, there is 'no determination of the time,' as, for instance, in its taking place only from causes dependent on the senses. 'As in the Case of Vámadeva.' That is to say: as, in consequence of causes pertaining to a previous life, knowledge arose, in the case of Vámadeva, even when in embryo, so it may in the case of another. b. But then, since it is written, that the means of knowledge need be nothing other than devotion to those [viz., Brahmá, &c.,] who [unlike the Absolute,] have Qualities, knowledge may result from this. Why, then, a hard and subtle process of Concentration? To this he replies: Inferior means not altogether unprofitable. Aph. 21.* Through devotion to something under a superinduced form, [attainment to, or approach towards, knowledge takes place] by degrees; as in the case of those who devote themselves to sacrifices. a. Supply 'there is attainment.' Through devotion to Souls, e.g., Brahmá, Vishṉu, Śiva, under the forms superinduced on them, the effecting of knowledge takes place 'by degrees,' i.e., by the successive attainment of the worlds of Brahmá, &c., or else through the purification or the Good principle, &c., but not directly; as is the case with sacrificers [whose slaughter of animals, requiring to be expiated, throws them back, so far, in the road to emancipation]: such is the meaning. b. He tells us, that, moreover, there is no certainty that successive rise to the worlds of Brahmá, &c., would effect knowledge: Scriptural proof that heaven gives not liberation. Aph. 22.* Moreover, after the attainment of what [like the world of Brahmá,] is other [than the state of emancipated soul], there is return [to mundane existence]; because it is written [in the 5th Prapáṭhaka of the Chhándogya Upanishad4]: 'From conjunction with the five fires there is birth,' &c. a. He exhibits an illustration, to the effect that the effecting of knowledge takes place only in the case of him who is free from passion: Discrimination illustrated. Aph. 23.* By him who is free from passion what is to be left is left, and what is to be taken is taken; as in the case of the swan and the milk. a. That is to say: only by him who is free from passion is there a quitting 'of what is to be left,' i.e., of Nature, &c., and a taking 'of what is to be taken,' i.e., of Soul; as it is only the swan,—and not the crow, or the like,—that, out of milk and water mingled, by means of leaving the unimportant water, takes the valuable milk, [as the Hindus insist that it does]. b. He tells us that both of these also take place in consequence of association with a perfect1 man: Benefit of good society. Aph. 24.* Or through association with one who has obtained excellence;4 as in the case thereof. a. That is to say: moreover, from association with him by whom 'excellence,' i.e., excellence in knowledge, has been obtained, the aforesaid [discrimination] takes place; just as in the case of the swan, [§ 23]; as, in the case of Alarka, Discrimination manifested itself spontaneously, merely through simple association with Dattátreya. b. He tells us that we ought not to associate with those who are infected with desire: Danger of unsuitable society. Aph. 25.* Not of his own accord should he go near one who is infected with desire; like the parrot. a. Association is not to be made, voluntarily, with a person infected with desire. 'Like the parrot.' That is to say: just as the bird [called a] parrot, by reason of its being exceedingly beautiful, does not [by going near people,] act in a rash manner, through fear of being imprisoned by those who covet it for its beauty. b. And he states the harm of association with those who labour under desire: Of this further. Aph. 26.* [Else he may become] bound, by conjunction with the cords; as in the case of the parrot. a. And, in the case of associating with those persons, he may become bound, 'by conjunction with the cords,' i.e., by conjunction with their Desire, &c., [the Qualities, punningly compared to cords]; just 'as in the case of the parrot;' that is to say, just as the bird [called a] parrot becomes bound by the cords, i.e., the ropes, of the hunter. b. He determines, by two [aphorisms]. the means of [effecting] dispassion: Means of dispassion. Aph. 27.* Not by enjoyment is desire appeased; as in the case of the saint. a. That is to say: as, in the case of the saint, Saubhari,3 desire was not appeased by enjoyment, so, also in the case of others, it is not. b. But, further: Of this further. Aph. 28.* From seeing the fault of both. a. That is to say: only 'from seeing the fault,' e.g., of being changeable, of consisting of pain, &c., 'of both,' i.e., of Nature and her productions, does the appeasing of desire take place; just as in the case of the saint [§ 27]. For it is written, that Saubhari, just from seeing the evil of society, was afterwards dispassionate. b. He tells us that incompetency even to accept instruction attaches to him who is infected with the fault of desire, &c: Agitation excludes instruction. Aph. 29.* Not in the case of him whose mind is disturbed does the seed of instruction sprout; as in the case of Aja. a. In him whose mind is disturbed by desire, &c., not even does a sprout spring up from that seed of the tree of knowledge which is in the shape of instruction. 'As in the case of Aja.' That is to say: as not a sprout from the seed of instruction, though delivered to him by Vasishṭha, sprang up in the king named Aja, whose mind was disturbed by grief for his wife.2 b. What need of more? Of this further. Aph. 30.* Not even a mere semblance [of this true knowledge arises in him whose mind is disturbed]; as in the case of a foul mirror. a. Even superficial knowledge does not arise, from instruction, in one whose mind is disturbed, through the obstruction caused by its wandering away, e.g., to other objects; as an object is not reflected in a foul mirror, through the obstruction caused by the impurities: such is the meaning. b. Or, if knowledge should spring up in any kind of way, still it may not, he tells us, be in accordance with the instruction: Knowledge not necessarily perfect knowledge. Aph. 31.* Nor, even though sprung therefrom, is that [knowledge, necessarily,] in accordance therewith; like the lotus. a. Though sprung 'therefrom,' i.e., from instruction, knowledge is not [necessarily,] in accordance with the instruction, in case this has not been entirely understood. 'Like the lotus.' That is to say: just as the lotus, though the seed be of the best, is not in accordance with the seed, when the mud is faulty. The mind of the student is compared to the mud [in which the lotus-seed was sown]. b. But then, since the Soul's end is, indeed, gained by [the attainment of] supernatural power in the worlds [§ 21. a.] of Brahmá, &c., to what purpose is the effecting of knowledge, with so much toil, for liberation? To this he replies: Heaven not perfect bliss. Aph. 32.* Not even on the attainment of glorification has that been done which was to be done; as is the case with the perfection4 of the objects worshipped, as is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped. a. Even though one attain to supernatural power, 'that has not been done which was to be done,' i.e., the end has not been gained; because it is attended by the grief of deficiency and excess. 'As is the case with the perfection of the objects worshipped.' That is to say: as, though the possession of perfection [so called,] belongs to 'the objects worshipped,' i.e., to Brahmá, &c., [still] that has not been done which was to be done; since it is written, that even these, while in the sleep of Concentration, &c., [still] practise Concentration, [from fear of losing what they have attained to]. Just in like manner is the case with him who, by the worship of these, has attained to their supernatural power. Such is the meaning. b. So much for the Fourth Book, that of Tales, in the Commentary, composed by Vijnána Bhikshu, on Kapila's Declaration of the Sánkhya. END OF BOOK IV. Footnotes 2 The Sanskrit yields 'under the star [named] Gaṇḍa.' Ed. 1 VI., i., &c. Ed. 1 Read, instead of 'of Soul,' &c., 'of one's self.' Ed. 4 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6648. Ed. 5 Read, 'molested' (upahatya). Dr. Ballantyne followed an error of the press, apahatya, which he did not observe that I had pointed out in the corrigenda to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed. 1 The original, dínánátha, compounded of dína and anátha, 'miserable and having no master,' is an epithet of 'fawn.' For the story of Bharata and the fawn, see the Vishṇu-puráṇa, Book ii., Chap. xiii. Ed. 4 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6652. Ed. 3 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6447. Ed. 1 Quoted from the Mahábhárata, xii., 6649. Ed. 3 Abhyupagama, 'acceptings' (of positions, &c.). Ed. 3 See the Mahábhárata, xii., 6651. Ed. 2 Probably this is an epithet, 'changing one's form at will,' not a proper name. Ed. 4 See the Chhándogya Upanishad, viii., viii., 4. 3 See the Aitareya Upanishad, ii., iv., 5. Ed. 4 This reference is taken from Vijnána, who, however, does not represent that the original of the words 'From conjunction,' &c., is found, literally, in the Chhándogya Upanishad. Ed. 1 Siddha. Vide supra, p. 115, note 3. For the cognate siddhi, vide infra, p. 310, note 4. Ed. 4 See the Márkaṇḍeya-puráṇa, ch. xvi. Ed. 3 See the Vishṇu-puráṇa, Book iv., Ch. ii. and iii. Ed. 2 See Kálidása's Raghuvanśa, Book viii. Ed. 4 Nágeśa, commenting on this aphorism, explains siddhi, here rendered 'perfection,' by aiśwarya, 'supernatural power.' Ed. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous Next

a. The tenets of his Institute are completed. Next is begun a Fifth Book, in order to set aside the primâ facie notions of others in regard to his Institute. Among those, in the first place he disposes of the objection that the Benediction implied by the expression 'Well,' in the first Aphorism [of Book I.], is purposeless: Reasons for a Benedictory Opening. Aph. 1.* The [use of a] Benediction [is justified] by the practice of the good, by our seeing its fruit, and by Scripture. a. The [use of a] Benediction, which we made, is proved to be proper to be made, by these proofs; such is the meaning. The word iti is intended to preclude the expectation of any other reasons. b. He repels those who entertain the primâ facie view, that what was asserted in the expression, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord' [see Book I., Aph. 92], is not made out; because [forsooth,] his existence is proved by his being the giver of the fruits of works:3 Needlessness of a Lord. Aph. 2.* Not from its [the world's,] being governed by a Lord is there the effectuation of fruit: for it is by works [i.e., by merit and demerit,] that this is accomplished. a. That is to say: it is not proper [to suppose] the effectuation of the change [of the elements] into the shape of the [appropriate] fruit of works, on the ground that the cause is 'governed by a Lord;' because it is possible for the fruit to be effected by the works [i.e., the merit and demerit,] alone, which are indispensable; [and, if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, he cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].2 b. He declares, further, in [several] aphorisms, that it is not the case that the Lord is the giver of fruit: The supposed Lord would be selfish. Aph. 3.* [If a Lord were governor, then] from intending his own benefit, his government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world. a. If the Lord were the governor, then his government would be only for his own benefit; as is the case [with ordinary rulers] in the world: such is the meaning. b. In reply to the doubt, 'grant that the Lord, also, be benefited: what harm?' he says: And, therefore, not the Lord spoken of. Aph. 4.* [He must, then, be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of him]. a. If we agree that the Lord, also, is benefited, he, also, must be something mundane, 'just like a worldly lord;' because, since his desires are [on that supposition,] not [previously] satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.: such is the meaning. b. In reply to the doubt, 'be it even so,' he says: The difficulty perhaps originates in a mistaken expression. Aph. 5.* Or [let the name of Lord be] technical. a. If, whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then let yours, like ours, be merely a technical term for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation; since there cannot be an eternal lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will: such is the meaning. b. He states another objection to the Lord's being the governor: Objection to there being a Lord. Aph. 6.* This [position, viz., that there is a Lord,] cannot be established without [assuming that he is affected by] Passion; because that is the determinate cause [of all energizing]. a. That is to say: moreover, it cannot be proved that he is a governor, unless there be Passion; because Passion is the determinate cause of activity. b. But then, be it so, that there is Passion in the Lord, even. To this he replies: This objection, further. Aph. 7.* Moreover, were that [Pasion] conjoined with him, he could not be eternally free. a. That is to say: moreover, if it be agreed that there is conjunction [of the Lord] with Passion, he cannot be eternally free; and, therefore, thy tenet [of his eternal freedom] is invalidated. b. Pray [let us ask], does lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be properties of Nature, [not properties of Soul]? Or from an influence by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative: Objection, on one branch of an alternative. Aph. 8.* If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul]. a. From the conjunction, with Soul, of 'the properties of Nature,' i.e., Desire, &c., Soul, also, would turn out [contrary to Scripture,] to be associated with properties. b. But, in regard to the latter [alternative], he says: Objection, on the other branch. Aph. 9.* If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then lordship would belong to every one. a. That is to say: if lordship is by reason of the mere existence of proximity, as in the case of the magnet [which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron], then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that even all men, indifferently, experiencers in this or that [cycle of] creation, [may] have lordship; because it is only by conjunction with all experiencers, that Nature produces Mind, &c. And, therefore, your tenet of there being only one Lord is invalidated. b. Be it as you allege; yet these are false reasonings; because they contradict the evidence which establishes [the existence of] a Lord. Otherwise, Nature, also, could be disproved by thousands of false reasonings of the like sort. He therefore says: Denial that there is any evidence of a Lord. Aph. 10.* It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord]; because there is no evidence of it. a. Its establishment, i.e., the establishing that there is an eternal Lord. Of the Lord, in the first place, there is not sense-evidence; so that only the evidences of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable: such is the meaning. b. The inapplicability he sets forth in two aphorisms: Denial that it can be established by inference. Aph. 11.