Meditations on First Philosophy

SIX METAPHYSICAL _MEDITATIONS_; Wherein it is Proved That there is a GOD. And that Mans MIND is really distinct from his BODY. Written Originally in Latin By _RENATUS DES-CARTES_. Hereunto are added the OBJECTIONS made against these Meditations By _THOMAS HOBBES_ Of _Malmesbury_. With the AUTHORS Answers. All Faithfully Translated into ENGLISH, with a short Account of _Des-Cartes’s Life_. By _WILLIAM MOLYNEUX_. _London_, Printed by _B.G._ for _Benj. Tooke_ at the _Ship_ in St. _Pauls_ Church-yard, 1680. Some Books sold by _John Lawrence_, at the _Angel_ in _Cornhill_, near the _Royal Exchange_. A Collection of Letters for the improvement of Husbandry and Trade, intended to be continued Monthly, by _John Houghton_, fellow of the _Royal Society_, ’tis designed that every Letter shall be usefull to Mankind, and by degrees for most persons of both Sexes. The _Merchant Royal_, (a very pleasant Sermon) Preached before the King at _White-Hall_, upon the Nuptials of an Honourable Lord and his Lady, in Quarto, price 6_d._ _Humane Prudence_, or the Art by which a man may raise himself and Fortune to Granduer, by _A. B._, the second Edition, with the Addition of a Table; in Twelves, price Bound, 1_s._ THE TRANSLATORS PREFACE. TO THE READERS. _Had honor or applause and not the publick advantage of English Readers been the design of this Undertaking, the consideration of the common Fate of Translations had discouraged Me from permitting this even to have seen the light; for meer Versions do alwayes carry with them this Property, that if not well done they may much disgrace, but if well, not much commend the doers._ _And certainly I might well have expected the same chance, had this been the Translation of an History, Play or Romance; wherein there is requisite not onely a bare version but a conformation of Idiom and language, manner and customary expression; But the nature of this present Work will not admit of the like liberty, and therefore, I hope, amongst Judicious Readers it may be exempt from the common Fate of Translations; for if we look upon it as a Philosophical or Metaphysical Tract, or rather as (really it is) a Physico-Mathematical Argumentation, we shall find that a great strictness of Expression is requisite to be observed therein. So that had a Translator taken upon him to use his own liberty of Phrase, he would thereby have endanger’d the sense and force of the Arguments; for Politeness of language might as well be expected in a Translation of ~Euclide~ as in this. And all that are acquainted with this famous Authors design, do very well know, that it was his intention in these Meditations ~Mathematically to demonstrate~, that there is a ~God~, and that mans ~mind~ is ~incorporeal~. And it was his opinion, that metaphysicks may as clearly be demonstrated as mathematicks, as witness his expression in the Dedicatory Epistle of this Work to the ~Sorbone~ Doctors, ~Eas~ (Rationes scilicet) ~quibus hic utor certitudine & evidentiâ Geometricas æquare, vel etiam superare existimem~; That he

Geometrical certainty._ _And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein any smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here delivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the Original. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express what is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own Copy expresses._ _Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough Language of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first relating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the Meditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to this Work._ _As to the Readers, ’tis, I suppose, so evident that candour of mind, and freedome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage themselves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here insisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this subject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be more than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing Tract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over, but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical demonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may render the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these metaphysical Demonstrations, which (as, before has been noted from the illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel Geometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular Argument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse._ _The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in Mathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge of what went before, ’tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend the Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the Arguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct Knowledge, lett him pass his judgement._ _And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he would not be content with a single perusal of the following Discourses, but that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means the force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the most diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may offer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This was the desire of our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his ~Principles of Philosophy~, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of mind, as these abstracted speculations; and therefore if it were his Request in that case, we may Reasonably think that ’twas no less his desire in this._ _When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations, we have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude of the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more certain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent Philosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for more; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry into the inward Thoughts, (largly discover’d in the Writings) of our Famous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small knowledge._ _Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of ~March~ in the year 1596. at ~Tours~, or at ~Castrum Eraldum~ a Town near ~Tours~ in ~France~; He came of an Antient and Noble Family, being by Descent ~Lord~ of ~Perron~, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and seven thousand pounds a year._ _He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, ~viz. Epist. 90. partis secundæ~ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had run through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of ~Flexia~, or ~La Flesche~ a Town in the Province of ~Anjou~, famous for the Colledge of Jesuites there establish’d by ~Henry~ the ~4th~._ _But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of the Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as he himself testifies in his ~Dissertatio de Methodo~) to get loose from those Chains and Fetters of Mind to which the weakness of his tender years had subjected him._ _To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the variety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys, the memory of his past Notions might be blotted out; In his travel he applied himself much to the study of the Art Military, and Mathematicks; In the latter he has left the World large testimonies of his Excellence in his ~Book of Geometry~; and in the former we have reason to believe him most expert, for He was personally present at some Sieges and Battles both in ~France~ and ~Germany~, as particularly at the Siege of ~Rochel~, of ~Gava~ near ~Genoa~, of ~Breda~, at the Battle of ~Prague~, ~&c.~ so that we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto of the noble ~Sir W. Raliegh~) ~Tam Marti, quam Mercurio~, For the Pike as well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperour became a ~Cæsar~ by his Book as well as Sword, by the Conquests of his mind as well as those of his arm; so our Famous Author was ~Ex Utroque Clarus~._ _In his Travels he spent many years, in all which time he was not Idle, but highly improved himself by his converse with the ~Beaux Esprits~, which he met with in several Regions he visited; The first Place he betook himself to, was ~Italy~, then he went into ~Denmark, Germany, Hungary, &c.~ And after a Long but advantagious Peregrination he return’d to ~Amsterdam~, where he intended to take up his Rest, had he not been called by the French King upon very Honourable terms to ~Paris~; During his Continuance there he so order’d his annual Revenue, that he might be supplied by the hands of a Friend wherever he was. He staid at ~Paris~ three years, and then retired Himself to a solitary village in ~Holland~ called ~Egmond~, where he lived twenty five years, during which time he apply’d himself wholly to the Restauration of true Philosophy, wherein he gave the World such mighty testimonies of his Excellence, that in a short time he became celebrated in the mouths of all Learned Men. Neither were the Courts of Princes silent in his deserved Praises; for after a Retirement of twenty five years he was Invited by ~Christina Queen of Sweedland~ to her Court; Thither upon the intreaty of this brave and Learned Princess he betook himself, where he had not continued Long before he was struck with a Peripneumonia or Inflammation of the Lungs (contracted, as it is thought by the long Discourses which he used to hold bare headed with the Queen, continuing them sometimes till far in the Night,) of which unhappy distemper he Died the seventh Day after he sicken’d._ _Thus Expired this Wonder of his Own and succeeding Ages, desired and lamented by all men, Æqual’d by none. He was buried in a costly Monument consisting of four sides, upon which were inscribed Epitaphs; bestow’d upon him by many Renown’d Persons._ _What shall we now say sufficient to express our Grief for the untimely Decease of this Worthy Philosopher? But Especially what shall we now do to recover our Loss? Let us endeavour to Redeem what we have lost by well Husbanding and careful improvement of what is left; which may be done in Part by a Diligent Perusal of the Works written by this Excellent Author; This, This only is the way of Reviving him again, and of giving him Immortality in spight of his untimely Fate. And so let him for ever live celebrated by the Deserved Praises of all ingenious Enquirers after truth, and Learning._ _Let us therefore cast our eye upon the Present Work of this extroardinary Philosopher, and therein let us admire his profound Judgment and vigorous Fancy, for if we seriously consider it, we shall hardly find a more solid close piece of Reasoning either in this or Foregoing ages; ~Here~, what was commonly asserted without proof, is not only proved but ~Mathematically~ Demonstrated, ~viz.~ That ~God is the Fountain and Original of Truth~; His sharp Wit, like ~Hannibals~ Vinegar, hath eaten thro the Mazing and overtowring hills of Errors, a Plain and Pleasant Way to the Divine seat of Knowledge._ _In fine, such is the Excellence of these six Meditations, that I cannot resemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the Supream Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out of Nothing, the Restauration of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine Work; so that (with Reverence be it spoken) the Incomparable ~Des-Cartes~ does hereby deserve as it were the name of a Creatour. In the first Meditation we are Presented with a Rude and Indigested Chaos of Errours and Doubts, till the Divine spirit of the Noble ~Des-Cartes~ (pardon the Boldness of the Expression) ~moves upon the confused face of these Waters~, and thereout produces some ~clear~ and ~distinct Light~; by which ~Sun-shine~ he proceeds to bring forth and cherish other ~Branches of Truth~; Till at last by a six Days Labour he Establishes this Fair Fabrick (as I may call it) of the ~Intellectual World~ on foundations that shall never be shaken. Then sitting down with rest and satisfaction he looks upon this his Off-spring and Pronounces it ~Good~._ _These Things Consider’d, I need not make any long Apologies for my undertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with a Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the Methods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well find fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion among savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language, because they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is no (or at most a very small) part of Learning, and that which certainly every Cobler in ~Rome~ was once endow’d with; and therefore must there then be no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are many Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding very capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances of our Kingdomes occasion’d many Youths, who were then in a fair way of Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions from Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become Men of extraordinary nary abilities and qualifications for learning notwithstanding their deficiency in the Roman Tongue. And I see no Reason why it should not be the desire, and consequently the endeavour of every true English man, to make his language as universal as is now the ~French~, into which the best Books in all sorts of Learning, both Poetry and Prose, are daily translated out of all languages, but especially out of Greek and Latine. Among which these Meditations are to be found, entituled, ~Les Meditations Metaphysiques De Rene Des Cartes touchant la Premiere Philosophie~. This was translated out of the Authors Latine into French by ~Monsieur le D. D. L. N. S.~ The several Objections also, which were made by divers learned Persons against these Meditations, with the Authors Answers, were translated into French by ~M. B. L. R.~ And, I hope, no one will assert, that the French are more fit to receive those metaphysical Notions delivered herein than the English Nation._ _But ’twas none of the smallest motives I had to this undertaking, that tho some famous English Authours have taken notice of the Arguments here produced (for the proof of a ~Deity~ drawn from the ~Idea~ we have of ~God~ in our Mind, ~&c.~) Particularly the most excellent and learned ~Dr. Stillingfleet~ in the first Chapter of the third Book in his ~Origines Sacræ~, who refers his Readers to a further search into these Meditations in the ~400 page~ of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr. ~Henry More~ in his ~Antidote against Atheism~, and more fully in his ~Appendix~ annex’d thereto, hath treated of our Authors demonstration; and yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed all their Copies (tho some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question whether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever appear’d in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long before thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors just vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made against these Discourses._ _And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from that satisfaction which he may reasonably expect from the perusal of the following Meditations; this Translation is dedicated to no one in particular, but is humbly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid Readers, by_ Their humble servant Will. Molyneux. _Dublin Feb. 19. 1679/80._ The Contents. Meditation 1. _Of Things Doubtful._ Pag. 1. Meditat. 2. _Of the Nature of Mans Mind, and that ’tis easier Proved to Be then our Body._ p. 11. Meditat. 3. _Of God, and that there Is a God._ p. 27. Meditat. 4. _Of Truth and Falshood._ p. 55. Meditat. 5. _Of the Essence of Things Material, and herein again of God, and that He does Exist._ p. 70. Meditat. 6. _Of Corporeal Beings and their Existence, as also of the Real Difference between Mind and Body._ p. 83. _Objections and Answers._ p. 155. ERRATA. Pag. 1. line 8. dele _off_. p. 3. l. 21. _there wants the sign of Interrogation_. p. 8. l. 10. r. _Premeditated_. ib. l. 14. r. _falshoods_. p. 18. l. 15. r. _that it may_. p. 20. l. 11. r. _suffers_. _In the two or three first chapters there are ~Astericks~ wanting_. p. 33. l. 10. dele I. p. 39. l. 25. r. _formally_. p. 49. l. 14 r. _Duration_ and _Continuance_. p. 54. l. 2 _for the Point put a Comma_. p. 61. l. ult. r. _I enquire_. p. 91. r. _in the margin_ _doubted_. p. 124. l. 6. r. _have no affinity_. Transcriber’s Note: These errata have been corrected, along with some obvious typos. The spelling in this book is not only of its time, but also wildly variable, and has been left well alone. Upright text within _italic_ passages is marked ~like this~. THE Metaphysical Meditations OF _Renatus Des-Cartes_, &c. MEDITAT. I. _Of Things Doubtful._ Some years past I perceived how many _Falsities_ I admitted as _Truths_ in my Younger years, and how _Dubious_ those things were which I raised from thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a designe to establish any thing that should prove _firme_ and _permanent_ in sciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former opinions, and begin a new from some _First principles_. But this seemed a great Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, then which none could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which Account I waited so long, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in _Deliberation_ which remain’d only for _Action_. This day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I procured to my self a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired my self Alone; and now at length will I freely and seriously apply my self to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions. To the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove them all _false_ (for that perhaps I shall never atcheive) But because my reason perswades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those opinions which seem _not so very certain_ and _undoubted_, then I should from those that are _Apparently false_, it will be sufficient if I reject all those wherein I find any _Occasion_ of doubt. Neither to effect this is it necessary, that they all should be run over particularly (which would be an endles trouble) but because the _Foundation_ being once undermin’d, whatever is built thereon will of its own accord come to the ground, I shall therefore immediately assault the very _principle_, on which whatever I have believed was _grounded_. Viz. _Whatever I have hitherto admitted as most true, that I received either from, or by my Senses; but these I have often found to deceive me, and ’tis prudence never certainly to trust those that I have (tho but once) deceived us._ 1 _Doubt._ But tho sometimes the _senses_ deceive us being exercised about _remote_ or _small_ objects, yet there are many other things of which we cannot doubt tho we know them only by the senses? as that at present I am in this place, that I am sitting by a fire, that I have a Winter gown on me, that I feel this Paper with my hands; But how can it be denied that these hands or this body is mine? Unless I should compare my self to those mad men, whose brains are disturbed by such a disorderly melancholick vapour, that makes them continually profess themselves to be Kings, tho they are very poor, or fancy themselves cloathed in Purple Robes, tho they are naked, or that their heads are made of Clay as a bottle, or of glass, _&c._ But these are mad men, and I should be as mad as they in following their example by fancying these things as they do. 1 _Solution._ This truly would seem very clear to those that never _sleep_, and suffer the same things (and sometimes more unlikely) in their repose, then these mad men do whilst they are awake; for how often am I perswaded in a Dream of these usual occurrences, that I am in this place, that I have a Gown on me, that I am sitting by a fire, _&c._ Tho all the while I am lying naked between the Sheets. But now I am certain that I am awake and look upon this Paper, neither is this head which I shake asleep, I knowingly and willingly stretch out this hand, and am sensible that things so distinct could not happen to one that sleeps. As if I could not remember my self to have been deceived formerly in my sleep by the like thoughts; which while I consider more attentively I am so far convinced of the difficulty of distinguishing sleep from waking that I am amazed, and this very amazement almost perswades me that I am asleep. 2 _Doubt._ Wherefore let us suppose our selves _asleep_, and that these things are not _true_, viz. that we open our eyes, move our heads, stretch our hands, and perhaps that we have no such things as hands or a body. Yet we must confess, that what we see in a Dream is (as it were) _a painted Picture_, which cannot be devised but after the _likeness_ of some _real_ thing; and that therefore these Generals at least, _viz._ eyes, head, hands, and the whole body are things _really existent_ and not _imaginary_; For Painters themselves, (even then when they design Mermaids and Satyrs in the most unusual shapes) do not give them natures altogether new, but only add the divers Parts of different Animals together; And if by chance they invent any thing so new that nothing was ever seen like it, for that ’tis wholy fictitious and false, yet the colours at least of which, they make it must be _true Colours_; so upon the same account, tho these General things as eyes, head, hands, _&c._ may be imaginary; yet nevertheless we must of necessity confess the more _simple_ and _universal_ things to be _True_, of which (as of true Colours) these _Images_ of things (whether _true_ or _false_) which are in our minds are made; such as are the nature of a body in General, and its Extension, also the shape of things extended, with the quantity or bigness of them; their number also, and place wherein they are, the time in which they continue, and the like, and therefore from hence we make no bad conclusion, that _Physick_, both _Natural_, and _Medicinal_, _Astronomy_, and all other _sciences_, which depend on the consideration of _compound things_, are _Doubtful_. But that _Arithmetick_, _Geometry_, and the like (which treat only of the most _simple_, and _General_ things not regarding whether they really are or not) have in them something _certain_ and _undoubted_; for whether I sleep or wake, _two_ and _three_ added make five; a _square_ has no more sides than _four_ _&c._ neither seems it possible what such _plain truths_ can be _doubted_ off. 2 _Solution._ But all this While there is rooted in my mind a certain old opinion of the _being_ of an _Omnipotent God_, by whom I am _created_ in the state I am in; and how know I but he caused that there should be no Earth, no Heaven, no Body, no Figure, no Magnitude, no Place, and yet that all these things should seem to me to be as now they are? And as I very often judge others to Erre about those things which they think they _Throughly understand_, so why may not I be _deceived_, whenever I add _two_ and _three_, or count the sides of a Square, or whatever other easy Matter can be thought of? 3. _Doubt_. But perhaps _God wills not_ that I should be _deceived_, for he is said to be _Infinitely Good_. 3. _Solution._ Yet if it were _Repugnant_ to his _Goodness_ to create me so that I should be _always deceived_, it seems also _unagreeable_ to his _Goodness_ to permit me to be deceived _at any time_; Which last no one will affirme: Some there are truely who had rather deny _Gods Omnipotence_, then beleive all things _uncertain_; but there at present we may not contradict. And we will suppose all this of _God_ to be _false_; yet whether they will suppose me to become what _I_ am by Fate, by _Chance_, by a _continued chain_ of _causes_, or any other way, because to _erre_ is an _Imperfection_, by how much the less _power_ they will Assigne to the _Author_ of my _Being_, so much the more Probable it will be, that I am so _Imperfect_ as to be _alwayes deceived_. To which Arguments I know not what to answer but am forced to confess, that there is nothing of all those things which I formerly received as _Truths_, whereof at present I may not _doubt_; and this doubt shall not be grounded on inadvertency or Levity, but upon strong and Premeditated reasons; and therefore I must hereafter (if I designe to discover any truths) withdraw my assent from them no less then from _apparent falshoods_. But ’tis not sufficient to think only _Transiently_ on these things, but I must take care to _remember_ them; for dayly my old opinions returne upon me, and much against my Will almost possesse my Beleife tyed to them, as it were by a continued _use_ and _Right_ of _Familiarity_; neither shall I ever cease to _assent_ and _trust_ in them, whilst I suppose them as in themselves they really are, that is to say, _something doubtful_ (as now I have proved) yet notwithstanding _highly Probable_, which it is much more Reasonable to beleive then disbeleive. Wherefore I conceive I should not do amiss, if (with my mind bent clearly to the contrary side) I should deceive my self, and suppose them for a While altogether _false_ and _Imaginary_; till at length the Weights of prejudice being equal in each scale, no ill custome may any more Draw my Judgement from the _true Conception_ of things, for I know from hence will follow no dangerous Error, and I can’t too immoderately pamper my own Incredulity, seeing What I am about, concernes not _Practice_ but _Speculation_. To Which end I will suppose, not an _Infinitely perfect God_, the _Fountain_ of _truth_, but that some _Evil Spirit_ which is very _Powerful_ and _crafty_ has used all his endeavours to _deceive_ me; I will conceive, the Heavens, Air, Earth, Colours, Figures, Sounds, and all outward things are nothing else but the delusions of Dreams, by which he has laid snares to catch my easy beleif; I will consider my self as not having hands, Eyes, Flesh, Blood, or Sences, but that _I_ falsely think that _I_ have all these; _I_ will continue firmly in this Meditation; and tho it lyes not in my power to _discover any truth_, yet this is in my power, not to _assent to Falsities_, and with a strong resolution take care that the _Mighty deceiver_ (tho never so _powerful_ or _cunning_) impose not any thing on my beleife. But this is a laborious intention, and a certain sloth reduces me to the usual course of life, and like a Prisoner who in his sleep perhaps enjoy’d an imaginary liberty, and when he begins to suppose that he is asleep is afraid to waken, but is willing to be deceived by the _Pleasant delusion_; so I willingly fall into my opinions, and am afraid to be Roused, least a toilsome waking succeeding a pleasant rest I may hereafter live not in the _light_, but in the confused _darkness_ of the _doubts_ now raised. MEDITAT. II. _~Of the nature of Mans mind~, and that ’tis easier proved to ~be~ then our ~body~._ By yesterdays Meditation I am cast into so great _Doubts_, that I shall never forget them, and yet I know not how to answer them, but being plunged on a suddain into a deep Gulf, I am so amazed that I can neither touch the bottome, nor swim at the top. Nevertheless, I will endeavour once more, and try the way I set on yesterday, by removing from me whatever is in the _least doubtful_, as if I had certainly discover’d it to be _altogether false_, and will proceed till I find out some _certainty_, or if nothing else, yet at least this _certainty, That there is nothing sure_. _Archimedes_ required but a _point_ which was _firm_, and _immoveable_ that he might move the _whole Earth_, so in the perfect undertaking Great things may be expected, if I can discover but the _least thing_ that is _true_ and _indisputable_. Wherefore I suppose all things I see are _false_, and believe that nothing of those things are really existent, which my deceitful memory represents to me; ’tis evident I have no senses, that a Body, Figure, Extension, Motion, Place, _&c._ are meer Fictions; what thing therefore is there that is _true_? perhaps only _this, That there is nothing certain._ [Sidenote: _Doubts and Solutions._] But how know I that there is nothing _distinct_ from all these things (which I have now reckon’d) of which I have no reason to _doubt_? Is there no _God_ (or whatever other name I may call him) who has put these thoughts into me? Yet why should I think this? When I my self perhaps am the _Author_ of them. Upon which Account, therefore must not I be something? ’tis but just now that I denied that I had any _senses_, or any _Body_. Hold a while—Am I so tied to a _Body_ and _senses_ that I cannot _exist_ without them? But I have perswaded my self that there is nothing in the World, no Heaven, no Earth, no Souls, no Bodies; and then why not, that I _my self am not_? Yet surely if _I_ could perswade my self any thing, _I was_. But there is _I_ know not what sort of _Deceivour_ very _powerful_ and very _crafty_, who always strives to _deceive_ Me; without Doubt therefore _I am_, if he can _decieve me_; And let him _Deceive_ me as much as he can, yet he can never make me _not to Be_, whilst _I think that I am_. Wherefore _I_ may lay this down as a _Principle, that whenever this sentence I am, I exist, is spoken or thought of by Me, ’tis necessarily True_. But _I_ do not yet fully understand _who I am_ that now necessarily _exist_, and _I_ must hereafter take care, least _I_ foolishly _mistake_ some other thing _for my self_, and by that means be _deceived_ in that thought, which _I_ defend as the most _certain_ and _evident_ of all. Wherefore _I_ will again Recollect, what _I_ believed _my self to be_ heretofore, before _I_ had set upon these Meditations, from which _Notion I_ will withdraw whatever may be _Disproved_ by the _Foremention’d Reasons_, that in the End, _That_ only may Remain which is _True_ and _indisputable_. What therefore have I heretofore thought my self? _A Man._ But what is a man? Shall I answer, a _Rational Animal_? By no means; because afterwards it may be asked, what an _Animal_ is? and what _Rational_ is? And so from one _question_ I may fall into greater _Difficulties_; neither at present have I so much time as to spend it about such Niceties. But I shall rather here Consider, what heretofore represented it self to my thoughts _freely_, and _naturally_, whenever I set my self to understand _What I my self was_. And the first thing I find Representing it self is, that I have _Face_, _Hands_, _Arms_, and this whole _frame_ of _parts_ which is seen in my _Body_, and which I call my _Body_. The next thing represented to me was, that I was _nourish’d_, could _walk_, had _senses_, and could _Think_; which functions I attributed to my _Soul_. Yet what this _soul_ of mine was, I did not fully conceive; or else supposed it a small thing like _wind_, or _fire_, or _aire_, infused through my _stronger parts_. As to my _Body_ truly _I_ doubted not, but that _I_ rightly understood its _Nature_, which (if _I_ should endeavour to describe as _I_ conceive it) _I_ should thus Explain, _viz._ By a _Body_ _I_ mean whatever is _capable_ of _Shape_, or can be _contained_ in a _place_, and so fill’s a space that it excludes all other _Bodys_ out of the same, that which may be _touch’d_, _seen_, _heard_, _tasted_, or _smelt_, and that which is _capable_ of _various_ _Motions_ and _Modifications_, not from it _self_, but from any _other thing moving_ it, for _I_ judged it _against_ (or rather _above_) the _nature_ of a _Body_ to _move it self_, or _perceive_, or _think_, But rather admired that _I_ should find these _Operations_ in certain _Bodys_. But How now (since _I_ suppose a certain _powerful_ and (if it be lawful to call him so) _evil deluder_, who useth all his endeavours to deceive me in all things) can _I_ affirme that I have any of those things, which I have now said belong to the _nature_ of a _Body_? Hold— Let me Consider—, Let me think—, Let me reflect— I can find no Answer, and I am weary with repeating the same things over-again in vain. But Which of these _Faculties_ did I attribute to my _Soul_, my _Nutritive_, or _Motive faculty_? yet now seeing I have no _Body_, these also are _meer delusions_. Was it my _sensitive faculty_? But this also cannot be perform’d without a _Body_, and I have seem’d to _perceive_ many things in my _sleep_, of which I afterwards understood my self _not_ to be _sensible_. Was it my _Cogitative Faculty_? Here I have discovered it, ’tis my _Thought_, this alone cannot be separated from Me, I _am_, I _exist_,⸺_tis true_, but for what time _Am I_? Why _I am_ as long as _I think_; For it May be that When I cease from _thinking_, I may cease from being. Now I admit of nothing but what is necessarily true: In short therefore I _am_ only a _thinking thing_ that is to say, a _mind_, or a _soul_, or _understanding_, or _Reason_, words which formerly _I_ understood not; I am a _Real thing_, and _Really Existent_, But what sort of thing? I have just now said it, _A thinking thing_. [Sidenote: * _Places noted with their Asterisk are refer’d to in the following Objections._] But am I nothing besides? I will consider⸺I am not that _structure_ of _parts_, which is called a Mans _Body_, neither am I any sort of _thin Air_ infused into those Parts, nor a _Wind_, nor _Fire_, nor _Vapour_, nor _Breath_, nor whatever I my self can feign, for all these things I have supposed _not to Be_. Yet my Position stands firm; _Nevertheless I am something._ Yet perhaps it so falls out that these very things which I suppose not to exist (because to me _unknown_) are in reallity nothing _different_ from that very _Self_, which I _know_. I cannot tell, I dispute it not now, I can only give my opinion of those things whereof I have some knowledge. I am sure that I exist, I ask who I am whom I thus know, certainly, the knowledge, of _Me_ (precisely taken) depends not on those things, whose existence I am yet ignorant of; and therefore not on any other things that I can _feign_ by my _imagination_. And this very Word (_feign_) puts me in mind of my _error_, for I should _feign_ in deed, if I should _imagine_ my self any thing; for to _imagine_ is nothing else but to think upon the _shape_ or _image_ of a _corporeal_ thing; but now I certainly know that I _am_, and I know also that ’tis possible that all these _images_, and generally whatever belongs to the _Nature_ of a _Body_ are nothing but _deluding Dreams_. Which things Consider’d I should be no less Foolish in saying, _I will imagine that I may more throughly understand what I am_, then if I should say, _at Present I am awake and perceive something true, but because it appears not evidently enough, I shall endeavour to sleep, that in a Dream I may perceive it more evidently and truely_. Wherefore I know that nothing that I can comprehend by my _imagination_, can belong to the _Notion_ I have of _my self_, and that I must carefully withdraw my mind from those things that it may more _distinctly_ perceive its _own Nature_. Let me ask therefore _What I am, A Thinking Thing_, but What is That? That is a thing, _doubting_, _understanding_, _affirming_, _denying_, _willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. These truely are not a few _Properties_, if they all belong to Me. And Why should they Not belong to me? For am not I the very same who at present _doubt_ almost of All things; yet _understand_ something, which thing onely I _affirm_ to be true, I _deny_ all other things, I am _willing_ to know more, I _would not_ be deceived, I _imagine_ many things _unwillingly_, and _consider_ many things as coming to me by my _senses_. Which of all these faculties is it, which is not as _true_ as that I _Exist_, tho I should _sleep_, or my _Creatour_ should as much as in him lay, strive to _deceive_ Me? which of them is it that is _distinct_ from my _thought_? which of them is it that can be _seperated_ from _me_? For that I am the same that _doubt_, _understand_, and _will_ is so _evident_, that I know not how to explain it more _manifestly_, and that I also am the same that _imagine_, for tho perhaps (as I have supposed) no thing that can be _imagined_ is _true_, yet the _imaginative Power_ it self is _really_ existent, and makes up a part of my _Thought_; and last of all that I am the same that am _sensitive_, or _perceive corporeal_ things as by my _senses_, yet that I now _see_ light, _hear_ a noise, _feel_ heat, these things are false, for I suppose my self _asleep_, but I _know_ that I _see_, _hear_, and am _heated_, that cannot be _false_; and this it is that in me is _properly_ called _Sense_, and this strictly taken is the same with _thought_. By these Considerations I begin a little better to _understand My self_ what I am; But yet it _seems_, and I cannot but _think_ that _Corporeal Things_ (whose _Images_ are formed in my _thought_, and which by my _senses_, I perceive) are much more _distinctly known_, then that _confused Notion_ of _My Self_ which _imagination_ cannot afford me. And yet ’tis strange that things _doubtful_, _unknown_, _distinct from Me_, should be _apprehended_ more _clearly_ by _Me_, then a Thing that is _True_, then a thing that is _known_, or then _I my self_; But the Reason is, that my Mind loves to wander, and suffers not it self to be bounded within the strict limits of _Truth_. Let it therefore Wander, and once more let me give it the Free Reins, that hereafter being conveniently curbed, it may suffer it self to be more easily Govern’d. Let me consider those things which of all Things I formerly conceived most _evident_, that is to say, _Bodies_ which we touch, which we see, not bodies in General (for those _General_ Conceptions are usually _Confused_) but some one _Body_ in particular. Let us chuse for example this piece of _Bees-wax_, it was lately taken from the _Comb_, it has not yet lost all the _tast_ of the _Honey_, it retains something of the _smell_ of the _Flowers_ from whence ’twas gather’d, its _colour_, _shape_, and _bigness_ are manifest, ’tis _hard_, ’tis _cold_, ’tis _easily felt_, and if you will knock it with your finger, ’twill _make a noise_: In fine, it hath all things requisite to the most perfect notion of a _Body_. But behold whilst I am speaking, ’tis put to the Fire, its _tast_ is purged away, the _smell_ is vanish’d, the _colour_ is changed, the _shape_ is alter’d, its _bulk_ is increased, its become _soft_, ’tis _hot_, it can scarce be _felt_, and now (though you strike it) it makes no _noise_. Does it yet continue the same Wax? surely it does, this all confess, no one denies it, no one doubts it. What therefore was there in it that was so evidently known? surely none of those things which I _perceived_ by my _senses_; for what I _smelt_, _tasted_, have _seen_, _felt_, or _heard_, are all _vanish’d_, and yet the _Wax remains_. Perhaps ’twas this only that I now think on, _viz._ that the _Wax_ it self was not that _tast of Honey_, that _smell of Flowers_, that _whiteness_, that _shape_, or that _sound_, but it was a _Body_ which awhile before appear’d to me _so_ and _so modified_, but now _otherwise_. But what is it strictly that I thus imagine? let me consider: And having rejected whatever belongs not to the Wax, let me see what will remain, _viz._ this only, a _thing extended_, _flexible_, and _mutable_. But what is this _flexible_, and _mutable_? is it that I _imagine_ that this Wax from being _round_ may be made _square_, or from being _square_ can be made _triangular_? No, this is not it; for I conceive it capable of _innumerable_ such _changes_, and yet I cannot by my _imagination_ run over these _Innumerables_; Wherefore this notion of its _mutability_ proceeds not from my _imagination_. What then is _extended_? is not its _Extension_ also _unknown_? For when it _melts_ ’tis _greater_, when it _boils_ ’tis _greater_, and yet _greater_ when the heat is increas’d; and I should not rightly judge of the Wax, did I not think it capable of more various _Extensions_ than I can _imagine_. It remains therefore for me only to confess, that I cannot _imagine_ what this Wax is, but that I _perceive_ with my _Mind_ what it is. I speak of this _particular_ Wax, for of Wax in _general_ the _notion_ is more _clear_. But what Wax is this that I only conceive by my mind? ’Tis the same which I see, which I touch, which I imagine, and in fine, the same which at first I judged it to be. But this is to be noted, that the _perception_ thereof is not _sight_, the _touch_, or the _imagination_ thereof; neither was it ever so, though at first it seem’d so. But the _perception_ thereof is the _inspection_ or _beholding_ of the Mind only, which may be either _imperfect_ and _confused_, as formerly it was; or _clear_ and _distinct_, as now it is; the _more_ or the _less_ I consider the Composition of the Wax. In the interim, I cannot but admire how prone my mind is to erre; for though I revolve these things with my self _silently_, and _without speaking_, yet am I intangled in _meer words_, and am almost deceived by the usual way of _expression_; for we commonly say, _that we see the Wax it self if it be present_, and not, _that we judge it present by its colour or shape_; from whence I should immediately thus conclude, therefore the Wax is known by the _sight_ of the _eye_, and not by the _inspection_ of the _mind_ only. Thus I should have concluded, had not I by chance look’d out of my window, and seen men passing by in the Street; which men I as usually say that I _see_, as I do now, that I _see_ this Wax; and yet I see nothing but their Hair and Garments, which perhaps may cover only _artificial Machines_ and _movements_, but I judge them to be men; so that what I thought I only _saw_ with my eyes, I comprehend by my _Judicative Faculty_, which is _my Soul_. But it becomes not one, who desires to be wiser than the Vulgar, to draw matter of _doubt_ from those ways of _expression_, which the Vulgar have invented. Wherefore let us proceed and consider, whether I perceived more _perfectly_ and _evidently_ what the Wax was, when I first look’d on’t, and believed that I knew it by my outward _senses_, or at least by my _common sense_ (as they call it) that is to say, _by my imagination_; or whether at present I _better understand_ it, after I have more diligently enquired both _what it is_, and how it may be _known_. Surely it would be a foolish thing to make it matter of doubt to know which of these parts are true; What was there in my first _perception_ that was _distinct?_ What was there that seem’d not incident to every other Animal? But now when I distinguish the Wax from its outward adherents, and consider it as if it were naked, with it’s coverings pull’d off, then I cannot but really perceive it with my mind, though yet perhaps my judgment may erre. But what shall I now say as to my _mind_, or my _self_? (for as yet I admit nothing as belonging to me but a _mind_.) Why (shall I say?) should not I, who seem to perceive this Wax so _distinctly_, know my _self_ not only more _truly_ and more _certainly_, but more _distinctly_ and _evidently_? For if I judge that _this Wax exists_, because I _see_ this Wax; surely it will be much more _evident_, that I _my self exist_, because _I see this Wax_; for it may be that this that I see is not really Wax, also it may be that I have no eyes wherewith to see any thing; but it cannot be, when I _see_, or (which is the same thing) when _I think that I see_, that I who _think_ should not _exist_. The same thing will follow if I _judge that this Wax exists_, because I _touch_, or _imagine_ it, &c. And what has been said of Wax, may be apply’d to all other outward things. Moreover, if the _notion_ of Wax seems more _distinct_ after it is made known to me, not only by my _sight_ or _touch_, but by more and other causes; How much the more _distinctly_ must I confess my _self known_ unto my _self_, seeing that all sort of reasoning which furthers me in the _perception_ of _Wax_, or any other _Body_, does also encrease the proofs of the _nature_ of my _Mind_. But there are so many more things in the very _Mind_ it self, by which the _notion_ of it may be made more _distinct_, that those things which drawn from _Body_ conduce to its knowledge are scarce to be _mention’d_. And now behold of my own accord am I come to the place I would be in; for seeing I have now discover’d that _Bodies themselves_ are not _properly perceived_ by our _senses_ or _imagination_, but only by our _understanding_, and are not therefore _perceived_, because they are _felt_ or _seen_, but because they are _understood_; it plainly appears to me, that nothing can possibly be _perceived_ by _me easier_, or more _evidently_, than my _Mind_. But because I cannot so soon shake off the Acquaintance of my former Opinion, I am willing to stop here, that this my new knowledge may be better fixt in my memory the longer I meditate thereon. MEDITAT. III. _Of GOD, and that there is a God._ Now will I shut my eyes, I will stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses, I will blot out the Images of _corporeal_ things clearly from my mind, or (because that can scarce be accomplish’d) I will give no heed to them, as being _vain_ and _false_, and by discoursing with my self, and prying more rightly into my own Nature, will endeavour to make my self by degrees more known and familiar to my self. I am a _Thinking Thing_, that is to say, _doubting_, _affirming_, _denying_, _understanding_ few things, _ignorant_ of many things, _willing_, _nilling_, _imagining_ also, and _sensitive_. For (as before I have noted) though perhaps whatever I _imagine_, or am sensible of, as without me, _Is not_; yet that _manner_ of _thinking_ which I call _sense_ and _imagination_ (as they are only certain _Modes_ of _Thinking_) I am certain are in Me. So that in these few Words I have mention’d whatever I _know_, or at least Whatever as yet I _perceive_ my self to _know_. Now will I look about me more carefully to see Whether there Be not some other Thing in Me, of Which I have not yet taken Notice. I am sure That I am a _Thinking Thing_, and therefore Do not I know what is Required to make _certain_ of any Thing? I Answer, that in this My _first knowledge_ ’tis Nothing but a _clear_, and _distinct perception_ of What I affirm, Which would not be sufficient to make me _certain_ of the _Truth_ of a Thing, if it were _Possible_ that any thing that I so _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Perceive should be _false_. Wherefore I may lay this Down as a _Principle_. _Whatever I Clearly and Distinctly perceive is certainly True._ But I have formerly Admitted of many Things as very _Certain_ and _manifest_, Which I afterwards found to be _doubtful_. Therefore What sort of Things were they? _Viz._ Heaven, Earth, Stars, and all other things which I perceived by my _Senses_. But What did I Perceive of These _Clearly? Viz._ That I had the _Ideas_ or _Thoughts_ of these things in my mind, and at Present I cannot deny that I have these _Ideas_ in Me. But there was some other thing Which I affirm’d, and Which (by Reason of the common Way of Belief) I thought that I _Clearly_ Perceived; Which nevertheless, I did not really Perceive; And that was, that there were Certain Things _Without Me_ from whence these _Ideas Proceeded_, and to which they were exactly like. And this it was, Wherein I was either _Deceived_, or if by Chance I Judged _truly_, yet it Proceeded not from the strength of my _Perception_. But When I was exercised about any single and easie Proposition in Arithmetick or Geometry, as that two and three added make five, Did not I Perceive them _Clearly_ enough to make me affirm them True? Truly concerning these I had no other Reason afterwards to _Doubt_, but That I thought Perhaps there may be a _God_ who might have so created me, that I should be _Deceived_ even in those things which seem’d most _Clear_ to me. And as often as this Pre-conceived opinion of _Gods great Power_ comes into my Mind, I cannot but Confess that he may easily cause me to Err even in those things which I Think I perceive most _Evidently_ with my Mind; yet as often as I Consider the Things themselves, which I Judge my self to perceive so _Clearly_, I am so fully Perswaded by them, that I easily Break out into these Expressions, Let Who can Deceive Me, yet he shall never Cause me _Not to Be_ whilst _I think that I Am_, or that it shall ever be True, _that I never was_, Whilst at Present ’tis True _that I am_, or Perhaps, that Two and Three added make More or Less then Five; for in These things I Percieve a Manifest Repugnancy; And truely seeing I have no reason to Think any _God_ a _Deceiver_, Nor as yet fully know Whether there Be _any God_, or _Not_, ’Tis but a slight and (as I may say) Metaphysical Reason of Doubt, which depends only on that opinion of which I am not yet Perswaded. Wherefore That this Hindrance may be taken away, When I have time I ought to Enquire, Whether there _Be a God_, And if there be One, Whether he can be a _Deceiver_, For whilst I am _Ignorant_ of this, I cannot possibly be fully _Certain_ of any Other thing. But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_. Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as _Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and _Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for _evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_ that I Wish for them. Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual _Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are _without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of _Erring_. Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_ Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_ heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by _My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_, or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not as yet discover’d their true _Original_. But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count _Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_, that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat, and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the _heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie. When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis _discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_ of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other _Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the _Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing _one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever _trust_ them in any other thing. And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_. For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the _Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External Object_. And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are _different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be _like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the _Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers _Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very _smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self. All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a _true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their _Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other way. But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me; And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_, an _other Thing_, ’tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_ are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_; and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_, _Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those _Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be _as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the _Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its _Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that _Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it? And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of _Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_. And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_ or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider’d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose _Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_, should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or _Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of _Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some _Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the _Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which ’tis a _mode_. But that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any _other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_ in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_; but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not _altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_. Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_ of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally contain’d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_ then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to be _true_. But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either _formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_ of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that _Idea_, does _exist also_. But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_. Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_ to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_ things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me _men like my self_. As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of _my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither _man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being. And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz. _Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_, the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that _Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_ have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very _obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the _judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of _material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a _privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_ the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the _privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing _real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas. And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and _imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little _reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_, I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them. But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are _clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like; For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_, tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_ in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as _now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which afterwards I apply to other things. As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as _extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain _modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may seem to be in me _eminently_. * Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain _Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do _Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions. From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_; for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a _substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the _negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_ of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or _desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own _Imperfections_. Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_, and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this _notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more _objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This _Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing _real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_ also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy _contain’d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_. Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither _conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am _finite_. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_ is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_ perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either _formally_ or _eminently_. _Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to _be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_, are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_ by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the _power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_. _Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_, for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_, that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the _potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_. Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_ by the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_ things _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should of necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It will be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_, can possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end let me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my _Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing can be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with _God_. But first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor _desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those _perfections_, of which I have any _Idea_, and consequently I my self should be _God_; and I cannot think that those things I _want_, are to be acquired with _greater difficulty_ then those things I _have_; but on the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much more _difficult_ that _I_ (that is, _a substance_ that _thinks_) should _arise_ out of _nothing_, then that I should _acquire_ the _knowledge_ of many things whereof I am _Ignorant_, which is only the _accident_ of that _substance_. And certainly if I had that _greater thing_ (viz _being_) from my self, I should not have _denyed_ my self (not only, those things which may be easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are contain’d in the _Idea_ of a _God_; and the reason is, for that no other things _seem_ to me to be _more difficultly_ done, and certainly if they were _Really more difficult_, they would _seem_ more _difficult_ to me (if whatever _I have_, I _have_ from my self) for in those things I should find my _Power_ put to a stop. Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to _have alwaies Been, what now I am_, and that therefore I need not seek for an _Author_ of my _Being_. For the _Duration_ or _Continuance_ of my life may be _divided_ into _Innumerable Parts_, each of which does not at all _depend_ on the _Other Parts_; Therefore it will not follow, that because _a while ago, I was_, I must of necessity _now Be_. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose some _Cause_ to _Create me_ (as it were) _anew_ for _this_ Moment (that is, _Conserve me_). For ’tis evident to one that Considers the Nature of _Duration_, that the same _Power_ and _Action_ is requisite to the _Conservation_ of a Thing each _Moment_ of its _Being_, as there is to the _Creation_ of that Thing _anew_, if it did _not exist_. So that ’tis one of those _Principles_ which are _Evident_ by the _Light_ of _Nature_: that the _Act_ of _Conservation_ differs only _Ratione_ (as the Philosophers term it) from the _Act of Creation_. Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether _I_, who _now_ Am; have any _Power_ to _Cause_ my self to _Be hereafter_? (for had I any such _power_, I should certainly _know_ of it, seeing I am nothing but a _Thinking Thing_, or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me, which is a _Thing_ that _Thinks_) to which, I answer, that I can discover no such _Power_ in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that _I depend_ on some _Other being distinct_ from _my self_. But what if _I_ say that perhaps this _Being_ is not _God_, but that _I_ am produced either by my _Parents_, or some other _Causes less perfect_ then _God_? In answer to which let me consider (as _I_ have said before) that ’tis _manifest_ that whatever is in the _effect, so much_ at least ought to be in the _cause_; and therefore seeing _I_ am a thing that _thinks_, and have in me an _Idea_ of _God_, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort of _cause_ I assign of my _own Being_, it also must be a _Thinking Thing_, and must have an _Idea_ of all those _Perfections_, which I attribute to _God_; Of which _Cause_ it may be again Asked, whether it be _from it self_, or from any other _Cause_? If _from it self_, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that it must be _God_; For seeing it has the _Power_ of _Existing of it self_, without doubt it has also the _power_ of _actually Possessing_ all those _Perfections_ whereof it has an _Idea_ in it self, that is, all those _Perfections_ which I conceive in _God_. But if it Be from an _other Cause_, it may again be asked of that _Cause_ whether it be _of it self_, or from an _other_; Till at length We arrive at the _Last Cause_ of All, Which will Be _God_. For ’tis evident, that this _Enquiry_ will not admit of _Progressus in Infinitum_, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at _first made_ Me; But chiefly of that which _conserves_ me in this _Instant_ time. Neither can it be supposed that many _partial Causes_ have _concurred_ to the making Me, and that I received the _Idea_ of one of _Gods perfections_ from _One_ of them, and from an _other_ of them the _Idea_ of an _other_; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found _scattered_ in the World, but not all of them _Joyn’d_ in any one which may Be _God_. For on the contrary, _Unity_, _Simplicity_, or the _inseparability_ of All Gods Attributes is one of the _chief Perfections_ which I conceive in Him; and certainly the _Idea_ of the _Unity_ of the _Divine Perfections_ could not be _created_ in me by any other _cause_, then by _That_, from whence I have received the _Ideas_ of his other _perfections_; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive these _perfections_, _conjunct_ and _inseparable_, unless he should also make me know what _perfections_ these _are_. Lastly as touching my _having_ my _Being_ from my _Parents_. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them were _True_, yet certainly they _contribute_ nothing to my _conservation_, neither proceed I from them as _I am_ a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, for they have onely _predisposed_ that _material Thing_, wherein _I_, that is, _my mind_ (_which_ only at present I take for _my self_) _Inhabits_. Wherefore I cannot _now_ Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that because _I am_, and because I have an _Idea_ of a _Being most perfect_, that is, of _God_, it evidently follows that _there is a God_. * Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this _Idea_ of _God_. For I have neither received it by _means_ of _my Senses_, neither comes it to me _without_ my _Forethought_, as the _Ideas_ of _sensible_ things use to do, when such things _Work_ on the Organs of my _Sense_, or at least _seem_ so to work; Neither is this _Idea_ framed by _my self_, for I can neither _detract from_, nor _add_ any thing _thereto_. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is _Innate_, even as the _Idea_ of me _my self_ is _Natural_ to my self. And truly ’tis not to be Admired that _God_ in Creating me should _Imprint_ this _Idea_ in me, that it may there remain as a _stamp impressed_ by the _Workman God_ on _me_ his _Work_, neither is it requisite that this _stamp_ should be a Thing _different_ from the _Work_ it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that _God Created_ me) that I am made as it were according to his _likeness_ and _Image_, and that the same _likeness_, in which the _Idea_ of God is contain’d, is _perceived_ by Me with the _same faculty_, with which I _perceive my Self_; That is to say, whilst _I reflect_ upon my self, _I_ do not only _perceive_ that I am an _Imperfect_ thing, having my _dependance_ upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires _more_ and _better_ things _Indefinitely_; But also at the same time I understand, that _He_ on whom I _depend_ contains in him all those _wish’d for things_ (not only _Indefinitely_ and _Potentially_, but) _Really_, _Indefinitely_; and that therefore he is _God_. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, _Viz._ Having the _Idea_ of a _God_ in me, unless really there were a _God_, a _God_ (I say) that very _same God_, whose _Idea I_ have in my _Mind_ (that is, Having all those _perfections_, which I cannot _comprehend_, but can as it were _think upon them_) and who is not _subject_ to any _Defects_. By which ’tis evident that _God_ is no _Deceiver_; for ’tis manifest by the _Light_ of _Nature_, that all _fraud_ and _deceit_ depends on some _defect_. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other _Truthes_ which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this _God_, to Consider with my self His _Divine Attributes_, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of this _Immense light_, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my _dark_ Understanding. For as by _Faith_ we _believe_ that the greatest _happiness_ of the _next Life_ consists alone in the _Contemplation_ of the _Divine Majesty_, so we _find_ by _Experience_ that now we receive from thence the greatest _pleasure_, whereof we are capable in _this Life_; Tho it be much more _Imperfect_ then that in the _Next_. MEDITAT. IV. _Of Truth and Falshood._ Of late it has been so common with me to withdraw _my Mind_ from my _sences_, and I have so throughly consider’d how few things there are appertaining to _Bodies_ that are _truly_ perceived, and that there are more Things touching _Mans mind_, and yet more concerning _God_, which are _well known_; that now without any difficulty _I_ can turn my Thoughts from things _sensible_, to those which are only _Intelligible_, and _Abstracted_ from _Matter_. And truely _I_ have a much more _distinct Idea_ of a _Mans mind_ (as it is a _Thinking Thing_, having no _Corporeal Dimensions_ of _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, nor having any other _Corporeal Quality_) then the _Idea_ of any _Corporeal Thing_ can be. And when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I _doubt_, that is, am an _imperfect dependent Being_, I from hence Collect such a _clear_ and _distinct Idea_ of an _Independent perfect Being_, which is _God_, and from hence only that _I have such an Idea_, that is, because _I_ that have this _Idea_ do _my self Exist_; I do so _clearly_ conclude that _God also Exists_, and that on him my _Being depends_ each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more _Evidently_ and _Certainly_ by _Humane Understanding_. And now _I_ seem to perceive a _Method_ by which, (from this Contemplation of the _true God_, in whom the Treasures of _Knowledge_ and _Wisdome_ are Hidden) _I_ may attain the _Knowledge_ of other Things. And first, _I_ know ’tis impossible that this _God_ should _deceive_ me; For in all _cheating_ and _deceipt_ there is something of _imperfection_; and tho to be _able_ to _deceive_ may seem to be an Argument of _ingenuity_ and _power_, yet without doubt to _have_ the _Will_ of _deceiving_ is a sign of _Malice_ and _Weakness_, and therefore is not _Incident_ to _God_. I have also found in my self a _Judicative faculty_, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received from _God_; and seeing he will not _deceive_ me, he has surely given me such a _Judgement_, that I can _never Err_, whilst I make a _Right Use_ of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore _I can never Err_; for if whatever I have, I have from _God_, and if he gave me no _Faculty_ of _Erring_, I may seem not to be _able to Err_. And truly so it is whilst I think upon _God_, and wholly convert my self to the _consideration_ of him, I find no occasion of _Error_ or _Deceit_; but yet when I return to the _Contemplation_ of _my self_, I find my self liable to _Innumerable Errors_. Enquiring into the _cause_ of which, I find in my self an _Idea_, not only a _real_ and _positive one_ of a _God_, that is, of a _Being infinitely perfect_, but also (as I may so speak) a _Negative Idea_ of _Nothing_; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect _Being_ and _No-being_, that as I am _Created_ by the _Highest Being_, I have nothing in Me by which I may be _deceived_ or drawn into _Error_; but as I pertake in a manner of _Nothing_, or of a _No-Being_, that is, as I my self am _not_ the _Highest Being_, and as I _want_ many _perfections_, ’tis no Wonder that I should be _Deceived_. By which I understand that _Error_ * (as it is _Error_) is not any _real Being_ dependant on _God_, but it is only a _Defect_; And that therefore to make me _Err_ there is not requisite a _faculty_ of _Erring_ given me by _God_, but only it so happens that I _Err_ meerly because the _Judicative faculty_, which he has given me, is not _Infinite_. But yet this Account is not fully _satisfactory_; for _Error_ is not only a meer _Negation_, but ’tis a _Privation_, or a _want_ of a certain _Knowledge_, which _ought_ (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider the _Nature_ of _God_, it seems impossible that he should give me any _faculty_ which is not _perfect_ in its _kind_, or which should _want_ any of its _due perfections_; for if by how much the more _skilful_ the _Workman_ is, by so much the _Perfecter Works_ proceed from him. What can be made by the _Great Maker_ of all things which is not _fully perfect_? For I cannot Doubt but _God_ may _Create_ me so that I may _never_ be _deceived_, neither can I doubt but that he _Wills_ whatever is _Best_; Is it therefore _better_ for me to be _deceived_, or not to be _deceived?_ These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that ’tis no cause of Admiration that _God_ should do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his _Being_, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend _Why_ or _How_ they are done; for seeing I now know that my _Nature_ is very _Weak_ and _Finite_, and that the _Nature_ of _God_ is _Immense_, _Incomprehensible_, _Infinite_; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, the _Causes_ whereof lie _hidden_ to Me. Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz. _Final Causes_) as of no use in _Natural Philosophy_, for I cannot without Rashness Think my self _able_ to Discover _Gods_ Designes. I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the _Works_ of _God_ are _perfect_, we must not Respect any _one kind_ of Creature _singly_, but the _Whole Universe_ of _Beings_; for perhaps what (if considered _alone_) may Deservedly seem _Imperfect_, yet (as it is a _part_ of the _World_) is most _perfect_; and tho since I have _doubted_ of all things, I have discover’d nothing _certainly_ to _Exist_, but _my self_, and _God_, yet since I have Consider’d the _Omnipotency_ of _God_, I cannot deny, but that many other things _are made_ (or at least, _may be made_) by him, so that I my self _may be_ a _part_ of this _Universe_. Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these _Errors_ of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my _Imperfection_) * I find them to _depend_ on _two concurring Causes_, on my _faculty_ of _Knowing_, and on my _faculty_ of _Choosing_ or _Freedome_ of my _Will_, that is to say, from my _Understanding_, and my _Will together_. For by my _Understanding alone_ I only perceive _Ideas_, whereon I make _Judgments_, wherein (_precisely_ so taken) there can be no _Error, properly_ so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whose _Ideas_ I have _not_ in Me, yet I am not _properly_ to be said _Deprived_ of them, but only _negatively wanting_ them; and I cannot prove that _God ought_ to have given me a _greater faculty_ of _Knowing_. And tho I understand him to be a _skilful Workman_, yet I cannot Think, that he _ought_ to have put all those _perfections_ in _each_ Work of his _singly_, with which he might have _endowed some_ of them. Neither can I complain that _God_ has not given me a _Will_, or _Freedom_ of _Choise_, _large_ and _perfect_ enough; for I have experienced that ’tis _Circumscribed_ by _no Bounds_. And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so _perfect_ and so _Great_, but I Understand that there may be _Perfecter_ and _Greater_, for if (for Example) I consider the _Faculty_ of _Understanding_, I presently perceive that in me ’tis very _small_ and _Finite_, and also at the same time I form to my self an _Idea_ of an other _Understanding_ not only _much Greater_, but the _Greatest_ and _Infinite_, which I perceive to belong to _God_. In the same manner if I enquire into _memory_ or _imagination_ or any other faculties, I find them in my self _Weak_ and _Circumscribed_, but in _God_ I Understand them to be _Infinite_, there is therefore only my _Will_ or _Freedome_ of _Choice_, which I find to be _so Great_, that I cannot frame to my self an _Idea_ of _One Greater_, so that ’tis by this _chiefly_ by which I Understand my self to Bear the _likeness_ and _Image_ of _God_. For tho the _Will_ in _God_ be without comparison _Greater_ then Mine, both as to the _Knowledge_ and _Power_ which are _Joyn’d_ therewith, which make it more _strong_ and _Effective_, and also as to the _Object_ thereof, for _God_ can apply himself to _more_ things then I can. Yet being taken _Formally_ and _Precisely Gods Will_ seems _no greater_ then Mine. For the _Freedome_ of _Will_ consists only in this, that we can _Do_, or _not Do_ such a Thing (that is, _affirm_ or _deny_, _prosecute_ or _avoid_) or rather in this Only, that we are _so carried_ to a Thing which is _proposed_ by Our _Intellect_ to _Affirm_ or _Deny_, _Prosecute_ or _Shun_, that we are _sensible_, that we are _not Determin’d_ to the _Choice_ or _Aversion_ thereof, by any _outward Force_. Neither is it Requisite to make one _Free_ that he should have an _Inclination_ to _both_ sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more _strongly_ I am inclined to _one_ side (whether it be that I _evidently perceive_ therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that _God has so disposed_ my _Inward Thoughts_) By so much the _more Free_ am I in my _Choice_. Neither truly do _Gods Grace_ or _Natural Knowledge_ take away from my _Liberty_, but rather _encrease_ and _strengthen_ it. For that _indifference_ which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me _more_ to _one side_, then to _the other_, is the _meanest_ sort of _Liberty_, and is so far from being a sign of _perfection_, that it only argues a _defect_ or _negation_ of _Knowledge_; for if I should always _Clearly see_ what were _True_ and _Good_ I should never _deliberate_ in my _Judgement_ or _Choice_, and Consequently, tho I were _perfectly Free_, yet I should never be _Indifferent_. From all which, I perceive that neither the _Power_ of _Willing precisely_ so taken, which I have from _God_, is the _Cause_ of my _Errors_, it being most _full_ and _perfect_ in its kind; Neither also the _Power_ of _Understanding_, for whatever I _Understand_ (since ’tis from God that I _Understand_ it) I _understand aright_, nor can I be therein _Deceived_. From _Whence_ therefore proceed all my _Errors_? To which, I answer, that they proceed from _hence_ only, that seeing the _Will_ expatiates it self _farther_ then the _Understanding_, I keep it not within the _same bounds_ with my _Understanding_, but often extend it to those things which I _Understand not_, to which things it being _Indifferent_, it easily Declines from what is _True_ and _Good_; and consequently I am _Deceived_ and _Commit sin_. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth _Exist_, and found that from my setting _my self_ to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I _my self Exist_, I could not but _Judge_, what I so _clearly Understood_, to be _true_, not that I was _forced_ thereto by any _outward impulse_, but because a _strong Propension_ in my _Will_ did follow this _Great Light_ in my _Understanding_, so that I believed it so much the more _freely_ and _willingly_, by how much the less _indifferent_ I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I _Exist_ as I am a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, but I also meet with a certain _Idea_ of a _Corporeal Nature_, and it so happens that I _doubt_, whether that _Thinking Nature_ that is in me be _Different_ from that _Corporeal Nature_, or Whether they are _both the same_: but in this _I_ suppose that _I_ have found no Argument to _incline_ me _either ways_, and therefore _I_ am _Indifferent_ to _affirm_ or _deny either_, or to _Judge nothing_ of _either_; But this _indifferency_ extends it self not only to those things of which I am _clearly ignorant_, but generally to all those things which are _not_ so very _evidently known_ to me at the Time when my _Will Deliberates_ of them; for tho never so probable _Guesses incline_ me to _one_ side, yet the Knowing that they are only _Conjectures_, and not indubitable _reasons_, is enough to Draw my _Assent_ to the _Contrary_ Part. Which Lately _I_ have sufficiently experienced, when _I_ supposed all those things (which formerly _I_ assented to as most _True_) as very _False_, for this _Reason_ only that _I_ found my self _able_ to doubt of them in some manner. If I abstain from _passing_ my _Judgment_, when I do _not clearly_ and _distinctly_ enough perceive what is _Truth_, ’tis evident that I do _well_, and that I am _not deceived_: But if I _affirm_ or _deny_, then ’tis that I _abuse_ the _freedome_ of my _will_, and if I turn my self to that part which is _false_, I am _deceived_; but if I _embrace_ the _contrary_ Part, ’tis but _by chance_ that I light on the _Truth_, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the _light_ of _Nature_ that the _Perception_ of the _Understanding ought_ to preceed the _Determination_ of the _Will_. And ’tis in this _abuse_ of _Free-Will_ that That _Privation_ consists, which Constitutes _Error_; I say there is a _Privation_ in the _Action_ as it proceeds from Me, but not in the _Faculty_ which I have received from _God_; nor in the _Action_ as it _depends_ on _him_. Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a _larger Intellective Faculty_, or more _Natural Light_, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a _finite Understanding_ that it should not Understand _All_ things, and ’tis Incident to a _Created Understanding_ to be _Finite_: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has _bestowed_ upon me (tho he _owed_ me nothing) then to think my self _Robbed_ by him of those things which he _never gave me_. Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then my _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only, and as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then ’tis; and certainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I ought to be to _him_; that Gave it me. Neither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of those _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for those _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_; and I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if I could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of _Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For it is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought not to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly ’tis no _Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_ or _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge whereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly ’tis an _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my _Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand. Yet I see that ’tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should remain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that is, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of _deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had _God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider’d in my self) should be _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then if they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_ not the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi’d, which depends upon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet that I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention’d, which depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this _Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_ Knowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not erring_. In which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of _Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain’d much by this days _Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover’d the _Cause_ of _Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_ have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle my _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_. For doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and therefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have _God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and who _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_. Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not _deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_, which I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour. MEDITAT. V. _~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And that he does ~Exist~._ There are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and many things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for the _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things. But before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent without_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_. In which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which Philosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_ of that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which _Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_ plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_, and _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and _agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only _remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those things which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so _diligently_. One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_. As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a _Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_, yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is _Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_ on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_ of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_ never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of _sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_; for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various _properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all _true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_, and not a meer _Nothing_, for ’tis Evident that _what is true is something_. And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive, is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_ of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_ perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived, such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of _Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and _abstracted Mathematicks_. Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and _distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_, as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or _Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that, tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a _God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_. _Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish’d_ from his _Essence_, so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_. _Solution._ But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the _Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_, then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be _seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a _Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that ’tis no less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_. _Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a _Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_ in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_ no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no _Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God exist_. _Solution._ ’Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow, that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_, and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily, because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_) _Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a _God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either _with_ or _without Wings_. _Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_, seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._ His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, ’tis not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_. _Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One; which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a _Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_ to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_; For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_ on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_; As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose _Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_, Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_. But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only, which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more _carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less certainly_ believed when once ’tis perceived, then this _Last_. Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with _Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him; For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does _Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so _depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_. For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and _Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_ is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but _Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once _Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me _doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the like. What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by _Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be _deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this _Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self _moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing appear’d _evident_ to my Understanding, ’twould be _True_. And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_ Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself, and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_ to me. MEDITAT. VI. _~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real Difference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._ It now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_; And already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_) they _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive them; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to _perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but what was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material Beings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, ’twill appear to be only _a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_. But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the _difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or _Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_, but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a _Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_ of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_ as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a _Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may _confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other) yet ’tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_, because ’tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of _More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of _Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my _Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_. Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it, yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_; and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn’d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and _beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_ something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or _perceived_ by _Sense_. But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination _May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say _probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my _Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_ conclude, _that Body does Exist_. But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that _Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so _distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of _Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_. And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_ for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_. [Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._] First therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_, _Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have look’d upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists; And I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or engaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_ with what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_ I judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by a _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I perceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_, as also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_, and other like _Passions_. As to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_, _Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them _Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_, _Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of these I _distinguish’d_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other _Bodies_ from each other. Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_ of _Qualities_, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or _Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found these _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can neither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were _before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from perceiving it, when it is _Present_. And seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more _Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those which _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in my _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other Knowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_ are _like_ the Things. Moreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_ before my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_ which _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_ received by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was easily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_, which I had not _First_ in my _sense_. Neither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a _peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to _Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_ can never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and _Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and _Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the _sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a certain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the _stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or the _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason but _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no _Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the desire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful thought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_ that I made of _sensible objects_, I seem’d to be taught by _Nature_, for I first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it. [Sidenote: _The Reasons why I doubted my senses._] [Sidenote: _Medit. I._] But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein my _senses_ so grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’d _Round_ a far off, nigh at hand appear’d _square_, and _large_ Statues on their tops seem’d _small_ to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the _judgements_ of my _outward senses_ were _deceived_: and not of my _outward_ only, but of my _inward senses_ also; for what is more _intimate_ or _inward_ than _Pain_? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt _pain_ in that part which they _wanted_, and therefore I am not _absolutely certain_ that any part of me is affected with _pain_, tho I _feel pain_ therein. To these I have lately added two very _general Reasons_ of _doubt_; The first was, that while I was _awake_, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were _a sleep_; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my _sleep_ proceeds from _outward Objects_, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am _awake_? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the _Author_ of my _Being_ (or at least I then _supposed_ my self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by _Nature_ as to be _deceived_ even in those things which appear’d to me most _true_. And as to the _Reasons_, which induced me to give _credit_ to _sensible_ Things, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by _Nature_ to many Things, which _Reason_ disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by _Nature_. And tho the perceptions of my _senses_ depended not on my _Will_, I thought _I_ should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from _Objects different_ from my self; for perhaps there may be some other _Faculty_ in me (tho as yet _unknown_ to me) which might frame those _perceptions_. [Sidenote: _How far the senses are now to be trusted._] But now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my _Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my _senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_, to be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive them; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing _without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is _different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by _God_, and that it may be esteem’d _different_, it matters not by what _Power_ it _may_ be so _sever’d_. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a _thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this alone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall shew presently, ’tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_ conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct Idea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on the other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is onely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, ’tis from hence _certain_, that I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_ it. Moreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow’d with _certain_ peculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_, the _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive my _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_ cannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that is, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them in their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I perceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of a Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_. I acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as _changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can no more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then the foremention’d _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be understood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be in a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_, because _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is included in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them. But there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of _Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which _Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_ those _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no _Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this _Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_ from me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain’d _Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be contain’d _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice) this _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or some _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is not a _Deceivour_, ’tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place these _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_ from any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not * contain’d _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given me no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_ or _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe that they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where, but from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are _Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very _Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I say at least are _True_. As to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the Sun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less _Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because _God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other to _Correct_ my _Error_, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things. And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_ has something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand either _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God. By my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or _Association_ of all those things which are given me by God. Now there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_ then that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that this _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._ And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And by this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me that _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I am most _nighly conjoyn’d_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_; so that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_ were hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore _feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my _Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I should only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused sense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly the _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_ or _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were) _mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_. I am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_ and _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to be _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in _Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed, tho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_ are _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, ’tis evidently _certain_, that my _Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and _Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me about. There are many Other Things Also which _Nature_ seems to teach Me, but _Really_ I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an _ill use_ of Passing my Judgement _Inconsiderately_, and from hence it is that these things happen often to be _false_; as that all _space_ is _Empty_, in which I find _nothing_ that _works_ upon my _Senses_; That in a _hot Body_ there is something _like_ the _Idea_ of _Heat_ which is in me; That in a _White_ or _Green_ Body there is the same _Whiteness_ or _Greenness_ which I _perceive_; And the same _Taste_ in a _bitter_ or _sweet_ Thing, _&c._ That _Stars_, _Castles_, and Other _Remote_ Bodies are of the same _Bigness_ and _Shape_, as they are _Represented_ to my _senses_: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot _Distinctly_ perceive, it behoves me here to determine more _Accurately_ What I mean when I say, _That I am taught a Thing by Nature_. Here I take _Nature_ more _strictly_, then for the _Complication_ of all those Things which are Given me by _God_; For in this _Complication_ there are many things contain’d which relate to the _Mind alone_, as, That I perceive What is _done_ cannot be _not Done_, and all Other things which are known by the _Light_ of _Nature_, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belong _only_ to the _Body_, as, That it _tends Downwards_ and such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which _God_ hath bestowed upon me as I am _Compounded_ of a _Mind_ and _Body together_, and not _differently Consider’d_. ’Tis _Nature_ therefore thus taken that teaches me to _avoid troublesome Objects_, and _seek_ after _pleasing Ones_; but it appears not that this _Nature_ teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our _senses_, before that we make by our _Understanding_ a diligent examination of _outward Objects_; for to Enquire into the _Truth_ of Things belongs not to the _Whole Compositum_ of a Man as he Consists of _Mind_ and _Body_, but to the _Mind alone_. So that tho a _star affect_ my eye no _more_ then a _small spark_ of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no _Real_ or _Positive Inclination_ to _believe_ One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing _like_ either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us those _sensations_ of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on my _senses_, it does not from thence follow, that there is no _Body_ there; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use these _perceptions_ of _sense_ (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_ to the _Compositum_, whereof the _mind_ is part, and _so far_ only they are _Clear_ and _Distinct_ enough) as _certain Rules_ immediately to discover the _Essence_ of _External Bodies_, of Which they make known nothing but very _Obscurely_ and _Confusedly_. [Sidenote: Medit. 4.] I have * formerly shewn how my _Judgement_ happens to be false notwithstanding _Gods Goodness_. But now there arises a new _Difficulty_ concerning those very things which _Nature_ tells me I am to _prosecute_ or _avoid_, concerning my _Internal senses_, Wherein I find many _Errors_, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the _Poyson_, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the _Meat_ only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That _Mans-Nature_ is not _All-knowing_; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a _Finite Being_, and therefore nothing but _Finite Perfections_ belong to him. But We often err even in those things to Which we are _Impelled_ by _Nature_, as when sick men desire that _Meat_ or _Drink_, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That they _Err_ in this because their _Nature_ is _Corrupt_. But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less _Gods Creature_ then a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine a _Deceitful Nature_ imposed by _God_ on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the _Laws_ of its _Nature_, when it is _ill_ contrived, and tells the hours _falsly_, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer _Machine_ or _Movement_, made up and compounded of _Bones_, _Nerves_, _Muscles_, _Veins_, _Blood_, and _Skin_; so that, tho there were no _mind_ in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the _Will_, and consequently from the _Mind_) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as _natural_ for him (if for example sake he were sick of a _Dropsie_) to suffer that _Driness_ of his _Throat_ which uses to bring into his mind the _sense_ of _Thirst_, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when ’tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it _Errs_ from its _Nature_, when it tells the Hours _wrong_, and so considering the _Movement_ of a _Mans Body_ as contrived for such _Motions_ as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to _Err_ from its _Nature_, if its _Throat_ is _Dry_, when it has no want of Drink for its _Preservation_. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last _Acceptation_ of _Nature_ differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a _Denomination extrinsick_ to the Things whereof ’tis spoken, and _depending_ on my _Thought_, while it _Compares_ a _sick_ man, and a _disorderly_ Clock with the _Idea_ of an _healthy_ man and a _Rectified_ Clock. But by _Nature_ in its former _Acceptation_ I Understand something that is _Really_ in the _Things_ themselves, which therefore has something of _Truth_ in it. But tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick Denomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has a _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the _Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn’d_ to such a _Body_, ’tis not a _meer Denomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when _drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_. First therefore I understand that a _chief difference_ between my _Mind_ and _Body_ consists in this, That my _Body_ is of its _Nature divisible_, but my _Mind indivisible_; for while I consider my _Mind_ or _my self_, as I am only a _thinking Thing_, I can distinguish _no parts_ in Me, but I perceive my self to be but _one entire_ Thing; and tho the _whole Mind_ seems to be _united_ to the _whole Body_, yet a Foot, an Arm, or any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive any _part_ of my _Mind_ taken away; Neither can its _Faculties_ of _desiring_, _perceiving_, _understanding_, &c. be called its _Parts_, for ’tis one and the _same_, _mind_, that _desires_, that _perceives_, that _understands_; Contrarily, I cannot think of any _Corporeal_ or _extended Being_, which I cannot easily _divide_ into _Parts_ by my thought, and by this I understand it to be _divisible_. And this alone (if I had known it from no other Argument) is sufficient to inform me, that my _mind_ is _really distinct_ from my _Body_. Nextly I find, that my _mind_ is not _immediately affected_ by all parts of my _body_, but only by the _Brain_, and perhaps only by one small part of it, That, to wit, wherein the _common sense_ is said to reside; Which part, as often as it is disposed in the _same manner_, will represent to the _mind_ the _same thing_, tho at the same time the other parts of the _body_ may be _differently_ order’d. And this is proved by numberless Experiments, which need not here be related. Moreover I discover that the _nature_ of my _body_ is such, that no part of it can be _moved_ by an other _remote_ part thereof, but it may also be _moved_ in the _same manner_ by some of the _interjacent_ parts, tho the more _remote_ part lay still and acted not; As for example in the Rope, A⸺B⸺C⸺D if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel _pain_ in my _Foot_, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of _Nerves_ dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being _continued_ like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are _drawn_ in the Foot, they also _draw_ the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain _motion_, which is ordain’d by _Nature_ to affect the _mind_ with a _sense_ of _Pain_, as being in the _Foot_. But because these Nerves must pass through the _Shin_, the _Thighs_, the _Loins_, the _Back_, the _Neck_, before they can reach the _Brain_ from the _Foot_, it may so happen, that tho _that part_ of them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of their _intermediate parts_, yet the same _motion_, would be caused in the _Brain_, as when the _Foot_ it self is _ill affected_, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the _mind_ should _perceive_ the same _Pain_. And thus may we think of any other _Sense_. I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites therein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it can cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_ conduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience witnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by _Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the _Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order’d_ by _God_, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, _viz._ either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the Rest. From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite Goodness_ of God) ’tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he consists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_ would be _naturally_ deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the _mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so if a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as ’tis used from the _necessity_ of _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual Cause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, ’tis far better that it should _then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the _Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest. And this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the _Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and _avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform me _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies advantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one to _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns present and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which hath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought no longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be false. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of them, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now I plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_ are never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my life_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he came or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or _Apparition feign’d_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_ they come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with the other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented to me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_, and _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_, it follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the _urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not alwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess that _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so that the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us. _FINIS._ ADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS. Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being Penn’d by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. _Hobbs_’s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built. OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS,