* There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord]; because there is [here] no [case of invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken]. a. 'Association,' i.e., invariable concomitancy. 'There is none;' i.e., none exists, [in this case]. And so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as, 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' [the fact of] invariable concomitancy3 is not established, since there is no compulsion [that every product should have had an intelligent maker]. Such is the meaning. b. Nor, moreover, he tells us, is there [the evidence of] Testimony [to there being a Lord]: Denial that there is Scripture for it. Aph. 12.* Moreover, there is Scripture for [this world's] being the product of Nature, [not of a Lord]. a. Scripture asserts, exclusively, that the world is the product of Nature, not that it has Soul for its cause. b. He refutes, diffusely, by a cluster [of seven aphorisms],3 the opinion of an opponent in regard to that which was established in the first Section,4 viz., 'Bondage does not arise from Ignorance,' [conjoined with Soul]. Conjunction, in the case of the solitary, would be a contradiction. Aph. 13.* With that which is solitary there cannot be conjunction of the property of Ignorance. a. Since Soul has no association [with anything whatever], it is plainly impossible for it to be united with the property of Ignorance. b. But then, [it may be replied,] what is to be asserted is, that the conjunction of Ignorance is simply through force of Ignorance [which is a negation, or nonentity]; and so, since this is no reality, there is no association occasioned thereby. To this he replies: A suggestion repelled. Aph. 14.* Since the existence of this [alleged negative Ignorance] is established [only] on the ground of its [pretended] conjunction, there is a vicious circle.3 a. And, if it is by the conjunction of Ignorance that Ignorance is established, there is 'a vicious circle,' [literally, a resting of each on the other, alternately], a resting a thing on itself; or, in short, a regressus in infinitum. b. In reply to the doubt [suggested by the Naiyáyika], 'but then, as in the case of seed and sprout, the regressus in infinitum is no objection,' he replies: The world has a beginning. Aph. 15.* It is not as in the case of seed and sprout; for Scripture teaches that the world has a beginning. a. There cannot belong to it such a regressus in infinitum as that of seed and sprout; because there is Scripture for the fact that the mundane state of souls, consisting of all undesirable things, viz., Ignorance, &c., had a beginning. For we hear, in Scripture, that these cease to exist at the dissolution of all things, in profound sleep, &c. Such is the meaning. b. But then, [you Vedántís will say], according to us, Ignorance is technically so termed, and is not, e.g., in the shape, specified by the Yoga, of supposing what is not soul to be soul; and so, just like your 'Nature,' since this [Ignorance] of ours has an unbroken eternity, though it be lodged in Soul, there is no disparagement of the solitariness thereof: in regard to this doubt, having deliberated on this artificial sense of the word 'Ignorance,' he objects to it: Soul and knowledge not identical. Aph. 16.* Then Brahma would be found to be excluded [from existence]; because he is something else than knowledge. a. If the meaning of the word 'Ignorance' (avidyá) be only 'otherness than knowledge,' then Brahma, soul itself, would be found to be excluded, to perish, through his being annihilable by knowledge; since he is other than knowledge: such is the meaning. [Further]: Knowledge, not excluding ignorance, would be resultless. Aph. 17.* Were there not exclusion, then there would be resultlesseness. a. But, if, the existence of ignorance were really not excluded by knowledge, then there would be resultlessness of knowledge, because of its not debarring Ignorance, [which is the only result competent to knowledge]: such is the meaning. b. He censures the other alternative, [viz., that knowledge might exclude Soul]: On the Vedánta theory, the world ought to vanish. Aph. 18.* If it [Ignorance,] meant the being excludible by Knowledge, it would be [predicable], in like manner, of the world, also. a. If, on the other hand, the being excludible by Knowledge, in the case of the soul, which possesses properties, be, indeed, what is meant by the being Ignorance, in that case 'the world,' the whole mundane system, viz., Nature, Mind, &c., would, also, in like manner, be Ignorance. And so, the whole mundane system being merely Ignorance, since the Ignorance would be annihilated by one man's knowledge, the mundane system would become invisible to others, also. Such is the import. The Vedánta theory self-contradictory. Aph. 19.* If it [Ignorance,] were of that nature it would be something that had a commencement.2 a. Or suppose it to be the case, that to be Ignorance means simply the being excludible by Knowledge, still such a thing could not have had an eternal existence in souls [as held by Vedántís (see § 15, b.)], but must have had a commencement. For it is proved, by such recited texts as, 'Consisting of knowledge alone,'12 &c., that, at the time of the universal dissolution, &c., the soul consists of Knowledge alone. Such is the meaning. Therefore, it is settled that there is no other Ignorance, annihilable by Knowledge, than that stated in the Yoga system; and this is a property of the understanding only, not a property of the soul. b. By a cluster of [six] aphorisms,4 he clears up the primâ facie view of an opponent, in regard to that which was stated in the same Book [Book V., § 2], that Nature's energizing is due to Merit: Merit is undeniable. Aph. 20.* There is no denying Merit; because of the diversity in the operations of Nature. a. Merit is not to be denied on the ground of its being no object of sense; because it is inferred; since, otherwise, 'the diversity in the operations of Nature' [accommodating one person, and inconveniencing another,] would be unaccounted for: such is the meaning. b. He states further proof, also: Proofs of this. Aph. 21.* It [the existence of Merit,] is established by Scripture, by tokens, &c. a. He shows to be a fallacy the argument of the opponent, that Merit exists not, because of there being no sense-evidence of it: Sense-evidence not the only kind of evidence. Aph. 22.* There is, here, no necessity; for there is room for other proofs. a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a thing of which there is no mundane sense-evidence must be non-existent; because things are subject to other proofs. b. He proves that there exists Demerit, as well as Merit: Demerit as certain as Merit. Aph. 23.* It is thus, moreover, in both cases. a. That is to say: the proofs apply to Demerit, just as they do to Merit. The proof of each the same. Aph. 24.* If the existence [of Merit] be as of course, [because, otherwise, something would be unaccounted for], the same is the case in respect of both. a. But then, merit is proved to exist by a natural consequence in this shape, viz., that, otherwise, an injunction would be unaccounted for; but there is none such in respect of demerit: so how can Scriptural or logical argument be extended to demerit? If any one says this, it is not so; since there is proof, in the shape of natural consequence, 'it is alike, in respect of both,' i.e., of both merit and demerit; because, otherwise, a prohibitory injunction, such as, 'He should not approach another's wife,' would be unaccounted for. Such is the meaning. b. He repels the doubt, that, if Merit, &c., be acknowledged [to exist], then, in consequence of souls' having properties, &c., they must be liable to modification, &c.: Merit, &c., inhere in what. Aph. 25.* It is of the internal organ3 [not of soul] that Merit, &c., are the properties. a. In the expression '&c.' are included all those that are stated, in the Vaiśeshika Institute, as peculiar qualities of soul.2 b. [To the objection, that the existence of an internal organ, as well as of the Qualities from which such might arise, is debarred by Scripture, be replies]: The Qualities exist, though not in soul. Aph. 26.* And of the Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment. a. The Qualities, viz., Purity, &c., and their properties, viz., happiness, &c., and their products, also, viz., Mind, &c., are not denied essentially, but are denied only adjunctively in respect of soul; just as we deny that heat [in red-hot iron,] belongs to the iron. b. In regard to the doubt, 'Why, again, do we not deny them an essence, as we do to what is meant by the words sleep, wish, &c.?' he says: The above thesis argued. Aph. 27.* By a conjunction of the five members [of an argumentative statement] we discern [that] Happiness [exists]. a. Here, in order to get a particular subject of his assertion, he takes happiness alone, one portion of the matter in dispute, as a representative of the entire matter. But the better reading is, 'we discern [that] Happiness, &c., [exist].' The five members of an argumentative statement are the Proposition, Reason, Example, Synthesis [of the two premises], and Conclusion; and, by the 'conjunction,' i.e., the combination, of these, all things, viz., Happiness, &c., are proved to exist. Such is the meaning. b. And the employment [of the argument] is this: (1) Pleasure is real; (2) Because it produces motion in something. (3) Whatever produces motion in anything is real, as are sentient beings; (4) And pleasure produces motion in things, in the way of horripilation, &c.: (5) Therefore, it is real. c. But then the Chárváka, next, doubts whether there be any evidence other than sense-evidence; since [he contends,] there is no truth in the assertion [of an inductive conclusion], that such and such is pervaded by such and such, &c.3 The validity of inference questioned. Aph. 28.* Not from once apprehending is a connexion established. a. That is to say: from once apprehending concomitance [of a supposed token and the thing betokened], a 'connexion,' i.e., a pervadedness [or invariable attendedness of the token by the betokened,] is not established; and frequency [of the same apprehension] follows1 [the rule of the single apprehension; just as a thousand times nothing amount to nothing]. Therefore [argues the sceptic,] since the apprehending of an invariable attendedness is impossible, nothing can be established by Inference. [This] he clears up: This point cleared up. Aph. 29.* Pervadedness is a constant consociation of characters, in the case of both, or of one of them. a. 'Consociation of characters,' i.e., consociation in the fact of being characters [or properties of something]; in short, concomitancy. And so we mean, that that concomitancy is 'pervadedness,' [furnishing solid ground for inference], which is invariably non-errant, whether in the case of 'both,' the predicate and the reason, or in the case of 'one of them,' the reason only. 'Of both' is mentioned with reference to the case of 'equal pervadedness': [e.g., every equilateral triangle is equiangular, and, conversely, every equiangular triangle is equilateral]. And the invariableness may be apprehended through an appropriate confutation [or reductio ad absurdum of the denial of it]; so that there is no impossibility in apprehending 'pervadedness,' [and of inferring on the strength of it]. Such is the import. b. He declares that Pervadedness is not an additional principle, consisting, e.g., of some such power as is to be mentioned [in § 31]: Pervadedness not an additional principle. Aph. 30.* It [Pervadedness,] is not [as some think (see § 31),] an additional principle [over and above the twenty-five (Book I., § 61)]; for it is unsuitable to postulate entities [praeter rationem]. a. 'Pervadedness' is not an entity other than a fixed consociation of characters; because it is unsuitable to suppose, further, some entity as the residence of what constitutes 'pervadedness.' But we consider that what constitutes 'pervadedness' belongs to extant things simply. Such is the meaning. b. He states the opinion of others: A heterodox opinion regarding 'Pervadedness.' Aph. 31.* [But certain] teachers say that it [Pervadedness,] is [another principle, in addition to the twenty-five,] resulting from the power of the thing itself. a. But other teachers assert that 'Pervadedness' is, positively, a separate principle, in the shape of a species of power, generated by the native power of the 'pervaded.' But [they continue,] 'Pervadedness' is not simply a power of the [pervaded] thing itself; else it would exist wherever the thing is, [which 'pervadedness' does not do]. For smoke, when it has gone to another place [than the point of its origination], is not attended by fire; and, by going into another place, that power is put an end to. Therefore [contend these teachers,] there is no over-extension in the above-stated definition; for, according to our doctrine, the smoke [which betokens fire] is to be specialized as that which is at the time of origination. Such is the import. Opinion of Panchaśikha Aph. 32.* Panchaśikha2 says that it ['Pervadedness,'] is the possession of the power of the sustained. a. That is to say: Panchaśikha holds that pervadingness is the power which consists in being the sustainer, and that 'Pervadedness'3 is the having the power which consists in being the sustained; for Intellect, and the rest, are treated as being pervaded [or invariably attended,] by Nature, &c.; [and this means that each product, in succession] is sustained by what precedes it in the series]. b. But then, why is a 'power of the sustained' postulated? Let 'Pervadedness' be simply an essential power of the thing pervaded. To this he [Panchaśikha,] replies: Panchaśikha's reply to the objection. Aph. 33.* The relation is not an essential power; for we should have [in that case,] a tautology. a. But 'the relation,' viz., 'Pervadedness,' is not an essential power; for we should [thus] have a tautology; because, just as there is no difference between 'water-jar' and 'jar for water,' so, also, there is none in the case of 'Intellect' and 'what is Pervaded' [by Nature, of which Intellect consists]. Such is the meaning. b. He himself explains the 'Tautology:' The reason why. Aph. 34.* Because we should find the distinction unmeaning; [as Intellect does not differ from Nature at all, except as does the sustained from the sustainer]. a. This is almost explained by the preceding aphorism. b. He [Panchaśikha,] mentions another objection: A further reason. Aph. 35.* And because it [Pervadedness,] would not be reconcilable in shoots, &c. a. Because shoots, &c., are invariably attended [at their origination,] by trees, &c. But this cannot be called simply an essential power [in the shoot]; because, since the essential power [that which belongs to the shoot as being a shoot,] does not depart, even in the case of an amputated shoot, we should, even then, find it attended [by the tree, which, however, no longer accompanies it]. Such is the sense. But the power [(see § 32), which consists in having the character] of the 'sustained' is destroyed at the time of amputation; so that there is no 'Pervadedness' then. Such is the import. b. But then what? Panchaśikha says that 'Pervadedness' is not a result of any essential power. Then, since smoke is not sustained by fire [see § 32, where he contends that 'sustainedness' is what really expresses pervasion], it would turn out that it [viz., smoke,] is not [as token of something that is betokened,] accompanied by fire. To this he says: Reply, that this would prove too much. Aph. 36.* Were it [thus] settled that it is a power of the 'sustained,' then, by the like argument, its dependence on an essential power, [as pretended by the heterodox teachers referred to in § 31, might be proved, also; and thus the argument proves nothing, since it proves too much]. a. That is to say: 'were it settled' that 'a power of the sustained' constitutes the fact of 'Pervadedness,' it would be really settled 'by the like argument.' i.e., by parity of reasoning, that the fact of 'Pervadedness' results from essential power, also, [§ 31. a.]. b. It was with a view to substantiate what was stated [in § 27], viz., that the Qualities, and the rest, are established [as realities,] by the employment of the five-membered [form of argumentative exposition], that he has repelled, by an exposition of 'Pervadedness,' the objection to Inference as evidence, [or as a means of attaining right notions]. c. Now, in order to establish the fact that words, of which the five-membered [exposition] consists, are generators of knowledge, the objection of others to a word's being a means of right knowledge,3 in the shape of [the objection of] its being inadequate, is disposed of, by means of an exposition of the powers, &c., of words: Sound and sense. Aph. 37.* The connexion between word and meaning is the relation of expressed and expresser. a. To the 'meaning' belongs the power termed expressibleness; to the 'word,' the power termed expression: simply this is their 'connexion;' their interrelation, as it were.3 From one's knowing this [connexion between a given word and meaning], the meaning is suggested [or raised in the mind,] by the word. Such is the import. b. He mentions what things cause one to apprehend the powers [in question]: Sense of words how learned. Aph. 38.* The connexion [between a word and its sense] is determined by three [means]. a. That is to say: the connexion [just] mentioned [in § 37,] is apprehended by means of these three, viz., information from one competent [to tell us the meaning], the usage of the old man [whose orders to his sons we hear, and then observe what actions ensue, in consequence (see the Sáhitya-darpaṉa, § 11)], and application to the same thing which has a familiar name, [whence we gather the sense of the less familiar synonym]. Imperatives and predications. Aph. 39.* There is no restriction to what is to be done; because we see it both ways. a. That is to say: and there is no necessity that this apprehension of the powers [§ 37,] should occur only in the case of 'something [directed] to be done;' because, in [the secular life and dealings of] the world, we see the usage of the old man, &c., [§ 38,] in regard to what is not to be done [being something already extant], also, as well as in regard to what is to be done. Scriptural and secular senses of words the same. Aph. 40.* He who is accomplished in the secular [connexion of words with meanings] can understand the sense of the Veda. a. Here he entertains a doubt: A doubt. Aph. 41.* Not by the three [means mentioned in § 38, objects some one, can the sense of the Veda be gathered]; because the Veda is superhuman, and what it means transcends the senses. a. Of these he first repels the assertion, that what is meant [by the Veda] is something transcending the senses: This cleared up. Aph. 42.* Not so [i.e., what is meant by the Veda is not something transcending the senses]; because sacrificings, &c., are, in themselves, what constitutes merit, preeminently. a. What is asserted [in § 41,] is not the case; since sacrificings, gifts, &c., in the shape, e.g., of the relinquishment of some thing for the sake of the gods, are really, in themselves, 'what constitutes merit,' i.e., what is enjoined by the Veda, 'preeminently,' i.e., because of their having preeminent fruit. And sacrificings, &c., since they are in the shape of wishings, &c., [of which we are perfectly conscious,] are not something transcending intuition. But 'what constitutes merit' [which the objector supposes to transcend intuition,] does not belong to something mysterious that resides in sacrificings &c., whence what is enjoined in the Veda must be beyond intuition. Such is the meaning. b. He repels also what was asserted [in § 41], viz., that, inasmuch as it [the Veda,] is superhuman, there can be no instruction by any competent person, [in regard to its import]: Knowledge of the Veda traditional. Aph. 43.* The natural force [of the terms in the Veda] is ascertained through the conversancy [therewith of those who successively transmit the knowledge]. a. But then, still, how can there be apprehension of the sense of Vaidic terms, in the case of gods, fruits [of actions], &c., which transcend sense? To this he replies: Intelligibility of the Veda undeniable. Aph. 44.* This really takes place; because they [viz., the words,] give rise to knowledge, in the case both of things adapted [to sense] and of things not [so] adapted. a. He defines the, peculiarities which belong to words, just because this matter is connected with the question of the power of words to cause right knowledge:3 Eternity of the Vedas denied. Aph. 45.* The Vedas are not from eternity; for there is Scripture for their being a production. a. Then are the Vedas the work of [the Supreme] Man? To this he replies, 'No': The Lord not the author. Aph. 46.* They [the Vedas,] are not the work of [the Supreme] Man; because there is no such thing as the [Supreme] Man, [whom you allude to as being, possibly,] their maker. a. Supply, 'because we deny that, there is a Lord.'1 [This is] simple. b. Adverting to the anticipation that there may be some other author, he says: Who are not authors of the Vedas. Aph. 47.* Since the liberated is unsuited [to the work, by his indifference], and the unliberated is so, [by his want of power] neither of these can be author of the Vedas].4 a. But then, in that case, since they are not the work of [the Supreme] Man, it follows that they are eternal. To this he replies: An illustration. Aph. 48.* As in the case of sprouts, &c., their eternity does not follow from their not being the work of [any Supreme] Man. a. [This is] plain. b. But then, since sprouts, &c., also, just like jars, &c., are productions, we must infer that they are the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies: Plants denied to be works. Aph. 49.* Were this the case with these, also, [i.e., if it were the case that vegetables were works], we should find a contradiction to experience, &c. a. It is seen, in the world, as an invariable fact,3 that whatever is the work of Man is produced by a body. This would be debarred, &c., were the case as you contend; [for we see no embodied Supreme Man to whose handiwork the sprouts of the earth can be referred]. Such is the meaning. b. But then, since they were uttered by the Primal Man, the Vedas, moreover, are, really, the work of [the Supreme] Man. To this he replies: Only what is voluntary is a work. Aph. 50.* That [only] is Man's work, in respect of which, even be it something invisible, an effort of understanding takes place.2 a. As in the case of what is visible, so, too, in the case of what is invisible, in respect of what thing there takes place 'an effort of understanding,' i.e., a consciousness that Thought preceded,3 that thing alone is spoken of as Man's work: such is the meaning. Thus it has been remarked that a thing is not Man's work merely through its having been uttered by Man; for no one speaks of the respiration during profound sleep as being Man's work, [or voluntary act]. But what need to speak of antecedence of Understanding? The Vedas, just like an expiration, proceed, of themselves, from the Self-existent, through the force of fate, wholly unpreceded by thought. Therefore, they are not [a Supreme] Man's work.2 b. But then, in that case, since they are not preceded by a correct knowledge of the sense of the sentences,1 the Vedas, moreover, like the speech of a parrot, can convey no right knowledge.2 To this he replies: The Vedas their own evidence. Aph. 51.* They are, spontaneously, conveyers of right knowledge, from the patentness of their own power [to instruct rightly]. a. That is to say: the authoritativeness5 of the very whole of the Vedas is established, not by such a thing as its being based on the enouncer's knowledge of the truth, but quite 'spontaneously;' because, as for the Vedas' 'own,' i.e., natural, power of generating right knowledge, thereof we perceive the manifestation in the invocations6 [which produce the result promised], and in the Medical Scripture, [the following of which leads to cures], &c. And so there is the aphorism of the Nyáya [Book II., § 681]: 'And [the fact of] its being a cause of right knowledge, like the validity of invocations, and the Medical Scripture,' &c. b. In regard to the proposition [laid down in § 26, viz.], 'And of the [existence of the] Qualities, &c., there is not absolute debarment,' there was duly alleged, and developed [under § 27], one argument, viz., by the establishing the Existence of Happiness, &c. Now he states another argument in respect of that [same proposition]: Cognition is evidence of existence. Aph. 52.* There is no Cognition of what is no entity, as a man's horn. a. Be it, moreover, that the existence of pleasure, &c., is proved by the reasoning [under § 27]; it is proved by mere consciousness, also. Of pleasure, &c., were they absolutely nonentities, even the consciousness could not be accounted for; because there is no cognition of a man's horn, and the like. Such is the meaning. b. But then, [interposes the Naiyáyika,] if such be the case, let the Qualities, &c., be quite absolutely real; and then, in the expression 'not absolute debarment' [in § 26], the word 'absolute' is [superfluous, and, hence,] unmeaning. To this he replies: The Qualities, &c., not absolutely real. Aph. 53.* It is not of the real [that there is here cognizance]; because exclusion is seen [of the Qualities]. a. It is not proper [to say], moreover, that the cognizance of the Qualities, &c., is that of the absolutely real; because we see that they are excluded [and not admitted to exist,] at the time of destruction [of the mundane system], &c. b. But then, even on that showing, let the world be different both from real and from unreal; nevertheless, the demurring to absolute debarment [in § 26,] is untenable. To this he replies: A Vedántic advance rejected. Aph. 54.* It is not of what cannot be [intelligibly] expressed [that there is cognizance]; because there exists no such thing. a. And there takes place, moreover, no cognizance of such [a thing] as is not to be expressed as either existing or not existing; 'because there. exists no such thing,' i.e., because nothing is known other than what exists, or what does not exist: such is the meaning. The import is, because it is proper to form suppositions only in accordance with what is seen. b. But then, on that showing, do you really approve of [the Nyáya notion of] 'cognizing otherwise,' [or our fancying that nature to belong to one, which belongs to another]? He replies, 'No': A Nyáya view rejected. Aph. 55.* There is no such thing as cognizing otherwise [or cognizing that as belonging to one, which belongs to another]; because your own proposition is self-destructive. a. This, also, is not proper [to be said], viz., that one thing appears under the character of another thing [e.g., a rope, under the character of a serpent, for which it may be mistaken, in the dusk]; 'because your own proposition is self-destructive.'4 Of another nature [e.g., snakehood], in a different thing [e.g., a rope], equivalence to a man's horn, is [what is virtually] expressed by the word 'otherwise' [than the truth; both a man's horn, and the presence of snakehood in a rope mistaken for a snake, being, alike, otherwise than real]; and [yet] its cognition [thus] otherwise is asserted, [as if that could be cognized which is equivalent to what can not be cognized]: hence your own proposition is self-destructive. For even those who contend for 'cognizing otherwise' [as one mode of cognition,] declare that the cognition of what does not exist is impossible. Such is the meaning.2 b. Expounding what he had said above, [in § 26,] 'not absolute debarment,' he sums up his doctrine: Summing up. Aph. 56.* They [the Qualities,] are cognized rightly or wrongly, through their being denied and not denied [appropriately or otherwise]. a. All the Qualities, &c., 'are cognized rightly and wrongly.' How? 'Through their being denied and not denied.' There is non-denial, as far as regards their existing at all; because all things [and things are made up of the Qualities,] are eternal. But there is denial, relatively, in Soul, of all things; just as is the case with the imaginary silver, for example, in a pearl-oyster, &c., or with the redness, &c., in crystal, &c., [which has no redness, without its following that redness, altogether and everywhere, is non-existent]. b. This investigation is concluded. Now the consideration of Words, it having presented itself in this connexion, is taken in hand incidentally, at the end; [the Sánkhya not allowing to Testimony a coordinate rank with Sense and Inference]: The Yoga theory of speech rejected. Aph. 57.* A word does not consist of [what the Yogas call] the 'expresser' (sphoṭa); by reason both of cognizance [which would disprove the existence of such imaginary thing,] and of non-cognizance, [which would, in like manner, disprove it]. a. It is held, by the followers of the Yoga, that there exists, in distinction from the several letters, an indivisible [unit, the] word, such as 'jar,' &c., [which they call] the 'expression;'1 just as there is a jar, or the like, possessing parts, which is something else than the parts, viz., the shell-shaped neck, &c.; and that particular sound, termed a word, is called the 'expresser,' because of its making apparent the meaning: such a word [we Sánkhyas assert, in opposition to the Yogas,] is without evidence [of its existence]. Why? 'By reason both of cognizance and of non-cognizance,' [as thus]: Pray, is that word [which you choose to call the 'expression,'] cognized, or not? On the former alternative, what need of that idle thing, [the supposed 'expression'? For,] by what collection of letters, distinguished by a particular succession, this ['expression'] is manifested, let that be what acquaints us with the meaning. But, on the latter alternative, [viz., that it is not cognized], the power of acquainting us with a meaning does not belong to an 'expression' which is not cognized. Therefore, the hypothesis of an 'expresser' is useless. Such is the meaning. b. The eternity of the Vedas was contradicted1 before, [under § 45]. Now he contradicts also the eternity of letters: The eternity of letters denied. Aph. 58.