_THOMAS HOBBS_ Of MALMESBURY,

_DES-CARTES’S_ ANSWERS. OBJECT. I. _Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful._ ’Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that there is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True Sense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well doubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because ’tis commonly Observed by the Vulgar that ’tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions. ANSWER. Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_, were proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that I may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my Readers for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem’d to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken’d by these Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in Physick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends to Teach. OBJECT. II. _Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind._ I _am a Thinking Thing_. ’Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a _Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am Thinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing. Because _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot be _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am a Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the Understanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking Thing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_. Wherefore _D.Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and _Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_ (which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and _Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it self_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore that a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or _Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary Whereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is the _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D.Cartes_ would Establish. [Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against._] In the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_. ’Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this, _I think_ as he hath rightly inform’d us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_ without a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a _thinker_. And from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a _Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only in a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its _colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to continue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many _changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now think_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists only in _memory_) yet ’tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that he _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be put _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_, that you _know_? &c. Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on the knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems rather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that ’tis _immaterial_. ANSWER. When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, &c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the _things_ indow’d with those _Faculties_; and so ’tis alwayes understood by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning. Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for _walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the _thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides. Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when ’tis taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from _Body_. Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things. _It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly _undetermin’d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that ’tis proved. Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_ cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the _subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_, or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of _metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_. But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some _Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_. Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, _That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it self_, but by this alone, that ’tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the _subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_ or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call _corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_ wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as _understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_; And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_, or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or _different_. OBJECT. III. * _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me?_ Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am distinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me (tho’ not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_ (as before is noted.) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who _understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight sees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble _Des-Cartes_. ANSWER. I do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_, as a _thing_ is _distinguish’d_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when I ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I understand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention’d, and not of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be separated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_ of _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of _doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined. OBJECT. IV. * _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is._ There is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having an _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a _Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But _Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that _substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by _Ratiocination_. But what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but a _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this Word _Is_? From whence ’twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_ nothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_ of _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the _Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we have made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may be) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_, and perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal Parts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of an _Organical Body_. ANSWER. I have here Explain’d the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer _Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_ in our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place How we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure. There is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of _Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_ could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho they use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is _Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same Right that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases. OBJECT. V. _Against the Third Meditation of God._ * _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God._ When I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and _Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_ or not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not. But thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the _Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_ with _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and therefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we Impose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things. In the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or _Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any _Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable. Whereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born blind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be _Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing it called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of what _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or _Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_. So Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_ or _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he is brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal Cause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other _Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that ’tis _necessary_ that some _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call the _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name _God_. But now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea of God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have explain’d this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced not only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World. ANSWER. Here the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood for the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_ Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is immediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_, because at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this very _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon’d by me among the number of _Ideas_; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the _Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in _God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by. And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the _Idea_ of _God_ for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them. Lastly, what is here added concerning the _Creation_ of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand. OBJECT. VI. * _But there are Other (~Thoughts~) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements._ When any one _Fears_ or _Wills_, he has certainly the _Image_ of the _Thing Fear’d_, or _Action Will’d_, but what more a _Willing_ or _Fearing_ Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho _Fear_ be a _Thought_, yet I see not how it can be any other then the _Thought_ of the _Thing Fear’d_; For what is the _Fear_ of a _Lion rushing on me_, but the _Idea_ of a Lion Rushing on me, and the _Effect_ (which that _Idea_ produces in the _Heart_) whereby the Man _Fearing_ is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of _Flying_ is not _Thought_, it remains therefore that in _Fear_ there is no other _Thought_, but that which consists in the _likeness_ of the thing. And the same may be said of _Will_. Moreover _Affirmation_ and _Negation_ are not without a _voice_ and _words_, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither _affirme_ or _deny_ not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we _affirme_ that a Man runs, we have not a _thought_ different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; _Affirmation_ therefore or _Negation_ superadds nothing to _meer thoughts_, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the _names_ of which an _Affirmation_ consists are (to the Person _affirming_) the _Names_ of the _same thing_; and this is not to comprehend in the _thought_ more then the _likeness_ of the _thing_, but it is only comprehending the same _likeness twice_. ANSWER. ’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to _see_ a Lion and at the same time to _fear_ him, and an other thing _only_ to _see_ him. So ’tis one thing to _see_ a Man Running, and an other thing to _Affirme_ within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I _see_ him. But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer. OBJECT. VII. * _Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self._ If there be no _Idea_ of _God_, as it seems there is _not_ (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the _Idea_ of _my self_ (if I respect the _Body_) it proceeds from _Sight_, but (if the _Soul_) there is no _Idea_ of a _Soul_, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it _Animal Motion_, by which it _perceives_ and _moves_, and this (whatever it be) without any _Idea_ we call a _Soul_. ANSWER. If there be an _Idea_ of _God_ (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole _Objection_ falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, _That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination_, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no _Image_ thereof represented in the _Phantasie_, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an _Idea_. OBJECT. VIII. * _An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers, that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions._ At the same time we can certainly have but one _Idea_ of the Sun, whether it be look’d at by our eyes, or collected by _Ratiocination_ to be much bigger than it seems; for this last is not an _Idea_ of the Sun, but a proof by Arguments, that the _Idea_ of the _Sun_ would be much larger, if it were look’d at nigher. But at different or several times the _Ideas_ of the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do not make the _Idea_ of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us that the _sensible Idea_ thereof is _false_. ANSWER. Here also (as before) what he says is not the _Idea_ of the Sun, and yet is described, is that very thing which I call the _Idea_. OBJECT. IX. * _For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more objective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited._ I have before often noted that there can be no _Idea_ of _God_ or the _Mind_: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an _Idea_ of _Substance_. For _Substance_ (Which is only _Matter Subject_ to _Accidents_ and _Changes_) is _Collected_ only by _Reasoning_, but it is not at all _Conceived_, neither does it _represent_ to us any _Idea_. And if this be true, How can it be said, _That those Ideas which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More Objective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents_? Besides, Let _Des-Cartes_ again Consider what he means by ~More Reality~? Can _Reality_ be increas’d or diminish’d? Or does he think that One _Thing_ can be _More A Thing_ then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can be Explain’d to our Understandings with that _Perspicuity_ or Clearness which is requisite in all _Demonstrations_, and Which He Himself is used to present us with upon other Occasions. ANSWER. I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is _evidenc’d_ by _Reason_, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is Called by Me an _Idea_. And I have sufficiently explain’d How _Reality_ may be _Encreas’d_ or _Diminish’d_, in the same manner (to wit) as _Substance_ is _More_ a _Thing_, then A _Mode_; and if there be any such things as _Real Qualities_, or _Incomplete Substances_, these are _More Things_ then _Modes_, and _Less Things_ then _Complete Substances_: and Lastly if there be an _Infinite Independent Substance_ this is _More_ a _Thing_, then a _Finite, Dependent Substance_. And all this is self-evident. OBJECT. X. * _Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must Conclude there is a God._ Considering the _Attributes_ of _God_, that from thence we may gather an _Idea_ of _God_, and that we may enquire whether there be not something in that _Idea_ which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the _Venerable name_ of _God_ proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other _Original_ then from _Outward Objects_. For by the Name of _God_ I understand a ~Substance~, that is, I understand that _God_ Exists (not by an _Idea_, but by Reasoning) ~Infinite~ (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an _Idea_ of _Gods Infinity_ but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the Word _Infinite_. ~Independent~, That is, I do not conceive any _Cause_ from which _God_ may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no other _Idea_ at the word _Independent_, but the memory of my own _Ideas_ which at Different Times have _Different Beginnings_, and Consequently they must be _Dependent_. Wherefore, to say that God is _Independent_, is only to say That _God_ is in the Number of those things, the _Original_ whereof I do not Imagine: and so to say that _God_ is _Infinite_, is the same as if we say That He is in the Number of Those Things whose _Bounds_ we do not Conceive: And thus any _Idea_ of _God_ is Exploded, for What _Idea_ can we have without _Beginning_ or _Ending_? ~Omniscient~ or Understanding all things, Here _I_ desire to know, by what _Idea_, _Des-Cartes_ understands _Gods Understanding_? ~Almighty~, I desire also to know by What _Idea Gods Power_ is _understood_? For _Power_ is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For my Part, I understand _Power_ from the Image or Memory of past Actions, arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was _able_ (or had _Power_) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have _Power_ to do so. But now all these are _Ideas_ that may arise from _external Objects_. ~Creatour~ of all things, _I_ can frame an _Image_ of _Creation_ from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other _Idea_ then this no man can have at the word _Creatour_; But the _Possibility_ of _Imagining_ a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world _was created_. And therefore tho it were _Demonstrated_ that some _Infinite Independent Almighty Being_ did _exist_, yet it will not from thence follow that a _Creatour exists_; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we _believe_ that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world _was Created_ thereby. Moreover when he says, that the _Idea_ of _God_, and of our _Soul_ is _Innate_ or _born in us_, I would fain know, whether the _Souls_ of those that _sleep soundly_ do _think_ unless they _dream_; If not, then at that time they have no _Ideas_, and consequently no _Idea_ is _Innate_, for what is _Innate_ to us is never _Absent_ from us. ANSWER. None of _Gods_ Attributes can proceed from _outward objects_ as from a _Pattern_, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in _External_, that is, _Corporeal_ things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever we think of in him _differing_ or _unlike_ what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cause of that very _diversity_ in our Thought. And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces _Gods Understanding_ from _outward Things_, and yet I can easily explain what _Idea_ I have thereof, by saying, that by the _Idea_ of _Gods Understanding_ I conceive whatever is the _Form_ of any _Perception_; For who is there that does not perceive that he _understands_ something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an _Idea_ of _understanding_, and by enlarging it _Indefinitely_ he forms the _Idea_ of _Gods Understanding_. And so of his other Attributes. And seeing we have made use of that _Idea_ of _God_ which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this _Idea_ such an _Immense Power_, that we conceive it a contradiction for _God_ to _Exist_, and yet that any thing should _Be_ besides Him, which was not _Created_ by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from _God_, were _Created_ by God. Lastly when we assert, that some _Ideas_ are _Innate_ or _natural_ to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no _Idea_ would be _Innate_) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of producing them. OBJECT. XI. * _The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, ~viz~, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind._ Wherefore seeing ’tis not _demonstrated_ that we have an _Idea_ of _God_, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that _God_ is _Inconceivable_, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an _Idea_ of Him, it follows, that the _Existence_ of _God_ is not demonstrated, much less _the Creation_. ANSWER. When _God_ is said to be _Inconceiveable_ ’tis understood of an _Adequate full conception_. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an _Idea_ of _God_. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my _demonstration_. OBJECT. XII. _Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood._ * _By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God._ ’Tis Certain that _Ignorance_ is only a _Defect_, and that there is no Occasion of any _Positive Faculty_ to make us _Ignorant_. But this position is not so clear in Relation to _Error_, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot _Err_, for this Reason only, because they have not the _Faculties_ of _Reasoning_ or _Imagination_; from whence ’tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Judging_, or at least of _Imagining_, both which _Faculties_ are _Positive_, and given to all _Creatures_ subject to Error, and to Them only. Moreover _Des-Cartes_ says thus, _I find_ (my Errors) _to Depend on two concurring Causes_, viz. _on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will_. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that _Freedom of Will_ is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists. ANSWER. Tho to make us _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Reasoning_ (or rather of _Judging_, that is, of _Affirming_ and _Denying_) because _Error_ is the _Defect_ thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that this _Defect_ is any thing _Real_, for neither is _Blindness_ a _Real_ Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be _Blind_, for this Reason only, That they are _incapable of sight_. And I much wonder that in all these _Objections_ I have not found one _Right Inference_. I have not here assumed any thing concerning the _Freedom_ of _Mans Will_, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position. Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting _Gods predisposal_ of Things cannot Comprehend, How their _Freedom_ of _Will_ Consists there-with, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be _Willing_, and to be _Free_. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter. OBJECT. XIII. * _As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto._ This expression, _Great Light in the Understanding_, is _Metaphorical_, and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a _Light_, and has no less a _Propension_ in his _Will_ to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that _really_ and _truely_ knows a Thing. Wherefore this _Light_ may be the cause of _Defending_ and _Holding_ an Opinion _Obstinately_, but never of _knowing_ an Opinion _Truly_. Moreover not only the _Knowledge_ of _Truth_, but _Belief_ or _Giving Assent_, are not the _Acts_ of the _Will_; for Whatever is _proved_ by _strong Arguments_, or _Credibly_ told, we Believe whether we will or no. ’Tis true, To _Affirm_ or _Deny_ Propositions, to _Defend_ or _Oppose_ Propositions, are the _Acts_ of the _Will_; but it does not from thence Follow that the _Internal Assent_ depends on the _Will_. Wherefore the following Conclusion (_so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error_) is not fully Demonstrated. ANSWER. ’Tis not much _matter_, Whether this expression, _Great Light_, be _Argumentative_ or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by _light in the understanding_ is meant _clearness_ of _knowledge_, which every one has not, that _thinks_ he has; and this hinders not but this _light_ in the _Understanding_ may be very different from an _obstinate Opinion_ taken up without _clear perception_. But when ’tis here said, _That we assent to things clearly perceived whether we will or no_, ’tis the same, as if it were said, _that willing or nilling, we desire Good clearly known_; whereas the word _Nilling_, finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill the same thing. OBJECT XIV. _Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things._ * _As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle._ If a Triangle be _no where_, I understand not how it can have _any Nature_, for what is _no where_, is not, and therefore has not a _Being_, or any _Nature_. A Triangle in the _Mind_ arises from a Triangle _seen_, or from one made up of what has been _seen_, but when once we have given the name of a _Triangle_ to a thing (from which we think the _Idea_ of a _Triangle_ arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the _name_ continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, _That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones_, and when we have given this other name (viz. _Having its three Angles equal to two right ones_) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the _Name_ would still continue, and this Proposition, _A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones_, would be _eternally true_. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy’d. This Proposition likewise, _A Man is an Animal_, will be _true_ to _Eternity_, because the Word _Animal_ will eternally signifie what the Word _Man_ signifies; but certainly if _Mankind_ perish, _Humane Nature_ will be no longer. From whence ’tis Manifest, That _Essence_ as ’tis distinguish’d from _Existence_ is nothing more than the _Copulation_ of _Names_ by this word _Is_, and therefore _Essence_ without _Existence_ is meerly a _Fiction_ of our own; and as the _Image_ of a _Man_ in the _Mind_ is to a _Man_, so it seems _Essence_ is to _Existence_. Or as this Proposition _Socrates is a Man_, is to this, _Socrates Is or Exists_, so is the _Essence_ of _Socrates_ to his Existence. Now this Proposition, _Socrates is a Man_, when _Socrates_ does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word _Is_ carries under it the _Image_ of the _unity_ of the thing, which is called by these _Two Names_. ANSWER. The Difference between _Essence_ and _Existence_ is known to all Men. And what is here said of _Eternal Names_ instead of _Eternal Truth_, has been long ago sufficiently rejected. OBJECT. XV. _Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings._ * _And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings exist._ ’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the _fault_ of _Deceit_ does not consist in the _falsity_ of _Words_; but in the _Injury_ done to the Person deceived. Let _D. Cartes_ therefore consider whether this Proposition, _God can upon no account deceive us_, Universally taken be _true_; For if it be not _true_ so universally taken, that Conclusion, _Therefore Corporeal Beings exist_, will not follow. ANSWER. ’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, _That we cannot be deceived on any account_ (for I willingly granted, that we may be _often_ deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our _Error_ argues that in _God_ there is such a _Will_ to _Cheat_ us as would be _contradictious_ to his _Nature_. And here again we have a _wrong inference_ in this _Objection_. The Last Objection. * _For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (~that is sleep and waking~) for my Dreams are never conjoyn’d by my Memory, with the other Actions of my Life._ I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man _dreaming_, that the _doubts_ whether he _dream or not_, may not _Dream_, that he joyns his _Dream_ to the _Ideas_ of things past long since; if he may, than those _Actions_ of his past life, may be thought as _true_ if he were awake. Moreover because (as _D. Cartes_ affirms) the _Certainty_ and _truth_ of all _knowledge_ depends only on the _knowledge_ of the _True God_, either an Atheist cannot from the _Memory_ of his past life conclude that he is _awake_, or else ’tis possible for a man to know that he is _awake_ without the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_. ANSWER. A Man that _dreams_ cannot _really_ connect his _dreams_ with the _Ideas_ of past things, tho, I confess, he may _dream_ that he so connects them; for whoever deny’d That a man when he is _a sleep_ may be _Deceived_? But when he awakens he may easily discover his Error. An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake, but he cannot know, that this _Sign_ is sufficient to make him _certain_, that he is not _deceived_, unless he know that he is _created_ by a _God_ that will not _deceive_ him. FINIS. _A Catalogue of some Books sold by ~Benjamin Took~ at the Ship in St. ~Pauls~ Church-yard._ _Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri novem ejusdem narratio de vita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto accesserunt huic Edition Chronologia Historia, & Tabula Geographica Herodotææ, necnon variantes Lectiones & notæ ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis scriptoribus collectæ._ fol. _Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Grau. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in decem libros distributus._ fol. _Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controversias Ecclesiæ._ fol. The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by _N. Causin_, translated by Sir _T. H._ the fourth Edition. _fol._ The Works of the most Reverend _John Bramhal_, D. D. late L. Archbishop of _Armagh_, some of which never before printed, with the life of the Author, _&c._ _fol._ The History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all Calumnies and Censures in several Treatises. _folio._ A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of _Ireland_, with Notes in the Margin. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty that now is, to the dissolution of the Parliament, _Aug. 7. 1666_. Several Chyrurgical Treatises by _Rich. Wiseman_, Serjeant Chyrurgion. _folio._ The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according to the light of Nature, written by Sir _M. Hale_, Kt. late Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. _folio._ _Sir Rich. Baker_’s Chronicle of the Kings of _England_ from the Romans Government to this time. Thirty five Sermons by the Right Reverend _R. Sanderson_ late Lord Bishop of _Lincoln_. _Le Beau Pledeur_, a Book of Entries containing Declarations, Informations, and other select and approved Pleadings; with special Verdicts and Demurrers in most actions real, personal, and mixt, which have been argued and adjudged in the Courts of _Westminster_, with faithfull references to the most authentick Law Books, by Sir _Humphry Winch_, Kt. sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas, _fol._ _Etymologicon Linguæ Anglicanæ; seu explicatio vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque distinctas Classes digesta. Authore Step. Skinner, M.D._ folio. A large Dictionary in three Parts by _Tho. Holyoake_ D.D. _folio._ _Horæ Hebraicæ & Talmudicæ impensæ in Evangelium S. Johannis._ p. I. Lightfoot. quarto. Doctor _Browns_ Travels in _Hungaria_, _Servia_, _Bulgaria_, _Macedonia_, &c. As also through a great part of _Germany_, with Observations on the Mines, Baths, and mineral Waters in those Parts, illustrated with the Figures of some habits and remarkable places. _quarto._ A Representation of the State of Christianity in _England_, and of its Decay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papists. The Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversie, concerning the pretended authority of Popes and true Soveraign of Kings, in 16 Letters. _quarto._ A True Widow, a Comedy written by _T. Shadwel_. _quarto._ A Vindication of the sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of Obedience to Sovereigns, opposed to the Doctrine of Rebellion authorised and practised by the Pope and the Jesuites, by _Peter Du Moulin_. _quarto._ _Phocæna_, or the Anatomy of a Porpess dissected at _Gresham_ Colledge, with a Preliminary discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of Animals. _quar._ _Dodwells_ separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised by the present Nonconformists proved Schismatical from such principles as are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of Schism. _quarto._ —Two Letters of Advice. 1. For the susception of Holy Orders. 2. For Studies Theological, especially such as are rational; at the end of the former is inserted a Catalogue of the Christian Writers, and genuine works of the first three Centuries. _octavo._ —Some Considerations of present Concernment; how far Romanists may be trusted by Princes of another Perswasion. _octavo._ —Two short Discourses against the Romanists 1. An Account of the fundamental Principle of Popery. 2. An Answer to six Queries. _twelves._ Navigation and Commerce their Original and Progress, containing a succinct account of Traffick in general, by _John Evelin_, Esq; _octavo._ Of Gifts and Offices in the publick Worship of God, in three parts, endeavouring an impartial account, what was in the inspired Age of the Church, what succeeded in the more ordinary State; what reasonably may be allowed in Prayer, singing, and preaching, by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D. _octavo._ The Catechism of the Church of _England_ with marginal Notes, very plainly setting forth its meaning, and proving the same out of the Scriptures, for the use of Schools by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D. Poems and Songs by _Tho. Flatman_. _octa._ Poems by _N. Tate_. _octavo._ The Degrees of Consanguinity affinity described and delineated, by _Robert Dixon_, D.D. in _octavo_. The French Gardiner instructing how to cultivate all sorts of Fruit Trees and Herbs for the Garden, together with instructions to dry and conserve them, written in French, and Englished by _Jo. Evelin_, Esq; in _octavo_. _Ataxiæ Obstaculum_; being an Answer to several Queries dispersed in several parts of _Glocestershire_ in _octavo_. _S. Gardinerus S. T. P. de Trinitate contra Sandium_, in octavo. _Deus Nobiscum._ A Narrative of a great Deliverance at Sea, by _W. Johnson_, D.D. _Phædri Augusti Cæsaris Liberti Fabularum Esopiarum Libri V. in usum scholarum Anglæ._ octavo. A Short View of the chief points in Controversie between the Reformed Churches, and the Church of _Rome_, by Dr. _Peter Du Moulin_. in _octavo_. The Country Parsons advice to his Parishioners in two Parts. 1. Containing a plain and serious Exhortation to a Religious Life. 2. General Directions how to live accordingly. in _octavo_. FINIS.