* Sound is not eternal; because we perceive it to be made. a. It is not proper [to say, as the Mímánsakas say], that letters are eternal, on the strength of our recognizing, e.g., that 'This is that same G'; for they are proved to be non-eternal, by the cognition, e.g., that '[the sound of] G has been produced': such is the meaning. And the recognition has reference to the homogeneousness with that [one which had been previously heard]; for, otherwise, it would turn out that a jar, or the like, is eternal, inasmuch as it is recognized. b. He ponders a doubt: A doubt. Aph. 59.* [Suppose that] there is [in the case of sounds,] the manifestation of something whose existence was previously settled; as [the manifestation] of a [preexistent] jar by a lamp. a. But then [some one may say], of Sound, whose existence was 'previously settled,' the manifestation, through noise, &c., that alone is the object in the cognition of its production, [which you speak of in § 58]. An example of manifestation [of a thing previously existing] is, 'as of a jar by a lamp.' b. He repels this: The doubt disposed of. Aph. 60.* If the dogma of products' being real [is accepted by you], then this is a proving of the already proved. a. If you say that 'manifestation' means the taking of a present condition by means of rejecting an unarrived [or future,] condition, then this is our dogma of the reality of products [Book I., § 115]; and such an eternity belongs to all products, [not specially to Sound]; so that you are proving the already proved [or conceded]: such is the meaning. And, if 'manifestation' is asserted to be just in the shape of the cognition of what is presently real, then we should find [on your theory,] that jars, &c., also, are eternal; because it would be proper [on that theory,] that the object in the perception of production, by the operation of the causes [the potter, &c.], should be that of knowledge only, as in the case of words, &c., and also in the case of jars, &c.; [for the jar is shown by the lamp, not made by it]. Such is the import.3 b. An objection to the non-duality of Soul, not previously mentioned, is to be adduced; therefore the refutation of the non-duality of Soul is recommenced, [having been already handled under Book I., § 149]. Non-duality of Soul denied on grounds of Inference. Aph. 61.* Non-duality of Soul2 is not; for its distinctions are cognized through signs. a. That is to say: because it is proved to be really different [in different persons], by the sign that one quits Nature [or escapes from the mundane condition], while another not does quit it, &c. b. But, he tells us, there is even sense-evidence destructive of the non-distinction of Soul from things [that are] non-Soul, asserted in the Scriptural texts, 'All this is Soul only,'4 'All this is Brahma only:'6 Non-duality denied on grounds of Sense. Aph. 62.* Moreover, there is not [non-distinction of Soul] from non-Soul; because this is disproved by sense-evidence. a. That is to say: moreover, there is not a non-distinction between the non-Soul, i.e., the aggregate of the experienceable, and Soul; because this is excluded also by sense-evidence, [as well as by signs, (§ 61)]; because, if Soul were not other than the whole perceptible, it would also not be different from a jar and a web; since the jar, e.g., would not be other than the web, which [by hypothesis,] is not other than the Soul: and this is excluded by sense-evidence, which constrains us to apprehend a distinction [between a jar and a web]. b. In order to clear the minds of learners, he illustrates this point, though already established: The reasons combined. Aph. 63.* Not between the two [Soul and non-Soul, is there non-difference]; for that same [couple of reasons]. a. 'Between the two,' i.e., between Soul and non-Soul, the two together, also, there is not an absolute non-difference; for the couple of reaaons [given in § 61 and § 62]: such is the meaning. b. But then, in that case, what is the drift of such Scriptural texts as, '[All] this is Soul only?' To this he replies: Scripture accomodates itself to human frailty of understanding. Aph. 64.* There it is for the sake of something else, in respect of the undiscriminating. a. That is to say: 'in respect of the undiscriminating,' with reference to undiscriminating persons, in the case or non-difference [between Soul and non-Soul, apparently asserted in Scripture], it is 'there for the sake of something else;' i.e., the observation3 is [designed to be] provocative of worship. For, in the secular world, through want of discrimination, body and the embodied, the experienced and the experiencer, are regarded as indifferent; [and Scripture humours the worldling's delusion, with a view to eventually getting him out of it]. b. He declares, that, according to the asserters of Non-duality [of soul], there can be no material cause of the world, either: The Vedánta system supplies no material for the world. Aph. 65.* Neither soul, nor Ignorance,2 nor both, can be the material cause of the world; because of the solitariness of [Soul]. a. The soul alone, or Ignorance lodged in the soul, or both together, like a pair of jar-halves [conjoined in the formation of a jar], cannot be the material of the world; 'because of the solitariness' of Soul. For things undergo alteration only through that particular conjunction which is called 'association;' hence the [ever] solitary Soul, without a second, since it is not associated, cannot serve as a material cause. Nor can it do so by means of [association with] Ignorance, either; because the conjunction of Ignorance has been already excluded by the fact of solitariness. Moreover, that the two together should be the material is impossible, even as it is that either, severally, should be the material; simply 'because of the solitariness.' Such is the meaning. And, if you choose that Ignorance should subsist as a substance located in the soul, as the air in the heavens, then there is an abandonment of the non-duality of Soul, [for which you Vedántís contend]. b. He himself [in Book I., § 145] decided that the soul consists of light, [or knowledge]. In regard to this, he repels the primâ facie view, founded on the text, 'Brahma is reality, knowledge, and joy,'1 that the essence of the soul is joy, also: Soul not joy and knowledge, both. Aph. 66.* The two natures, joy and knowledge do not belong to one; because the two are different. a. A single subject has not the nature both of joy and of intelligence; because, since pleasure is not experienced at the time of knowing pain, pleasure and knowledge are different: such is the meaning. b. But then, in that case, what becomes of the Scripture, that it [Soul,] consists of joy? To this he replies: A Vedánta term explained away. Aph. 67.* Metaphorical [is the word joy, in the sense] of the cessation of pain. a. That is to say: the word 'joy,' in the Scriptural expression which means, really, the cessation of pain, is metaphorical. This is stated in [the maxim], 'Pleasure is the departure of both pain and pleasure.' b. He states the cause of this metaphorical employment: Why the term was used in a sense not literal. Aph. 68.* It is [as] a laudation of emancipation, for the sake of the dull. a. That is to say: the Scripture, as an incitement to 'the dull,' i.e., the ignorant, lauds, as if it were joy, the emancipation, consisting in the cessation of pain, which [cessation] is the essence of the soul;4 [for the soul is such joy as consists of the absence of pain]. b. In order to manifest immediately the origin, already declared,1 of the internal organ, he repels the primâ facie view, that the Mind is all-pervading. The Mind not all-pervading. Aph. 69.* The Mind is not all-pervading; because it is an instrument, and because it is, moreover, an organ. a. The Mind, meaning the totality of the internal instruments,4 is not all-pervading; for it is an instrument, as an axe, or the like, is. The word 'and' [literally, 'or,' in the Aphorism,] implies a distributive alternative, [not an optional one]. The meaning is this, that, [while the whole of the internal instruments are instruments,] the particular internal instrument, the third5 [the Mind, manas6]. is not all-pervading; because it is, moreover, an organ.1 But knowledge, &c., pervading the body, are demonstrable as only of medium extent, [neither infinite nor atomic]. b. Here, there being a doubt whether this be convincing, he propounds an appropriate confutation: Proof of this. Aph. 70.* [The Mind is not all-pervading]; for it is moveable; since there is Scripture regarding the motion. a. That is to say; since, inasmuch as there is Scripture regarding the going of the Soul [which, being all-pervading, cannot go] into another world, it being settled that it is its adjunct, the internal organ, that is movable, [see Book I., § 51], it cannot be all-pervading. b. In order to prove that it is a product, he repels also the opinion that the Mind is without parts: The Mind has no parts. Aph. 71.* Like a jar, it [the Mind,] is not without parts; because it comes in contact therewith, [i.e., with several Senses, simultaneously]. a. The word 'therewith' refers to 'organ,' which occurs in a preceding aphorism, [§ 69]. The Mind is not without parts; 'because it comes in contact,' simultaneously, with several sense-organs. But, 'like a jar,' it is of medium size, [neither infinite nor atomic], and consists of parts. Such is the meaning. And it is to be understood that the internal organ, when in the state of a cause, [and not modified and expanded, e.g., into knowledge, which is its product,] is, indeed, atomic. b. He demurs to the eternity of Mind, Time, &c: Eternity belongs to what. Aph. 72.* Everything except Nature and Soul is uneternal. a. [This is] plain. And the Mind,2 the Ether, &c., when in the state of cause, [not developed into product], are called Nature, and not Intellect,3 &c., by reason of the absence of the special properties, viz., judgment,4 &c. b. But then, according to such Scriptural texts as, 'He should know Illusion to be Nature, and him in whom is Illusion to be the great Lord, and this whole world to be pervaded by portions of him,'6 since Soul and Nature, also, are made up of parts, they must be uneternal. To this he replies: Soul and Nature not made up of parts. Aph. 73.* No parts [from the presence of which in the discerptible, one might infer destructibility,] are found in the Experiencer; for there is Scripture for its being without parts. a. Parts are not appropriate to 'the Experiencer,' i.e., to Soul, or to Nature; for there is Scripture for their being without parts; that is to say, because of such [texts] as, 'Without parts, motioniess, quiescent, unobjectionable, passionless.'2 b. It has been stated [in Book I., § 1,] that Emancipation is the cessation of pain. In order to corroborate this, he then repels the doctrines of others, in regard to Emancipation: A view of Emancipation disputed. Aph. 74.* Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy; because there are no properties [in Soul, as, e.g., in the shape of joy]. a. There belongs to Soul no property in the shape of joy, or in the shape of manifestation; and the essence [of Soul] is quite eternal, and, therefore, not something to be produced by means: therefore, Emancipation is not a manifestation of joy: such is the meaning. Second view disputed. Aph. 75.* Nor, in like manner, is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of special qualities. a. Emancipation is, moreover, not the destruction of all special qualities, 'In like manner.' Because there are absolutely no properties [in Soul, (see § 74)]. Such is the meaning. A third view disputed. Aph. 76.* Nor is it [Emancipation,] any particular going of that [Soul,] which is motionless. a. Moreover, emancipation is not a going to the world of Brahmá;1 because the Soul, since it is motionless, does not go. A fourth view disputed. Aph. 77.* Nor is it [Emancipation,] the destruction of the influence of [intellectual] forms, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c. a. The meaning is, that also the doctrine of the Nihilist, that the Soul consists merely of momentary knowledge, that Bondage is the modifying thereof by objects, and that emancipation is the destruction of the influence thereof called Memory,3 is inadmissible; because, by reason of the faults of momentariness, &c., [such] emancipation is not the Soul's aim. b. He censures another [conception of] emancipation of the Nihilist's: A fifth view disputed. Aph. 78.* Nor is it [Emancipation,] destruction of all; for this has, among other things, the fault of not being the soul's aim. a. Likewise, the entire destruction of the Soul, which consists of knowledge, is not emancipation; because, among other things, we do not see, in the world, that the annihilation of the soul is the soul's aim: such is the meaning. A sixth view disputed. Aph. 79.* So, too, the Void. a. The annihilation of the whole universe, consisting of cognition and the cognizable, is, thus, also, not emancipation; because Soul's aim is not effected by Soul's annihilation: such is the meaning. A seventh view disputed. Aph. 80.* And conjunctions terminate in separations; therefore, it [Emancipation,] is not the acquisition of lands, &c., either. a. From its perishableness, possessorship is not Emancipation. An eighth view disputed. Aph. 81.* Nor is it [Emancipation,] conjunction of a Part with the Whole. a. Emancipation is not absorption of 'a Part,' i.e., the Soul, into 'the Whole,' i.e., that of which it is [on the view in question,] a part, viz., the Supreme Soul; for the reason assigned [in § 80], viz., 'conjunctions terminate in separations,' and because we do not admit a Lord [Book I., § 92], and because, thus, self-dissolution is not Soul's aim: such is the meaning. A ninth view disputed. Aph. 82.* Nor is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the [power of] becoming as small as an atom, &c.; since, as is the case with other conjunctions, the destruction of this must necessarily take place. a. Moreover, conjunction with superhuman power, e.g., the assuming the size of an atom, is not Emancipation; because, just as is the case with connexions with other superhuman powers, the destruction of this, also, follows, of necessity: such is the meaning. A tenth view disputed. Aph. 83.* Nor, just as in that case, is it [Emancipation], moreover, conjunction with the rank of Indra, &c. a. Nor is the attainment of the superhuman power of Indra, &c., Emancipation,—just as is the case with other superhuman powers [such as assuming atomic bulk];—by reason of perishableness: such is the meaning. b. He repels the objection of an opponent to what has been stated [in Book I., § 61], that the Organs are products of Self-consciousness: The organs whence. Aph. 84.* The Organs are not formed of the Elements [as the Naiyáyikas assert]; because there is Scripture for their being derived from Self-consciousness. a. With advertence to the opinion that Power, &c., also, are principles, he repels the determination of categories [insisted upon by the various sects] of his opponents, and the notion that Emancipation comes through a knowledge of these [categories] merely: The categories of the Vaiśeshika objected to. Aph. 85.* The rule of six categories is not [the correct one]; nor does Emancipation result from acquaintance therewith, [as the Vaiśeshikas maintain]. And those of the Nyáya, &c. Aph. 86.* So, too, is it in the case of the sixteen [categories of the Nyáya], &c. a. In order to establish, what has been already stated [in Book I., § 62], that the five Elements are products, he rejects the eternity of the Earthy and other Atoms, which is held by the Vaiśeshikas and others: The eternity of Atoms unscriptural. Aph. 87.* [The five Elements being products, as declared in Book I., § 61], Atoms are not eternal, [as alleged in the Nyáya]; for there is Scripture for their being products. a. Although that text of Scripture is not seen by us, because it has disappeared, in the lapse of time, &c., yet, it is to be inferred from the words of teachers, and from the tradition of Manu, [Ch. I., v. 27]. b. But then, how can an Atom, which is without parts, be a product? To this he replies: The Scripture decisive of the question. Aph. 88.* Since it is a product, it is not without parts. a. That is to say: since the fact, established by Scripture, of their being products, cannot be otherwise accounted for, the [so-called] Atoms of Earth, &c., are not without parts. b. He repels the objection of the Nihilist, that direct cognition of Nature, or of Soul, is impossible; because [forsooth,] the cause of a thing's being directly cognizable is colour: A cavil disposed of. Aph. 89.* There is no necessity that direct cognition should have colour as its cause. a. It is no rule, that to be directly cognizible should result from colour only, [or other object of sense], as the cause; because direct cognition may result from Merit, &c., [viz., mystical practices, and so forth], also: such is the meaning. b. Well, if that be the case, pray is the dimension of an Atom a reality, or not? With reference to this, he decides the question of dimension, [as follows]: Dimension of what kinds. Aph. 90.* There are not four varieties of dimension; because those can be accounted for by two. a. There are not four kinds of dimension, viz., small, great, long, and short; but there are only two sorts. 'Because those can be accounted for by two:' that is to say, the four varieties can be accounted for by merely two, the atomic [or positively small,] and the great. Such is the meaning. For the short and the long are merely subordinate kinds of the dimension called great; else we should have, e.g., no end of dimensions, in the shape of the crooked, &c. b. He rebuts the Nihilist's denial of genera, [as follows]: Genus proved by recognition. Aph. 91.* Though these [individuals] be uneternal, recognition, as being associated with constancy, is of genus. a. Hence, he says, it is not proper to deny [the existence] of genus: And not to be denied. Aph. 92.* Therefore it [genus,] is not to be denied. a. But then [it may be said], recognition is to be accounted for simply by a non-existence, in the shape of the exclusion of what is not the thing [recognized]: and let this be what is meant by the word 'genus.' To this he replies: Genus positive, not negative. Aph. 93.* It [genus,] does not consist in exclusion of something else; because it is cognized as an entity. a. That is to say: genus does not consist in exclusion [of something else]; because 'This is that same' is the cognition of something positive; for, otherwise, the only thing cognized would be, 'This is not a non-jar.' b. But still, recognition may be caused by likeness. To this he replies: Likewise not a distinct principle. Aph. 94.* Likeness is not a separate principle; for it is directly apprehended, [as one manifestation of Community]. a. That is to say: likeness is nothing other than sameness in many parts, &c.; for it is directly apprehended as consisting in sameness; [the likeness of a fair face to the moon, e.g., consisting in the sameness of the pleasurable feeling, &c., occasioned by the sight of either]. b. The conjecture, 'But then, let likeness be really an inherent power, and not [a modified aspect of] Community,' he repels: Nor a peculiar power. Aph. 95.* Nor is it [likeness,] a manifestation of [something's] own power; because the apprehension of it is different. a. Moreover, likeness is not the manifestation of a particular natural power of a thing; because the apprehension of likeness is different from the apprehension of power. For the cognition of a power is not dependent on the cognition of another thing; the cognition of likeness, on the other hand, is dependent on the cognition of a correlative,1 as is the case with the cognition of a non-existence; so that the two conceptions are heterogeneous. Such is the meaning. b. But still, let the likeness among individual jars, &c., be merely that they have [all alike,] the name, e.g., of jar. To this he replies: Nor the relation between names and things. Aph. 96.* Nor, moreover, is it [likeness,] the connexion between name and named. a. Because even he who does not know the connexion between a name and the thing named may cognize a likeness, [e.g., between two jars]. b. Moreover: How it cannot be so. Aph. 97.* That connexion [viz., between name and named,] is not eternal; since both [the correlatives] are uneternal. a. Since both the name and the named are uneternal, the relation between them, also, is not eternal. How, then, can there be, through that, the likeness of a departed thing in a thing present? Such is the meaning. b. But then, though the correlatives be uneternal, let the relation be eternal. What is to hinder this? To this he replies: Another suggestion repelled. Aph. 98.* The connexion is not so [not eternal], for this reason, viz., because this is debarred by the evidence which acquaints us with the thing; [i.e., the supposition is inconsistent with the definition of the term]. a. Connexion is proved only where disjunction incidentally subsists; because, otherwise, there is no room for the supposition of connexion; the case being accounted for,—as will be explained,—simply by the natural state of the matter. And this incidental disjunction is impossible, if connexion be eternal. Therefore, connexion is not eternal; for this is debarred by the very evidence that acquaints us with Connexion. Such is the meaning. b. But, on this showing, there could be no such thing as the eternal [connexion called] Coinherence1 between those two eternals, a Quality and the thing qualified; [which Coinherence, or intimate relation, is one of the categories of the Nyáya]. To this he replies: The Category of Intimate Relation rejected. Aph. 99.* There is no [such thing as] Coinherence, [such as the Naiyáyikas insist upon]; for there is no evidence [for it]. a. But then [it may be said], the evidence of it is, the perception that something is qualified [or conjoined with a quality which inheres in it], and the unaccountableness, otherwise, of the cognition of something as qualified. To this he replies: This argued. Aph. 100.* Neither perception nor inference [is evidence for the existence of Coinherence]; since, as regards both alike, the case is otherwise disposed of.3 a. Since, 'as regards both alike,' i.e., the perception of qualifiedness, and the inferring of it, 'the case is otherwise disposed of;'4 viz., simply by the natural state [of the thing and its qualities], neither of the two is evidence for [the imaginary category called] Coinherence: such is the meaning. b. It is a tenet, that, from the agitation of Nature the conjunction of Nature and soul takes place, and thence results creation. In regard to that, there is this objection of the atheists, that 'Nothing whatever possesses the action called agitation; everything is momentary; where it arises, even there it perishes; therefore, no motion is proved to be inferrible from conjunction [of anything] with another place;' [the fruit, for instance, which appears to reach the ground not being that fruit, any longer existent, which appeared to drop from the tree]. To this he replies: Motion is a matter of perception. Aph. 101.* Motion is not a matter of inference; for he who stands very near has, indeed, direct cognition both of it and of what it belongs to. a. In Book Second the different opinions were merely mentioned, that the Body is formed of five elements, and so forth; but no particular one was considered. In regard to this question, he denies the view of an opponent: The Body is of Earth only. Aph. 102.* The Body does not consist of five elements; because many [heterogeneous things] are unsuitable as the material. a. He will mention, that, whilst there is but one material, the material of every Body is earth: There is a Subtile as well as a Gross, Body. Aph. 103.* It [the Body,] is not, necessarily, the Gross one; for there is, also, the vehicular [transmigrating or Subtile] one. a. Senses, [the organ of vision, for example,] distinct from the eye-balls, have been already mentioned. In order to substantiate this [point], he refutes the opinion, that the senses reveal what they do not reach to: Connexion between sense and object. Aph. 104.* The senses do not reveal what they do not reach to; because of their not reaching, or because [else,] they might reach everything. a. The senses do not reveal things unconnected with them. 'Because of their not reaching.' For we do not see that lamps, or the like, reveal what they do not reach to; and because, if they were to reveal what they do not reach to, we should find them revealing all things, viz., those intercepted, and the like. Such is the meaning. Therefore there is an organ, other than the eye-ball, for the sake of connexion with the distant sun, &c. Such is the import. And the instruments reveal the objects simply by delivering the object to the soul,—for they are, themselves, unintelligent;—as a mirror reveals the face. Or [in other words], their revealing an object is simply their taking up an image of the object. b. He repels the conjecture: But then, in that case, the opinion [of the Naiyáyikas,] that the sight is luminous is quite right; for we see Light alone glide rapidly to a distance, in the form of rays: The Sight not formed of Light. Aph. 105.* Not because Light glides [and the Sight does so, too,] is the Sight luminous [or formed of Light]; because the thing is accounted for by [the theory of] modifications, [to be now explained]. a. The Sight is not to be asserted to be luminous, on the ground that light is seen to glide. Why? Because, just as in the case of the vital air, where there is no luminosity, the gliding forth can be accounted for through a kind of modification. Such is the meaning. For, as the vital air, without having at all parted from the body, glides out ever so far from the end of the nose, under the modification called breathing, [and thus smells a distant flower], just so the Sight, though a non-luminous substance, without, indeed, quitting [connexion with] the body, all in a moment will dart off [like the protruded feeler of a polyp,] to a distant object, such as the sun, by means of the species of change called modification. b. But what is the proof that there is any such modification? To this he replies: Proof of his theory of vision, that it accounts for the phenomena. Aph. 106.* By the sign of the display of the attained object the [existence of the] modification [which could alone account for that display,] is proved. a. He shows [us] the nature of the modification, to account for the going, though without parting from the Body: Of the theory, further. Aph. 107.* The 'modification' is another principle than a fragment, or a quality, [of the Sight, or other sense]; because it is for the sake of connexion that it glides forth. a. The modification is not a fragment of the Sight, or other sense, [serving as] the cause of the revealing of objects,—a part disjoined like a spark,—or a quality, like, e.g., Colour; but the modification, whilst a portion thereof, is something else than a fragment, or a quality. For, if there were disruption, connexion of the sun, &c., with the Sight would not, through it, take place; and, if it were a quality, the motion called 'gliding forth' would be unaccountable; [for a quality cannot move by itself]. Such is the meaning. b. But, if, thus, the 'modifications' are substances, how is [the term] 'modification' applied to the qualities of intellect, in the shape of Desire, &c.? To this he replies: 'Modifications' may be qualities, as well as substances. Aph. 108.* It [the term 'modification,'] is not confined to substances; because it is etymological, [not technical, and applies, etymologically, to a quality, as well]. a. Since it is also stated, in Scripture, that the sense-organs are formed of the Elements, the doubt may occur, whether the Scriptural texts are, perhaps, to be applied distributively, according to the difference of particular worlds. In regard to this, he says: The materials of the organs everywhere the same. Aph. 109.* Not though there be a difference of locality, is there a difference in the material [of which the organs are formed]: the rule is as with the like of us. a. Not through 'difference of locality,' as the world of Brahmá, and the like, is it, again, the fact, that the organs have any other material than self-consciousness; but the rule is, that those of all alike are formed of self-consciousness; as is the case, e.g., with us who live in this terrestrial world. For we hear, in Scripture, of only one Subtile Body [made up of the organs], transmigrating generally throngh the different localities. Such is the meaning. b. But then, in that case, how is the Scripture relating to the materiality [of the organs] to be accounted for? To this he replies: A non-literal text accounted for. Aph. 110.* The mention thereof [viz., of materiality, as if it belonged to the organs,] is because there is [intended to be made, thereby, a more emphatic] mention of the concomitant cause.4 a. There is designation as the material cause, in the case even where the cause is [but] concomitant, with a view to indicating its importance; just as fire is [spoken of as a rising] from fuel, [which fuel is a necessary concomitant of, though not really the substance of, the fire]. Hence are they [the organs,] spoken of as being formed of the Elements. Such is the meaning. For, only in reliance on the support of Light, or other Element, do the Organs, viz., the Sight, &c., [formed] from the accompanying Self-consciousness, come to exist; as fire, in reliance on the support of earthly fuel, results from the attendant Light, [or Heat, which cannot manifest itself alone]. b. As the subject presents itself, he determines the variety that belongs to Gross Body: Varieties of Gross Bodies. Aph. 111.* The heat-born, egg-born, womb-born, vegetable, thought-born, and spell-born; such is not an exhaustive division [of Gross Body, though a rough and customary one]. a. It was stated, before, that Body has only one Element as its material. In this same connexion, he observes discriminatively, as follows: The material of Bodies. Aph. 112.* In all [Bodies] Earth is the material: in consideration [however,] of some speciality, there is designation as this [or that other element than earth, as entering into the constitution of some given body], as in the preceding case [treated under § 110]. a. In all Bodies the material is Earth only. 'In consideration of some speciality;' i.e., in consequence of intensity through excess, &c., in the case of Body, as before [in the case of the Organs], there is, however, designation as consisting of Elements, five, or four, &c., on the ground only of there being a support, as in the case of the materiality of the Organs. Such is the meaning. b. But then, since the vital air is the principal thing in the Body, let the vital air itself be the originant of the Body. To this he replies: The vital air not the source of the Body. Aph. 113.* The vital air is not [on the allegation that it is the principal thing in the Body, to be considered] the originant of the Body; because it [the vital air, or spirit,] subsists through the power of the organs. a. The vital air, consisting in the function of the organs, does not subsist in the absence of the organs. Therefore, since, in a dead Body, in consequence of the absence of the organs, there is the absence of the vital air, the vital air is not the originant of the Body. b. But then, in that case, since the vital air is not the cause of the Body, the Body might come into existence even without the vital air. To this he replies: Soul essenial to a living body. Aph. 114.* The site of experience [viz., the Body,] is contructed [only] through the superintendence of the experiencer [Soul]: otherwise, we should find putrefaction. a. 'Through the superintendence,' i.e., only through the operation, 'of the experiencer,' i.e., Soul [literally, that which has the vital airs], is 'the construction of the site of experience,' i.e., the Body; because, 'otherwise,' i.e., if the operation of the vital airs were absent, we should find putrefaction in the semen and blood, just as in a dead body. Such is the meaning. And thus, by the several operations of circulating the juices, &c., the vital air is a concomitant cause2 of the Body, through the sustaining of it: such is the import. b. But then [it may be said], it is only the vital air, itself, that can be the superintender; because it is this which operates, not the Soul, since it is motoinless, and since there is no use in the superintendence of what does not operate. To this he replies: The Soul 'acting by another's actions.' Aph. 115.* Through a servant, not directly, is superintendence [exercised] by the master. a. In the construction of the Body, 'superintendence,' in the shape of energizing, is not 'directly,' i.e., immediately, [exercised] 'by the master,' i.e., by Soul, but 'through its servant,' in the shape of the vital airs; as in the case of a king's building a city: such is the meaning. b. It was stated before [Book II., § 1,] that Nature's [agency] is 'for the emancipation of what is [really, though not apparently,] emancipated.' In reference to the objection of opponents in regard to this, viz., 'How can the soul be eternally free, when we see it bound?' with a view to demonstrating its eternal freedom, he says: Soul ever free. Aph. 116.* In Concentration, profound sleep, and emancipation, it [Soul,] consists of Brahma.2 a. Then what is the difference of emancipation from profound sleep and concentration? To this he replies: Perfect and imperfect emancipation. Aph. 117.* In the case of the two, it is with a seed; in the case of the other, this is wanting. a. 'In the case of the two,' viz., concentration and profound sleep, the identity with Brahma5 is 'with a seed,' i.e., associated with some cause of Bondage, [or reappearance in the mundane state]; 'in the case of the other,' i.e., in emancipation, this cause is absent: this is the distinction. Such is the meaning. b. But then, Concentration and profound sleep are evident: but what evidence is there of Emancipation? This objection of the atheist he repels: The reality of Emancipation. Aph. 118.* But there are not the two [only]; because the triad, also [Emancipation inclusive], is evident; as are the two. a. The meaning is, that, since Emancipation, also, is 'evident,' i.e., is inferrible, through the example of Concentration and profound sleep, there are not the two, viz., profound sleep and Concentration, only; but Emancipation, also, really is. And the argument is thus. The quitting of that identity with Brahma4 which [identity] exists during profound sleep, &c., takes place only through a fault, viz., Desire, or the like, lodged in the mind; and, if this fault be annihilated by knowledge, then there results a permanent condition, quite similar to profound sleep, &c.; and it is precisely this that is Emancipation.2 Memory inactive during profound sleep. Aph. 119.* There is not the revelation, by memory, of an object likewise during the conjunction of a [more potent] fault [such as sleep]: the secondary cause does not debar the principal.2 a. As in the case of apathy, so, also when there is the conjunction of the fault of sleep, Memory does not reveal its own objects, does not remind us of its objects; for the 'secondary,' the subordinate, Memory,3 cannot defeat the more potent fault of Sleep: such is the meaning. For the really more potent fault makes the memory powerless, incompetent to produce its effects; [and so there is nothing, in this, to prevent identification of Soul with Brahma, during profound sleep, any more than during apathetic Concentration]: such is the import. b. It was stated, in the Third Book [§ 83], that the retention of a Body by him who is emancipated while still living, is 'in consequenue of a mere vestige of impression.'2 To this it is objected as follows. Experience is observed, in the case of the [alleged person] emancipated during life, just as in the case of the like of us, [and this experience continuous,] even though it may be constantly in respect of a single object: now, this is unaccountable [on the hypothesis of his really being emancipated]; because the antecedent impression is annihilated, exactly on its having produced the first [instant of] experience, and because no subsequent impression arises, inasmuch as knowledge debars it; just as is the case with Merit. To this he replies: An objection met to the possibility of emancipation in one still living. Aph. 120.* A single impression [suffices to generate, and] lasts out2 the experience: but there are not different impressions, one to each [instant of] experience; else, we should have a postulation of many, [where a single one may suffice]. a. In like manner, in the case of the whirling of the potter's wheel, the self-continuant principle,3 called motal inertia, is to be regarded as only one, continuing till the completion of the whirling. b. It has been stated [§ 111,] that there are vegetable Bodies. He repels the objection of the atheist, that, in the case in question, there is not a Body, inasmuch as there is no knowledge of the external: The Vegetable organism really a Body. Aph. 121.* Knowledge of the external is not indispensable [to constitute a Body]:1 trees, shrubs, climbers, annuals, trees with invisible flowers, grasses, creepers, &c., [which have internal consciousness], are, also, sites of experiencer and experience; as in the former case. a. There is no necessity that that only should be a Body, in which there is knowledge of the external; but it is to be held that the being a Body, in the form of being the site of experiencer and experience, belongs also to trees, &c., which have internal consciousness; because, 'as in the former case,' meaning the putrescence already mentioned [see § 114], of the Bodies of men, &c., [which takes place] in the absence of the superintendence of an experiencer [the living soul], even in the same way do withering, &c., take place in the Bodies of trees, &c., also: such is the meaning. And to this effect there is Scripture. Law, as well as Scripture, is authority for this. Aph. 122.* And from the Legal Institutes [the same fact may be inferred, viz., that vegetables have bodies and are conscious].1 a. But then, from the fact that trees, &c., also, are thus conscious, we should find merit and demerit accruing to them. To this he replies: Vegetables not moral agents. Aph. 123.* Not merely through a Body is there susceptibility of Merit and Demerit; for Scripture tells us the distinction. a. The vital spirit is not liable to the production of Merit and Demerit through a Body merely. Why? 'For Scripture tells us the distinction:' because we are told, in Scripture, that the liability results just from the being distinguished by a Brahmanical Body, or the like [animal body, not vegetable]. Such is the meaning. b. Showing that the liability to Merit and Demerit is solely through the kind of Body, he mentions how Body is of three kinds: Body of three principal kinds. Aph. 124.* Among the three there is a threefold distribution; the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both. a. There is a threefold distribution of Body 'among the three,' i.e., among those highest, lowest, and intermediate,—all living beings,—viz., the Body of merit, the Body of experience, and the Body of both: such is the meaning. Of these, a Body of merit belongs to the preeminent sages; a Body of experience, to Indra and others, and to things immovable, &c.; and a Body of both, to the royal sages. Here the division is [not exhaustive, but] into three, because of the preeminence [of these]; for, otherwise, we should have all alike possessed of a Body of experience, [like Indra]. b. He mentions also a fourth Body: A fourth kind of Body. Aph. 125.* Not any one [of these], moreover, is that of the apathetic. a. That is to say: the Body which belongs to the ascetics is different from all these three; such as was that of Dattátreya, Jaḍabharata, and others; for they possessed bodies consisting of mere knowledge. b. In order to establish the non-existence of a Lord, which was stated before, he disproves the eternity of knowledge, desire, action, &c., which is accepted by others [as existing in the case of the Lord]: Argument against the existence of a Lord. Aph. 126.* Eternity does not [as is alleged by those who wish to establish the existence of a Lord,] belong to knowledge,2 &c., even in the case of the particular site, [viz., that of the supposed Lord]; as is the case with fire. a. That is to say: just as we infer, from the example of ordinary fire, that the empyrean fire,3 also, is not eternal. The argument really ex abundantiâ Aph. 127.* And, because the site [viz. the supposed Lord] is unreal, [it matters not, in the present instance, whether knowledge, &c.. may be eternal, or not]. a. But then, in that case, how can it, indeed, be possible that there should arise Omniscience, &c., adequate to the creation of the universe; since we do not behold, in mundane life, such superhuman powers [though we do see some,] arising from penance and the rest [of the alleged means of acquiring superhuman powers]? To this he replies: The height to which asceticism may elevate. Aph. 128.* The superhuman powers2 of concentration, just like the effects of drugs, &c., are not to be gainsaid. a. That is to say: by the example of the effects of drugs, &c., even the superhuman powers of assuming atomic magnitude, &c., which result from concentration, and are adapted to the work of creation, &c., are established. b. He refutes him who asserts that Thought belongs to the Elements; since this is hostile to the establishment [of the existence] of Soul: Argument against Materialism. Aph. 129.* Thought does not belong to the Elements; for it is not found in them separately, or, moreover, in the state of combination,—or, moreover, in the state of combination. a. That is to say: Thought does not exist in the five Elements, even when in the state of combination; because we do not find Thought in them, generally, at the time of disjunction; [and there can be nothing in the product which does not preexist in the cause]. END OF BOOK V. Footnotes 3 For another rendering, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed. 2 See, for a somewhat different translation, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 78. Ed. 3 Vyápyatwa, here rendered, is regarded as a synonym of vyápti, by which sambandha, 'association,' is interpreted just above. Hence I have bracketed the words 'the fact of.' Ed. 3 Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Vide p. 264, note 4, supra. Ed. 4 Pada, here used for adhyáya, which the translator renders by 'Book.' For the Aphorism referred to, and carelessly quoted in part, vide supra, p. 24. Ed. 3 For a different translation of this Aphorism, and of what introduces and succeeds it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 257, Ed. 2 Owing to a clerical defect, both my MSS. of Nágeśa's work omit this Aphorism, and also much of the comment preceding and following it. Ed. 1 Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, ii. 4, 12; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 12. Ed. 2 Professor Gough has, 'a pure indifference of thought.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 153. Ed. 4 Read, instead of 'by a cluster,' &c., 'by enunciations.' Ed. 3 The 'great internal organ' (mahat), called also buddhi, is here referred to. See Book I., Aph. 64. a. Ed. 2 Vide supra, p. 71, Aph. 61. b. Ed. 3 For the Chárvákas' rejection of the anthority of inference, see pp. 5, et seq., of the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangrana by Professors Cowell and Gough. Ed. 1 As suggestive of the correction here required, see Professor Cowell's Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 8, text and foot-note. Ed. 2 The translator's 'the Panchaśikha' I have everywhere corrected. Ed. 3 This is to render vyápyatwa, on which vide supra, p. 320, note 3. Ed. 3 'Being a means of right knowledge' here renders prámáṇya, represented, just before, by 'as evidence.' Ed. 3 Instead of 'simply,' &c., read, 'this itself is their connexion, such [a connexion] as [is seen] in anatheticity.' The 'connexion' in question is the swarúpa-sambandha, for which see Professor Cowell's translation of the Kusumánjali, p. 13, note †. A better reading than the one which Dr. Ballantyne accepted from me is, certainly, that which omits the clause rendered, 'to the word, the power termed expression.' According to Nagesa, 'the expressibleness inherent in the meaning is the connexion [intended].' Anuyogin and anuyogitá, as Professor Cowell informs me, are the opposites of pratiyogin and pratiyogitá, which latter I would represent, provisionally, by 'antithetic' and 'antitheticity.' Pratiyogin, a very much commoner technicality than anuyogin, occurs in the comment on Aph. 95 of this Book. It must suffice, here, to add, that, as I learn from Professor Cowell, the anuyogin, or 'anathetic,' of ghaṭábháva, 'non-existence of a jar,' is ghaṭábháva itself, and the pratiyogin, or 'antithetic' of ghaṭábháva is ghaṭa, 'jar.' Ed. 3 'Power to cause right knowledge' is to render prámáṇya. Ed. 1 Vide supra, p. 112, note 3. Ed. 4 See Book I., Aph. 93 and 94, at pp. 113, 114, supra. Ed. 3 'Invariable fact' is to translate vyápti. Ed. 2 Read: 'Even where an invisible [originator] is in question, that [thing] in respect of which there arises the idea of [its] being made is [what is meant by] a production by a person.' Aniruddha, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva agree in supplying kartari after adṛishṭe. Ed. 3 Instead of Vijnána's expression, 'the idea of [its] being preeeded by consciousness,' Nágeśa has: 'the idea that [its] being made was preceded by consciousness, i.e., the notion that it was produced aforethought. Vedánti Mahádeva impliedly contrasts with a jar, as being a production of an intelligent and self-conscious maker, a sprout, which originates as a factor of a series of causes and effects alternating from the time when vegetation was first evolved. Also see the two aphorisms preceding the one commented on. Ed. 2 Instead of 'a thing is not Man's work,' &c., I have translated, in the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 65: 'Not from the mere fact of [its] being uttered by a person [can one say there is] producedness [of a thing] by [that] person; since it is not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person: but, by [reason of its] production consciously, [a thing is said to be produced by a person]. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert [of souls], issue, spontaneously, from Brahmá, without ever being consciously produced [by him]. Hence they are not productions of a person.' Dr. Ballantyne was misled by the full stop mistakenly put, in my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, before ###.Ed. 1 Read, instead of 'since they are,' &c., 'since the true sense of their sentences was not originated consciously.' Ed. 2 The implied 'power to convey right knowledge' represents prámáṇya. Ed. 5 As in the aphorism, prámáṇya, which, soon after, is rendered by 'validity.' Ed. 6 Mantra, a word of various meanings. Ed. 4 See Book III., Aphorism 66, at p. 267, supra. Ed. 2 The text followed, in this paragraph is, throughout, very inferior; and the rendering of it also calls for some alteration. See, for the purer text, pp. 23, 24, of the Appendix to my edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Ed. 1 For sphoṭa, 'eternal word,' which the translator renders by 'expresser,' and also by 'expressien,' see Professor Cowell's edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 331, foot-notes 2 and 3; and the translation of the Sarva-darśana-sangraha by Professors Cowell and Gough, pp. 209, et seq. It is likewise observable that, in what precedes and follows, śabda is variously rendered, besides that śabda and pada are not discriminated. Ed. 1 Pratishiddha, 'demurred to.' Ed. 3 Vide supra, p. 142, c. Ed. 2 Nagesa, as also some copies of Vijnána's work, has 'non-duality of souls.' Ed. 4 Chhándogya Upanishad, vii., xxv., 2. Ed. 6 For a very similar passage, vide supra, p. 243, near the foot. Ed. 3 To render anuváda, which, as defined by Professor Cowell, signifies, 'the reiteration or reinculcation of an injunction, it may be with further details, but without dwelling on the purpose of the injunction itself.' Aphorisms of Śáṇḍilya, &c., p. 75, foot-note. At pp. 24 and 26, he translates anuváda by 'confirmatory repetition' and 'illustrative repetition.' Ed. 2 According to Nágeśa's reading, 'Ignorance' is qualified as 'beginningless,' or 'eternal a parte ante.' 1 The passage thus rendered looks as if it were taken, with the addition of its opening word, from the Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, iii., 9, 28; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 6, 9, 34. Ed. 4 For another translation, beginning with the introduction to Aphorism 67, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 34. Ed. 1 Dr. Ballantyne, under the misapprehension that 'the subtile body' was pointed to, here added, in brackets, 'in B. III., §§ 14, 15, &c.' Ed. 4 The term manas, the translator's 'Mind,' denotes not only one of the three internal organs, but, sometimes, as here, all three taken together. See the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 45, 46, text and foot-notes. Ed. 5 See Book II., Aph. 30, at p. 208, supra. Ed. 6 The words here bracketed I have substituted for 'the subtile body, mentioned under B. III., § 12, a.' Ed. 1 See Book II., Aph. 26, at p. 206, supra. Ed. 2 Intended to represent antah́karaṇa, 'internal organ.' Vide supra, p. 370, note 4. Ed. 3 The very inferior, because ambigous, reading, in the original, manas, I have changed to buddhi, and have displaced Dr. Ballantyne's corresponding 'Mind.' Ed. 4 Vyavasáya. For its synonym, adkyavasáya, vide supra, p. 209, note 1. Ed. 6 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iv., 10. Professor Gough translates differently: 'Let the sage know that Prakṛiti is Máyá, and that Maheśwara is the Máyin, or arch-illusionist. All this shifting world is filled with portions of him.' A foot-note explains 'Maheśwara' as intending 'Íśwara, Rudra, Hara, or Śiva.' Philosophy of the Upanishads. p. 224. Ed. 2 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, vi., 19. Professor Gough renders as follows: 'Without parts, without action, and without change; blameless and unsullied.' Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 232, 233. Ed. 1 See Book IV., Aph. 21, a., and Aph. 31, b., at pp. 301 and 310, supra. Ed. 3 Vásaná; for which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 1 Pratiyogin; on which vide supra, p. 342, note 3. Ed. 1 Samaváya; of which the preferable rendering, proposed by Professor Cowell, is 'interpenetration.' Ed. 3 Read, instead of 'the case is otherwise disposed of,' 'the establishment [which they lead to] is otherwise.' Ed. 4 See the preceding note. Ed. 4 Nimitta, 'instrumental cause.' Nimitta-káraṇa is rendered 'occasional cause' at p. 194, supra. Colebrooke's representatives are 'chief or especial cause' and 'efficient cause.' Ed. 2 Nimitta-káraṇa. Vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 5 Brahmatwa, the abstract of Brahma. Ed. 4 Brahma-bháva, the same as brahmatwa. Ed. 2 See the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 33. Ed. 3 Here and below, this renders vásaná, on which vide supra, p. 29, note 2. Ed. 2 The rendering given above is susceptible of improvement; and so, very probably, is that which follows: 'Where, moreover, there is influence from an obstruction [like that offered by sleep], mental impression does not inform one of objects [and, hence, one is then exempt from desires, &c., and in a state identical with that of emancipation]: a cause [of desires, &c.; and such is mental impression,] does not countervail what is predominant, [e.g., sleep, which is, as it were, temporary Brahmahood or emancipation].' Aniruddha's interpretation of this obscure aphorism, possibly by reason of his elliptical mode of expression, is far from clear. His view of its sense is, certainly, peculiar. Ed. 3 Sanskára, here used as synonymous with vásaná. Ed. 2 Here, and often below, 'impression' is to render sanskára. Ed. 2 Read, instead of 'lasts out,' 'brings about.' Ed. 3 This phrase is meant to translate sanskára. Ed. 1 Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva here end one aphorism, and treat what follows as a second. Vijnána formally defends the reading to which he gives the preference. Ed. 1 Nágeśa pretty evidently does not regard these words as an aphorism. Ed. 2 Buddhi, rendered 'intellect' at pp. 196, &c., supra. Ed. 3 The world, viewed as Brahmá's egg, is fabled to be surrounded by seven envelopes. One of these is the ávaraṇa-tejas, Dr. Ballantyne's 'empyrean fire.' See Professor Wilson's translation of the Vishṇu-puráṇa (ed. 1864, &c.), vol. i., p. 40. I have to thank Prof. Cowell for this reference. Ed. 2 Vide supra, p. 310, note 4. Ed. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Previous

HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced. The existence of Soul. Aph. 1.* Soul is; for there is no proof that it is not. a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are aware of this, that 'I think;' because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the meaning. b. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of two proofs: Soul is not Body, &c. Aph. 2.* This [Soul,] is different from the Body, &c.; because of heterogeneousness, [or complete difference between the two]. The usage of language is evidence for this. Aph. 3.* Also because it [Soul,] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive,] case. a. That is to say: Soul is different from Body, &c., also because the learned express it by the possessive case, in such examples as, 'This [is] my body,' 'This [is] my understanding;' for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession]. b. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical], 'Ráhu's head' [the trunkless Ráhu being all head], 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies: An objection disposed of. Aph. 4.* It is not as in the case of the statue; because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing. a. This expression by means of the possessive case, [viz., 'My body' (§ 3)] is not like 'The statue's body,' &c. In such a case as 'The statue's body,' there is a mere fiction; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints is with the thing;' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by evidence; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. Such is the meaning. b. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., he settles its emancipation: Soul's aim how accomplished. Aph. 5.* Through the entire cessation of pain there is done what was to be done. a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the ceasing of Pleasure, also, that cannot be Soul's aim. To this he replies: Pleasure no compensation for Pain. Aph. 6.* Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul, as there is annoyance from Pain. a. And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for he cessation of Pain simply; so that there is not an equality of gain and loss: [but a clear gain, in the desired release]. b. He declares that Soul's aim is simply the cessation of Pain; because Pain is, indeed, abundant, in comparison of Pleasure: Pleasure sparingly dispensed. Aph. 7.* For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy. a. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy: such is the meaning. Pleasure undeserving of the name. Aph. 8.* It [Pleasure,] is also mixed with Pain, therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,] Pain. a. He rejects the opinion that Soul's aim is not the simple cessation of Pain, but this [cessation] tinctured with Pleasure: Cessation of suffering is a joy. Aph. 9.* If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say; for there are two kinds [of things desired]. a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration: [the first,] 'May I be happy;' [the second,] 'May I not be miserable;' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude]. b. He ponders a doubt: A doubt. Aph. 10.* The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality; for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c. a. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim: such is the meaning. b. He clears up this [doubt]: This cleared up. Aph. 11.* Though it [the Pain,] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul,] through non-discrimination. a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the shape of a reflexion, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non-discrimination,' as the cause, owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning. And this has been set forth in the First Book. b. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters,] arises from non-discrimination: but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this, he says: Two reasons why non-discrimination must have been from eternity. Aph. 12.* Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless; because, otherwise, two objections would present themselves. a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first,] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated; and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, &c., also: such is the meaning. b. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be everlasting. To this he replies: Non-discrimination, though from eternity, may be cut short. Aph. 13.* It [non-discrimination, cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is; else, it could not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be]. a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless, in the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. For, otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, [though the beginningless antecedent non-entity of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the production of the jar]. Such is the meaning. b. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage, he states the cause of Liberation: Bondage how destructible. Aph. 14.* It [Bondage,] is annihilable by the alloted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light]. This enforced. Aph. 15.* Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation;2 [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not]. a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book,3 viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c: Bondage not innate. Aph. 16.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [which cannot be innate]. a. 'Bondage' here means the cause of Bondage, named the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain. b. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place over again. To this he replies: Bondage does not recur. Aph. 17.* Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated; because there is Scripture4 for its non-recurrence. Evidence of this. Aph. 18.* Else, it [liberation,] would not be the Soul's aim, [which it is]. a. He states the reason why this is not Soul's aim: Force of the evidence. Aph. 19.* What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable]. a. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound; because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and, therefore, such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim, [but emancipation final and complete]. b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it that you have asserted [Book I., § 19,] the eternal freedom [of all souls alike]? To this he replies: The nature of liberation. Aph. 20.* Liberation is nothing other than the removal3 of the obstacle [to the Soul's recognition of itself as free]. a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen]; to which he replies: An objection repelled. Aph. 21.* Even in that case, there is no contradiction. a. That is to say: 'even in that case,' i.e., even if Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim. b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one's neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string], is attained, [on one's hearing where it is]. To this he replies: Another objection repelled. Aph. 22.* This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it].3 a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also: Utility of other means besides hearing. Aph. 23.* Of others [viz., other means besides hearing] for the sake of confirmation, [there is need]. a. He speaks of these same other means: Formality in postures not imperative. Aph. 24.* There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., § 34]. a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a 'posture' should be the 'lotus-posture,' or the like; because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] 'posture.' b. He states the principal means [of Concentration]: The efficient means of Concentration. Aph. 25.* Mind without an object is Meditation. a. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is 'Meditation,' i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word 'cause' is employed for 'effect.' For it will be declared how Meditation effects this [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect]. b. But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up: A distinction not without a difference. Aph. 26.* If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the excluion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case]. a. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies: Soul tinged by what does not belong to it. Aph. 27.* Though it [Soul,] be unassociated, still there is a tingeing [reflexionally,] through Non-discrimination. a. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, as it were, a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflexion, by those who discriminate the tinge [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to]. b. He explains this same: Its seeming presence explained. Aph. 28.* As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I., § 19, c.], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such]. a. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge: How to be got rid of. Aph. 29.* It [viz.,the aforesaid tinge,] is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c. a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, in regard to the exclusion—through Meditation, &c., lodged in the Mind,—of the tingeing of Soul: The ancient dogma on this point. Aph. 30.* It is by the exclusion of dissolution2 and distraction, say the teachers. a. That is to say: through the removal, by means of meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers. b. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, &c., should take place in caves and such places: Meditation may take place anywhere. Aph. 31.* There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind. a. That is to say: Meditation, or the like, results simply 'from tranquillity of Mind.' Therefore, such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it. b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles compendiously the cause of the world: Nature the material of the world. Aph. 32.* Nature is the primal material; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products. a. That is to say: since we learn, from Scripture, that Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these. b. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies: Soul not the material of the world. Aph. 33.* Not to Soul does this [viz., the material of the world,] belong, though it be eternal; because of its want of suitableness. a. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies possession of qualities, and the being associable: [and,] by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal, [and, therefore, no product,] cannot serve as material. b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,'2 we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered this adverse suggestion, he replies: The opposite view unscriptural. Aph. 34.* The despicable sophist4 does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul; because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to Scripture. a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof,1 have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the Naiyáyikas,] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation [of soul, as material, into the world, as product]. b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies: Nature the ultimate material cause. Aph. 35.* Though but mediately [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes,]; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiśeshikas]. Nature all-pervading. Aph. 36.* It [Nature,] is all-pervading; because [its] products are seen everywhere. a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, 'Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or act];' [for what is unlimited] and fills all space, can find no other space to move into]. To this he replies: An objection parried. Aph. 37.* Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms. a. 'Motion' means action. Though it be present, this does not prevent its [Nature's,] being the radical cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vaiśeshikas: such is the meaning. Nature the proper substitute for eight of the substances in the Nyáya list. Aph. 38.* Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyáyikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine]. a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import. Nature consists of the three Qualities. Aph. 39.* Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence. a. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature; because they are what constitutes Nature. b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing; since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, Emancipation would be inexplicable: Nature's disinterestedness. Aph. 40.* Nature, though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing], creates for the sake of Soul; like a cart's carrying saffron, [for the use of its master. See Book III., § 58]. a. He states the concomitant3 cause of diversified creation: Nature treats every one according to his deserts. Aph. 41.* The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert. a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies: Contrary results from Nature how. Aph. 42.* The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise. a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is 'equipoise:'2 through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same: such is the meaning. b. But then, since it is Nature's attribute to create, there should be the mundane state, even after [the discriminative] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. To this he replies: Nature's energy does not debar emancipation. Aph. 43.* Since [or when,] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil,when the king's purpose has been accomplished].1 a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies: No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated. Aph. 44.* Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause,4 [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion]. a. But then, this arrangement could be possible then, [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls: but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. Having pondered this doubt, he says: Multeity of Soul proved from the Veda. Aph. 45.* The multeity of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself]. a. That is to say: the multeity of Soul is proved, absolutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, 'Whoso understand this, these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.'3 b. But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct. To this he replies: Unity excluded by the supposion of Souls. Aph. 46.* If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being established, there is duality, [upsetting the dogma founded on in § 44]. a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of 'Ignorance,' [which, according to the Vedánta, is no reality]; so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedántíc dogma of] non-duality. With reference to this doubt, he says: The Vedánta cannot evade non-duality. Aph. 47.* Even by the two the authority is contradicted. a. Thst is to say: even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contradiction is constituted to the text, [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality. b. He states another couple of objections, also: The establishment of the Vedánta tenet implies a contradiction. Aph. 48.* The primâ facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality]. a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. To this he replies: Self-manifestation contradictory. Aph. 49.* [And,] in its [Soul's,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedántís say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction]. a. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of, there is the 'opposition of patient and agent' [in one]. b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, object to itself. To this he replies: Illuminating function of Soul. Aph. 50.* This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent. a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies: A salvo for the Vaidic view. Aph. 51.* There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time']. a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal: The world's reality irrefragable. Aph. 52.* The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture,] no debarrer [of this view of the matter]. a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep,2 &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,3 [according to Book I., § 71]. b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always: Creation excluded. Aph. 53.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed]. a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form. b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, be asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms: The real agent who. Aph. 54.* Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent. Experience is got rid of when. Aph. 55.* Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king]. a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmá: Paradise no security against transmigration. Aph. 56.* Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to munane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return]. a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c. b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies: This point enforced. Aph. 57.* Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors]. a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there no return from the world of Brahmá? To this he replies: A salvo for Scriptural text. Aph. 58.* There is Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of Brahmá]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate means]. a. He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul's going [to the locality where it is to experience], even though it be all-filling, [and can, therefore, have no place into which to move]: Another. Aph. 59.* And, in accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,] is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space. a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it [here]. b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body,] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer, [Soul]: The Body's existence dependent on Soul. Aph. 60.* This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent]. a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls,] take place without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies: Desert not the author of the Body. Aph. 61.* If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant. a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body] , should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant. b. According to the system of the Vaiśeshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause [of the Body]: Reason for this. Aph. 62.* For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul]. a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the Body,] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import. b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says: Soul how limited and unlimited. Aph. 63.* The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect argument.1 a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by peraonality, not of pure Soul, [which is unlimited]. b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness: The real agent what. Aph. 64.* The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiśeshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].4 a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra1 [respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or peronality]. b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness? to this he replies: The real agent whence. Aph. 65.* It is the same as in the arising of Desert. a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from time alone. as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof, also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning. Orthodox recognition of Brahmá, Śiva, and Vishṇu, put forward. Aph. 66.* The rest is from Mind, [the Great Principle]. a. What is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone; because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence towards others: such is the meaning. And by this aphorism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishṇu, owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct2 [of the soul, which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy (see § 64)]. b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by? With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this [regress] is valid; [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]: A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument. Aph. 67.* The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some,] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants], is beginningless. A second. Aph. 68.* Or [the case is, likewise, one of infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchaśikha [holds]. A third. Aph. 69.* [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world]. a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute: The summing up. Aph. 70.* Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim. THE END. Sacred-Texts Hindu Index Footnotes 2 Vide supra, p. 43, note 2, and p. 194, note 3. Prof. Cowell defines anwaya-vyatireka as 'affirmative and negative induction,' in his edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 315, note 3. See also his translation of the Kusumánjali, pp. 7 and 23. Ed. 3 Vide supra, p. 8. Ed. 4 Vijnána and Nágeśa quote the text: ###1. Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva cite the longer passage: ###2, 3, 1. See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words ###2 in the Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 5. Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the twenty-third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a fact which suggests that my criticism on Váchaspati Miśra's quotation, ventured in the note above referred to, may be hasty. Ed. 3 The rare word dhwasti, thus rendered, Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva explain by dhwansa. Ed. 3 This Aphorism, as given, is a literal repetition of Book I., 70, at p. 87, supra. Ed. 2 'Inertness [of mind]' is a better rendering of laya. Ed. 2 Muṇḍaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed. 4 Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste.' Ed. 1 'Lowest . . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' Ed. 3 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. 2 Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed. 1 Compare Aph. 66 of Book III., at p. 267, supra. Ed. 4 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed. 3 Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 2, 15. Ed. 2 For 'injured,' &c,' read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.' Ed. 3 Instead of 'in which,' &c., read, '[consisting of] the Great One, &c.' Ed. 1 On anawaya-vyatireka, vide supra, p. 428, note 2. Ed. 4 See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed. 1 This is an appellation of Śiva. Ed. 2 The text here followed is very inferior. Ed.